ML20133B374

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Responds to H Denton Questions Re Tech Spec Order.Listed Documents Encl.Problem Sheet 306 Identified to Have Inconsistencies Between as-built Plant & FSAR
ML20133B374
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/13/1984
From: Capra R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Collins T, Notafransesco, Virgilio M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19276B572 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-84-459 TAC-54667, NUDOCS 8507200283
Download: ML20133B374 (17)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

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April 13, 1984

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NOTE T0: Grand Gulf 1 TS Reviewers RSB - Tim Collins ICSB-Marty Virgilio CSB - Allen Notafransesco PSB - Sang Rhow/ Bob Giardina l

ASB - John Ridgely CPB - Summer Sun l

AEB - Jacques Read RAB - John Minns/ Wayne Meinke 3

l METB-Jay Lee / Earl Markee

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FROM:

R. Capra, T/A DSI

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY H. DENTON REGARDING GRAND GULF 1 a

TS ORDER Attached are three enclosures (labled Attachment 4, 5 and 7) which were extracted from a document submitted by MP&L today.

H. Denton has asked three questions which need to be answered by cob today.

The' attachments are as follows:

Attachment #4 identifies 53 problem sheets for which the TS are inconcistent with the FSAR.

Attachment #5 identifies 12 problem sheets for which the TS are inconsistent with the SER.

Attachment #7 identifies 10 problem sheets for which the as-built j

plant is inconsistent with the FSAR.

3 The three questions that need to be answered are as follows:

1.

For the priority lb or lc requested TS changes you are evaluating, are any of the requested changes inconsistent with the FSAR or SER?

If so, will the changed TS either meet or exceed,FSAR & SER requirements?

(Note Attachment #4 identifies 3 priority lb or lc items. Attachment #5 does not identify any) 2.

Are there any problem sheets identified in Attachments #4 & #5 which are not being reviewed for 5% operation? If not why not? (Note the answer is yes for all but the three items in questions 1 above. Therefore, an answer is needed for the rest) 3.

Has a TS change been requested for any problem shhet where there are inconsistencies between the as-built plant and the FSAR? If so, why does it need to be included in the 5% license? (The only one identified by the licensee in Attachment #7 is Problem Sheet 306-CSB).

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2-Please write your hand-uritten answers on the attachments and return them to either Les Xintner (Room 322) or Elinor Adensam (Room ll6B) this afternoon.

I am available to help you with the responses, if you have questions at extension 29625.

R. Capra

Enclosures:

As stated cc: R. Mattson

. W. Houston L. Rubenstein D. Muller L. Kintne'r t

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Attachment #4 lists 53 problem sheets for which the TS are inconsistent with the FSAR.

Attachment #5 lists 12 problem sheets for which the TS are inconsistent with the SER.

Attachment #7 lists 10 problem sheets for which the As-built plant is inconsistent with the FSAR.

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS 1.

For the priority lb or Ic requested TS changes you are evaluating, are any of the requested changes inconsistent with the FSAR or SER? If so, will the changed TS either meet or exceed FSAR & SER requirements?

2.

Are there any problem sheets identified in Attachments 4 and 5 which are not being reviewed for 5% operation? If not, why not?

3.

Has a TS change been requested for any problem sheet where there are incon-sistencies between the as-built plant and the FSAR? If so, why does it need to be included in the 5% license?

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MatrixFootnotes'so'rtedforFSARdiscrep5ncies.f This is responsive to the FSAR portion of List 1 (tasklaof3/26/84NRCmemo).

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FOOTNOTES - SECTION 2 FSAR INCONSISTENCIES Page.l.of 1 NOTE

.TSPS #

PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS

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319 2E Tech Spec Base's references wrong code 4

date for Rx vessel. Change 1974 code to 1971 Edition thru winter 1972 Addendum.

2 151 3B Change FSAR and SER from 112.5% to 118%

for APRM trip. Tech Spec is correct.

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FOOTNOTES - SECTION 3/4 FSAR INCONSISTENCIES i

Page 1 of S P10TF TSPS #_

PRIORIT[

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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS 1

152 2E ll FSAR to be revised to.28% delta k/k

,t shutdown margin.. Tech Spec is more ij conserva tive.

