ML20129D572
| ML20129D572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129D556 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-96-07, 50-373-96-7, 50-374-96-07, 50-374-96-7, NUDOCS 9609300129 | |
| Download: ML20129D572 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1996007
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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 111
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Docket Nos: 50-373, 50-374
! License Nos: NPF-11, NPF-18 ,
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Report Nos: 50-373/96007, 50-374/96007
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: 2601 North 21st Road
Marseilles, IL 61341 {
Dates: June 23 - August , 1996
> Inspectors: K. Ihnen, Resident Inspector !
H. Simons, Resident Inspector i
J. Adams, Reactor Engineer l
N. Shah, Radiation Specialist
D. Hart, Radiation Specialist
G. Pirtle, Security Specialist
J. Roman, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
Approved by: Bru r nsen, Acting Chief, Projects Branch 5
Divis1% of Reactor Projects
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9609300129 960923
PDR ADOCK 05000373
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! EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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l LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-373/96007(DRP); 50-374/96007(DRP)
This integrated inspection report included aspects of licensee operations,
maintenance, engineering and plant support. The report covers a 6 week period
by the resident inspectors plus several announced inspections by regional
specialist inspectors.
Plant Operations
. A maintenance work practice deficiency and a procedural weakness resulted
in a significant plant transient during an Instrument Maintenance (IM)
l surveillance. Corrective actions for a previous event and a problem
identification form (PIF) were not fully effective in preventing the main
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steam isolation valve (MSIV) isolation and reactor scram which occurred on
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June 26, 1996. This is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
l Criterion XVI (Section 01.2).
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. Materiel condition of the containment air particulate and noble gas
monitors was considered poor. In addition, an operator work-around was
identified by the inspector (Section 01.3).
Maintenance
. A Technical Specification (TS) surveillance to verify the proper position
of four manual primary containment isolation valves in each unit had not
been conducted monthly as required because the surveillance procedure did
not include these valves. The valves had been verified locked closed once
per 18 months per an administrative procedure. Although Comed had
initiated a review of TSs required surveillances to ensure they were being
properly accomplished, this problem was outside the scope of the review and
was not previously identified (Section M1.1).
. Four human performance errors which occurred while performing 00Ss were not
significant when reviewed individually. However, the number of errors in a
short time period indicated a continuing need for improvement in human
performance (Section M1.2).
Enaineerina
. No significant engineering issues were documented in this inspection
report. Significant engineering issues which occurred during this
inspection period were documented in inspection reports 50-373/374-96008
and -96009. Both of these reports discussed details of the events related
to the inadvertent injection of foam sealant into the core standby cooling
system (CSCS) water tunnel.
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, Plant Suncort
. The inspectors reviewed a recent failure in the radwaste evaporator system
which caused a large spill. The inspectors concluded that there was no
i formal maintenance and operational trending program for the floor drain and
chemical waste processing systems. This could affect long-term evaporator
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operations. No problems were observed with the licensee's initial response
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to the evaporator spill event or with the radiological planning for the
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evaporator room cleanup (Section RI.1).
. Human performance errors in the area of fire protection continued to occur.
Corrective actions for previous missed fire watches had not been fully
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l effective. The failure to perform a Technical Specification fire watch is
considered a violation (Section F1.1).
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- . Implementation of the Vehicle Barrier System was reviewed and determined to
- be adequate. The need for some administrative actions, barrier
l modifications, and additional analyses were noted (Section S1.1).
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full power until June 19, 1996, when power was
reduced to about 77% due to low service water header pressure. Full power was
achieved again on June 20. On June 24, power was again reduced to about 77%
due to low service water header pressure. On June 26, at 2056 hours0.0238 days <br />0.571 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.82308e-4 months <br />, an
automatic reactor scram occurred due to the closing of the main steam
isolation valves (MSIV) during a surveillance. On June 28, a reactor startup
! commenced; however, later that day, Unit I was manually scrammed due to the
core standby cooling system (CSCS) being declared inoperable. Unit I returned
to service on July 14 and remained at or near full power for the remainder of
the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power until June 19, 1996, when power was
, reduced to about 77% due to low service water header pressure. Full power was
! achieved again on June 20. On June 24, power was again reduced to about 77%
- due to the low service water deader pressure. At midnight on June 29, a
l shutdown of Unit 2 began after the CSCS system was declared inoperable. Unit
2 was returned to service on July 16, and remained at or near full power for
the rest of the inspection period.
