ML20128F526
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UNITED STATES l
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
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January 20, 1995 l
MEMORANDUM T0:
The Chairman Commissioner Rogers Commissioner de Planque FROM:
James M. Taylor Executive Direc r for 0 erations
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED RESOL ION OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST GEORGIA l
POWER COMPANY (V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT) (EA 93-304 i
AND EA 94-037)
To notify the Commission of the results of settlement discussions initiated by counsel for Georgia Power Company (GPC or Licensee) anp the staff's intent to accept the Licensee's proposal to resolve this matter.
Pursuant to the May 5, 1994, Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-94-075, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $200,000 was issued to GPC on May 9, 1994. The Notice described I
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Contact:
Joseph Gray, OE tLQJf: ENFORCEMENT-RELATED; LIMITED l
504-2741 TO NRC UNLESS THE COMMISSION j
Jack Goldberg, 0GC DETERMINES OTHERWISE 1
415-1681 i
Roy Zimmerman, NRR 1
504-2969 i
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l 9610080112 960927 PDR FOIA WILMOTH95-81 PDR
f The Commissioners i violations identified as a result of an investigation conducted by the Office of Investigations (0I) at GPC's Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP). The investigation was initiated as a result of information received in June 1990 by Region II alleging, in part, that material false statements were made to the NRC by senior officials of GPC regarding the reliability of the Diesel Generators (DGs).
The Notice was based on five instances where GPC failed to provide information to the NRC that was complete and accurate in all material respects. The violations collectively represented a very significant regulatory concern, and as such, were categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a i
Severity Level II problem. Three Demands for Information (DFIs) were also issued to GPC regarding the performance failures of six individuals involved in the circumstances of the violations.
By separate correspondence, the six individuals were provided the opportunity to submit separate responses to the DFIs.
The Licensee responded to the Notice in a letter dated July 31, 1994.
In its response, GPC admitted Violations A and D (in part), aad denied Violations B, C (as stated, but admitted to the ambiguity of the correspondence that was involved in Violation C), D (in part), and E.
The Licensee also requested that the NRC reconsider the materiality of the matters involved in Violations A, C, and D, that the NRC reconsider the severity level assigned to the problem, and that the amount of the civil penalty be mitigated.
4 The Licensee also responded to the three DFIs and all six individuals submitted separate responses to the DFIs.
ThestaffreviewedGPC'sresponsetotheNoticeandhasdetermjnedthat Violations A, C, D, and E occurred as stated, that Violation B should be withdrawn, and that the penalty proposed for the aggregated problem consisting of Violations A, C, D, and E in the Notice ($200,000) should be imposed. As with the initial enforcement action, the staff's position was determined taking into account the reviews of the Vogtle Coordinating Group and the Office of Investigations.
After considering the DFI responses, the staff has concluded that no further action is warranted for five of the individuals who were subject to the DFIs.
Although they all deny their performance failures, the staff considered their j
limited involvement, the effect that GPC's general corrective actim will i
likely have on them, and the remedial effect that the enforcement and DFI process itself has likely had on them. Based on these considerations, the staff believes that these five individuals will likely conform their conduct 2 Violation B asserted that GPC failed to include complete information regarding diesel generator air quality in its April 9,1990, letter. After review of GPC's response to the NRC, the staff concludes that GPC's statements regarding air quality presented in the April 9th letter were sufficient in scope and GPC had an adequate technical basis to support a finding that air quality was acceptable.
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The Commissioners.
i and improve their performance in the future to avoid being the subject of similar NRC enforcement action. The staff is proposing to issue close-out letters to these individuals.
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In the case of the sixth individual, Georg khold Jr., the Vogtle Plant j
Manager at the time of the events at issue i
l This concern raises a significant question as to whether GPC, with Mr. Bockhold's involvement in certain positions, would, in the future, conduct licensed activities in accordrece with all NRC requirements, particularly the requirements of 10 CPR 50.9, " Completeness and accuracy of nformation." Although Mr. Bockhold's current position does not cause the i
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l As a result of this concern 4
a Contemporaneous with the staff's internal development of the above position, counsel for the Licensee expressed an interest in proposing a means to resolve this matter.
In response to the Licensee's interest, 0GC attorneys, at the l
staff's suggestion, engaged in discussions with counsel for the Licensee. As i
a result of those discussions, the Licensee and Mr. Bockhold, in an offer to fully resolve this matter, have stated their intent to supplement their responses to the Notice of Violation and Demand for Information, as follows:
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l The Comissioners.
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(3)
Based on its review of the Licensee's response to the Demand for Information and the respective responses filed by the individuals, the staff has determined that no further action against any individual (other than that described above regarding Mr. Bockhold) is warranted and the staff will so inform the licensee and each individual.
In doing so, however, the staff will stress to each the importance of assuring the accuracy and completeness of all information provided to the Comission.
If the Licensee and Mr. Bockhold supplement their responses to the Notice of Violation and Demand for Information, respectively, as described above, and subject to the comitments of the Licensee and Mr. Bockhold regarding Mr.
Bockhold, the staff's concerns about the performance of the individuals arising out of their involvement in the events which were the subject of the
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Notice of Violation and the Demands for Information will be resolved.
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addition, with the Licensee's and Mr. Bockhold's comitments, the staff has no present concerns with the character and integrity of the individuals or the Licensee arising out of the events which were the subject of the NOV and DFIs so that this settlement is warranted. Upon the submission of the Licensee's
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l The Comissioners and Mr. Bockhold's supplemental responses, the staff will reflect these positions in writing to the Licensee.
The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection to this proposal.
The staff intends to proceed as described above if the Licensee and Mr.
Bockhold supplement their responses as indicated, but in no event before January 27, 1995.
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The Comissioners e
DISTRIBUTION:
JTaylor, ED0 JMilhoan, DEDR SEbneter, RII JGray, OE WRussell, NRR RZimerman, NRR SBurns, CGC ri F
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I Notice of Violation 1.
The LER cover letter is incomplete because the submittal did not provide information regarding clarification of the April 9,1990 letter.
The incompleteness was material in that the NRC subsequently requested GPC to make a submittal clarifying the April 9,1990 letter.
The letter states that:
"If the criteria for the completion of the test program is understood to be the first successful test in accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) procedure 14980-1 " Diesel Generator Operability Test," then there were 10 successful starts of Diesel Generator IA and 12 successful starts of Diesel Generator IB between the completion of the test program and the end of April 19, J
1990, the date the LER-424/1990-06 was submitted to the NRC. The number of successful starts included in the original LER (at least 18) included I
some of the starts that were part of the test program. The difference l
is attributed to diesel start record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program."
2.
The last sentence in the above paragraph is inaccurate because 1 diesel record keeping practices were not a cause of the differende j
in number of diesel starts-reported in the April 19, 1990 LER and the June 29, 1990 letter. The difference was caused by personnel errors unrelated to any problems with the diesel generator record 4
j keeping practices.
I The inaccuracy was material in that it could have led the NRC to erroneously conclude that the correct root causes for the j
difference in the number of diesel starts reported in the April 19, 1990 LER and the June 29, 1990 letter had been identified by i
GPC.
l 3.
The last sentence in the above paragraph is also incomplete because it failed to include the fact that the root causes for the difference in the number of diesel starts. reported in the April 19 LER and the June 29, 1990 letter were personnel errors.
the vaatle Plant General Manager who directed the Unit Supe ndent to perform the start count (which formed the basis for the April 19, 1990 LER) failed to issue adequate instructiQAs.as to how to perform the count and did not adequately assess'the data developed by the Unit Superintendent.
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addition, the Unit pn intandant made an error in reporting his count.
Second, th Vogtle Plant-General Managed the General 1
Manager for Plant S port anf4he Techntcal support Manager failed to clarify and ver fy the starting point for the count of successful conse tive DG starts reported in the April 19, 1990 LER.
The incomplete ess was material in that, had correct root causes is record was deleie' the differ.nce in the number of diesel starts reported in the Wlormation in th.
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l REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION EA 93-304 f(RC Violation A:
" Contrary to the above, information provided to the NRC Region II Office by Georgia Power Company ("GPC") in an April 9,1990 letter and in an April 9,1990 oral presentation to the NRC was inaccurate in a material respect. Specifically, the letter states that: "Since March 20, the 1A DG has been started 18 times, and the IB DG has been stared 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts."
These statements are inaccurate in that they represent that 19 consecutive successfu! etarts without' problems or failures had occurred on the IB Diesel Generator (DG) for the Vogtle i
facility as of April 9,1990, when, in fact, of the 19 starts referred to in the latter associated I
with the IB DG at the Vogtle facility, three of those starts had problems. Specifically, Start 132 tripped on high temperature lube oil, Start 134 tripped on low pressure jacket water and Start 136 had a high temperature jacket water trip alarm. As of April 9,1990, the IB DG had only 12 consecutive successful starts without problems or failures rather than the 19 represented by GPC. The same inaccuracy was presented to the NRC at its Region II Office during an oral j
presentation by GPC on April 9,1990.
The inaccuracy was material. In considering a restart decision, the NRC was especially interested in the reliability of the DGs and specifically asked that GPC address the matter in its presentation on restirt. The NRC relied, in part, upon this information presented by GPC on April 9,1990 in the oral presentation and in the GPC letter in reaching the NRC decision to allow Vogtle Unit I to return to power operation."
GPC Resoonse to Viointion A:
Admission or Denial of Violation A: The Violation is admitted.
i Remmns for the Violation:
On April 9,1990, GPC made an oral presentation to the NRC in the Region II office (RII). The presentation was in response to a verbal request by the NRC and the March 23 NRC Confirmation of Action letter and was in support of GPC's request for VEGP, Unit I restart approval. Following the April 9 oral presentation GPC submitted a letter to the NRC which contained the same diesel generator ("DG") start information that was presented during the oral presentation.1' l' References to exhibits contained throughout this Response shall follow the exhibit numbering system used in the December 17, 1993, Office of Investigation's Report No. 2 information in this record was deleted in accordance with the f eedom of information
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a Prior to the April 9,1990 presentation, the VEGP General Manager was given the i
responsibility of preparing irjformation for the presentation regarding issues that wer'e raised as a result of the March 20, Site Area Emergency ("SAE"), including the special testing that was conducted on the DGs.
The materials used during the presentation were assembled on transparencies immediately prior to April 9 by the VEGP General Manager with the help of subordinates. In reference to the DGs, it is clear that the VEGP General Manager desired to present an overview of the special testing, but did not intend to present a complete accounting of all the DG starts since the March 20 event. Rather he intended to present a number of I
consecutive successful stans as support for the position that the DGs would perform their i
intended function. (Vogtle Coordinating Group Report, p. 2). In other words, a number of successful stans of the DGs would demonstrate that the single operability test (suiveillance) was not a fluke.
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The three " problem" starts (later designated as starts 132,134 and 136) which are the j
focus of this Violation A, occurred prior to the IB DG being declared operable.2/ Two of the l
problems (132 and 134) involved trip features which would be by-passed in an actual emergency.
l The other start (136) involved an alarm for an emergency feature that did not result in a trip of the DG.
1 GPC attributes the inaccuracy to the performance of the Unit Superintendent, who was responsible for obtaining the start count information. The inclusion of the " problems" in the i
start count of the IB DG appears to have resulted from the Unit Superintendent's beginning his j
count earlier in time than understood by the VEGP General Manager.
Additionally, the
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availability of an updated single source document of recorded DG start information, which would have been evaluated by qualified personnel (c.g., Engineering Suppon) would have afforded the Unit Superintendent with clearer information. At the time the Unit Superintendent performed i
i his count, record keeping practices (e.g., data sheet routing) did not permit for a timely updated document. Had there been such a document which collated all start activities with supporting data, then this violation might never have occurred.2' a
The VEGP General Manager requested the Unit Superintendent to compile the number
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020R, unless otherwise indicated.
l 2' The specific stan number, such as start 132,134 and 136, would not be assigned until the DG log was in the process of updating on April 25,1990 (the log's list of starts was updated on May 2,1990).
l' Such a single source document would have been an updated version of Engineering Support DG start log maintained pursuant to VEGP Procedure 55038-C. A possible difference in result would be the listing of specific start activities with the specific stan numbers (e.g. E-Run Bubble Test -- 137; Multiple [ simulated] Starts -- 138 - 141; UV Run Test - 142, etc.).
The "14" Multiple Starts placed on the transparency would then have been recognized as an aggregation of out-of-sequence starts. Soc, also, NUREG-1410, Appendix J, p. J-15. t k
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of successful starts of the DG for inclusion on a draft transparency (slide) to be used during the presentation.
The Unit Superintendent confirmed the number which was placed on the
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transparency. (Exhibit 9 p. 7). According to the Unit Superintendent, the VEGP General l
Manager's instructions were to review the log books and determine how many starts had j
occurred without significant pmblems. (11 p. 3). The Unit Superintendent understood that the VEGP General Manager wanted a count of starts without "significant problems, i.e., where the diesel had started properly and reached the required voltage and frequency."
The Unit Superintendent inbW "significant problems" to be anythug which would have prevented j
the diesel from operating in an emergency. The VEGP General Manager had the same j
understanding. However, as discussed in this Response, he would not have included the three l
problem starts in his count. (GPC response to NRC Staff's First Set of Interrogatories, Response 7a and b, August 9,1993). While ae VEGP General Manager may.ot have articulated a definitive criteria for " successful starts" when he directed the Unit Superintendent to gather successful DG starts, both viewed the task as calling for the same information. The task assigned to the Unit Superintendent was narrow in scope and straight forward, and the Unit Superintendent was competent to perform the task based on his experience and knowledge.f' A review of the context of the Unit Supermtendent's task establishes that he was provided sufficient guidance to perform the task adequately and took diligent steps to perform it. He reviewed control logs and prepared a handwritten list of DG starts. (Exhibit 10, p. 26). The draft transparency was typed prior in time to the start lists prepared by the Unit Superintendent (Exhibit 113, p. 28-46), and GPC has concluded that the Unit Superintendent received a draft of the DG "Special Testing" transparency when he assembled the requested information. He assisted with the formatting of the transparency and supplied the start count numbers by modifying the transparency. (Exhibit 10, p. 26). He knew the transparency and his (lata were for the presentation to the NRC relative to the Confirmation of Action letter. (Exhibit 9, p. 5).
He did not note any starts that had significant problems. (Exhibit 9, p.15). He understood that the presentation was going to address all of the problems of the DGs that GPC had identified in troubleshooting or corrective actions and schedules for those activities.I' (Exhibit 10, p.18).
From recreating his count, the Unit Superintendent concluded that several post-maintenance starts were gg included in his IB diesel count. (Exhibit 10, p.19 - 20). Contrary to the Office of Investigations report (p. 23, evidentiary fact 34), he did not claim that he made his own decision on the starting point of the count. He simply did not recall the VEGP General Manager's specific instructions. (Exhibit 10, p.11). Prior to his assignment to prepare the a' He Unit Superintendent was a member of the Event Critique Team and a degreed SRO licensed Unit Superintendent.
I' He Unit Superintendent also had knowledge concerning DG starts or runs which were problematic. On March 23, 1990, he discussed the high lube oil trip on the IB DG which occurred on March 22,1990 (Start 132) in the early afternoon, including the precursor alarms to the trip and the likelihood that the sensor malfunctioned (Exhibit 70, Tape 10, pp. 24-25, GPC Transcript)..
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J transparency by the VEGP General Manager, the Unit Superintendent had reviewed the logs and j-highlighted DG starts (Tape,19, pp. 23-24, GPC transcript, Tab A, Item 1), and during the l
performance of his task was observed with extensive DG start documentation by another tasked individual.- (Exhibit 51 p. 2).
i' While the VEGP General Manager also could not recall his specific instructions regarding the point for the Unit Superintendent to start his count, he understood that the Unit j
Superintendent began counting 19 starts on the IB after the overhaul period. (Exhibit 12, p.
l 18). It should be noted that the Unit Superintendent's recall of exclusion of three " post-maintenance starts" on the engine with problems (starts 120,121 and 122) and the VEGP i
General Manager's understanding that three failures to start during the " overhaul period" were j
excluded may be related. The VEGP General Ma.4er's understandmg of the beginning of the start count excluded the three starts with problems (starts 132,134 and 136) based on the time l
covered by the count, ne Unit Superintendent apparently evaluated each of these " post-l maintenance" starts as not having a significant problem. (Exhibit 10, p.19, 20). And, since j
l these three start problems during the overhaul period were viewed by the Unit Supenntendent 1
i as not affecting emergency functions, they were included by him in his count. (Exhibit 10, p.
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16, p.19).
4 The NRC assumes the VEGP General Manager did not determine the specific point by l
date or time when the Unit Superintendent began his count. However, the VEGF General Manager did determine the point when the Unit Superintendent began his count relative to j
activity. Activity was the subject matter of the transparency, not date and time of specific starts.
j While GPC cannot recreate the relevant conversation, it appears reasonable to conclude that the Unit Supenntendent, in excluding certain " post-maintenance" starts for the IB DG, was aware j
that "in overhaul" was listed on the draft transparency, and conveyed to the VEGP General Manager - either by word or work product -- that " post-maintenance" starts had been excluded.
Indeed, by stating that "after the overhaul period... that's when [the Unit Superintendent]
started counting these 19 starts" (Exhibit 12, p.18), or "after sensor calibration and logic j
testing" (Exhibit 36, p. 21), the VEGP General Manager made statements consistent with such i
an understanding in the relevant time frame.F he Unit Supenntendent was aware that the use of the information he was providing the VEGP General Manager was for inclusion on the transparency,which would be used in a l
presentation to the NRC TExhibit 9, p. 5 -- for the presentation on the confirmation letter, to j
determine the number of starts we had had with the diesel without significant problems; Exhibit l
10, p.12, - the start count would " define" the scope of the test program). He knew his 1
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l F No DG starts were associated with the extensive calibration and logic testing of the DG.
" Bubble test starts" and " Multiple 'itarts" were associated with starts of the DGs. The VEGP j
General Manager's understanding of the Unit Superintendent's start point on the IB was reflected in taped conversations on April 19 (of which he was unaware), his testimony to the j
NRC in August,1990, and his conversations with co-workers in August,1990.
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numbers would be used on the transparency (Exhibit 9, p. 8; Exhibit 10, p. 26). Given'this l
contextual knowledge, any, concern about the meaning of the VEGP General Manager's
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instructions should have prompted him to request clarification. GPC is unaware of any such concern being voiced.
In conclusion, GPC has concluded that the data which the Unit
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Superintendent provided to the VEGP General Manager was neither exclusively oral (it was l
documented by the completed transparency), nor, do we believe, presented to the VEGP General j
Manager in a manner likely to prompt questioning of the Unit Superintendent's performance.
The transparency describing the Special Testing of the DGs did not reference any i
problems or failures. (Exhibit 7). The Unit Superintendent was not involved in the preparation j
of the April 9,1990 letter and after the April 9 presentation, did not review the letter. (Exhibit 10, p. 60, 61). Since he was the only person who was aware that the start count information j
used in the April 9,1990 letter contained " problem starts" and he did not review the April 9, 1990 letter, a potential opportunity to cormet the inaccuracy was missed.
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One of the reasons that the VEGP General Manager tasked the Unit Superintendent to review the logs and count the number of DG starts was due to the absence of a single source l
Engineering Support DG start log based on data sheets for DGs. The Unit Superintendent
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obtained his information from a review of the Control Room's Unit Control logs and the Shift Supervisor logs. The VEGP General Manager believed that with the Unit Superintendent's
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experience in Operations, he would be able to obtain the requested information. The Unit Superintendent had previously reviewed the control room log to obtain DG start information for the Event Critique Team. Additionally, plant personnel, including the VEGP General Manager i
were aware that the Engineering Support DG start log was not up to date. Even the Supervisor -
SAER in his review of the various sources of information available to determine the number 2
of DG starts concluded that there was a need for more extensive updated documentation. At the time it took approximately 24 days for processing sheets to go from the control room to the engineers. (Exhibit 57, p.6). As a result, the Engineering Support DG start log would not be updated on a current basis. There was not available a current source record book that a person j
could review to obtain the number of DG starts. As a result, since the Engineering Support DG l
start log was not current, it was logical for the VEGP General Manager to assign the Unit j-Superintendent who was familiar with the control room logs to obtain the start count j
information. In hindsight, had there been one current single source record containing updated information about the DGs, no need to review the control room logs would have existed and the i
inclusion of the problems within the 19 " successful start" count might not have occurred.
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j Matenahty:
i The NRC has concluded that the inaccuracy was material in that the NRC relied, in part, j
upon the information provided by GPC in the April 9 oral presentation and letter in reaching the i
decision to allow Unit I to return to power generation. GPC recognizes the importance of GPC statements concerning DG performance and the NRC's restan decision, but suggests that the inaccuracy (19 versus 12) when read in context, was not significant particularly when considered
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with the extensive information concurrently provided to NRC experts.
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The cause of the 1A DG failure during the SAE was one focus of NRC and GPC concems. Immediately follo, wing the event, personnel conducted several trouble shooting stans on the 1 A DG to determine,.if possible, the cause of the event. The DG started and ran without difficulties or problems each time. The plant staff's focus was shifted to bringing the IB DG out of overhaul so that one functioning DG was available for backup power. Testing and trouble shooting on the 1 A DG was deferred while engiering personnel concentrated on the IB DG.
The problem starts which are the focus of the Violation A were known to the NRC experts. During the period March 22 through April 7, interaction between NRC and GPC personnel through meetings, interviews, document production, personal observation, telephone conferences and a review of planned testing clearly established that (1) GPC openly discussed all of the problems it experienced with the Calcon sensors, including those associated with starts 132,134 and 136 on the IB DG and (2) numerous NRC personnel, including Region II personnel (Kenneth E. Bmckman, Milton D. Hunt and Peter A. Taylor), were aware of the problems associated with the IB DG.
During the presentation to the NRC on April 9,1990, the VEGP General Manager was prepared to discuss components associated with the historic problem starts of the DGs. He presented a transparency of quarantined components which directly followed the transparency which set out the Special Diesel Testing. Tids transparency identified six sensors associated with the IB DG. With the presentation of this transparency, he was identifying specific sensors -
which caused problem starts coming out of overhaul on the IB DG.
Prior to the April 9,1990 presentation, the NRC was also aware of the special testing that was conducted on the IB DG, Milton D. Hunt, NRC Region II Inspector, witnessed special testing for the determination of IB DG operability. (NRC Inspector Report 90-05, dated April 26, 1990). He was satisfied that the IB DG was operable; every test that was conducted on the IB DG while he was at the plant site was successful. He was not concerned with the occurrence of any failures on the IB DG prior to his witnessing of the testing. Even if GPC had shown failures on starts or mns prior to the undervoltage ("UV") test, Mr. Hunt's opit icn regarding l
operability or the return to criticality would not have been affected. Mr. Hr.'s opinion l
regarding restart was based on the testing he witnessed while at the plant site. t 2 hibit 21).
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Peter A. Taylor also believed that any failures during the trouble shooting test period would not have made a difference in the operability or reliability determination. (Exhibit 22). According l
to Mr. Taylor, during the presentation, had the NRC known of the problems during trouble shooting, they would have required more tests be conducted prior to restart, hul DQ mos additional lasta than was actually conducted between April 9,1990 and return to power.
l (Exhibit 22). Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator had final responsibility for the decision on allowing restart, and relied on the technical input from his staff, which included l
Milton D. Hunt. (Exhibit 18). It appears the observation of the testing, as well as the testmg procedures themselves, rather than correspondence describing the number of successful starts, were influential in affecting NRC personnel judgment regarding operability and root cause identification. -_
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GPC strives to fulfill its obligations under 10 CFR 550.9 by assuring the completeness and accuracy of allinformatipn submitted to the NRC. However, for enforcement purposes the inaccuracy in the start count information should not be considered material in light of all the l
information the NRC was given regarding the SAE and the special testing of the DGs. The statements of NRC personnel support the position that they relied on the observation of and results of the special testing conducted on the DGs for a determination that the DGs were operable.2/ GPC has not treated the inaccuracy lightly but, due to the interaction between GPC j
and the NRC during this time period, we respectfully request the NRC to r-W whether i
the difference between 19 and 12 m-nful starts is material.
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Corrective Action - Results Achieved :
GPC is committed to open, complete and accurate communication with employees and the NRC. GPC is keenly aware of its legal obligation to ensure that all information provided j
to the NRC is complete and accurate in all material respects. This commitment and awareness are exhibited in managements interaction with employees and NRC personnel. Since the SAE GPC has taken various actions in an attempt to inform the NRC of relevant information, to ensure that areas where GPC can improve are acted upon, as well as remind employees of GPC's commitment to open communication and the resolution of employee concerns.
On April 19,1990 the Vice President - Vogtle Project ip,aned Ken Brockman of NRC Region II to assure that the IIT and Region 11 participants at the April 9 presentation understood the basis of the April 9th start count numbers in order to avoid any miscommunication (Exhibit 36, p. 27). This evWa= GPC's efforts to correct a potential ambiguity of the April 9 letter when brought to management's attention.
On May 8,1990 the Vice President - Vogtle Project held a managers meeting to discuss the NRC's negative perceptions of GPC's approach to regulatory obligations. (Exhibit 74, p.
8). The Vice President - Vogtle Project informed the group that the Executive Vice President -
GPC, the Senior Vice President - Nuclear operations and he had been requested to attend a meeting in Washington with the NRC. He described in detail how the discussion addressed the NRC's perception of the personnel at Vcgtle. The NRC believed that the personnel at Vogtle "have a cowboy cavalier attitude". (Exhibit 74, p.10). The tape illustrates GPC's commitment to openness. The Vice President - Vogtle Project led a very frank and critical discussion regarding personnel attitudes, performance and communication with the NRC.
In July,1990, GPC nuclear officers held two meetings in Augusta, Georgia for VEGP managers. The first meeting, on July 11, 1990, at the Pinnacle Club, was a dinner, followed by discussion concerning such issues as :camwork, personnel policies, and open and effective 2' Peter A. Taylor stated that while he was not aware of any troubleshooting test failures during the IIT, any failures during such testing would not have made a difference in an operability or reliability determination.
