ML20058M841
| ML20058M841 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1993 |
| From: | Mary Thompson NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058M837 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310070059 | |
| Download: ML20058M841 (175) | |
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1 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT SB0/ESU PROJECT ,
i DESIGN REPORT REVISION 2 APPROVED: MRic2/c d[te,nn4cr I- /.f73 PROJECT ENGINEEd DATE I
9310070059 DR 930923 '
ADOCK 05000282 '
PDR ,,
Rev. 2 )
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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT 1
CONTENTS l
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 CONTENTS OF DESIGN REPORT
1.3 BACKGROUND
REVIEW OF STATION BLACKOUT PROGRAM 1.3.1 Reculatory History 1.3.2 Industry Position 1.3.3 Prairie Island Plant SDecific Studies 1.4 SBO/ESU PROGRAM OBJECTIVE AND GOALS 1.S RESPONSE TO THE NRC RULE ON STATION BLACKOUT 1.6 ELECTRICAL SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE 1.7 QA PROGRAM APPLICATION 1.8 DEFINITIONS
1.9 REFERENCES
2.0 OVERVIEW
EXISTING DESIGN AND UPGRADED DESIGN 2.1 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM 2.2 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM 2.2.1 DS and D6 Diesel Generators and SuDoort l Systems 2.2.2 Safecuards Electrical System 3.0 DIESEL GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS - DESIGN AND INSTALLATION 3.1 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION 3.1.1 Diesel Encine Auxiliary Systems 3.1.2 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System 3.1.3 Electric Power Distribution. Instrumentation, and Controls '
3.1.4 Fuel Oil Storace and Transfer System 3.2 SAFETY DESIGN CLASSIFICATION 3.2.1 Diesel Encine Auxiliary Systems 3.2.2 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Systems 3.2.3 Electric Power Distribution. Instrumentation and Controls 3.2.4 Fuel Oil Storace and Transfer System i
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i Rev. 2 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT CONTENTS 3.3 SYSTEM DESIGN AND INSTALLATION 3.3.1 piesel Encine Coolina System 3.3.2 Diesel Fuel Oil System '
3.3.3 Diesel Air Startina System I 3.3.4 Diesel Lube Oil System -
3.3.5 Diesel Combustion Air and Exhaust System 3.3.6 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Systems !
3.3.7 Diesel Enaine Auxiliary Systems Picina and Eauiement Reauirements and Materials 3.3.8 Mechanical Desian and Fabrication Codes 3.3.9 Electrical Power Distribution and Switchaear l' 3.3.10 Diesel Generator Controls, Indication, and Alarms 3.3.11 Diesel Generator Operatina Description I 3.4 FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM 3.4.1 Functional Recuirements and Description l 3.4.2 Desian Reauirements 3.5 DESIGN STANDARDS 3.5.1 NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP) i 3.5.2 IEEE Standards l 3.5.3 NRC Reaulatory Guides and Bulletins !
3.5.4 NFPA Standards !
3.5.5 ANSI Standards !
3.5.6 Northern States Power Standards 1 3.5.7 Fluor Daniel Procedures I 4.0 NEW D5/D6 BUILDING 4.1 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION 4.1.1 Structures 4.1.2 Electrical / Mechanical /HVAC Buildina Supeort Systems 4.2 SAFETY DESIGN CLASSIFICATION 4.2.1 Structures 4.2.2 Buildina Succort Systems il
RGv. 2 i NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT i CONTENTS 4.3 BUILDING STRUCTURE DESIGN 4.3.1 Desian Loads 4.3.2 Structural Desian Basis 4.3.3 Construction Materials 4.3.4 Load Combinations 4.3.5 Desian and Analysis Procedures 4.3.6 Structural Acceptance Criteria 4.3.7 Structural / Architectural Fire Protection Reauirements 4.3.8 Buildina Exterior Openinas 4.4 BUILDING ELECTRICAL DESIGN i
4.4.1 Lichtina 4.4.2 Power Distribution and Loads 4.4.3 Groundina 4.4.4 Communications 4.4.5 Fire Detection 4.4.6 Security ;
4.4.7 Radiation Monitorina j 4.5 BUILDING / MECHANICAL /HVAC DESIGN 4.5.1 Fire Protection Desian 4.5.2 Plumbina/ Drains 4.5.3 Heatina, Ventilation, and Air Conditionina ,
(HVAC) 4.5.4 Station Air Reauirements 4.6 DESIGN STANDARDS 4.6.1 NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP).
4.6.2 IEEE Standards 4.6.3 Reaulations and Reculatory Guides 4.6.4 NFPA Standards 4.6.5 ANSI Standards !
4.6.6 Buildina Codes ;
Northern States Power Standards 4.6.7 4.6.8 Other Reference Documents l
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Rev. 2 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT l
CONTENTS 5.0 DIESEL GENERATOR INTERFACE AND ELECTRICAL SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE 5.1 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION 5.2 SAFETY DESIGN CLASSIFICATION 5.3 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM DESIGN 5.3.1 General Description 5.3.2 Preferred. Alternate, and Standby Power Source Conficuration 5.3.3 4160V Confiauration - Safecuards Buses 5.3.4 480V Conficuration - Safecuards Buses 5.3.S Voltace Restoration / Load Reiection/ Load Restoration I 5.3.6 Emercency Response ComDuter System 5.3.7 D5/D6 Control Scheme Tie-In With Existina I Plant .
5.3.8 Main Control Room "G" Panel Modification !
5.3.9 Detailed Desian 5.4 DESIGN STANDARDS
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5.4.1 NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP1 5.4.2 IEEE Standards l 5.4.3 Beaulatorv Guides I 5.4.4 ANSI Standards 5.4.5 Northern States Power Standards ;
5.4.6 Electrical Eauipment Plan !
5.4.7 Structural Recuirements ATTACHMENTS i
5-A Electrical Cable and Cable Tray Coding 6.0 COOLING WATER SYSTEM MODIFICATION 6.1 SYSTEM FUNCTION 6.2 121 COOLING WATER PUMP UPGRADE 7.0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR ADDITION OF DIESEL GENERATORS AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEM UPGRADE FOR PRAIRIE ISLAND UNIT 1 AND 2 7.1 SBO/ESU PROJECT CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 7.2 SBO/ESU PROJECT STARTUP ACTIVITIES 7.3 SBO/ESU PROJECT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 8.0 SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM OPERATION 8.1 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 8.2 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM OPERATION iv
R",v. 2 8.3 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 8.4 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM OPERATION f
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Rev. 2 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT CONTENTS FIGURES Figure 2-1 Original One-Line Electrical Diagram of l the Emergency AC Power System Figure 2-2 Upgraded One-Line Electrical Diagram of the Emergency AC Power System Figure 3-1 D5 HT Cooling Water System Figure 3-2 DS LT Cooling Water System Figure 3-3 D6 HT Cooling Water System Figure 3-4 D6 LT Cooling Water System Figure 3-5 D5/D6 Fuel Oil System Figure 3-6 D5 Fuel Oil System Figure 3-7 D6 Fuel Oil Systems Figure 3-8 .D5 Starting Air System Figure 3-9 D6 Starting Air System Figure 3-10 D5 Lube Oil System Figure 3-11 D6 Lube Oil System Figure 3-12 DS Combustion Air & Exhaust System Figure 3-13 D6 Combustion Air & Exhaust System Figure 4-1 Arrangement of New DS/D6 Building and CSTS 21 and 22 Figure 4-2 DS/D6 Building Ground Floor Figure 4-3 D5/D6 Building Mezzanino Floor Figure 4-4 D5/D6 Building Operating Floor Figure 4-5 D5/D6 Building Upper Deck Figure 4-6 D5/D6 Building Roof Figure 4-7 D5/D6 Building Elevation Figure 4-8 D5/D6 Building Elevation Figure 4-9 D5/D6 Building Fuel Oil Storage Vault
& Basement Figure 6-1 Cooling Water System Simplified Flow Diagram Figure 6-2 Cooling Water Screenhouse Figure 7-1 SBO/ESU Project Integrated Schedule vi
Rev. 2 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT CONTENTS ,
TABLES Table 2-A D1/D2 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading: DBA and ,
LOOP in Unit 1 Table 2-B DS/D6 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading: DBA and LOOP in Unit 2 Table 4-A Damping Factors Table 4-B Tornado Generated Missiles Table 4-C Fire Barriers Table 8-A Existing and Proposed Voltage Restoration Sequence 1
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s Rev. 2 NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT STATION BLACKOUT / ELECTRICAL SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE PROGRAM DESIGN REPORT
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade (SBO/ESU)
Design Report provides the following:
a) Background information and descriptions of the existing Prairie Island emergency power system.
b) Information and discussion on the SBO/ESU Program . hardware additions which includes two additional new emergency diesel generator sets, a new building and new electrical distribution equipment.
c) Information regarding the proposed operation of the modified emergency power system.
The introductory section provides a background review of the Station Blackout issue, the SBO/ESU Program objective and goals, and the NSP response to the NRC rule on Station Blackout, which includes a summary of the hardware modifications.
This report is being provided to the NRC to support NRC staff approval. A separate submittal containing the Safety Evaluation, proposed Technical Specification changes, and the Significant Hazards Analysis will be docketed early in 1992.
1.2 CONTENTS OF DESIGN REPORT This report contains the following sections:
Section 1.0 provides an introduction and background for the Station Blackout and Electrical Safeguards Upgrade (SBO/ESU) Program.
Section 2.0 provides an overview of the existing emergency power distribution system and an overview of the revised emergency power distribution system which includes two additional diesel generators, DS and D6, and upgraded electrical safeguards 4kV and 480V systems.
Section 3.0 discusses the design and installation of the D5 and D6 safety-related diesel generators.
Section 4.0 discusses the design and installation of the new DS/D6 1
Rev. 2 Building and support systems, and the relocation of two existing Condensate Storage Tanks that stand near the new building site.
Section 5.0 discusses the interface of the new emergency diesel generators to the electrical safeguards distribution system and the upgrade of the electrical safeguard 4kV and 480V distribution systems.
Section 6.0 discusses the repowering of the 121 Cooling Water Pump to increase the reliability of the cooling Water System.
Section 7.0 discusses the implementation plan for the addition of the diesel generators and the electrical system upgrade.
Section 8.0 discusses the operation of the existing emergency power system and of the proposed systems for Unit 1 and Unit 2.
1.3 BACKGROUND
REVIEW OF STATION BLACKOUT PROGRAM ;
I This section provides a summary of the Station Blackout Issue (SBO) from its inception in 1975 to its resolution through the efforts of the Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
1.3.1 Reculatory History 1 i
The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) issue in 1975 showed that i station blackout was a significant contributor to-the potential total risk from nuclear power plant accidents. The NRC designated station blackout as an Unresolved Safety Issue USI A-44 and issued a Task Action Plan, TAP A-44, in July 1980.
The NRC staff researched various aspects of the issue through supporting contractors, documenting the research results in various NUREG reports. This effort culminated with presentation of the NRC staff's technical findings in NUREG-1032 issued on June 15, 1985.
The NRC identified proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, Vol. 51, No. 55, March 21, 1986. The NRC proposed to amend regulation 10 CFR Part 50 by adding section 50.63 and by adding a paragraph to General Design Criteria 17, Appendix A of 10 CFR Part
- 50. These additions would require that all nuclear power plants be capable of coping with a station blackout for some specified period of time. Additionally, the NRC proposed issuance of a Regulatory Guide on Station Blackout to recommend a means for meeting the requirements of Section 50.63 of 10 CFR Part 50.
The draft Regulatory Guide was first issued for comment in March 1986. The final Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout, was issued in June 1988.
On June 21, 1988, the NRC issued the final rule on Station Blackout which endorses the approach contained in the nuclear industry i report NUMARC 87-00 as an acceptable method for meeting the 2
4 Rev. 2 requirements of the rule. This rule became effective July 21, 1988. The intent of the rule was to reduce the contribution of station blackout to the overall risk of a core meltdown.
1.3.2 Industry Position The nuclear utility industry formed a working group under NUMARC that developed a guideline for responding to the Station Blackout >
Issue. This group, the Nuclear Utility Group for Station Blackout (NUGSBO), produced a guide (NUMARC 87-00) for evaluating the probability for a plant to encounter a station blackout condition.
It also presented five initiatives for plants to use to address the more important contributors to station blackout events. This guide '
also established a method to determine the minimum required coping time for each plant to be able to maintain reactor core and NSSS systems integrity until AC power is returned.
l 1.3.3 Prairie Island Plant Specific Studies i
Two studies were completed by teams consisting of representatives from Plant Engineering, Plant Operations, Nuclear Technical Services, Nuclear Engineering and Construction, Production Plant i i Maintenance and a consultant engineer, Fluor Daniel, Inc.
The Station Blackout Coping Study was completed in September 1987.
This study showed that the Prairie Island Plant can safely respond to a Station Blackout condition of four hour coping duration as determined by the analysis required in NUMARC 87-00. This study was done based on the configuration which will exist when Prairie Island has met the NUMARC SBO Initiatives.
- The NUMARC Initiatives express relative risk by the number of hours the assumed loss of all normal sources of safeguards AC power continues. This is called the " coping duration". Plants with a less secure power supply system have to be able to cope with a blackout for a longer period of time. NUMARC's position is that if ;
l a plant's coping duration is greater than the four hour category, then improvements must be made by the Licensee until the plant is -
within the four hour coping duration category. The addition of two safeguards diesel generators is the action Prairie Island will take
- to move from an eight hour to a four hour coping category. When installation of the new diesel generators is complete, Unit 1 can provide an alternate power source for Unit 2 (and vice versa) under i blackout conditions.
l 1 A Study of the Station Blackout Issue and Addition of Safeguards l Diesel Generators, issued in September 1987 reviewed the safeguards Electrical, Auxiliary Feedwater and Reactor Coolant Pump seal injection systems plus the proposed SBO rule. It described modifications to comply with the rule and addressed issues with those systems. It also identified issues for additional study. l 2 I 3
Rev. 2 1.4 SBO/ESU PROGRAM OBJECTIVE AND GOALS ,
The primary objective of the Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards ,
Upgrade (SBO/ESU) Program for Prairie Island is to implement those plant modifications and software elements (procedures, reporting mechanisms and analyses) that will be necessary to comply with the final NRC rule on Station Blackout and remove the regulatory '
- uncertainty and negative availability factor associated with the unit's sharing of safeguards diesel generators. Implementation will be consistent with the industry position as represented in the NUMARC Initiatives and the Guidelines published in NUMARC 87-00. ,
- 1) The short term goals for SBO included:
o Respond to the SBO Rule using the NUMARC 87-00 format, within 270 days of July 21, 1988 -
Complete.
1 o Upgrade the transmission grid and offsite power restoration procedures - Complete.
o Provide interim procedures to provide alternate AC using the ;
D3 and D4 generators - Complete.
o Revise the Emergency Operating Procedures to address coping with SBO with the present plant equipment -Complete. I
- 2) The long term goals for SBO are:
1 o Achieve a four hour coping duration per NUMARC 87-00 by )
adding two new diesel generators.
. o Achieve alternate AC availability within 10 minutes or if not possible, one hour, by utilizing the safeguard diesel generators as alternate AC power for the other unit.
o Update the coping analysis to reflect the actual design for the new diesel generators, l
Additional benefits of the SBO Program include: 1
- 1) Install additional safeguards diesel generators, to:
o Reduce the regulatory uncertainty associated with sharing emergency diesel generators between units.
o Reduce the loss of onsite AC power contribution to core melt risk.
o Eliminate the two unit shutdown exposure caused by the present
, diesel generator Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO).
o Provide increased emergency on-site power margin as well as margin for future loads.
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- 2) Provide for powering of 121 Cooling Water Pump to reduce two unit shutdown exposure caused by the Cooling Water System LCO. !
- 3) Provide integrated planning, design and installation for ;
diesel generator plant interface.
l 1.5 RESPONSE To THE NRC RULE ON STATION BLACKOUT !
The formal report required by the NRC SBO Rule was submitted to the i Commission on April 13, 1989. This response was formatted in ,
accordance with guidance from NUMARC and addressed completed and future activities required to meet the NUMARC Initiatives.
For Prairie Island, the response included:
o Description of the coping category and coping duration.
o Description of completed and planned procedure revisions.
o The schedule for the addition of D5 and D6.
o Description of the alternate AC concept. In response to the NRC Rule on Station Blackout, an alternate source of AC power for the essential (safeguard) electrical equipment buses will be provided.
The addition of the alternate AC source of power will be accomplished by the following SBO Program plant modifications:
- 1. D5/D6 Diesel Generator Addition Two new diesel generators, D5 and D6, will be added to the Prairie Island Plant. These generators will serve as a dedicated source of emergency power for Unit 2 and as an alternate AC source of power for Unit 1. The existing D1 and D2 diesel generators will serve as dedicated emergency AC -
power for Unit 1 and as an alternate AC source of power for '
Unit 2. The new diesel generators will be sized to provide adequate onsite emergency power to Unit 2. Additional capacity will be provided for 121 Cooling Water Pump and possible future loads.
- 2. New Diesel Generator Building i
A new Class I building will be constructed to house DS and D6 diesel generators, support equipment, and new switchgear for Unit 2.
- 3. Plant Interface Electrical, instrument and control equipment will be installed to permit the use of DS and D6 as onsite emergency sources for Unit 2 and as alternate AC for Unit 1. The existing electrical power and control systems for D1 and D2 will be ;
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modified to facilitate their use as onsite emergency sources for Unit 1 and as alternate AC for Unit 2.
The control design will minimize the impact of the additional
, equipment on plant operations staffing requirements for an l Appendix R safe shutdown condition by centralizing local controls for diesel generator and switchgear operation. The electrical and controls design will permit the implementation of alternate AC within 10 minutes. Main control room instrumentation and controls will be human engineered to allow efficient control room operation of the diesel generators and safeguards electrical systems.
Additional switchgear will be provided to allow powering of 121 Cooling Water Pump from either Unit 2 safeguard 4kV bus.
Additional switchgear cubicles will be provided for future loads.
Plant computer monitoring of the new diesel generators and related electrical systems will be provided.
To the fullest extent possible, construction sequencing will ;
be planned to allow installation during unit operation, with minimal disruption of plant activities. Critical installation 1 interfaces will be planned to occur during planned unit refueling outages.
- 4. 121 Coolina Water Puro Uoarade l As part of the SBO project, a new 4kV switchgear power feed will be provided for 121 Cooling Water Pump. This pump is common to both units. The pump motor will be upgraded to safety related. The new switchgear will be designed to be fed from either D5 or 06 diesel generators. This upgrade will ,
increase the availability of the Cooling Water System and provide the basis to request a Technical Specification change to a Limiting Condition for Operation which presently requires shutdown of both units in the event of extended inoperability of one of the safeguards diesel-driven cooling water pumps. ;
S. Main Control Board Modification Space will be provided on the Main Control Room panels for DS !
and D6 instrumentation and controls and for additional ,
switchgear controls. An evaluation was performed to determine the information and control capability required to operate the diesels and safeguards buses, and to determine the prudence of ;
modifying G Panel versus providing space on each unit's F Panel. The evaluation considered cost, single and two unit outage time, safe operations, construction complexity and operating philosophy for the two basic options.
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Rev. 2 The option chosen was to replace G Panel. The work will be performed as part of the Plant Interface discussed above.
This will involve placing all required instrumentation and controls on a new "G" Panel.
- 6. Simulator Modification I
The plant control room simulator will be modified to reflect the addition of the D5 and D6 diesel generators. This modification will include changing the simulator software and ,
the simulator control board to include the new diesel .l generator and electrical switchgear control functions. The ,
Emergency Response Computer System Simulator (ERCSS) software will also be modified to emulate the ERCS in the plant.
i 1.6 ELECTRICAL SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE l 1
In conjunction with the SBO Program modifications listed in Section l 1.5, an upgrade of the electrical safeguards 4kV and 480V l distributions systems will also be provided. The Electrical l Safeguards Upgrade (ESU) Program will perform the following ,
modifications: )I o Replacement of 4kV safeguards buses in Unit 2 and expansion of 1 Unit 1 safeguard buses. l 1
o Replacement of 480V safeguard buses in Units 1 and 2. ,
o Provide additional 460V safeguard buses and 4kV switchgear capacity for future loads, Units 1 and 2.
o Provide 480V safeguard bus alternate feeds in Unit 1 and 2. l o Improve voltage support, principally at the 480V level, in Units 1 and 2.
I o Improve circuit coordination by eliminating subfed 480V Motor l Control Centers (MCCs) on safeguards buses, j 1.7 QA PROGRAM APPLICATION Northern States Power Company has established and is implementing -
an Operational QA Plan to govern operation and modification ]
activities of the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant. The Operational QA j Plan describes in general terms compliance with 10CFR 50, Appendix B, and has been reviewed and found to be acceptable by the NRC QA Branch. Corporate level Administrative Control Directives (N1ACDs) and Administrative Work Instructions (N1AWIs) establish the responsibilitics and requirements for implementing the requirements of the Operational QA Plan for design, procurement & construction activities. The QA program for SBO/ESU will consist of these Corporate and Department procedure requirements, supplemented by Project Procedures (PPs) and Section Work Instructions (SWI's).
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l Rev. 2 Design and selected safety related and Non-safety related procurement activities for SBO/ESU will be performed by Fluor Daniel, Inc. (FDI) using their QA program, which has been reviewed and evaluated against 10CFR 50, Appendix B by NSP. The balance of j procurement activities will be performed by NSP under their QA ,
procedures.
With regard to construction activities, contractors furnish l fabrication and construction services, while NSP will provide the QA/QC procedures and personnel, and overall construction management including procurement, site engineering and training.
Suppliers of safety related items and materials provide their own QA/QC programs, which have been evaluated by NSP or NSP's approved representatives, FDI and Nuclear Utility Procurement Issues ,
Committee (NUPIC), for compliance to 10CFR50, Appendix B. The !
diesel generator supplier, SACM of France, is required by contract through FDI to apply a QA program meeting the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B. NSP and FDI have performed three QA audits of SACM along with several surveillance trips. In addition, the NRC Vendor Inspection Branch has made inspection trips to SACM facilities. The NRC Electrical Branch has witnessed SACM's f actory acceptance run tests for the project's diesel generators.
1.8 DEFINITIONS ,
Alternate AC (AAC) Source:
An alternating current (AC) power source that is available to and '
located at or nearby a nuclear power plant and meets the following requirements; 1) is connectable to but not normally connected to the offsite or onsite emergency AC power system; 2) has minimum potential for common mode failure with offsite power or the onsite emergency AC power sources; 3) is available in a timely manner after the onset of station blackout; and; 4) has sufficient capacity and reliability for operation of all systems required for coping with Station Blackout (SBO) and for the time required to bring and maintain the plant in safe shutdown (non-design basis accident).
Component:
- A piece of equipment required to perform a specific function within .
a system.
Class 1E:
Label applied to all electrical equipment that has been seismically and environmentally qualified to support all required safety related equipment and safety system functions. (New equipment in D5/D6 Building)
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Rev. 2 Non-Class 1E:
Label applied to all electrical equipment qualified to support all non-safety related equipment and non-safety system functions.
Desian Bases: 7 Information which identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system, and component of a facility, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling '
parameters as reference bounds for design.
Encineered Safeauards Features (Safeauards):
Provisions in the plant which implement methods to retain fission products by the containment for operational and accidental releases beyond the reactor coolant boundary and limit fission product releases to minimize population exposure, prevent occurrence, or to minimize the effects of serious accidents.
Fire Protection Related:
Plant fire protection features including those which prevent fires from starting, detect, control or extinguish fires or otherwise provide fire protection for structures, systems and components in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R commitments, Safety Evaluation Reports, Technical Specifications, and other documented commitments ,
to the NRC concerning fire protection.
Functional Component:
A component in which movement must occur automatically, with or without operator action at the device location, to accomplish the nuclear safety function of the component.
Operatina Basis Earthauake (OBE):
That earthquake which, considering the regional and local geology and seismology and specific characteristics of local subsurface material, could reasonably be expected to affect the plant site during the operating life of the plant, and produce the vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public are designed to remain functional.
Safety Related Items:
Any structure, system or component that prevents or mitigates the consequences of postulated nuclear accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
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Rev. 2 Safety Related Structures:
Safety related structures are those structures whose failure might cause or increase the severity of a loss-of-coolant accident or '
result in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity which would produce radiation levels at the site boundary in excess of 1% of 10 CFR 100 limits, and those structures vital to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor. Safety related structures include those structures that are foundations or supports for or that protect those systems and components classified as safety related.
Non-Safety Related Structures:
Non-safety related structures are those structures which may or may not be important to normal reactor operation but are not essential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor and whose failure could not result in the release of radioactivity in excess of 1% of 10 CFR 100 limits.
Safety Systems:
Any systems or portions of systems which are necessary to remove heat directly from the reactor containment, circulate reactor coolant for any safety system purpose, control radioactivity released within the reactor containment, or control hydrogen in the reactor containment.
Safe Shutdown Earthauake (SSE):
An earthquake which is based upon an evaluation of the maximum earthquake potential considering the regional and local geology and seismology and specific characteristics of local subsurface material. it is that earthquake which produces the maximum vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and' components are designed to remain functional necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant boundary, the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in safe shutdown condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences and accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures. The SSE defines that earthquake which has commonly been referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake.
Safe Shutdown (Non-Desian Basis Accident (Non-DBA)):
In reference to Station Blackout (SBO), the non-DBA means bringing the plant to either Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown, since plants have the option of maintaining the RCS at normal operating or reduced temperatures.
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Rev. 2 Seismic Catecorv I A structure, system, or component designed to withstand the effects of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and remain functional because they are needed to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shutdown and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, the capability to prevent or .
mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposure comparable to 1% of the 10 CFR 100 guidelines. This category has two subsets as follows:
Seismic-Active Components which must remain operable during and or after an SSE in order to perform their safety function.
Seismic-Passive Components which must maintain structural integrity during or after an SSE in order to perform their safety function.
Non-Seismic:
Components that have no seismic requirements.
Seismic II over I: '
All non-safety-related systems and components and their supporting systems are designed to ensure that the SSE does not cause their structural failure in a manner that will result in damage to safety-related systems or components.
Sinole Failure: t An occurrence which results in the loss of capability of a component to perform its intended safety functions. Multiple f ailures resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure.
