ML20133D960

Summary Rept for Evaluation of Pipe Supports for Pressurizer Safety & Relief Line

ML20133D960
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	08/15/1985
From:	Bartholomew G, Dickerson B, Dykstra P FLUOR CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20133D879	List: ML20133D876 ML20133D913 ML20133D941 ML20133D960
References
NUDOCS 8510090227
Download: ML20133D960 (27)

Text

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FLUOR ENGINEERS,INC.

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Northern States Power Company Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 Project: 21-7450-287 Activity 000287 g

SUMMARY

REPORT FOR THE EVALUATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS FOR THE PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF LINE fh8'R S0YkSMA N0 '$ 'dl]Civ ..s y ,'///

Prepared byi@f Reviewed Yhbh6 .

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/ Approved tysgs" QA/0C Approval,1i, . Jg'-

Revised Reviewed Rev. Date By By Pages Affected Remarks Approved 0A/0C

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TABLE OF CONTENTS OR IND_EX Page I INTRODUCTION................................. 1 II DISCUSSIONS.................................. 2 III CONCLUSION................................... 11 IV REFERENCES................................... 11 APPENDIX A - Isometric drawings for Unit #1 APPENDIX 8 - Isometric drawings for Unit #2 APPENDIX C - Tables from EPRI guidelines (Reference C) acceptance criteria.

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o d 'o y PLUOR ENGINEERS,INC. Page 1 I INTRODUCTION "Under US NRC NUREG 0737,Section II.D.1, " Performance Testing of BWR and PWR Relief and Safety Valves," all operating plant licensees and applicants are required to conduct testing to qualify the reactor coolant system relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions during design basis transients and accidents. In addition to the qualification of valves, the functionability and structural integrity of the as-built discharge piping and supports must be demonstrated on a plant specific basis."

"In response to these requirements, a program for the performance l

testing of PWR safety and relief valves was formulated by the Electric Power Research Institute. The primary objective to the test program was to provide full scale test data confirming the functionability of reactor coolant system power operated relief valves and spring loaded safety valves for expected operating and accident conditions. The second objective was to obtain suffi-cient piping thermal hydraulic load data to permit confirmation of the accuracy of computer codes and analytical methods which might be utilized for plant unique analyses of safety relief valve discharge piping system."

,~ s k FLUOR ENGINE 2RS.lNC. age 2 The opening paragraphs of Reference A, given above, serve as a fitting introduction to the subject of this report. References A

& B Summarize both the results of and the analytical methods used i in the thermal hydraulic analysis and structural evaluation of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 and 2 pressurizer safety and relief valves discharge piping system.

This report demonstrates, in sumary form, the structural integrity of the modified pipe support system based on the revised loading conditions as documented by the Westinghouse analyses.

II DISCUSSIONS In general, the pressurizer RV/SV discharge lines for each unit were analyzed from the pressurizer nozzles to the pressurizer relief tank. These analyses are summarized in references A and

8. As a result of the new loading conditions documented, every support on these lines were analyzed and modified where neces-sary, to assure that the -loadings are properly carried into the building structure.

Support relative locations and piping configurations for Units 1 and 2 are indicated on the isometrics drawings included in Appendix A and B respectively. As indicated on these drawings:

Unit #1 has only one variable spring hanger upstream of the relief valves and no hangers upstream of the safety valves; whereas Unit #2 has no hangers up stream of the safety valves or

C O e y Ft UOR ENGINEERS.INC. Page 3 the relief valves. Therefore, with the exception of the one variable spring hanger upstream of the relief valve in Unit #1, Table 2A of EPRI's guidelines (Reference C) applies for all i

hangers and supports for these lines. Loading combinations as i

specified in this table (and table 1 for the variable spring in Unit #1) were used to determine the maximum loading condition at

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each support. \

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The supports were then evaluated in accordance with the criteria of the USAR (Reference D) and NSP's commitments based on their response to IE bulletin 79-02 (Reference E). For cases where a new pipe support was required, the maximum loading combination was increased to determine the design load. For existing supports, the maximum loading combination was not increased and therefore is the same as the design load. The design loads were i

then used in the evaluation of the pipe support. The resulting stress and loading conditions calculated on the pipe support components were then compared to normal catalog load ratings and/or allowable stresses (Equivalent to the allowables of service stress limit A and B).