I. Operations
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
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The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations.
In general, operations in the control room were conducted in a
professional manner with good decorum and communication practices.
The inspectors observed portions of both units' shutdowns and startups,
and control room response to abnormal conditions. No problems were
identified in control room operations during this inspection period.
01.2 Automatic Reactor Scram Durina Surveillance Testina
a. Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the Unit I
automatic reactor scram on June 26, 1996. The inspectors observed the
initial root cause investigation effort and the Plant Operations Review
Committee (PORC) startup review meeting.
b. Observations and Findinas
On June 26, 1996 at approximately 8:56 p.m., a MSIV isolation was
received on Unit 1 while instrument maintenance (IM) department
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l personnel were performing LaSalle Instrument Surveillance (LIS)-MS-102,
- " Unit 1 Main Steam Line High Flow MSIV Isolation Calibration." The MSIV
- isolation resulted in an automatic reactor scram. All systems
i functioned as expected during the shutdown and no anomalies were
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) There are four instrument racks associated with the main steam line hi
i flow detection instrumentation. Each instrument rack contains one
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primary containment isolation system (PCIS) subchannel. Each PCIS
subchannel consists of four Static 0-Ring (SOR) differential pressure hi
- flow switches, one from each main steam line. These subchannels are A1
1 (A switches), B1 (B switches), A2 (C switches), and B2 (D switches).
l The switches are configured in a one-out-of-two twice logic. To trip a
j PCIS subchannel from the high flow switches, at least one switch in a
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channel must trip on high flow. To receive a full MSIV isolation, one
of the A or C channels must trip along with one of the B or D channels.
l A half isolation trip was in place on the A2 channel during the
- calibration of the C switch. An IM technician had just completed
actions for propressurizing the_ switch to near reactor pressure, and was
in the process of throttling open the switch's high side isolation valve
when a trip was received from the PCIS Channel B2. The combination of
these trips caused the MSIV isolation.
The root cause of the event was an IM work practice deficiency in the
technique for prepressurizing instruments. A contributing factor was a
procedural weakness. The procedure did not include steps to reset the
main steam high flow isolation trip channel prior to returning the
instrument to service. This action would have reduced the probability
of receiving a MSIV isolation from a pressure spike induced while
valving in the instrument.
A previous MSIV isolation and reactor scram occurred on Decmber 12,
1994, during the same surveillance procedure. The root cause of this
previous event was an equipment failure; specifically, a SOR switch had
failed. The root cause report and corrective actions for this event
focused on. ne failed switch. The instrument maintenance calibration
procedure was not identified as a possible contributing cause. In
retrospect, the corrective actions for the December 12, 1994, were
appropriate for the failed switch, but too narrowly focused.
On March 6,1995, a Problem Identification Form (PIF) was written by a
reactor operator identifying a potential problem with the methodology of
performing LIS-MS-102. The PIF outlined the basic scenario which caused
the MSIV closure and the reactor scram of June 26, 1996. Specifically,
the potential for a MSIV isolation due to a pressure spike while valving
in a hi flow switch. In the PIF, the operator also presented a solution
to prevent the event from occurring. The event screening committee :
which reviewed this PIF forwarded it to the " Scram Reduction Committee"
for appropriate review and action. However, no action was taken to
revise the procedure.
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The failure to take adequate corrective actions on these two previous
issues described above, resulted in a significant condition adverse to
quality on June 26, 1996; specifically, a MSIV isolation and reactor
scram. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (VIO
373/374-96007-01).
c. Conclusion
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A maintenance work practice deficiency and. a procedural weakness ,
resulted in a MSIV isolation and reactor scram during an IM
surveillance. Corrective actions for a previous event and a PIF were
i not fully effective in preventing the MSIV isolation and reactor scram
which occurred on June 26, 1996.
01.3 Unolanned Entry Into Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3
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a. Insoection Scone (71707. 62703)
The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the entry into TS 3.0.3 following the loss of containment air particulate and noble gas ,
monitor 2PL75J, while monitor 2PL15J was inoperable for calibration.
The inspector interviewed personnel involved in the event and reviewed !
licensee documentation of the event.
b. Observations and Findinas
On July 22, 1996, the licensee entered TS 3.0.3 due to insufficient
operable instruments to monitor Unit 2 containment leakage as required
by TS 3.4.3.1. This event was initiated by the loss of the containment
air particulate and noble gas monitor 2PL75J due to the tripping of the
sample pump. At the time, containment air particulate and noble gas
monitor 2PL15J was removed from service for the performance of LIS-PC-
206, " Containment Air Particulate and Noble Gas Monitor Calibration."