Station Blackout (10CFR50.2 SBO):
" Station Blackout" means the complete loss of alternating current (ac) electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant (ie, loss of offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of the onsite emergency ac power system). Station blackout does not ;
include the loss of available ac power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or by alternate ac sources as defined in this section (10CFR50.2) , nor does it assume a concurrent single failure or design basis accident. At single unit sites, any !
emergency ac power source (s) in excess of the number required to l meet minimum redundancy requirements (ie, single failure) for safe .
shutdown (non--DBA) is assumed to be available and may be designated i as an alternate power source (s) provided the applicable 11
1 Rov. 2 requirements are met. At multi-unit sites, where the combination '
of emergency ac power sources exceeds the minimum redundancy requirements for safe shutdown (non-DBA) of all units, the remaining emergency ac power sources may be used as alternate ac power sources provided they meet the applicable requirements. If these criteria are not met, station blackout must be assumed on all the units.
Structure:
The physical shield, foundation, or building which encloses, '
protects, and/or supports any plant system or component, or protects plant operators.
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Rev. 2 System:
A group of interdependent components required to perform a specific function.
1.9 REFERENCES
" Study of Station Blackout Issue and Addition of Safeguard Diesel ,
Genarators", Northern States Power / Fluor, R/E 86Y730, September 19 7 < .
Prairie Island Updated' Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Sections 1, 8, 10 and 14.2.
~
10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.63, Station Blackout Rule.
NUMARC-8700 " Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors", November, 1987.
" Loss of all Alternating Current Power Information Required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.63 (c) (1)", NSP letter of April 13, 1989 to NRC. !
" Project for Addition of Two Emergency Diesel Generators", NSP letter of September 29, 1989 to NRC.
Nuclear Specification for Emergency Diesel Generators D5 and D6, M- l' 870, Northern States Power Company's Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
NSP letter to the NRC: " Reply to Questions on Design Report for the ;
Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project (TAC numbers l 68588/68589)," dated July 10, 1991.
NSP letter to the NRC: " Supplemental Information on Programmable Logic Controllers for the Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project (TAC numbers 68588/68589)," dated October 21, 1991.
NRC Letter to NSP dated January 31, 1990, entitled " Safety Evaluation Related to the Emergency Diesel Generator Qualification
, Plan (TAC Nos. 68588 and 68589)"
l l
13 l
Rev. 2
2.0 OVERVIEW
EXISTING DESIGN AND UPGRADED DESIGN 2.1 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM The existing Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 diesel generators, D1 and D2, and safeguards electrical distribution system provide for emergency power in the event of loss of offsite power in order to bring both units to a safe (het) shutdown condition. This is achieved using automatic control logic and operator actions. Each diesel generator, as a backup to the preferred offsite A-C power supply, is capable of sequentially starting and supplying the power requirements of one complete set of engineered safety features for r one unit while providing power to allow the second unit to be placed in a safe shutdown condition.
See Figure 2-1 for the existing one-line electrical diagram of the Emergency AC Power System.
o l Diesel generators, D1 and D2, consist of two Fairbanks Morse units each rated at 2750kW continuous (8750 hr. basis) , 0.8 power factor, ;
900 rpm., 4160-volt, 3-phase, 60 Hertz. The 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of each diesel generator is 3000 kilowatts and the 30 minute rating is i 3250 kilowatts maximum. This figure is based on cooling water at !
a maximum temperature of 95'F and ambient air at a temperature of !
90*F. The limitations imposed by the generator and the heat !
removal equipment limits the overall 30 minute rating of the system !
to 3250 kilowatts. Subsequent to the addition of D5 and D6, the worse case plant loads placed on emergency diesel generators D1 or D2 are during a Unit 1 design basis accident (requiring safety ,
injection in conjunction with loss of offsite power (LOOP) plus a ,
failure of one. EDG). This results in approximately 2360kW for the !
automatically and manually connceted loads within the first hour, ,
and decreasing to less than 1460kW for the duration of the accident. See Table 2-A for the presently evaluated D1 and D2 loads for the above scenario. ,
Each diesel engine is automatically started by compressed air stored at a pressure of approximately 250 psi. Two parallel solenoid admission valves deliver air simultaneously to a timed pilot air-distributor valve and an individual air-start valve ;
located in each of the twelve cylinders. Starting air is thus l admitted directly into the cylinders for fast, reliable cranking ;
and starting. Adequate cranking effort is obtained with only six l 3
air valves. The additional six valves give increased starting l reliability. ;
t Each diesel generator has its own independent air starting system '
including motor-driven air compressors, (powered from a 480-volt safeguards bus) and receiving tanks, each of sufficient capacity to -
] crank the engine for 20 seconds. ,
To enhance rapid start-up, each diesel unit is equipped with two !
temperature-controlled immersion heaters which furnish heat to the j i engine cooling water and the engine lubricating oil when the engine
~
14 s
A 1J-L .h ---4 -e-- w --.4"--J- - . *Je ---# s +.e l
Rev. 2 l
is shutdown. Two motor-driven circulating pumps, for cooling water i and lube oil, operate continuously when the engine is shutdown. ]
Automatic starting of each diesel generator (D1 and D2) is initiated by an under voltage or sustained degraded voltage relay scheme (either of 2 sets of 1 plus 1-out-of-2) on the 4160-volt bus ;
to which the diesel generator is connected. Automatic starting is !
also initiated by a Safety Injection (SI) signal. l l
Sufficient fuel is stored in the day tank for each diesel generator !
for a minimum of one hour operation at full load. Fuel from interconnected storage tanks is transferred to the day tanks by electric pumps for operation of each diesel.
I 2.2 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM The upgraded safeguards auxiliary power system includes the ;
, construction and installation of two new diesel generators, D5 and D6, with all support systems. The support systems include fuel oil, starting air, ventilation, cooling water, diesel oil storage i tanks located in a vault, and transfer pumps located in the D5/D6 i i
building, 4160V and 480V switchgear buses, 480V Motor Control Centers (MCC), 125V DC distribution panels, load sequencers, l lighting distribution panels, transformers, cabling and numerous l components necessary for modifying the existing equipment. See i Figure 2-2 for an upgraded one-line electrical diagram of the l emergency AC power system. l 2.2.1 D5 and D6 Diesel Generators and Succort Systers i
The new diesel generators will consist of two tandem-drive units manufactured by Societe Alsacienne de Constructions Mecaniques de Mulhouse (SACM), located in Mulhouse, France. Each diesel generator consists of one generator driven by two diesel engines, >
with one mounted on each end of the generator in a back-to-back .
arrangement. Each diesel generator is rated at 5400 kW continuous j (8750 hr. basis), 0.8 power factor, 1200 rpm, 4160-volt, 3-phase, 60 Hertz. The worse case plant loads placed on D5 or D6 are during i a Unit 2 design basis accident (requiring a safety injection in ;
conjunction with a Loop, plus the failure of one EDG) . This results i in approximately 3350 kW for the automatically and manually !
connected loads within the first hour, and decreasing to less than ;
2280kW for the duration of the accident. See Table 2-B for the i presently evaluated DS and D6 worse case loads for the above scenario. ,
i The new diesel generators are radiator cooled and will be ;
independent of the existing plant cooling water system. l l
The new D5/D6 Building houses two SACM diesel generators (DS/D6), l with associated control panels, auxiliary equipment, electrical i distribution equipment, fuel oil day tanks and lube oil tanks, and the diesel engine radiators. !
l 15 i
l 4
Rev. 2 The Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System for each diesel generator consists of two storage tanks mounted in a concrete vault located adjacent to the DS/D6 Building plus two transfer pumps located in the diesel room pit area of the DS/D6 Building. A shared, above grade, receiving tank is also provided. Diesel engine fuel oil transported to the site will be off-loaded initially to the l receiving tank. The fuel oil in the receiving tank will be tested i to ensure compliance with the diesel engine fuel oil l specifications. After compliance is verified, the fuel oil in the receiving tank can be transferred to any of the diesel engine fuel l oil storage tanks. ;
2.2.2 Safecruards Electrical System ,
As part of the SBO/ESU Program, existing diesel generator D1, presently supplying power to the Train A Safeguards system of both Units, will be reassigned to the Unit 1 Train A Safeguards emergency power system. Similarly, existing diesel generator D2 will be reassigned to supply power to the Unit 1 Train B Safeguard i emergency power system. Thus, the two existing diesel generators will be aligned as the emergency AC power supplies for Unit 1_and certain common or shared systems.
The two new diesel generators will be aligned as the emergency AC power supplies for Unit 2 and certain common or shared systems. D5 ,
will supply power to Unit 2 Train A Safeguards power system and D6 I will supply the Unit 2 Train B Safeguards power system.
The four existing Unit 1 and Unit 2 load sequencers will be replaced with four new commercial grade solid-state programmable i logic controller-based sequencers, which have been dedicated for Safety Related service and software qualified as discussed in NSP's
" Reply to Questions on Design Report for the Station Blackout Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project (TAC numbers 68588/68589)",
dated July 10, 1991.
In addition to installing D5 and D6 diesel generators, the 1 safeguards electrical distribution system will be upgraded.
New Unit 2 4160V safeguards switchgear will be located in the new Seismic Category I DS/D6 Building. This will be accomplished using ;
two new 4160V switchgear lineups. The present Unit 2 4160V i safeguard loads will be reconnected to the new Unit 2 safeguards switchgear.
A new 4160V safeguards switchgear lineup (Bus 27) will be installed in the D5/D6 Building and the switchgear will be selectively energized from Unit 2 4160V switchgear train A or B. This lineup will be the safeguards power source for 121 Cooling Water Pump.
)
Portions of the present Unit 2 4160V safeguards switchgear will be added to Unit 1 safeguards switchgear.
r 16 P
Rev. 2 The cooling tower source transformers and the R source transformers will be connected to each of the four safeguards 4160V switchgear i line-ups. This configuration will provide 2 independent (see Section 5.3.2) offsite sources to each 4160V safeguards bus and l !
will minimize the use of 4160V bus ties between units. ;
Four new Unit 2 480V safeguard buses (two per train) will be installed in the new DS/D6 Building to replace the two existing buses. The present Unit 2 safeguards loads (MCCs) plus additional DS, D6 and building safeguards loads will be divided between the buses of a given train to improve the voltage regulation on the l 480V safeguards buses.
The two existing Unit 1480V safeguards buses will be replaced with four new safeguard buses. One of the buses will occupy vacated i Unit 2 480V switchgear room. The second bus will occupy an existing Unit 1 480V switchgear room. The two additional buses :
will be located in the present Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms. The resulting Unit 1 configuration, two buses per train, will be i similar to Unit 2. The present Unit 1 safeguard MCC loads will i
also be divided between the buses.
Automatic solid-state programmable logic controller-based voltage regulators will be added to each of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 480V safeguards buses (8 total) to improve voltage regulation. The :
voltage regulators and sof tware have been qualified for this safety ;
related application as discussed in NSP's " Supplemental Information on Programmable Logic Controllers for the Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project (TAC numbers 68588 :
and 68589," dated October 21, 1991. !
Alternate power sources from the same train of the opposite unit, to be used primarily during maintenance outages on 4160V source buses will be added to the 480V safeguards buses. Each alternate source line-up will consist of an incoming line compartment, a 4160-480V transformer section and a transition section for connection to the 480V switchgear by bus duct or cable. One alternate source line-up per train will be provided to be used by '
either or both 480V safeguards buses. Loading on the alternate l
source transformer will be administratively controlled within ratings.
l l
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17
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rov. 2 Tablo 2-A D1/D2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING:
TRAIN B (D2)
- STEP LOADING SUMPARY [
LOAD SEQUENCE LOAD ADDITION O SECONDS (STEP 1) 1085 KW 5 SECONDS (STEP 2) 374 KW 10 SECONDS (STEP 3) 0 KW 15 SECONDS (STEP 4) 249 KW 20 SECONDS (STEP 5) 328 KW 25 SECONDS (STEP 6) 201 KW 30 SECONDS (STEP 7) 168 KW LOAD PERIODS: TOTAL LOAD 0 - 5 MINUTES 2371 KW 5 - 30 MINUTES 2302 KW 30 MINUTES - 1 HOUR 2313 KW 1 HOUR - 14 DAYS 1439 KW i
l l
KW loads were calculated following the guidance of Prairie island Engineering Manual Section 3.3.1.3 (Rev. 0).
Train B has the highest EDG load, of the two trains, for this event.
20 l l
l
ROV. 2 Tablo 2-B D5/D6 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING:
DBA AND LOOP IN UNIT 2 TRAIN A (DS)' BTEP LOADING
SUMMARY
F LOAD SEQUENCE LOAD ADDITION O SECONDS (STEP 1) 952 KW 5 SECONDS (STEP 2) 373 KW 10 SECONDS (STEP 3) 807 KW 15 SECONDS (STEP 4) 249 KW 20 SECONDS (STEP 5) 326 KW 25 SECONDS (STEP 6) 465 KW 30 SECONDS (STEP 7) 168 KW LOAD PERIODS: TOTAL LOAD 0 - 5 MINUTES 1?.74 KW 5 - 30 MINUTES 3246 KW
_ 30 MINUTES - 1 HOUR 3250 KW L 1 HOUR - 14 DAYS 2378 KW KW loads were calculated following the guidance of Prairie island Engineering Manual Section 3.3.1.3 (Rev. 0).
Train A has the highest EDO load, of the two trains, for this event.
21 5
I x--< . . . _ . .
l l
l Rev. 2 l l
i 3.0 DIESEL GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS- DESIGN AND INSTALLATION Two identical diesel generator sets, D5 and D6, will be installed on a concrete foundation, complete with all accessory components, connecting piping, wiring, and instrument tubing. D5 and D6 will be located in separate rooms of a reinforced concrete Seismic Category I structure. Each diesel generator system will be monitored to alert personnel of abnormal conditions. Annunciator alarm systems will be located in the main control room and on local control panels in the DS/D6 Building.
l The DS and D6 units will be composed of tandem-engine diesel l generators manufactured by Societe Alsacienne de Constructions i Mecaniques de Mulhouse (SACM). The diesel engines arc Model No.
l UD45-V16-5-D-5, 16 cylinder, and have a closed cooling system using i radiators. The generator manufacturer, subcontractor to SACM, will i be Jeumont-Schneider, also of France.
The equipment will be specified, designed and manufactured to i operate over a design life of 40 years with specified servicing.
The diesel engine will be of vertical V-frame, stationary type, ;
turbocharged, multi-cylinder, and complies with the manufacturer's qualified design for emergency standby operation required for nuclear power plant service. The operating rated speed will be 1,200 rpm.
]
The two engines in each set will be directly coupled to a dual bearing generator, one on each end in a back-to-back arrangement. ,
The generator and exciter will have a continuous rating of 5,400 kw -
gross, and a voltage rating of 4.16 kV at a frequency of 60 Hz. l Each diesel generator will be capable of attaining rated frequency and voltage within 10 seconds after receipt of the starting signal.
During the loading sequence steps, frequency and voltage will be ,
maintained above minimum values of 95 percent and 75 percent, l respectively. During recovery from transients caur,ed by step load increases, or resulting from the disconnection of its largest single load, the speed of the diesel generator set will not exceed nominal speed plus 75 percent of difference between nominal speed ;
and the overspeed trip setpoint. Each generator will be designed I for isolated and parallel operation. The units will be free from harmful critical speeds within the normal operating range, up to and including automatic trip shutdown speed at 115 percent of rated operating speed.
The two engines are identical except for the camshaft drive trains which provide clockwise rotation for one engine and counter clockwise for the other as required by the back-to-back arrangement. Each diesel delivers equal power to the generator as a result of the governor control. Acceleration, speed, and load will be controlled by means of the governors which meter the flow of fuel into the combustion chambers.
22
l Rev. 2 3.1 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION ,
i The seismic design classifications for the diesel generator and ;
auxiliary systems are as follows: !
The DS/D6 Building Seismic Response Spectra will be used for Seismic design' and qualification of systems and components ,
classified as Seismic Category I. I 3.1.1 Diesel Encine Auxiliary Systems I
All components of the diesel engine auxiliary systems that are I required to operate during a design basis accident or to mitigate consequences due to an accident will be designated as Seismic 1 Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand safe i shutdown earthquake (SS2). All other components which are not l required for safe shutdown will be seismic II over I supported to preclude damage to safety related systems or components.
3.1.2 Diesel Generatt;r Room Ventilation Systems All componersts of the diesel generator room ventilation systems will be Seismic Category I, except the normal mode ventilation fan and ductwork which will be mounted Seismic II over I. Components required for alarming, indication and monit.xing will be designed for seismic mounting only (seismic passiv% . ;
l 3.1.3 Electrical Power Distribution. Instrumentation and Controls The electrical power distribution system will be designed and installed as Seismic Category I per RG 1.29, and Seismic l qualification will be per IEEE 344 and Regulatory Guide 1.100. l This safety-related system is required to be operable both during and after the occurrence of a design basis event.
1 Instruments, controls and associated sensing lines required for the operation of the diesel engine auxiliaries and engine room ventilation system will be Seismic Category I. Those that are required for alarming indication and monitoring will be designed for seismic mounting only (Seismic II over I) when necessary to i preclude damage to safety related systems or components.
3.1.4 Fuel Oil Storace and Transfer System i The fuel oil storage tanks, concrete structures, transfer pumps, i piping and electrical equipment will be Seismic Category I. The i receiving tank, recirculating pump, associated piping, and piping l components will be non-safety related, but will be designed to I withstand SSE loads without failure (Seismic II over I). The storage tank level instrumentation for indication and alarm will not be safety related and will be seismically mounted only to 1 preclude damage to safety related equipment (Seismic II over I) . )
The control switches to initiate operation of the transfer pumps j i
23
I Rev. 2 (also day tank level switches) will be Seismic Category I.
All electrical equipment and raceways will be designed and installed as Seismic Category I. ,
i All sensing lines for tank level. and transfer pump instrumentation will be seismically supported and must maintain integrity of the pressure boundary (Seismic category I).
3.2 SAFETY DESIGN CLASSIFICATION The safety design classifications for the diesel generator and auxiliary systems are as follows:
3.2.1 Diesel Encine Auxiliary Svstems All interconnecting piping between equipment that is necessary for !
the operation of the diesel generator will be safety related. All ,
other piping and its components that are not necessary for diesel generator operability, such as drain, vent, and fill lines will be non-safety related. :
The design classification for piping and equipment in each diesel engine auxiliary system is as follows: ,
- 1. Cooling Water System Safety Classification l (both HT: High Temperature :
Cooling Circuit i and LT: Low Temperature ;
Cooling Circuits)
- a.
- Radiator Safety Related
- b.
- Expansion Tank Safety Related
- c. Coolant Mixing Non-Safety Related Tank and Piping ;
- d. AC Motor Operated Non-Safety Related l Transfer Pump l
- e. Interconnecting Safety Related j Piping (Including l Equipment Vent Lines)
- f. Exp. Tank Fill, Non-Safety Related ,
Overflow, Vent, beyond j first isolation and l Drain Lines valve. l l
- 2. Fuel Oil System j
- a. Day Tank Safety Related
- b. Dirty Oil Tank Non-Safety Related
- c. Interconnecting Safety Related Piping 24
Rev. 2
- 3. Starting Air System
- a.
- Compressor Unit Non-Safety Related
- b.
- Air Dryer Non-Safety Related
- c.
- Air Receiver Safety Related
- d. Interconnecting Piping
- 1) Receiver to Safety Related Engine
- 2) Compressor to Non-Safety Related Dryer
- 3) Dryer to Non-Safety Related Receiver
- 4) Engine 01 to Safety Related Engine 02 overspeed shutdown lines
- e. Vent & Drain Lines Non-Safety Related beyond first isolation valve for air receiver
- b.
- Lube Oil Cooler Safety Related
- c. AC Motor Driven Non-Safety Related Transfer Pump
- d. Tank Vent & Non-Safety Related Drain Lines
- e. Engine / Aux. Desk Safety Related Interconnecting Piping
- f. Lube Oil Tank Non-Safety Related Fill Line
- 5. Combustion Air and Exhaust System
- a.
- Intake Air Filter Safety Related
- b.
- Exhaust Silencer Safety Related
- c. Interconnecting Safety Related Piping
- Supplied under Diesel Generator Specification M-870.
- Designed and Constructed Safety Related l 3.2.2 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation System The diesel generator room normal mode ventilation fans and associated ductwork and controls, will be non-safety related. This equipment is provided for human comfort only.
Components of the diesel generator room ventilation system that support operation of the diesel generator set will be safety related and support operation of the diesel generator set. Those 25 4
%g s
i Rev. 2 components required for alarming indication and monitoring will be non-safety related.
3.2.3 Electrical Power Distribution. Instrumentation and Controls The electrical power distribution and controls system necessary for operation of safety related equipment is classified as safety i related (Class lE). Diesel generator power is required in the event of a loss of offsite power, and is required to be available when a safety injection (SI) actuation signal is initiated.
Instruments, controls, and associated sensing lines having the function to ensure operation of the diesel generator units, the engine room ventilation, or to maintain integrity of Class lE circuits, will be designed safety related. Those that are required for alarming, indication and monitoring will be non-safety related.
3.2.4 Fuel Oil Storace and Transfer System The electrical power supply equipment, including pump controls, instrumentation and cable / raceway will be safety related Class 1E ,
for the equipment associated with the four storage tanks and four ;
transfer pumps. Controls and instrumentation associated with level j and leak detection of fuel oil for the purpose of indication, monitoring and alarm will be designated as non-safety related. ;
- Power supply equipment, controls, instrumentation and !
circuits / raceway associated with the receiving tank and i recirculating pump will be designated as non-safety related. ;
The fuel oil storage tanks and associated transfer pumps, piping, including interconnecting lines, concrete structures and supports, i will be safety related. The fuel oil receiving tank, recirculating pump and associated piping are not part of the safety related storage tank pressure boundary, therefore, will be designated as non-safety related.
l l
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1 26
i Rev. 2 i
The design clascification for piping and equipment for the fuel oil storage system are summarized as follows:
1 Safety Classification
- 1. Tanks
- a. Emergency Storage Tanks Safety Related ,
- b. Receiving Tank Non-Safety Related
- 2. Pumps a.* Transfer Pumps Safety Related l
- b. Recirculating Pump Non-Safety Related
- 3. Piping and Components
- a. Fuel Oil Transfer Piping Safety Related System including storage tank interconnecting lines, vent lines, and drains up to isolation valves ;
- b. Receiving Tank Non-Safety Related Recirculating Piping System
- c. Storage Tank Vent Lines Safety Related
- d. Storage Tank Drain Lines Non-Safety Related After First Isolation Valve
- e. Fuel Oil System Emergency Safety Related Fill Connections
- 4. Instrumentation ,
- a. Fuel Oil Day Tank Level Safety Related Switches and Standpipe !
- b. All Other Instrumentation Non-Safety Related
- c. Instrumentation Lines from Safety Related Safety Related Process Line i to Root Valve
- Commercial Grade Dedicated j' 1
l 27 i
i
Rev. 2 3.3 SYSTEM DESIGN AND INSTALLATION 3.3.1 Diesel Encine Coolina System 3.3.1.1 Diesel Engine Cooling System Design Each engine will be provided with two independent closed loop cooling systems consisting of high temperature (HT) circuit and low temperature (LT) circuit. The HT circuit cools the engine jacket, cylinder block, and the turbocharger. The LT circuit cools the ,
aftercooler and the lube oil heat exchanger. Both HT and LT circuits will be provided with an engine driven circulating pump, expansion tank, water-to-air heat exchanger (radiator), and a three-way thermostatic valve.
In addition, the HT circuit will be provided with a preheating ,
circuit to reduce thermal stress and wear during fast starts of the diesel engine. The preheating circuit will consist of an AC motor-driven standby circulating pump, an electric water heater, and a lube oil standby heat exchanger. The heater and pump are electrically interlocked so that the heater will be energized only when the pump is running. The preheating circuit equipment are located in the engine auxiliaries desk (skid) located adjacent to each engine.
In the standby mode when the engine is not running, the standby motor-driven circulating pump wi.'l be running to circulate warm water through the engine jacket. Jacket water temperature is maintained at a " keep warm" temperature by controlling power to the electric heater with a temperature switch. The warm tewperature is transferred to the lube oil system through the preheating lube oil heat exchanger of the HT circuit. During normal engine operation, the coolant temperature for either HT or LT circuit will be maintained at design temperature by the 3-way thermostatic valve action to either direct flow to or bypass the radiator.
l The purpose of the HT or LT cooling system expansion tanks located on the third floor of the DS/D6 Building, will be to maintain the required pump NPSH on the system circulating pump. The cooling system flow to the pump will be pressurized thus protecting the pumps from cavitation. The cooling expansion tanks will be adequately sized to provide for thermal expansion of the cooling water, and for minor system leaks at the pump shaft seals, valve stems, and other associated components. Each approximately 100 l gallon expansion tank per diesel engine will provide an air vent for the venting of the cooling water system to remove air pockets which otherwise will be entrained in the system creating poor heat transfer conditions in the radiator.
The closed cycle cooling system will utilize high quality makeup water from the existing plant demineralized water system. This is necessary to prevent formation of scale and to maintain a uniform 28
Rev. 2 heat transfer rate in the engine jackets. The cooling water will be treated with ethylene glycol mixed to a ratio of 50-50% by weight and a rust inhibiter.
3.3.1.2 Diesel Engine Cooling System Installation The installation requirement for the engine high temperature (HT) and low temperature (LT) cooling circuits will include providing interconnecting piping between the engine outlet nozzle and the radiator, and from the radiator discharge to the engine driven pump inlet connection. A 3-way thermostatic valve will be installed in the piping between the engine and the radiator and its bypass connection will be connected to the piping between the radiator and ,
the pump inlet connection. The function of this valve will be to bypass the radiator to enhance quick engine heatup; therefore, the valve will be located as close to the engine as possible.
Interconnecting piping will be provided to install the HT preheating circuit in parallel with the engine driven pump. The i standby circulating pump of the preheater circuit will be in operation when the engine pump is not running.
All vent connections from the engine cooling water piping, the i electric water heater, and the radiator will be routed to the expansion tank.
A reservoir / storage tank will be provided for each diesel generator ;
set to collect overflow from the expansion tank and to provide '
refilling water to the cooling water system. A fill line will be provided so that treated water can be added to the storage tank for replacing any system losses. A manual AC electric pump will.be provided to assist in transferring water from the reservoir / storage tank to the expansion tank. The minimum capacity of the reservoir / storage tank will be sufficient to allow the batch mixing of one 55-gallon drum of glycol and an equivalent volume of water.
1 Figures 3-1 through 3-4 depict the HT & LT cooling Water Systems l for D5 and D6 diesel generators. l 3.3.2 Diesel Fuel Oil System 3.3.2.1 Diesel Fuel Oil System Design Each engine fuel oil system will consist of a 100% capacity engine-driven booster pump, a 100% capacity backup booster AC motor-driven pump, a duplex-type filter and a common day tank. Any excess fuel oil from both pumps is returned to the day tank by the excess flow valve located upstream of the duplex filter. Each of the 16 cylinders will be fed from a dedicated injection pump and nozzle via the double wall injection piping. Any fuel oil leakage from the engine driven fuel oil pump seals or the inner wall piping will be contained within the outer wall where it drains into a drip ramp which is routed directly to the dirty oil tank.