Tables 1 through 6 list the maximum calculated loads and the design loads for each support. Note that in some cases, load ratings equivalent to service stress limit C were used on the snubbers components to evaluate the faulted and emergency condi-tions.

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, o o V FLUOR ENGINEERS. INC. Page 4 Also it should be noted that there is a variation in the margin between maximum load combination and design load. Design loads were used in the support evaluation and in the evaluation of applied loads on the structure. They do not always represent the capacity of the support. In many cases the supports are capable of withstanding much higher loads. Such a maximum capacity would have to be based on the maximum capacity of the weakest component in the support assembly. Therefore, the maximum capacity of the support was not calculated nor documented in this report.

Variable Springs The maximum loads were calculated on the basis of normal loads (dead weight plus thermal expansion) from the pressurizer SV/RV discharge line pipe stress analysis. Variations in load due to dynamic loading conditions are negligible for the variable spring supports and hangers. See Summary Table 1 for Unit #1 and Table 4 for Unit #2.

Rigid Supports The maximum loads were calculated on basis of the load combinations i from Table 2A (See Apprndix C).

See Summary Table 2 for Unit #1 and Table 5 for Unit #2.

Snubbers See summary Table 3 for Unit #1 and summary Table 6 for Unit #2.

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k FLUOR ENGINEZRS,INC. Page 5 TABLE 1 UNIT #1 PRESSURIZER SV/RV DISCHARGE LINE VARIABLE SPRING HANGERS Analysis Maximum Design Mark No; Pt. No. Loading Combination load 1-RCRH-25 460 - 1,410# - 1 ,410#

1-RCRH-29 275 - 2,936# - 2,936#

1-RCRH-31 185 -

971# -

971#

1-RCRH-33 1340 -

842# -

842#

l-RCRH-35 1525 -

453 -

453#

Notes:

1. For Support locations see isometrics in Appendix A.

I

+ ~ s Page 6 k FLUOR ENGINEERS im TABLE 2 UNIT #1 PRESSURIZER SV/RV DISCHARGE LINE RIGIO SUPPORTS MARK ANALYSIS MAXIMUM LOADING DESIGN NO. PT. NO. COMBINATION LOAD l-RCRH-28 290 + 1,965# + 1,965#

767# - 767#

1-RCRH-28 291 + 1,079# + 1,079#

- 2,492# - 2,492#

l-RCRH-30 250 + 1,570# + 1,570#

515#

l-RCRH-32' 185 + 2,343# +

- 3,300#

1-RCRH-45 490 + 9,988# + 9,988#

l-RCRH-46 400 + 24,867# + 24,867#

- 17,769#

- 17,769#

l-RCRH-49 135 + 14,374# + 16,198#

NOTES:

1. For support locations see isometrics drawing in Appendix A.

2. For load combinations see Table 2A in Appendix C.

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jf FLUOR ENGINEERS.lNC. age 7 TABLE 3 UNIT #1 PRESSURIZER SV/RV DISCHARGE LINE SNUBBERS MARK ANALYSIS MAXIMUM LOADING DESIGN LOAD NO. PT. N0. COMBINATION PER SNUBBER .PER SNUBBER

, 1-RCRH-27 330 1 2,793# 1 5,000#

1-RCRH-34 1345 1 2,059# 1 2,450#

l-RCRH-47 310 1 26,986# 1 30,000#*

l-RCRH-48 210 1 27,195# 1 30,000#*

l-RCRH-51 470 1 5,070# 1 6,600#

l-RCRH-52 485 1 3,292# 1 5,900#

NOTES:

1. For support location see isometrics drawing in Appendix A.

2. For load combinations see Table 2A in Appendix C.

3.

• Indicates that Level C load level, for snubber only, was used to evaluate emergency and Faulted load combinations.