IMO technicians were able to restart the monitor 2PL75J after it
tripped, which returned it to an operable status. TS 3.0.3 was exited
24 minutes after its entry.
Materiel condition problems and work control weaknesses were
contributing factors to this event. The inspector conducted a review of
twelve PIFs written over the previous eleven months that were associated
with the 2PL15J and 2PL75J containment air particulate and noble gas
monitors. Several examples of material condition problems were noted.
In recent examples, the 2PL75J monitor control room indication failed
downscale, the 2PL75J indication was observed to be spiking, the 2PL15J
indication was observed to be spiking, and the 2PL15J or 2PL75J sample
pumps were routinely tripping following particulate filter change out.
The inspector also noted a materiel condition problem with the
containment cooler condensate flow rate monitoring system. This system
was inoperable at the time of the event. If operable, it would have
provided sufficient instrumentation such that entry into TS 3.0.3 would
not have been necessary. The inspector later learned that the
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containment cooler condensate flow rate monitoring system had been
inoperable for a significant period of time and had been referred to
- engineering for determination of corrective action.
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{ The inspector concluded that weaknesses in the work control process
contributed to the event. The 2PL15J monitor calibration work was
l approved and started without considetetion of maintenance personnel
j availability to complete the work. This oversight resulted in the
i inoperable condition of the 2PL15J monitor at the time of the event and
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I Problems similar to the event of July 22, 1996 recurred on July 31,
- 1996, and again on August 1, 1996. The licensee removed the 2PL15J
- monitor from service to allow for the operation of the post accident )
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sampling system for testing. In these cases, the licensee considered !
! the 2PL15J monitor operable and available for use. The 2PL75J monitor l
l subsequently tripped, leaving the unit without any containment
. particulate or gaseous activity monitors in operation. The control room
] operator promptly started the 2PL15J monitor each time.
The inspector identified two operator workarounds. First, the operator
is required to remove one of the containment air particulate and noble
gas monitors from service, prior to operating the post accident sampling !
system. Failure to do this results in the tripping of the associated
containment air particulate and noble gas monitoring system. Second,
the containment air particulate and noble gas monitors routinely trip
following particulate filter paper replacement. The inspector was
informed by the licensee that the first workaround was on the workaround
list but the second was not. The licensee informed the inspector that >
the second workaround would be placed on the list, and so would the
containment cooler condensate flow rate monitoring system.
c. Conclusion
Materiel condition of the containment air particulate and noble gas
monitors was considered poor based on the problems discussed above and ;
the historical performance. In addition, an operator work-around was '
identified by the inspector.
II. Maintenance ,
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Failure to Conduct a Technical Soecification Reauired Surveillance
a. Inspection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a missed TS
surveillance, including the reason it was missed and how it was
identified.
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b. Observations and Findinas ,
On August 2, 1996, an issue was identified by Comed personnel concerning l
which valves must be checked to verify primary containment integrity in
accordance with TSs. As a result, a review was conducted and it was ;
identified that eight manual primary containment isolation valves (four J
on each unit) were not verified to be in the correct position once per
31 days as required.
- These eight valves were not included in the monthly surveillance
l procedure that is conducted to satisfy TS Surveillance Requirement
! 4.6.1.1.a. These eight manual valves isolate one of the two narrow
range suppression pool sightglasses. Although these valves had not been
checked monthly, they had been verified locked closed once each 18
months per an administrative surveillance.
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The failure to conduct the required surveillance in accordance with TS 4.6.1.la is a violation (VIO.373/374-96007-02). The root cause and
corrective actions will be followed up during the review of the response
to the violation and the LER.
Comed had done a complete review of TS surveillances in November 1995
because several surveillances had been missed. The review was directed
at verifying that a procedure existed for conducting all required
surveillances, and verifying the frequency for conducting these
procedures was correct and was being appropriately tracked. The review
did not include reviewing the content of the surveillance procedures to
L ensure they completely satisfied the TS surveillance requirements; thus,
the problem discussed above was not discovered.
c. Conclusion
A TS surveillance to verify the proper position of eight manual primary
containment isolation valves had not been conducted monthly as required
because the surveillance procedure did not include these valves.