29 l
l Rev. 2 other leakage from the injection pumps / piping will be collected in the accidental leakage ramp which is routed to the leakage tank.
The leakage tank is monitored by a high level alarm that indicates excessive leakages. Discharge from the leakage tank flows by gravity to a common dirty oil tank.
The usable volume of each day tank, accounting for the actual elevations of overflow connections and suction piping is approximately 600 gallons. Based upon full load fuel oil ;
consumption rates for both engines, plus a margin of 10%, each day tank would be of a capacity to allow the running of both engines for 90 minutes without makeup. Each day tank will be located !
inside the DS/D6 building at an elevation that will ensure adequate !
net positive suction head to the booster pumps.
l 3.3.2.2 Diesel Fuel Oil System Installation The installation requirements for the fuel oil system will include providing interconnecting piping for the following:
- a. From the day tank to the engine oil pump inlet connection.
- b. From the engine oil pump outlet to the auxiliaries desk.
- c. From the auxiliaries desk discharge connection to the engine oil feed inlet connection.
- d. From the day tank to the backup booster pump inlet located in the auxiliaries desk.
Miscellaneous engine connections such as the engine oil overflow line and the auxiliaries desk safety valve connections will be routed back to the day tank.
Each day tank will be equipped with a drain and overflow connections that are tied together and routed back to the storage tanks. A missile-protected vent line will be provided and vented to atmosphere. A flame arrestor will be installed in the vent line.
One dirty oil tank will be provided for each diesel generator set for storing leakage from the fuel oil system. A drain line with manual operated valve will be provided to empty the tank periodically into a portable container. The tank will be equipped i with overflow line that is routed to the respective DS/D6 dirty oil i sump. A gauge site glass for tank level indication will be provided.
Level switches will be provided for each day tank to automatically i refill the tank by actuating a fuel oil transfer pump on low tank l level. l l
30
Rev. 2 3.3.3 Diesel Air Startina System 3.3.3.1 Diesel Air Starting System Design The air starting system for the tandem SACM diesel generator set consists of four separate subsystems, each including its own air l dryer, compressor, and air receiver. The air receivers were sized based upon test data for SACM engines, corrected for system inertia specific to the Prairie Island diesels. Each of the four air receivers is sized to provide ten starts of the diesel engine without recharging, and any two of the four receivers will start the genset within ten seconds. Therefore, sizing of the starting air system per the manufacturer's recommendations complies with the guidance of SR.P 9.5.6 (capacity for five cranking cycles).
Each starting air receiver will be provided with a pressure switch '
which will alarm a low air pressure condition at the DG control room annunciator panel. This signal will also annunciate the common trouble alarm in the main control room. The air receivers will also be monitored by pressure indicators located on the DG benchboard in the DG control room. This arrangement complies with SRP 9.5.6, Section II, Item 4h.
The air dryer will be of the heatless type containing two towers that are connected in parallel. Both towers are filled with molecular sieve desiccant product where one tower is alternately in the drying phase while the other tower is regenerating. The dryer will provide dried starting air at a dew point of -4 F when the system is pressurized.
Each starting air skid will be provided with equipment to prevent .
fouling of the air start valve or filter as follows: !
- 1. Moisture - a desiccant type air dryer will be provided upstream of the air receiver to reduce moisture to acceptable levels. In j addition, a water asparator is provided upstream of the air dryer to ensure cfficient dryer operation.
- 2. Oil - lubricating oil carry over from the air compressor will be prevented by an oil separator located at the compressor discharge.
- 3. Rust - an air filter will be provided upstream of each air dryer to clean up contaminants in the air stream such as rust. In i addition, a dust filter located at the air skid discharge will be capable of eliminating fine rust particles. The dryer discussed above will also reduce the potential for rust i formation.
Provisions will be made to blow down any accumulated moisture in the water separator provided with the compressor unit, and the oil and water separators with the air dryer. The air receiver will be provided with drain connections to allow periodic manual draining of moisture content during startup and normal 31
Rev. 2 operation. A relief valve will be provided to protect the air ,
receiver from overpressure.
)
The starting air system also provides shutdown air lines which l synchronize the actions of Engine 01 and 02 overspeed trip !
devices. There are two lines per genset, one for each side. ;
when one overspeed device, A or B side, trips and admits I starting air pressure to actuate its fuel rack stop jack, the same air signal is sent to the stop jack of the other engine via the synchronous shutdown line. These lines pneumatically link the fuel rack controls of one engine's A side to the other engine's B side. The fuel rack controls on each engine are mechanically linked between the A and B side. This combination ;
provides synchronous shutdown of the entire genset on any engine overspeed actuation. j 3.3.3.2 Diesel Air Starting System Installation The installation requirements for the air starting system will include providing interconnecting piping for the following:
- a. From each air receiver outlet connection to the air filter and starting air solenoid located inside the auxiliaries desk.
- b. From the auxiliaries desk outlet connection to the engine air distributor inlet connection. I
- c. From air supply line in the auxiliary desk to engine overspeed protection system. ;
- d. From engine 01 protection system (stop jack) to engine 02 overspeed protection system (stop jack). I l
- e. From the dryer to the air receiver.
l Figures 3-8 and 3-9 depict the starting air systems for the DS and D6 diesel generators, respectively.
3.3.4 Diesel Lube Oil System j 3.3.4.1 Diesel Lube Oil System Design l l
The engine lube oil system will consist of two cross-tied loops, !
pressurized by two 50% capacity engine driven pumps. The pumps i discharge supply oil from the crankcase sump through the lube oil l cooler, a duplex-type filter for cleaning, and distribute lube oil to the engine block to lubricate moving parts and to provide piston cooling.
A 3-way thermostatic valve regulates flow through the oil cooler based on outlet temperature. Any excess oil from the discharge valve and cylinder block internal bearings are returned to the oil sump.
32
Rev. 2 The lube oil system will be provided with a pre-lube system to maintain constant flow of lubricating oil to critical areas during standby mode to minimize wear during engine starts. To enhance :
quick engine starts, the pre-lube system maintains lube oil in the !
" keep warm" temperature through the lube oil standby heat exchanger, heated by the keepwarm portion of the HT cooling water ;
system. The pre-lube system design will include provision for draining lube oil from the engine crankcase. An AC motor-driven pump will be used normally for pre-lube system operation with a DC motor-driven pump for backup operation. Both pumps and the standby heat exchanger will be located in the auxiliaries desk.
The diesel engine lubricating oil system (except for interconnecting piping between the engine and auxiliaries desk) was designed by the diesel engine manufacturer, SACM. Design values for operating pressure, temperature differentials, flow rate and heat removal rates determined by SACM were utilized in the design for the system. Interconnecting piping between the engine and auxiliaries desk was designed to ensure that the pressure losses within the piping met SACM's allowable pressure loss requirements.
A sufficient quantity of lube oil to permit 7 days of continuous operation at rated load will be maintained on site for each diesel .
generator. The lube oil will be stored in drums or a lube oil lll storage tank.
The lube oil storage tank provided for each diesel generator will '
be located at an elevation to permit filling of each engine crankcase by means of gravity flow, which will be controlled by a j manually-operated fill valve. l 3.3.4.2 Diesel Lube oil System Installation Installation requirements for the lube oil system will include providing interconnecting piping for the following equipment:
- a. From the lube oil storage tank to the manually operated fill valve. ;
- b. From the engine prelubrication outlet to the auxiliaries desk. !
- c. From the auxiliaries desk outlet to engine prelubrication inlet ;
connection. >
Miscellaneous piping will be required by the diesel engine. This includes providing crankcase relief valve discharge piping to be routed to the building sump.
An AC motor driven transfer pump will be provided at the ground floor elevation to refill the lube oil tanks from portable lube oil containers. The control of this motor will be provided by local start and stop push buttons and local motor starter.
33
Rev. 2 The lube oil storage tanks will be located inside the D5/D6 Building. Each will be equipped with a vent line and a flame arrestor. A drain line with a manual drain valve will be provided.
Each tank will be furnished with an overflow line so that any overflow will be accumulated in the dike enclosure provided for each lube oil tank.
Instrument interconnecting lines for the lube oil system will be routed from the engines to the auxiliaries desk. These include instruments, such as for oil pressure and oil temperature '
indicators and switches.
Figures 3-10 and 3-11 depict the lube oil systems for DS and D6, respectively.
3.3.5 Diesel Combustion Air and Exhaust System 3.3.5.1 Diesel Combustion Air and Exhaust System Design Each diesel engine will have independent combustion air intake and exhaust systems. The combustion air system will include an air intake filter that will function in accordance with the engine manufacturer's recommendations. The air intake system will be designed and located no less than 20 feet above grade such that fresh outside air will be provided and dilution with exhaust products will not occur. The air intake system will be designed to '
prevent entrained water from entering the engine air intake.
The combustion air inlet piping system has been reviewed by the engine manufacturer to assure the engine ability to start and run during site design basis tornado depressurization conditions.
The engine exhaust system will include a manuf acturer's recommended industrial-type exhaust silencer with multi-compartment construction to limit noise level.
3.3.5.2 Diesel Combustion Air and Exhaust System Installation J
Installation requirements for the combustion air and exhaust system of each engine will include the following interconnecting piping:
- a. From single air intake filter discharge connection to two i turbocharger inlet connections.
l
- b. From both turbocharger outlet connections to a single connection !
provided by the exhaust silencer.
- c. From exhaust silencer discharge end to atmospheric discharge. ;
1 The combustion air and exhaust piping will be sized so that the '
combined total maximum pressure drop will be within the manufacturer's recommendation. Each of the engine's dual air intake and exhaust legs will be closely balanced to minimize 34 I
l
l l
l Rev. 2 i differential back pressures from occurring. Similarly, the total pressure loss consisting of combustion air and exhaust piping for both engines will be closely matched so that both engines will l share equal loads. l l
The exhaust piping will be protected from possible clogging due to rain, snow, or ice, during standby or operation of the systems. An i angled shield structure equipped with a bird screen protects the exhaust from plugging and from damage by external missiles. ,
t An expansion joint will be provided in the intake air and exhaust piping to accommodate piping thermal expansion and to minimize transfer of vibration to the piping system.
Thermal insulation will be provided for the exhaust piping including silencer and expansion joints.
Figures 3-12 & 3-13 depicts the combustion air and exhaust for DS ,
and D6, respectively.
l i
i a
35
i i
l l
Rev. 2 i
3.3.6 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Systems 3.3.6.1 Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Supply System Design l
- a. Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Supply Each of the two diesel generator rooms will have an independent ventilation system which will function to limit the maximum ambient temperature to 120*F in conformance with equipment '
ratings, when the Diesel Generators are operating.
The ventilation system will also supply greater than the minimum l, required volumetric flow of air necessary to directly cool'the
- generator bearings and other features specified by the l Manufacturer. ;
The diesel generator room cooling fan will force outside air into the room. Provisions will be made to modulate the outside air with return air to maintain the selected engine room temperature. ,
Each diesel generator room cooling fan will auto start when the corresponding diesel generator starts.
- b. Diesel Generator Room Normal Mode Ventilation Each of the two diesel generator rooms will have an independent ventilation exhaust system which will function to provide a minimum continuous ventilation requirement of 1 cfm per square foot of the diesel generator room floor area when diesel generator set is not operating.
- c. Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Instrumentation and Controls The engine room ventilation system will be provided with instruments and controls to enable operation of the systems to maintain room temperature within design limits. The controls are required to function during and after diesel generator operation.
3.3.6.2 Detailed Design All components of the diesel generator room ventilation systems will be capable of performing their function in a 120*F environment. Relative humidity is in the range of 20% to 90%.
The heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems capacities are based on an outdoor ambient temperature range of 96*F and -20*F. This is the 99% occurrence range recommended by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE).
36
Rev. 2 Five different sources of historical weather data were reviewed in the selection of the outdoor design temperature. The two principle sources were ASHRAE and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA).
The justification in selecting the Summer temperature given above was based on the following:
The outdoor temperature recommendation with 99% occurrence was given as 92 F. This information was also referenced from the ASHRAE " Weather Data and Design Conditions," Table 1, Page 24.10.
1985 Edition for the city of Minneapolis.
Ample meteorological evidence indicates that the temperature at the 1% level may vary on the order of 2 F to 4 F in any 15 year period from the previous 15 year period, and may vary even more in any single year from the previous year. Since there were stringent design conditions, the 4 F was added to the referenced temperature. "
Although extremes may result from 100 F and above for a short time, the system will tolerate this increase without adverse impact.
Although the record maximum on-site temperature was 101.6 F for one hour in the hottest summer recorded of 1988, recordings exceeding 96 F (transients of 97 F or 101.6 F) are not appropriate to be used '
as summer design temperatures due to their short duration. The HVAC steady state heat load calculations do not take credit for passive heat sinks (concrete walls and floors) and thermal lag.
Therefore, the HVAC design conditions are conservative, and brief temperature excursions up to 100 F or below -20 F will not adversely affect electrical equipment operability.
Ventilation air flow rates for the diesel generator rooms will be based on heat losses including lights, diesel engine, generator, exhaust piping within the room, air compressors and cooling fan ,
motors. l The diesel generator room cooling fan will be automatically started by a run signal from its corresponding diesel generator. When the diesel generator stops, the supply fan will continue to run until the room temperature falls below 100*F as sensed by a temperature switch in the room. The control switch for the supply f an is located on the benchboard control panel.
Temperature control in the Engine Room will be achieved by modulating outside air and return air dampers with a set point of 70 'F to maintain a minimum temperature of 50 F in the engine room.
The temperature sensor and associated temperature controller provide a modulating signal to control the outside and return air dampers. These controls are located in the engine rooms near the local control rooms.
e 37
Rev. 2 High engine room temperature as a result of loss of air flow, fan failure or control component failure will be alarmed in the diesel generator control room.
The intake and exhaust louver frames and blades will be steel, and will be tornado missile proof. The intake and exhaust openings will be located at an elevation higher than the maximum probable flood level.
Associated dampers will be safety related, seismically qualified, and will be powered from Class lE electrical sources.
All components of each ventilation system will be protected from tornado generated missiles.
The diesel generator room cooling f ans will be vane axial type with direct-drive totally-enclosed-air-over (TEAO) motors.
Fan-developed pressures will be based on the pressure drop through ductwork, concrete plenums and distribution accessories.
3.3.7 Diesel Encine Auxiliarv Systems Pioina and Eauinment Reauirements ;
and Materials !
i All interconnecting piping unless otherwise noted herein, will be ANSI 150 lb pressure class. All miscellaneous piping such as for drains and vents, will be rated for 150 lbs. or greater.
All piping joints and connections will be welded. Where required, such as at pump suction, discharge connections, and flexible connections, flanges or threaded couplings will be acceptable. l All piping material will be carbon steel except the following systems:
Material
- a. Starting Air System Stainless Steel 304 or 304L
- b. Combustion Air Carbon Steel
- c. Exhaust System Carbon Moly Alloy Steel i All tanks will be designed to atmospheric conditions. Tank material will be carbon steel.
The day tank discharge nozzle connections will be bottom mounted. 1 It will be extended inside the tank such that the accumulated residual sediment from the tank bottom will not be disturbed and i carried into the engine cylinders.
38
l Rev. 2 l i
The day tank and storage tanks associated with each diesel generator include provisions for a low-point drain with a trap for removal of accumulated water and sediment.
The lube oil motor-operated transfer pump will be of the rotary gear type and of manufacturer's standard, non-safety related. The l casing material will be cast iron or carbon steel and will be compatible with the transferred fluid.
Engine-generator set and supporting systems will be designed to provide sufficient space to allow for inspection, maintenance and testing per ASME Section XI. Maintenance envelope space requirements will be in accordance with vendor's recommendations.
3.3.8 Mechanical Desian and Fabrication Codes SACM diesel generators have been used extensively throughout the world in nuclear power plants with successful results. There have been no significant failures of engine or skid mounted mechanical systems in approximately 300 units placed in service in nuclear power plants. This history attests to the general integrity of the codes and standards applied by SACM. With regards to the pipe systems supplied with SACM equipment, baseline comparisons of the French codes utilized (CODAP) and ASME Section III have been performed. In a technical audit performed by FDI in 1988, it was found that stress allowables prescribed by CODAP were more J conservative than ASME Section III in the ranges applicable- to engine related piping. In addition, SACM performed comparisons j between French material (NFA) codes and ASME Section II for carbon steel piping and weld materials, and stainless steel piping, with )
acceptable results. SACM welders are qualified to ASME Section IX.
SACM utilizes codes and standards that compare favorably with ASME or otherwise will provide items that will perform acceptably. j In addition, the qualification of the EDGs and the auxiliary systems supplied by SACM is the result of an extensive effort by SACM, NSP and FDI. This effort is described in "SACM Diesel Generator Qualification Report, Revision 0" submitted to the NRC as 1 an attachment to the September 29, 1989, letter entitled " Project i for the Addition of Two Emergency Diesel Generators". This J qualification plan was found acceptable by the NRC by letter dated l January 31, 1990. !
The codes utilized for piping and equipment in diesel engine auxiliary systems, not supplied by SACM, are as follows:
3.3.8.1 Pipe / Pipe Support Installation Code ASME Section III (1986) Class 3 with the following exceptions:
(1) No N-Stamp is required. Valves are engineered to ASME III Class 3 requirements but a Design Report is not furnished (ND-3131.1).
39
Rev. 2 (2) Maintenance of a current ASME Certificate (NA-8100) or valid stamp is not required.
(3) Filing of a quality assurance manual with ASME (NCA-3463, NCA-3862) is not required.
Piping subassembly fabrication and installation is performed under NSP's QA program. This will provide sufficient assurance that the fabrication and installation of piping and supports will meet the design, material and fabrication requirements of Section III. In addition, design reports and authorized Nuclear Inspector certified data reports will be supplied.
Pipe support welds to plant structural members and in transitional structural sections, will be in accordance with AWS D1.1-1988.
Integral pipe attachment welding will be per ASME Section III (1986), Class 3 with exceptions as noted above.
3.3.8.2 Design and Fabrication Codes (*/** Footnotes on next page)
- 1. Cool'ina Water System Desian & Fabrication Code (both HT & LT Circuits)
- a.
- Radiator ASME Section VIII, (1986), U Stamp
- b.
- Expansion Tank ASME Section VIII, (1986)
- c.
- Coolant Mixing Tank AWWA D100-73 l
- d. Motor Operated Manufacturer Std.
Make-up Pump
- e. Interconnecting ASME Section Piping (Including III (1986), Class 3**
Equipment Vent Lines)
- f. Exp. Tank Fill, ANSI B31.1-1967 Overflow, Vent and Drain Lines (beyond the First Isolation Valve)
- g. *Three-way valves Manufacturer Std.
- 2. Euel Oil System
- a. Day Tank ASME Section III, (1986) Class 3**
- b. Dirty 011 Tank API 650-1984
- c. Interconnecting ASME Section III Piping (1986), Class 3**
40
I Rev. 2
- 3. Startina Air System
- a.
- Compressor. Unit Manufacturer Std.
- b.
- Air Dryer Manufacturer Std. ,
- c.
- Air Receiver ASME Section VIII, (1986) U Stamp
- d. Interconnecting ASME Section III Piping (except Manu- (1986), Class 3**
facturer's Standard <
Piping Sections)
- e. Vent & Drain Lines ANSI B31.1-1967 (for air receiver, '
beyond First Isolation Valve)
- 4. Lube Oil System
- a. Lube Oil Storage ASME Section III l
Tank (1986) , Class 3**
- b.
- Lube Oil Cooler Manufacturer Std.
- c. AC Motor Driven Transfer Pump Manufacturer Std.
- d. Tank Vent &
Drain Lines ANSI B31.1-1967 ;
- e. Engine / Aux. Desk ASME Section III Interconnecting (1986), Class 3**
Piping '
- f. Lube Oil Storage ANSI B31.1-1967 Tank Fill Line
- 5. Combustion Air and Exhaust System
- a.
- Intake Air Filter Manufacturer Std.
- b.
- Exhaust Silencer Manufacturer Std.
- c. Piping
- 1. Exhaust ASME Section III (1986), Class 3**, fabricated per SA 691 Class 13. Stress analyzed per ASME Section III Class 3 components using ANSI B31.1 (1986) stress allowables.***
- 2. Intake ASME Section III (1986), Class 3**, fabricated per SA 105/134 Gr.B. Stress analyzed per ASME Section III, Class 3.
-
- Supplied under Diesel Generator Specification M-870.
- With exceptions as listed in Section 3.3.8.1.
- B31.1 allowables were used since the operating temperature of the exhaust piping is in excess of the range covered in SECTION III, Appendix I material tables 41
___-_-_-_O
Rev. 2 .
3.3.9 Electrical Power Distribution and Switchaear 3.3.9.1 Electrical Power Distribution and Switchgear Design The electrical power distribution system will provide safeguards power to the D5/06 diesel engine auxiliaries, and serve the plant distribution systems when power is required from the diesel generator sources. The power distribution system will consist of Class 1E 4160 and 480 VAC switchgear, 480 VAC motor control centers, distribution panel boards and transformers, and all 120V UPS, interconnecting cable and raceway. In addition, this power distribution system will serve those safety related building systems that are essential to emergency diesel generator operation :
such as HVAC system loads. Normal (non-1E) 480 V AC power distribution, and all DC power distribution will be obtained from the existing plant.
The electrical power distribution system and its components will be designed to have sufficient capacity to serve all loads identified at present, plus spare capacity in terms of both load current and spare hardware for unknown future loads. Separation between the safeguards trains, between voltage classes and between fire zones will be provided in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75, IEEE 384 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. Refer to Section 5.3.9.2, Separation Requirements.
Electrical interlocks or administrative controls will be utilized l to prevent inadvertent paralleling of power sources in all cases where alternate feeds are provided.
3.3.10 Diesel Generator Controls. Indication, and Alarms 3.3.10.1 Diesel Generator Controls, Indication, and Alarm System Design Each engine generator set will be provided with seven control ,
panels: two engine auxiliaries desks, one bench board control panel, one vertical control panel, one exciter panel, one monitoring system remote terminal unit (RTU) with computer and one vibration monitoring panel (RTV). Required Class 1E and non-1E 120V AC power will be provided to the control panels from MCC distribution panels existing plant UPS distribution system and j receptacle panels. Required Class 1E and non-1E 125V DC power will be provided from existing plant 125V DC systems.
The auxiliary desk (one for each engine), located near the diesel generator unit, will include gauges to indicate engine temperatures, pressures, rack position, and engine RPM.
The bench board control panel, located in the diesel generator control room, will include instruments and controls for the diesel generator and auxiliaries plus the fuel oil transfer pumps, engine room cooling, and building electrical HVAC supply and return fans.
42
Rev. 2 e
A vertical panel, located in the diesel generator control room, will be provided to include additional instruments and controls for the diesel generator and auxiliaries. ,
i A generator exciter panel, located in the diesel generator control room, will include excitation, voltage regulation, and field flashing equipment, and current and voltage transformers for ,
protective relays and power measuring instruments.
3.3.10.2 Trips and Interlocks All protective trips other than engine overspeed and generator '
differential overcurrent will be bypassed upon receipt of an' '
automatic emergency start signal in response to a safety injection '
signal and will be annunciated in the main control room. No protective trips will be bypassed upon receipt of an automatic bus undervoltage start signal.
Protective trips are provided to automatically shut dovn the diesel engine and/or trip the diesel generator breaker, an1 protect the diesel generator units from possible damage or degradation during routine testing. Protective trips and logic for ench' engine are in accordance with vendor recommendations and consist of:
o Overspeed 1/4 o Engine Lube Oil Low-Low Pressure 2/3 (per engine) o Jacket Water High-High Temperature 1/1 (per engine) o Jacket Water Low Pressure 1/2 (per engine) o Crankcase High Pressure 1/1 (per engine) o Lube oil Sump Low Level 1/1 (per engine) o Generator Bearing High Temperature 1/2 o Engine Bearing High-High Lube Oil Temperature 1/1 (per engine) i o Reverse Power 1/1 (breaker only) l o Generator Differential Current 1/1 ;
o Generator Phase Time Overcurrent 1/1 l o Generator Overvoltage 1/1 l o Loss of Excitation 1/1 i o Electric Governor / Fuel Rack Failure 1/1 ,
l In order to run the diesel generators during maintenance and '
testing, start permissive signals from each engine will be required from the following:
o HT & LT Cooling Water Expansion Tank Level o Engine Oil Sump Level o Engine Preheating Water Temperature o Prelubricating Pump Discharge Pressure All trip functions will be alarmed prior to or at trip level and the same sensing device may be used to generate both alarm and trip signals through isolation relays.
1 1
43
Rev. 2 An annunciator system will be provided to alarm abnormal operating ,
conditions. This system will consist of logic relays and solid-state components located in the vertical panel and light boxes '
mounted above the benchboard.
The design complies with Position C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.9. All diesel generator protective trips except engine overspeed and generator differential will be blocked upon receipt of a safety injection (SI) signal. The blocking circuits will be testable, abnormal values of blocked parameters will alarm in the control room, and the bypass must be manually reset.
3.3.10.3 Diesel Generator Monitoring System Design A non-safety related computer monitoring unit, located in the diesel generator control room, will include the following:
o PC-based data acquisition equipment to collect, store and process analog and digital input signals from sensors in the diesel generator unit and auxiliary systems.
o The system will be capable of monitoring operating parameters, interface with the plant computer, event sequencing, provide historical file, graphics and report generation.
o The system will be capable of providing 0-5V DC or 4-20 mA DC analog or digital outputs for remote use.
A non-safety related vibration monitoring panel located in the ,
diesel generator control room, will: ;
o process input signals from vibration sensors mounted on the engine block, generator bearings and radiator fan assemblies, and o provide analog and digital outputs for remote use.
3.3.11 Diesel Generator Operatina Descriotion The mode of operation of each diesel generator set is determined by the position of the diesel generator control mode selector switch to either " normal" or " maintenance". A brief description of the operating sequence is as follows:
- 1. Normal mode - Selection of " Normal" mode will allow automatic start-up, manual emergency start or test operation of the diesel i generator set. These operating functions can be initiated from the Diesel Generator Control Room (" Local") or Main Control Room i
(" Remote") by using the " Local-Remote" selector switch. I
- a. Automatic Start Mode - Start of the diesel generator can be initiated automatically by either a bus undervoltage and/or a Safeguards (SI) signal. In response to either of these 44 I
1
Rev. 2 types of automatic starts, the diesel generator will accelerate to rated speed and voltage within ten (10) seconds (FAST START mode), from receipt of the startirg signal.
Emergency start signals (manual or SI) differ from the bus undervoltage start signal, in that normal engine or generator trips are not bypassed during a bus undervoltage-only automatic start.