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)f R.UOR ENGINEERS,INC. Page.8 TABLE 4

• UNIT #2 PRESSURIZER SV/RV DISCHARGE LINE VARIABLE SPRING HANGERS Maximum Loading Mark No. Analysis Pt. Nos. Combination Design Load 2-RCRH-21 1765 -

444# -

500#

2-RCRH-23 1662 - 1,398# - 1398#

2-RCRH-27 1360 - 1,873# - 1873#

2-RCRH-28 1240 - 1,256# - 1256#

2-RCRH-30 3310 -

939# - 939#

NOTE:

1. For support locations see isometrics drawing in Appendix B.

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)f R.UOR ENGINEZRS,INC. Page 9 TABLE 5 UNIT #2 PRESSURIZER SV/RV DISCHARGE LINE

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RIGIO SUPPORTS Maximum Loading Mark No. Analysis Pt. No. Combination Design Load 2-RCRH-25 1530 1 4,068# 1 4,068#

2-RCRH-25 1530 1 3,718# 1 3,718#

2-RCRH-26 1460 1 8,326# 1 9,750#

2-RCRH-29 3390 1 2,555# 1 3,00d#

2-RCRH-41 1885 1 20,432# 1 22,800#

2-RCRH-44 1630 1 15,900# 1 19,350#

2-RCRH-48 1305 1 9,620# 1 11,900#

2-RCRH-49 1250 1 6,321# 1 9,750#

2-RCRH-60 1509 1 4,398# 1 6,000#

2-RCRH-61 515 1 5,868# 1 8,000#

NOTES:

1. For support locations see isometrics drawings in Appendix B.

2. For load combinations see Table 2A in Appendix C.

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i n . s y N ENGIN5ERS,INC. Paga 10 TABLE 6 UNIT #2 PRESSURIZER SV/RV DISCHARGE LINE SNUBBERS Maximum Loading Mark No. Analysis Pt. No. Combination Design Load 2-RCRH-31 3300 1 646# + 775#

2-RCRH-42 1665 112,953# + 13,600#

- 15,600#

2-RCRH-45 1570 128,375# *1 34,000#

2-RCRH-47 1380 1 7,833# 1 9,400#

, NOTES:

1. For support location see isometrics drawing in Appendix B.

2. For load combination see Table 2A in Appendix C.

3.

• Indicates that Level C load level, for snubbers only, was used to evaluate emergency and faulted load combinations, i

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FLUOR ENGINEZRS. INC. Page 11 III CONCLUSION The structural integrity of the modified pipe support systems for the Unit # 1 and 2 pressurizer RV/SV Discharge Line has been ensured for all applicable loadings and load combinations includ-ing all pertinent safety and relief valve discharge cases.

IV REFERENCES A. " Pressurizer Safety and Relief Line Evaluation, Summary Report, Northern States Power Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Stations, Unit #1; L.M. Valasek, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, February 1984.

B. " Pressurizer Safety and Relief Line Evaluation, Summary Report, Northern States Power Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit #2; L. M. Valasek, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, February 1984.

C. "EPRI PWR Safety and relief valve test program, guide for application of valve test program results to plant specific evaluations", Revision 1, March 1982.

D. Updated Safety Analysis Report for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Revision 1, 12/82.

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• f PLUOR ENGINEZRS,INC. Page 12 E. " Pipe support base plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts", IE bulletin 79-02, United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Revision 2,11/8/79.

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APPENDIX A l

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470 RCilli-51 annbber vertical 460 IICilll-25 spri ng ver tical pressurizer POTNT VAINE 530 RC-10-2 820 11C-10-1 FICIlllR 6d 11tE:13tillIZElf SAFKfY AllD REI.IEP 1.IllR STilllC'ItRIAL !!ODEI.

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)f FLUOR ENGINEERS,INC, APPENDIX C

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LOAD COMBINATIONS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR PRESSURIZER SAFETY ..

- AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING AND SUPPORTS - CLASS 1 PORTION i

Plant / System Service Stress Combination Operating Condition Load Combination Limit 1 Normal N A 2 Upset N + OBE + SOT g B 3 Emergency N + SOT C E

4 Faulted N + MS/FWPB or DBPB D

+ SSE + SOT p 5 Faulted N + LOCA + SSE + SOT p D g NOTES: 1.) Plants without an FSAR may use the proposed criteria contained in Tables 1-3.

P1Lnts with an FSAR may use their original design basis in conjunction with the appropriate system operating transient definitions in Table 3; or they may use the proposed criteria contained in Tables 1-3.

2.) See Table 3 for SOT definitions and other load abbreviations.

3.) The bounding number of valves (and discharge sequence if setpoints are signifi-cantly dif ferent) for the applicable system operating transient defined in Table 3 should be used.

4.) Verification of functional capability is not required, but allowable loads and accelerations for the safety-relief valves must be met.