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communication between groups within the organization. A follow-up meeting with a less social tone was held on July 24,1990, at the Holiday Inn. Among other items, GPC officers stated their goals of fostering better communications betwi the corporrate office and the plant site, j
of greater overall candor in dealing with the issues to assure broad awareness of important safety issues, and of the corporate office's desire to support, not over manage, on-going efforts at the plant. These meetings, including the May 8th plant meeting, evidence GPC's sensitivity to NRC perceptions at that time, and efforts to enhance the information flow and cooperation between functional groups associated with the VEGP. As NRC Resident Inspectors and managers have observed, since this period improvements in communication have been commendable, and a culture of openness pervades external and internal discussions. 'Ihe possibility of omitted material information or of materially inaccurate information is felt to be significantly less as well.
l Weaknesses were identified in the June,1990 audit of DG record keeping practices conducted by the Safety and Engineering Analysis group. Successive revisions to procedures were thereafter initiated to provide additional assurance that data sheets which record start attempts (officially " Completion Sheet 1") were completed, and to place the completed Completion Sheet in a DG logbook maintained and located in the control room. This logbook provided a comprehensive collation of data sheets which was readily available. Today a bound logbook with consecutively numbered Complet;on Sheets is maintained in the control room.
3 When filled out by operators, a single impression creates two " originals," with the second l
(yellow) copy directly forwarded to the Eng,ineering Support DG system engineer for completion of the diesel test evaluation section. The original remains in the control room. In contrast to past practice, the operators, rather than the system engineer, assign an identifying start number to each successive start and the " successful start" category has been deleted from the test evaluation section of the Completion Sheet. VEGP Procedure 14980-1 (Dical Generator Operability Test," Rev. 35, Sections 3.7 and 3.8 and VEGP Procedure 13145-1 " Diesel Generators," Rev. 35, Section 2.2.9).
GPC has made a concerted effort to enhance the accuracy and completeness of all communications to the NRC. GPC executive management and Region II officials, and GPC site management and NRC Resident Inspectors have periodically discussed openness and quality of communications.
On May 11,1994 the Executive Vice President - GPC forwarded a letter to employees informing them of the issuance of the Notice of Violation and reinforcing the company's policy toward openness in communicatians with the NRC. The letter also addresses GPC's philosophy in dealing with employee concerns (Tab A, Item 2).
On May 11,1994 the Senior Vice President - GPC visited both Hatch and Vogtle nuclear plants and talked to large groups of employees regardmg the Notice of Violation. He also discussed the company's policy toward open communication with the NRC and stated "we must always provide complete, accurate information regarding our operation to the NRC." The NRC :
i l
i Resident inspector, attended 'hese meetings. The Senior Vice President - GPC emphasized the i*
t i
~
point that it is essential that,there be open and proactive sharing of all relevant and 'significant j
information, even if it exceeds the scope of an information request (Tab A, Item 3). Managers and supervisors, iri turn, shared these observations with their subordinates.
Notice of the NOV with a copy of 10 CFR 50.9 has been posted at both plant sites for 4
j all employees to read.
The above actions show GPC's continued commitment toward open and accurate communication with the NRC.
Additionally some of the above addressed GPC's policy regarding employee's concerns. While employees are encouraged to raise any and all concerns, j
it was stressed that it is not always enough to resolve the concern in one's own mind but one needs to be sure that any concern in the minds of others is also resolved. GPC is very focused t
on the appropriate treatment and resolution of all employee concerns. The discussions with employees was also aimed at preventing the Notice of Violation from having the effect of chilling any internal or external communications.
Corrective Action to be T**n:
GPC's Reply to the Notice of Violation will be made available for employees to read.
If an Order is issued by the NRC regarding the Notice of Violation, it will be posted for all employees to read.
The Senior Vice President - GPC will send a letter to the Vice Presidents of Hatch and Vogtle regarding the adequacy of established record keeping practices during an "off-normal" event. The letter suggests that upon the occurrence of "off-normal" events, managers consider the adequacy of existing documentation practices and whether additional action is prudent to preserve relevant information, including the need for more frequent updating of logs.
9
4 l
NRC VialnHan B:
i "Coctury to the above, information provided to the NRC Region II Office by GPC in an April 9,1990 letter was incomplete in a material respect. Specifically, the letter states, when L
discussing the air quality of the DG starting air system at the Vogtle facility, that: "GPC has reviewed air quality of the D/G ak system including dewpoint control and has concluded that i
air quality is satisfactory. Initial reports of higher than expected dewpoints were later attributed to faulty instrumentation."
1 This statement is incomplete in that it fails to state that actual high dew points had occurred at the Vogtle facility. It also fails to state that the causes of those high dew points included failure to use air dryers for extended periods of time and repressurization cf the DG air start system receivers following maintenance.
1 The incompleteness was material. In considering a restart decition, the NRC was especially interested in the reliability of the DGs and specifically asked that GPC address the j
matter in its presentation on restart. The NRC relied, in part, upon this information p;esented by GPC in its letter of April 9,1990 in reaching the decision to allow Vogtle Unit i to return j
to power operation."
i GPC Resnonse to Violation B i
l Admission or Denial of Violation B: 'Ihe violation is denied.
I i
Ramenns for the Denial:
GPC's Apnl 9,1990 letter addressed, accurately and completely, the on-going events at Plant Vogtle related to concerns about " dew point" data. The statement about " initial reports" referred to the resolution of a current issue which was first identified and reported to NRC representatives in the April 5-9, 1990 period (i.e., specific reports of higher than expected dewpoints referred to reports of measurements that had been taken during the recovery from the SAE). To suggest that the letter sought to either identify or explain all " higher than expected dew points" is to take GPC's statement out of context. This would give it a meaning which is inconsistent with the actual understanding of both GPC and NRC representatives at the time.
Prior to the NRC's decision to allow Vogtle Unit I to return to power operation, GPC kept the NRC informed of dew point information, which included providing the NRC with written infonnation on actual high dew points on the 1 A diesel control air and oral information on other engines. Documents in the possession of the NRC substantiate the context and meaning of the statement, and an undereading of the statement's meaning by NRC representatives and of information conveyed to the NRC prior to restart. None of these documents are identified in the Notice of Violation, the February 9,1994 Vogtle Coordinating Group analysis, or the Office of Investigations report 2-90-20 dated December 17,1993, and so, for ease of reference, will be discussed here.
The Statement's Context and Meaning The April 9,1990 letter identified certain short term corrective actions. Beginning on
- p. 3, the April 9 letter sets out, in summary form, these actions which had been or were being implemented by GPC. 'Ihe letter concludes " Based on the above discussion, we have completed the appropriate corrective actions rw*mry to safely operate the unit." 'Ihe short term corrective actions included 1) operator training, 2) modification of the under voltage start feature, 3) ongoing evaluation of the possibility of design change for the jacket water high temperature trip function, 4) review of air quality, 5) prospective review and identification of l
long term corrective action, and 6) prospective laboratory evaluation of quarantine components.
The bases for GPC's conclusion of satisfactory current air quality of the DG's control system was also provided in summary form: (1) recesit unacceptable dew point measuren.ents were attributed to faulty instrumentation; (2) internal inspection of an air receiver on April 6; (3) periodic replacement of control air filters; and (4) daily air receiver blow downs.
There can be little doubt that the letter was discussing the current situation and it is unduly strained to say the statement was intended to describe all past maintenance issues. Said another way, GPC's statement regarding " dewpoint control" conveyed GPC's judgment on April 9,1990, that air quality in the starting air system relative to moisture or " humidity" was satisfactory at that time. Although higher than expected dewpoints had, in fact, been recorded during the Plant's recovery from the SAE, these post-event measurements.wom erroneous, and faulty instrumentation.Was the teason. Representatives of the NRC's Incident Investigation Team (IIT) were informed of these high readings.
GPC Informs the NRC of Erroneous. Post-Event Dew Point Randings The IIT transcribed many conversations between the NRC and GPC representatives regarding dewpoint control. Air quality, including the possibility of small debris or moisture in the DG air system, was discussed at an IIT meeting on March 28,1990. (IIT Document 145,
- p. 95-97. Tab B, Item 1). In response to a question from the IIT, GPC committed to review the last historic dewpoint and, in addition, take new dewpoint readings. Both the IIT and GPC were attempting to identify the cause of the 1 A DG spurious trip on March 20,1990.
Between March 28 and April' 3, as a follow up to the IIT request, GPC tested the air quality for moisture and wonducted a review of the control air fl&rs. (IIT Document 257, p.
59-60. Tab B, Item 2). GPC stated that, based upon tests done, the quality of air was satisfactory, and air quality was not considered the root cause of the 1 A diesel trip on March 20,1990.
'Ihe " initial reports
- of higher than expected dewpoints arose on April 6. The reports were made to GPC management and, in turn, to the IIT. (IIT Document 203, p. 4. Tab B. Item 3). The IIT team leader (1d. p. 4, line 16-18) indicated that the IIT may have been informed of the situation prior to the morning of April 6. In any event, the VEGP General Manager explained that on April 5 he had learned that the test of dewpomt on March'29 was 1 J
e i
l unsatisfactory for the 1 A diesell' He further stated that the preliminary indications were a bad j
dewpoint sensor instrument.,This was the " initial reports." The " jacket water test" on the engine had been placed on hold, while a bleed and feed on the air storage tanks had been started. The basis for the General Manager's belief that the test instrumentation was suspect included recent i
" bad" readings on the IB diesel. " Cooper people" (i.e., representatives of the DG vendor) had i
been contacted to verify GPC's belief that any immediate problem associated with the controls of the diesel did not call into the question the operability of the engines. (IIT Document 203,
)
pp. 5-7. Tab B, item 3). A new dewpoint instrument or equivalent was being sought on the morning of April 6. (Id. p. 7)!'.
l By April 9, GPC had performed additional post-SAE dewpoint readings. (IIT Document j
206, p. 4, lines 7-10. Tab B, Item 4). On the me day, NRC repmsentatives were informed j
of the dewpoint readings obtained by new instrumentation. One dewpoint rendirig at 60.9* en
)
the diesel 2A receiver, was attributable to the air dryer being turned off on Friday (4/6). (IIT Document 206, p. 5. Tab B, Item 4). Ms IIT team leader,appyrendy. understood this fact.
{
l
- (Exhibit 28, p.128). The HT team leader indicated to plsit' personnel that Unit 2 diesel-related
]
air quality history was not of substantial interest; "we just need the information that shows'us i
l 1o what extent air poor quality might have had an impact on the operation of unit IA diesel."
(IIT Document 206, p. 6, lines 23-25. Tab B, Item 4). He also observed: "you also brought up
)
j another good point, which is that, you know, the way you got into this thing here recently was 1
l you thought you had bad air, but the instrument was bad." Qd. p. 8, lines 15-16). This NRC l
statement is remarkably similar to GPC's statement which is the basis for Violation B. Both l
accurately and completely describe recent, not historic, developments ast.ociated with dewpoint
{
measurements of the DG control air following the SAE.
4 i
j A Rule of Remenn Should Be An_olied to The April 9 Control Air Statement In promulgating 10 C.F.R. 50.9(b), the NRC has stated that it intended to apply a " rule of reason in assessing completeness of a communication." 52 Fed. Reg. 49366, December 31, t
1987. A discussion of higher than expected dewpoints in the distant past attributed to " system j
mir dryers being out of serwce" and " system repressurization following maintenance" was not i
i l' The associated Maintenance Work Order is dated March 31,1990. MWO 19001513.
j 2' That " initial reports" were associated with comments to the IIT in the April 6 time frame j
is confirmed by other contemporaneous documentation.
On April 5,1990, a facsimile transmission of the draft April 9 letter was made to Plant Vogtle. At that point, the draft letter described a test of the " jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts" as "in progress." (Tab B, item 5, Exhibit 28, p. 85). His draft paragraph was completed in the final i
April 9 letter with inclusion of the test results. (Tab B, Item 6, p. 2, paragraph f). The final i
April 9 letter also discussed the air quality issue which had been resolved shortly before. These modifications, occurring over a period of a few days, highlight and underscore the efforts of GPC to provide current information on DG issues.
reasonably rw-ry to completely describe the short term corrective actions associated with high dew point readings after'the SAE.
Moreover, changes in preventive maintenance (PM) practices in late.1988 made more i
distant dewpoint measurements much less informative about air quality thanlecent data. See, for example, HT Document 05-221-90, indicating improved PMs.8 i
Additional Information Provided After Anril 9.1990 and Prior to Rectnet GPC provided pertinent historic data on dewpoint prior to restart. On April 9, based upon a review of preventative maintenance (PM) documentation, the NRC was informed of PM results which showed unacceptable dewpoints. (IIT Document 206, pp. 7-8; Tab B, Item 4).
I GPC offeral the actual numbers from the PM packages, including the IB-train diesel package j
from March,1989 when the dryer was replaced. (IIT Document 206, p. 9, lines 3-14, Tab B, 4
i 8 NRC Inspectico Report No. 50-424/425,90-19, Supplement 1, dated November 1,1991, j
when compared to GPC's statements to the IIT during the 4/6 - 4/11 time frame, demonstrates the completeness ofinformation conveyed to the NRC:
i l
In 1988 GPC's PM program for the DG were improved; prior to that time dewpoint measurements were not consistently taken; (IIT Document 233, pp. 6-7.
j Tab B, Item 7).
]
l The daily blowdown of receivers assured freedom of moisture; (IIT Document 233, p. 7, lines 1-5. Tab B, Item 7).
GPC's internal inspection of the DG air receiver after the SAE formed a credible basis for concluding the components had not degraded due to moisture; (IIT Document 233, p.7, lines 9-12. Tab B, Item 7).
Dewpoint measurements were above specifications in instances due to air dryers j
out of service following the SAE; (IIT Document 206, pp. 4-5. Tab B, Item 4).
4 i"
Dewpoint measurements above specifications were due to instrument problems; (IIT Document 206, p. 4. Tab B, Item 4).
Filters on the control air system which were pulled in early March,1990 looked new, and did not appear to have been affected by " dirty" air. (IIT Document 206,
- p. 9. Tab B, Item 4).
Applying a rule of reason, the information in the April 9 letter was a complete exf-% of the basis for GPC':s closure of dewpoint concerns which arose subsequent to the SAE.
(-
i Item 4). The NRC requested a table of historic measurements (IIT Document 206, p. 7, lines 12-19; Tab B, Item 4); the ~1A diesel was of greatest interest. The next day the General Manager stated that he would like to obtain information if compressors were out of service for long periods: "that's not information we have." (Tape 40, p.17-18, April 10,1990, Tab B, Item 8).
l Early on April 10,1990 dewpoint measurements on the 1 A diesel were reponedly faxed to the NRC. (IIT Document 233, p. 6, lines 7-9, Tab B, Item 7; Tape 41, p. 74, Tab B, Item j
9; IIT Document 05-202-90 has a date of April 11, Tab B, Item 10). GPC thereafter orally j
explained that good, consistent data earlier than the transmitted data had not been obtained.
GPC's belief remained as it had been on April 9 - that the current air quality of the diesel was j
satisfactory, although "during that period of time" in 1988, one of the air dryers was out of service for maintenance. GPC also explained the inspection of the control air filters and the lack i
of observed rust or corrosion products. GPC further referenced the one air receiver which was 2
visibly inspected (on 4/6).u' In light of these communications, documented by the IIT, the NRC was provided historic data. The fact that the April 9 letter had not also indicated such data l
is therefore immaterial.
i Thus, GPC believes that its denial of this violation should be accepted by the NRC and i
this violation should be withdrawn.
4 1
i i
H' Discussions with the IIT on April 11,1990, followed a GPC morning meeting. (Exhibit 66 of the OI Report, tape 41). In addition to the consensus reached at the end of that meeting concerning air quality, the General Manager expressly told the participants that he intended to inform the IIT of the fact that the preventative maintenance program in 1988 was "not as good" as the current program. (Exhibit 66, p. 48). This he did. Conversations also indicate that the knowledgeable GPC engineers considered historic dewpoint as only tangentially related to current air quality conditions.
l l
'NRC Viahtian C:
l t
" Contrary to the above, information provided to the NRC by GPC in a Licensee Event Report (LER), dated April 19,1990, was inaccurate in a material respect. Specifically, the LER
" Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), special pneumatic states:
leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs were performed under various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control systems of both engines have been subjected to a comprehensive test program. Subsequent to this test program, DGI A and DGIB have been started at least 18 times each and no failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts."
These statements are inaccurate in that they represent that at least 18 consecutive successful starts without problems or failures had occurred on the DGs for Vogtle Unit 1 (I A DG and IB DG) following the completion of the comprehensive test program of the contml systems for these DGs, when, in fact, following completion of the comprehensive test program of the contml systems, there were no more than 10 and 12 consecutive successful starts without problems or failures of IA DG and IB DG respectively.
4 The inaccuracy was material in that knowledge by the NRC of a lesser number of consecutive successful starts on I A DG and IB DG without problems or failures could have had a natural tendency or capability to cause the NRC to inquire further as to the reliability of the DGs."
GPC's Resnonse to Viohtion C Admission or Denial of Viohtion C: Violation C is denied, as stated, but GPC admits to the ambiguity of the LER.
GPC believes that the basis for this violation is a comparison of the April 19 LER and the June 29 cover letter to the revised LER. Both documents ostensibly refer to the end of the
" comprehensive test program" yet have different DG start counts. The LER uses "at least 18" and the cover letter says "10 and 12." In fact, there had been at least 18 consecutive successful starts without problems or failures on the 1 A and 13 DGs going back in time as of April 19, 1990 (the date of the LER). There had also been at least 18 consecutive successful starts without problems or failures after the " comprehensive test program of the control systems" as defined by the VEGP General Manager. The statements are accurate only because additional successful starts had occurred after April 9; the statements would not have been accurate as of April 9.D' The additional starts in the intervening time period fortuitously made the statements accurate.
GPC acknowledges that the statements were ambiguous and that a common understanding of thc "mmprehensive test program of the control systems" phrase was not assured prior to submittal of the LER to the NRC.
n/
GPC officials in Birmingham thought that the phrase "at least 18 consecutive starts'.. the LER found its basis in the April 9 letter.
t l.
l.
^
)
Ramns for the Ambinuity in'the mR.
The conversations reviewed by GPC in preparing this response demonstrate the efforts of GPC representatives to assure accurate and clear communications with the NRC, including 4
LERs, consistent with the GPC's policies and NRC regvWs. Several revisions of the draft LER were made to clarify information or statements. The statement which is the subject of violation C is accurate, based on the definition of the " comprehensive test program of the control j;
systems" as understood by the VEOP General Manager and as conveyed to the Generd Manager l
- Support, the Technical Support R w and the acting VEGP Assistant General Manager -
i Plant Support. This definition specified the beginning point of the start count on the IB DG as 1
4 understood by the VEGP General Manager. (GK Tape 58, pp. 21-26, Tab C, Item 1; Exhibit
)
36, pp. 21,23-25, proposed stipulard transcript with NRC staff. Docket Nos. 50-424/425-OLA-3; ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-4 T!g LER statement was fortuitously accurate only because i
of additional successful starts 8 the Ns between the time when the count was performed through April 19th.
i Several factors contributed to the failure of GPC to assure an unambiguous statement.
Some are nts of individuals, others are conditions in which the individuals performed their tasks. First, the &g8 LER being reviewed on April 19th in the afternoon was based, in part, on the April 9 data. The VEGP General Manager wrwted that this data had been verified e
correct by the Unit Superintendent who had gone through the operators logs, and therefore could
]
be relied upon in finalizing the LER. He informed others, including the Technical Support Manager, the Genemi Manager - Support and the acting Assistant General Manager - Support, j
about the Unit Superintendent who developed this earlier data. He also confirmed that the start
)
count was of starts beginning after the comprehensive test program of the control systems of the i
i DGa. (GPC Tape 58, pp. 8-9, 26-30; Exhibit 36, pp. 9, 26,30. Tab C, Item 1). The VEGP General Manager did not differentiate between the two Unit 1 DGs, and did not inform these I
other managers that the beginning point of the count on the 1 A DG might be different than for the IB DG. Although he was informed that employees working for the Technical Support Manager were verifying the LER statement's accuracy, his strong verbal assurances about the beginning point of the count and accuracy of the numbers were relied on by these managers in 4
subsequent deliberations.
Recorded conversations do not indicate that he advised that i
verification by Technical Support employees should be used to confirm the accuracy of his i
recollection. However, by established practice Technical Support would sign-off on the LER document prior to execution by cupurde officers.
1 l
Second, the presence of an updated Engineering Support DG start log, which could be readily reviewed to confirm the Unit Supermtendent's prior count, would have affected the April
]
19 verification efforts. (Tab C, Item 2, pp. 76-78, stipulated transcript with NRC staff and provided to the staff on June 22,1994; Docket Nos. 50-424/425-OLA-3; ASLBP No. 93-671-j.
01-OLA-3). That updated log would likely have assured an accurate understanding of the April 9 data. In this regard, GPC finds the following facts extremely persuasive:
4 l
l :
b.
I-1)
Prior to the Unit Superintendent's efforts, the Technical Support Manager informed the VEGP General Manager that the data compiled by Engineering Support was the traditional sourceof start data. For example monthly INPO reports are based on the log. (Exhibit 38, p.10 -11; p. 83);
}
2)
The acting Assistant Plant General Manager - Support on April 18,1990 advised the General Manager - Support that accurate statements about DG starts from March 13 l
through March 20 were not a problem, but that making accurate statements about DG starts up to April 18 was more difficult (Tab C, Item 3, Tape 53, Side B, p. 8 -
approximately 70% through recording).
i 3)
On April 19th, when the acting Assistant Plant General Manager was tasking.the verification efforts of the draft LER, he was informed by the Technical Support Manager that "the real key is that it's got to come from [ logs maintained by Engineering Support i
employee] Kenny Stokes... And it's got to come from Kenny Stokes because - you i
know, I'm just talking about the - telling the NRC people because Kenny Stokes is the one who makes the calls of ' valid' or ' invalid.'" (GPC Tape 57, p. 76, Exhibit 34, p.
i 122; Tab C, Jtem 2). Knowing that the DG start log kept by Engineering Support was not up to date, the acting Assistant Plant General Manager tasked his subordinates to review control room logs for the IB DG from 3-23 through 4-9 inclusive; this review
{
would be sufficient to "do the job." (Exhibit 34, p.124; see, also, p.122, lines 22-l 24).H' This conclusion was after another subordinate told him that "we can't get it I
quickly is my problem. We don't have that information available. That's got to come from...." (GPC Tape 57, p. 78, Tab C, Item 2).
Had the " key" updated log been available, no doubt exists that it would have been used by these persons. No reasonable doubt exists' that the task of verification would have been substantially shortened. No need would have existed to contact the Unit Superintendent, as was done belatedly on April 19th. L: stead, several opportunities would have been present to assure an accurate statement in the LER. Foremost would have been additional time for Technical Support employees,1) to determine (such as by review of outage schedules) the date and time of the sensor recalibration and logic testing on each of the DGs and,2) to confirm that such date and time was after 1731 on 3-23 and that 19 starts without problems or failures had occurred since tb t tirac. The specific DG start that represented the beginning point for the count, i.e. after completion of the comprehensive test program as defined by the VEGP General Manager, would have been identified. Dey could have then designated the beginning point of the count by date and time, or specific reference to the start (e.g. E-Run Bubble Test) in lieu of the phrase
" comprehensive test program."
D'12ter conversations indicate that the compilation of starts went through April 19. -..
1
- 4) The Unit Superintendent's start lists were not readily allable by the reviewers of the draft LER. This necessitated a new, "from scratch", tempt at data compilation by the Technical Suppon employees. (GPC Tape 57, pp. 78-79, Exhibit 34, pp. 89-90, Tab C, Item 2).
An updated single source document, if available, would have substantially decreased the degree of reliance placed on the VEGP General Manager's assurances. His statements could have been independently confirmed without significant effort. Rather than merely orally questioning the Unit Superintendent about his historic data compilation, site managers on April 19 could have shown him a written " total stan history." He could have directly referred to the document to show his inclusion of starts which were of concern to the acting Assistant General Manager (i.e. < IB starts between 3-20 and 1731 on 3-23). The reviewers then would have known nQt o rely on the prior data. At that point the two site managers would have a clear conflic' octween the VEGP General Manager's understanding of when the Unit Superintendent'< ount began and the Unit Superintendent's recollection. With the conflict shown, at concerns about the ambiguities in the " comprehensive test program" phraseology w' have become moot.
Third, the Technical Support Manager, the acting Assistant General Manager and the General Manager - Support failed to clarify the " comprehensive test program" phraseology before issuance of the LER. The two onsite managers also failed to adequately review new data ' compiled by the Technical Suppon employees relative to the phraseology before issuance u
of the LER:
...there was no data that we had that proved the new way we were going to word this was correct. We had the data that brought it into question and we -- and we went forward without any data that proved it correct." (Exhibit 6, p. 91). Technical Support employees who compiled the new data did not review the " comprehensive test program of the control systems" revision of the LER. One of these employees questioned the finalized language as erroneous the first time that he reviewed it, on or shortly after April 20. He was the employee who was tasked on April 19 to verify the PRB-approved LER draft language and did not attend the early afternoon PRB meeting when he was collating control room log start data. (GPC Tape 57, pp.
15-16, Exhibit 34, pp. 27-29); (Tab C, Item 2, Exhibit 6, p.103).
Fourth, the acting Assistant General Mariager, when directly asked whether he took exception to the proposed wording in the final LER draft language presented to him for review voiced no concern. (GPC Tape 57, pp. 26-27; Exhibit 36, pp. 25-27; Tab C, Item 2). Bolh of the other managers h:4 wi;gested deleting the statements related to DG numbers. Instead of adopting this approach the acting Assistant General Manager subsequently told the Technical Support Manager that the matter should not be pursued further, even after discussions with the Unit Superintendent and further review of data provided by the Technical Support employees H'The new data compiled on April 19 was apparently not provided to GPC's corporate office. --
s failed to prove the LER correct. (GPC Tape 58, pp. 37-38, Exhibit 36, pp. 27-28, Tab C, Item 1).
Mmearimlity -
GPC acknowledges that the phrase " comprehensive test program" of the " control systems of both engines" is subject to different interpretations. GPC personnel, prior to the submittal of Licensee Event Report ("LER") 9046 were aware of at least two connotations: (1) VEGP j
General Manager's connotation of after the recalibration of the Calcon sensors (Exhibit 26, Insert p. 4, lines 2-6; p. 5. lines 1-6, lines 39-44); and (2) acting Assistant General Manager's connotation of after root cause testing of the DGs ending with the first under voltage test (Exhibit 26, p. 26; p. 33). NUREG-1410 and the June 29,1990 audit reflects a third potential connotation: completion of all of the special testing up through the first survaiH~> operability test used to satisfy Tachaim! Specifications. (NUREG-1410, Appendix J, p.13)u' A fourth connotation affecting only the 1A dieseI was suggested at the PRB on May 8,1990: after the third jacket water surge test per Temporary Engineering Test T-ENG-90-016. (PRB Minutes 90-66).