A Safeguards (SI), or EMERGENCY manual start will block all of the engine and generator trips, except those from manual emergency stop, generator differential, and engine overspeed.
- b. Test Mode -
For periodic test purposes, the diesel generator may be started and stopped through the use of a manual start-stop Test Switch. Two (2) acceleration rates are available in this mode, SLOW and FAST.
The SLOW start mode is operator-selected and provides for a longer acceleration time via a pre-set speed ramp within the diesel generator governor control system. The acceleration time is at least twice that of the FAST start mode.
The FAST start mode is operator-selected and provides a direct simulation of the rapid acceleration rate required in response to any automatic start signal.
Both the SLOW and FAST start modes provide automatic operation of the field flashing circuitry, resulting in a
" Ready-For-Load" condition when synchronous speed has been reached.
- 2. Maintenance Mode -
Selection of " Maintenance" position will allow the following operation similar to test mode except:
- a. Permit individual operation of either engine 1 or 2 through the use of the diesel engine selector switch when the generator is decoupled. ,
- b. Allows hydraulic or electric governor operation.
- c. Diesel generator set will not respond to an emergency start signal while on maintenance mode.
- d. Maintenance operation can only be initiated from the DG Control Room by way of key-locked selector switches.
- e. Field flashing circuit requires manual operation.
45
Rev. 2
- 3. Shutdown Mode -
Diesel generator shutdown sequence may be initiated in either normal (emergency or test) or maintenance modes. Emergency shutdown can be manually accomplished through the use of an emergency stop pushbutton, located on the bench board in the diesel generator control room, or automatically on receipt of overspeed or generator differential signal. While in maintenance or test mode, manual shutdown is initiated by placing the start-stop selector switch to the "stop" position or automatically upon activation of any of the diesel generator protective devices. However, if an emergency (SI) start signal is received while in test mode, the diesel generator cannot be stopped through the start-stop switch and must go through the normal shutdown sequence upon termination of the emergency condition.
Following shutdown, the diesel generator set is immediately available for operation as long as no maintenance and/or repair is to be performed.
- 4. Load Sharing and Speed Control - Diesel generator speed control and load sharing between the two engines is accomplished through the electric governors with associated speed sensors, LVDT rack transducers and actuators. The electronics governors are backed up by hydraulic units. Idle / rated speed setpoints and droop /isochronous modes are preset and will automatically override all manual settings upon receipt of an emergency start signal.
3.4 FUEL OIL STORAGE AND TRANSFER SYSTEM l l
3.4.1 Functional Reauirements and Description The following are general functional requirements and descriptions of systems and structures. Detailed design parameters and requirements are given in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1.1 Basic System Description The Fuel Oil Storags and Transfer System provides long term storage of fuel for the new Unit 2 Diesel Generators (D5 and D6). The DS/D6 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage System consists of four safety related fuel oil storage tanks and one non-safety related receiving tank, and includes transfer pumps, piping, instrumentation, and controls necessary for supplying fuel to the diesel engines via Fuel Oil Day Tanks for seven days of continuous 100 percent operation at rated full load, without being replenished. The four storage tanks will be contained in an underground concrete vault structure provided along the west wall of the new diesel generator building. The vault will provide the tanks and piping components protection from tornado generated missiles and flood. It also provides a 3-hour fire protection barrier between tanks for each diesel generator set and from surrounding environment.
46
Rev. 2 i
The receiving tank is provided to receive and hold fuel oil from delivery trucks for testing prior to placing oil in the storage tanks. The receiving tank will be located outdoors and mounted on a diked concrete pad along the south wall at the west corner of the DS and D6 Building.
Two storage tanks will be dedicated for each diesel generator set. l Two 100% capacity transfer pumps will be provided for each diesel generator set with suction piping interconnected and valved so that any pump can be used in transferring fuel from any storage tank of the associated diesel generator set on day tank low level control signal. This provides system flexibility to ensure operability of both diesel generator sets under all potential single active failure conditions.
The storage tanks are filled by means of gravity flow from the outdoor receiving tank. The storage tank to be filled is selected by manual valve operation.
Figure 3-5 depicts the fuel oil storage and transfer system for the D5 and D6 diesel generators. Figures 3-6 and 3-7 depict the fuel oil systems for the D5 and D6 diesel generators, respectively.
3.4.1.2 Tank Capacity
- a. Storage Tanks Each diesel generator set will be provided with two storage tanks each with a usable volume of 30,800 gallons. Usable volumes have been determined by actual elevations of the overflow piping and '
suction piping. These volumes were determined to provide sufficient capacities to allow for operation ef a diesel generator set for seven days of continuous 100 percent operation at rated full load. The conservative calculation method given in ANSI N195-1976 has been used to determine fuel oil storage requirements.
The tanks are sized so that if one is not in service, the capacity of the remaining three is sufficient to supply DS and D6 continuously for seven days at actual load. Interconnecting piping is provided between the storage tanks for D5 and D6 such that the fuel oil storage system can supply sufficient fuel to operate one diesel generator for 14 days at actual load in the event of a design basis flood.
In addition to level instrumentation, each fuel oil storage tank will be provided with a stick gauge connection for determining fuel level in the tank. The connection will be accessible through a ceiling hatch.
- b. Receiving Tank The receiving tank will be designed to receive and hold fuel oil until it has passed all required testing for use. The tank will 47
Rev. 2 have usable capacity of 13,800 gallons.
1 3.4.1.3 Pump Requirements l l
- a. Transfer Pump There will be four transfer pumps for the DS and D6 diesel )
generator sets, two for each diesel generator set. All pumps will ;
be identical and have sufficient head and capacity to transfer oil to the associated day tank. The pump will start when the day tank reaches the designated low liquid level. The transfer pump suction and discharge lines for each pair of pumps associated with the diesel generator set will be cross-tied to allow fuel to be transferred from either storage tank to the day tank by either j transfer pump. 1
- b. Recirculating Pump f A recirculating pump will be provided with the receiving tank. A cleanup filter is provided on the pump discharge side to provide filtering while the fuel oil is being recirculated prior to ;
transfer to the storage tank.
3.4.1.4 Process Piping !
The fuel oil transfer piping will be capable of transferring oil at design temperature and pressure from the storage tank to the day tank. The return line from the de.y tank will be sized to handle continuous overflow by gravity tc the storage tanks.
hth the exception of the transfer pumps, controls, and relief valves, no other active or automatic devices are required for operation of the fuel oil transfer process. The storage tank piping system will be designed to allow manual control of flow.
The piping system will allow oil stored within each fuel oil storage tank to be pumped directly from one safety related storage tank to the other storage tank. The fuel oil transfer system piping includes five micron duplex filters. .
The receiving tank recirculation piping will be capable of recirculating fuel oil from the receiving tank by means of the recirculating pump, through the cleanup filter and return back to the receiving tank.
Sampling points will be provided as required at the inlets to filters. Samples will be taken while recirculating storage tank contents.
3.4.1.5 Electrical Power Supply and Controls The Safeguards electrical power supply to the fuel oil transfer pumps will be 480 Volt, 3-phase, 60 Hertz, and of adequate capacity to power the drive motors. Safeguards Class 1E 120V AC and 125V DC 48
Rev. 2 power will be provided for all associated control and instrumentation circuitry. Non-1E power will be provided for indication and alarm circuitry.
Controls for the fuel tank transfer operation will be automatic, with provisions for manual override.
The storage tanks will be provided with high and low level alarms to be annunciated in the DS/D6 control rooms. High pressure differential across the transfer system fuel strainers or filters will also be annunciated in the D5/D6 Control Room. The storage tanks will be provided with level indication to be displayed locally and on the DG benchboard control panels. On-off operation of the transfer pumps will be initiated by level switches in the fuel oil day tanks. Operating status will be monitored and alarmed.
The receiving tank will be provided with a locally mounted level indicator. The recirculating pump will be provided with on-off operation initiated by a local control switch. Trouble in the recirculating pump and associated cleanup filter will be annunciated in the diesel generator control room through low /high differential pressure switches across each pump and filter.
Temperature inside the below-grade vault will be above the fuel oil cloud point temperature since the vault is insulated and located below the frost line; therefore, heat tracing will not be required.
3.4.1.6 Operation Fuel oil shipments, received by truck delivery, will be held in the i receiving tank and tested for specification conformance. After specifications are verified by test, the fuel oil will be transferred to the storage tanks.
On a periodic basis, the fuel oil in each storage tank will be tested for water content, sediment and viscosity. Algae growth in the storage tank will be inhibited by an additive furnished in the fuel oil.
3.4.2 Desian Reauirements 3.4.2.1 Tank Design
- a. Storage Tank The fuel oil storage tanks will be horizontal cylindrical tanks j made of materials compatible with the stored diesel fuel oil. ;
Galvanized material will not be used. The tanks will be shop l fabricated and will meet the requirements of NFPA 30 and designed l and fabricated in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section !
III, 1986 Edition, Subsection ND with the following exceptions:
l 49 l
Rev. 2 Extending below the fill inlets of the Fuel Oil Storage Tanks will be vertical spargers with numerous holes. This arrangement will disperse the fuel during filling and minimize turbulence. !
Similarly, the outlet originates with a horizontal tube with numerous holes which is raised above the tank bottom.- A bell shape sump at the tank bottom with drain plug will provide a collection and removal point for water and sludge.
(1) No N-Stamp is required.
(2) Maintenance of a current ASME Certificate (NA-8100) or valid stamp is not required. !
(3) Filing of a quality assurance manual with ASME (NCA-3463, NCA-3862) is not required.
The tank manufacturer is required to apply its QA program, which has been evaluated and found to meet 10CFR50 Appendix B. This will provide sufficient assurance that the tanks will meet the design, material and f abrication requirements of Section III. In addition, design reports and Authorized Nuclear Inspector certified data reporte will be supplied.
- b. Receiving Tank The fuel oil receiving tank will be vertical steel cylindrical shop fabricated atmospheric tank designed and fabricated to the requirements of API 650. The tank will be installed outdoors on a Non-Seismic Category I concrete pad with vertical concrete walls (diked). The dike is sized to contain the tank volumetric contents, should a leak or rupture occur, plus an additional volume equivalent to 30 minutes of fire suppression water flow. The tank will be located such that the outside tank surface is separated .
from any adjacent structure by at least 5 feet.
- c. General All tank fill and drain connections will be designed to avoid any '
turbulence that may stir up the sediment accumulated at the bottom of the tank. .All tanks will be provided with a drain connection to remove sediment or water from the tank bottom.
Each storage tank will be provided with liquid level indication (analog loop), to be monitored inside the DS/D6 Building (NSP UST policy for inventory requirement) on the Benchboard panel.
The receiving tank will be provided with spill protection at the i fill connection. i The storage tanks auxiliary fill inlet connection and vent outlet I connectors will be protected from flood conditions and will be positioned above the maximum probable flood level.
50 l
l
Rev. 2 3.4.2.2 Underground Storage Vault The storage tanks will be installed in a Seismic Category I l reinforced concrete vault enclosure located below seismic grade i level and adjacent to the west wall of D5/D6 Diesel Generator l Building. The vault will provide the required 3-hour rated fire l protection barrier, including D5/D6 west wall penetrations, for enclosed fuel supply tanks, and in addition, will withstand the effects of tornado generated missiles, site flood, and buoyancy force considerations.
The vault will be divided into two compartments by a concrete partition wall to separate each pair of tanks serving a single diesel generator set and provide fire and flood protection between each diesel generator sets fuel supply equipment.
The vault will be sized to provide a minimum clearance of 15 inches from all tank surfaces. Leakproof hatches will be provided on top of the vault for tank internal and external inspection access and to allow removal of tank internal baffles and other appurtenances.
Level instrumentation will be bottom mounted. l The underground storage vault will be insulated sufficiently to protect the fuel oil from reaching a minimum system operating '
temperature. The vault temperature will be indicated on a wall mounted panel in the respective engine room and monitored by operations. This indication serves the function of fuel oil -
temperature indication (ref. SRP 9.5.4).
Each vault compartment will be designed for containing leakage of l the tank contents and any accumulated seepage water. Compartment j floors will slope to a sump, which will contain a leak detector.
Leak detection instruments will be provided to alert presence of fuel or water in the sump. This indication will be locally ;
alarmed, and will provide an input to the general trouble alarm in the main control room.
The detailed structural design requirements for the concrete vault :
structure will be as specified in Section 4.0 '
The vault's walls and bottom will be provided with a waterproof .
membrane. All hatches and penetrations on the top slab will be i leak-tight.
3.4.2.3 Pump Design ,
- a. Transfer Pump l l
The transfer pumps will be of the rotary gear drive positive !
displacement type. The pump casing will be constructed of carbon !
steel or other materials that are compatible with diesel fuel oil.
The transfer pumps will be located in the DS and D6 pit areas at an i elevation that will ensure the available net positive suction head ,
51
Rev. 2 (NPSH) will conservatively envelope the required NPSH. The ,
transfer pumps of each diesel generator set will be separated by a .
3-hour rated fire barrier.
- b. Recirculating Pump The receiving tank recirculation pump will be of the rotary gear drive positive displacement type. Pump casing will be constructed of carbon steel or other material compatible with the stored fuel oil. The pump will be located in the D6 pit area.
3.4.2.4 Piping System -
All piping, fittings, valves, and associated components and I supports connecting the emergency storage tanks, transfer pump, l diesel engine day tanks, and the emergency fill station will be designed and fabricated to the requirements of ASME Section III, 1986 Edition, Subsection ND with the following exceptions:
(1) No N-Stamp is required. Valves are engineered to ASME III .'
Class 3 requirements but a Design Report is not furnished (ND 3131.1). ,
(2) Maintenance of a current ASME Certificate (NA-8100) or i valid stamp is not required.
(3) Filing of a quality assurance manual with ASME (NCA-3463, NCA-3862) is not required.
Manufacturers are required to apply their QA programs, which have been evaluated and found to meet 10CFR50 Appendix B. This will provide sufficient assurance that the piping systems will meet the design, material and fabrication requirements of Section III. In addition, design reports on piping systems and supports will be ;
supplied.
All piping and isolation valves protecting the safety related pressure boundary will be located within the Category I diesel generator building or Category I buried vault structures where they are protected from tornado missiles and site flood conditions.
Pipe supports will be designed to the requirements of ASME Section III, 1986 Edition, Subsection NF with exceptions as noted above.
Pipe support welds to plant structural members and in transitional structural sections will be per AWS Code D.1.1 - 1988.
All piping and components associated with the receiving tank and connected beyond the safety related piping pressure boundary isolation valves will be designed to the requirements of ANSI B31.1 and designated as non-safety related. The recirculation pump piping loop will contain a duplex cartridge type filter which will provide high solid removal efficiency for cleanup of any new fuel received at the storage facility. A differential pressure alarm will be provided to alert the operator of a plugged filter. Manual 52
Rev. 2 action can then be taken to valve in the redundant filter.
Sample stations will be provided in the transfer piping to the day tank and also at the receiving tank recirculation piping. All stations are located inside the diesel generator engine rooms to allow convenient fuel test sample retrieval for the required 6 chemical testing of stored fuel. ,
i All fuel oil piping will be located inside the concrete structures or over concrete slabs. Containment curbs as required (dikes) will be provided to collect all potential fuel leakage or spills to !
prevent ground contamination. These structures will be provided with local leak detection instrumentation to provide indication of any leakages from piping.
The transfer pumps, recirculating pump and all fuel oil piping will be designed to allow for inspection, maintenance and testing. !
Strainers are provided on the transfer pump inlets to protect pump internals from debris in accordance with ANSI N195-1976. Pump and valve maintenance envelope space requirements will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. Flanges and/or threaded I connections are permitted where required for maintenance (e.g. pump connections).
Piping material will be of carbon steel having a minimum ANSI pressure-temperature rating of 150 lbs.
i The contents of any storage tank can be recirculated through a 5 micron duplex filter without preventing the other storage tank for the same DG set from feeding the day tank. ,
l Any storage tank can receive fuel from any other storage tank while ,
the first storage tank is feeding its associated day tank. !
3.4.2.5 Electrical and Controls i Electrical power distribution will be accomplished by means of a 480V AC, 3-phase, 4-wire, grounded system. Transformations from this service to 120 (single-phase) will be provided as necessary. l l
Overcurrent protection will be provided by means of molded case thermal-magnetic circuit breakers. Proper coordination of all overcurrent protection devices will be provided down to (and including) local panelboard(s). Circuit breakers for safety related circuits will be testable.
Separation between redundant trains (by 3-hour rated barriers) as well as that required between IE and non-1E circuits will be provided in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, IEEE 384, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Refer to Section 5.3.9.2, Separation ,
Requirements.
All controls and instrumentation will be electric and/or electronic 53
._-__-i
Rev. 2 and will be designed to operate within the design basis environment of 50 F to 120 F inside the D5/D6 engine room areas. Electrical j equipment inside the fuel storage tank vault will be designed for -
10*F to 120*F.
Transfer Pump control switches and storage tank level indicators will be located on the diesel generator control room bench board. i All pressure indicators and the receiving tank pump controls and '
additional storage tank level indicators will be mounted locally.
The following conditions will be monitored and alar cd in the diesel generator control room with a common trouble alarm in the main control room: ;
- a. High and low storage tank levels.
- b. Low differential pressure across the recirculating pump or high .
differential pressures across the recirculating clean-up !'
filters.
- c. High differential pressure across transfer pump strainers.
Signals from the fuel storage tank level sensors will be transmitted to the RTU for computer monitoring and to the Control Room and local Annunciator Panel for high/ low alarms. Power '
supplies for the DS and D6 fuel oil storage tank pumps will be separated for redundancy and protection from common mode failure. Power cable will be routed separately from any control wiring. Non-safety related power and control cables for the receiving tank and its pump will not be routed with safety related cables or piping. ;
3.4.2.6 Mechanical Design and Fabrication Codes The design fabrication code for piping and equipment for the fuel oil storage system are as follows I i
3.4.2.6.1 Pipe / Pipe Support Installation Codes l ASME Section III (1986) Class 3 with the following exceptions:
l (1) No N-Stamp is required. Valves are engineered to ASME III Class 3 requirements but a Design Report is not furnished (ND 3131.1). ,
(2) Maintenance of a , current ASME Certificate (NA-8100) or valid stamp is not required. .
1 (3) Filing of a quality assurance manual with ASME (NCA-3463, NCA-3862) is not required.
NSP will apply its QA program to piping, fabrication and {
installation, including supports. This will provide sufficient '
54 i 1
Rev. 2 assurance that_the piping will meet the material and fabrication requirements of Section III. In addition, design reports and Authorized Nuclear Inspector certified data reports will be supplied. .
Pipe support welds to plant structural members and in transitional t
structural sections will be in accordance with AWS D1.1-1988. -
Integral pipe attachment welding will be per ASME Section III (1986), Class 3, with exceptions as noted above. !
3.4.2.6.2 Design and Fabrication Codes i Desian & Fabrication Code
- 1. Tanks
- a. Fuel Oil Storage Tanks ASME,Section III (1986), Class 3**
- b. Receiving Tank API 650-1984
- 2. Pumps
- a. Transfer Pumps Viking Pump Commercial Grade dedicated for Safety-Related use.
- b. Recirculating Pump Viking Pump Manufacturer's Std.
- 3. Piping, Pipe Support Components and Valves
- a. Fuel Oil Transfer Piping ASME Section III system (except vent and (1986), Class 3**
drain lines)
- b. Receiving Tank Piping & ANSI B31.1-1967 Recirculating Piping System
- c. Storage Tank Vent ASME Section III (1986), Class 3**
- d. Drain Lines and ANSI B31.1-1967 Instrumentation Tubing after First Isolation / Root Valve
- e. Strainers Commercial Grade dedicated for Safety-Related use.
- With exceptions as listed in Section 3.4.2.6.1.
55
Rev. 2 3.5 DESIGN STANDARDS In addition to the codes and standards listed in the design I requirements given above in Section 3.4.2.6, the following NUREG ,
)
0800, IEEE standards,' and regulatory guides are adopted in whole as design criteria requirements for the D5 and D6 Diesel Generator and' <
Auxiliary Systems as described in Section 3.0. Within the existing plant boundary the existing design criteria as defined in the USAR will apply except as noted otherwise in this document.
3.5.1 NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP)
SRP 3.2.1 Rev. 1, 7/81 Seismic Classification SRP 3.2.2 Rev. 1, 7/81 System Quality Group Classification SRP 3.9.2 Rev. 2, 7/81 Dynamic Testing and Analysis of Systems, ,
Components, and Equipment SRP 3.9.3 Rev. 1, 7/81 ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, Component Supports, and Core Support Structures SRP 9.5.4 Rev. 2, 7/81 Diesel Engine Puel Oil Storage and Transfer System (except no fuel oil temperature indication is provided.
Building temperature is controlled and vault temperature is monitored)
SRP 9.5.5 Rev. 2, 7/81 Diesel Engine Cooling Water System SRP 9.5.6 Rev. 2, 7/81 Diesel Engine Starting System SRP 9.5.7 Rev. 2, 7/81 Diesel Engine Lubrication System SRP 9.5.8 Rev. 2, 7/81 Diesel Engine Combustion Air Intake And Exhaust System BTP PSB-2 Rev. O, 7/81 Criteria For Alarms And Indications Associated With Diesel-Generator Unit !
Bypassed And Inoperable Status (
3.5.2 IEEE Standards i IEEE 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power f Generating Stations j IEEE 308-1974 Criteria for Class IE Electric Systems for Nuclear I Power Generating Stations .
IEEE 323-1974 Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for :
I Nuclear Power Generating Stations (Note: IEEE 323 is invoked as a guideline document l to provide a basis for the determination of 56 l i
i
Rev. 2 i
qualified life of equipment. It is not intended to be invoked as a basis for environmental qualification. 10 CFR 50.49 requirements which are ;
met by methods described in RG 1.89 (endorsing IEEE 323) do not apply to the mild environment of the new D5/D6 Building).
IEEE 338-1977 Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems IEEE 344-1987 Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating ,
Stations (Note: Seismic qualification for the D5/D6 Diesel Generator, HVAC duct dampers, damper actuators, and the Class IE Motor Control Centers cites the 1975 revision. Refer to documentation for details.)
IEEE 379-1972 Guide for the Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems IEEE ;?3-1974 Standard for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cable, >
Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Sections.
IEEE 384-1981 Criteria for Separation of Class IE Equipment and Circuits (See note under Reg. Guide 1.75)
(Note 1: The 1981 revision is specified because it addresses comments contained in Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2 on the 1974 revision of the standard.)
(Note 2: The identification requirements of IEEE 384 for tagging intervals of cable, cable tray and raceway may not be strictly followed. Guidance provided by the USAR will be adhered to as introduction of a different set of requirements would be confusing.)
IEEE 387-1977 Diesel Generator Units as Standby Power Supplies (Note: Certain provisions of the 1984 revision of the standard are included in the D5/D6 Diesel Generator specification because they provide guidance for issues not fully addressed in the 1977 l revision which was referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 2. These provisions include Appendix A guidance for development of a load profile, :
Appendix B for the format to define diesel generator service conditions, and Table B2 format for use in defining those components with less than 57
l Rev. 2 a 40 year operating life.)
3.5.3 Reaulatory Guides Regulatory Guide 1.6, 3/10/71 Independence Between Redundant Standby (On-site) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 2, 12/79 Selection Design and Qualification of Diesel Generator Units Used As Standby (On-site) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.29, Rev. 3, 9/78 Seismic Design Classification Regulatory Guide 1.32, Rev. 2, 2/77 Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Regulatory Guide 1.47, 5/73 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems Regulatory Guide 1.53, 6/73 Application of the Single Failure Criteria to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems Regulatory Guide 1.61, 10/73 Damping Values for Seisric Design of Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.62, 10/73 Manual Initiation of Protective Actions Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2, 9/78 Physical Independence of Electric Systems (Note 1: Separation criteria of RG 1.75 and IEEE 384 will be met within the new diesel generator structure. As a minimum, requirements of the USAR will be met for new equipment and system designs within the existing plant.)
(Note 2: For regulatory position C.10, cables will be marked at 10 foot intervals, rather than the 5 foot interval specified, in conformance with USAR Section 8.7.5 which has been found to be sufficient to ensure proper cable installation.)
Regulatory Guide 1.81, Rev. 1, 1/75 Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants ,
(Note: For regulatory position C.3, the onsite emergency a.c.
electrical system for each unit will be separate and independent, 58
i l
l Rev. 2 1 but the capability to interconnect the emergency (safeguards) 4kV a.c. buses within separation criteria divisions (i.e. , Unit 1-Train A to Unit 2-Train A, etc.) will be retained for use during Station Blackout (access to Alternate A.C. (A.A.C) source) and other similar circumstances.)
Regulatory Guide 1.92, Rev. 1, 2/76 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2, 6/88 Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, 8/77 Periodic Testing of Diesel Units Used As On-site Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plant Regulatory Guide 1.118, Rev. 2, 6/78 Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems Regulatory Guide 1.122, Rev 1, 2/78 Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components Regulatory Guide 1.131, Rev. O, 8/77 Qualification Tests of ' Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.337, Rev. 1, 10/79 Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel GeneratorsBulletin 79-02, Rev. 2, 11/79 Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts 3.5.4 FFPA Standards NFPA 30-1987 National Fire Protection Association Standard for Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code NFPA 37-1984 National Fire Protection Association Standard for Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines (Note: Paragraph 5-8.1 can not be met. Fuel will be fed to the engines by gravity from non-integral day tanks.)
3.5.5 ANSI Standards ANSI-N195-1976 Fuel Oil Systems For Standby Diesel Generators 59
l Rev. 2 l
3.5.6 Northern States Power Standards l Prairie Island - Updated Safety Analysis Report l Prairie Island - Final Safety Analysis Report Prairie Island Technical Specifications NSP Underground Storage Tank Policy Compliance Guide, dated October 3, 1989 (exception: fuel inventory management system not provided).
Prairie Island Operations Manual Section Hil,. Electrical Construction Standards.
Prairie Island Security Plan.
3.5.7 Fluor Daniel Procedures Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Support Design Procedures for SBO ,
Projects Procedures No. 834473-1 (latest Rev.)
