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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant ML20210P8721997-08-31031 August 1997 Post Decommissioning Activities Rept, for Aug 1997 ML20141A0041997-05-31031 May 1997 Independent Assessment of Radiological Controls Program at Cyap Haddam Neck Plant Final Rept May 1997 ML20137H3031997-03-31031 March 1997 Rev 2 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137C6281997-03-14014 March 1997 Redacted Version of Rev 1 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20135E3221997-02-13013 February 1997 Independent Review Team Rept 1996 MP -1 Lout NRC Exam Failures ML20134L2751997-02-0303 February 1997 Draft Rev to GPRI-30, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Licensing Basis/Design Basis ML20134L2911997-01-0808 January 1997 Rev 0 to UFSAR Rev Grpi ML20204B6811996-12-31031 December 1996 Nuclear Lemons Assessment of America Worst Commerical Nuclear Power Plants. 5th Edition ML20237E0751996-12-31031 December 1996 Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant ML20134L2591996-12-31031 December 1996 Rev 0 to Sys Reclassification ML20134L2721996-12-31031 December 1996 Commitment Mgt Grpi ML20134L2481996-12-30030 December 1996 Rev 0 to Sys Needed for Decommissioning Sys Evaluation Process ML20135E2711996-12-26026 December 1996 Evaluation of Intakes by Two Workers at CT Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20134L2841996-12-23023 December 1996 Rev 0 to Spent Fuel Pool Island Studies ML20134L2871996-12-19019 December 1996 Rev 0 to Grpi for Defueled Condition Fire Protection Technical Requirements ML20134L2381996-12-19019 December 1996 Rev 0 to Accident Analysis ML20058G3481993-10-31031 October 1993 Nonproprietary VIPRE/WRB-1 DNBR Thermal Limit for Westinghouse Fuel Types, for Oct 1993 ML20058G6771993-09-29029 September 1993 Rev 0 to Project Assignment 91-006, Connecticut Yankee Event V Mods ML20058L7411993-07-15015 July 1993 QA Svcs Dept Surveillance Rept SS-169, Assessment of Fitness for Duty Program ML20045F3351993-06-30030 June 1993 IPE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities RA-93-022, Cy Containment Isolation Failure Probability1993-05-18018 May 1993 Cy Containment Isolation Failure Probability ML20127J5391992-11-30030 November 1992 Connecticut Yankee Structural Reevaluation of Plant Structures to Address SEP Topic III-7.B Load Combinations Code Changes ML20125E5661992-03-31031 March 1992 Nonproprietary PWR SG Tube Repair Limits:Technical Support Document for Expansion Zone PWSCC in Roll Transitions Final Rept A08995, Rev 1 to Auxiliary Initiation Event Analysis1990-09-14014 September 1990 Rev 1 to Auxiliary Initiation Event Analysis ML20062G4951990-07-31031 July 1990 Rev 3 to Northeast Utils USNRC Read & Sign ML20055G4951990-07-31031 July 1990 Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept ML20044A8481990-07-0202 July 1990 Vol 1 to Connecticut Yankee Simulator Certification Submittal:Connecticut Yankee Simulator Design Info & Certification Program Overview ML20055D8931990-06-30030 June 1990 Fracture Mechanics Evaluation:Haddam Neck Pressurizer ML20043A4831990-04-30030 April 1990 Rev 1 to Technical Rept Supporting Cycle 16 Operation ML20012A2281990-03-0101 March 1990 Vol 6 to Probabilistic Safety Study B13388, Zircaloy Clad Fuel Mechanical Design Rept1989-11-30030 November 1989 Zircaloy Clad Fuel Mechanical Design Rept ML20246N9421989-08-31031 August 1989 Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station ML20044G5131989-07-31031 July 1989 Rev 1 to Final Rept J5439-89-001R1, Fluidelastic Instability Analysis of U-Bend Region of Westinghouse Model 27 Sg ML20206J9991988-10-31031 October 1988 Crdr Summary Rept, Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 ML20153G4081988-06-0303 June 1988 Rev 0 to Conneticut Yankee Replace Nuclear Instrumentation Sys, Neo Project Description ML20153G4031988-03-0808 March 1988 Rev 0 to, Connecticut Yankee Modernize Reactor Protection Sys - Phase 2, Conceptual Project Description ML20235B5911987-09-24024 September 1987 Undated Technical Evaluation:Haddam Neck Plant Reanalysis of Non-LOCA DBAs & Tech Spec Change Requests in Support of Reload Cycle 15 B12619, Bimonthly Progress Rept 5:New Switchgear Bldg Const1987-07-31031 July 1987 Bimonthly Progress Rept 5:New Switchgear Bldg Const ML20214R6371987-06-30030 June 1987 Technical Rept Supporting Cycle 15 Operation ML20205Q7011987-04-30030 April 1987 Bimonthly Progress Rept 3:New Switchgear Bldg Const B12480, Const Design Info Submittal:New Switchgear Bldg Const. W/38 Oversize Encl1987-04-30030 April 1987 Const Design Info Submittal:New Switchgear Bldg Const. W/38 Oversize Encl