The Notice of Violation concludes that the inaccuracy in the LER was material because
" knowledge by the NRC of a lesser number of consecutive successful starts on 1A DG and IB DG without problems or failures could have a natural tendency or capability to cause the NRC to inquire further as to the reliability of the DG." GPC question whether this finding of materiality is appropriate for several reasons.
First, as of April 19,1990 and going back in time "at least 18 consecutive successful starts without problems or failures" had occurred on the DGs for Vogtle Unit 1, "ne significance 4
of this statement arises from the number of consecutive starts without failares or problems, rather than the beginning point of the start count. It was merely intended to reflect that there had been some failures during troubleshooting as the NRC staff was aware. The demarcation of " subsequent to the comprehensive test program of the control system" is therefore immaterial with respect to influencing the NRC to inquire further as to the reliability of the DGs.
Second, determinations of materiality require careful, common-sense judgments of the context of which the information appears and the regulatory setting of the information. Virginia Electric and Power Comnany (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22,4 NRC 480, 491 (1976). GPC acknowledges the regulatory importance of accurate Licensee Event Reports. Indeed, the conversations on April 19,1990 reflect GPC employees conscientiously reviewing draft LER language in addition to the DG start statements. The internal reviews for u' December 23,1993 Interrogatory Response of Kenneth E. Brockman to Georgia Power's October 8,1993 First Set of Interrogatories to the NRC Staff, Responses 4 and 3; Vogtle Coordinnting Group Analysis dated February 9,1994, page 14.
J i.
this LER included a request to, verify the DG statement by the Senior Vice President. Technical Support personnel were tasked to fulfill this request, Managers and officers of the licensee commented on and discussed the draft LER. These internal reviews of the LER were as sure j
as they could possibly be that the submission was accurate. Even with the reviews, the result 1
still was an ambiguous demarcation of the beginning point of the DG start count. GPC submits that the ambiguity of the LER does not affect the signifk: ant messages of the LER:
l That the likely components causing the 1 A diesel failure had been identified as l
Calcon sensors used to monitor high jacket water temperature; and A factor supportive of this cause was that at least 18 consecutive, s=*enful starts i
had been observed for the diesels.
The more important message, both for the NRC and the industry, was the identification of the suspect component to prevent future events at the VEGP and other facilities. In fact, on April 23,1990 the Vice President wrote a letter to the industry DG Owners Group which contained the same DG information which was included in the April 19,1990_ LER. Inthis way, GPC assured prompt and extensive notification to the industry of potential component unreliability. The ambiguous statement would not have a natural tendency or capability to influence an NRC decision maker in light of its context.
j Third, the regulatory setting of the statement should be considered. LER's are prepared j
and filed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. i 50.73(b) which sets forth the required contents. The cause of each component or system failure, if known, as well as the failure mode, mechanism and l
effect of each failed component, if known, must be included. Other required information is an assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the evem, and a description of any corrective action. Because the IB DG was not involved in the March 20, 1990 site area emergency, GPC's reference to this component was not required. The omission of the number j
of starts of either DG after the SAE would not have run afoul of LER reporting requirements.
Simply stating that " numerous sensor calibrations, special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple 1
engine starts and runs, were performed under various conditions, as well as an undervoltage test j
without an air roll for the 1 A engine, support GPC's identification of the suspect components" would have fulfilled GPC's reporting obligations. Therefore, the ambiguous phraseology of the LER does not appear material relative to the intended message or relative to the regulatory setting. 'Ihe NRC is requested to reconsider whether the ambiguity was material in light of these factors.
f Corrective Actions Taken and the Results Achieved:
GPC self-identified the " comprehensive test program" as,affiahian=j prphl,em and, on June 29,1990 submitted a revised LER to the NRC. The revised LER and a cover letter corrected the potential for misinterpreting the phrase " comprehensive test program of the control systems" by applying the most restrictive definition.
e i
~ - - -.
l.
l.
j Significantly, prior to submitting of the revised LER, GPC orally notified the NRC that the LER was incorrect. On pr about May 24,1990, the Regional Administrator was informed that the original LER contained incorrect numbers of DG starts, and that he would be provided l
" correct" numbers of starts in a revision. (April 1,1991 letter of Mr. R.P. Mcdonald to Mr.
Thomas E. Murley, attachment 3 " Response to Hobby / acting Assistant General Manager i 2.206 i
Petition,"Section III.3, p. 6-7).
When different " count" numbers were provided to the l
corporate office, the Senior Vice President assigned the independent site-based Safety Analysis and Engineering Review (SAER) group to obtain the correct number for the revised LER. /.
second oral notification of the Senior Vice President to the Regional Administrator occurred on June 14,1990l to inform him of Aa-ed start numbers. At this time the NRC was told that an independent review to verify the correct number had been commissioned by the Senior Vice President. The General Manager - Support contacted an NRC Regen II manager in the same time frame (See, Tab C, Item 4, August 22,1990 " White Paper" entitled Diesel Starts and Failure Reporting provided to the NRC Special Operational Safety Inspection team). The Technical Support Manager informed an acting Resident inspector in the same time frame.that the LER had to be revised. (GPC Tape 172, p. 31; Exhibit 24, Tab C, Item 5).
Other corrective actions for Violation C, more extensively discussed in response to Violation A of the Notice of Violation, include:
)
Posting of the NOV with 10 C.F.R. 6 50.9; i
The May 11,1994 letter of the GPC Executive Vice President to employees; o
Discussions between a GPC Senior Vice President and employees at both of the Company's nuclear plants which stressed accurate communications with the NRC and the need to resolve concerns when voiced by co-workers; and Management observation of communications with the NRC to assure that the NOV does not adversely affect the completeness of statements.
GPC's judgment is that these actions have preserved the enhanced communications initiated as a result of a May,1990 NRC/GPC management meeting.
Request for Treatment as Self-reported and Corrected Violation:
GPC identified the LER statement's inaccuracy concerning DG starts, orally notified the NRC of the error,W and submitted a corrected LER on June 29,1990. It would be strained to judge the revised LER as not prompt, or as " ineffective" because the cover letter to the revised Frhis notification was prior to any submission of allegations submitted to the NRC. More specifically, on or about May 24,1990, the NRC Regional Administrator was informed of the LER's error. -
revised LER currently is viewed by the NRC as lacking. GPC requests that the accuracy of the cover letter be considered on its own merits, and the revised LER be considered effective corrective action for the original LER. " Generally, if the matter was promptly identified and corrected by the licensee prior to reliance by the NRC, or before the NRC raised a question i
about the information, no enforcement action will be taken for the initial inaccurate or i
incomplete information." 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C, IX. GPC believes this request is fair W~ the revised LER, standing alone, would have fulfilled regulatory obligations. He voluntary submission of additional information in the cover letter 'should not be viewed as
)
negating the original LER's correction.
Moreover, m reviewmg this response, the Office of Enforcement should consider the l
significance of the inaccurate information. Obviously,18 is numerically different from 10/12 but the enforceraent process should also consider whether this is a distinction without a difference.- If 10/12 is satisfactory, then merely correcting the number 18 does nothing to
)
undermine the ultimate conclusion of DG reliability. In essence, the question is whether at least i
"18" consecutive successful starts in the LER, after adjustment, is materially dissimilar from "10/12" to warrant enforcement action. This is particularly true, where, as here, it appears that the NRC did not rely on this number to reach it reliability conclusion. The NRC inspector who apparently had principal, technical input on VEGP diesel engine reliability was Milton D. Hunt.
Mr. Hunt was " pretty confident" in tl.e results of the testing after the UV run test and was not concerned with any failures on the "B" diesel that occurred prior to his witnessing of diesel testing. (Exhibit 21). Every test that was tried on the "B" diesel while he was at the site was successful and he was satisfied that it was operable. This technical judgment was based on Mr. Hunt's personal witnessing of DG starts. The NRC Regional Administrator, we believe, would not have been concerned with troubleshooting phase failures "if GPC had a subsequent sequence of successful starts, he may have still given his permission to retum to criticality, but only after his conversation with NRC staff." (Exhibit 18, 'p. 2). The Regional Administrator apparently relied on the technicaljudgment of Mr. Hunt (Exhibit 21, p. 2). In a similar vein, NRC Inspector Peter A. Taylor apparently would not have been concerned about failures during troubleshooting tests since such failures "are not viewed as ' failures'" and "would not have made a difference in an operability or reliability determination." (Exhibit 22, p.1). Rued on these considerations of self-identification and reporting, and significance, GPC requests treatment of Violation C as a self-reported violation which mitigates the NOV. This treatment would re-enforce the appropnate message to licensees to correct LER inaccuracies. 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. VII.
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NRC Violation D
" Contrary to the above, information provided to the NRC by GPC in an LER cover letter dated June 29,1990 was inaccurate and incomplete in material respects as evidenced by the following three examples:
The letter states that: "In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, GPC hereby submits the enclosed revised report related to an event which occurred on March 20,1990. This revision is necessary to clarify the information related to the number of successful diesel generator starts as discussed in the GPC letter dated April 9,1990...."
1.
The LER cover letter is incompiete because the submittal did nw provide information regarding clarification of the April 9,1990 letter.
The incompleteness was material in that the NRC subsequently requested GPC to make a submittal clarifying the April 9,1990 letter.
The letter states that: "If the criteria for the completion of the test, program is understood to be the first successful test in accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) procedure 14980-1 " Diesel Generator Operability Test," then there were 10 successful starts of Diesel Generator 1 A and 12 successful starts of Diesel Generator 1B between the completion of the test program and the end of April 19, 1990, the date the LER-424/1990-06 was submitted to the NRC. The number of successful starts included in the original LER (at least 18) included some of the starts that were part of the test program. The difference is attributed to diesel su:rt record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program."
2.
The last sentence in the above paragraph is inaccurate because diesel record keeping practices were not a cause of the difference in number of diesel starts reported in the April 19,1990 LER and the June 29,1990 letter. The difference was caused by personnel errors unrelated to any problems with the diesel generator record keeping practices.
The inaccuracy was material in that it could have led the NRC to erroneously conclude that the correct root causes for the difference in the number of diesel starts reported in the April 19,1990 LER and the June 29,1990 letter had been identified by GPC.
3.
The last sentence in the above paragraph is also incomplete because it failed to include the fact that the root causes for the difference in the number of diesel starts reported in the April 19, 1990 LER and the June 29,1990 letter were personnel errors. First, the Vogtle Plant General Manager who directed the Unit Superintendent to perform the start count (which formed the basis for the April 19,1990 LER) failed to issue adequate instructions as to how to perform the count and did not adequately assess the data developed by the Unit Superintendent. In addition, the Unit Superintendent made an error in reporting his count. Second, the Vogtle Plant General Manager, the General Manager for Plant Support and the Technical Support Manager failed to clarify and verify the starting point for the count of successful consecutive DG starts reported in the April 19,1990 LER.
l The incompleteness was material in that, had correct root causes for the difference in the number of diesel starts reported in the April 19,1990 LER and the June 29,1990 letter been presented, this information could have led the NRC i
to seek further information."
GPC Famonse to Viohtim D l
General Response: Because this Violation identifies three examples, each requiring a response, GPC first provides this general response, and then GPC will respond to each example.
In Example 1, the Staff, concludes that GPC's cover letter to the revised LER and dated June 29,1990 was incomplete because it promised "to clarify the information related to the number of successful diesel generator starts," which first appeared in GPC's April 9,1990 correspondence, and yet failed to do so. In pet, GPC denies this alleged violation and will show why the June 29 letter was a clarification. GPC admits, however, that the April 9 letter erroneously stated that no problems or failures had occurred in the identified DG starts and that this error was not recognized when the LER cover letter was transmitted. Accordingly, GPC admits that the cover letter was incomplete in that regard.
In the second example, the NOV alleges that the LER cover letter is inaccurate because it attributes the difference in start counts wr &d in the April 19 LER and the June 29 LER e
cover letter to " diesel start record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program." The NOV states that personnel error, unrelated to record keeping, was the cause of the aforementioned differences. GPC denies that the June 29 letter was inaccurate, primarily because ofits strongly held belief that record keeping practices contributed to the numerous, and different, DG start counts. As will be explained in its response to Example 3, GPC does acknowledge that personnel error was also a reason for the start count differences in the two i
pieces of curiW.
Example 3 is the corollary to Example 2. Its logic is that if the letter was inaccurate by not blaming the differences in DG start counts on personnel error, then it wa', also incomplete in the same manner. GPC admits this violation. Although GPC believes strongly that the LER cover letter was (and is) accurate, in retrospect it concurs tiat the letter was incomplete.
5a Personnel error did contribute to causing the differences in DG start counts described in the April 19 LER and June 29 letter. Unquestionably, the communication in those documents that, "no failures or problems have occurred" during the referenced DG starts needed additional explanation - a need which GPC recognized only after the documents had been sent. Said slightly differently, a violation of 10 C.F.R. I 50.9 is admitted on the basis that the LER cover letter was incomplete by not, acknowledging that personnel error (i.e. resolution of ambiguity in phraseology) contributed to GPC's failure to identify and resolve the underlying errors in its April 9,1990 letter and the April 19,1990 LER.
Example 1 Admission or Denial of Funmole 1. Viointion D:
Example 1 is denied in part and admitted in part.
Wa=ms for Viointion. Framole 1:
The starting point for evaluating whether the June 29 LER cover letter clarified "the information related to the number of successful diesel generator starts" in GPC's April 9 letter is, naturally, the initial correspondence. In pertinent part, it said:
"Since March 20 the 1 A DG has been started 18 times, and the IB DG has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts."
With the revised LER GPC thought that it provided clarification of the original April 9 letter. Vice President C.K. McCoy's own handwritten words, made in an August,1990 explanation say:
In a Licensee Event Report (LER) dated April 19,1990 (LER 50-424/1990-006, ELV-01545) and Revision 1 to this LER dated June 29,1990 (ELV-01729), GPC attemnted to clarify this [ April 9th information] by ming rer. euide terminolony (i.e. valid vs successful starts) and clearly defining the time neriod. (Emphasis added) (Tab D, Item 1, p.1).
A review of *. aped conversations occurring on April 19th confirm also that Mr. McCoy clarified a definition for the time period associated with the April 9th DG data. (Tab C, Item 1, p. 9).
'Ihe~ June 29th letter, using Reg. Guide terminology, also clearly defined the time period of count data (by dates of March 21 through June 7) in the revised LER. From Mr. McCoy's viewpoint, each of the documents which followed the April 9 letter attempted to clarify prior statements. The time period of the count was more accurately defined in the June 29 cover letter as beginning with the first successful test was "in accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ("VEGP") procedure, 14980-1 Diesel Generator Operability Test..." Also, instead of the reference in the April 9 letter to starts "without problems or failures" (equivalent to the
" successful starts" in the oral presentation) the LER cover letter points out the revised LER's use of commonly known terminology customarily found in LERs, or other reports, e.g. Reg Guide 1.108 terms. Instead of a subjective standard for what constitutes a " successful start" now there was a commonly understood phrase, " valid tests" that would operate as the objective..
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yardstick. At a minimum, thef., this point was taken from fuzzy to precise.
From the perspective of the responsible GPC officers, the cover letter was helpful in additional ways. They thought that the start count numbers referenced in the April 9 letter and April 19 LER were the same and could see plainly that the June 29 cover letter had different numbers. "Dms, to them the cover letter provided additional clarification by more fully explaining its basis. It said:
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1)
Some of the starts in the earlier LER were part of the test program, 2)
There was a definitional problem with the end of the " comprehensive test l
program" and 3)
Poor reccrd keeping, iA, the absence of a single source document, explained the differences.
Furthermore, the June 29 correspondence provided a start count number beginning on March 21, the same beginning time literally stated in the April 9 letter, and used " valid test" terminology which was consistent with phraseology traditionally used in NRC special reports on DG failures.u' This clearly was helpful in understanding the differences between the two earlier documents and the June 29 correspondence.
Thus, GPC contends the June 29 LER cover letter met its intended goal of providing explanatory information by correcting and clarifying the April 9 letter. It did this by its terms and, from the perspective of the GPC officers, it went beyond what was required to provide a full and complete explanation of be different start count numbers.
Knowing what it knows now, however, GEC admits that the LER cover letter should have corrected the "no problems or failures" language in the April 9 letter! There were concerns raised: Even a casual reading of the transcript of Tape 187 demonstrates that at least one person, Mr. Mosbaugh, was attentive to the absence of this kind of correcting language.
Other managers had the opportunity to confront the concern and resolve it, but this was not done. Thus, GPC admits that, to this extent, the June 29, LER cover letter was incomplete.
The reasons for this violation are:
1)
'Ihe concern was raised but not fully addressed. Discussions between GPC site and corporate representatives afforded an opportunity to identify the error in the April 9 letter.
GPC's review of these conversations lead to the conclusion that the communication between site and corporate representatives and the failure to explore a " comment" of the former acting Assistant Plant General Manager were underlying factors in this violation. (GPC Tape 157, pp.
2-5, 9-13, 24-25, Tab D, Item 2; and Exhibit 57, p. 61). The corporate licensing engineer involved explained his rationale that the April 9 letter was not in error but, instead, was n/ he June 7,1990 date for the end of the start count contained in the revised LER reflects T
the date through which the Technical Support personnel had developed a " valid test" start count.
i l
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l supported by data (the April 9. overlay). In response, the former acting Assistant Plant General Manager cryptically stated his opinion that he thought both the April 9 letter and the overlay were wrong. In this particular conversation, he neither provided supporting facts (which he I
possessed) nor suggested that the VEGP General Manager had instructed the Technical Support i
Manager to use the LER cover letter to correct the April 9 document, which he knew. (Exhibit 5, p.195,234). He remained silent. Even so, GPC admits that it had enough information to trigger additional questions to resolve the concern.
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2)
The SAEd audit was probably overly narrow in scope. GPC concludes that, by June 1990, enough questions had been raised about the DG start counts, indeed GPC senior management was raising questions too, that *e SAER audit probably should have attempted to recreate the development of prior start counts. Of course, this would likely have led to the discovery of the three problem st.'.rts that were included in the April 9 numbers. Had the SAER audit examined the development of the April 19 LER " start count" or obtained the Unit Superintendent's start listing for verification, the inclusion of three " problem starts" in the April 9 letter would have surfaced.
3)
The former acting Assistant Plant General Manager (now Technical Assistant reporting directly to the VEGP General Manager) did not divulge that he had prepared a written detailed evaluation which was material and relevant to the issues under discussion. As earlier noted, GPC's review of Tape 187 has led it to conclude that the failure to explore a " comment" of the former acting Assistant Plant General Manager contributed to causing this violation. But no discussion of this violation would be complete without focusing on his opportunities to speak 1
accurately and completely.
For example, when commenting on the June 29 cover letter, the Technical Assistant said:
Mosbaugh:
In addition, this particular cover letter assigns a - attributes a reason to the errors, and whereas that statement may be correct, it is certainly not complete as to the cause of our making these mistakes and providing inaccurate information.
Greene:
Mm-hmm.
Mosbaugh:
We can send a half-truth out, but, you know, it seems to me at this point we ought to be coming clean.
Greene:
How would you change the letter? (pause)
Mosbaugh:
Well, it wuld seem to me that somebody ought to explain the truth relative to the mistakes. (Emphasis added).
What is missing, of course, is the Technical Assistant's revelation that he had already prepared detailed evaluations of DG stants and was personally involved in the LERs development and verification.
1 i
After he made his concern known, he was given another opportunity for a full, articulate explanation of what to do; his response was simply not helpful.
Greene:
Allen I don't know any - you know, I wasn't involved in the original LER and I don't know all the sources. I do know that we have revised the LER several times. Most PRB members are getting tired of looking at this (inaudible) the LER. We need to go ahead and just decide what we're going to submit. And that the original LER, everybody agrees, has some problems with it. This is as reasonable a way of explaining how the differences are that I can think of. You have to admit that.
Mosbaugh:
It's incomplete.
Greene:
Tell me how you would change the letter then.
Mosbaugh:
We said this was going to explain the April kh letter. This doesn't explain the April kh letter at all. (Emphasis added).
Greene:
All right.
Mosbaugh:
This only explains references to the comprehensive test program. The April 9th letter doesn't use any words like comprehensive test program. So how did we make that mistake?
Webb:
Titat April 9th letter also referred to 18 starts, without problems or failures.
Mosaugh:
Yeah, from the time of the event. How was that false? Why was that false?
Webb:
Because there wasn't 18 starts with no problems or failures. There were starts with problems on that basis.
Mosbaugh:
Well, okay, is that because we counted starts that were included in the test program? No. It's a different reason, j
i Greene:
What do you think the cause was?
Mosbaugh:
The information was all available, okay.
Odom:
You say the information was available, then how does it fit that the (inaudible) was it easily...? i
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Mosbaugh:
I don't know..You know, you're trying to ask me to state why somebody else made mistakes; okay, and I don't know how to do that. I took the same set of information ahd got right numbers.
I Example 2 Admission or Denial of Example 2. Violation D: Example 2 is denied.
Reasons for the Denial Example 2 of Violation D addresses the accuracy and completeness of the sentence "the difference is attributed to diesel stan record keeping practices and the definition of the end of the test program." The "differerice" specifically addressed by this sentence is, as recognized by the NRC, the difference in the number of DG starts reported in the April 19,1990 LER and the June 29,1990 LER cover letter. GPC has carefully considered the NRC's analysis of this sentence. It has also conducted interviews of employees with first-hand knowledge of the development of the April 19,1990 LER who were not interviewed previously by the agency.
The NRC's reviews miss the significance of the fact that the Unit Superintendent developed a l
written list from control room logs prior to April 9,1990 and that a different list was developed g
on April 19,1990 in support of the development of the LER. GPC has concluded that the NRC
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is in error in concluding that personnel errors " unrelated to any problems with the diesel generator record keeping practices" was a cause of the difference in the number of starts reported in the April 9,1990 LER as compared to the June 29,1990 letter for the following reasons.
The need for an accurate record of diesel-related starts license and testing was evident immediately after the SAE. George Frederick acknowledges the importance of this need when he said, "...You don't keep a record, you are doomed for disaster...." (Exhibit 57, p. 31).
Paul Kochery, using the control room logs, fashioned a preliminary list in response to NRC inquiries (Tab D, Item 3, IIT Document 05-180-90). Kochery stated that he probably started listing these control room entries because the Engineering Support DG start log had not been updated past March 12 or 13. Similarly, tape 19 dated March 29,1990, reflects an effort by the Unit Superintendent to retrieve control room logs, so he could highlight the starts and stops and confirm the performance of the 1 A diesel. The NRC's need for up-to-date data was also evident. IIT Document 212, p. 4-5 reflects NRC difficulty in developing a finalized, complete picture on DG starts and stops. (Tab D, Item 4). In response, the Technical Support Manager recognized that a resolution would be to make sure that the " diesel log is totally up-to-date.
That is how we keep track of our starts and stops. And we will fax you the latest copy of the diesel log." Clearly the absence of a single source document, i.e., the updated, verified, and retrievable Engineering Support DG start log, was an impediment experienced by the agency and the licensee in having a common understanding and appreciation of DG start history. 4
l Prior to the April 9,.1990 presentation to the NRC Region, VEGP General Manager requested the Technical Support Manager to perform a DG start count; the Technical Support i
Manager informed him that his Technical Support group obtained the start count from Engineering Support.
(Exhibit 38, p.10-11; Technical Support obtained DG start log information for NRC "Special Reports" and the monthly INPO reports. Exhibit 38, p. 83).
The Unit Superintendent's compilation of starts, based on control room logs, was not 4
precise. (Exhibit 11). A review of the list shows that IB DG starts 128 through 133 were not recorded in the control mom logs.u/ In addition, the Unit Superintendent appears to have i
made a mistake in listing an Aprd 1,1990 "phantsin" start. Without doubt, if the Unit Superintendent had an updated Engineering Support DG start log on April 6,1990, the omission 2
of the unlogged starts would not have occurred.H' l
Additionally, the lack of the single source DG log for starts after March 13,1990 also necessitated the manual development of start numbers for use in reporting, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.73, the valid 1A DG failure which occurred on March 20,1990. As reflected in i
April 18,1990 conversations (Tape 53, side B, approximately 70% through the recording, Tab C, Item 3), the corporate office had been apprised that records in the DG log after March 13, 1990 were absent. Mosbaugh advised that making statements about DG tests after March 13-20 j
was not a problem, but "I think it becomes more difficult to make statements, you know, up to k today [ April 18]." Consequently, prior to the finalization of the LER on April 19,1990, thei l
difficulty, and possible error, inherent in making start count statements in the absence of an updated log was recognized by the acting Assistant Plant General Manager - Support.
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Because of the absence of an updated DG log, on April 19 Technical Support personnel were tasked to develop a list of start attempts and any associated problems from control room logs (see, generally, Response to Violation C). 'Ihe list is referred to in April 19 conversation, and given the known methodology and source documents, the list would Igg have included starts l
128 through 131 or the April 1,1990 " phantom" start on the Unit Superintendent's list. The list would have included start attempts through the afternoon of April 19. (See, Exhibit 36, p.
j 37, lines 12-19: "Odom counted up to the present."). For the IB diesel, five satisfactory surveillance tests under procedure 14980 were performed in this additional time frame, and one inadvertent emergency start. On June 29, IB data included starts 128 through 131, although they were not involved in the count because of the definition assigned to the " comprehensive test program."
WThe acting Assistant Plant General Manager - Support in his written allegations to the NRC also noted the absence of these starts in the Operations Department control room logs, as well as the failure of data sheet development for certain start attempts. (Exhibit 5, pp.184-186.)
D#rhe Unit Superintendent can not correlate the specific starts which he included in the "18" and "19" to his start count list. However, given the timing and character of starts 128 through 131, a reasonable conclusion is that the missing data affected his count.
30 -
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Finally, GPC requests that the NRC reexamine the actual wording used in the LER cover j
letter in cc..sidering this response to the Notice of Violation. The sentence in question does not i
represent that a definitive rdot cause analysis had been performed on the underlying events. In addition, the opinion-based nature of the sentence is reflected in the wording choice (i.e., "is attributed to" by GPC based on the SAER audit). A comparison is bemg made between two documents, not merely an identification of the cause for the first document's LER error. In the first instance DG start records were incomplete, as acknowledged by the acting Assistant Plant i
Manager - Support on April 18,1990 and in his July,1990 interview with the NRC. The lack of a precise " definition of the end of the test program," on April 19,1990 contributed to the original LER's error as well. Had a single source DG start document been available on April 19, 1990 and had a precise definition of the comprehensive test program been applied, the original LER would not have been in error. In the second instance, on June 29, the Engineering Support DG start log had been completed. Several additional starts omitted from prior lists had been identified. A clear difforence in documentary basis had been used for the two different counts.8' Thus, GPC contends that the June 29 LER cover letter accurately states that a cause of the LER's error was record keeping practices.