FSAR now states.25% delta k/k shutdown margin.

4 805 3B FSAR needs to be corrected for sodium i

pentaborate required volume.

Tech Spec

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S 313 28

.,l, Tech Spec 4.1.5.d.4 changes " Heaters" to

" normal heater". SLC tank has only one heater for maintaining temperature.

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300 3A Change FSAR MAPLHGR Limit at 20,000 MWD /T to read 12.6 kw/ft (Table 6.3-6).

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7 800 38 j

Change FSAR APRM scrampoint.

Tech Spec 3.2.2 vs FSAR Table 7.6-6.

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006 3B MCPR limit of 1.18 in Tech Spec is i

correct. Change SER Section 15.4.3.

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Fuel load error analysis is not limiting.

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Table 3.3.2-1 change is to delete note I,

(f) for secondary containment manual isolation valve groups. Mechanical vacuum pumps do not trip on manual isolation initiation.

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This inconsistency is in ECCS response j

times between FSAR & Tec;h Spec. LPCS/

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28 802 3B j:

Change FSAR to state 40% of rated thermal

{3 power for RPT-EOC function; now states i.

30% power.

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z FOOTNOTES - SECTION 3/4 FSAR INCONSISTENCIES Page.2 of 5 NOTE TSPS #

PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS 34 803 3B Tech Spec Table 3.3.7.1.1 and FSAR Table 11.5-1 do not match.

(Rad Mont. Inst).

Consider explanatory note as addition to FSAR.

39 807 3B FSAR Change to show proper Surveillance intervals (Sections 11.5.2.3.1; t

11.5.2.3.2; 12.3.4.2.7).

40 202 3B Table 3.3.7.5-1.

Proposed change 1

increases the number of required channels of suppression pool temperature monitoring from 6 (1/ sector) to 12 (2/ sector).

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41 327 3B Change FSAR requirements for CTMT/DRWL area rad monitor inst to be sent to vendor for calibration each refueling outage.

43 329 t

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l 44 330 2B Table 4.3.7.5-1.

Proposed change adds-daily checks to accident monitoring instrumentation.

Reference:

FSAR 11.5.2.3.1.

47 251 2F The.7 cps was approved by Amendment 12 and issued by NRC is now inconsistent with the FSAR.

49 010 2B Plant has 5 TIPS vs. 3 as stated in Tech Spec. Change Tech Spec to 5.

52 073 28 Table 3.3.7.9-1.

Update Table of fire 102 28 detection instrumentation and zones in 304 20 both Tech Spec and FSAR.

i tusd3 Rev. 3, 4/11/84

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FOOTNOTES - SECTION 3/4 FSAR INCONSISTENCIES Page 3 of 5

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PRIORIT[

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COWiENTS 56 257 28 The Action Statement b of Tech Spec i

3/4.4.2 is inconsistent with 3.6.3.1 Action Statement b but is more conservative in that it requires mode I

switches to shutdown immediately at a

i pool temp of 105"F with a stuck open valve where the FSAR and Tech Spec 3.6.3.1 allow the temp to go to Il0*F.

59 001 no I B_

i ADS 7 vs. 8 valves.

67 229 28 j

'1 4.6.1.4.a.2 and c.1 revise for j'

clarification. MSIV LCS heater only on inboard system, not on outboard as implied by STS.

69 801 3B Evaluate equipment qualification program to confirm CTMT to Auxiliary Building Diff. Press. Range. Revise FSAR and NUREG-0588 response.

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70 260 38 CTMT avg. air temp. 80"F vs. 90*F.

Correct FSAR.

72 172 2B t

A/ k is not leakage. Clarification.

74 234 3A FSAR revisions to agree with Tech Spec.

Tables for Sup. Pool Volume and instrumentation. Editorial for clarification of suppression pool Icvel instrumentation.

85 131 2G Table 3.7.6.5-1 requires update for hose stations for completenes's.

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This is an inconsistency with the FSAR only, not the SER. Later evaluation determined Tech Spec and as-built to be i

correct and revision of FSAR is needed.