I 60
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Rev. 2 4.0 NEW DS/D6 BUILDING The new DS and D6 Building will house two SACM diesel generators (D5 and D6), with associated control panels, auxiliary equipment, electrical distribution equipment, fuel oil and lube oil tanks, and diesel engine radiators. The D5/D6 Building will be an above-grade Seismic Category I reinforced concrete structure, designed to withstand design basis load combinations. The D5/D6 Building will be located along the west wall of the Auxiliary Building (Column Row 15) between Column Rows G and K, and has approximate dimensions of 68 ft. x 124 ft. x 61 ft. high including penthouses. The DS/D6 Building will not be , connected structurally to the existing main plant Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building. The existing cooling water emergency discharge line, Turbine Room Alternate Discharge Line, Fire Hose Station HH7, the high mast lighting and below-grade communication duct bank and security cable are to be relocated to accommodate the new building. Building space will be provided for future addition of batteries, battery charges, inverters, MCCs, and distribution panels. Figures 4-1 through 4-9 depict the layout of the DS/D6 Building. Since the new D5/D6 Building will occupy the area in which the condensate storage tanks and associated piping were situated, the Condensate Storage Tanks 21 and 22 were relocated to west of the Unit 2 Containment Building along the south wall of the new DS/D6 Building. 4.1 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION The seismic design classification for the DS and D6 building - systems are as follows: 4.1.1 Structures The D5/D6 Building will be a Seismic Category I structure. 4.1.2 Electrical / Mechanical /HVAC Building Support Systems All safety related electrical, mechanical and HVAC systems and components will be designed to withstand a Safe Shutdown Earthquake ; (SSE) and remain functional (Seismic Category I). All non-safety related systems and components and their supporting systems will be designed to ensure that the SSE would not cause their structural l failure resulting in damage to safety related systems or components (Seismic II over I). 4 74
Rev. 2 4.1.2.1 Electrical Support Systems The potential failure of electrical support systems that are non-safety related anywhere within the Building could endanger the functioning of safety related systems and will, therefore, be supported seismically. The mounting of lighting, communications, and fire detection system components will be designed to withstand seismic conditions (Seismic II over I). The mounting of security control system components will be designed for seismic conditions in areas where structural failure of security system components could result in damage to safety related equipment. Normal power distribution equipment, raceways and supports within , the new building will be supported seismically to preclude the - possibility of damage to safety related equipment (Seismic II over I). Safeguards power distribution equipment (seismic active), raceways and supports (both seismically passive) will be seismically qualified. 4.1.2.2 Mechanical Support Systems 4 All station air, plumbing, fire suppression, and other non-safety l related piping and supports within the new Building _ will be seismically supported to withstand the SSE without structural failure (Seismic II over I). Non-safety related piping will be supported seismically to assure that the failure of the piping , cannot damage safety related systems or components (Seismic II over i I). l l 4.1.2.3 HVAC Support Systems All components of the DS/D6 Building HVAC System shall be Seismic Category I. Instruments and controls that are required for the { operation of safety related fans and dampers will also be Seismic ) Quality Class I. Instruments that perform indication and alarming ' and controls for non-safety related cooling equipment will be supported seismically (Seismic II over I). 4.2 SAFETY DESIGN CLASSIFICATION f The safety design classification for the D5/D6 building systems are as follows: 4.2.1 Structures All structures are classified as safety related or non-safety related. 75
I 1 Rev. 2 , SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF STRUCTURES l Structure Classificati2n ; DS/D6 Building Safety Related i 4.2.2 Buildina Suncort Systems ; The design classification for electrical, mechanical & HVAC support systems is as follows:
- 1. Electrical Support System Classification i
- a. Lighting, communi- Non-Safety Related cation, & normal power !
distribution : 4
- b. Safeguards power Safety Related &
distribution system Class 1E components serving HVAC
- c. Fire Detection Non-Safety Related, Fire Protection Related I i
- d. Security Control Non-Safety Related, ,
Security Related i
- 2. Mechanical Support Systems Classification ;
- a. Plumbing, service Non-Safety Related air, & fire suppression
- b. Fire suppression & Non-Safety Related systems l
- 3. Normal HVAC Support Systems Classification
- a. Components of the Non-Safety Related lube oil storage tank / fuel oil day tank rooms exhaust system
- b. DS/D6 Control Room Non-Safety Related Auxiliary Cooling System l;
- c. Switchgear Area Non-Safety Related [
auxiliary cooling system
- d. Controls for auxiliary Non-Safety Related [
heating, cooling & 76 r
Rev. 2 ventilation systems
- e. Instrumentation (indi- Non-Safety Related cation & alarm only)
- f. Future battery room Non-Safety Related
- 4. Safety-Related HVAC Support Systems ,
- a. Cooling fans / modu- Safety Related lating dampers (control switches, temperature sensors, transmitters &
controllers)
- b. Instrumentation (indi- Non-Safety Related cation & alarm only) 4.3 BUILDING STRUCTURE DESIGN 4.3.1 Desian Loads All structures will be designed to withstand various loads as follows: -
All mechanical and electrical equipment and appurtenances will be supported in accordance with their design classification. Supports for non-safety related items will be designed and installed such that their supports do not fail under seismic conditions and ! endanger the operation of any adjacent safety-related items , (Seismic II over I). All the major loads to be encountered or to be postulated are-listed below. All the loads listed, however, are not necessarily applicable to all the structures and their elements. Loads and the applicable load combinations for which each structure has to be i designed will depend on the conditions to which that particular - structure is subjected. , 4.3.1.1 Dead Loads (D) ! The dead loads include the weight of framing, roofs, floors, walls, ! partitions, platforms and all permanent equipment and materials. , The vertical and lateral pressures of liquid will also be treated as dead loads, as indicated in ACI Codes. Floors shall be checked for the actual equipment loads. For f permanently attached small equipment, piping conduits and cable trays, a minimum of 50 psf shall be added where appropriato. 4.3.1.2 Live Loads (L and L.) 77
i i Rev. 2 Live loads will be as specified in Subsections 1 and 2, below, but j in no case less than the minimum design live loads specified in 3. j
- 1. Live Loads (L) !
These include floor area loads, equipment handling loads, and similar items. The floor area live load will be omitted from areas occupied by equipment whose weight is specifically included in dead , load. Live load will not be omitted under equipment where access - is provided (for example, elevated tank on legs). The lateral earth pressure will be treated as live load as ; indicated in ACI codes. ,
- 2. Live Loads During Operation (Lo)
In loading combinations including earthquake, the live loads shall ! be limited to "I% ", which is defined as the live load expected to be present when the plant is operating. , The value of Ig will be considered to be 50 psf.
- 3. Minimum Design Live Loads :
1 The following minimum live loads will be used in the design. Certain other applicable loads are listed separately in succeeding 2 sections. Roofs 50 psf Stairs & Walkways 100 psf
- Railings 25 psf or !
200 lbs. applied in any direction ; at top of railing Platforms & gratings 100 psf Ground Floor (except control room) 500 psf , Control Room 250 psf All other floors 200 psf 4.3.1.3 Construction Loads i Structures and components will be designed considering all ; applicable construction load conditions.
, 4.3.1.4 Earth Pressure Earth pressures will be in accordance with the requirements of UBC.
~ 4 In load combinations, loads due to earth pressure will be treated as live load. 1 i 78 }
, . , _ _ - . _ _ _. ~ .
i i Rev. 2 4.3.1.5 Groundwater Pressure For structural and buoyancy calculations,_ the high groundwater I table will be as specified below: Water Levels (Ref. USAR) Normal ground water El. 674'6" [ Low ground water El. 672'6" i Probable Maximum Design Flood El. 70387" The effect of a design flood will also be considered. In load combinations, loads due to water pressure will be treated as dead load. 4.3.1.6 Environmental Loads (USAR Sec. 12) These consist of wind (W) and snow loads. Snow loads of 50 lbs. per sq. ft. of horizontal projected area will be used in the design of structures and components exposed to snow. Roof loads from rain ponding is not significant. The main roof slab at elevation 755' is sloped to collect roof drainage at four locations. The roof drains are sized for 3 inches per hour of precipitation. The roof drains of the new building are connected to the existing plant drains and the roof slab does not have curbs. Because of the flat roof construction, and lack of parapet and . curbs, the water will run off the roof from the sides if the intensity of precipitation should exceed the design intensity or if the roof drains should get plugged. There will be no ponding on the roof slab except for a very shallow trough created for the roof drainage. The design wind speed is 100 mph. Wind pressure, shape fact 6rs, gust factors and variation of winds with height shall be determined in accordance with the procedures given in the American Society of ; Civil Engineers, (ASCE) paper No. 3269 " Wind Forces on Structures", Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 126, Part II (1961). 4.3.1.7 Tornado Loads (W,) (Ref. Regulatory Guide 1.76) l Tornado loadings used in the design will consist of the following:
- a. A lateral force caused by a funnel of wind having a rotational speed of 290 mph and a maximum translation speed of 70 mph.
- b. A pressure drop of 3.0 psi, the rate of pressure drop being 2.0 l psi /sec.
- c. The design tornado generated missiles as shown on Table B.
79
Rev. 2 These tornado, wind and missile loads represent current NRC guidance and were used in place of those from the USAR. < 4.3.1.8 Seismic Loads The following seismic loads will be used in the_ design.
- a. Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) (E)
The Operating Basis Earthquake loads based upon - a maximum horizontal and vertical ground acceleration of 0.06g.
- b. Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) (E')
The Safe Shutdown Earthquake loads based upon a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.12g. 1
- c. Uniform Building Code Earthquake Loads All structures that are not required to be designed for OBE or SSE loads as shown above, will be designed in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Building Code. This code '
specifies the location of the plant site to be in a "Zero" earthquake area. However, for conservatism earthquake loads applicable to Zone 1 areas will be used in the design under this ; category. 4.3.1.9 Temperature Loads (T or Ta) Thermal effects and loads during normal operating or shutdown conditions, based on the most critical transient or steady state condition. 4.3.1.10 Pipe Reaction Loads (Ro or Ra) Pipe reactions during normal operating or shutdown conditions, ; based on the most critical transient or steady state condition. 4.3.1.11 High Energy Pipe Break Loads i The only system in the D5/D6 Building which is considered a high energy line is the Diesel Generator Air Start system. The Diesel > Generator Air Start system was evaluated against the guidance of , Standard Review Plan 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, " Postulated Rupture Locations in Fluid System Piping Inside and Outside Containment," indicates that circumferential breaks should be postulated in fluid system piping runs exceeding > a nominal pipe size of one inch. The air start piping runs do not ; exceed one inch; therefore, circumferential breaks are not postulated. Similarly, longitudinal breaks should be postulated in . piping runs exceeding four inches nominal pipe size. The air start ! piping runs do not exceed this criterion therefore no high energy pipe break loads need to be considered in the design. Therefore, 80
Rev. 2 no high energy pipe break loads need to be considered in the design. A postulated leak in the air start piping may result in the blowdown of a single air receiver. However, as stated in Section 3.3.3.1 of the SBO/ESU Design Report, only two of the four receiver bottles are required to start the diesel generator. In addition, the leakage of air will not result in an adverse environment in the diesel generator room. 4.3.2 Structural Desian Basis 4.3.2.1 General All steel structures will be designed by the elastic working stress method. All reinforced concrete structures will be designed using , the Ultimate Strength Design (USD) method. Under normal loading conditions, a minimum factor of safety will be provided for all structures as shown below: Overturning: 1.50 Sliding: 1.50 Buoyancy 1.25 Minimum f actor of safety for buoyancy under design flood conditions will be 1.1 (SRP 3.8.5). Design characteristics assumed for the various materials used are stated in Section 4.3.3 " Construction Materials". 4.3.2.2 Safety Related Structures l
- 1. Seismic Design 1
- a. General ;
1 The building will be modeled as a three dimensional finite l element lumped mass model. The soil will be represented by six spring elements. The computer program STARDYNE will be used for modal integration to obtain floor response, acceleration time histories and subsequent generation of the floor response acceleration spectra. The spectral acceleration will be used for the design of the floor slabs and the procurement of equipment based on their design classification. The modal responses obtained from the spectral analysis will be combined in accordance with the Regulatory Guide 1.92. All three components of seismic accelerations, two horizontal and one vertical component, will be considered to act simultaneously. The spatial components will be combined by the Square Root of Sum of Squares (SRSS) method. 81
i l Rev. 2 I
- b. Design Input Response Spectra Input horizontal and vertical seismic spectra for the j seismic design of the D5/D6 Building will be based on the Regulatory Guide 1.60 Rev. 1, July 1981 spectra for a ,
maximum ground acceleration (zero period acceleration) of 0.06g for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and 0.12g t for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). These zero period acceleration values are in compliance - with the PI Nuclear Generating Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report. ,
- c. Time Histories Acceleration time histories for the three directions of i motion (two horizontal and one vertical) will be developed using the reverse shock spectrum feature (DYNRE 7) of the .
STARDYNE MICRO computer program. These time histories will l be developed independently for the three directions using randomly generated input values by iteratively adjusting i the frequency content so as to match the resulting response spectrum with the design response spectrum for a chosen damping value. Comparison of the resulting spectra for various damping values with the corresponding OBE input i design response spectra curves will be done to ensure l acceptability of the final time histories. The requirement of SRP 3.7.1 for the enveloping criteria will be satisfied. No separate SSE time histories will be developed. The OBE response spectra values will be doubled to obtain corresponding SSE values. These time histories will be used as input motion for the mathematical model to generate response spectra for all floors. i
- d. Critical Damping Values The percentage of critical damping values for the OBE and ~
SSE levels used in the analyses will be in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.61, October 1973. These values will be used for seismic qualification of equipment and systems. The values for material and radiation damping within the 1 soil medium will be taken as 10 percent of critical damping l for the translational (3 directions), rocking and torsional > motions of the building structure. These values will be ' the same for both OBE and SSE levels.
- e. c Soil-S~ructure Interaction ,
Soil-structure interaction will be accounted for in the , seismic analyses through the use of soil springs , 82
Rev. 2 representing the six degrees of freedom (three translations and three rotations) of the rigid foundation mat. Soil Spring constants will be computed using the formulas given in " Design Procedures for Dynamically Loaded Foundations" by R.V. Whitman and F.E. Richart, Journal of the Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, ASCE, November, 1967. Material properties used in these formulas will be taken from the John A. Blume & Associates Report / JAB-PS-02 which provided the basis for the original seismic design for ; Prairie Island. The set of six springs will be placed at the mass center of the foundation slab. The ground motion time histories will be applied directly at the base of the foundation slab.
- f. Interaction with Existing Structures I
The DS/D6 Building foundation is maintained independent ' from the adjacent Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building foundations using compressible materials between them to achieve the specified spacing. Similarly, the D5/D6 Building walls and floors are maintained independent from the adjacent Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building walls. The only exception to this is along G-line wall of the Turbine Building between column lines 15 and 16.6 between elevations 695' and 705', where the DS/D6 Building stairwell partition wall has some contact with the Turbine Building wall. The above mentioned spacing between structures, and points of contact, have been analyzed to show that they provide adequate seismic independence of the DS/D6 Building from existing structures. (
References:
Letter from Thomas M Parker, Northern States Power Company, to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated December 21, 1992 titled " Reply to a Request for Information on the Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project" and Letter from Marsha Gamberoni, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Thomas M Parker, Northern States Power Company, dated March 22, 1993 titled Prairie Island, Unit 2 - DS/D6 Building Structural Safety Evaluation
- g. Mathematical Model The dynamic model will consist of several " sticks" representing the shear walls with nodes at each floor level. Each of these nodes will be connected by rigid link, representing the rigid diaphragm action of the floor slab.
The shear areas and moments of inertia of the concrete walls between floors will be used to calculate the 83
i Rev. 2 stiffness characteristics of the elements between nodes of < the individual wall " stick". Tha foundation slab will be treated as a rigid member for , in-plane and out-of-plane motions. In order to incorporate the effect of the actual floor slab , stiffness on the vertical response spectra, vertical spring : mass systems will be attached, at the center of mass of ; each floor to represent the vertical flexibility of the slab at that elevation. The slab mass along with the equipment loads will represent the mass of the spring-mass system. This will be done by solving the problem twice, once with the lowest flexibility of the slab and second with the highest flexibility. This will provide an enveloping spectrum. Composite behavior of the concrete slab and steel beams will be considered in the computation of the spring constants, where appropriate.
- h. Spectral Peak Broadening j The spectral accelerations obtained from the STARDYNE program will be smoothed and its frequency at peak acceleration will be broadened (115%) in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.122, Rev. 1.
- 2. Tornado Winds Structures will be analyzed for stresses due to tornado and missile loads. Stresses due to tornado loading will be combined with stresses due to dead loads and operating loads to obtain total stress. Maximum stresses will be limited to those specified in 3ection 4.3.6.
- 3. Design for Missiles
- a. Externally Generated Missiles Missiles shown in Table 4-B will be considered for design.
All tornado generated missiles will be assumed to impact !
- end on at 90 degrees to the surface being impacted and all
- areas of Safety Related structures exposed to either falling or horizontally flying tornado missiles will be investigated.
In accordance with SRP 3.5.3, Local Damage of Barriers (Penetration, Spalling and Scabbing Effects) and their overall response is investigated. Where elasto-plastic behavior of steel barriers is relied upon, a maximum , ductility ratio of 20 is used. j 84
i Rev. 2 e
- b. Internally Generated Missiles ,
The safety related portions of the diesel engine auxiliary support systems are all located within the new DS/D6 building and the attached underground fuel oil storage vaults. These safety related systems are located outside l of the turbine missile trajectories defined in Figures 12.2-36 and 12.2-37 of the Prairie Island USAR or are protected by reinforced concrete barriers (l'-6" thick roof , slab and l'-8" thick walls). Therefore, the auxiliary , systems are not subject to turbine missiles. , 1 The only potential missile sources within the DS/D5 building are the diesel generators themselves. The diesel generators are each surrounded by reinforced concrete barriers ranging from 12 to 20 inches thick. The two trains of auxiliary support systems are also completely separated by these protective barriers. The design, fabrication, and inspection of the SACM engine block, connecting rods, cylinder liners and pistons is performed to ensure that there are no catastrophic failures which could generate missiles. During more than 57,000 hours of operation of over 250 diesel generator sets in nuclear i power plants around the world, SACM engines have never experienced a failure resulting in internally generated missiles. In addition, the diesel engine overspeed trip logic is configured such that an overspeed signal in either of the two tandem engines will result in a trip signal to both engines. This redundancy ensures the reliability of the overspeed trip function. The design provisions and operating experience described above ensure that the safety related diesel auxiliary support systems are protected from internally generated missiles. The only piping within the D5/D6 building which is considered high energy is the diesel generator air start system piping. This piping is not subject to breaks which could damage the diesel auxiliary support systems due to pipe whip or jet impingement, as discussed in 4.3.1.11.
- 4. Flood Protection The Diesel Generator Building Structure will be protected l against the probable maximum flood at an elevation of 703'7". l The base slab and the exterior walls will be designed to resist i the full hydrostatic head of the probable maximum flood. Except for the exit doors, all openings to the exterior wall will be above elevation 705'0". All mat and exterior wall construction '
l joints below elevation 705'0" will have water stops. In the event of a design basis flood, exit door openings through the i exterior walls will be protected by water tight bulkhead i 85
Rev. 2 closures. 4.3.2.3 Non-Safety Related Structures Structures in this class are designed for the conditions of loading specified in Section 4.3.4.2 and in accordance with the design methods and allowable stresses specified in the codes. Stresses i are combined as before and reviewed to assure that they are within limits. l 4.3.3 Construction Materials l I The principal construction materials for Safety Related structures j are: concrete, reinforcing steel and structural steel. Concrete desien compressive strength will be as follows: All structures 4000 psi Mud slab and concrete fill 2000 psi Reinforcing steel will be deformed billet steel, conforming to ASTM Designation A-615, grade 60. Structural steel will conform to ASTM designation A-36 or A-572 Grade 50. i i 4.3.4 Load Combinations The following loads and loading combinations will be used in the design and analysis. 4.3.4.1 Safety Related Structures Safety related structures will be analyzed for the following conditions of loading:
- 1. Load Combinations for Concrete Structures (Ref. SRP 3.8.4)
For concrete structures using ultimate strength design method, the load combinations will be in accordance with the following: For normal / service load conditions, the following load combinations will be considered: (1) 1.4 D + 1.7 L (2) 1. 4 D + 1. 7 L, + 1. 9 E (3) 1.4 D + 1.7 L + 1.7 W Where thermal stresses due to T. and R, are present, the following combinations shall be considered: (4) (0.75) (1.4D + 1.7L + 1.7To + 1. 7 R,) (5) (0.75) (1.4D + 1.7Lo + 1.9E + 1.7To + 1. 7R ) 86
Rev. 2 (6) (0.75) (1. 4 D + 1. 7L + 1. 7W + 1. 7T. + 1. 7Ro) In addition, the following combinations will be considered: (7) 1.2 D + 1.9 E (8) 1.2 D + 1.7 W , For factored load conditions which represent extreme environmental, abnormal, abnormal / severe environmental, and i abnormal / extreme environmental conditions, the following load combinations will be considered. (9) D + L, + To + E' (10) D + L, + T + Ro + W, (11) D+Lo + T. + R, + 1. 5 P. (12) D+Lo + T. + R, + 1. 2 5 P + 1. 0 ( Y, + Y3 + Y.) + 1. 2 5E > (13) D + L, + T. + R + 1. 0 P. + 1. 0 ( Y, + Y3 + Y. ) + 1.0E' In combinations (11),(12), and (13), the maximum values of D., T., R., Y, 3 Y,, and Y., including an appropriate dynamic load factor will be used unless a time-history analysis is performed to justify otherwise. Combinations (10) and (12) and (13) and the corresponding ' structural acceptance criteria of Section 4.3.6 will be satisfied first without the tornado missile load in (10) and without Y,, Yj, and Y. in (12) and (13). When considering these concentrated loads local section strength capacities may be exceeded provided there is no loss of function of any safety-related system. Where any load reduces the effects of other loads, the corresponding coefficient for that load will be taken as 0.9 if it can be demonstrated that the load is always present or occurs simultaneously with other loads. Otherwise the coefficient for that load will be taken as a zero.
- 2. Load Combinations for Steel Structures (Ref. SRP 3.8.4)
{ For steel interior structures using elastic working stress design methods, the load combinations will be in accordance with the following: , s For normal / service load conditions, the following load ' conditions will be considered: (1) D+L (2) D+Lo +E (3) D+L+W If thermal stresses due to T, and R, are present, the following combinations will be also considered: (4) D+L+To + R, 87
Rev. 2 i (5) D+L+T+R+E (6) D + L + T. + R + W For factored load conditions the following load combinations will be considered: (7) D + 4 + T + R. + E ' (8) D+b+T+R+W (9) D + 4 + T. + R. + P. (10) D + 4 + T. + R. + P. + 1. 0 (Y, + Yj + Y.) +E (11) D + L + T. + R. + P. + 1. 0 (Y, + Yj + Y.) + E' In the above factored load combinations, thermal loads can be selected when it can be shown that they are secondary and self-limiting in nature and where the material.is ductile. In combinations (9), (10), and (11), the maximum values of P., T., R., Yj, Y, and Y., including an appropriate dynamic load f actor will be used unless a time-history analysis is performed to justify otherwise. Combinations (8), (10) and (11) and the corresponding structural acceptance criteria of Section 4.3.6 will first be satisfied without the tornado missile load in (8) and without Y,, Yj, and Y in (10) and (11). When considering these concentrated loads, local section strength may be exceeded provided there will be no loss of function of any safety-related system. Where any load reduces the effects of other loads, the corresponding coefficient for that load will be taken as 0.9, if it can be demonstrated that the load is always present or occurs simultaneously with other loads. Otherwise, the coefficient for that load will be taken as zero. Where the structural effect of differential settlement may be significant, it shall be included with the dead load, D. 4.3.4.2 Non-Safety Related Structures Non-safety related structures will be designed for the greater of the following two combinations of loads:
- 1. Dead, Live and Environmental loads (wind or snow) or
- 2. Dead, Live and Uniform Building Code Earthquake loads specified in Section 4.3.1.8 which for the Prairie Island site is 0.05g (Ref. USAR Sec. 12) 4.3.5 Desian and Analysis Procedur,e_s The design and analysis procedures utilized for structures, including assumptions on boundary conditions and expected behavior under loads, will be in accordance with the following:
88
Rev. 2
- a. For safety related concrete structures, the procedures will be .
in accordance with ACI 349-85, " Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Structures".
- b. For non-safety related concrete structures, the procedures will be in accordance with either ACI 349-85 or ACI 318-83.
- c. For steel structures, the procedures will be in accordance with the AISC Specification, eighth edition.
4.3.6 Structural Acceptance Criteria (Ref. SRP 3.8.4) For each of the loading combinations delineated in section 4.3.4.1 - of this criteria, the following defines the allowable limits which constitute the structural acceptance criteria:
- a. In Combinations for Concrete Limit All Load Combinations U
- b. In Combinations for Steel Limit Load Combinations (1), (2), (3) S Lead Combinations (4), (5), (6) 1.S S Load Combinations (7), (8), (9) 1.6 S*
Load Combinations (10), (11) 1.7 S* Notes: S For structural steel, S is the required section strength based on elastic design methods and the allowable stresses defined in Part 1 of the AISC " Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings" The 1/3 increase in allowable stresses for steel due to seismic or wind loadings is not permitted. I U For concrete structures, D is the section strength required to resist design loads based on the strength design methods described in ACI 349 Code.
- For these two combinations, in computing the required section strength, S, the plastic section modulus of steel shapes, except '
for those which do not meet the AISC criteria for compact sections, may be used. I 4.3.7 Structural / Architectural Fire Protection Reauirements 4.3.7.1 Separation Barriers Each Diesel Generator and associated trained auxiliary components l will be separated from each other and the remainder of the plant by reinforced concrete walls having a fire rating of at least 3-hours. 89 l l
i i Rev. 2 In light of its proximity to the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building, the east wall and a portion of the north wall are also 3-hour fire rated. All penetrations in fire walls will be 3-hour fire rated. Each redundant electrical train will be separated by : 3-hour rated fire barriers. The building stairway walls at all levels will be separated from all adjacent areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers. The pipe trench running through both fire areas on the grade level will be separated from the remainder of the building area by a 3-hour rated barrier. Fire barriers are listed in Table 4-C. Fire doors of equivalent rating will be provided in fire walls. 4.3.7.2 Fire Area Boundaries and Penetrations The DS/D6 Building has been divided into areas with unique fire area designations, mainly for convenient inventory of combustibles. Boundaries separating the areas that do not contain redundant safe ' shutdown equipment or cables are not maintained as 3-hour rated boundaries. Cable and cable tray penetrations as well as piping and ventilation duct penetrations through designated fire area boundaries, will be l sealed with a penetration seal having a 3-hour fire rating. Adequacy of these seals was previously demonstrated by fire tests conducted in accordance with IEEE G 4-1978 by Southwest Research Institute (test reports SWRT 03-1402/ Quadrex-NOR-0176 and NOR-0179, PO 5364). The diesel fuel oil day tank and the lube oil storage tank room are i each contained in a separate room constructed of reinforced concrete with 3-hour fire rated walls, floor and ceiling. Room doors and fire dampers in ventilation ducts through designated fire boundaries are fire rated for 3-hours. All penetrations through the room boundaries that are designated fire area boundaries are , sealed with three hour penetration seals. Floor drains and curbs are provided for each room which discharge into the building sump pit. In high combustible loading fire areas, all structural steel l forming a part of or supporting a fire barrier wall or slab will be coated with fire proofing material to provide a fire rating equal or greater than the fire barrier. 4.3.8 Buildina Exterior ODeninas All building exterior openings except exit doors will be protected from access by access-controlled Security Devices. These openings will be protected from tornado generated missiles. All openings that serve as inlet or outlet for HVAC Systems, will be provided with screens to preclude entry of birds, leaves and other debris. I 90
Rev. 2 ; 4.4 BUILDING ELECTRICAL DESIGN 4.4.1 Lichtina 4.4.1.1 System Functions Lighting for the new DS/D6 Building is provided by two systems. ,
- 1. Normal Lighting System Function This system will provide general and local illumination for operating and maintenance activities.