Example 3 Adminion or denial of Frample 3. Viointion D: Example 3 of Violation D is admitted.
Remmns for Violation D. Framole 3 As GPC has described in its response to Violation A and the other two examples of this Violation, it adpig that the Unit Superintendent's personnel error was a cause of the inaccurate language in the April 9 letter. GPC does not view the Plant General Manaaer's assignment of the task to the Unit Superintendent, or subsequent assessment of the data as involving performance failures. As set out in response to Violation C, GPC believes that the Unit Superintendent's error was supplanted by the independent verification efforts by Technical Support personnel who were tasked by and reoorted to the Tedmiral Support Manager and the 8The acting Assistant Plant Manager - Support's efforts between April 20 and May 8,1990, demonstrate the ability to develop an accurate count for inclusion on an LER if (1) all relevant records are located and compiled in one location, and (2) an express definition is assigned to the end of the comprehensive test program. By the time he did this, though, he knew of the degree of difficulty of the task. Those who performed start counts on April 19 and before April 9 were not as fortunate.
For them the value of a single source document would have been l
immeasurable. --
l acting Assistant General Manager.E' I
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But admitting to making " personnel errors" does little to correct the conditions which permitted them to occur; and that's the only way to improve future performance. GPC believes that, regardless of the specific individuals involved, DG start record keeping practices and greater precision in defining ambiguous wording are causes which encompass or " bound" the various personnel performance failures which have been identified by either the NRC or GPC.
I In GPC's opinion, the combination of accurate DG start records and a precise definition of the end of the comprehensive test program on April 19,1990 are the two essential elements which 4
i were missing that day. In addition, had they been present, the Unit Superintendent's earlier efforts would likely not have been used or, at the least, his error woald have been caught and
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corrected.
'Ihe failure of GPC employees to resolve a concern als'o contrib sted to the violation. The reason for this failure was an atypical situation in which the conma holder withheld detailed knowledge which he panaaed and fellow employees did d fully explore his basis for the concerns. Had the information been forthcoming, a different weighing of knowledge and opinions might have resulted.
Corrective Action T*evi - Remits Achieved:
Please refer to pertinent corrective action sections of GPC's responses to Violations A J
and C.
Those actions are believed to encompass sufficient corrective action to preclude violations similar to Violation D. In addition, on January 2,1991, the new VEGP General Manager sent correspeiiir.ce to each VEGP employee which addressed the essential nature of frank and open communications, including the voicing of concerns. "The identification ofissues which may adversely affect safety or health is a fundamental responsibility of each employee."
(Tab D, Item 5).
E' Violation D.3 refers mistakenly to the "Vogtle Plant General Manager" as failing to clarify and verify the starting point for the count for successful consecutive DG starts. The acting Assistant Plant General Manager, rather than the Plant General Manager, was aware of the ambiguity in the starting point for the count. (See, May 9,1994 Notice of Violation transmittal letter, p. 5).
4 4
NRC Violation E:
" Contrary to the above, information provided to the NRC Region II Office by GPC in a letter dated August 30,1990 was inaccurate and incomplete in material respects as evidenced by the following two examples:
The letter states that: "'Ihe confusion in the April 9th letter and the original LER appear to be the result of two factors. First, there was confusion in the distinction between a successful start and a valid test... Secor d, an error was made by the individual who performed the count of DG starts for the NRC April 9th letter."
1.
These statements are inaccurate in that confusion between a successful start and a valid test was not a cause of the error regarding DG start counts which GPC made in its April 9,1990 letter to the NRC.
The inaccuracy was material in that it could have led the NRC to erroneously conclude that the correct root causes for the error in the April 9,1990 letter had been identified by GPC.
2.
The statements are also incomplete.
While an error was made by the Unit Superintendent who performed the count of diesel starts for the April 9,1990 letter, the root causes of the error in that letter were not completely identified by GPC.
Specifically, the VEGP General Manager who directed the Unit Superintendent to perform the start count failed to issue adequate instructions as to how to perform the count and did not adequately assess the data developed by the Unit Superintendent. In addition, the Unit Superintendent did not adequately report his count to the Vogtle Plant General Manager.
The incompleteness was material in that, had the correct root causes for the error in the April 9,1990 letter regarding DG start counts been reported, this information could have led the NRC to seek further information."
GPC Response to Violation E Admission or denial of Violation E: The violation is denied.
Remmns for the Denial:
Violation E is based on two instances in which GPC's August 30,1990 letter is viewed as inaccurate or incomplete. In the first example, the NRC misquotes and unreasonably reads GPC's August 30 letter. The statements in the August 30 letter are accurate, when taken in context. (Tab E, Item 1). In the second example, the NRC incorrectly concludes that the letter was incomplete when, in fact, the letter was complete relative to the letter's intended purpose..- -
Funmnie 1 of VinIntinn E:
L_
The NRC letter of May 9, f994 transmitting the NOV at page 8 concludes that GPC's letter stated "that errors in the April 9 letter and presentation and the April 19, 1990 LER were caused, in part, by confusion in the distinction between a successful start and a valid test" (emphasis supplied). First, the NRC misquotes the GPC letter. The letter actually states "the confusion in the April 9 letter and the original LER appear to be the result of two factors" (emphasis supplied). An earlier draft of the letter, referred to in conversations, used the word
" errors" but was revised. This revision avoided any suggestion that the distinction between the two terms by the Unit Superintendent was one of the reasons for the error in the April 9 letter.
Second, GPC's statement cannot reasonably be construed as stating that confusion between a w==ful start and a valid test was a cause of the error in GPC's April 9 letter, i.e.,
either confusion by the Unit Superintendent in performing his count, or confusion after April 9.
j The letter by its express wording describes two factors which caused confusion about the April 9 letter: (1) confusion about the distinction between a successful start and a valid test and (2) i an ermr made by the Unit Superintendent who performed the count of DG starts. After describing the historic submittals to the NRC in initial paragraphs, the letter accurately describes j
two sources of confusion which developed from the time the April 9 letter was submitted, through the August,1990 special Ope ational Safety InspectionH'.
s Thini, the August 30 letter expressly states "our use of the term ' successful' was never mtended to imply a ' valid successful test' in the context of Regulatory Guide 1.108" (emphasis supplied). This sentence explains that no prior correspondence's use of " successful starts" meant that the counts, or counter (s), applied formal Regulatory Guide terminology. Similarly, GPC told the NRC special Operational Safety Inspection team a week or so before that "The 19 starts discussed on April 9 were based on operator assessments of the starts as successful using VEGP procedures." Therefore, the allegedly inaccurate statement can not be read, in context, as stating that a root cause of the error in the April 9 letter was confusion between a successful start and i
valid test. The statement was simply a recognition of past developments. Real confusion by some NRC employees about the terminology used in the April 9 presentation and letter had developed over time. (Exhibit 23, p.1; questions posed by the special Operational Safety inspection team in August,1990 (e.g., Exhibit 1, p. 2 "...Those inspections... did develop' enough information to indicate that there may, in fact, have been a ' counting problem' with respect to enumerating the number of starts and definine what actually constituted a valid start for countine purooses"); (Exhibit 9, pp. 8-9; Exhibit 12, pp. Il-12; and Tape 184, Er.hibit 60, Insert, p.15; p. 20).
I B' Another way of stating this can be found in an earlier draft of the letter: "In hindsight this uw of multiple terms [in the historic correspondence] to discuss diesel engine starts was confusing and in combination with the operations superintendent error in counting the num'oer of starts resulted in the confusion of the April 9 letter." (Tab E, Item 2). !
i i
i l
Some GPC personnel.also became confused about DG start terminology over time.
Between June 29 and August 30, 1990 different connotations of the term "eweeeeful start" ultimately lead GPC to ideintify three 1B DG starts designated starts 132,134 and 136 as unsM;Gnaaful starts. Each had previously been treated as "eeraeeful starts." Based on new, specific definitions set out in the August 30 letter, starts 132 and 136 were treated as unsuccessful, even though the diesel ran for one and a half and one-half hours, respectively.
{
(Tape 184, pp.12-14; Exhibit 29, p. 80 and Exhibit 40, p.73). For these reasons, GPC denies that the August 30 letter was inaccurate in its discussion of confusion which developed over time i
about with the NRC and GPC reviews of the DG start counts.U' i
i i
Famole 2 of Viahtian E:
1 l
GPC's August 30,1990 letter was complete. The letter identified personnel error in the development of the April 9 letter's inaccuracy: "Second, an error was made by the individual who performed the count of DG starts for the NRC April 9th letter." But the purpose of the letter was not to provide the NRC with a root cause analysis of the April 9 letter error. The purpose of the letter is expressly articulated in it: "However, during a recent inspection it was pointed out hat the revised LER did not adequately clarify the number of starts in the April 9th letter." This purpose is as reflected in other contemporaneous documents "...an appropnate report to clarify the number of starts reported April 9,1990...." (Tab E, Item 3 August 22, 1990 OSI White paper, p. 2).
The August 30th letter fulfilled its intended purpose - it laid out all the starts in Tables and, using a new definition of " successful start" defined in the letter, identified starts which were inappropriately included in the April 9 presentation and letter.
GPC acknowledges that it failed to timely recognize and correct the April 9th letter.
(See, generally, response to violation D). Notwithstanding the corporate office's desire to understand why an LER revision was warranted (PRB 90-81 Minutes, p. 5 of 5, Tab E, Item
- 4) and attempts by GPC corporate office managers to obtain an explanation as to why the LER was in error (Tape 157, Tab D, Item 5, pp. 3-10,12), we failed to identify and take timely corrective action on the error in the April 9,1990 letter. Because no error in the April 9,1990 letter was identified, no effective action was taken to determine the underlying error until the NRC August,1990 special Operational Safety Inspection. Based on knowledge gained in that inspection, GPC came to its conclusion that the Unit Superintendent had made an error by
)
inclusion of start 134 in his count, as reflected in the transparency presented to the NRC on April 9.
i Violation E is also premised on the NRC's conclusion that personnel errors by the D' The former acting Assistant Plant General Manager - Support also observed that confusion arose relative to the terminology used in counting starts. (Exhibit 92, Insert p. 3, lines 18-24).
i ~
s 1
1 General Manager were a contributing cause of the errors in the April 9,1990 letter. As explained in response to Violation A, the narrow tasking of the Unit Superintendent by the General Manager, the Unit Superintendent's knowledge of the prospective use of his data and the actual mvision of the transparency by the Unit Superintendent for GPC's use on April 9, 1990, convince us that the General Manager did not fail to adequately task or provide sufficient oversight of the paformance of the task.
Although he was the " architect" of the DG transparency, the General Manager's actions were not a significant factor in, or " root cause" of, the April 9 letter's error.E' We also disagree that the special inspection i1 August,1990, should have prompted an nueument of the actions of the General Manager and the Unit Superintendent. The NRC's observations in the NOV transmittal letter come from conversations in an August 17, 1990 meeting, aficI a meeting with the NRC team leader but before the team's exit.
'Ihe Vice-President was advised that the underlying issue of " intentional error" had been "basicall resolved..." The issue that the team had not resolved was why the LER and the cover lette that sent it did not address 12 sequential starts. (Exhibit 68, p. 33, lines 8-14; see, also, p. 35 lines 6-7; p. 38, lines 6-16). Contemporaneous documentation also reflects the fact that the Vice President was told that the " intentional error" allegation had been resolved by the NRC. First, the NRC's exit notes reflect this fact. Second, a letter from the General Manager to plant employees restated the NRC's conclusion. (Tab E, Composite Item 6). Third, the NRC did not request, nor do we suspect expected, an explanation of personnel error associated with the April 9 letter. The NRC had interviewed the Unit Superintendent and the General Manager. It knew that the start count was a " successful scquential" start count. (Exhibit 68, pp. 37-38). It also knew that "one successful start" was, in fact, a " failure" or " unsuccessful," and broke the sequential or consecutive "19." (Exhibit 29, p. 80; Exhibit 40, p. 73; Exhibit 68, p. 33, lines 19-23).u/ Thus, GPC should not have held a heightened concern after August 17,1990, or beliuved that the NRC desired anything other than a technical clarification of the start numbers.
From the perspective of GPC, the allegation had been resolved, and only a technical closure on start numbers and reporting of " invalid failures" remained open.
In hindsight GPC observes that the September, 1990 6 2.206 petition raised additional questions about the April 9 letter and the LER, and prompted an NRC investigation, i.e. an
" assessment," of the performance of the General Manager and the Unit Superintendent, among others. But the purpose of the August 30,1990 letter was not to address these questions, and was not an attempt of such an undertaking. The NRC's analysis unfairly and inaccurately E'" Successful starts" were provided to the NRC in the April 9th presentation. The April.
letter describes starts "without problems or failures."
The General Manager reasonablv considered these phrases as synonymous.
L. )
D'On December 19, 1990, by an informal memorandum from Mark Ajtuni, the Vice-President was informed of documentary basis of the specific error (which correlates with start 134 of the IB DG).
i r
implies that it was.
With respect to the Unit Superintendent's reporting of his count to the General Manager, please refer to GPC's response to Violation A.
His count was reported, in writing, by madWumhan of the draft transparency used on April 9..
u Materiality We request the NRC to reexamine its materiality findings in light of the express purpose of the letter, as understood by both the NRC and GPC. On September 20,1990, the Vice l
President - Vogtle, called the NRC's Mr. Ken Brockman, who had been the Region Il representative involved with the VEGP's recovery from the SAE and then the customary contact in the Region for the Vice President. Mr. Brnekman and the Vice Presulent dimenaead the August 30 lettesand, as reflected in contemporaneous notes, Mr. Brockman "indicatad1they had all [the] info [rmation] and understood what occurred." (Exhibit 29, p.106, p. 72). Therefore, at the time the NRC, which had conducted a detailed " assessment" did not view the letter as incomplete. These facts indicate that the materiality finding in Violation E is based on hindsight review of September,1990 allegations addressed in the OI report, rather than an examination of whether the information was material to the NRC at the time. The purpose of the August 30 letter was not to address those allegations.
Moreover, the NRC's determination of materiality is in the abstract, without a meaningful examination of whether the allegedly omitted information would have been considered by reasonable staff experts. We suggest the omitted information was neither requested nor had a potential bearing on the issues under discussion in late August,1990. The omitted information could not have led to further inquiry, because the relevant issues had been resolved.
I 1
//1 f-i 1
TAPE 187. PAGE 18. LINE 18 THROUGH PAGE 75. LINE 5
)
1 JUNE 29, 1990 4
Tynan:
Hey Curtis.
What?
I wish I was.
You got a: copy of 5
(on phone that cover letter to the site area emergency dropped 2
6 W/ Horton) in your hand; right?
You got any comments, problems i
7 with it?
I think corporate kind of wants to blame it j
8 on us, if there's anything wrong.
What I'm doing is j
9 the PRB telephone poll before the five o' clock meeting l
10 because this can't wait until 5 o' clock.
Okay, the 11 last half of the first paragraph.
Mm-hmm.
Okay, the 12 first half you disagree with.
13 14 Tynan:
(inaudible) 15 16 (Comment:
Can hear ALM in background saying "this is i
17 Hairston's material false statement."]
18
{
19 Tynan:
Right.
20 4
21 Frederick:
You can't count 18 starts after the event, in a row 22' without problems.
1 23 24 Tynan:
You know what, I think, (inaudible) George Fredericks 25 sent me.a thing.
Allen, that --
26
'?
Frederick:
I didn't give anybody any words.
1 Tynan:
No, he didn't.
I 30 31 Frederick:
(inaudible) j 32 j
33 Tynan:
Hey, George, did you come up with these words? (i.e.,
34 "these discrepancies can be attributed to j
35
"]
36 37 Frederick:
Mr. Hairston (inaudible)
/
38 i
39 Tynan:
Mr. Horton?
i 40 41 Horton:
(inaudible) 3 l
42 43 Tynan:
Well, I think what Mr. Fredericks is saying is that Mr.
l 44 Hairston come up with the last sentence in the first l
45 paragraph.
46 47 Frederick:
I just think that, my understanding from Harry Majors i
48 is that Hairston may have wrote the last sentence 49 himself.
50 51 Tynan:
He disagreed with it.
4 i
Horton:
Then I withdraw my comments.
a
'abim;t!an in ihis N0'd E N g
in a:cerdance with tM freedom 0; bbrmahon I
Act, enemptions.
i F0IA-
,M
1 Frederick:
Why?
If it's the truth, it's the truth.
'2
)
Horton:
I thi'nk it's wrong, but I certainly think I'm sure 4
Hairston knows more than I do.
5 6
Frederick:
What's wrong, Mike, because I think you got it from our 7
audit report.
8 9
Horton:
Well, what was wrong with our diesel start 10 recordkeeping practices?
11 12 Frederick:
Okay.
Let me give it to you in a nutshell, okay.
On 13 the days --
14 15 Horton:
We're doing it the same way we've always done it.
I 16 17 Frede: rick:
No, no.
Wait a minute.
Let me just tell you what the 18 19 20 Horton:
Do I need to change my program?
21 33 Frederick:
Probably.
Let me tell you the facts, okay.
You ready?
23 24 Horton:
Tell me what's wrong.
25 36 Frederick:
Your log was out of date the day we wrote the LER.
i
'7 Horton:
Oh, okay.
i
.3 30 Mosbaugh:
That's irrelevant.
31 i
32 Horton:
If that's the justification, I'll buy that.
1 33 34 Frederick:
Well, it's true.
35 36 Horton:
Is that the root cause here?
37 38 Frederick:
That's part of it.
39 40 Mosbaugh:
That's irrelevant.
It wasn't even used.
41 42 Frederick:
It could have been used.
43 44 Mosbaugh:
It wasn't used.
45 46 Frederick:
It could have been used.
47 48 Mosbaugh:
It doesn't matter.
49 50 Horton:
That's why I keep getting comments about updating the 51 log today.
e, 2
.\\
1 Mosbaugh:
It doesn't matter if it wasn't used.
~2 i
i Frederick:
Yes,,*it can be.
4 5
Horton:
I understand now.
6 7
Frederick:
I can't hear you.
Allen was talking to me.
8 9
Horton:
Several people kept asking me how often I update the 10 log and have I updated it today and when am I going to
+
11 get off my buns and update it and things like this, and 12 I've always wondered where they were coming from with 1.3 those comments.
Now I know.
14 15 Frederi k:
Was that before today or aft'er?
Was that before today 16 or today?
17 18 Horton:
No, before today, long before today.
19 20 Frederick:
Okay.
He only got my results today, so those comments 21 were generated for some other reason.
22 23 Horton:
Okay.
But it's your opinion that the reason we gave 34 the NRC erroneous data was because the people that 25 gathered the data used the log and assumed it was up to j
26 date and it wasn't?
i
'7
)
Frederick:
No, that's not true.
The reason we gave the NRC
.4 erroneous data is because we had no log available to 30 use.
The last time the log was updated before we wrote 31 the LER was March the 16th, which was before the event.
{
32 33 Horton:
Right.
34 35 Frederick:
So there was --
36 37 Horton:
It's the same issue.
A timely updating is the same 38 issue.
39 40 Frederidk:
Well, but what,I'm saying is they didn't use an, 41 erroneoui21og; There was no ~1og*to"use for that 42 period.
43 44 Horton:
Right, because it hadn't been recorded yet.
45 46 Frederick:
That's right.
That's a different statement then what 47 you're saying.
48 49 Mosbaugh:
George, that's not true, okay.
50 51 Frederick:
It is true. The log is not up to date, Allen.
It's not up to date right now.
3
1 Mosbaugh:
I'm not going to argue with you on that, okay.
3 t
3 Frederick:
I'm not arguing.
4 5
Mosbaugh:
I was a participant on these conversations, and I know 6
and understand why the error was made, and this is not 7
why.
8 9
Frederick:
I didn't say why the error was made.
I haven't said l
10 why the error was made....
My audit.
Hey, Mike --
11 12 Mosbaugh:
I'm referring to what's written down here.
13 14 Frederick:
Hey, Mike.
15 16 Horton:
I'm listening.
17 18 Frederick:
The audit report does not say why we made.an error.
4 19 The audit report says what the conditions were that 20 existed when we wrote the LER.
As a matter of fact, 21 the audit report says that several of the start pages 23 that have to be forwarded to the engineer were still 33 being processed by Operations and had been processed 34 for 24 days and still hadn't been sent to them yet.
So 25 1 don't know how anybody counted them because nobody 26 knew where they were.
i
'7
^,
Mosbaugh:
Nobody counted them from your log, Mike.
{
9 30 Frederick:
Nobody counted them (inaudible).
31 3a Mosbaugh:
The problem is not that they counted them from your log 33 or they didn't count them from your log.
The problem 34 is that the people that counted them from the source 35 records'that they counted them from either counted them 2
36 wrong or made mistakes in counting them or weren't 37 careful in their counting or whatever.
38 39 Horton:
That was my understanding.
40 41 Mosbaugh:
That is the cause of the event.
43 43 Frederick:
Yeah, but, Mike --
44 45 Horton:
I'll go with the flow here.
I won't resist.
1 46 47 Frederick:
Hey, Mike, if the log had been up to date, they t
48 wouldn't have had to go to those sheets of paper.
49 50 Horton:
I don't disagree.
51 4
4
- t
I
)
1 Frederick:
Okay.
That's all the audit report says.
The log 1
wasn't -- there was no log to go to.
3 4
Mosbaugh:
George, I'm not disputing your report and whether it 5
was up to date.
And obviously it wasn't up to date and 1
6 there was a big lag, and a lot of people have 7
responsibility for that.
8 9
Horton:
Everything you're saying, George, is true.
10 11 Mosbaugh:
But what we're talking about now is the letter we're 12 going to submit to the NRC.
13 14 Horton:
But it's irrelevant.
15 l
16 Frederick:
I don't think it's irrelevant.
17 18 Mosbaugh:
We talking about a letter we're going to send to the 19 NRC.
20 31 Frederick:
I think, Mike, we're unwilling to face the truth if we 32 don't say that the fact that we didn't do our 23 recordkeeping right probably caused us to make the 24 mistake.
35 l
26 Mosbaugh:
That's not true.
7 Horton:
If that were true, I have no problem whatsoever with 29 saying that and going off and fixing it, but that was 30 just not my understanding.
31 33 Frederick:
Well, I --
33 34 Horton:
I thought adequate research went into this and it was 35 just poorly done.
36 37 Mosbaugh:
You're correct, Mike.
38 I
39 Frederick:
Well, Mike --
40 41 Horton:
But that's alright.
I don't have a major heartburn 42 with this, but --
43 44 Frederick:
Hey, Mike --
45 46 Horton:
What?
47 48 Frederick:
I would say right now that basically --
49 50 Horton:
Go ahead.
51 5
1 Frederick:
I would say that the people who are drawing the 1
conclusion on the root cause right now are doing it J
from.the facts they've been presented.
And the facts 4
are that the diesel start sheets from 14980 and 13145 5
were in routing someplace.
They hadn't been processed.
6 The Shift Supervisor's log is not an accurate record of 7
what happened.
And the diesel start logs were not 8
updated until five days after we submitted the L(ER) --
9 as a matter of fact, it wasn't 10 11 Voice:
(inaudible) 12 13 Frederick:
They weren't updater' until 13 days after we submitted 14 the LER.
15 16 Horton:
I understand.
17 18 Frederick:
So if you take all those things in total, that's a 19 significant burden on the person trying to come up with 20 the number of starts.
So now what you got to do is 21 draw your root cause from all of that.
22 23 Mosbaugh:
George, I used those same gource documents and came up 24 with an accurate record without much airficulty.
25 26 Frederick:
You're exceptional Allen (laughing).
m l
Mosbaugh:
Well, there's other information.
If we send this in 49 the way it is, we may well be submitting additional 30 false information.
31 32 Frederick:
Mike -- There's nothing false in there.
I would 33 recommend what you do is get on the phone real quick 34 with Harry Majors and, you know, discuss with him where 35 their conclusions are coming from.
I think the major 36 contibuting -- my personal opinion is the contributing 37 factors were the sloppy processing from the control 38 room to your engineers, okay.
It took something like 39 24 days to get several of those sheets to them.
And 40 the other one was the fact that the log had never been 41 updated.
As a matter of fact, Mike, as of this 42 morning, the 1A diesel log has not been updated since 43 May the 2nd.
That was as of this morning.
44 45 Horton:
Okay.
That, that doesn't bother me.
I mean, it would 46 be nice to have it up to date to the minute, but --
47 48 Frederick:
Well, it's missing about probably about 10 valid starts 49 or valid tests and one valid failure.
50 l
6 l
\\
1 Mosbaugh:
If thi.s root cause is true, then we shouldn't be 2
subm4tting it because his log is not up to date for i
3 this,information, if this is the root cause.
4 (inaudible)f(yket 5
7 Horton:
If there's a need to have the log updated because j
8 people may run up and look at it, then I need to go fix 9
that.
But previously we report off the logs as for 10 certain intervals or certain events and we generally 11 just update it for those purposes.
If there are other 12 purposes, then I need to go fix that, which I can do.
13 I don't disagree, but I think we're introducing a new 14 variable that's not part of the program currently, and 15 I don't consider that necessarily a problem.
It's just 16 an enhancement we need to go make to the program.
17 18 Frederick:
I don't think we're talking about a program right now, 19 Mike.
I think that we're talking about is Mr. Hairston 20 trying to explain why we made a mistake.
21 22 Horton:
I understand that, but the program in question is the 23 methodology of getting the log updated:
24 25 Frederick:
Yeah.
26
'7 Horton:
Whatever, I don't see that as a material false statement Carolyn.
.9 30 Tynan:
Okay.
31 l
32 Horton:
I disagree with it personally, but I'm not interested 33 in arguing about it right now.
34 35 Tynan:
Okay.
I'm going to pass that on to Tom.
36 37 Horton:
I'm assuming though that there's a corresponding 38 corrective action required.
For example, George, am I 39 going to get AFR?
40 41 Frederick:
No, we couldn't find where you were not in compliance 42 with your procedure.
43 44 Horton:
Make a suggested recommendation?
45 46 Frederick:
Yeah.
We recommended we change the way we do business 47 or either that your procedure have more specific 48 guidance in it.
49 50 Horton:
Okay.
Well, there's your corrective action then.
51 Bottom line is let's send it.
?
7
~
1 Tynan:
I'm golag to pass that on to Tom.
J Horton:
Tell him I loved it.
4 5
Mosbaugh:
I just loved it.
6 7
Tynan:
You'd be the only one.