However, these valves were verified locked closed once per 18 months per
an administrative procedure. Although Comed had performed a review of
TS-required surveillances to ensure they were being properly
accomplished, this problem was outside the scope of the review and was
not previously identified.
M1.2 Several Human Performance Errors in Performina Out-of-Services (00S)
a. Insoection Scope (62703)
The inspectors reviewed several 00S problems which occurred during the
inspection period.
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b. Observations and Findinas
The Operations Manager initiated an Out-of-Service (005) standdown due
to several human performance errors that occurred. The following is a
summary of the events.
On July 18, an operator incorrectly hung an DOS on the wrong control
switches in the radwaste control room. This was identified by another
operator during a walkdown before performing a radwaste water transfer.
On July 22, while hanging an DOS on a fire protection circuit, the
operators in the control room received several alarms that were
unexpected, indicating that more fire detection circuits than planned
had lost power. This event is described further in Section F1.1 of this
I report.
On July 22, while clearing an DOS on plant service water to the stator
cooling system, an error resulted in a transient which challenged
temperature limits on the Unit I main turbine bearings.
Also on July 22, during the preparation of an 00S on the 08 control room
ventilation system, an instrument related to the U2 standby gas
treatment system was also taken DOS. This was not a planned evolution
and resulted in a potential challenge to the operability of an ,
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engineered safety feature.
During the standdown, all operating crews were briefed on these events
and performance expectations were reiterated.
I c. Conclusion
Individually, the four human performance errors which occurred while
l performing 00Ss were not safety significant. However, the number of
errors in a short time period indicated a continuing need for
improvement in human performance.
III. Enaineerina
Engineering issues were the focus of separate special inspection during this
inspection period. An NRC Augmented Inspection Team performed a review of the l
circumstances surrounding the injection of foam sealant into the CSCS system. l
This review is documented in inspection report 50-373/374-96008. Engineering i
performance related to the foreign materiel in the essential service water l
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tunnel is also documented in inspection report 50-373/374-96009. l
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IV. Plant Sunnort i
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
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R1.1 OWZ Evanorator Event (83750)
a. Scone - (0 pen) Followun on IFI 373/374-96006-05fDRS)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance of the liquid
radwaste evaporators and a June 15, 1996 event involving the licensee's
OWZ evaporator. Items specifically reviewed included:
. The evaporators' maintenance histories;
. Licensee procedures concerning evaporator operation; l
. The licensee's problem identification form (PIF No. 96-1715)
documenting the June 15, 1996 event; and
l . A Deviation Report (DVR No.88-085) documenting a similar event in
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I The inspectors also interviewed selected members of the licensee's
radwaste operations, system engineering and radiation protection groups.
b. Observations and Findinas
. System Operation and Maintenance
l The licensee has three evaporators (IWF, 2WF and OWZ) for cleanup of
i liquid radwaste from the floor drain and chemical waste systems. Only
one of the evaporators is normally needed to handle liquid radwaste
processing. The station evaporators were to be replaced with a vendor
system, which was to be installed in 1995. Several problems identified
l during preoperational testing delayed installation, which is now
l scheduled for the end of 1996. Until installation of the vendor system,
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the station evaporators remained the primary system for processing
liquid radwaste.
l The station evaporators were maintained under an informal program
developed by the radwaste coordinator. Under this program, each
evaporator was sequentially removed from service to perform necessary
maintenance and component inspection. However, operational parameters
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trended and therefore, not used to measure system performancs. The
radwaste coordinator and system engineer take corrective actions for
deviations from normal operation based on their familiarity with the
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The inspectors were concerned that the lack of a formal maintenance and
operational trending program could impact long-term evaporator
operation, if the vendor problems were not resolved. The existing
informal program appeared adequate, but relied on personal knowledge
rather than a formal process.
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The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) accurately described
radwaste processing activities as they were being performed at the
facility. The licensee was performing a 10 CFR 50.59 analysis for the
specific vendor process to be used and indicated that the UFSAR would be
revised after the analysis was completed.
. Evaoorator Soill Event
On June 15, 1996, a spill of about 3600 gallons of contaminated water
and sludge occurred in the OWZ evaporator room and an adjacent hallway.
Radiation levels in the evaporator room increased to 5 rea/hr (normally
0.05 rem /hr) and contamination levels.in the hallway exceeded 1 million I
dpm (seearable). An NRC inspection performed June 16-18, 1996, reviewed j
the licensee's immediate response to the event and the cleanup of the
hallway outside the evaporator room; no problems were identified.