ML20238C3751986-12-31031 December 1986 Connecticut Yankee 1986 Core XIII - Xiv Refueling Outage ALARA Rept ML20238C3821986-12-31031 December 1986 Connecticut Yankee 1986 Steam Generator Repair Outage ALARA Rept ML20209C7161986-12-31031 December 1986 Vols 1 & 2 to Isap,Haddam Neck Plant,Final Rept ML20206J8871986-06-30030 June 1986 Isap Public Safety Impact Model Project Analyses Summaries ML20202D5071986-06-30030 June 1986 Non-LOCA Transient Analysis ML20205T1201986-05-19019 May 1986 Steam Generator Tube Insp Rept for 1986 Refueling Outage ML20205T1231986-05-0808 May 1986 Steam Generator Tube W/55% Through Wall Defect Safety Evaluation for Structural Integrity CY-86-031, Rev 1 to 4.10.1(D) Inservice Insp of Steam Generator Tubes (Acceptance Criteria)1986-05-0808 May 1986 Rev 1 to 4.10.1(D) Inservice Insp of Steam Generator Tubes (Acceptance Criteria) 1997-08-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use 05000213/LER-1999-001, :on 990105,main Stack RM R-14A Pressure Compensating Signal Was Not Calibrated.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Calibration Procedure.With1999-02-0101 February 1999
- on 990105,main Stack RM R-14A Pressure Compensating Signal Was Not Calibrated.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Calibration Procedure.With
05000213/LER-1997-016, :on 970825,discovered That Negative Pressure Was Not Maintained in Sf Bldg,Per Design Basis.Caused by Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Being Based on Lower Pab Ventilation Flow Rates.Corrected Ventilation Sys Design.With1999-01-25025 January 1999
- on 970825,discovered That Negative Pressure Was Not Maintained in Sf Bldg,Per Design Basis.Caused by Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Being Based on Lower Pab Ventilation Flow Rates.Corrected Ventilation Sys Design.With
ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included 05000213/LER-1997-018, :on 971003,discovered That Sf Bldg Exhaust Fan Did Not Meet Design Basis.Caused by Higher than Expected Pressure in Pab.Design of Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Was Corrected.With1998-12-0808 December 1998
- on 971003,discovered That Sf Bldg Exhaust Fan Did Not Meet Design Basis.Caused by Higher than Expected Pressure in Pab.Design of Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Was Corrected.With
05000213/LER-1998-009, :on 980915,noted Excessive CV,SW-CV-963,seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers.Caused by Subject Cv Disc Being Stuck in Open Position.Valve Was Exercised & Freed from Stuck Open Position.With1998-10-14014 October 1998
- on 980915,noted Excessive CV,SW-CV-963,seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers.Caused by Subject Cv Disc Being Stuck in Open Position.Valve Was Exercised & Freed from Stuck Open Position.With
05000213/LER-1998-008, :on 980721,determined That Main Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Samples Were Not Analyzed to Required Detection Level.Caused by Inadequate Design.Immediately Controlled Temp of Radiation Monitor Room.With1998-09-29029 September 1998
- on 980721,determined That Main Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Samples Were Not Analyzed to Required Detection Level.Caused by Inadequate Design.Immediately Controlled Temp of Radiation Monitor Room.With
05000213/LER-1997-021, :on 971124,found Contaminated Matls Offsite. Caused by Breakdown of Health Physics Program in Effect at Time Contaminated Matl Was Released from Site.Revised Procedures.With1998-09-0101 September 1998
- on 971124,found Contaminated Matls Offsite. Caused by Breakdown of Health Physics Program in Effect at Time Contaminated Matl Was Released from Site.Revised Procedures.With
ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 05000213/LER-1998-007, :on 980714,excessive Check Valve Seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers,Occurred.Caused by SW-CV-963 Disc Sticking in Open Position.Increased Test Frequency from Quarterly to Monthly1998-08-13013 August 1998
- on 980714,excessive Check Valve Seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers,Occurred.Caused by SW-CV-963 Disc Sticking in Open Position.Increased Test Frequency from Quarterly to Monthly
CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 05000213/LER-1998-005, :on 980511,determined That Design Deficiency Was Found in Main Stack Flow Rate Monitor.Caused by 1974 Mod Change on Original Installation.Declared F-1101 Channel Out of Svc & Develop Means of Estimating Flow1998-06-0909 June 1998
- on 980511,determined That Design Deficiency Was Found in Main Stack Flow Rate Monitor.Caused by 1974 Mod Change on Original Installation.Declared F-1101 Channel Out of Svc & Develop Means of Estimating Flow