Okay, thanks, Mike, and I guess 8
five o' clock is still on.
9 10 Horton:
Bye.
11 12 Tynan:
All right.
13 14 Tynan:
Let me call Tom.
Ya'll should be in here too.
15 16 Mosbaugh:
We're digging a deeper hole.
17 18 (Comment:
dialing tones]
j 19 20 Tynan:
Ester, I need to talk to Tom.
21 23 Dixon:
Hold on.
He's on another line, Carolyn.
Hold on.
23 l
24 Tynan:
Okay.
25 j26 Mosbaugh:
I mean, this is not false but you attribute
'.t to something false.
]
29 Tynan:
Is that the only problem, Allen, that last line?
30 31 Mosbaugh:
It's the only thing that's false.
32 33 Tynan:
What's false?
34 35 Mosbaugh:
It says the discrepancy is attributed tes these causes, 36 okay, and I would contend that those ar<a really not the 37 causes.
Now, it may be true that we're attributing to 38 those things that are wrong, okay, and ['m not sure if 39 that's false or not.
Is it wrong when (ou say you 40 attribute it to'somethiny that is wrong' 41 42 (Comment: Starting here, the transcript asy be hard to 43 follow because Tynan is having a conversat.'on with 44 Dixon and then Greene while at the same time Mosbaugh 45 argues with Frederick.)
46 47 Tynan:
Yeah?
48 49 Dixon:
He's talking to Bill Shipman.
Let me get him to call 50 you right back.
51 Frederick:
Opinion's not fact.
8
==-w u.... - _ _.
--__m 1
Mosbaugh:
I think I would have to be a lawyer to determine that.
1 All I/m saying is that if you were involved you would 3
know..
i 4
5 Greene:
Hello?
6 7
Tynan:
Say, Tom?
8 9
Greene:
Yes, ma'am.
10 11 Voice:
(inaudible) 12
]
13 Frederick:
It's true.
14 15 Tynan:
I've got Allen Mosbaugh and. Tom Webb and George 16 Fredericks in here.
I just got off the phone with Mike 17 Horton.
18 j
19 Frederick:
The person that had to come up with a. number had no i
20 data to go to.
He did it by the seat of his pants.
21 22 Greene:
(inaudible) 23 24 Tynan:
There is a concern on the last line of the first 25 paragraph.
26 i
7 Frederick:
Why did he do it by the seat of his pants?
He was i
forced to.
Why was he forced to?
The logs were not 29 available.
Records were not available.
The records 30 weren't in the vault; ops still had them.
31 32 Greene:
The number of (inaudible).
33 34 Mosbaugh:
You didn't listen to what I said.
35 36 Frederick:
I did too.
I've been li'stening to the whole thing.
37 38 Tynan:
That's not the one.
39 40 Frederick:
I'm the guy that put comments in the PRB minutes the 41 time we tried to write it wrong the last time and you 42 rewrote it for me.
It was still wrong.
43 44 Mosbaugh:
It was not wrong when I rewrote it.
45 46 Tynan:
Okay, so the first part of that sentence is 47 (inaudible).
48 49 Frederick:
The note I got is.
50 51 Mosbaugh:
What note have you got?
i 9
1 Frederick:
I've got an updated copy of the LER.
2 J
Tynan:
(inau'dible) there seems to be a little problem with 4
that.
5 6
Greene:
Where are you at now?
7 8
Tynan:
In my office.
9 10 Greene:
In your office, okay.
Do I need to walk over there?
11 12 Voice:
Well, I mean, they can talk to you right now in here.
13 14 Greene:
Okay, go ahead.
j 15 i
16 (comment: All parties are now involved in the same 17 conversation.)
18 19 Tynan:
Okay, George and Allen.
I think Allen may have some 20 other questions.
21 22 Greene:
All right.
.l 23 24 Mosbaugh:
I guess, Tom, you know, the thing that seems rather 25 funny to me about this is that the PRB approved the 26 revision to that LER on the 8th of May, and that
'7 revision approved on the 8th of May was correct then and remains correct now.
And all of what we've done
.9 has not changed anything.
And now we're going to send 30 a letter forward that, you know, it's probably'*4 ~ most 31 of what's in this cover letter is'pfobably true, and 32 the new basis that's being presented in the LER is 33 probably true too.
But then-what was in the rev.
34 approved by the PRB on the 8th of May was also true.
35 36 Greene:
Mm-hmm.
37 38 Mosbaugh:
And I think some explanation is owed for all that.
In 39 addition, this particular cover letter assigns.a --
40 attributes a reason to the errorswSnd,whereasg f. hat 41 statement may be corre_ct, it'ls certainly not complete 42 aE ww une cause or our making these mistakes and 4
43 providing inaccurate information.
44 45 Greene:
Mm-hmm.
46 47 Mosbaugh:
We can send a half-truth out, but, you know, it seems 48 to me at this point we ought to be coming clean.
49 50 Greene:
How would you change the letter?
(pause]
51 10
l l
1 Mosbaugh:
Well, it would seem to me that somebody ought to 1
explain the truth relative to the mistakes.
J 4
Greene:
George, have you gone through how you arrived at these 5
numbers with them?
6 7
Frederick:
Is this Tom Greene?
8 9
Greene:
Yes.
10 11 Frederick:
Okay.
I didn't recognize your voice on the speaker.
12 You sound different.
13 14 Greene:
I got here at five this morning.
15 16 Frederick:
Yeah, me too.
The problem -- what Allen is talking 17 about is where someone down at corporate has looked at 18 the audit report and made a decision on attributing a 19 root cause to why we made the mistake.
That's what --
20 21 Greene:
Mm-hmm.
22 23 Frederick:
And Allen feels that that's not a true statement or 24 it's not completely true.
I don't know what Allen's 25 talking about.
I don't know what other root cause he 36 means.
Allen's going to have to tell you what it is.
7 I don't know what root cause we're talking about otherwise.
49 30 Greene:
Mm-hmm.
Have you explained to him exactly how you 31 arrived at the 10 and 12, George?
32 33 Frederick:
Yeah.
That's not an issue.
34 35 Greene:
Okay.
36 37 Frederick:
Tom Webb is here with me and he's gone over the sane 38 numbers from his own records.
He agrees with those 39 numbers.
40 41 Mosbaugh:,,
You know, Tom, the revision approved by the PRB on the 42 8th of May stated that the completion, in that
\\g particular meeting, stated ts.at the completion of the 43 44 comprehensive test program, that the program was over 45 just prior to doing the -- and the couprehensive test 46 program as referenced in the LER was a comprehensive 47 test program testing the controls and logic.
So that 48 test program completed just prior to doing the 49 undervoltage test, and that was the definition that the 50 PRB agreed to when it approved that revision and indeed 51 that notation is reflected in the revision of 5/8.
Now, this goes ahead and assumes a different basis for 11
1 that point, and that's fine.
We all can assume 2
diffgrant bases, but I don't know why we're changing 3
our bases.
4 5
Greene:
Mm-hmm.
6 7
Frederick:
Hey, Tom?
8 9
Greene:
Yes.
10 11 Frederick:
The reason the first successful surveillance test was 12 picked.was.because it.ramoves any fuzziness on whether
)s.t'was a' valid start attempt and whether"it was 13 uccessful.
And if you use the criteria that Allen is 14 15 talking about, I believe you gain two starts.
That 16 still doesn't --
17 18 Mosbaugh:
Nobody's trying to gain or lose starts here.
I'm iust 19 saying that --
20 21 Frederick:
I have --
22 23 Mosbaugh:
Just a second.
This brings into question, you know, 24 whether or not we had a definition of the end of the 25 test program.
And all I'm saying is the PRB on the 8th 26 of May established the definition for that.
'7 i
Greene:
Why don't ya'll come on over to Skip's office and let's 49 talk about it.
30 31 Frederick:
Sure.
3*J 33 Greene:
I don't think we can do it over the phone.
See ya'll 34 in a few minutes.
35 36 Frederick:
You're there right now?
37 38 Greene:
I'm in Skip's office, now.
39 40 Frederick:
Okay.
41 42 Greene:
All right.
Bye.
43 44 12
4 1
TAPE 187. SIDE 2 2
3 Voice:
(inaudible) 4 5
Voice:
(inaudible) the log (inaudible).
6 7
Frederick:
There were no logs is (inaudible).
8 i
9 Williams:
When I say logs I'm talking about the supervisor's log 10 or (inaudible) logs.
11 12 Voice:
It's (inaudible).
You can't --
13 14 voice:
What I'm saying is we're not missing that log j
15 (inaudible).
16 17 Frederick:
I couldn't agree (inaudible).
18 19 Voice:
What we (inaudible).
Err on the side of conservatism.
20 31 Voice:
(inaudible).
Jimmy Paul Cash and George Bockhold j
22 got information.
They used the logs from the control l
23 room.
24 25 Voice:
(inaudible) the log.
36 7
Voice:
Well, (inaudible).
5 29 Voice:
Can I borrow (inaudible)?
30 l
31 Voice:
(inaudible) 33 33 (pause in tape) 34 35 Voice:
I guess (inaudible) the core (inaudible).
36 37 Voice:
(inaudible) 38 39 Voice:
As I was saying (inaudible) divided by (inaudible).
40 41 Voice:
(inaudible) 42 l
43 Greene:
I don't like speaker phones.
44 45 Voice:
I don't either.
46 47 Greene:
They cut in and out on you and you can't (inaudible).
48 49 Greene:
Okay.
50 13
l" 1
Voice:
Let me. interrupt before you start.
Did you understand 1
that ye're supposed to get (inaudible) back to Ken l
McCoy. immediately if not sooner on this?
4 5
Voice:
Well, (inaudible).
I can tell you that right now.
6 7
Greene:
Really?
(inaudible)
If Ken is expecting this to go to a
the PRB at five (inaudible) at five.
It can't wait 9
till five.
10 11 Webb:
That was the phone call.
12 13 Voice:
It can't wait till five.
14 15 Voice:
This is a phone call.
(inaudible) the PRB.
16 17 Voice:
Okay.
Now, (inaudible) about the letter (inaudible).
18 19 Voice:
(inaudible) 20 21 Voice:
Just the substance.
22 23 Voice:
Right.
24 35 Voice:
Let's do that.
26 7
Greene:
What's the concern about that statement in the letter (inaudible)?
39 30 Voice:
(inaudible) 31 32 Mosbaugh:
Well, what you're trying to do is, you know, somebody 33 else is going to have to answer for changing everything 34 all around to a new basis.
I mean, first we're going 35 to a basis of valid versus any old start which was all 36 of our other documents.
Then we're going to go to a 37 new basis of where we count the starting of the 38 comprehensive, the completion of the comprehensive test 39 program, okay.
So we've established two new bases, and 40 we said, okay, with these two new bases, these are the 41 start numbers now, okay.
Now, if somebody wants to 42 establish new bases, fine, and those numbers for those 43 new bases, I will assume somebody's done a review and 44 those are correct.
You know, I think that in itself is 45 questionable establishing these new bases, especially 46 when previous revisions exist that use the old bases 47 and compared apples to apples instead of apples to 48 oranges.
But, notwithstanding all that, the last 49 sentence then goes and draws a conclusion as to why the 50 error was made.
51 7
Greene:
Mm-hmm.
14
?
1 Mosbaugh:
And it.says the error was made because of diesel start 1
recorpkeeping practices and the definition of the end 3
of the test program.
Well, I say that is not true, and 4
I participated in the calls and the discussion and the PRB meetings and so forth, in preparation of the LER.
5 6
I assume this Qor is 2D1X referencing why the error 7
was made in the LER.
I don't know.
8 9
Greene:
This information is also (inaudible) -- these numbers 10 are also (inaudible).
11 12 Mosbaugh:
No, not these numbers.
The only thing that's gone in 13 the LER is valid stnrt numbers.
14 15 Voice:
(inaudible) 16 17 Mosbaugh:
No.
18 l
19 Webb:
The LER is (inaudible).
20 31 Mosbaugh:
The 10 and 12 are not going in the LER.
22 23 Greene:
What makes you think that?
34 25 Mosbaugh:
Because I've seen the approved LER.
26 7
Voice:
(inaudible) 1 29 Mosbaugh:
The PRB approved the LER at the last PRB meeting.
30 31 Greene:
What did the PRB approve yesterday?
(inaudible) 32 33 odom:
It changed five times in the last (inaudible).
34 35 Mosbaugh:
Well, somebody else is changing the PRB other than --
36 the LER, other than the PRB.
37 38 Greene:
This is what the PRB looked at yesterday.
I have this 39 (inaudible).
40 41 Mosbaugh:
Oh, the LER's been changed by corporate again?
Okay.
43 43 Webb:
(inaudible) changed that and (inaudible) the cover 44 letter, yes, but the LER itself, no.
45 46 Greene:
These numbers, this makes no sense to me to write a 47 letter like this when the LER hasn't got the numbers in 48 it because they're updating the LER.
What I believe is 49 (inaudible) the updated LER and for you to have numbers 50 like this and then can't use them, they won't 51 (inaudible).
Whatever is sent will most likely and up 7
in the LER.
I certainly would never send this letter 15
i i
1 1
off, attach the LER, and then have a letter..
I believe 2
we'ra talking about numbers that we'll see in the LER.
3 I'll be glad to put clarify (inaudible).
4 3
Mosbaugh:
Well, the basis in the LER is different, Tom.
The LER 6
states valid starts through today's date.
This letter 7
states successful starts, not valid starts, through 8
April 19th, so you have totally different bases.
9 10 Webb:
Yes, the letter was making a correction from the first 11 LER, but the LER itself is updated.to tne current time 12 or'approximatly the current time.
So they are talking 13 apples and oranges bere.
(inaudible) put those numbers 14 in there.
15 16 Greene:
Well, I think the whole argument comes down to are you 17 implying that the previous work was some way in error?
18 And what I think I hear you saying is may changed 19 around a little bit (ina dible).
We all know how to 20 count.
We y counted correctly and (inaudible).
i 21 4%
22 Mosbaugh:
No,wedidnotcountcorrectly,andthat's.basicallymyjh' 23 bottom line when you start to talk about the cause for 24 the LER being submitted with incorrect information in 25 it.
I believe that that -- if I were to state the 26 cause of that, is due to personnel error, carelessness, 7
and negligence.
Those are pretty strong words, but J
that's what I think happened.
39 30 Greene:
That's how we go through 19 and 11 and got what?
Which 31 number are you referring to?
32 33 Mosbaugh:
The original revision of the LER.
34 35 Greene:
That's the one that was done on May 8th?
36 37 Mosbaugh:
No, that was the one that was submitted on the 19th of 38 April.
39 40 Greene:
That's the original version of the LER.
41 42 Mosbaugh:
That's the only one that's false.
I mean, that's the 43 only LER that's false.
It's the only LER we've 44 submitted.
45 46 Webb:
The original version (inaudible) the PRB approved on 47 May the 14th or May the 8th, excuse me.
48 49 Greene:
We said no failure occurred in any of these tests. If I 50 change that last line, have I said something wrong in 51 the rest of the letter?
1 16
l 1
Mosbaugh:
I think the rest of the --
1 Voice:
(inaudible) 1 4
5 Frederick:
In the course of our audit, we found that on the date 6
we submitted the LER, the diesel start log had not been 7
updated since March the 15th (inaudible) we submitted 8
the LER on April the 19th.
The diesel logs were not 9
updated until May the 2nd, so when we submitted the 10 LER, there were no diesel, none of these starts were in 11 the log.
There were no diesel logs to go to.
12
-13 Mosbaugh:
When he's saying the diesel log, he means the 14 engineering diesel log.
So it was not available and 15 was not used.
16 17 Frederick:
The second thing we found was that some of the diesel 18 start sheets (inaudible) surveillance (inaudible) 19 diesel starts (inaudible).
Some of those had been in 20 process for up to 24 days in the control room before 21 being sent to the engineers, not to the engineer until 22 April the 24th, which is five days after we sent the 23 LER.
It hadn't'even been processed.
24 25 Greene:
So that makes (inaudible).
26 Frederick:
So it was a significant processing problem with the sheets (inaudible) out of the control room.
There was 49 no diesel log to look at and (inaudible) the 30 supervisor's log you counting significant (inaudible) 31 was significant omission.
So the pe,rson who was tasked 32 with trying to develop the numbers of starts 33 (inaudible).
I don't know where they were located.
34 There was no need for the (inaudible).
I don't know 35 how you can know you had a complete set if you had a 36 whole' stack'of them laying in front of.you.
37 (Inaudible) what the audit documented was what the 38 situation was, (inaudible) person was, (inaudible).
39 Corporate is attributing the error made4to those same 40 problems.
41 42 Mosbaugh:
The. log was not available and was not used to compile 43 the~information.
That's the facts.
44 45 Frederick:
I agree with him.
It wasn't.
46 47 Greene:
Okay, so let's forget the fact that we're talking about 48 the log and let's go back to the statement.
[ Reading]
49 "The discrepancy was attributed to diesel start 50 recordkeeping practices."
All right, the recordkeeping 51 we're referring to me is not just the log, but the fact that we wrote things down, the information was 17
1 incomplete; that we had a method of reporting, even 1
1 though it's not part of the log, it was (inaudible).
J And then we start to (inaudible).
'4 5
Mosbaugh:
We didn't use that.
You know, Tom, this information j
6 started with Jimmy Paul Cash.
7 8
Greene:
Mm-hmm.
9 10 Mosbaugh:
Okay.
So you ask yourself.why did Jimmy Paul Cash make 11 a mistake?
I mean, If you want to ask yourself why the 12 error was made, that's where the error started.
And 13 the error propagated through Tom and NSAC (inaudible) 14 because they assumed that information was correct, and 15 then just added on to it for extra days.
Is that not
)
16 correct?
17 18 Odom:
That's 22t correct.
We went through and we personally 19 took the control room logs and everything else and i
20 tried to verify the (inaudible).
21 32 Mosbaugh:
That was afcer, that was after, that was after
)
23 questions relative to the accuracy of the data were 24 brought up, l
25 26 Webb:
Right.
We didn't put numbers in (inaudible).
l Mosbaugh:
Prior to that, you merely extended on Jimmy Paul Cash's d9 information.
Then questions were brought up as to the 30 accuracy of the data, and you went out and did a review 31 of the log.
33 33 Webb:
That's not true.
34 35 Mosbaugh:
Well, if any of it isn't true, let me know.
36 37 Webb:
When we originally drafted the LER, we didn't put those 38 numbers in there at all.
Corporate came back and 39 wanted to put numbers in, so in the last day or two 40 before the LER was ready to go to the NRC, we started 41 scrambling trying to find numbers that we could rely 42 on.
We went through the control room logs and started 43 to add up the (inaudible).
44 45 Frederick:
Any reason we didn't use the engineering log?
46 47 Mosbaugh:
It wasn't available.
It wasn't complete and it wasn't 48 available.
There was nothing in it.
49 50 Voice:
It wasn't a usable source.
51 Mosbaugh:
There was nothing in it.
18
1 Odom:
Usually more accurate and (inaudible) started up.
2 3
Greene:
Mm-hmm.
4 5
Odom:
We couldn't tell in a lot of cases what was going on.
6 The control room (inaudible).
7 8
Greene:
Based on that, why is the statement incorrect then that j
9 the discrepancy was attributed to diesel. start i
10 recordkeeping practices?
If we don't send the stuff to 11 the engineering people in a timely fashion, don't you 12 think we've got a poor practice?
13 14 Odom:
I can tell you from the past that in doing diesel 15 Special Reports we always had a hard time getting the 16 material.
17 18 Greene:
I think that's all we're trying to say in this letter 19 is they're not blaming the log per se.
They're saying 20 our practice of keeping the log up, but (inaudible) 21-records (inaudibic) log.
It's the way we keep our 22 records.
[ Phone ringing.)
The definition of the end 23 of test erocram.
Tell me the definition of, we used on 24 May 8th and (inaudible),
25 26 Mosbaugh:
The LER states numerous sensor and logic testing was j
7 performed prior.
after.
. subsequent to the completion of the comprehensive test program.
29 30 Voice:
(inaudible) 31 32 Mosbaugh:
It's in reference to logic, control logic testing.
33 34 Voice:
Harry's holding.
35 36 Greene:
Harry, here I am with a unit down and you hand me this 37 hot potato.
38 39 Voice:
Is (inaudible) reasons (inaudible)?
40 41 Greene:
Where did the last line....I'm going to put you on 42 speaker.
You have to understand you're right in the 43 middle of a heated argument, so you just let the water 44 roll off your back.
45 46 Majors:
This is (inaudible).
47 48 Greene:
Okay.
49 50 Majors:
All right.
51 19
1 1
Greene:
This is the author of the letter.
Is that a fair statement, Harry, that you're the author of this letter?
4 5
Majors:
I will accept it, but I'll reserve the right to make a 6
disclaimer at a later point.
7 8
Greene:
Let me see if I can establish some facts here.
9 10 Majors:
All right.
11 la Greene:
All right.
Number one, the information that is in this 13 letter, " Loss of Off-Site Power Leads to Site Area 14 Emergency" is to be a cover letter to the LER?
15 l
16 Majors:
That's right.
17 18 Greene:
That's the same information that is also being put into j
19 the LER?
)
20 21 Majors:
The only thing that changed in the LER since the PRB 22 saw it last is we changed that number of starts from 11 23 to 12 because the, when they did the QA audit report, 24 they found another valid test that hadn't been checked 25 in the column there.
36 Greene:
All right.
So the 11 and 16 is now 12 and 16?
29 Majors:
That's right.
30 31 Greene:
All right.
So this letter then -- okay.
Okay, that's 32 a fact.
Let's see if I understand it based on that.
33 34 Majors:
Okay, now, I can explain further, if you want me to.
35 36 Greene:
Go ahead.
37 38 Majors:
Okay.
The audit report, if you look at Page 3 of.the 39 audit report where it talks about the number of 40 successful starts subsequent to the completion of the 41 test program.
42 43 Greene:
Yes.
44 45 Majors:
Okay.
What we.were trying,to do is be consistent with s
~
46 the audit Yeport with"th'e ' letter.
47 48 Greene:
Okay.
l 49 50 Majors:
So what we're trying to do to the LER is change it to 51 not mention the number of starts subsequent to the test program.
l 20
4 1
Greene:
Okay.
We're going to let the LER talk about valid starts, and we're going to let the cover letter talk about successful starts subsequent to the test program?
e 4
5 Majors:
Right.,_In other words, the letter is going to' 6
hasically address the question of the prahl== with the 7
previous LER.
8 9
Greene:
Okay.
The number of successful starts included in the 10 original LER included some of the starts that were part 11 of the test program.
12 13 Majors:
Right.
Now, that's a Ken McCoy additional sentence 14 that has been blessed oy George (Hairston).
So 15 obviously if there's a problem with it, George would 16 want to know about it.
17 18 Greene:
Sure.
The discrepancy is attributed to diesel start 19 recordkeeping practices.
What did you mean by that?
20 21 Majors:
Okay.
That's another George and Ken McCoy designed 4
22 sentence, and they're referring there to this audit 23 report, trying to summarize I'm trying to find...
24 the thing the section of, especially in the audit 25 report where it says no specific cause for the error in 26 the LER, a number of 18 starts was identified other than it (inaudible) appears this problem existed when the LER was prepared, based on the review of the log no 29 entries were made in the Unit i diesel log between 30 March 15th (inaudible).
It says "there is no single 31 source document readily available for determining the 32 results of diesel starts."
33 34 Greene:
Let me ask you something.
The word discrepancy implies 35 that there was mistakes and errors made previously.
36 The only thing that I believe everybody agreed to is 37 that the original LER had some mistakes in it.
38 39 Majors:
Right.
40 41 Greene:
The LERs written after that were based on how do you 42 want to count these things.
43 44 Majors:
That's right.
45 46 Greene:
All right.
So why don't you say instead of 47 discrepancy, why don't you just sayfthe difference, 48 meaning you're talking about what's in this letter 49 versus what's in the LER.
50, 5:
Majors:
I don't have any problem with that, and I don't think they will either.
21
1 Greene:
"The difference is attributed to the diesel start 1
recordkeeping practices..."
J j
4 Majors:
Right.
I don't think anybody will have any problems 5
with that.
6 7'
Greene:
"...and the definition at the end of the test program."
8 That's how you explain the difference in the LER and 9
what's in this letter?
10 11 Majors:
Yes.
12 13 Greene:
All right.
We're all standing behind what's in the 14 LER, the 11 and the 16.
15 16 Majors:
Right.
We-had the QA report, we counted off, and show 17 exactly what we're saying, 12 and 16.
18 19 Greene:
The 12 and 16, okay.
But we used the engineering log 20 for that number, didn't we?
I 21 22 Majors:
That's right.
We.used the engineering log.
If you 23 turn over to Page 4 of the audit report, Section B.
j 24 l
25 Greene:
Mm-hmm.
i 26
'7 Majors:
It says -- it discusses the fact that they go to the engineering log and then it talks about the fact that 09 there have been additional tests performed according to 30 procedure 14980, diesel generator operability test, 31 that were done since the last time that the engineer's 32 log was updated, these tests have been done.
If you 33 add those to the ones on the engineering log, you come 34 up with 16 and 12.
35 36 Greene:
Right.
37 38 Majors:
And that's how I came up with 16 and 12, 39 40 Greene:
But that's based on the engineering log that we keep?
41 42 Majors:
That's based on the engineering log that we keep which 43 was last updated on -- I'm not sure -- 5/2 or something 44 like that, plus the additional successful completion of 14 5 tests according to that procedure, since the last time 46 the log was updated.
47 48 Greene:
Okay.
Allen, can you... you know, basically what 49 we're saying here is that the LER was indeed accurate.
5.0 So --
51 22
1 Mosbaugh:
I haven't contested that the new LER is inaccurate or 1
accurate.
I haven't looked at the data.
I don't know that it is inaccurate.
You've just changed to apples e
4 and oranges.
5 6
Majors:
That's right.
He's right about that.
7 8
Greene:
Yeah.
9 10 Majors:
What we've done is because we have so much difficulty 11 discussing and getting our hands around the number of i
12 starts subsequent to the test program, particular if 13 you try to count tri number of starts subsequent to the 14 test program and prior to our submittal of the original 15 LER -- it really gets more difficult there because we 16 don't have a good -- you know, you can argue whether 17 something is a successful start or not.
So that's why 18 we chose to go with the valid starts.
You can now tie 19 it down to the Reg Guide 108 definition and that sort 20 of thing.
31 22 Mosbaugh:
But, you know, with what Tom just said about the 23 difference, you know, that makes the end of that 34 sentence read better, but it makes the beginning of 25 that sentence read in a funny way as far as I'm 26 concerned.