Although the licensee was still investigating the root cause, a
preliminary inspection of the evaporator (via remote camera) indicated ;
apparer.t damage to a gasket located on the evaporator heating element.
In 1988, similar damage (caused by overpressurization of the evaporator
system) also resulted in leakage from the 0WZ evaporator. The
inspectors verified that corrective actions for the 1988 event were in
place and that no overpressurization had occurred.
During the 1988 event, cracks in the evaporator room wall allowed water
to leak through and flow down the exterior of the radwaste building.
Although the cracks were repaired, the licensee again observed leakage
on the exterior wall during the current event. A radiological survey of
the affected area did not identify any contamination, but the survey did
find several other areas of the wall where residual contamination from
the 1988 event had apparently leached onto the exterior surface. This
contamination ranged from 3,000 to 5,000 dpa (seearable). The affected
areas were decontaminated and coated with a sealant to prevent further
leaching.
The licensee was decontaminating the evaporator room to allow for
subsequent disassembly of the evaporator to identify the source of the
leakage. The inspectors reviewed the ALARA plans for the cleanup; no
problems were identified. These plans included positioning workers
outside the radwaste building to verify that no water leakage occurred
during the cleanup,
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that there was no formal maintenance and
operational trending program for the floor drain and chemical waste
processing systems. This could affect long-term evaporator operations.
No problems were observed with the licensee's initial response to the
evaporator spill event or with the radiological planning for the
evaporator room cleanup. The licensee was still investigating the root
cause of the event.
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F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities
F1.1 Failure to Perform a Tech Spec Reauired Firewatch
a. Inspection Scone (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a missed firewatch
event and discussed the event with the fire protection group.
b. Observations and Findinas
At 6:00 a.m. on July 31, 1996, a fire protection inverter was taken 00S
for scheduled maintenance. The 00S and associated fire impairment were )
prepared and reviewed prior to taking the inverter 00S. The individuals
that prepared and reviewed the 00S and associated fire impairment failed
to recognize that the 00S would cause all power to be lost to the Unit 2
main fire detection control panel and the control room remote !
annunciator panel. Fire suppression capability was not affected. j
When the 00S was implemented, the appropriate fire watches were not j
established as required by the action statement of Technical
Specification 3.3.7.9. This is considered a violation (VIO 374-96007-
03).
At 9:00 a.m. an operator recognized that power to the main fire
detection control panel had been lost and immediately notified the fire
marshal. The fire marshal immediately established the fire watches.
The power to the main fire detection control panel was restored at
approximately 7 p.m. that day when the scheduled maintenance was
completed.
Comed's investigation determined this incident resulted due to a human
performance error on the part of the personnel writing and reviewing the
00S and the fire impairment.
This event was not isolated in that several fire watches had been missed
in 1996. Two of these missed fire watches were required by TSs and
therefore documented in LERs. Other missed fire watches were not
required by TSs and were not reportable. However, they were still
significant in that human performance with regards to conducting fire
watches was weak. Corrective actions for the previously missed fire l
watches appeared to be too narrow in scope to have prevented this
current event.
c. Conclusions
Human performance errors in the area of fire protection continued to
occur. Corrective actions for previous missed fire watch had not been
fully effective. The failure to perform a TS fire watch is considered a
violation.
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51 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
!- S1.1 Temocrary Instruction 2515/132. " Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear
Power Plants"
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a. Inspection Scone (TI 2515/132) I
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j Areas examined included the licensee's provisions for land vehicle l
control measures to protect against the malevolent use of a land vehicle '
l and to determine compliance with regulatory and licensee commitments.
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b. Observations and Findinas
j (1) Vehicle Barrier System
The inspector found that the features and structures that form the
Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) met the design characteristics established
by the NRC. The vehicle barrier components and the location of the
barrier were as described in the revised summary description of the VBS
which the licensee submitted to the NRC in February 1996.
A visual walkdown performed by the inspector confirmed that the general
type of vehicle barrier described in the VBS summary description had
been installed and that the barrier was continuous.
Some observations were noted that require analysis or actions by the
licensee's staff. The observations are noted below and will be tracked
as an inspection followup item (IFI 50-373/374-96007-04). The specific
VBS locations for the below noted observations are considered Safeguards
Information and exempt from public disclosure.
(a) Spacing between some barriers exceeded recommendations.
(b) Some barrier connectors at some locations were not secured to
prevent manipulation with hand held tools.