Diesel day tank volume needs to be I

corrected.

tilsd4 Rev. 3, 4/11/84 1

FOOTNOTES - SECTION 3/4 FSAR INCONSISTENCIES Pcge 4 of 5' fiOTE TSPS #

PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE C009 TENTS 91 335 2B Clarification,of which revision of i

Regulatory. Guide 1.137 applies. Proposed change to include diesel fuel oil testing requirements. Check for water.

1 93 810 3B FSAR revision required to describe

' as-built trip setpoints per DCP 82/3173.

FSAR Q8R 040.5.c needs to agree with Tech Spec 4.8.4.1.

I 94 809 39 FSAR and SER should be changed to properly describe MOV thermal overload t

bypass circuitry.

102 249 2D FSAR does not address GGNS use of a vendor to perform solidification /

dewatering of radwaste.

107 322 2E Change to ADS Bases page 3/4 5-2.

Change the Bases with respect to LPCS/LPCI injection pressure into the vessel.

Change to state that the reactor pressure i

is reduced by ADS substantially below the pressure at which LPCI/LPCS inject into the vessel.

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109 320 2E Page 3/4 6-4 of the Bases has an incorrect number of 1089 for blow down pressure. Should be 1060 psig which reflects 105% heat balance.

119 291 38 Maximum MSIV Isolation Times - Allowable times differ in FSAR and Tech Spec.

125 019 2B Drywell Purge Flowrate Definition - Tech Spec definition is in CFM, should be SCFM (i.e., temperature dependent).

Wisd5 Rev. 3, 4/11/84

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PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COP # TENTS 151 812 3B INEL item 38. MSL Tunnel Temp Timer is j

816 3B not in FSAR. FSAR values for MSL Flow-High setpoint and range are wrong.

j 153 820 3B 1

RCIC Instrument settings in FSAR Table 7.4-1 differ from Tech Spec setpoints.

,..l 154 819 3B I

FSAR 3.7-17 reference to triaxial I

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response spectrum recorders is incorrect.

b' Should be spectrum analyzer.

i 155 818 3B Revise FSAR 6.2.3.2 to indicate that blind flanges and rupture discs are also used to isolate secondary containment.

156 817 3B Revise FSAR 6.2.3.2 to indicate that SGTS has capability to overcome the additional inleakage from a single 4 inch penetration or failure of all non-Q lines

.i 2 inch and under.

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Revise FSAR 9.5.1.2.1 to correct the fire water storage tank low level alarm.

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POTE TSPS 8 PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS

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l 225 2D 111egible figures.

2 105 2E Correction of terminology for effluent release boundary vs. unrestricted. area I

, boundary.

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3 252 3B

. The figures for containment and drywell net free air volume in the FSAR ' arc' not the same as those in the Tech Spec.

Within the FSAR the numbers are not l

consistent among Tables 1.3-4, 6.2-1,i 6.5-6.

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6 258 3B The spent fuel pool can be partially drained if the valves (G41-F032, F033) are opened while the spent fuel pool gate is removed. The valves are neither locked nor do they have electrical interlocks to prevent inadvertent operation.

7 259 2B GGNS Tech Spec Table 5.7.1-1, Vendor Documents, and FSAR Table 3.9-1 do not correlate. The transients / cycles are defined differently in the documents.

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13 813 3B Requirement for MQA are.less restrictive i

in the 0QAM than in the GGNS Tech Spec..

MQA is required by GGNS Tech Spec to be a i

member of the SRC.

16 096 2E FSAR requires semi-annual review of ALARA appraisals by SRC.

19 270 2E Verify GGNS Tech Spec, include NUREG-0737 requirement.

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PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COPMENTS i

1 319 2E Tech Spec Bases references wrong code

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i 1971 Edition thru winter 1972 Addendum.

2 151 3B Change FSAR and SER from 112.5% to 118%

i for APRM trip. Tech Spec is correct.

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FOOTNOTES.- SECTION 3/4 SER INCONSISTENCIES Page 1 of 1 f{0]E ISPS #

PRIORITY.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.

COMMENTS F'

8 806 38 MCPR limit of 1.18 in Tech Spec is 1

correct.

Change SER Section 15.4.3.