05000213/LER-1998-006, :on 980507,design Deficiency Was Found in Stack RM RMS-14B Sampling Lines.Caused by Design Not Meeting ANSI N13.1-1969 Stds.Corrective Action Plan for RMS-14B Is Being Developed1998-06-0808 June 1998
- on 980507,design Deficiency Was Found in Stack RM RMS-14B Sampling Lines.Caused by Design Not Meeting ANSI N13.1-1969 Stds.Corrective Action Plan for RMS-14B Is Being Developed
05000213/LER-1998-004, :on 980507,discovered Design Deficiency in Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Isokinetic Sampling.Caused by Failure to Account for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Flow. Will Develop CAP for RMS-14B1998-06-0404 June 1998
- on 980507,discovered Design Deficiency in Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Isokinetic Sampling.Caused by Failure to Account for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Flow. Will Develop CAP for RMS-14B
05000213/LER-1998-003, :on 980505,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded Time Limit W/Sw Effluent RM Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Was Counseled & Technicians Were Reminded of Sampling within Required Frequency1998-06-0202 June 1998
- on 980505,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded Time Limit W/Sw Effluent RM Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Was Counseled & Technicians Were Reminded of Sampling within Required Frequency
05000213/LER-1998-002, :on 980421,determined That Visual Insp of Switchgear Cable Shaft Sprinkler Sys Was Not Being Performed Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of License Amend.Fire Watch Patrol Established1998-05-19019 May 1998
- on 980421,determined That Visual Insp of Switchgear Cable Shaft Sprinkler Sys Was Not Being Performed Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of License Amend.Fire Watch Patrol Established
05000213/LER-1998-001, :on 980409,seismic Monitor Sp Was Not in Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Engineering Review. Submitted Proposed License Amend to Correct Issue1998-05-0707 May 1998
- on 980409,seismic Monitor Sp Was Not in Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Engineering Review. Submitted Proposed License Amend to Correct Issue
CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant 05000213/LER-1997-020, :on 971117,determined That Radioactive Effluent Dose Calculations Were Not Performed within Required Frequency.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Will Revise Procedures & Will Enhance Tracking Process1997-12-16016 December 1997
- on 971117,determined That Radioactive Effluent Dose Calculations Were Not Performed within Required Frequency.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Will Revise Procedures & Will Enhance Tracking Process
ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-017, :on 970924,identified Three Locations of Detectable Plant Related Radioactivity in on-site Landfill Area.Caused by Failure to Conduct Adequate Survey.Access to Area Controlled1997-11-18018 November 1997
- on 970924,identified Three Locations of Detectable Plant Related Radioactivity in on-site Landfill Area.Caused by Failure to Conduct Adequate Survey.Access to Area Controlled
05000213/LER-1997-019, :on 970808,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded W/Rms Determined Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Incorrect Interpretation of Ts.Compensatory Sampling to Be Conducted in Time Frame Required1997-11-17017 November 1997
- on 970808,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded W/Rms Determined Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Incorrect Interpretation of Ts.Compensatory Sampling to Be Conducted in Time Frame Required
ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-018, :on 971003,Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Flow Was Found Below Design During Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Evaluated Replacement of Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Capable of Overcoming Higher Pressures1997-10-30030 October 1997
- on 971003,Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Flow Was Found Below Design During Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Evaluated Replacement of Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Capable of Overcoming Higher Pressures
ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-015, :on 970813,functional Testing of Radiation Monitoring Sys Was Not Performed as Defined in Ts.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Definition of Acot.Revised Appropriate RMS Surveillance Procedure1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 970813,functional Testing of Radiation Monitoring Sys Was Not Performed as Defined in Ts.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Definition of Acot.Revised Appropriate RMS Surveillance Procedure