- 2. Emergency Lighting System Function This lighting will provide protection of personnel and allow continued safe plant operation in the event of normal lighting failure. It will consist of fixed self-contained battery pack lighting.
Fixed self-contained lighting with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies will be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown (in the event of a fire) and for access , and egress routes to these areas. 4.4.1.2 System Design
- 1. General System The type of fixture and foot candle requirements for the various areas of the new Building will be as required by NFPA 70 and with consideration of the guidelines of the Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) Handbook. Illumination requirements will be determined by test with personnel performing required emergency tasks and egress using emergency lighting only.
Conduit for lighting systems will be run embedded and exposed, I and grounded. Separated conduit system will be provided for the 277V, normal lighting and 120V receptacles which provide power to and emergency lighting units. All lighting fixtures are to be pendant or surface mounted. I Lighting wire insulation will be type XHHW, rated 90 C. I Common neutrals are used wherever possible for lighting ll! circuits. A common neutral will be run with each 3-phase feeder circuit. Full-siae neucrals will be used for feeder and branch j circuits. I 91 l
Rev. 2 l The combined voltage drop of both feeder and branch circuits ; will not exceed 5%. l Lighting wires will be labeled as to panel and circuit. ; 1
- 2. Normal Lighting System l Normal lighting fixtures will be 277V fluorescent, HP sodium or metal halide and 120V incandescent.
Fixtures will be switched from the lighting panelboard, using molded case circuit breakers rated for switching duty. The normal lighting panels will be 480/277V, 3-phase, 4-wire fed from two new normal MCC's in the new diesel building.
- 3. Emergency Lighting and Exit Signs System Emergency lighting vill be incandescent and provided with self-contained 8-hour rated battery packs.
Exit lights will be incandescent and provided with self-contained 8-hour rated battery packs. 4.4.2 Power Distribution and Loads 4.4.2.1 System Function The power distribution system will provide electrical energy to all non-Class 1E building loads, including lighting systems, communication, security and fire detection systems, convenience outlets and miscellaneous building equipment. Normal (non-safeguards) 480 VAC electrical power to serve building , loads will be obtained from normal 480V motor control centers. The building normal power distribution system will consist of motor control centers, transformers, distribution panels and associated , cable and raceway systems. safeguards 480 VAC electrical power will be obtained from new safeguards motor control centers and 480V switchgear in the DS/D6 Building for the safety-related HVAC systems and diesel generator support systems. This portion of the power distribution system will be Class lE. 4.4.2.2 System Design Electrical power distribution will be accomplished by means of a 4 8 0 VAC , 3-phase, 4-wire, solidly grounded system. Transformations from this service to 120 and 208 V AC will be provided by panel boards mounted in motor control centers or separate panels mounted near the motor control centers. 92
Rev. 2 Electrical supply equipment will have the capacity to supply the power requirements of all identified and anticipated loads plus spare capacity for future loads. All components of the power distribution system will be rated for 600V AC and be suitable for application in a typical industrial environment. The non-safety building electrical power distribution system will be electrically and physically independent from all safety-related ' systems. Segregation will also be provided between different voltage classes. Non-Class 1E circuits for lighting, communication, fire detection and security systems are routed in totally enclosed raceway and cable for these systems need not comply with IEEE 383. The remaining non-Class 1E circuits will use fire resistant cable which has passed the fire tests contained in IEEE 383 on UL VW-1 and is Class 1E qualified cable. Overcurrent protection will be provided by means of molded-case thermal-magnetic circuit breakers. Proper coordination of all overcurrent protection devices will be provided down to (and including) local panelboard(s), in accordance with IEEE Std. 242-1975. Transformers, disconnect switches, lighting panels, receptacle panels and receptacles will be surface or floor mounted. The receptacle panels will be 120/208V, three-phase, four wire stepped down from a 480-120/208V transformer. i Power receptacles will be 120V AC, duplex with no covers, except that in the diesel pit, radiator room, air inlet room and generator room weather proof covers will be used. Welding receptacles (minimum of 4) will be, 480V, 3-phase, 4 wire. l I 4.4.3 Groundinc The electrical power distribution system will be solidly grounded ; to the existing Station ground network. 1 Load equipment, power supplies, raceways, and enclosures will be l electrically interconnected and form a continuous path to Station ground. In addition, all load equipment (25 HP or greater) will be grounded by means of a separate ground conductor routed with the l circuit conductors. 93 l
Rev. 2 4.4.4 Communications 4.4.4.1 System Function This system will provide dependable, convenient and rapid communication between all plant areas vital to the operation and maintenance of the plant and the protection of personnel. The existing communications system will be extended to the new diesel R generator building. 4.4.4.2 System Design The communications system will consist of: Telephone system installed by an independent telephone contractor. Page/Public Address System (Gai-tronics) A visual signaling device will be provided in the diesel engine . rooms to indicate plant alarm actuation. Flashing lights in the t noisy areas (Diesel Engine Rooms) will supplement the PA system in these areas. Maintenance (sound powered) system. 4.4.5 Fire Detection 4.4.5.1 System Function This system will detect and alarm in case of fire. The detection devices will be appropriate to the specific area and the type of fire anticipated. All detection equipment will alarm on the fire detection panel in the main control room. Only one alarm will be sent to the Main Control Room for the entire Diesel Generator Building. The fire detection panel will be located on the turbine building side of the north wall of the stairway. There will be no connection between the HVAC system and the fire alarm system. No HVAC smoke control system will be . provided. Manual pull stations will be provided at the main exits.- 4.4.5.2 System Design Fire detectors for the diesel generator will be heat detectors that I will be single zoned and wired to activate a pre-action sprinkler system for each diesel. All other rooms in the diesel building will have smoke detectors installed. All fire alarm wiring will be supervised. A single zone will be , provided in the control room for the entire building. l The fire alarm and pre-action control panel will be located on the turbine side of the north diesel generator wall. Electrical power 94 i
Rev. 2 will be supplied by an existing non-safeguards 120V AC UPS source. Manual fire alarm pull stations will be locoted at the main exits. . 4.4.6 Security Security for the new DS/D6 Building is provided by three systems.
- 1. Building Security System The building security system will provide protection from unauthorized access into the building. The security system will have the capability to monitor, alarm, store data and generate reports pertinent to personnel access / egress into the building.
This system will function during normal plant operation and during loss of off-site power but is not required to operate following a design basis accident or safe shutdown earthquake. The building security system will consist of card readers, electric door strikes, position switches, security lighting and cables to interface with the existing plant security system. Normal entrance / exit doors will be monitored and controlled by the plant security computer. Operation of emergency exit doors will be monitored and alarmed.
- 2. Security Lighting System The building's external lighting system will satisfy the plant security illumination requirements in accordance with the 3 Prairie Island Security Plan. ;
- 3. Security Fence System I
The new DS/D6 Building and Fuel Oil Storage Vault will be located entirely within the existing protected area security fence. During construction, a temporary construction guardhouse located at the southwest corner of the existing protected area security fence will be utilized. 4.4.7 Radiation Monitorina i l Three area radiation monitors will be located in the D5/D6 i Building. Each monitor alarm will be an input to the existing area radiation monitoring panels in the Control Rod Drive Rooms and the Emergency Response Computer System. l 95 l i
Rev. 2 4.5 BUILDING MECHANICAL /HVAC DESIGN l 4.5.1 Fire Protection Desian l An automatic pre-action fire suppression system will protect the diesel engine rooms. The fuel oil tank day tank and lube oil tank l rooms will have wet pipe automatic sprinkler systems. Other areas l will be protected with standpipe hose stations and hand-held ! extinguishers as required by NFPA 10 Portable Fire Extinguishers. l The fire suppression system piping will be supplied from a new bulk main from the Turbine Building Fire Protection loop. ; The following areas will be provided with automatic fire ! suppression in compliance with NFPA, ANI and NRC requirements. l
- 1. D5 and D6 Diesel Generator Rooms !
- 2. Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms
- 3. Lube Oil Storage Tank Rooms
- 4. Outdoor Fuel Oil Receiving Tank 1
The diesel generator rooms will each have a single interlocked pre-action sprinkler system. Activation of the system will be by a single zone heat detection circuit that is wired into the local ' fire alarm control panel. Output from-the panel will be 24V DC to the fire detectors. The sprinkler riser will be separate from the standpipe station riser. l Three new feed mains and indicating isolation valves will be added to the existing Turbine Building 10-inch fire protection loop; one to supply the station system standpipe riser; one to supply the ! preaction and wet pipe systems; and one to supply the deluge system. This arrangement provides flexibility for removing i individual systems from service for maintenance. ' l
- 1. Preaction Sprinkler System An automatic proaction fusible-link sprinkler system will be provided for each emergency diesel generator room. The l l preaction valve will be tripped by a single zoned heat detection circuit. Piping will be supervised by air pressure with trouble signals annunciated at the local fire alarm control panel and i the fire alarm control panel in the control room.
- 2. Wet-Pipe Sprinkler System Each Fuel Oil Day Tank Room and Lube Oil Room will be provided :
with an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system that will have its l flow alarm wired into the fire alarm system. j
- 3. Deluge System The Fuel Oil Receiving Tank will be protected by an automatic l deluge system tripped by a single zoned heat detection circuit. i 96
Rev. 2 ! l
- 4. Hose Stations 1-1/2 inch hose stations with proper length of fire hose with fog nozzles will be provided to protect- all areas on each elevation.
- 5. Fire Extinguishers Dry chemical or carbon dioxide fire extinguishers will be ,
provided to protect all areas of the Diesel Generator Building depending on the specific hazard.
- 6. Sprinkler Systems and Hose Stations i Sprinkler systems and hose stations will be provided with !
separate risers such that primary or secondary protection will always be available. Hose stations in electrical equipment areas intended for electrical fires will be equipped with low flow fog nozzles. Sprinklers in stairways are not required by NFPA and will not be provided in the D5/D6 Building. A fire suppression system is not required for the Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vault per code. 4.5.2 Plumbina/ Drains 4.5.2.1 System Function Demineralized water hose stations for washdown in mechanical equipment areas will be furnished. Lavatories will not be provided i due to the temporary habitation of this structure. The building will be provided with convenient floor drains to route all normal drains and oily waste spills to two separate sumps in each diesel generator room. The sumps will be sized to contain the maximum quantity of oily waste spills corresponding to the capacity of the single largest system and will be sized to accommodate credible water pipe breaks. Portable sump pumps will be used for transfer of oil spills or water collected in the sumps. 4.5.2.2 System Design Plumbing system drain piping will be designed to meet the American Water Works Association (AWWA) and other appropriate building codes and industrial standards, consistent with existing Prairie Island I plant systems. Service water for the hose stations will be , provided from a tie to the Unit 2 Turbine Building. Potable water i piping for future battery room eyewashes will also be from a Unit i 2 tie-in. A waste discharge line will connect to the Unit 2 > Turbine Building waste system which will route to the plant hold-up pond. Roof drain piping and drain piping in the diesel generator 97
Rev. 2 radiator exhaust open area will connect to the cooling water return > line in the main plant. All other general area drain piping will run to the DS/D6 Building sump in the engine room pit area, except floor drains in the lube oil tank rooms and the fuel day tank ' rooms. Floor drains in the lube oil tank room and the fuel oil day tank rooms will run to the dirty oil tank located in the respective D5/D6 Building engine room pit area. t overflow piping from the dirty oil tanks will run to the DS/D6 l dirty oil sump located in the engine room pit areas. The dirty oil sumps are located in the diesel engine pit areas. A l portable sump pump will be used to transfer oil from the sumps to barrels for removal. Fire suppression water, discharged in the diesel generator rooms, will flow through the 695 ' elevation grating to the 687 ' elevation. At this elevation the water will be routed, via open channels, to the diesel generator pit sump. This sump will be provided with level switches to alarm high level. Indication of high level will be displayed on the local control room annunciator panel. Assuming that all sprinkler heads and two hose stations (total 1500 gpm) discharge water for a period of 30 minutes, approximately 2.3 feet of water would accumulate in the basement. When the fire is extinguished and the preaction system isolated by operator action, the water would be removed from the basement by use of portable pumps installed in the diesel generator pit sumps. 4.5.3 Heatina, Ventilation, and Air Conditionina (HVAC) 4.5.3.1 System Function The D5/D6 Building HVAC System will provide heating and ventilation and will provide for removal of electrical equipment heat loads to maintain equipment within qualification limits and operating limits during all plant operating conditions. It will also provide sufficient air flow to prevent build-up of unwanted gases. The DS/D6 Building HVAC system will be comprised of the following subsystems for each diesel generator train: o Lube oil Storage Tank and Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms Exhaust System o Battery Room Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation System (Future) o Emergency Equipment Switchgear Areas Ventilation System o Diesel Generator Control Room and Switchgear Area Auxiliary Cooling System o Local Electric Unit Heaters The HVAC system controls will consist of temperature sensors, temperature switches, controllers and damper control drives to control air flows in order to maintain required temperatures in the building. Fans will be operated by control switches with interlocks with their corresponding dampers and temperature 98
Rev. 2 sensors. Operating temperatures will be monitored and alarmed. Ductwork, wall, ceiling and floor cpenings will be provided to allow the later addition of a Battery Room Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation System. > 4.5.3.2 System Design The HVAC system capacities are based on an outdoor ambient temperature range of 96 F and -20 F. This is the 99% occurrence range from ASHRAE. The HVAC steady state heat load calculations do not take credit for passive heat sinks (concrete walls and floors) and thermal lag. Therefore, the HVAC design conditions are conservative, and brief upper temperature excursions up to 100*F for a few hours will not significantly affect electrical equipment operability. The vertical benchboard and control panels in the diesel generator control room must be maintained during all plant operating conditions at a temperature less than 104 F. The HVAC system will be designed to maintain component operating temperatures. A forced-air ventilation system for each train will be provided to , meet the equipment heat removal and fresh air ventilation needs of various areas serving each diesel generator.
- 1. Tank Rooms The Diesel Lube Oil Storage Tank rooms and Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms each have a minimum ventilation requirement of 1 cfm per square foot of floor area (minimum 150 cfm) on a year round basis in order to prevent possible build-up of a flammable atmosphere (NFPA30). The make-up air for the Diesel Lube Oil Storage Tank Rooms and Fuel Oil Day Tank Rooms will be from the DS/D6 Building ventilation supply.
- 2. Inlet Air l Inlet air will be ducted, fresh outside air mixed with ,
recirculated building air to maintain selected air temperatures. : The maximum indoor ambient temperature will be limited to be 12 0 F . The minimum temperature will be limited to 50 F. ,
- 3. Exhaust Air All exhaust air flows will be discharged to the outside ,
atmosphere.
- 4. Control Room & Electrical Equipment Ventilation The incoming air supplied by the main vent to the control room and electrical areas will be rough filtered.
The safety related ventilation system for the D5/D6 Control Room 99
Rev. 2 and electrical equipment areas will be designed to limit ambient critical room temperatures to 104 F without supplemental cooling. Outside air will be supplied to the area by one normally operating vane axial fan with an installed, operator selectable back-up fan provided. Provisions for mixing outside air with recirculated air will be made to limit the minimum supply air temperature to 50 F. l> The Control Rooms and 480V switchgear areas will each be provided with a direct expansion type mechanical cooling system for non-safety related auxiliary cooling. Each cooling system will consist of a compressor / condenser unit, a ' room-mounted evaporator / fan unit to circulate room air, and the l interconnecting Freon-12 tubing, control equipment and power supply. Fresh air will be provided to the rooms from the common ventilation system independent of this system.
- 5. Temperature Control Temperature control will be accomplithed by modulating dampers in the air supply ducts in response to signals from room temperature sensors and controllers. Class 1E power for these dampers and the associated instruments and controls is supplied from class 1E MCC panel boards which is interruptible. Class 1E power for all other safety related instruments will be obtained from existing plant safety related 120V AC UPS distribution system. Non-1E power for non-safety related instrumentation will be obtained from existing plant 120V AC UPS distribution system. High room temperature will be alarmed in the Diesel Generator control room, with a common trouble alarm in the main control room.
- 6. HVAC Capacities Capacities of individual system ventilation fans and all other components will be indicated on design drawings or specifications.
- 7. HVAC Electrical Equipment All safety related electrical equipment for the Diesel Generator Building HVAC Systems will be powered from engineered safety features buses.
- 8. Heating System The heating system will be designed to maintain spaces above a minimum temperature of 50 F.
- 9. Ventilation and Exhaust Fans D5/D6 Building supply and exhaust fans will be vane axial type with direct-drive TEAO motors. Two 100% capacity supply fans 100
Rev. 2 and two 100% capacity exhaust fans per train will be provided.
- 10. HVAC Missile Protection All components of each ventilation system will be protected from tornado generated missiles. The building ventilation intakes and exhausts will be missile protected. -
I
- 11. Fire Protection Fire dampers of 3-hour fire rating will be provided in all openings penetrating designated 3-hour fire rated l walls / floors / ceilings. No connection exists between the HVAC system and the fire alarm system. Smoke venting will be provided utilizing portable fans. Operator action is required to shut-down the HVAC system when necessary during a fire.
- 12. HVAC Intake and Exhaust Elevation The intake and exhaust openings for the Emergency DS/D6 Building Ventilation System will be located at an elevation higher than the maximum probable flood level.
The D5/D6 Building is designed to preclude engine exhausts, a postulated fire exhaust, or other air contaminates emanating from one train affecting the other train. Also, air inlets are separated from air exhausts / outlets by both elevation and orientation to preclude air system contamination.
- 13. Fail Safe System The HVAC dampers will fail to a safe position (i.e., a position which permits an outside, fresh air flow to safety related areas) on loss of normal / safeguards AC Power.
- 14. Structural Design Safety related HVAC systems were analyzed using the applicable load combinations and allowable stresses from the AISC
" Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of i Structural Steel for Buildings," Ninth Edition. The seismic spectra for 2% damping at elevation 755 feet were used in the I analysis. The largest segment of ductwork (north fan supply !
ducting) was analyzed, and the resulting support spans used for , the remainder of the system. This design approach is i conservative for the remaining ductwork, which is at the same i elevation (south supply ducting) or lower in the building. Duct supports were qualified in a generic analysis to an upper limit design load (largest system at highest building elevation), again using allowable stresses from the AISC Specification referenced above. This method results in 101
Rev. 2 conservatively designed supports for the remainder of the HVAC system. Safety related HVAC fans are required per the purchase specification HIAW 02707 to withstand a seismic event defined as five Operating Basis Earthquake occurrences followed by a Design Basis Earthquake. 4.5.3.3 Equipment Manufacture, Inspection and Testing All system components and materials will be similar to those previously utilized in industry and have demonstrated their reliability. All equiDment will be factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specification. System ductwork and erection of equipment will be inspected in accordance with the design drawings and manufacturer's recommendation. System testing and balancing will be performed and evaluated prior to system turnover. Controls on each system will be - checked, adjusted and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operations. A final, integrated pre-operational test will be conducted with all equipment and controls to verify system operation. 4.5.4 Station Air Recuirements Station air for maintenance needs will be provided for the new building, serving non-safety related functions only. The supply of air will be from a connection to the Unit 2 station air system operating normally at 95 psig. Suitable maintenance hose stations will be provided where required in the new building. 4.6 DESIGN STANDARDS The following NUREG 0800, IEEE Standards, and Regulatory Guides are adopted in whole as design criteria requirements for the D5 and D6 Building as described in Section 4. Within the existing plant boundary the existing design criteria as defined in the USAR will apply except as noted otherwise in this do ument. 4.6.1 NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP) SRP 3.2.1 Rev 1, 7/81 Seismic Classification SRP 3.2.2 Rev 1, 7/81 System Quality Group Classification SRP 3.3.1 Rev. 2, 7/81 Wind Loadings SRP 3.3.2 Rev. 2, 7/81 Tornado Loadings SRP 3.4.1 Rev. 2, 7/81 Flood Protection 102
Rev. 2 SRP 3.5.1.1 Rev. 2, 7/81 Internally . Generated - Missiles (outside containment) SRP 3.5.1.3 Rev. 2, 7.81 Turbine Missiles (protection against turbine missiles per USAR 6.1.2.3 and 12.2.1) SRP 3.5.1.4 Rev. 2, 7/81 Missile Generated by National Phenomena. SRP 3.5.3 Rev. 1, 7/81 Barrier Design Procedures SRP 3.6.1 Rev. 1, 7/81 Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment SRP 3.6.2 Rev. 1, 7/81 Determination of Rupture Locations ' and Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping SRP 3.7.1 Rev. 1, 7/81 Seismic Design Parameters SRP 3.7.2 Rev. 1, 7/81 Seismic System Analysis SRP 3.8.4 Rev. 1, 7/81 Other Seismic Category 1 Structures SRP 3.8.5 Rev. 1, 7/81 Foundations SRP 3.10 Rev. 2, 7/81 Seismic & Dynamic Qualification of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment 4.6.2 IEEE Standards IEEE 242-1986 Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems IEEE 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 308-1974 Criteria for Class IE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 323-1974 Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Note: IEEE 323 is invoked as a guideline document to provide a basis for the determination of qualified life of equipment. It is not intended to be invoked as a basis for environmental qualification. 10CFR50.49 requirements which are met by methods described in RG 1.89 (endorsing IEEE 323) do not apply to the mild environment of the new D5/D6 Building. IEEE 338-1977 Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems IEEE 344-1987 Guide for Seismic Qualification of Class I Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (Note: Seismic qualification for the DS/D6 Diesel Generator, HVAC duct damper, damper actuators, and 103
i Rev. 2 the Class 1E Motor Control Centers cites the 1975 revision. Refer to documentation for details.) IEEE 379-1972 Guide for the Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station l Protection Systems l IEEE 383-1974 Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power e Generating Stations IEEE 384-1981 Criteria for Separation of Class IE Equipment and l Circuits (see note under Regulatory Guide 1.75) { (Note 1: The 1981 revision is specified because it : addresses comments contained in Regulatory Guide ' 1.75, Rev. 2 on the 1974 revision of the standard.) (Note 2: The identification requirements of IEEE 384 for tagging intervals of cable, cable tray and raceway may not be strictly followed. Guidance provided by the USAR will be adhered to as introduction of a different set of requirements would be confusing. 4.6.3 Reculations and Reculatorv Guides 10 CFR 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization, Facilities, including all appendices. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) , Department of Labor, " Occupational Safety and Haalth Standards", Title 29- Labor. Regulatory Guide 1.6, Rev. 3, 03/71 Independence Between Redundant Standby (On-site) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems , Regulatory Guide 1.29, Rev. 3, 9/78 Seismic Design Classification Regulatory Guide 1.32, Rev. 2, 2/77 Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Regulatory Guide 1.38, Rev. 2, 5/77 Quality Assurance for Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage and Handling of Items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.53, 6/73 Application of the Single Failure Criteria to Nuclear Power Plant ! Protection Systems Regulatory Guide 1.59, Rev. 2, 8/77, ERRATA 7/30/80 104
i Rev. 2 Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants (Design Basis flood per USAR Section 2.4.5) Regulatory Guide 1.60, Rev. 1,.12/73 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of' Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.61, 10/73 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants ? Regulatory 1.75, Rev. 2, 9/78 Physical Independence of Electric Systems (Note 1: Separation criteria of RG 1.75 and IEEE 384 will be met within the new diesel generator structure. As a minimum, l requirements of the USAR will be met for new equipment design i within the existing plant.) (Note 2: For regulatory position C.10, cables will be marked at 10 foot intervals, rather than the 5 foot interval specified, in conformance with USAR Section 8.7.5 which has been found to be sufficient to ensure proper cable installation.) , Regulatory Guide 1.76, 4/74 : Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.92, Rev. 1, 2/76 Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response Analysis Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2, 6/88 , Seismic Qualification of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power i Plants Regulatory Guide 1.102, Rev. 1, ~ 9/76 Flood Protection (Flood Protection per USAR Section 2.5) Regulatory Guide 1.115, Rev. 1, 7/77 ; Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles (Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles per USAR Sections 6.1.2.3 and 12.2.1) Regulatory Guide 1.117, Rev. 1, 4/78 Tornado Design Classification i l Regulatory Guide 1.118, Rev. 2, 6/78 j Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems l l Regulatory Guide 1.122, Rev. 1, 2/78 ' Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Design of Floor-Supported Equipment or Components Regulatory Guide 1.132, Rev. 1, 3/79 Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Plants 105
Rev. 2 (Site Investigation per USAR Sections 2.5 & 2.6) , h i b L i e
)
l t 5 Y t 106 ;
l i Rev. 2 Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, 10/79 Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generator { Regulatory Guide 1.138, 4/78 Laboratory Investigations of Soils for Engineering Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Laboratory Investigation of Soils per USAR Sections 2.5 and 2.6) - Regulatory Guide 1.142, Rev. 1, 10/81 Safety-Related Concrete Structures for Nuclear Power Plants (other than Reactor Vessels and Containment) ! Regulatory Guide 5.65 Vital Area Access Controls, Protection of Physical Security Equipment, and Key and Lock Controls 4.6.s NFPA Standards NFPA 10-1988 National Fire Protection Association Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers NFPA 13-1989 National Fire Protection Association Standard for i Sprinkler Systems NFPA 14-1986 National Fire Protection Association Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems NFPA 30-1987 National Fire Protection Association Standard for , Flammable Liquids NFPA 72A-1987 National Fire Protection Association Standard for Signaling Systems, Local Protective NFPA 72D-1986 National Fire Protection Association Standard for Signaling Systems, Proprietary Protective NFPA 72E-1987 National Fire Protection Association Standard for Fire Detectors NFPA 255-1984 National Fire Protection Association Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction'& Materials 4.6.5 ANSI Standards ANSI A58.1-82 American National Standard Institute Code Requirements for Minimum Design Loads in Buildings and Other Structures ANSI B31.1-1967 American National Standard Code for Power Piping 107
l l Rev. 2 l
.l ANSI N45.2-1971 Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants 4.6.6 Buildina Codes j AISI American Iron and Steel Institute
" Specification for the Design of Light Gage ,
Cold-Formed Steel Structural Members" 1980 Edition ; Minnesota Building Code (1985) > AWS D1.1 American Welding Society, " Structural Welding Code" ACI 318-83 American Concrete Institute " Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete" ACI 349-85 American Concrete Institute " Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete , Structures" , ANSI /AWWA American Water Works Association, "AWWA Standard for Welded Steel Tanks for Water Storage" ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials Applicable standards for the various
- construction materials specified in Project specifications.