(c) A separate engineering analysis had not been completed to confirm
that structural features for a small portion of the VBS was
adequate to act as an effective vehicle barrier.
(2) Bomb Blast Analysis
Inspector field observations of standoff distances were consistent with
those documented in the summary description. The licensee confirmed
that the calculation of minimum standoff distance was based on NUREG/CR-
6190 or an independent engineering analysis. Six actual measurements
were completed to confirm that the minimum standoff distances, as
documented in the summary description, were the actual distances
provided by the as-built VBS.
The licensee identified standoff distance for one location within the
VBS required additional analysis based upon the inspector's
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determination that a land vehicle could approach closer to the building
containing vital equipment than the licensee's initial analysis
indicated. This issue will be monitored as an Inspection Followup Item
(IFI 50-373/374-96007-05).
(3) Procedural Controls
The licensee appropriately defined criteria for maintenance,
surveillance, and compensating for the VBS in Corporate Nuclear Security
Guideline No. 4, " Operational Planning and Maintaining Integrity of
Vehicle Barrier Systems (VBS), Revision 0, dated February 1996. Some
administrative issues required further action by the licensee and are
described below. Resolution of these administrative matters will be
tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (IFI 50-373/374-96007-06).
(a) Some building barriers that act as part of the VBS were not
included within the VBS description.
(b) A surveillance procedure for testing and inspection of the VBS was
required.
(c) The need to advise the NRC Region III office concerning barriers
! that have to be compensated for, in excess of 30 days, was not
l included in the procedure for VBS compensatory measures.
(d) NRC review comments, dated June 26, 1996, pertaining to the VBS
addressed in Revision 54 of the security plan, need to be
resolved.
Discussions with the Site Security Administrator, security staff, and a
Senior Reactor Operator confirmed that procedures necessary to safely
shutdown the units after a bomb blast were reviewed and found to be
adequate.
c. Conclusion
The licensee's provisions for land vehicle control measures met
regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The VBS program was
consistent with the summary description submitted to the NRC; installed
components were identified in NUREG/CR-6190 or the licensee's
- engineering analyses, and appropriate procedures had been developed and
implemented. The need for some additional administrative actions,
analysis, and barrier modifications were noted and will be tracked as
Inspection Followup Items.
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l X1 Exit Neeting Summary
The inspectors presented the results of these inspections to Comed
management listed below at an exit meeting on August 7, 1996. Comed
acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee if any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information
was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Comed
- J. Brons, Acting Site Vice President
- D. Ray, Station Manager
- L. Guthrie, Operations Manager
P. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. Fairbank, System Engineering Supervisor
P. Antonopoulos, Site Engineering Manager
- D. Boone, Health Physics Supervisor
- R. Crawford, Work Control Superintendent
- J. Burns, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- Present at exit meeting on August 7, 1996.
INSPECTION PROCEDUkES USED
IP 37551 Onsite Engineering
IP 40500 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726 Surveillance Observation
IP 62703 Maintenance Observation
IP 71707 Plant Operations
IP 71750 Plant Support Activities
IP 83750 Occupational Exposure
TI 2515/132: Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
373/374-96007-01 VIO Failure to take corrective actions on a significant
condition adverse to quality (MSIV isolation and
reactor scram)
373/374-96007-02 VIO Failure to perform a Tech Spec surveillance to verify I
the position of manual containment isolation valves
373/374-96007-03 VIO Failure to perform a Tech spec required fire watch
VBS Barrier Modifications and Analysis
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373/374-96007-04 IFI l
373/374-96007-05 IFI Analysis of VBS Standoff Distance !
373/374-96007-06 IFI Administrative Requirements Pertaining to the VBS
Items Discussed
373/374-96006-05 IFI Root Cause of the Radwaste Evaporator Failure
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA As low As Reasonably Achievable
CSCS Core Standby Cooling System
DRP Division of Reactor Projects
DRS Division of Reactor Safety
IDNS Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
IM Instrument Maintenance
IR Inspection Report
IFI Inspection Follow-up Item
LER Licensee Event Report
LIS LaSalle Instrument Surveillance
MSIV Main Steam Line Isolation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
DOS Out of Service
PCIS Primary Containment Isolation System
PIF Problem Identification Form
PORC Plant Operations Review Committee
PDR NRC Public Document Room
SOR Static 0-Ring
TI Temporary Instruction
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
VBS Vehicle Barrier System
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