"The difference is attributed to diesel 7
start recordkeeping practices."
29 Majors:
Yeah.
30 31 Mosbaugh:
We didn't change our recordkeeping practices.
32 33 Majors:
George personally zeroed in on those words.
34 35 Greene:
Well, what he's saying is we haven't changed our 36 recordkeeping practices.
37 38 Majors:
Right.
39 40 Mosbaugh:
We didn't get different numbers because we changed our 41 recordkeeping practices.
We got different numbers 4,_
42 because we failed to accurately count in the beginning / t 43 as compared to now.
44 45 Majors:
Right.
And what the QA audit report says is that part 46 of that was apparently due to the fact that, you know, 47 you do tests but you keep separate logs, different 48 kinds of logs for different kinds of tests, and you 49 collect data sheets and they're transferred over to the 50 diesel generator log.
So a person that went out and 51 tried to count, you know, could.;have,been misled by 1
counting from the wrong log or a combination of logs.
23
\\
1 The way they worded it was that there's no single
)
1 source document -- that's (reading from the audit J
repor.t] "therefore, no single source document was 4
readily available for determining the results of the 5
diesel start attempts following the Site Area Emergency 6
and prior to the submittal of the LER."-
It also is 7
that there is the " confusion about the specific point 4
j 8
at which the test program was completed".
And they 9
start that paragraph out,by saying "no opecific cause 10 fcW A.tstror in the LER in the LER, number of 18 starts 11 was identified."
So this sentence.is consistent with j
12 the QA audit r'eport, and that's what they were trying l
13 to attempt because they anticipate that the QA audit 14 report will have to be explained i the NRC.
They want j
15 to make sure this letter, you kno (inaudible).
16 17 Mosbaugh:
I got - -
18 l
19
.Greene:
I've got to step cut of the room for a minute.
fb-20 (Comment: Greene apparently leaves the, room.]
4 21 22 Mosbaugh:
I've got one other comment about the letter, Harry.
In 23 the second sentence you state that this letter is j
24 explaining the discrepancies in two different i
i 35 documents, yet you do not proceed to explain the 26 difference in the second document.
Youdonly-address ][-
7 the difference in one document.-
l 29 Majors:
Yeah.
Originally the letter did not refer to the April 1
30 9th letter, but George was afraid that if we didn't i
31 mention the April 9th letter, the NRC might interpret 32 it as trying to avoid discussing it.
And we think we i
33 can defend the April the 9th letter, but we don't want 34 the NRC to think we're trying to avoid discussing it.
I 35
}
36 Mosbaugh:
Well, I'll read it again.
"This revision is necessary And,then,itonlyproceedsto((,
37 to clarify the information about the diesel starts in 38 the letter and the LER."
39 clarify the information as stated and referred to in 40 the LER; 41 42 Majors:
That's right.
i 43 44 Webb:
(inaudible) letter makes the same statement about the 45 number of starts.
46 47 Mosbaugh:
No.
The errors in counting in the. original -- in the 48 COA response letter are different errors than the-49 errot's'that were made in counting that went into the 50 LER'.: W 1
51 i
i 24 1
j 4
1 Majors:
Yeah, I'm not sure that I would say that there were errors in the April the 9th letter.
4 Mosbaugh:
Why would that be?
1 5
6 Majors:
Because the April the 9th letter was based on George 7
Bockhold's presentation.
In George Bockhold's 8
presentation he identified each individual start, and 9
so on that basis I think you can say that the letter on j
10 April the 9th was consistent with what he had in slides j
11 in terms of numbers of starts anyway.
12 i
13 Mosbaugh:
Yeah, I think it's probably consistent, but I think 14 it's also false.
15 16 Greenc:
It seems to me its reasonable to leave the last line in 4
17 there to say the difference is attributed to the diesel 18 start recordkeeping practices and the definition of the 19 end of test program, and it's referring to the original 20 LER, not the revised LER, not any of the updated LER's 21 but it makes specific reference to the original LER.
22 33 Majors:
Right.
24 25 Greene:
There is a difference between what the attached LER 26 that we're going to give to them (inaudible), what this 7
letter has, and what the original one had.
And you have to explain that difference.
And it seems to me 29 these are acceptable ways to explain that difference.
30 Some of these should not have been counted.
We made 31 log entries that didn't take the adequate information, 32 or we went from information that was probably a poor 33 way to get (inaudible), and the bottom line was we 34 ended up with a false count.
35 1
36 Majors:
Right.
I don't have any problem with changing 37 discrepancy to difference.
4 38 39 Greene:
I really feel like we've got to put something in here 40 that's usable.
(inaudible) 41 42 Greene:
Let's change the word to difference, and let me find 43 out if any of the other PRB members '.u.e a problem with 44 it.
45 46 Majors:
Okay.
47 48 Greene:
We did this by phone poll because I couldn't get 49 everybody together.
50 51 Majors:
Okay.
1 25
1 Greene:
I had to have a PRB at five o' clock to get the plant 1
started up.
}
4 Majors:
Yeah.
5 6
Greene:
And we we got (inaudible) a phone call.
So I'll get 7
back to you in a few minutes and let you know.
8 9
Majors:
Okay.
10 11 Greene:
Thank you.
12 13 Majors:
All right.
You'll get back to me or you're going to 14 call Ken McCoy?
15 16 Greene:
Tell me your extension.
17 18 Majors:
My extension is 7079.
19 30 Greene:
I'm going to get back to you.
21 22 Majors:
Okay.
33 24 Greene:
All right.
25 26 Majors:
All right.
Greene:
You go talk to Ken and see if he's got any problems d9 with that word, if you would.
30 31 Majors:
I will in the meantime.
32 33 Greene:
Thank you.
34 35 Majors:
Okay.
36 37 Greene:
Good bye.
38 39 Voice:
(inaudible) 40 41 Greene:
Allen I don't know any -- you know, I wacn't involved 43 in the original LER and I don't know all the sources.
43 I do know that we have revised the LER several times.
44 Most PRB members are getting tired of looking at this 45 (inaudible) the LER.
We need to go ahead and just 46 decide what we're going to submit.
And that the.
47 original LER, everybody agrees, has some problems with 48 it.
This is as reasonable a way of explaining how the 49 differences are that I can think of.
You have to admit 50 that.
51 Mosbaugh:
It's incomplete.
26
_ - ~ -
1 Greenu.
Tell me how you would change the letter then.
2 3
Mosbaugh:
We sdid this was going to explain the April 9th letter 4
This doesn't explain the April 9th letter at all.
5 6
Greene:
All right.
7 8
Mosbaugh:
This only explains references to the comprehensive test 9
program.
The April 9th letter doesn't use any words 10 like comprehensive test program.
So how did we make 11 that mistake?
12 13 Webb:
That April 9th Jetter also referred to 18 starts, 14 without problems or failures.
15 16 Mosbaugh:
Yeah, from the time of the event.
How was that false?
17 Why was that false?
18 19 Webb:
Because there wasn't 18 starts with no problems or 30 failures.
There were starts with problems on that 1
21 basis.
22 23 Mosbaugh:
Well, okay, is that because we counted starts that were 34 included in the test program?
No.
It's a different 25 reason.
26
'7 Webb:
I don't know where the 18 came from either, but I know 3
that 18
.9 30 Mosbaugh:
It came from George's presentation.
31 32 Webb:
We argued and argued over it until this time of day on 33 April 19th and finally corporate said we believe what 34 we said on April 15 okay, we're going to put that in 35 the LER.
36 37 Mosbaugh:
You're correct.
That is what George Bockhold said.
38 39 Webb:
(inaudible.)
Now we have two letters, the LER letter 40 on April 19th and the April 9th letter which are both 41 wrong.
43 43 Frederick:
(inaudible) that paragraph.
44 45 Webb:
I agree.
46 47 Frederick:
And that is on that date that letter was wrong and we 48 still didn't have documents (inaudible).
49 50 Mosbaugh:
Well, sure, but is that the cause?
51 27
77 W aum===,
1 Frcd; rick:
Most likoly.
If you gava a pSrcon (inaudible) tha odds#
Oro (innudiblo).
a cyjg 4
Greene:
You think if we had kept the engineering log up like we 5
should have, we wouldath have this problem?
6 7
Mosbaugh:
Yes.
Certainly.
Definitely.
~#
9 Greene:
What do you think the cause was?
l 10 11 Mosbaugh:
The information was all available, okay.
12 13 Odom:
You say the information was available, then how does it 14 fit that the (inaudible) was it easily
...?
)
15 16 Mosbaugh:
I don't know.
You know, you're trying to ask me to 17 state why somebody else made mistakes, okay, and I 18 don't know how to do that.
I took the same set of 19 information and got right numbers.
20 21 Frederick:
Well, two weeks ago (inaudible).
22 23 Mosbaugh:
George, I understand that.
I understand that, okay, 24 but I took source data.
I took the S[hift) 25 S[upervisor's] log, I took the control log, and I took
)
26 the data sheets filled out for the machine operation, and I got a right set of -- I got right numbers.
29 Frederick:
Well --
30 31 Mosbaugh:
In addition, those right numbers were put into an LER 32 revision over six weeks ago.
In addition, we defined 33 in that revision what the comprehensive test program 34 was, and it was perfectly clear, but we didn't submit 35 that LER.
That leads me to wonder what's going on.
36 37 Greene:
I think I've got the information I need.
I've got to 38 find out what the (inaudible).
I appreciate ya'll's 39 time.
Rick, you got a minute?
40 41 Odom:
Sure.
42 43 Voice:
(inaudible) 44 45 (ALM walking).
(Break in taping.)
46 47 Webb:
And so after about two or three weeks I call up and 48 said, " Hey, you guys working that thing or what are you 49 doing with this?"
He says, "I don't know.
I'll find 50 out" and Amy Streetman (inaudible).
She calls back and 51
- says, "I found it.
It was put up on a shelf.
It wasn't being looked at."
28
1 Mosbaugh:
Why di.dn't we submit that?
Why didn't we jump on that?
1 Webb:
And then it started again three weeks ago.
4 5
Mosbaugh:
So why didn't we jump on that one?
6 7
Webb:
Well we did.
They they started to (inaudible).
8 9
Mosbaugh:
No. No.
I know.
10 11 Webb:
They worked on it for a week or two and then they sent 12 something back here, "How do ya'll like this," and we 13 said, "That's fine," and they sent it bacP again with 14 more major changes.
Ana we said this is going to have 15 to go to the PRB.
16 17 Mosbaugh:
Then why did they want a complete rewrite?
18 19 Webb:
That was kind of strange too.
I was wondering where 20 that was coming from.
21 22 Mosbaugh:
There's more than one thing strange (inaudible).
33 34 Webb:
Instead of just fixing the one error, "We want to get a 25 complete rewrite."
We went, " Huh?
What?
Why?"
26 7
Frederick:
That was part of our (inaudible) wanted it updated for all the corrective action.
49 30 Webb:
I heard that was Hairston's mandate.
31 32 Voice:
(inaudible) 33 34 Webb:
Yeah.
I heard that from a couple of people.
35 36 Frederick:
(inaudible) changed their mind on that.
37 38 Webb:
Well, they didn't exactly change their mind.because we 39 did update the information that was in there 40 originally.
We didn't add in the information we said 41 we were going to.
42 43 Frederick:
But I understood the reason we did that was because 44 it's taking so long to correct the original LER that we 45 felt'if we're going to do that, we (inaudible) 46 47 Webb:
I know we couldn't, on the original we send that we'll 48 send the complete update in five months.
49 50 Frederick:
Yeah.
51 29
1 Webb:
And here we are halfway through the five months and nov 2
we'rq going to change plans and do something else.
I 3
thought that was kind of weird.
4 5
Frederick:
That was because of an identified error in the LER.
6 7
Webb:
(inaudible) 8 9
Frederick:
I guess we waited long enough to correct the error that 10 they decided we'd better go (inaudible).
11 13 Webb:
But we were right in the middle of all the action.
We 13 (inaudible).
These are al;. done; here's what we did.
14 15 Frederick:
(inaudible) 16 17 Webb:
We're still in the middle of everything now.
It is 18 real strange how they handled this at the Corporate 19 level.
I don't know why.
20 21 Frederick:
Well, there were at least two revs of that thing today 22 that I know of, that I don't believe ever crossed 13 anybody's desk.
- 4 e
25 Mo6baugh:
Let me ask you about one other thing.
When was 26 Hairston going to sign the revision?
'7 Frederick:
He's got to sign it before twelve o' clock because 49 (inaudible) 30 31 Mosbaugh:
No, no, no, the revision that we processed on the 8th 32 of May.
33 34 Frederick:
I don't know, (inaudible) 35
)
36 Webb:
I called all the past couple of week and said where's 37 that.
Oh, its in the office up on a shelf.
It's not 38 being looked at.
So we've got to get it going again.
39 (inaudible) That's real strange because I can't recall 40 when that's happened before (inaudible).
41 42 Voice:
What?
43 44 Webb:
That we sent them up to them and it just got dropped.
45 46 Mosbaugh:
Mm-hmm.
47 48 Voice:
This happened before, but very (inaudible).
49 50 Mosbaugh:
Especially one like this.
51 30
a 1
Voice:
(inaudible) especially when it's had so much attention
?
(inaydible).
J 4
Mosbaugh:
(inaudible) 5 6
Frederick:
I recall sitting in the war room the night of the event 7
recommending that we keep a detailed log of everything 8
we do, then we can reconstruct it.
And it worked for 9
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and they decided that -- somebody decided it's 10 too cumbersome, too much work.
And I do see many of 11 these events, when they get big and take more than 24 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, you don't keep a record, you are doomed for i
13 diaster.
Because "who shot John" becomes more of an 14 issue than what really happened.
You just continually 15 spin your wheels on what you did and who said what and 16 what was the real test that was performed; what were 17 the pertibations put on the system and under what 18 conditions was it done, and everybody forgets.
People 19 get tired and they don't have notes.
20 21 Webb:
(inaudible) get tired.
22 23 Voice:
(inaudible) 24 35 Voice:
Yeah.
26
'7 Vo.tce:
(inaudible) 69 Mosbaugh:
One LER 30 31 Voice:
(inaudible) 32 33 Voice:
(inaudibir.)
34 35 36 37 38 39
< p i 4 > s-pa.c.wi,s,ws.p.i s7.r.,
40 31
'?
=
1 1
2 3
4 S
6 l
7 8
9 Transcription of Audiotape No. 157 10 transcribed by Janice Walters, Certified Court 11 Reporter and Notary Public.
12 13 14 15 16 17 l
18 19 l
20 21 22 23 l
BROWN REPORTING, INC.
24 1100 SPRING STREET, SUITE 750 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309 25 (404) 876-8979 L
j information in this record was deleted
/
l in accordance with tpheedom of Information
/-
Act, exemptio.ns F0IA-9 >< i/
W
.. ~. -
a
..n.
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x.
.s 1
2 (APPROXIMATELY 10% THROUGH SIDE A) 1
'(Phone dial tone and phone ringing.)
RUSHTON:
Paul Rushton.
2 MOSBAUGH:
Paul, this is Allen.
I 4
3 understood from Theresa you wanted to talk to me.
4 RUSHTON:
Yes, I did.
I am trying to get 5
the background on this LER for the diesel generator 6
starts.
7 MOSBAUGH:
Uh-huh.
8 RUSHTON:
And we had originally reported
)
9 at least 18 and now we are going to report that was 10 in error and that it was, I think, 15 and 14 11 respectively was the correct numbers and Tom Greene l
12 told me that you had the background on that because 13 I am going to need to explain it to management up 14 here.
15 MOSBAUGH:
I think John Aufdenkampe has I
16 been talking to Jim Bailey about that.
17 RUSHTON:
Yeah.
I got a part of that 18 story.
John -- wasn't real clear in listening to 19 John about a couple of things.
Like, I understand 4
20 that the 18 came from a tally of the starts logged 21 in the control room operator's log, and that when we 22 went back and filled in the diesel generator logs 23 that Engineering maintains, they came up and counted 24 them "ifferently.
25 And it wasn't clear to me why one log has e
4 4
3 1
got 18 or more but other logs only count 15 or 14.
2 I didn't understand the difference between the two 3
logs.
4 MOSBAUGH:
Yeah.
Well, I guess you would 5
have to ask the operations people about how they 6
keep their logs.
(Pause.)
They initiate both logs.
7 (Ice biting sounds.)
They initiate the log in the 8
control room and they initiate the data sheets that 9
count the starts.
(Pause.)
So why don't you call 10 Jim Swartzwelder or somebody about that?
11 RUSHTON:
So you don't know what the 12 history is on it?
13 MOSBAUGH:
I know some of the history 14 because I was in the PRB when we approved the 15 revision to the LER.
And I can only tell you that 16 any differences between the logs that operations 17 generates that fills out data sheets versus the logs 18 that they maintain in the main control room that 19 I -- that you would have to ask Jim Swartzwelder why 20 there are discrepancies between their logs.
21 RUSHTON:
Okay.
22 MOSBAUGH:
And I am not sure that that 23 fact explains all the discrepancies.
I do not 24 believe actually that that fact is a discrepancy, 25 but that fact does not explain the discrepancies and
I i-1 4
1 1
the reason why the previous numbers were incorrect.
4 2
I believe that mistakes were made in the b
j 3
previous numbers and that that probably started with 4
George Bockhold and his presentation to the NRC.
5 RUSHTON:
If Bockhold made a presentation l
l 6
to the NRC, then he used numbers like 18 and 19.
7 MOSBAUGH:
I believe that that is where l
8 the mistake originated.
t 9
RUSHTON:
And thot.q got put into the LER 10 without verification?
j 11 MOSBAUGH:
Uhm.
No, I think there was --
1 l
12 I believe that inaccuracies in those numbers were b
{
13 flagged -- were flagged in the LER, in the LER I
14 development.
(Ice biting sounds.)
i j
15 RUSHTON:
You are telling me I need to go 1
16 talk to Operations and find out what the problem i
17 was?
i 18 MOSBAUGH:
In terms of logs, the log i
I 19 discrepancies, I can't explain why there are 1
20 differences in the way operators fill out logs.
You 21 know, I don't work in that area.
l 22 RUSHTON:
Okay.
Well, fine.
I will call s
23 Operations then.
24 MOSBAUGH:
But I think that will not i
25 explain everything.
4 i
5 1
RUSHTON:
What else is there that I need 2
to know?
3 MOSBAUGH:
I think there is whatever i
l 4
initial mistake was made.
And, as far as I know, C
5 George Bockhold and maybe some of the Operations j
6 people developed the iritial information that George 7
used in his presentation.
8 RUSHTON:
Okay.
You don't know where 9
that information came from?
10 MOSBAUGH:
(Biting ice sounds.).LWkn"says 11 Jimmy Paul,, Cash.
l 12 RUSHTON:
Okay.
J l
13 MOSBAUGH:
Beyond that it is merely a 14 comparison between what was originally developed by 15 George and them to what the data sheets and the 16 control logs say.
j 17 RUSHTON:
Okay.
I will check with 18 Operations then.
19 MOSBAUGH:
Okay.
20 RUSHTON:
Bye.
I 21 MOSBAUGH:
See ya.
Bye.
22 (Movement sounds.)
23 MOSBAUGH:
What's going on?
(Inaudible) 24 AUFDENKAMPE:
Hairston's evidently on a 25 tear for misinformation.
1 6
1 NOSBAUGH:
He's on a what?
j 2
AUFDENKAMPE:
He's on a-- He's on a--
1 3
He's pissed off over misinformation.
4 MOSBAUGH:
On this?
f 5
AUFDENKAMPE:
Well, he's pissed off over 1
6 the revised LER for a date change because Lackey 7
didn't get the stuff done on time and he's pissed i
8 off over this one.
l (Movement sounds) 9 MOSBAUGH:
(To himself) I should have 10 asked him.
I didn't ask him why the hell are you 11 calling me.
All I did was compare two sets of 12 data.
That, anybody can do.
Now, they have got the
)
13 experience, the responsible parties will need to 1
14 account.
15 (Pause in tape.)
16 MOSBAUGH:
(Inaudible) from the middle of 17 May and now on Friday today is, it's finished.-- Well, 18 come on.
I 19 AUFDENKAMPE:
I can tell you why they've 20 had it for so long.
21 MOSBAUGH:
Something's going on.
22 AUFDENKAMPE:
Nah, nah.
(Inaudible) your stock trader's.
23 MOSBAUGH:
Yes, my instinct.
24 AUFDENKAMPE:
I will tell you why they 25 have had it for so long is basically they have got i
l 7
i 1
it and they have been sitting on it because I talked 4.
2 Jack Stringfellow several times, and he said he l
3 hasn't had time to work on it with the other ones h
4 going out that have a time clock on them.
l 5
MOSBAUGH:
Right.
[ Facetious tone.]
i j
6 AUFDENKAMPE:
-- times clocks on it.
i 7
MOSBAUGH:
Right.
(Facetious tone.]
l 8
AUFDENKAMPE:
And that is true.
That is 1
9 true.
4 10 MOSBAUGH:
Get out of here.
I don't 11 believe that for anything.
i 12 AUFDENKAMPE:
That's the way Bailey t
i 13 operates, Bailey operates the clock.
14 MOSBAUGH:
I don't believe that for a i'
15 second.
j 16 AUFDENKAMPE:
That is true.
)
17 MOSBAUGH:
That is my stock trader's 18 instinct.
T 19 AUFDENKAMPE:
The second part of it is l'
20 more elementary'than that and that is the same thing l
4 21 that always concerns you is that the NRC misleading 3
j 22 diesel information and Hairston gets nervous about 23 that.
t 24 (Pause.)
1 25 AUFDENKAMPE:
OI is back.
i
i 8
4 i
4 1
MOSBAUGH:
What?
i 1
2 AUFDENKAMPE:
OI is back.
H 3
MOSBAUGH:
What do you mean?
4 (Falsetto voice.)
"They're back."
5 MOSBAUGH:
They called somebody at home, 6
but is it more than that?
i 7
AUFDENKAMPE:
They're supposed to be back j
8 this week.
9 MOSBAUGH:
Oh.
AUFDENKAMPE:
Who did they call at 10 home?
Did George put this out at the staff meeting?
)
11 MOSBAUGH:
George put this out in a staff 12 meeting?
}
13 AUFDENKAMPE:
Not the staff meeting, must f
14 have been the 7:40 meeting.
(Inaudible) j
\\
i 15 MOSBAUGH:
It's when you were gone.
It 1
i 16 was Wednesday.
It wasn't yesterday and he put out i
17 in the 7:40 meeting that they had contacted somebody i
i 18 at home and he was reminding everybody of the li 19 Company advice on that and referenced the old letter
)
i 20 that they developed for it.
21 I tried to find out who it was and wasn't 22 able to, so I conclude that it was obviously in 23 Skip's organization.
24 (Phone rings.)
i j
25 AUFDENKAMPE:
John Aufdenkampe.
t 1
9 1
BAILEY:
John, how are you doing?
2 AUFDENKAMPE:
Wonderful.
3 BAILEY:
I don't think we've had the full 4
story on the generator starts, the numberir.g, who 5
is supposed to have the exact story on that.
6 AUFDENKAMPE:
Jim, I don't think -- is 7
Paul in there with you?
j 8
BAILEY:
Yes.
9 AUFDENKAMPE:
Okay. Allen is in here with 10 me.
I don't think anybody has and I didn't say 11 because I am not really sure what you are looking I
12 for with respect to the whole story, but I au not i
13 sure anybody has the whole story as to why we've 14 got misinformation in there, okay.
j 15 RUSHTON:
That's the --
l 4
l 16 AUFDENKAMPE:
The real bottora line on why 17 we have the misinformation in there, if you want to 18 point at one thing, is because we made the decision 19
-- we as management made the decision and the 20 Shipmans, Bockholds, Bailey, Aufdenkampe, Mosbaugh, 21 who else was on that phone call -- to put those 22 numbers in based on the fact that George (Bockhold) 23 told us that they were good numbers because they 24 used as the start point, completions of, I 25 think it was, the undervoltage testing, okay.
//
4
i 10 1
And when we went back, what was it he 2
said?
3 MOSBAUGH:
For George's?
4 AUFDENKAMPE:
Yeah, George.
5 MOSBAUGH:
I have no idea.
I have no 6
idea what George's basis sas for the data he i
j 7
presented to the Commission.
8 BAILEY:
You're talking about George 9
Bockhold?
10 MOSBAUGH:
Yes.
But I have no idea what l
11 the basis was.
j 12 AUFDENKAMPE:
It is based on --
13 MOSBAUGH:
It was not based on 14 undervoltage.
It couldn't be.
15 AUFDENKAMPE:
It was based on George's 16 comment that that, that he had used this point, 17 whatever the point was, whatever the point was, 18 that's exactly what he said as the start point.
And 19 we have completed the critical testing associated 20 with declaration of or with (operability?).
21 MOSBAUGH:
George never presented what 22 his basis was.
23 AUFDENKAMPE:
And I know those numbers 24 were counted by Jimmy Paul Cash.
25 MOSBAUGH:
The final numbers are based on l
i
^
11 1
starting with the UV test as the first test.
But a
2 what George's basis was, only George knows.
i 3
RUSHTON:
When was the UV test in the 4
sequence of events?
f i
5 AUFDENKAMPE:
Pretty far down the line.
}
l 6
Right before we-declared : hem operable, I think.
i i
7 MOSBAUGH:
Yes.
8 RUSHTON:
So we may have done 18 or 19 l
l 9
successf'11 starts, but it just depends on where you i
i 10 start counting.
11 BAILEY:
Yeah.
12 AUFDENKAMPE:
No, that is not true.
)
13 BAILEY:
That's what it looks like.
14 AUFDENKAMPE:
No, that is not true.
j 15 There were not 18 or 19 successful starts, l
16 continuous starts, regardless of where you started 17 counting when we reviewed the detailed data, not i
18 consecutive.
l 19 RUSHTON:
Starting from March 20th?
i l
20 AUFDENKAMPE:
Starting from March 20th.
21 There were not 18 or 19 consecutive, which is the 22 lek implies to consecutive starts without a failure 23 of some type or another.
24 BAILEY:
Here is what George has got 25 listed on his chart that he presented in Atlanta.
)
1 d
12 i
1 BAILEY / RUSHTON:
He said five starts in 2
troubleshooting, there is a UV run test, sensor
)
3 calibration, logic testing, E-run bubble testing, i
l 4
multiple starts five more, UV test, six months' 5
surveillance, high jacket water runs three times and 6
the UV run test.
That adds up to 18.
s 7
MOSBAUGH:
In amongst 18 are numerous 8
$,..ilures.
~
9 AUFDENKAMPE:
Failures.