05000213/LER-1996-027, :on 961010,boron Injection Flow Path Below Minimum Required Temperature Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design of Heat Trace Controls in Rtd.Boric Acid Flow Paths from Bamt Were Declared Inoperable1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 961010,boron Injection Flow Path Below Minimum Required Temperature Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design of Heat Trace Controls in Rtd.Boric Acid Flow Paths from Bamt Were Declared Inoperable
05000213/LER-1996-016, :on 960801,potential for Inadequate RHR Pump NPSH During Sump Recirculation Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Fully Analyze Containment Pressure & Sump Temperature Response.Redesign of Piping Proposed1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 960801,potential for Inadequate RHR Pump NPSH During Sump Recirculation Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Fully Analyze Containment Pressure & Sump Temperature Response.Redesign of Piping Proposed
05000213/LER-1997-014, :on 970808,ESFA Occurred Due to Deenergization of High Containment Pressure Actuation Circuits.Reemphasized Expectations of Mgt for Performing non-routine Operational Tasks1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 970808,ESFA Occurred Due to Deenergization of High Containment Pressure Actuation Circuits.Reemphasized Expectations of Mgt for Performing non-routine Operational Tasks
05000213/LER-1996-021, :on 960828,valve Leakage Resulted in Nitrogen Intrusion Into RCS During Cold Shutdown.Caused by Leaking Valve BA-V-355.Training Has Been Been Provided to Operators on Event & Features & Limitations of Sys1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 960828,valve Leakage Resulted in Nitrogen Intrusion Into RCS During Cold Shutdown.Caused by Leaking Valve BA-V-355.Training Has Been Been Provided to Operators on Event & Features & Limitations of Sys
05000213/LER-1996-005, :on 960301,spent Fuel Cooling Was Shut Down Due to Discovery of Loose Parts.Caused by Inadequate Design. Piping from Both Sent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps to Plate Exchanger Were Inspected for Loose Parts w/bore-a-scope1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 960301,spent Fuel Cooling Was Shut Down Due to Discovery of Loose Parts.Caused by Inadequate Design. Piping from Both Sent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps to Plate Exchanger Were Inspected for Loose Parts w/bore-a-scope
1999-04-28
[Table view] |
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FINAL REPORT CONNECTICUT YANKEE PLANT DESIGN CHANGE EXTERNAL REVIEW GROUP SEPTEMBER 6, 1985 Chairman A
D.
E.
Vandenburgh, Sr. V President Yankee Atomic Electric C ny D
Member W. D. HarringtoG, Sr. Vice President-Nuclear Boston Edison Company Member C.
H'. P~oindexterf Vice President -
Engineering & fonstruction Baltimore Gas & Electric 8510070193 850906 PDR ADOCK 05000213 P
PDR
t
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I i
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CONTENTS i
l Summary......................................
1 Evaluation of Task Groups Screening of Plant Design Changes.........
2 I
l Evaluation of Task Groups Review of Plant Design Changes............
3 1
[
Evaluation of.the Plant Design l
Change Process............................
4 i
Conclusions..................................
5 g
I Appendix.....................................
6 t
i i
I I
I l
i i
SUMMARY
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company's response to the NRC's order for modification of their license is contained in a Program Plan, dated January 1985.
Included in the plan was the creation of a three-member Plant Design Change External Review Group, the charter of which was included in the plan as Enclosure III.
As indicated in the charter, this group is responsible to provide a Final Report to the Vice President, Nuclcar and Environmental Engineering, at Northeast Utilities Service Company and to the NRC - Region I.
The External Review Group (ERG) was charged with the responsibility to provide an independent oversight of the Plant Design Change Task Group (Task Group).
In carrying out these responsibilities, the ERG was charged with the tasks of deter-mining the adequacy of the reviews, the effectiveness and sufficiency of the Task Group's activities and recommendations, and the completeness of the corrective actions to improve the design change process.