ASCE ASCE Paper No. 3269, " Wind Forces on Structure", Transactions of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Volume 126, Part II (1961) API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage (Seventh Edition) UBC International Conference of Building Officials, " Uniform Building Code" (1988 ; Edition) AISC American Institute of Steel Construction
" Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings,"
Ninth Edition. UL-555-73 Standard for Fire Dampers
- 108
Rev. 2 4.6.7 Northern States Power Standards Prairie Island - Updated Safety Analysis Report Prairie Island - Final Safety Analysis Report Prairie Island Technical Specifications Section 3.4 NSP Underground Storage Tank Policy Compliance Guide, October 3, 1989. (Exception: Fuel-Inventory Management ! System not provided). Prairie Island Operations Manual Section H7, Specification for the Analysis of Piping Systems , Prairie' Island Operations Manual Section Hil, Electrical Construction Standards Prairie Island Security Plan 4.6.8 Other Reference Documents SER-NRC Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, Sept. 1979 ) ASHRAE Handbook American Society of Heating Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers Handbook: Equipment (1988 Edition) ; HVAC Systems and Application (1987 Edition). , 109
I I Rev. 2 l l TABLE 4-A (Ref. Reg. Guide 1.61) i DAMPING FACTORS (Percent of Critical Damping) l Operating Basis Earthquake or 1/2 Safe Safe Shutdown Structure or Component Shutdown Earthouake* Earthauake , l Equipment and large- 2 3 diameter piping systems, piping diameter greater than 12 in.** Small-diameter piping 1 2 I systems, diameter equal to or less than 12 in. Welded steel structures 2 4 Bolted steel structures 4 7 Prestressed concrete 2 5 structures Reinforced concrete 4 7 structures
- In the dynamic analysis of active components, these values should also be used for SSE.
- Includes both material and structural damping. If the piping system consists of only one or two spans with little structural damping, use values for small-diameter piping.
110
Rev. 2 TABLE 4-B (Ref. SRP 3.5.3) TORNADO GENERATED MISSILES Mass Velocity
- Missiles Dimension (meters) (Kilocrams) i (Meters /Sec)
Wood Plank 0.092 x 0.289 x 3.66 52 83 6-inch Schedule 40 pipe 0.168 Diameter x 4.58 130 52 1-inch Steel Rod 0.0254 Diameter x 0.915 4 51 . Utility Pole 0.343 Diameter x 10.68 510 55 - 12-inch Schedule 40 pipe 0.32 Diameter x 4.58 340 47 i Automobile 5 x 2 x 1.3 1810 59 Velocities are horizontal velocities. For vertical velocities, 70 percent of the horizontal velocities shall be used. 111
1 i l I Rev. 2 , l
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TABLE 4-C j Pace 1 of 2 I FIRE BARRIERS ! 3 HOUR FIRE 3 HOUR FIRE 3 HOUR FIRE RATED WALLS RATED CEILING RATED FLOOR Elevation 687' West Wall x South Wall x center Wall x (between D5/D6) Elevation 695' Center Wall x (between D5/D6) East Wall Diesel Bldg. x Turbine & Diesel Bldg. Wall x Stairway All Walls x Elevation 707' North Wall x ; East Wall x i Center Wall x (between D5/D6) ; Stairway x All Walls Normal MCC Room x l Elevation 718' Center Wall X (between D5/D6) Day Tank D5 All Walls x Floor x Ceiling x Day Tank D6 All Walls x Floor x , Ceiling x Diesel Bldg. x East Wall , Turbine-Diesel x Bldg. North Wall t 112
i Rev. 2 TABLE 4-C Pace 2 of 2 FIRE BARRIERS 3 HOUR FIRE 3 HOUR FIRE 3 HOUR FIRE RATED WALLS RATED CEILING RATED FLOOR Elevation 718' (continued) i Stairway , All Walls x ' Bus 27 Room x x x Lube oil Tank D6 All Walls x Floor x Ceiling x i Lube Oil Tank D5 All Walls x x x Floor x Ceiling x Elevation 735' , x Center Wall (between D5/D6) , Stairway All Walls x l Diesel Bldg. East x Wall ; Turbine-Diesel Bldg. x . North Wall , i I l l 113 l
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Rev. 2 5.0 DIESEL GENERATOR INTERFACE AND ELECTRICAL SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE The Plant Interface and Electrical Safeguards Upgrade scope : includes the following: o Electrical tie-in of the D5 and D6 Diesel Generators to the existing plant safety related auxiliary power systems. o Modification of the voltage restoration, load rejection and load restoration schemes for Unit 1 and Unit 2. o Electrical tie-in of the D5/D6 system to the existing plant Emergency Response Computer System. o Improvement in voltage support, principally at the 480V level, in Units 1 and 2. o Replacement of two existing 480V safeguards buses in each of Units 1 and 2. o Provide alternate feeds to 480V safeguards buses in Units 1 and 2. i o Improve circuit coordination by eliminating subfed 480V MCC's on safeguards 480V buses. o Provide additional 480V safeguards buses and 4.16kV switchgear capacity for future loads, Units 1 and 2. o Provide safeguards 4160V sources to the 121 Cooling Water Pump. o Replacement of 4.16kV Safeguards Buses in Unit 2 and expansion of Unit 1 4.16kV buses. o Replacement of Main Control Room "G" Panel. The existing panel contains controls and indicators for the existing D1 and D2 diesel generators and safeguard electrical system. The new panel will be unitized and contain controls and indicators for D1, D2, DS and D6 diesel generators and the safeguards electrical system, Unit 1 and Unit 2. i l l l 123
l Rev. 2 5.1 SEISMIC DESIGN CLASSIFICATION - All safety related electrical systems and components provided in the Plant Interface and Electrical Safeguards Upgrade scope will be designed to withstand a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and remain functional (Seismic Category I per R.G. 1.29). Seismic qualifications shall be per IEEE 344 and Regulatory Guide 1.100. All non-safety related systems and components and their supporting systems will be designed to ensure that the SSE would not cause their structural failure resulting in damage to safety related systems or components and adversely affect their ability to perform the safety related function. 5.2 SAFETY DESIGN CLASSIFICATION The following electrical power distribution systems and the associated control circuits provided in the Plant Interface and Electrical Safeguards Upgrade scope are classified as safety related electrical.
- 1. 4160V safeguards switchgear buses 15, 16, 25*, 26*, and 27*.
- 2. 480V safeguards switchgear buses 111, 112, 121, 122, 211*,
212*, 221* and 222*.
- 3. 4kV and 480V loads connected to the switchgear and buses listed above.
- 4. 4160V alternate power source to each bus listed above. ;
- 5. Voltage restoration, load rejection, load restoration equipment and circuitry, including the new Unit 1 and Unit 2*
load sequencer cabinets.
- 6. Main Control Room "G" Panel.
- New equipment in the DS/D6 Buildiny, classified as Class 1E.
The following systems are classified as n;'-saftty related.
- 1. 4160V sources from transformers CT11, CT12, 2RY and 1R-Y winding up to the breaker connection at safeguards switchgear 15, 16, 25 and 26.
- 2. The Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS).
- 3. Annunciator circuits to Main Control Room.
1 124
l l Rev. 2 5.3 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY AC POWER SYSTEM DESIGN ; 5.3.1 General Descriution 1 i Figures 2-1 and 2-2 illustrates the existing and upgraded 4160V I Safeguards Auxiliary AC Power Systems, respectively. The planned modification will provide two dedicated emergency diesel generators for each unit; D1 and D2 are dedicated to Unit 1, and DS and D6 are dedicated to Unit 2. These diesel generators will be independent of the other unit's electrical support systems, and will be capable of being connected manually to the other unit's associated safeguards bus using two bus tie circuit breakers. No automatic closure of the bus tie breakers will be provided. Each diesel generator will be capable of supplying the required SBO shutdown loads for either unit. 5.3.2 Preferred. Alternate, and Standby Power Source Conficuration Three separate power sources consisting of preferred and alternate offsite sources and standby onsite sources will be provided to each of the plant's 4160 safeguards buses.
- 1. Startup Transformers (Preferred or Alternate) Source Startup Transformer 1R, Y-Winding provides power to Unit 1 Buses 15 and 16 and Startup Transformer 2RY provides power to ;
Buses 25 and 26.
- 2. Cooling Tower Transformers (Preferred or Alternate)
Cooling Tower Area Transformer CT11 will provide power to Unit 1 Bus 15 in addition to currently providing power to Bus 16. Transformer CT12 will continue to provide power to Bus 26 and in addition, will provide power to Bus 25. Normally, one safeguard bus per unit will be connected to a startup transformer source and the other safeguards bus will be connected to a cooling tower transformer source.
- 3. Standby Source If the Startup Transformers and the Cooling Tower Area Transformers should fail, standby power is provided by onsite safety related diesel generators.
This configuration provides two independent offsite sources to each 4160V AC Safeguards Bus without relying on the bus tie-breakers between units within separation criteria divisions (i.e., Unit 1-Train A to Unit 2-Train A, etc.). These bus tie-breakers would be used only during Station Blackout (for access to alternate AC (AAC) source) and other similar circumstances. 125 i
Rev. 2 5.,3.3 4160V Conficuration - Safeauards Buses The Unit 2 4160V safeguards switchgear will be replaced and ' located in the new Class I D5/D6 Building. This will be accomplished using two new 4160V safeguard switchgear line-ups. The present Unit 2 4160V safeguard loads will be reconnected to the new switchgear. The new Unit 2 switchgear will include space for future growth. Portions of the present Unit 2 4160V safeguards switchgear will become Unit 1 safeguards switchgear by means of a bus interconnection after the new Unit 2 switchgear has been installed. The resulting Unit 1 4160V safeguards switchgear will have space for future growth. A new 4160V safeguards switchgear line-up Bus 27, will be installed in the DS/D6 Building and will be capable of being supplied from either Unit 2 4160V switchgear train A or B. This line-up will be the safeguard source for 121 Cooling Water Pump. 5.3.4 480V Conficuration - Safeauards Buses Four new Unit 2 480V safeguard buses (two per train) will be installed in the new D5/D6 Building to replace the two existing buses. The present Unit 2 safeguard loads will be reconnected to these new 480V buses. The reconnected loads (safeguard MCCs) will be divided between the buses of a given train. The existing Unit 1 480V safeguard buses will be replaced and two additional 480V safeguard buses will be added. The additional ; buses will be located in the present Unit 2 4160V switchgear rooms after the existing 4160V switchgear has been removed. The resulting Unit 1 configuration, two buses per train, will be similar to Unit 2. The present Unit 1 safeguard MCC loads will be divided between the buses of a given train. Alternate power sources from the same train of the opposite unit, to be used primarily for maintenance outages on 4160V buses, will be added to the 480V safeguard buses. Each alternate source line-up will include an incoming line compartment, and a 4160-480V transformer section. One alternate source line-up per train will be provided for use by either or both 480V safeguards buses. Loading on the alternate source transformer will be administratively controlled within ratings. 126
Rev. 2 The new 480V safeguard configuration will accomplish the following goals: o Increase capacity for future growth, o Provide additional circuit breakers to allow improved MCC feeder circuit coordination, by eliminating subfed 480V MCCs from safeguards 480V buses. > l o Provide dual feeders (main and alternate sources) to the Screenhouse MCCs 1AB1 and 1AB2 through transfer switches. o Improve voltage support at the 480V level. o Provide alternate feeds to all 480V safeguards buses.- o Reroute cable to reduce wrapping (fire barrier) and its resulting cable ampacity derating. o Replace the original Siemens switchgear with new Class 1E equipment. 5.3.5 Voltaae Restoration / Load Reiection/ Load Restoration , Upon bus undervoltage or a sustained degraded bus voltage - , condition on the 4.16kv Safeguards Buses in Units 1 and 2, a sequence of events take place to restore proper voltage to the safeguards loads. Ther.e events may include automatic starting of the Emergency Diesel Generators, automatic load shedding and a subsequent reloading using the preferred or standby power sources. The control scheme that will initiate and control these events will be a new load sequencer systems. 5.3.6 Emercency Response Comouter System The Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS) will serve as an aid to the control room operator in monitoring the status of the D5 and D6 diesel generators. It can replicate some functions of the engine monitoring system, local control panels or the hard- ; wired control room instrumentation; however, it will only monitor inputs and provide data to fulfill a specific need for the operator. Areas identified to date include: o Annunciator system support to identify, on demand, a specific input that generated a group alarm. o operations data logging of surveillance testing events. o Provide analog process information. i 127 1 l I
Rev. 2 5.3.7 DS/D6 Control Scheme Tie-In with Existino Plant When the local Generator Control Mode switches, located in the D5 and D6 Control Rooms, are in the remote position, control of the D5 and D6 emergency diesel generators is transferred to the Main Control Room. Emergency start, manual start and stop, voltage adjust, speed control, main breaker control and synchronizing are among the controls that will be available in the Main Control Room. , The design of the control circuitry between the DS and D6 Control Rooms and the Main Control Room will include the intermediate termination of all control cables at terminal cabinets located in the Relay Room and then circuit continuation to the Main Control Room. The D5 and D6 tie-in to the existing plant will also include all ' appropriate alarm circuits to the annunciator cabinets. 5.3.8 Main Control Room "G" Panel Modification The existing controls for the safeguards diesel generators and their associated 4160V buses located on the Main Control Room "G" Panel will be replaced and additional controls for the new diesel generators will be installed. The existing panel will be replaced and smaller controls will be installed to accommodate the additional controls in the original space. All changes have taken human factors into consideration and will be approved by the Control Room Design Review Committee. Annunciator alarms for the new diesel generator will be installed concurrently with the "G" panel work. This work will be done during the 1992 Unit 1 Refueling Outage. Current construction plans are to also have a Unit 2 outage during this panel work. All required panel controls will be moved to a temporary panel during this two-unit outage and then transferred back to the original panel after it is replaced. . This method will minimize the use of temporary panels and the risks involved with electrical construction work on safeguards equipment. 5.3.9 Detailed Desion l 5.3.9.1 General Requirements The Plant Interface scope can be divided into two parts. The part that involves the existing plant components and systems and ' the part that involves new plant components and systems, i l l l l 128 l l
Rev. 2 The design, which will modify the existing plant, shall maintain or improve the present safeguard power distribution system reliability and availability. Throughout this criteria, any ; design that affects existing plant components or systems and any , design that addc new components or systems within the existing plant will be in conformance with the USAR as a minimum. 5.3.9.2 Cable and Raceway Separation 5.3.9.2.1 General Requirements ! o Cable and raceway separation and segregation within the D5/D6 Building and Fuel Oil Storage Area will conform to the requirements of IEEE 384 - 1981 as modified by NRC Regulatory , Guide 1.75. o Cable and raceway interconnections between the DS/D6 Building and existing plant facilities including direct buried cable, duct runs, and other raceway systems, as well as all cables and raceways routed within existing plant facilities will be separated and segregated in accordance with the requirements contained in USAR Section 8.7 as a minimum. Where feasible, ; the requirements of IEEE 384/R.G. 1.75 will be followed. o Cable and wire used to interconnect equipment will be 'i certified by the manufacturer as passing an approved flame test per IEEE 383 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.131. This requirement does not apply to wire internal to factory assembled devices or pieces of equipment (such as the internal wiring of a computer display terminal) . Custom assembled equipment (such as control boards or switchgear assemblies) will be specified with flame resistant wiring which meets the intent of IEEE 383 - 1974. 5.3.9.2.2 Specific Requirements - D5/DG Building and Fuel Oil Storage Area o Safety related cables will be segregated into two distinct redundant safety divisions designated Train A and Train B, which include Emergency Diesel Generator D5 and D6, respectively. o Redundant safety train cables will be routed in areas separated from one another by three hour fire barriers. i o Cables and raceways associated with Train A will be located in separate fire areas or cubicles from those with Train B. ! l o Cables designated as non-safety related will be segregated from the safety related cables by routing them in raceways which only contained non-safety related cables. o separation between the safety related raceways and non-safety l related raceways shall conform to the requirements in i 129
Rev. 2 IEEE 384 - 1981, as stated below:
- a. Open cable trays shall be separated 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically, minimum.
- b. Enclosed raceways (i.e. conduit) shall be separated by 1", minimum,
- c. Separation between a 1E enclosed raceway (i.e.
conduit) and a non-1E open cable tray shall be 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically. This separation distance amy be reduced to 1" if the cable tray has a metal cover. o Safety related cables shall be separated from non-safety related cables within equipment enclosures in accordance with the requirements in IEEE 384-1981 Section 6.6. Cables shall be separated by at least six inches or either the safety or non-safety cables shall be enclosed in metal raceway, except in the immediate vicinity of isolation device terminals. fire resistant barriers (such as metal or fire resistant board) may be used to separate 1E and non IE wiring if enclosing wiring within a metal raceway is impossible because of space limitations. Non-safety related wiring which is not physically separated from safety related wiring will be analyzed to show that the lack of physical separation does'not degrade the affected safety related circuits. - o Each area considered a hazard area per IEEE 384-1981, shall . contain cables and equipment of only one safety division. These areas are as follows: fuel oil day tank rooms; lube oil day tank rooms; and fuel oil storage areas. The cable and wiring separation requirements above also apply to these areas. 5.3.9.2.3 Specific Requirements - Existing Plant Areas o Safety related cables (except for the 121 Cooling Water Pump) shall be segregated into two distinct safety trains commensurate with the present plant design, as a minimum. Cable tray separation between redundant trains shall be 3 ft horizontally and vertically. o In addition to the existing plant requirements, the following also will apply to SBO/ESU cables and raceways:
- a. Non-safety related cables shall b1 separated and segregated from the safety related cables by routing in separate raceways.
- b. Enclosed conduit separation between redundant trains shall be one inch.
130
Rev. 2 o Cables arr.ociated with redundant safe shutdown circuits will be routed through separate fire zones as defined in the Fire , Hazards Analysis if at all possible. If routing redundant cables in the same fire zone is unavoidable, then the redundant cables will be physically separated from one another ! per 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.g. If the physical - separation distances specified in 10CFR50. Appendix R, Section III.G are unattainable, or if there are intervening ; combustibles, then one of the division cables and raceways i will be enclosed in an approved fire barrier protective material which has a one-hour rating for fire zones with ' suppression systems and a three-hour rating for fire zones without a suppression system. 5.3.9.2.4 Specific Requirements - 121 Cooling Water Pump o Power cables associated with Bus 27 and the 121 Cooling water pump will be treated as a separate cable division and will be separated from all other 'fidin A and B cables in accordance with the requirements contained in Section 5.3.9.2.2 and i 5.3.9.2.3 above. 5.3.9.3 Safeguards AC Auxiliary Power System i
- 1. The new Unit 2 safeguard switchgear Buses 25 and 26 shall '
consist of indoor air magnetic mradium voltage metal clad assemblies which have a nominal voltage rating af 5000V, 2000A , continuous main bus, 350MVA rating and 50kA intarrupting capacity. Each switchgear lineup shall contain the following breakers-t 3-2000A for diesel generator and offsite source supplies 3-1200A for transformer feeders , 9-1200A for existing and future motor feeders 2-1200A for bus tie and Bus 27 feeder
- 2. The new safeguard switchgear Bus 27 will have the same rating and shall contain 2-1200A motor feeders.
- 3. A portion of existing Unit 2 4160V safeguard switchgear will be used to expand the number of breakers in the existing Unit 1 Safeguard Switchgear 15 and 16. The additional circuit '
breakers will be used for: Bus 15 addition - 2 future feeder breakers
- 1 feeder breaker Bus 16 addition - 2 feeder breakers 1 future feeder breaker
- 4. The eight new Unit 1 and Unit 2 480V safeguard buses will consist of 600V rated indoor low voltage switchgear assemblies 131
Rev. 2 each having a 1000/1333kVA dry type transformer, 2000A main bus, 30kA instantaneous and 22kA delay trip interrupting capacity, 2000A main breaker, 600A manually operated and 600A electrically operated feeder breakers and future compartments. The breaker interrupting capacity will exceed the maximum fault duty from a 3-phase bolted fault at the breaker load i terminals. j l 5.3.9.4 Voltage Restoration / Load Rejection / Load Restoration ! Both units will have a new control scheme to initiate diesel generator start, load shedding and sequential load restoration. The undervoltage protection scheme will be revised per Branch Technical Position PSB-1. The logic and timing functions will be based on programmable controllers. ; The interfacing devices between the controller and the field equipment will be relays. The power supply to the controller will be safety related 120V AC UPS from the existing plant system. 5.3.9.5 Electrical Cable Requirements Safety related circuit design will comply with the general requirement given below.
- 1. No distinction between existing plant and new plant will be made regarding cable purchases. Therefore, all insulated cable shall be qualified in accordance with IEEE 383 and Regulatory Guide 1.131. ;
- 2. Only copper conductor will be used.
2
- 3. New site installed power, control, and instrumentation cable insulation will be ethylene propylene rubber (EPR) or cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE). Cable jacket material will be ;
chlorosulfonated polyethylene (CSPE). Neoprene and PVC , materials will not be used in insulation or jacket materials. Switchboard wire will be flame resistant SIS type or i equivalent. 5.3.9.6 Cable Tray and Conduit Requirements Tray and conduit systems will comply with the general requirements listed below:
- 1. Exposed rigid galvanized steel conduit and embedded intermediate metallic tubing will be used throughout the plant where the use of aluminum trays is not practical.
' s
- 2. Instrument cables will not share raceways with power or control cables, but may share raceway with communication cables.
132
Rev. 2
- 3. Safety related trays and conduits will be supported with l Seismic Category I supports.
- 4. Existing plant cable trays and raceways to which new circuits are added will have their supports analyzed to verify ;
continued acceptability.
- 5. The design will ensure that safety related, Seismic Category I systems and components are not prevented from performing their safety related functions by seismically induced physical .
interaction with non-safety related non-seismic Category I ; systems or components. Supports for non-safety related items will be designed and installed such that their supports do not - fail under seismic conditions and endanger the operation of any adjacent safety-related items. This interaction will be , identified as Seismic II/I. Seismic II/I supports will not fail during an SSE to the : degree that they degrade, to an unacceptable level, the ability of safety related systems to perform their required function. New installations in the existing plant will be evaluated to , identify potential Seismic II/I concerns. i Certain non-Seismic Category I components whose weight and configuration are such that even if their support failed, the , nature and force of their impact would not prevent safety related components from performing their safety-related function may be excluded by analysis from Seismic II/I ; considerations.
- i
- 6. Protection of safety related tray and conduit from potential pipe break failure hazards, missile hazards, hot pipe i concerns, and seismic interaction of closely spaced components will be provided by barriers, restraints, separation distance,
, orientation, or the appropriate combination thereof, i
One train of cables for each unit from the D5/D6 building will be routed in new cable enclosures in the Turbine Building. + These cable enclosures have been evaluated to ensure that the i criteria listed above for safety related cable raceways are ; met. 5.3.9.7 Cable and Cable Tray Coding i l The identifying code to be used on the electrical design l l drawings, the cable tray system and the cable will be as ; presented in Attachment 5-A. Color codes and markings will be in l accordance with USAR Section 8.7.5. I 1 133 l j
Rev. 2 5.4 DESIGN STANDARDS For new plant components and systems the Class 1E system design will comply with the following standards. 5.4.1 NUREG 0800 Standard Review Plan (SRP) SRP 8.1 Rev. 2, 7/81 General Requirements SRP 8.3.1 Rev. 2, 7/81 On-Site AC Power Systems BTP PSB-1, Rev. 1, 7/81 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages. BTP PSB-2, Rev. O, 7/81 Criteria For Alarms And Indication Associated With Diesel-Generator Unit Bypassed And Inoperable Status , BTP ICSB-2, Rev. 2, 7/81 Guidance for Application of , Regulatory Guide 1.47 l I 5.4.2 IEEE Standards IEEE 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear l Power Generating Stations IEEE 308-1974 Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for ! Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 323-1974 Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (Note:IEEE 323 is invoked as a guideline document to provide a basis for the determination of qualified life of equipment. It is not intended to be invoked as a basis for environmental qualification. 10 CFR 50.49 requirements which are met by methods described in RG 1.89 (endorsing IEEE 323) do not apply to the mild environment of the new DS/D6 Building). IEEE 338-1977 IEEE Standard Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems IEEE 344-1987 Guide for Seismic Qualification of Clads 1 Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (Note: Seismic qualification for the D5/D6 Diesel Generator, HVAC duct dampers, damper actuators, and the Class IE Motor Control 134 1
i Rev. 2 , Centers cites the 1975 revision. Refer to & documentation for details.) IEEE 379-1972 Guide for the Application of the Single' Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems IEEE 383-1974 IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating stations. IEEE 384-1981 Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment i and Circuits , (Note 1: The 1981 revision is specified because it addresses comments contained in Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2 on the 1974 revision of the standard.) (Note 2: The identification requirements of IEEE 384 for tagging intervals of cable, cable tray and raceway.may not be strictly followed. Guidance provided by the USAR will' , be adhered to as introduction of a different - set of requirements would be confusing. (Note 3: for specific cases where the minimum separation distances specified in Section 6.1 were not complied with, the use of lesser separation distances was justified by analysis per Section 6.1.1.3.A.) . t IEEE 387-1975 Diesel-Generator Units as Standby Power Supplies (Note: Certain provisions of the 1984 revision of the standard are included in the. D5/D6 Diesel Generator specification because they provide guidance for issues not fully addressed in the 1975 revision which was f referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 2. These provisions include Appendix A guidance for development of a load profile, Appendix B ' for the format to define diesel generator service conditions, and Table B-2 format for use in defining those components with less l than a 40 year operating life. IEEE 634-1978 IEEE Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Tests
- I 135
Rev. 2 5.4.3 Reculatory Guides Regulatory Guide 1.6, Rev. O, 3/10/71 Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 2, 12/79 Selection, Design and Qualification of Diesel Generator Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants Regulatory Guide 1.29, Rev. 3, 9/78 Seismic Design Classificatio.1 Regulatory Guide'1.32, Rev. 2, 2/77 Criteria for Class 1E Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Regulatory Guide 1.47, 5/73 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems Regulatory Guide 1.53, 6/73 Application of the Single Failure Criteria to Nuclear Power Plant Protection System Regulatory Guide 1.62, 10/73 Manual Initiation of Protective Actions Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev. 2, 9/78 Physical Independence of Electrical Systems (Note: For regulatory position C.10, cables will be marked at 10 foot intervals, rather than the 5 foot interval specified, in conformance with USAR Section 8.7.5 which has been found to be sufficient to ensure proper cable installation.) Regulatory Guide 1.81, Rev., 1, 1/75 Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants (Note: For regulatory position C.3, the ensite emergency a.c. electrical system for each unit will be separate and independent, but the capability to interconnect the emergency (safeguards) 4kV a.c. buses within separation criteria divisions (i.e., Unit 1-Train A to Unit 2-Train A, etc.) will be retained for use during Station Blackout (access to alternate AC (ACC) source) and other similar circumstances.) Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2, 6/88 Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants 136
i l Rev. 2 Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, 8/77
- Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electrical Power Systems at Nuclear Power ,
Plants l Regulatory Guide 1.118, Rev. 2, 6/78 i Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection System j Regulatory Guide 1.131, Rev. O, 8/77 Qualification Tests of l Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants > Regulatory Guide 1.152, Rev. O, 11/85 Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer System Software in Safety-Related Systems of Nuclear Power Plants 5.4.4 ANSI Standards ANSI /IEEE - ANS 4.3.2 - 1982 i American National Standard, Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Generating ! Stations 5.4.5 Northern States Power Standards Prairie Island - Updated Safety Analysis Report i Prairie Island - Final Safety Analysis Report Prairie Island Technical Specifications Prairie Island Operations Manual Section H11, Electrical Construction Standards , Prairie Island Security Plan 5.4.6 Electrical Eauipment Plan No distinction between existing plant and new plant shall be made regarding electrical equipment purchases, therefore, all Plant i Interface scope Class 1E equipment will be qualified for service l in nuclectr power generating stations in accordance with IEEE 344 and Regulatory Guide.l.100. Switchgear assemblies and circuit i breakers shall be designed and tested in accordance with l applicable U.S. industry standards, NEMA SG-3 and 5 and ANSI C37. l 5.4.7 Structural Reauirements ! Relevant structural requirements such as seismic loading shall be as contained in the Installation Design Criteria in Section 3.0.