5.) Use SRSS for combining dynamic load responses. g

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TABLE 2A , .l, LOAD COMBINATIONS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR PRESSURIZER SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING AND SUPPORTS - SEISMICALLY DESIGNED DOWNSTREAM PORTION i

Plant / System Service Stress Combination Operating Condition Load Combination Limit 1 Normal N A 2 Upset N + SOTg B 3 Upset N,+ OBE + SOTg C 4 Emergency N + SOT E U 5 Faulted N + MS/FWPB or DBPB D

+ SSE + SOT p -

6 Faulted N + LOCA + SSE + SOTp D NOTES: 1.) Plants without an FSAR may use the proposed criteria contained in Tables 1-3.

Plants with an FSAR may use their original design basis in conjunction with the appropriate system operating transient . definitions in Table 3; or they may use the proposed criteria contained in Tables 1-3.

2.) This table is applicable to the seismically designed portion of downstream non-Category I piping (and supports) necessary to isolate the Category I portion from the non-seismically designed piping response, and to assure acceptable valve loading on the discharge nozzle.

3.) See Table 3 for SOT definitions and other load abbreviations, w 4.) The bounding number of valves (and discharge sequence if setpoints are significantly g-different) for the applicable system operating transient defined in Table 3 should e.

be used. @

5.) Verification of functional ca;-Sility is not required, but allowable loads and p

accelerations for the safety /r. lief valves must be met.

6.) Use SRSS for combining dynamic load responses.

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TABLE 2B RIvision 1

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LOAD COMBINATIONS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR PRESSURIZER

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SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE PIPING AND SUPPORTS - ,

NON-SEISMICALLY DESIGNED DOWNSTREAM PORTION PIPING Plant / System Service Combination Operatine Condition Lead Combination Limit 1 Normal N A 2 Upset N + SOTg B 3 Emergency N + SOT E C 4 Faulted N + SOT y D l -

SUPPORTS Plant / System Service Combination Ocerating Condicion Lead Combination Limit Normal N A 1

N + SOT g P

- 2 Upset Upset N + OBE + SOTg D 3

Emergency N + SOT E C 4

Faulted N + MS/FWPB or D

5 t

DBPB + SSE + SOT F 6 Faulted N + LOCA + SSE D

' + SOT y i

NOTES: 1.) Plants without an FSAR may use the proposed criteria con-tained in Tables 1-3. Plants with an FSAR may use their original design basis in conjunction with the appropriate system operating transient definitions in Table 3; or they may use the proposed criteria contained in Tables 1-3.

2.) Pipe supports for the non-seismically designed down-stream piping should be designed for seismic load combinations to assure overall structural integrity of the system.

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3.) The bounding number of valves (and discharge sequence if setpoints are significantly different) for the applicable system operating transiant defined in Table 3 should be usec 4.) Verification of functional capability is not required,

s but allowable loads and accelerations for the safety / '

' relief valves must be met.

5.) Use SRSS for combining dynamic load responses.

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Rsvision 1 TABLE 3 b-- .

DEFINITIONS OF LOAD ABBREVIATIONS N =

Sustained Loads During Normal Plant Operation SOT =

System Operating Transient SOT g =

Relief Valve Discharge Transient II)

SOT =

Safety Valve Discharge Transient (

E SOT Max (SOT g ; SOT g ); or Transition Flow

=

F OBE =

Operating Basis Earthquake SSE =

Safe Shu'down Earthquake MS/FWPB = Main Eteam or Feedwater Pipe Break DBPB =

Design Basis Pipe Break LOCA =

Loss of Coolant Accident C. : -

(1) May also include transition flow, if determined that required operating procedures could lead to this con-dition.

(2)

Although certain transients (for example loss of load) which are l classified as a service level B conditions may actuate the safety

) valves, the extremely low probability of actual safety valve actu-

! ation may be used to justify this as a service level C condition with the limitation that the plant will be shut down for examination after an appropriate number of actuations (to be determined on a l

plant specific basis).

I L

NOTE:

Plants without an FSAR may use the proposed criteria contained in Tables 1-3. Plants with an FSAR may use their original design basis in conjunction with the

(

appropriate system operating transient definitions in L- Table 3; or they may use the proposed criteria con-

. ' tained in Tables 1-3..

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