.l Fuel load error analysis. is not limiting.

l 23 201' 2B Table 3.3.2-1 change is to delete note

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U 29 147 3B SER 8.4.4.1.d requires maximum and minimum limits for second-level voltage"

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sensors and time delay devices. Table 3.3.3-2.

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j 89 808 38 SER does not properly describe Diesel i

Generator trips under emergency i, -

conditions.

Ee 94 809 3B FSAR and SER should be changed to properly describe MOV thernal overload bypass circuitry.

H 111 148 3A SER' requires Turbine stop/ control' valve by-weekly testing.

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_f[0TE TSPS #

PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS I

2 095 2E Correct Organization Chart in Tech Specs

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101 2E and FSAR.

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3 340 2I Revise to require an eight hour break as opposed to a twelve hour break.

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12 814 3B SER requirements for SRC composition are in conflict with the GGNS Tech Spec.

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20 146 2E SER requires Tech Spec to control work in the control room ceiling in other than a

cold shutdown.

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DOTE TSPS #

PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS 57 073 2B Smoke detection is provided for subject areas.

a. FSAR 9A.7.2.2.24 and 69 states that 102 2B Overall SER conclusions not impacted.

smoke detectors will be installed.

304 2D The as-built plant has these detectors installed.

FSAR is not current.

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Renaming of zones does not

b. FSAR Figure 9A-22 does not correctly alter fire protection requirements or measures identify fire detection zones.

The provided. Overall SER conclusions are not design documentation does identify the i !

impacted.

zones correctly.

(Applies to diesel generator buildings.)

74 234 3A The FSAR discus ion should be expanded to clarify The FSAR 6.2.7.5 does not clearly reflect reference to narrow range instrument. The the suppression pool level clarification of the high and low water level instrumentation, i.e., which instrument alarm input should not alter overall conclusions provides high and low level alarms.

i' in the SER (7.5.2).

Narrow range instrumentation not described. Arrangement of sensors requires clarification.

4 85 131 2G Second column line is an editorial error. There FSAR Figure 9.5-4 incorrectly lists a can be only one location for a single hose second column line for a single hose station. Area is provided necessary fire station.

protection measures. No impact on SER overall conclusions.

94 809 38 (Evaluation of item under review.)

FSAR 7.1.2.c.22 does not fully describe methods used for providing thermal overload protection to M0V's.

112 234 3A The FSAR discussion should be expanded to clarify FSAR 6.2.7.5 does not clearly reflect reference to narrow range instrument. The the suppression pool level j.'

clarification of the high and low water level instrumentation, i.e., which instrunent alarm input should not alter overall conclusions provides high and low level alarms.

t in the SER (7.5.2).

Narrow range instrumentation not described. Arrangement of sensors requires clarification.

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PRIORITY SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE COMMENTS 154 819 3B By MP&L/Bechtel evaluation, the key issue is that FSAR Table 3.7-17 incorrectly describe's prompt readout of seismic information is provided certain seismic instrumentation.

The in the control room. The current design, with.

as-built plant has response spectrum analyzers, meets this requirement. The SER analyzers not recorders.

overall conclusions are not impacted.

155 818 3B Barriers such as these are considered acceptable FSAR does not indicate that blind flanges based on MP&L/Bechtel evaluation of BTP CSB 6-3.

and rupture discs are used in secondary The omission of the discussion of the use of containment boundary (FSAR 6.2.3.2).

blind flanges and rupture discs does not impact the overall SER conclusions (SER 6.2.2).

158 306 4

1B Categories "a" through "f" include discrepancies Numerous corrections and clarifications which are purely editorial, dealing with proposed to FSAR Table 6.2-44, information or changes to information which do

" Containment Isolation Valves." The not bear significantly on the overall acceptance items fall into the following categories:

of the plant's containment isolation provisions.

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'a) Penetration sizes incorrect or not O66 M #'g "3 d

indicated in Table.

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or outboard.

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  • d d) Direction of flow in line incorrect'.

b,s e) Footnotes no longer referenced in Table should be deleted.

i f) Valve position under certain circumstances not expressed

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consistently throughout Table (e.g.,

( " Closed" vs. " fail closed").

(Justification for Category "g" changes under g) Isolation signals of some valves review) b. listed incorrectly.

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