)
I 137
t i Rev. 2 i ATTACHMENT 5-A ELECTRICAL CABLE AND CABLE TRAY CODING PAGE 1 OF 5 l 1.0 CABLE TRAY CODING: 1.1 Each tray section of the cable tray system shall have an i identifying code indicated on the electrical design drawings and this same identification shall be stencilled on the tray after it is installed. Stencilling shall be applied at each straight section of tray where the identifying code changes. Any tray that is continuous thru walls or floors shall have the identifying code stencilled on both sides of the wall or floor. 1.2 The identifying code shall be based on the following system: Examnle: 1 I_G - L 1 Numerical sequence Safeguard and Reactor Protection Designations only See coding listing Paragraph 1.4. , L - Ladder (Power) i T - Trough (Control or ; Instrumentation) ; Plant Location - See coding listing ; Paragraph 1.3. l Generating Unit No. (Where required) 1.3 ADB- Administration Building FHR- Fuel Handling Riser . ADR- Administration Building Riser RR- Relay Room AG- Aux Bldg. Grd. Fl. SG- Switchgear Rm-Grd. F1. AM- Aux Bldg. Mezz Fl. SM- Switchgear Rm-Mez. Fl. , AU- Aux Bldg. Upper Fl. SH- Screen House AR- Aux Bldg. Riser SR- Screen House Riser BR- Battery Rooms TB- Turbine Rm-Cond Pit i CV- Containment Vessel TG- Turbine Rm-Grd. Fl. DR- D1 and D2 Diesel Rm TM- Turbine Rm-Mez. F1. 138
Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 5-A > ELECTRICAL CABLE AND CABLE TRAY CODING ; i PAGE 2 OF 5 ; FHG- Fuel Handling Grd. Fl. TF- Turbine Rm.-Roof j FHM- Fuel Handling Mezz. Fl. TR- Turbine Rm.-Riser l FHU- Fuel Handling Upper Fl. SM- DS/D6 Switchg. Rm-Mez. DBG- D5/D6 DS1 Rms & Cont. Rm. SU- D5/D6 Switchg. Rm-Oper BR- D5/D6 Diesel Bldg. Bat. Rm DBR- DS/D6 Dsl. Bld. Riser , DBS- DS/D6 MCC and Cable Spread-ing Rms. DBB- D5/D6 Bldg - Basement DBM- DS/D6 Mech. Rms-Mezz. DBU- D5/D6 Mech. Rms-Oper. { 1.4 *Safeauard Desianation , A - A Train , B - B Train A/B - 121 Cooling Water ; R - Reactor Protection Channel I W - Reactor Protection Channel II X - Reactor Protection Channel III i Y - Reactor Protection Channel IV 2.0 CABLE CODING , 2.1 Each electrical cable shall have an identifying code indicated on electrical design drawing and cable routing list. This same code , will be affixed at each end of the cable with permanent tags. , 2.2 The identifying cades shall be based on the following systems: 2.3 4 KV Switchaear Cable Example: 1_5 4 07 - 1 Numerical sequence for power , Alphabetical sequence for control 1 Cubicle No. 4kV I i Electrical Bus No. 1 l 139 l 1
)
i Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 5-A l ELECTRICAL CABLE AND CABLE TRAY CODING ; PAGE 3 OF 5 l 2.4 480V Switchaear Cable Codes: . Example: 2_R B -- 1 A , Add alphabetical ; sequence for control l Numerical sequence f for connected auxiliaries Breaker No. 480V Electrical Bus No. (Bus 211) , 2.5 Motor Control Center Cable Codes: Example: ATA 1 - 1 A Add alphabetical sequence for control Numerical sequence for connected , auxiliaries , MCC Bus No. MCC Identity No.. 2.6 DC Cable Codes: Example: 1 Q_g A - 1 - Numerical Sequence I For safeguards only-A or B Train , 125 V DC Generating Unit No. b 140 i
l l Rev. 2 ATTACHMENT 5-A ELECTRICAL CABLE AND CABLE TRAY CODING PAGE 4 OF 5 i 2.7 Control & Instrumentation Cable Codes: Example: 1 * - 1 Numerical Sequence Control or Instrumentation , Function See Listing Below Generating Unit No. i
- C -
Miscellaneous l CA - A Train : CB - B Train CAB - A/B Train CX - Reactor Protection Channel III (Blue) : CF - Reactor Process Instrumentation (Foxboro) CLD - Part Length Rod Drives CM - Radiation Monitors CN - Nuclear Instrumentation Systems CP - Computer i CR - Reactor Protection Channel I (Red) t CRD - Rod Drive r CRP - Rod Position [ CS - Substation i CT - Cooling Tower CV - Invertor Bus & Distribution ; CW - Reactor Protection Channel II.(White) , CY - Reactor Protection Channel IV (Yellow) 2.8 Pre-Fabricated Cables (Control Board Modules) i Example: P 49022 s Control Board Cutout No. Prefab Cable ! I I 141 l 1 1
1 l j Rev. 2 l ATTACHMENT 5-A ELECTRICAL CABLE AND CABLE TRAY CODING PAGE 5 OF S l l 3.0 Color Codina Assianments , The following colors will be utilized to identify the specific group which the cable tray, conduit and cables are assigned: l Orange - Safeguard Train "A" l Green - Safeguard Train "B" Orange / Green - Safeguard Train "A/B" l I I 4.0 Cable Trav Hancer Codinc 4.1 Non-trained cable tray ; 2 DBG - H 0001 Sequential # l Hanger Area code Unit I i 4.2 Trained cable tray 2 DBM - H A 0001 ! Sequential # 1 Trained designation A or B j Hanger l i Area code Unit . I 142 l
Rev. 2 6.0 COOLING WATER SYSTEM MODIFICATION 6.1 SYSTEM FUNCTION The Cooling Water System has been designed to provide redundant cooling water supplies with isolation valves to auxiliary feedwater pumps, diesel generators (D1 and D2), air compressors, component cooling water heat exchangers, containment fan-coil units, and the auxiliary building fan-coil units, plus other non-essential loads. l The Cooling Water System simplified flow diagram is shown on Figure 6-1. Normal operation utilizes two horizontal pumps (11 and 21) with a vertical motor-driven pump (121) as a standby. Two vertical ' diesel engine pumps (12 and 22) are provided in the eventuality that all power supplies are lost. The diesel engine-driven pumps' are used whenever an engineered safety features sequence is initiated, when auxiliary power is lost, or when header pressure decays below its set point. The diesel cooling water pumps, the vertical motor driven pump (121) and their associated equipment are located in the Class 1 portion of the cooling water screenhouse as shown on Figure 6-2.- All three pumps draw suction from the same pump bay for cooling water from the Mississippi River. An emergency cooling water intake from a branch channel of the river is also provided in case the river level drops suddenly or the intake canal is blocked. A ring header which is shared by Units 1 and 2 can'be isolated automatically to provide two redundant independent sourcas of train cooling water for all essential services. One train of the essential services for each unit is supplied from each side of the isolatable loop. Each side of the loop is designed to supply the needs for train of essential services for both units. Thus, failure of one side of the loop still provides for the operation of all equipment required for the safe shutdown of both units. As stated above, two diesel engine driven pumps are provided common to both Units 1 and 2. Redundant (Train A and B) Safety Injection signals start both engine driven pumps in case of a DBA in either unit. Each engine driven pump is provided with both local and Main Control Room manual controls. 6.2 121 COOLING WATER PUMP UPGRADE The 121 Cooling Water Pump (121 CLP) was purchased as Quality Assurance Type 1 pump but is presently powered from a non-safeguard power source (4kV Bus 14). The pump will be upgraded to function as a back-up to the 12 and 22 diesel engine driven 143
Rev. 2 ; 1 pumps during maintenance and normal operation by repowering the pump motor from the 4KV safeguards buses and modifying the pump ; control system. The 121 CLP will also retain the function of a stand-by pump to the two horizontal pumps during normal operation. The 121 CLP serves both units as part of the shared Cooling Water System and will be manually aligned with and powered from either . of the Unit 2 Safeguards 4.16 KV Buses. The upgraded Unit 2 ! Auxiliary Power System has sufficient capacity to power the 121 Cooling Water Pump from either Unit 2 Safeguards Buses 25 or 26. For emergency power, the new Unit 2 DS and D6 emergency diesel , generators have each been sized to start and operate the ' additional 1000 HP load. Thus the 121 CLP will have power source independent from the diesel driven safeguards 12 and 22 Cooling Water Pumps. The existing 121 Cooling Water Pump motor was originally purchased as safety related. The motor safety design : classification will be upgraded as necessary by analysis and , special maintenance to safety related using the methodology i applied to original plant equipment. The safety design classification of the pump remains as safety'related. The seismic design classification of the 121 Cooling Water Pump will be upgraded to Seismic Category I using the seismic qualification documentation prepared for the original equipment. The controls of the 121 Cooling Water Pump will be modified to provide an automatic start for any Safety Injection (SI) signal: Unit 1, Unit 2, Train A, or Train B. When both diesel driven pumps are operable, all three pumps will start on the SI signal. If both diesel driven pumps come up to speed, then 121 CLP will trip. If one diesel driven pump does fail to start, then 121 CLP will remain running. i The four existing cooling water header isolation valves, listed below, close on a Safety Injection signal to separate the safety l trains and assure cooling water system redundancy. The present control scheme aligns the 121 Cooling Water Pump to be in parallel with a diesel-driven cooling water pump, depending on which unit has an SI signal. This control scheme will remain unchanged except as discussed below. 144
l l Rev. 2 Valve safety Train Automatic Action MV 32034 A Closes on SI Signal in Unit 2 MV 32035 B Closes on SI Signal in Unit 2 MV 32036 A Closes on SI Signal in Unit 1 MV 32037 B Closes on SI Signal in Unit 1 . When it is necessary to take a diesel driven cooling water pump out of service for maintenance, the 121 Cooling Water Pump will be manually aligned to replace the out of service pump. The , appropriate MOVs will then be placed in the desired position i (open, close) and then administratively controlled in position by opening the MCC circuit breakers for the valve operators. ; The change improves the reliability of the Cooling Water system , during an engineered safety features initiation by providing a safeguards power supply to the 121 Cooling Water Pump that is manually selected from either Unit 2 4KV Safeguard Bus. The motor driven pump provides a diverse means of providing cooling water that is independent of a common-mode failure of the diesel drives for the 12 and 22 Cooling Water Pumps. This modification to the 12] Jooling Water power supply and control scheme, plus administrative controls will provide a significant basis to allow one diesel driven cooling water pump to be taken out of service for maintenance without initiating a limiting condition for operation (LCO) condition. This will . require a Technical Specification change with supporting analysis, which will be requested in a separate submittal to the NRC. 1 l 145 , t
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Rev. 2 7.0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR ADDITION OF DIESEL GENERATORS AND ELECTRICAL SYSTEM UPGRADE FOR PRAIRIE ISLAND UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 Note: This section is not being updated, it is being kept in the document for historical purposes. The initial planning and scoping for this project began in September 1986 with the subsequent generation of the Project Major Milestone Schedule. This schedule logic projects completion of all construction and final documentation by approximately December of 1994. What is discussed here are the major Administrative, Training, Construction, and Testing activities that are deemed necessary to provide an overall view of the project. This will show that the project is being implemented in a safe, logical, and economical manner. The extensive engineering and procurement effort that is required to replace the , entire electrical safeguard system for Unit 2 and upgrade the Unit 1 system is not portrayed but is implied as a prerequisite to support all these activities. Because the new construction effort will occur within the plant protected area and next to an operating unit, special attention has been given to ensure all the operational and site security rules are adhered to. This plan was developed while observing the constraints of major construction having to occur within the existing plant as & backfit effort. Although it is especially difficult to interface with existing equipment and even harder to replace older equipment with new, we are confident this can be achieved by an extensive detailed. effort. Installation of cable tray, raceway, cable, and various equipment determined not to require a unit outage will be installed in the Turbine, Auxiliary and New D5/D6 buildings during Unit operations. These actions will support more efficient efforts during the outages. - Electrical and mechanical interface activities with major existing plant systems will be done during refueling and maintenance outages to minimize impact on plant operations. The only exception being the modification of the Main Control Room Panel "G", which will be performed during a two-unit outage. In order to meet the objectives of the plan the activities have been segregated into three major design changes.
- 1. Diesel Generator Building
- 2. DS/D6 Diesel Generator Installation
- 3. Plant Interface The highlights for the execution of each of the parts will be discussed in the following text. The integrated schedule for completing the major SBO/ESU Project activities remaining as of j October 1, 1991 is shown in Figure 7-1. General descriptions of these i activities is included in the following subsections. l 148 l
Rev. 2 7.1 SBO/ESU PROJECT INTEGRATED SCHEDULE CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES: 7.1.1. D5/D6 D.G. BUILDING HVAC INSTALLATION: These activities include HVAC sheet metal ductwork, plenums, stiffeners, hangers, dampers, grills, registers, nozzles, diffusers, access doors, controls, electric heaters, air conditioning units, miscellaneous fans, filters and fan installation. 7.1.2. DS/D6 PLANT INTERFACE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION AND POWER SOURCES: This includes work in the existing plant to support the installation of tray, raceway, and conduits to facilitate the installation of new power sources for Unit 2 4160V equipment, 480V buses and Motor Control Centers, 120V UPS and distribution panels, and 125 VDC panels. Cable, wiring and equipment installation in the existing plant is also included. An emphasis on power sources for startup of D5/D6 Auxiliary equipment is shown in the last quarter 1991. 7.1.3. D5/D6 HIGH/ LOW TEMP COOLING WATER INSTALLATION: These activities include installation of piping, hangers, components, and integrity testing for the High and Low . Temperature Cooling Water Systems. 7.1.4. D5/06 STARTING AIR INSTALLATION: These activities include installation of piping, hangers, components, and integrity testing for the Starting Air Systems. 7.1.5. DS/D6 LUBE OIL SYSTEM INSTALLATION: ' These activities include installation of piping, hangers, components, and integrity testing for the Lube oil Systems. 7.1.6. DS/D6 F.O. VAULT, RECEIVING. AND TRANSFER SYSTEMS: These activities include site preparation, excavation earthwork architectural and structural items-including reinforcing steel installation, structural steel erection, and concrete placement for the walls-floors-ceilings-accesses. Installation of the bulk fuel oil storage tanks, the receiving tank, and associated piping, hangers, and components for the Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer system is also included. 149
I i Rev. 2 7.1.7. D5/D6 COMBUSTION AIR / EXHAUST SYSTEM INSTALLATION: ! These activities include installation of piping, hangers, l components, and integrity testing for the Combustion Air and ; Exhaust Systems. 7.1.8. D5/D6 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION (AC DISTRIBUTION): These activities include installation of all electrical components, equipment, hangers, tray, raceway, conduit, cable, and wiring. Construction testing of terminations and equipment function is also included. 7.1.9. D5/D6 FIRE PROTECTION INSTALLATION: These activities include installation and integrity testing of the automatic sprinkler systems, standpipe riser with hose stations, and deluge system with open head sprinklers. 7.2 SBO/ESU PROJECT INTEGRATED SCHEDULE STARTUP ACTIVITIES: Following most of the construction installation activities is an activity for the Startup Group to perform prerequisite and preoperational testing on each of the systems. At the end of these activities the system will be ready for the initial engine runs and integrated preoperational tests. A target date of July 27, 1992 for preliminary turnover for operations is projected. This will allow sufficient time for operations personnel to perform surveillance and routine preventative maintenance before the actual tie in to the plant. Finally, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 outages which include construction tie-in to the existing plant and preoperational tests of the final configuration are shown for October and November of 1992. 7.3 SBO/ESU PROJECT INTEGRATED SCHEDULE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES: 7.3.1 Submit Revision 1 Desian Report to NRC: This includes the submittal of Revision 1 of_the Design Report which was previously submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as Revisions to incorporate changes in project schedule, scope, and design are included. Clarifications and additional information requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are also included. 7.3.2 Licensino Amendment: This includes the submittal to be made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the actual Safety Evaluation, supporting documentation, and the proposed technical 150
Rev. 2 specification changes. 7.3.3 SBO Proiect Support Procedures: This includes the development and use of the new procedures required for operations and maintenance once the new systems have been turned over to Plant Operations. 7.3.4 D5/D6 Traininc Overview iEncine Run and Outace Related These activities include lesson plan development and actual training on all equipment, new system functions, procedures, and design changes associated with the modification. Training will be performed by site training personnel and equipment manufacturers for operations, maintenance, and engineering personnel. l l l i I i l l l 1 1 151
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Rev. 2 8.0 SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM OPERATION 8.1 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Each existing diesel generator (D1 or D2) is capable of supplying power, in the event of loss of off-site power (LOOP), to all the necessary safeguards equipment of one Unit in an accident condition, plus the auxiliary loads for a safe (hot) shutdown of the other Unit. The maximum automatically connected loading for these conditions per USAR Table 8.4-2a is about 2785KW, which occurs in the first minute of diesel generator operation. The D1 and D2 diesel generators installed at the Prairie Island plant have an 8760 hour (continuous) rating of 2750 kilowatts. The , 2000 hour rating of these machines is 3000 kilowatts and the 30 minute rating of the machines is 3250 kilowatts. Paragraph C-2 of Regulatory Guide 1.9 states that the predicted load on each machine will not exceed the smaller of the 2000 hour rating or 90% of the 30 minute rating of the set. 90% of the 30 minute rating of the Prairie Island diesel generators is 2925 kilowatts, and is less than the 2000 hour ratings of 3000 kilowatts. As shown on Table 2-A, the total predicted connected load on either diesel generator is 2825 kilowatts. 8.2 EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AUXILIAhi POWER SYSTEM OPERATION Each diesel generator is automatically started by either of the following events:
- a. Loss of voltage or degraded voltage on either of the ,
associated 4160-volt buses (buses 15 and 26 for D1 and buses 16 and 25 for D2);
- b. Initiation of a Safety Injection Signal (both diesel generators start on this signal).
With a loss of voltage or degraded voltage on any of the four - safety-features 4160-volt buses, the automatic sequence is as follows:
- a. Start associated diesel generator (D1 for buses 15 and 26; D2 for buses 16 and 25).
- b. Trip all associated source breakers to bus,
- c. Close breaker to offsite source if voltage is present; (Bus 15 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 1R) (Bus 25 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 2R) (Buses 16 and 26 - Cooling Tower 4160-volt Substation). If this source is not available:
- d. Close bus tie breaker to associated 4160-volt safety features bus of the other Unit, if voltage is present; (Bus 15 associated with bus 26) (Bus 16 associated with bus 25) If 153 l l
1 --w.- , - - .
Rev. 2 this source is not available:
- e. Shed designated loads on the affected 4160-volt bus and associated 480-volt buses experiencing undervoltage.
- f. Close diesel generator breaker if voltage and frequency of the diesel generator meet established criteria.
Relays are provided on buses 15, 16, 25, and 26 to detect loss of voltage and degraded voltage (the voltage level below which safety related equipment may not operate properly). On loss of voltage, the autonatic voltage restoring. scheme is initiated immediately. When degraded voltage is sensed, the voltage restoring scheme is initiated if acceptable voltage is not restored within a short time period. This time delay prevents initiation of the voltage restoring scheme when.large loads are started and bus voltage momentarily dips below the degraded voltage setpoint. The undervoltage trip signal to the diesel generator source breakers is blocked if the-safety injection signal is present, thereby preventing load shedding of the emergency buses when they are being supplied by the diesels. After voltage is re-established on the subject 4160-volt bus, either from an offsite source or from a diesel generator, the diesel unit continues to run (loaded or unloaded) until manually shutdown. The 480-volt buses are immediately energized at the same time as the 4160-volt bus from which it is fed. Running loads which are not de-energized by the load shed sequence and have maintained contact circuitry in their starting circuits will subsequently be re-energized when bus voltage is restored. Motors not running prior to the loss of voltage condition would not start upon restoration of voltage, until manual or subsequent automatic action is initiated. , If there is a requirement for engineered safety features operation coincident with or following bus undervoltage, load shedding as described in step "e" is initiated, followed by sequential starting of the safety features equipment. 8.3 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The Upgraded Safeguards Auxiliary Power System: Dedicates new EDGs DS and D6 to Unit 2 Dedicates existing EDGs D?. and D2 to Unit 1 Dedicates Cooling Tower offsite source Transformer CT11 to ; Unit 1 with connections to Safeguards Buses 15 and 16 and ) Transformer CT12 to Unit 2 with connections to Safeguards 1 154
Rev. 2 Buses 25 and 26.
- Retains dedication of offsite source Transformer 1R, Y Winding to Unit 1 with connections to Safeguards 4160V Buses 15 and 16 and Transformer 2RY to Unit 2 with connections to Safeguards 4160V Buses 25 and 26.
The offsite source and erergency diesel generator existing and proposed voltage restoration sequence are summarized in Table 8-A. The sources for Unit 1 Safeguards Buses 15 and 16 will be , Transformer 1R-Y Winding, Transformer CT-11 and EDGs D1 and D2. > The sources for Unit 2 Safeguards Buses 25 and 26 will be Transformer 2RY, Transformer CT-12 and EDGs D5 and D6. The new additional emergency diesel generators (D5/D6) dedicated to Unit 2 Safeguards muses will have a 8760 hour (continuous) gross rating of 5400 kW. At present the total predicted connected Unit 2 Safeguards steady state load is 3340 kW per , train. This represents approximately 60% of the diesel generator continuous gross rating. Approximately 250 kW of Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator D5 and D6 running auxiliary loads per EDG is included in Loaa step 6. j 8.4 UPGRADED SAFEGUARDS AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM OPERATION l One safety train from each unit will be normally supplied power from the "R" transformer while the other safety train will be , supplied from the "CT" transformer. With this arrangement, the , loss of a single offsite source transfer will cause the loss of only a single safety train per unit.
- On undervoltage, the automatic voltage restoring scheme is i actuated after a short time delay to prevent actuation during normal transients (such as motor starting) and protective ;
relaying operation during faults. The undervoltage setpoint is 75 2.5% of nominal bus voltage. , the minimum setpoint ensures equipment operates as it is above ! the limiting value of 75% (of 4000V) for one minute operation. ! The maximum setpoint is chosen to ensure adequate voltage during , starting. The under voltate time delay of 4 1.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for l normal transients and short enough to operate prior to the degraded voltage logic, providing a rapid transfer to an alternate source. ' When degraded voltage is sensed, two time delays are actuated. Again, the first time delay is long enough to allow-for normal transients. The first short time delay annunciates that a , sustained degraded voltage condition exists and enables logic for ; automatically performing the following upon receipt of an SI ; signal. 155 l
i Rev. 2
- 1. Auto start the diesel generator
- 2. Separate the bus from the grid
- 3. Load the bus onto the diesal generator
- 4. Start load sequencer (including SI loads)
The second longer time delay is used to allow the degraded , voltage condition to be corrected by external actions within a time period that will not cause damage to operating equipment. If voltage is not restored within that time period, the logic automatically performs the following:
- 1. Auto start the diesel generator
- 2. Separate the bus from the grid
- 3. Load the bus onto the diesel generator
- 4. Start load sequencer The degraded voltage setpoint for Unit 2 is 95.5 0.7% of nominal 4160V bus voltage. Testing and analysis have shown that all safeguards loads will operate properly at or above the '
minimum degraded voltage setpoint. The maximum degraded voltage setpoint is chosen to prevent unnecessary actuation of the voltage restoring scheme at the minimum expected grid voltage. The first degraded voltage time delay of 8 0.5 seconds has been shown by testing and analysis to be long enough to allow for normal transients (i.e. motor starting and fault clearing). It - is also longer than the time required to start the SI pump at minimum voltage. The second degraded voltage time delay is provided to allow the degraded voltage condition to be corrected within a time frame which will not cause damage to permanently connected safety related loads. 4 a f I i l 156 \
_ . . y Rev. 2 TABLE 8-A EXISTING & PROPOSED VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEQUENCE , 1 EXISTING VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEQUENCE BUS BUS BUS BUS l M M M M \ l Normal Source 1RY 1RY 2RY 2RY First Choice 1RY CT-11 2RY CT-12 , Second Choice Bus Tie Bus Tie Bus Tie Bus Tie to 26 to 25 to 16 to 1S Third Choice D1 D2 Di' D1 , UPGRADED VOLTAGE RESTORATION SEQUENCE (see note) BUS BUS BUS BUS M M M M Normal Source 1RY CT-11 2RY CT-12 First Choice CT-11 1RY CT-12 2RY Second Choice D1 D2 DS D6 ; NOTE: For normal operation of the Upgraded Voltage Restoration Sequence, the choice of the normal source for each bus may be reversed to the other dedicated source for that unit, provided that each bus is powered from a different source. This prevents both safeguards buses in a unit from simultaneously losing power in the - event of a single power source failure.
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