The oversight by the ERG took several forms as follows:
1.
Development of the Charter and Procedures for ERG activities.
2.
Review and approval of working prccedures for the Task Group.
3.
Four day-long meetings with the Task Group.
4.
Independent review by the staffs of ERG members of various documents and reports produced by the Task Group.
Based on the ERG's oversight of the Task Group's activities during the last six months, the ERG concludes that an effective multi-disciplined approach was taken to the review of all design changes at the Connecticut Yankee plant covering the period January 1979 through December 1984.
The ERG was very much impressed with the thoroughness of the review conducted.
During the six-year period in question, 355 Plant Design Change Requests (PDCR) were processed for Connecticut Yankee.
About 10% of these were found by the screening process to require detailed evaluation.
In addition, the Impell Corporation was retained by the Task Group to review 20,294 Work Permits / Orders to determine if any involved design changes of potential safety significance.
The subsequent detailed evaluation determined that the imple-mentation of only one PDCR raised an immediate safety concern.
The prompt notification of Northeast Utilities Service Company management resulted in a thorough review and a filing with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a Justification for Continued Operation.
A detailed listing of the other deficiencies has been provided to the Northeast Utilities Service Company Senior Vice President who will provide an action plan to the NRC which will address the resolution of the deficiencies.
It is gratifying to verify that design changes for Connecticut Yankee were handled in an appropriate manner in the past, but it is even more gratifying to determine that an improved process has evolved since the fuel pool seal failure incident.
Recommendations to improve further the plant design change process have been made by the Task Group, and the addition of these process modifications should provide a standard of excellence for the industry.
EVALUATION OF TASK GROUPS SCREENING OF PLANT DESIGN CHANGES The Plant Design Change Task Group performed a preliminary evaluation of all plant design changes approved during the period January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1984, to determine if any public safety concerns had been introduced with imple-mentation of the changes.
This preliminary evaluation was termed
" screening."
Plant design changes had been initiated in one of three ways:
through the use of Plant Design Change Requests through the use of jumpers, lifted leads and bypasses, and through the use of Work Permits and Automated Work Orders without approval under a PDCR.
The screening process was carried out by the six member Task Group working under the guidance provided in their Procedure 1.02 - Pland Design Change Screening.
The Task Group used three screening criteria to evaluate the design changes as follows:
- 1) Potential loss of a boundary designed to contain radioactivity,
- 2) Thoroughness of the change package for safety related changes, and 3) Adequacy of the safety evaluation.
Documentation of reviews was provided by completion of a form which included reviewer's evaluations, independent review questions and comments, a summary of the Task Group's discussion and the basis for the final deter-mination.
For those design changes requiring additional review, the appropriate concerns which arose during the screening process were documented on the screening form to ensure their resolution during detailed evaluation.
The Task Group's screening of 355 design changes resulted in 35 being selected for detailed evaluation.
The ERG's exami-nation of six screening packages (4 which had been dispositioned "yes" - indicating further review was required due to potential safety significance and 2 which had been dispositioned "no" -
but which had been considered borderline as to whecher further evaluation should be conducted) resulted in the Group's con-currence-that the assessments made by the Task Group had been made correctly..
t l
}
j The ERG also audited the screening packages for 2 of 12 l
design changes involving jumpers, lifted leads or bypasses which were still in effect as of April 15, 1985.
The ERG agreed with the Task Group's assessment.
l The Impell Corporation's review of 9101 work permits and 11,193 automated work orders revealed that safety evaluations j
had to be done for 65 work permits / orders which were safety significant.
The ERG verified that the Task Group worked in close cooperation with the contractor throughout the task, thereby auditing their work from time to time.
During the course of ERG's meeting with Impell representatives, the methodology used, the detailed findings, suggested generic guidelines and their observations and recommendations were all reviewed to the Group's satisfaction.
It is obvious the task was a formidable one yet it was performed in a thorough, probing and unbiased manner.
Based on ERG's discussions with the Task Group and discussions with Impell, we believe their work was complete and good judgement was exercised.
Although several work permits / orders have been identified for further evaluation, none have resulted in a changa which is known to adversely affect plant safety.
Based on ERG's review of selected design change screening packages and Impell's evaluations, ERG members have concluded that the screening process has been executed in an objective, complete and thorough manner.