I 10 BAILEY:
What was that, Allen?
i 11 AUFDENKAMPE:
There are failures in j
12 amongst those, mixed in with.
l 13 BAILEY:
Yes.
Okay.
He just says 18 i
14 successful starts.
He didn't say there were l
i 15 consecutive successful starts.
1 16 AUFDENKAMPE:
What we put in there was 18 17 starts without a failure.
l 18 BAILEY:
I am talking about on the chart, l
19 it doesn't say consecutive.
i 20 AUFnENKAMPE:
That is what we put in the 21 April 9th letter was 18 starts without a failure.
i l
22 BAILEY:
This chart implies that, that he 23 didn't mention any failure.
24 MOSBAUGH:
You have to check the data but 25 you may find that some of those five ones mentioned
i 13 1
failed, for' example.
2 BAILEY:
Five troubleshooting?
3 MOSBAUGH:
Uh-huh.
4 BAILEY:
Yes.
5 MOSBAUGH:
I don't think you have any 6
guarantee that those here all successful.
j 7
BAILEY:
Like I said, it doesn't say 8
that, but it implies that.
And this is --
9 MOSBAUGH:
It says that, because at the 3
10 bottom it says 18 successful starts.
l 11 BAILEY:
I mean, it implies that they i
)
12 were consecutive successful starts.
13 MOSBAUGH:
It may imply that.
Yeah.
It i
14 probably implies that.
15 BAILEY:
I think that that's what we led 16 the NRC to believe that in Atlanta.
17 AUFDENKAMPE:
I think that's what people 18 thought at the time.
You know, Paul, when you go.to 19 Hairston, you have got to tell him that we just 20 plain old screwed up; that we had data based on what 21 we thought -- we had data that we felt supported the 22 statements that were made in the LER and the, what 3
23 George presented in Atlanta; that upon further 24 scrutiny that it did not support that and at the 25 time we issued the LER we were more concerned about i
s
14 1
whether thode numbers were right or wrong.
2 BAILEY:
The information was supplied to 3
IIT.
Did we ever correct what we told them or do 4
you know?
5 AUFDENKAMPE:
We have not corrected the 6
April 9th letter.
The IIT, I guarantee you, knows 7
exactly what happened.
8 BAILEY:
They had to get the information 9
from us somehow, but we don't know what they are 10 going to present today in Washington?
11 AUFDENKAMPE:
I doubt they will get into 12 those kind of specifics.
But we have --
13 BAILEY:
I mean, in the report.
14 AUFDENKAMPE:
But these lists that we put 15 together, this gave the summary of the start 16 sequences as failures and what happened and stuff 17 like that we wrote the revised.LER on, the IIT was 18 given that.
19 BAILEY:
In the revised numbers that we 20 are presenting now, where did these numbers come 21 from?
22 AUFDENKAMPE:
Kenny Stokes took all the 23 diesel starts, put that down, wrote the diesel log, 24 and I guess -- did he review the operator's logs, 25 too?
He, reviewed the operator's logs to make sure that
15 1
we had picked up everything, that we had the big 2
picture.
t i
3 BAILEY:
Doesn't look like there is a 4
4 good story other than we were just in the process of l
5 all the confusion and stuff that we just screwed up.
6 AUFDENKAMPL.
You know,,you might would 7
argue that if there was a good story, we could 8
probably argue not revising the LER.
If we had some i
9 good sound basis for what is in the LER, we could 10 get around revising it.
31 BAILEY:
Yeah.
12 AUFDENKAMPE:
Paul, is that what you are 13 looking for?
14 RUSHTON:
Yes.
I was looking for a i
15 good story that, you know, we could use to explain 16 how this error had been made and not make us all i
17 look like a bunch of dummies, but sounds like we 18 were a bunch of dummies.
19 AUFDENKAMPE:
That is my perspective (chuckling).
20 RUSHTON:
We did the best we could at 21 the time and we went so fast through everything that 22 we didn't have adequate checks and balances to make 4
4 23 sure that every single piece of data was absolutely 24 correct and now that we have been through the IIT 25 investigation and done a whole lot more i
I
i' 1
1.
i 16
)
1 documentati'on, probably with further review and i
i 2
study we found that we were in error, you know.
3 And that's the best story we got to go a
4 with.
l 5
BAILEY:
You know, based on that it i
6 seemed to me like that we ought not to send in this 7
dann LER or revised LER until the IIT report.
3 Otherwise we may have a dann conflict in there, [in the 9
revised LER).
I 10 AUFDENKAMPE:
Well, I would only make the l
11 warning -- and throw it up to you guys.
We felt i
12 compelled down here as soon as we identified the 13 problem to correct it as expeditiously as possible.
1 1
14 BAILEY:
And I agree with that, but I am i
[
15 saying now that that report may be coming out next i
16 week or today that we give them (inaudible).
4 t
f 17 AUFDENKAMPE:
Well, anyway.
18 BAILEY:
We still are confused about J
1
)
19 these numbers, i
t 20 AUFDENKAMPE:
I understand.
I 21 RUSHTON:
I think that, you know, l
a i
22 Hairston feels that we have -- he's gone on the i
record attesting to the information in the LER and j
i 23 24 now we come back and say it's wrong.
25 And based on past precedent, I think he's going to
~
.1 4
17 l
1 probably either document it in the cover letter on 2
the LER or somewhere in the record why it was wrong 3
and what corrective action we have taken to make l
4 sure we don't report wrong information in the l
l 5
future.
6 AUFDENKAMPE:
Ckay.
Let me, I will tell you 7
what, Paul, let me bring that up with Tom Greene.
8 Now, I will tell you what, generally the i.'R 9
information is verified by my people, okay, up to a 10 point.
11 BAILEY:
Yes.
i 12 AUFDENKAMPE:
We can't verify everything, 13 but generally it is verified by my people.
Now, my 14 people started with the original April 9th letter as 15 their bases.
16 RUSHTON:
Yes.
17 AUFDENKAMPE:
Now, I don't think -- I 18 think -- I am not trying to dump this back in your 19 lap, Jim.
I just really don't recall.
I think you 20 guys generated the April 9th letter up there.
21 BAILEY:
We did.
22 AUFDENKAMPE:
We may have verified this 23 stuff on the April 9th letter.
I do not know 24 whether I did that on-site or how we did the l
25 verification of that information.
l l
l
5 4
i 18 1
MR. RUSHTON:
The PRB reviewed it.
2 AUFDENKAMPE:
Yes, the PRB reviewed it, 3
but they won't always go back and verify that kind i
4 of -- huh?
The April 9th letter.
)
i 5
MOSBAUGH:
I'm not sure we PRBed that --
i 6
It was sent before.
)
7 AUFDENKAMPE:
The PRB did after it went 8
out.
l 9
BAILEY:
Well, the PRB had it piir.: to 10 that time.
We made some revisions.
i 11 AUFDENKAMPE:
I am getting a vicious i
j 12 shaking of a "no" by a head here, who will remain I
i l
13 nameless.
14 But anyway regardless, regardless.
I 15 don't know who did verification of that and I i
l 16 suspect that the majority of that verification was i
f 17 done through hearsay (inaudible).
i j
18 MR. RUSHTON:
Probably was.
l 19 AUFDENKAMPE:
And that's where we erred.
20 If you want to point out where we erred on that, l
21 that's where we erred and -- as far as written l
22 communications.
4 23 And George probably erred in his f
24 presentation because a lot of that presentation was 25 made on hearsay because of the time frame involved i
i 19 1
in putting the presentation together.
2 So, if Mr. Hairston wants to do something 3
different, we certainly can, but all we can do is j
4 say that we will verify everything before we send it 5
out and I will personally do that and it will -- I i
6 don't mean this in a threatening nature at all.
7 just takes longer sometimes.
Sometimes we won't be 8
able to make the dates that we want to meet.
9 BAILEY:
I agree with you.
10 RUSHTON:
All right.
11 AUFDENKAMPE:
Do you guys feel better now 12 that you understand the whole story?
13 BAILEY:
(Laughter.)
14 RUSHTON:
Yeah.
Yeah.
I am a little 15 better equipped now.
16 AUFDENKAMPE:
Paul --
17 RUSHTON:
Yeah.
18 AUFDENKAMPE:
-- this is my recollection 19 and Allen's recollection of how things went.
We are 20 about to go to the PRB.
I will recount this 21 conversation and concerns that you guys have to the 22 PRB and specifically Tom Greene to see if he wants 23 to do anything else.
24 RUSHTON:
Well, the other one is on the 25
-- you have got two of them going down there.
24
- (LINES 1 - 6 DELETED) 1 5
(APPROXIMATELY 70% THROUGH SIDE A) 6 7
MOSBAUGH:
I'm a little confused.
I am getting these confusing 8
calls today.
Rushton and Bailey and people.
Why 9
did you c311 me for Tom iten Tom has right here?
10 HORTON:
Because he was talking to Lee (inaudible).
MOSBAUGH:
Why, I am trying figure out (inaudible).
i 11 HORTON:
Because he asked me what the 12 basis was for changing the number in the LER we sent 13 in from something to something.
14 MOSBAUGH:
Uh-huh.
15 HORTON:
And I told him I couldn't 16 remember, but I felt for sure you would, because I 17 thought you had been heavily involved in that -.
18 MOSBAUGH:
Uh-huh.
19 HORTON:
-- and would probably remember 20 what the reasoning was because we had a real 21 specific definition from what I remember of when we 22 declared the testing run start and --
23 MOSBAUGH:
We only -- we only developed 24 that after there was a discrepancy.
25 HORTON:
Yes, after.
o 25 1
1
'MOSBAUGH:
During that PRB meeting, 2
that's right.
We discussed when that was going to j
3 be and everybody agreed that it was going to be at a 4
certain point and then we submitted the revision.
5 I don't know what corporate'is up to.
I i
j 6
Rushton keeps calling me and wanting to talk about 7
this thing and explain why the initial information 8
was incorrect.
I keep telling him I got no idea why 9
initial information was incorrect.
It came from i
10 George (laughter).
l 11 MOSBAUGH:
It came from George and Jimmy 4
l 12 Paul Cash is where it came from.
George made a s
i 13 verbal presentation up there and then what happened l
14 was NSAC [ Nuclear Safety And Compliance Dept. under Odom, Aufdenkampe, and Mosbaugh) took that information and said j
well --
1 15 HORTON:
And wrote it up.
16 MOSBAUGH:
-- that was on that date and 4
17 since that date we had three or more starts.
So 18 effective this date, it's this.
Okay.
That's what 19 NSAC did.
If the initial information was wrong, 20 obviously what NSAC did was wrong.
You know, that's i
21 how the problem got started.
22 HORTON:
I didn't mean to drag you into 4
23 this.
I figured you would remember it all.
t' 24 MOSBAUGH:
Yeah.
I don't know.
I am not l
25 sure.
Their search for the guilty or something.
l
4 i
r i
26 e
1 HORTON:
That's definitely what it sounds j
2 like they are up to and as long as they know all j
3 that, they just need to give us the --
l 4
MOSBAUGH:
I told them, I said, "you are 4
4 5
going to have to talk to George (Bockhold).
And you l
6 are going to have to talk to whoever developed this 4
^
7 information for George so as to explain why it's e
j 8
incorrect."
i j
9 HORTON:
So they are comparing the l
10 George's presentation to a (inaudible) LER?
j 11 MOSBAUGH:
No.
All -- they probably 12 ought to.
(Laughter.)
You know, I mean, we will not i
4 13 be the only ones making that comparison.
But no, i
14 they are mainly seem to be wanting to just talk l
15 about the LER because it's up there for revision, i
16 so.
Okay.
I 17 MALE SPEAKER:
All right.
1 1
18 19 i
20 i
l 21 i
1.
22 23 j
24 25 i
4
AL 9
a UNITED STATES 8
S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Eg WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006H001 January 20, 1995 My MEMORANDUM T0:
The Chairman Commissioner Rogers Commissioner de Planque Ivan Selin FROM:
James M. Taylor Executive Direc r for 0 erations
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED RESOL ION OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT) (EA 93-304 AND EA 94-037)
To notify the Commission of the results of settlement discussions initiated by counsel for Georgia Power Company (GPC or Licensee) ang the staff's intent to accept the Licensee's proposal to resolve this matter Pursuant to the May 5, 1994, Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-94-075, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $200,000 was issued to GPC on May 9, 1994. The Notice described Currently there is an ongoing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) proceeding considering an operating license amendment to the transfer operating authority from GPC to Southern Nuclear. The information underlying this proposed enforcement action has been found by the ASLB to be relevant to issues being litigated in that proceeding. This notification to the Commission on the staff's intent to resolve this enforcement action is permissible under the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 2.781(b)(2)(i). This provision of the Commission's regulations implements the Administrative Procedure Act exception to the separation of functions doctrine for " members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. 554(d)(C). The communication being undertaken here, where a related proceeding is pending, is permissible within this " agency-head" exception. Courts have declined to find that an agency acted improperly when, for example, the agency head reviewed information ex parte in determining whether to authorize a pesticide cancellation proceeding when a related suspension proceeding was already pending, Environmental Defense fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1304-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975); when the agency initiated administrative proceedings to determine sanctions for. conduct that was the subject of a lawsuit brought by the agency and in which the agency rejected settlement offers by the defendant, Blinder, Robinson & Co. v.
SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104-07 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988).
Contact:
Joseph Gray, OE RQIE: ENFORCEMENT-RELATED; LIMITED 504-2741 TO NRC UNLESS THE COMMISSION Jack Goldberg, OGC DETERMINES OTHERWISE 415-1681 Roy Zimmerman, NRR 504-2969
)
)
Information in this re~ cord was deleted e
in accordance with the F tedom of Information
/
'7 4
Act, exem
/
SIG/e6EOHZ If'
~ -W F014
c d
6 0
t UNITED STATES b
j j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
t WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-0001
/
% * * * *
- p'
[ bdU January 20, 1995
'5 MEMORANDUM T0:
The Chairman Commissioner Rogers
/f/ MN#y - [k Commissioner de Planque M/2 FROM:
James M. Taylor Executive Direc r for 0 erations
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED RESOL ION OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT) (EA 93-304 AND EA 94-037) 5 To notify the Commission of the results of settlement discussions initiated by counsel for Georgia Power Company (GPC or Licensee) anp the staff's intent to accept the Licensee's proposal to resolve this matter.
Pursuant to the May 5, 1994, Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-94-075, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) in the amount of $200,000 was issued to GPC on May 9, 1994. The Notice described Currently there is an ongoing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) proceeding considering an operating license amendment to the transfer operating authority from GPC to Southern Nuclear. The information underlying this proposed enforcement action has been found by the ASLB to be relevant to issues being litigated in that proceeding. This notification to the Commission on the staff's intent to resolve this enforcement action is permissible under the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 2.781(b)(2)(1). This provision of the Commission's regulations implements the Administrative Procedure Act exception to the separation of functions doctrine for " members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. 554(d)(C). The communication being undertaken here, where a related proceeding is pending, is permissible within this " agency-head" exception.
Courts have declined to find that an agency acted improperly when, for example, the agency head reviewed information ex parte in determining whether to authorize a pesticide cancellation proceeding when a related suspension proceeding was already pending, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1304-06 (D.C. Cir. 1975); when the agency initiated administrative proceedings to determine sanctions for conduct that was the subject of a lawsuit brought by the agency and in which the agency rejected settlement offers by the defendant, Blinder, Robinson & Co. v.
SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104-07 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988).
Contact:
Joseph Gray, OE N_QIf: ENFORCEMENT-RELATED; LIMITED 504-2741 TO NRC UNLESS THE COMMISSION Jack Goldberg, OGC DETERMINES OTHERWISE 415-1681 Roy Zimmerman, NRR 504-2969 Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information
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L Georgia Power i
C. K. McCoy Vice Presiden: Nuclear Vogue Propect tm Southern erectnc sister l
d July 31,1994 l
i Mr. James Lieberman Director, Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:
NRC Demand for Information regarding George Bockhold, Jr.;
Docket Nos. 50-425/50-425; License Nos. NPF-68/NPF-81; EA 94-037 I
Dear Mr. Lieberman:
i This letter is written in response to the Demand for Information signed by Mr.
James L. Milhoan on May 9,1994 regarding George Bockhold, Jr. The Demand for Information requests further information to determine reasonable assurance that the Georgia Power Company ("GPC"), with the involvement of Mr. Bockhold, will provide complete and accurate information to the NRC and otherwise conduct activities in accordance with Commission requirements and why the Commission should'not issue an order removing, or restricting the participation of Mr. Bockhold in NRC licensed activities.l' During the relevant time period Mr. Bockhold was general manager of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. In that capacity he was responsible for the operation of plant Vogtle. In the wake of the March 20,1990 Site Area Emergency (SAE), the NRC sent two successive inspection teams to the Vogtle site to investigate the event. Company personnel, as well as the NRC began to focus on the numerous issues that had to be addressed in investigating the event, including: truck and vehicular access to the switch yard; off-site emergency notification; personnel accountability during emergency events; communication difficulties between the plant site and corporate offices; loss of core cooling capabilities during the loss of off-site power due to reduced water inventories as a result of plant outage activities, and diesel generator performance during the events.
l' References to exhibits contained throughout this response to the Demand for Information shall follow the exhibit numbering system used in the December 17,1993, Office of Investigation's Report No. 2-90-020R, unless otherwise indicated.
'/
Information in this record was deleted
/
j in accordance with the F edom of !atormation
/y Act, exemptions M
N k
J6 f9
l Georgia Power A
.s l
Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994 Pace 2 Immediately after the SAE, GPC's first priority was to place the plant into a safe condition. Management, as is appropriate and typical in such eventr., sought to get the plant back on track, into a " normal" configuration so that atypical activities and conditions are minimized. 'Ihis forward-looking approach is important from a safety perspective; leaving the plant in an off-normal configuration for an extended period of time is neither desirable i
nor safe. Once the safety of the plant is assured, established, prudent operational practice is j
to plan the " recovery" of the plant in accordance with an approved schedule of activities. In addition to these activities, the general manager as well as the staff at the Vogtle site, interfaced with and responded m the two NRC investigation teams. Mr. Bockhold was responsible for returning the Plant to a normal state as well as addressing all of the issues associated with the SAE. As the responsible individual, Mr. Bockhold relied upon his. staff to complete the many activities associated with recovery of the plant, responding to the questions of the event review teams, determine the cause of the event, as well as assemble l
I information for presentation to the NRC on April 9,1990.
The numerous Incident Inspection Team ("IIT") transcripts which recorded I
contemporaneous conversations between Mr. Bockhold and members of the NRC inspection teams are replete with examples of how Mr. Bockhold handled these activities. The transcripts show the existence and use of multiple lines of communication between GPC and NRC personnel for the dissemination and development of information. Unquestionably there were voluminous amounts of complete and accurate information delivered to NRC personnel which facilitated the NRC's involvement in investigating the SAE and the special testing conducted on the DG's.
A few examples which illustrate this interaction, as well as the dissemination of -
F information between Mr. Bockhold, GPC personnel and NRC personnel are as follows:
l On March 26,1990, the fully formed IIT was briefed by the Plant Vogtle staff.
Specific plant personnel were assigned to interface with and provide information to IIT members. With respect to DG issues, Mr. Bockhold assigned Allen Mosbaugh and Mike-Horton to the desel/ electrical issues. Paul Kochery was designated GPC's " point of contact" with respect to the DGs. (IIT #16-1, p.1-13).
F Exhibit 113 which was delivered to the NRC October 7,1993 contains numerous examples which illustrate this point.
700775
I Georgia Power d l
s.,
Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994 Page 3 On March 28,1990, Mr. Bockhold, with the help of Paul Kochery, indonned die IIT that three lube oil pressure sensors had been' changed out on the IB DG which lead GPC to look at lube oil pressure and jacket water pressurr sensors on the 1 A DG. (This disenssion initiated by GPC focused on the commonality issue between the dos and-StishDL). (IIT
- 145, p. 71).
On Apnl.2r 1990, Mr. Bockhold di=* with theIIT his aalaian that,the, plant hap problems with the Caloon sensors during initial start-up phases of the diesels.and during overhaul times, but not in between overhaul periods. (April 12,1990-IIT #168-2, p.14,18; April 4,1990-IIT #168-1, p. 60; April 3,1990-IIT #257, p. 50).
Mr. Bockhold discussed aspects of diesel testing and instructed GPC individuals to i
notify Rick Kendall immediately if anything unexpected occur, with the DGs. (Exhibit 113, pp. 240-241.)
l It is within the above framework of information and activity that Mr. Bockhold l
prepared for the April 9 presentation and the many tasks and demands on his' time should be-l considered.,When his actions are viewed in context of all the activity surrounding the SAE l
and the days thereafter, it becomes abundantly evident that his actions and statements were justified and reasonable at the time.
l In accordance with the requested Demand for Information, the following information, in writing and under oath, is provided:
l l
A.
A description of Mr. Bockhold's current position and responsibilities.
Mr. Bockhold is currently employed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
(" Southern Nuclear") as General Manager, NuclearsTechnical Serviens. His responsibilities include corporate support for work control reengineering associated with Plants Farley, Hatch and Vogtle, advanced reactor activities and other special projects.
B.
An explanation of why, notwithstanding his knowledge of the NRC's interest in DG reliability and the imponance of information on this issue to an NRC decision on 700775
_ _ _. ~. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _..
Georgia Power d
.m l
Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994
)
Pace 4 i
i 1
restart, Mr. Bockhold failed to take sufficient steps to ensure that l
information presented to the NRC in the April 9,1990 l
presentation ud letter regarding DG reliability was accurate and complete.
j
% caped:7 71990, Mr. hakkeld hasw GPC had been requemed1e-make e proscalation te ths NRC-en Mondoy,. April 9,1990 in support of GPC's request to restart j
Unit I and that he needed to address issues raised by the NRC as well as lessons learned by GPC from tne SAE event. DGs were one of many important issues raised by the NRC.
i l
Others were just as important: access control; mid-loop configuration and outage planning; i
ENN functions; emergency director actions; and accountability of personnel. While Mr.
j Bockhold was aware of the general aspects of tne issues he was not, and could not be, i
expected to be knowledgeable of the details of all the issues. As a result, as any high level i
manager would do, he relied upon his staff to provide him with the necessary information he l
needed to psepare for the presentation.
l Mr. Bockhold anticipated questions on operability of the DGs and discussions of the calcon sensors since the root cause of the SAE was still not conclusively known. Jamas.
i intaviad that with respect to the DGs, the presentation would preserCE aview of the-l comp =ha==ive, testing of the DGs and demonstrate that "... {w)e urA the best industry j
practices to declare this diesel operative...." (Exhibit 12, page 7) l On the weekend prior to April 9,1990 Mr. Bockhold directed the preparation of i
transparencies to be used during the presentation including a transparency entitled " Diesel.
l Testing." (Exhibit 7). The sequence of activity in relation to the special testing of the DGs was generally known to Mr. Bockhold but it was neosasary tomsy on individuals isome oggh3 coring (Ken Burr) and oped"w (Jimmy Paul Cash) in order to obtain specific detailed i
.information. The details regarding the,DG testing and start count was not data which Mr.
Mhal6 with the overall ra,caaaethility.for.the piarit (including the event recovery, day to j
i day oversight and IIT interface) vMuld be peaannhlyrv,-tad to possess. As a result, Mr.
Bockhold requested Jimmy Paul Cash to compile the number of successful starts of the DGs for inclusion on the transparency. (Exhibit 9, page 7).
When Mr: nar*hahi assigned. the task,to,Mr. Cashhe knew Mr Cash was a member j
g(.$m: Event Critique'TeamWwell as a degreed Sito maw" ; ^^- ' ^
4d
,ha $% fi^JZ1heinformationgpur. %aisomyes awass that,the sontrol room e i
.nossek! betited to obtain this kind of data.and that, selecting someone.from qperatiogs 700775 4
l'
}*
Georgia' Power A m
Mr. James Lieberman l
i l
July 31,1994
{
Pane 5 l
I i
i eeemed lagical. A review of the transcripts anC evidence available in this matter establish j
j that Mr. Cash understood the assignment and did not need much supervision in the narrow task assigned him. Mr. Cash understood that he was to review the logbooks and determine how many starts had occurred without significant problems. (Exhibit 9, page 3). Est i
<underseood that Mr. Bockhold wanted the kind of starts wkhout*signi8 east problems, i.e.,
wEthidiesel staithig pioperty and henched We' required vahage and hequency.";He j
inhequeted.*signincent psoblems" to be anything which would have prevented the diesel from
)
operating in an emerEcocy. Mr. Bockhold had the same understanding. However, this did, not mean that Mr. Bockhold did not want to be informed of the evidane of any problems or failures. (GPC response to NRC First Set of Interrogatories, Response 7a and b, August 9, 1993).
After Mr. Cash obtained this information and presented it, Mr. Bockhold did not know of any starts tha. had significant problems. (Exhibit 9, pp.15-16). Mr. Cash recalled explaining to Mr. Bockhold that the logs which were available to him to obtain the wa-y information were not the engineering logs from
... the engineer who kept up with the start count...." (Exhibit 10, p. 43). Mr. Cash was also aware that the information he obtained was to be used for the presentation to the NRC. (Exiiibit 10, pp.17-18).1 He realized that the transparency was intended "to describe the test program we went through, the trouble shooting process that we went through in addressing the problems that we had seen on March 20." (Exhibit 10, p. 46, 67-68). Cash was not confused with his assignment.
(Exhibit 10, page 88). He was able to identify some of the verbiage on the transparency but j
not all. (Exhibit 10, page 39). He knew his numbers would be used on the transparency.
(Exhibit 10, p. 26). The numbers on the transparency below the line were given to Mr.
Bockhcid by Mr. Cash. (Exhibit V, p. 9 and 10). He prepared a handwritten list of DG starts. (Exhibit 10, p. 26, 27).