This is based on the premise that in those design change packages audited it was found that a broad spectrum of concerns had been considered, concerns such as testing requirements, failure modes, specification adequacy, impact on other systems, adequacy of operation, adequacy of safety evalu-ations, seismic requirements, safety analysis, accident conse-quences, faulty operation of equipment and adequacy of procedures were all assessed in the Task Group's review.
The ERG believes that the Task Group has conducted a very complete and thorough screening review.
EVALUATION OF TASK GROUP'S REVIEW OF PLANT DESIGN CHANGES Working under the guidance provided in their Procedure 1.03 - Plant Design Change Evaluation, the Task Group undertook detailed evaluations of the 35 PDCR's which were found to have potential safety significance.
Detailed evaluations of 11 of the 35 resulted in no identified deficiencies.
The remaining 24 resulted in 39 deficiencies requiring further evaluation or corrective action.
A scope review was first conducted to outline the areas requiring detailed evaluation.
The review considered three primary. - - - -
phases for evaluation:
Impact on the plant design basis Confirmation of proper implementation Provisions for continued safe operation.
The detailed evaluations were then performed based on the concerns identified in the screening, scoping reviews, and on-site inspections and walkdowns.
Documentation of the evaluations was provided by completion of a Summary Evaluation form which provided each member of the Task Group an opportunity to review the findings for completeness and accuracy.
Questions and resolutions were also documented.
All six members of the Task Group had to concur with evaluation results before approval could be reached.
The Task Group findings on the 39 deficiencies showed 3 which needed to be addressed; one of immediate concern (PDCR "380")
which was addressed in a notification to the Vice President of Nuclear and Environmental Engineering and two major areas which could require extensive evaluation and corrective action.
These involved 1) an evaluation necessary to clearly identify components and system boundaries necessary to allow cold shutdown following a design basis earthquake, and 2) an evaluation of the contain-ment isolation system.
Further, deficiencies were categorized into five classifications; seismic, procedural, design, testing and safety analysis.
This revealed that 66% of the deficiencies were in the engineering and design areas and in particular, seismic qualification of components.
Eleven of the 39 deficiencies had been identified through other programs in process at Northeast Utilitiet and therefore only 28 deficiencies could require new studies or projects.
Based on ERG's audit of 10 evaluation packages, ERG members have concluded that the evaluation process has been conducted in a most thorough and professional manner.
The audits have indi-cated a genuine concern for addressing all possible issues even though remotely applicable.
The methodical manner in which the Task Group has conducted their evaluations gives the ERG a high level of confidence that the task was executed in a most competent and complete manner.
EVALUATION OF THE PLANT DESIGN CHANGE PROCESS Throughout the screening and detailed evaluation phases of the design review effort, the Task Group identified potential design change process deficiencies.
The ERG provided additional process improvement suggestions.
At the meeting of the ERG with the Task Group on August 8, 1985, eighteen recommendations for process corrections and improvements were discussed..
The ERG, on the basis of their oversight, concludes that there has been a concern for safety and quality at Connecticut Yankee throughout the six-year period, 1979-1984.
As expected, the process was not perfect and improvements have been continually made.
In fact, a number of process improvements were initiated by the Northeast Utilities Service Company independent of the Task Group's work.
The ERG believes that the recommendations made by the Task Group will further improve the process.- They include a more integrated review, enhanced identification of and control over design basis information, and improved ongoing training for engineering personnel responsible for the design changes.
The Northeast Utilities Service Company would do a service to the nuclear utility industry by sharing the lessons learned as a result of this review.
CONCLUSIONS Based on ERG's audit of the Task Group's conduct of investigations, data produced, findings and follow-up actions, the ERG concludes that the task has been conducted and completed in a very thorough and effective manner.
These conclusions are supported by the detailed information presented in the Connecticut Yankee Plant Design Change Task Group's Final Report, a copy of which is enclosed, and by the record of ERG's communication and involvement with the Task Group as found in the Appendix to this report.
We further believe that the Northeast Utilities Service Company has made available all the necessary resources to' allow completion of this task in a most competent and professional manner, as evidenced by the fact that approximately 11,700 man-hours of highly experienced engineering professionals were assigned and carried the project to completion.
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t APPENDIX CHRONOLOGY OF THE ERG /CYPDCTG INTERFACE Date
- Form Subject Feb. 1 Letter from W.G. Counsil Program background to D.E. Vandenburgh information WGC-85-CY-ll l
Feb. 13 Telecon between R.J. Schmidt Method for procedure
& D.E. Vandenburgh development Feb. 15 Letter from C.F. Sears to Draft ERG Procedures D.E. Vandenburgh, CFS85-050 Feb. 20 Telecon between R.J. Schmidt Procedures, Audit / Review and D.E. Vandenburgh Feb. 21 Letter from R.J. Schmidt to CYAPCO letter to NRC of D.E. Vandenburgh, CYPDCTG-012 Feb. 6, 1985.
Feb. 21 Letter from R.J. Schmidt to Transmit CYPDCTG Procedures D.E. Vandenburgh, CYPDCTG-Oll 1.01, 1.02, 1.03, 1.04 i
March 1 Telecon between R.J. Schmidt Comment on CYPDCTG and D.E. Vandenburgh procedures i
March 1 Letter from D.E. Vandenburgh Comments on CYPDCTG l
to R.J. Schmidt procedures March 5 Telecon between R.J. Schmidt Comments on CYPDCTG and D.E. Vandenburgh procedures March 6 Memo from R.J.
Schmidt to February Monthly Report C.F. Sears (CYPDCTG-017),
with copies to ERG March 7 Letter from R.J. Schmidt to Procedure 1.01, 1.02 CYPDCTG Procedures Manual l
Copy Holders, CYPDCTG-021 L
March 7 Letter from R.J. Schmidt to Procedures 1.03, 1.04, 1.05
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D.E. Vandenburgh, CYPDCTG-022 March 12 Meeting ERG and CYPDCTG Status / Audit March 21 Letter from C.H. Poindexter to Comments on Procedures j
D.E. Vandenburgh March 27 Letter from D.E. Vandenburgh Approval of 1.01, 1.02, to R.J. Schmidt 1.03, 1.04, 1.05
Date Form Subject April 4 Memo from R.J.
Schmidt to March Monthly Report C.F. Sears (CYPDCTG-037) with copies to ERG April 8 Letter from R.J. Schmidt to Procedures 1.01, 1.03, 1.04, CYPDCTG Procedures Manual 1.05, 2.01, 2.02 Copy Holders, CYPDCTG-046 April 11 Letter from D.E. Vandenburgh ERG first status report to T.E. Murley
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April 25 Meeting - ERG and CYPDCTG Status / Audit May 7 Memo from R.J.
Schmidt to April Monthly Report C.F.
Sears (CYPDCTG-064),
with copies to ERG May 8 Letter from R.J. Schmidt Screoning Milestone Report to C.F.
Sears, CYPDCTG-069 May 20 Letter from W.D.
Harrington Review Design Change to D.E. Vandenburgh May 21 Letter from R.J. Schmidt Procedure 1.04, Rev. 1 to D.E. Vandenburgh, CYPDCTG-074 May 31 Meeting - CYPDCTG and ERG Status / Audit May 31 Letter from D.E. Vandenburgh Approval of Procedure
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to R.J.
Schmidt 1.04, Rev. 1 June 7 Memo from R.J. Schmidt to May Monthly Report C.F. Sears (CYPDCTG-078),
with copies to ERG June 13 Leuter from R.J. Schmidt Procedures 1.04, Rev. 1, to CYPDCTG Procedure 2.01, 2.03 Manual Copy Holders, CYPDCTG-083 June 21 Letter from D.E. Vandenburgh ERG 2nd status report to C.F.
Sears July 2 Letter from R.J. Schmidt Evaluation of ERG to D.E. Vandenburgh, comments on screening CYPDCTG-091 and process improvement July 3 Memo from R.J.
Schmidt to June Monthly Report C.F.
Sears (CYPDCTG-090),
with copies to ERG.
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l Date Form Subject July 24 Letter from R.J. Schmidt Milestone reports:
Plant to-D.E. Vandenburgh Design Change Evaluations, Review of the Design Change l
Process l.
July 26 Letter from R.J. Schmidt Draft Final Report to D.E. Vandenburgh Aug. 5 Memo from R.J. Schmidt to July Monthly Report to C.F. Sears (CYPDCTG-106),
with copies to ERG l
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