After the presentation Mr. Cash spoke to Mr. Bockhold and told him that the starts i
referred to during the presentation were not valid test starts. Mr. Bockhold replied that j
everybody understood this fact. (Exhibit 10, p. 51). This conversation is consistent with the
)
direction given to Mr. Cash and indicates that Mr. Cash understood the assignment. There
. was no indicadon to Mr. Bockhold that " problems" were contained within the " successful.
starts" or that the count started prior to sensor calibration, GPC is of the opinion that the exhibits to Mr. Cash's June 24,1993 OI interview are the typed version of the hand written lists of DG starts which he developed in support of the transparency used for the April 9,1990 presentation. (GPC response to NRC First l
i 700775
i Georgia Power d 4
a Mr. James Lieberman i
July 31,1994 Page 6
/
Interrogatories dated June 16,1993, question 9 and 10). SpeidasestimmedanismGesh l
i
'vad - ~j i_2 C DGipeolaim j
Fe assisted with the formatting of the transparency and supplied the l
start count numbers (Exhibit 10, p. 26) and the secretary who Mr. Cash assisted in j
formatting the transparency recalled Mr. Cash's modifications of the actual start numbers on the transparency. Based on this information, GPC has concluded that the information presented to Mr. Bockhold by Mr. Cash was both oral and written, i
l Mr. Bockhold intended the presentation to focus on the special testing and the sensors l
of the DGs. The number of successful starts without problems or failures was a small piece
]
of information to be conveyed to the NRC. The import of the presentation was to j
demonstrate that the Vogtle Unit 1 DGs were reliable. Mr. Bockhold in preparing for the presentation relied on his own knowledge and experience as to the events since the SAE and 4
j also on the information gathered by his subordinates. He was not aware of any problems or failures associated with the IB DG which would call into question the reliability of the DG.
j There is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Cash at any time indicated to Mr. Bockhold that he i
did not follow nor understand the instructions for his assignment and there was no reason for Mr. Bockhold to question Mr. Cash on the information he' presented. Accordingly,edesse i
ggglannydamsweents and es sedans of Mob 144HKansantelapsdarAssuttheteurinfonession Wes%._ _. i %
e psessandshtressen*WWApstl 95emer.gogrpggeousate No fair basis exists for t conclusion that Mr. Bockhold either knew or should have know of the errar in judgment l
Mr. Cash in including starts with problems in his count.
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5 C.
An explanation of why, notwithstanding his lack
)
of a sound basis for agreeing that the term CTP was adequate to
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convey what he intended (i.e., that the DG start count being used as the basis for the April 19,1990 LER began after testing l
of the control systems that did not require diesel starts),
j Mr. Bockhold allowed this language to be included in the April 19,1990 LER.
/
1 e
i A review of the numerous transcripts and available evidence relevant to this issue i
establishes that Mr. Bockhold always believed that the use of the term " comprehensive test I
program of the control system" referred to a pointggt recalibration of the calcon sensgrs.
There is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Bockleoid ever changed his understanding of this j
phrase and even the transparency used at the April 9 presentation i.as " sensor calibration" i
~y -.
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Georgia Power A i
j.
Mr. James Lieberman j
July 31,1994 Pane 7 l
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appearing prior to the starts. During the period of April 9,1990 and April 19,1990 Mr.
Bockhold was not presented with any information that would alert him to any differences in interpretation of this phrase.
Mr. Bockhold was aware as of April 19,1990 that there had been additional starts of l
the DGs between the period of April 9, through April 19,1990 although the specific number i
was not known. (Exhibit 36, p. 8). Mr. Bockhold had also been informed that Technical j
Support personnel were in the process of reviewing the contro' oom logs to verify the start count number. Qd.) John G. Aufdenkampe, the VEGP Manager - Tacanical Support, informed Mr. Bockhold that his people came up with greater than 20 starts by using the l
nundwas from the April 9 letter and adding the number of starts that occurred between April 9 and April 19, 1990. This information confirmed in Mr. Bockhold's mind that there were j
at least 18 starts after the comorehensive test ornoram of the enatrol sy=tama of hath ansiarc.
i 1
The April 19,1990 conversation between John Aufdenkampe, William S. Shipman, j
the General Manager - Nuclear Support and Allen L. Mosbaugh, the acting VEGP Assistant j
General Manager - Plant Support clearly indicate that Mr. Bockhold had previously discussed -
his understanding of the phrase " comprehensive test program of the control systems of both l
engines" with Mr. Aufdenkampe and Mr. Shipman. They relayed to Mr. Mosbaugh their conversation with Mr. Bockhold and his belief that the starts occurred after the calibration of all the sensors The conversation included _an explanation of the logic behind Mr. Bockhold's i
rationale (Exhibit 36, p. 20), i.e., after all the bugs were worked out there were a numixr of DG starts and the DGs work fine. (Exhibit 36, p. 25). The recorded conversations in Exhibit 36 indicate that Mr. Bockhold was not given any information which would have brought to j
his attention thag others had a different understanding of the terminology that he used or that the information he based his statements on was erroneous.
i The April 19 tape recordings reflected Mr. Bockhold's reliance on his managers and support staff to obtain accurate information. It is reasonable for Mr. Bockhold to believe that his managers or support staff would have notified him had they determined that he relied upon inaccurate information or that any terminology used by him was subject to multiple connotations. In reference to the phrase "CFP", Mr. Bockhold always believed that the -
comprehensive test program meant after the IB recalibration of the sensors and logic te. ting.
.For the 1B.DG these activities correspond to dates of March 26 and March,27 with his understandias being consistent with that of the transparency.
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i GeorgiaPower A i
f Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994 j
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The managers at both the pisInt and corporate were aware of the connotation attributest to the phrase e:7- "-dvc test program of the control systems by Mr.1lockhold and even j
, though they a====ad the possibility of various connotations being attributable to thef there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Bockhold was made aware df thess~ discussions. He i
continued to believe that Mr. Cash's numbers were correct and that those numbers l
represented the starts after recalibration of the sensors. While Exhibit 36 established that a j
review of the logs was being conducted to verify the start counts, thereits no indloation that '
Mrr Bockhold was informed of the results of the review or that there was a discrepancy with the start count information he relied upon as the basis for his statementt Mr. Bockhold, as general manager of the plant continued to focus on the operation of the plant. Mr. Bockhold relied on his subordinates to determine the accuracy of the LER; i
reliance which was reasonable and justified. The managers' conversations reflected that possibly the phrase regarding the test program was subject to various connotations and also i
began to question the accuracy of the start count. Mr. Bockhold was not informed of the j
difficulty the managers were having in resolving these issues. Since MrcBockholdwas not j
aware of any information to the contrary, it is reasonable for him to assume that the phrase he'has referred to is bot accurate and understood to have the same meaning by everyone.
l There is no evidence to conclude that Mr. Bockhold lacked a sound basis for agreeing to use i
the term "CTP" nor is there any evidence to conclude'that he'should liave recognized the i
inadequacy'of the term based on ambiguity or vagueness.
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D.
An explanation of why, notwithstanding his l
knowledge that questions had been raised regarding the accuracy of the DG start information and his knowledge of the informal l
means by which the data he was relying on was developed, Mr.
i Bockhold failed to take sufficient steps to ensure that information i
included in the April 19,1990 LER was complete and accurate.
The Demand for Information faults Mr. Bockhold for failing to take sufficient steps to ensure that the information included in the LER was complete and accurate and is based on the assumption that he was aware that questions had been raised regarding the accuracy of the DG start Lformation and that he was aware of the " informal scan by which the data that he was relying tm was developed...." As indicated in the analysis of Violation C, Mr. Bockhou was not presented with any evidence which would call.into. question thel information upon which he relied. There is also no evidence to indicate that the diesel start 700775
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j Gecrgia Power d I
Mr. James Lieberman July ll,1994 i
Page 9 l
information had been gathered by informal means or that Mr. Bockhold was aware that information had been gathered in an informal means. To the contrary, the evidence i
i establishes an extensive and detailed effort by Mr. Cash to obtain the information that was l
requested of him. Mr. Cash reviewed the log book page by page. (Exhibit 36, p.35). W igstadmitigshe.fo!qttiggggtemposency and:suppund thoggouettsggbgs.
h(Exhibit 10, p. 26). He developed a handwritten list of starts which he used in s 1
the transparency used on April 9,1990. (Exhibit 9, p.5; Exhibit 10, p. 21). GPC believes I
Mr. Cash had been provided a draft of the transparency around the time he reviewed the logs. He was aware the transparency and his data would be used for the presenta' tion to the NRC and was related to the confirmation of action letter. (Exhibit 9, p. 5). Mr. Cash understood that Mr. Bockhold wanted a count of starts without "significant problems, where the diesel had started properly and reached the required voltage and frequency." Mr. Cash interpreted "significant problems" to be anything which would have prevented the diesel from i
operating in an emergency. (GPC response to NRC Staff's First Set of Interrogatories, Response 7a and b, August 9,1993.)
i
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'Ihe number of successful diesel starts was not known to Mr. Backhoki when hs,
9 requested Mr. Cash to obtain the informatkn. He was aware of % mneral testing activities, I
and was briefed on the status contemporaneous with "e events tw there had been i
I lot of starts, but not how many. As a regylh he ass Mr.CP fineqnpry i
task: compde the number of sucesisful starts of'the dM for inemm os a dMt C@ ash was a SRO licensed unit superintendent; had been a memb
{
,cy/Mr. Bockhold, at the time, was awara of the following about P. Cash: M had previously assembled information for the IIT (Tape 19, p. 23); and was on the full management team at the plant on the weekend of April 7 and 8,1990.
The information developed by Mr. Cash was developed from the best available l
documents and it was reasonable for Mr. Bockhold to rely on Mr. Cash and the work he
/
produccxi. This is especially true since there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Cash ever l
voiced a concern or any questions regarding either his task or the information he obtained.
1 In fact the transcripts of Mr. Cash's interviews clearly establish that he knew why he was gathering the information, the use of the information and the message to be conveyed. At the 1
i conclusion of the presentation on April 9,1990, Mr. Cash commented to Mr. Bockhold that j
the starts were not valid successful starts. This conversation confirmed Mr. Cash's j
understanding of the narrow task assigned to him.
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Georgia Power b 4
Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994 Pace 10 The above information was known to Mr. Bockhold during the conversations on April 19,1990 regarding the wording of the LER. In considering the start count number to be used in the LER, Mr. Bockhold was aware of additional starts of the DGs during the period between April 9 and April 19. He had been informed there was,an ongoing review of the logp Itwas justified and ranaaaahia for Mr. Bockhold,~as general managerreo assume that if an error or discrepancy ~had in fact been found, he would have been notified. The d.C.se mdicates that Mr. Bockhold was not informed of any conflict or ambiguity regardmg the data which he based his statements.
In hindsight, and notwithstanding all this evidence, GPC contends that on April 19, Mr. Bockhold likely should have followed up on the tasking of Mr. Mosbaugh and-Mr.' Aufdenkampe to complete their verification of DG start counts. The mere fact that' members of his staff had to ask Mr. Bockhold about the DG start count information indicates that maybe they were not carrying out their duties to verify the count information. On May 8,1990, Mr. Bockhold articulated his recognition of his own weakness and discussed his own natural communications style including shortcomings associated with his management style.
Specifically, Mr. Bockhold realized that while he believes ~he considers all aspects of a problem, he does make decisions quickly and is sometimes too forceful in his communications. Mr. Bockhold realized that he must allow time for all aspects of a problem to be aired and to make sure that those wla work for him feel that they have an opportunity to fully express their opinions. His forceful communications style may have contributed to his staff not performing an appropriate DG verification count on April 19, 1990. This is a lesson learned by Mr. Bockhold as is evidenced by his work over the past several years in which he has learned not to make decisions so quickly and realizes that all aspects of an issue must be considered prior to making a final decision.
E.
. n explanation of why, notwithstanding his review of the June 29,1990 letter, which stated that it would clarify the April 9,1990 letter, Mr. Bockhold failed to ensure that the June 29,1990 cover letter clarified the April 9,1990 letter.
GPC contends that the June 29 cover letter did clarify the April 9 letter and its
, position is set forth in the response to the NOV. In addition, the following information is supplied. On April 30,1990, Mr. Mosbaugh gave Mr. Bockhold a listing of IB DG starts, which, when confirmed on May 2,1990, showed that the start count reported in the April 9 presentation, the April 9 CAL response, and the April 19 LER were incorrect. When mm
Georgia Power d Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994 Pane 11 Bockhold was initially presented with the conflicting data, he requested Mr. Mosbaugh to obtain the correct information and prepare the appropriate documentation to be sent to the NRC and correct the previously filed document i
WWas@ gut to
'4diRegggygdyguramagegemKh (Exhibit 5, p.195.)
After being informed that the April 19 DG start counts was in error, W.G. Hairston, I:I, the Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations informed the Regional Administrator that a revision to the April 19 LER would be submitted, in part, to correct the DG start count.
1 After being provided conflicting data for the second time, Mr. Hairston again notified the Regional Administrator and requested that an audit be conducted by GPC's Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) group to verify the correct start count numbers for the LER revision.
The finalization of the LER by the Plant Review Board awaited the SAER and its results. Mr. Bockhold believed that although he was still responsible for any information that was sent to the NRC, the revision, as it applied to the start count, would be based on the SAER audit. Mr. Bockhold recalls informing Georgie R. Frederick, the Supervisor - SAER that Mr. Cash went to the control room logs for his information for the April 9 data which was included in the LER.
l When Mr. Lockhold reviewed the cover letter, he did so for major mistakes. He dkl not know what type of personnel error was in Mr. Cash's performance of the start count and viewed the SAER audit as logical, reasonable and consistent with his personal knowledge.
1 He believed that the cover letter and the revised LER clarified and provided additional information concerning significant safety items associated with diesel operability / reliability (a purpose of the April 9,1990 letter) and identified additional start failures associated with the IB DG including referencing the Technical Specification Special Report 1-90-4. 90e.d i
Boc'3old believed that the cover letter corrected the information previouslydachulad<in the j
LER+which.was the same information included in the April 9,1990 lettermi abat a correctign j
of*the LER acted as a correction of the April 9.lettq, 1
l F.
An explanation of why, notwithstanding his knowledge that the Unit Superintendent was not confused about the distinction between successful starts and valid tests when the Unit Superintendent collected start data for the April 9,1990 wn
4 GeorgiaPower d Mr. James Lieberman l
July 31,1994 Page 12 1
presentation and letter, Mr. Bockhold allowed the information to be included in the August 30,1990 letter as one of the reasons for the err." in the April 9,1990 'ctier.
GPC does not believe that the August 30,1990 letter to the NRC was incomplete or inaccurate in a material respect, as reflected in GPC's response to the May 9,1994 Notice of Violation (EA93-304) related to this matter. GPC's response explained the August 30,1990 letter fulfilled the communication purpose for which it was intended. The language of the August 30 letter is misquoted in the Notice of Violation and cannot reasonably be construed as identifying one of the causes of the error in the April 9 letter as Unit Superintendent confusion.
The August 30 letter did not state what the error of the April 9 letter was, bot rather what the " confusion" was about the April 9 letter and the LBR. Mr. Bockhold in the Plant Review Board purposefully changed the wording in the letter from " errors" to " confusion" because the import of the letter was to explain the historic context of the letter. The tape transcript of the August 29,1990 Plant Review Board Meeting as well as a literd reading of the letter substarciate the fact that the letter was accurate to the then current knowledge Mr. Bockhold did not believe that the Unit Superintendent was confused when he performed his count, but rather the confusion arose after NRC and GPC personnel debated the terminology used to describe the starts. This beliefis clearly substantiated by the edited letter where it is stated "our use of the term..." which referenced GPC's connotation and by the modification proposed by Mr. Bockhold to change " errors" to " confusion". (Exhibit 9, pp. 8-9; Exhibit 12, p.11-12; and Exhibit 60, insert p.15 and 20).
G.
An explanation of the corrective actions taken, or planned by the Licensee to address Mr. Bockhold's performance failures.
7W The Senior Vice-President oPGPC and Mr. Bockhold's im supemoor within Southern Nuclear have met with Mr. Bockhold and reviewed his actions and responsibilities which are the subject of this NOV. This review focused on the mistakes made by Mr.
Bockhoki's organizatien and his personal performance failums to assure that in the future all,
GeorgiaPower A Mr. James Lieberman July 31,1994 Pane 13 his responsibilities including delegated responsibilities are carried out without..vbladan of NRO ree"Ws. 'Ihis review ^also included ways to improve his management espabilities.
J l
In addition, in response to prior expressed concerns by the NRC regarding VEGP i
personnel, Mr. Bockhold accepted responsibility for implementing corrective action to l
address the bases of the NRC's perception. O , " '^^^ Mr. Bockhold and Mr. McCoy met'with the managers of the planttnd openly di==neart the NRC's concerns,and Mr4 Bockhold recognized and die"=ad his own. natural communications. style i_ncluding
. shortcomings associated with his management style. Specifically, Mr. Bockhold realized that while he believes he considers all aspects of a problem, he does make decisions quickly and is sometimes too forceful in his communication style. Mr. Bockhold realized that he must allow time for all aspects of a problem to be aired and make sure that people that he l
interfaces with feel that they have an opportunity to fully express their opinions. This is a 1esson learned by Mrc Bockhold as is evidaM by his work over.the past several years where he has learned not to mal decisions so quickly and realizes that all aspects of an issye
,must be considered prior to making a' final decisitm. Finally, Mr. Bockhold continues to make his personnel commitment, to the very best of his ability, to conduct licensed activities in accordance with all NRC requirements.
)l H.
Given the four violations of NRC requirements, an explanation as to why NRC should have confidence that the Licensee, with the involvement of Mr. Bockhold, will in the future conduct licensed activities in accordance with all NRC requirements, including the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9,
" Completeness and accuracy of information."
4 As explained in the preceding and GPC's response to the NOV in 93-304,
,Mr. Bockhold has not acted with careless disregard or indifference to regulatory requirements
,.or otherwise conducted his activities in a manner. to call into question his fitness to engage ip Hoensed~ activities. Mr. Bockhold has committed to work very carefully to provided complete and accurate information to the NRC and therefore the NRC should have confidence in his involvement in future licensed activities.
Mr. Bockhold has been out of theplantiline management for.the past4hsee and one
. half years. The Pie,.
suports received on Mr.;Bockhold's performance over this;penod r
of time have shown an impenvement in dealing with poople as-well as problems. He has been recognized as a highly skilled, technical, competent, and experienced manager. It was 700775
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Mr. James Lieberman j
July 31,1994 Pane 14 t
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i also noted that he has dealt with his prior shortcomings with consensus building and seeking advice from others.
Please feel free to contact me should you desire additional information regarding this j
matter. 'Ihis response to the Demand for Information has been developed after substantial j
inquiry under the supervision of me and other GPC officers. 'Ihe response was reviewed by j
certain individuals familiar with these events for accuracy and completeness. While I do not 3
have personal knowledge of all the facts as stated, I and others have thoroughly reviewed and i
evaluated the information. Rawi on all these efforts, I have high confidence of the response's accuracy. 'Ihe information provided in this response is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am available to provide an clarification, expansion or j
verification which you should require. Mr. C. Ken McCoy states that he is the Vice President-Vogtle Project and is authorized to execute this letter on behalf of Georgia Power j
. Company.
I j
Sincerely, C. Kenneth McCoy Sworn to and subscribxi before i
y of/ula o 1994.
me AL Wswr y {
u y, Georgia.
My Qutumssen Empires Januarv 29. toes
[ NOTARIAL SEAL]
6 Georgia Power A Mr. Jkmes Lieberman July 31,1994 Pace 15 l
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Georgia Power Comnany j
Mr. J. Beasley, Jr.
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Mr. M. Sheibani NORMS 3
i U.S. Nuclear Reenhtnry Comminion j
Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. D.S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. B.R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle 4
Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement i
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1 i
2 d
s 4
M r
700775
_ _ _... ~ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _ _. _ _
Georgia Power Company 40 toverness Center Pcrkwty h'
Post OHes Bos 1293 Birmingham Atacama 3120t Teleonone 203 877 7122 Georgia Pbwe C. K. McCoy Vce Prescent Nuclear Vogne Propc1 the sodhem enectre system August 5, 1994 1
1 l
Mr. James Lieberman Director, Office of Enforcement U. S'.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
NRC Demand ll'or Information regarding C. Kenneth McCoy; j
Docket Nos. 50-424/50-425; License Nos. NPF-68/NPF-81; EA 94-052
Dear Mr. Lieberman:
I am writing this letter in response to Mr. James L.
Milhoan's May 9, 1994 letter to me regarding the Demand for Information.
Mr. Milhoan's letter invited me to submit a response to the Demand for Information separate and apart from that of Georgia Power Company ("GPC").
I have read and agree with the response submitted by GPC and appreciate the opportunity to personally respond to the issues raised in the Demand for Information.
As a general point, I would like you to know that I always strive to ensure that complete and accurate information is provided to the NRC.
We have a common interest in basing our decisions on the very best information available.
A.
My current position and accountability.
As Vice President - Nuclear (Vogtle Project), the same position which I held in 1990 at the time of the March 20, 1990 site Area Emergency ("SAE*), I have a policy of personal accountability for actions, and I communicate it frequently to all employees who report to me. The plants and activities for which I have been responsible over the past 30 years have consistently moved to a level of recognized excellence, including Plant Vogtle.
I accept the responsibility for the action of the Vogtle organization in 1990, as well as today.
I realize that I
mistakes were made in collecting and reporting data, and I accept responsibility for those mistakes.
However, I do not believe that anyone, either intentionally or through careless disregard, Inforraau:n.a this record was deleted
, ff in accordance with thejfr edom of Information l
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I Act, exemptions
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FolA-9<
9'l
-9/G?l?OD??
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Georgia Power 1 j-Mr. Lieberman 1
August 5, 1994 Page 2 i
i submitted incomplete or inaccurate data to the NRC.
That would simply not be tolerated by me or by you.
I I believe that all of the significant information related to i
the SAE was available to and obtained by the NRC in order to l
support the NRC performing its functions in a timely and professional manner.
The NRC rarsonnel at the Vogtle site in l
March of 1990 were aware of the 1B diesel generator problems during overhaul / troubleshooting in the March 22 - 24, 1990 i
l period.
As evidenced by their statements, they did not raise i
them as an issue in connection with the NRC's restart decision.
4
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B.
A description of actions that Mr. McCoy, as a senior i
manager, took to ensure that the Licensee provided the NRC with j
complete and accurate information in each cf the five submittals.
1 In reference to the April 9, 1990 pres entation, the April 9, j
1990 letter and the April 19, 1990 Licensee Event Report ("LER"),
j I believe that I acted in a reasonable manner in an attempt to ensure that the NRC was provided with complete and accurate information.
I relied on staff to present accurate information i
to the NRC in the presentation and the April 9 letter, knowing i
full well the involvement of the NRC in reviewing all facets of i
the SAE.
I reviewed the LER and questioned my staff as to its i
accuracy, in particular, as to the diesel generator start count.
(Office of Investigations Report 2-90-020R, Exhibit 36, pages 8 - 10).
Their responses, which I had no reason to doubt, i
answered my questions.
As to my actions with respect to the June 29, 1990 cover letter and the August 30, 1990 letter, please refer to my responses below.
As to further specifics for each of these events, I refer you also to the GPC's reply to the Notice of Violation in Enforcement Action 93-304 and the Demand for Information response covering me.
Col. An explanation as to the June 29, 1990 cover letter preparation.
The Demand for Information is correct in a general sense.
I became actively involved in the preparation of the June 29, 1990 cover letter for an LER revision.
As I viewed it, this revision was necessary because the " start count" in the April 9' 1990 Confirmation of Action letter, in our meeting notes of April 9, and in the original LER was not clear and accurate.
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l Georgia Power A m
Mr. Lieberman August 5, 1994 Page 3 i
I do not recall all of my specific knowledge at that time.
I do know that the LER revision which was submitted to the NRC was based on the audit performed by the safety Analysis and Engineering Review Group ("SAER").
&~talhad,toethogSEER!aaniger about how&thea audit: was;4ges,. reviewed 4hesaiditEner-an=11y, and looked ~at the stables'to the report' to-confirm %s v.-;
4 revields k "startiopunt# wes.accuratp.
The an g p; tiety given fof the difference in " start counts" made w gging, including the explanations of why there had been differences in start counts over time.
I had confidence in the audit based on my review.
I, personally, knew little about the specific diesel record-keeping practices, other than my general knowledge that logs are kept when you start important equipment, such as the 4
starting and stopping of diesel engines.
To my recollection, I thought we were not clear when we provided the start count 4
)
information.,in.,ths;apuilt4 and April'.19' correspondence, vnicht I usagesesod-to be the same base' data.
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My involvement with the LER revision did not and there.
My contemporaneous notes for June 29, 1990, copies of which I 1
provided to the NRC's Office of Investigation (Office of Investigations Report 2-90-020R, Exhibit 29, page 109), reflect i
the fact that Iacalled.Mr..Een Brookshn'f"my'tustotaryUsestaats in i
"his,Sagion < IL at ;the timef 'and diWebisiped.h gudap9$g gith hiRC
{
,Again, I do not recall the details of my conversation with him, but I am certainith'at T conveyed'wy total"und&tstahding' 6f the-issues at'that' time.
I would add that this is only one of several instances in which I notified the NRC of our difficulty in arriving at a verified, accurate diusel generator " start i
count."
Mr. Brockman apparently also recalls these notifications (Interrogatory Response of Kenneth E. Brockman dated December 23, 1993; Docket Nos. 50-424/425-OLA-3, ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3, pages 5,7 attached).
Please refer, also, to my testimony, Office of Investigations Report 2-90-020R, Exhibit 29, pages 69 - 72, for other instances.
]
With respect to my failure to ensure that the June 29, 1990 letter clarified the April 9, 1990 letter, I refer to GPC's reply to Notice of Violation in Enforcement Action 93-304, Violation D, Example 1.
I honestly thought that a clarification was made because the June 29 letter and LER revision were more precisely defining the time period of the " start counts" and the LER 1
revision was using Regulatory Guide terminology.
More subjective j
phrases like " successful starts" were avoided..Weispect j
substantial time focusing 'on-the:oonfirimatien' and' revision'of an i
accurate, complete-ADA understandable' start count" number for the cover letter and revisiony and'not enough time mn<expremely,
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Georgia Power A Mr. Lieberman j
i August 5, 1994 1
Page 4 i
l esplaining hsm the June 29r1994.soverAetter "cidM" ths, originar April 9,1990 datp.
It was implicit; in hindsight;'ve should have been clearer.
We were calling attention to the April i
9th letter, because it was relevant.
We were clarifying the April 9 letter with a different, more precise approach of qj presenting data.
In both instances (April 9 and June 29), we considered the data supportive of the same true facts:
ti.at th diesel generators were operable and reliable and the probable cause of the 1A diesel generator trips on March 20, 1990 had bee identified.
In hindsight, what was missing on June 29, 1990, va a recognition that the base " start count" data of "19,.dccessful j
starts" for the 1B diesel generator included starts that were no supportive of the message -- presented to the NRC on April 9th -
of operable and reliable diesel generators.
h i
j C.2. An explanation as to the August 30, 1990 Clarification j
Letter.
)
l The Demand for Information is based upon the premise that because of circumstances surrounding the NRC's special i
operational Safety Inspection in August of 1990, I should have undertaken a " root cause" analysis of the performance of the'VEGP J
General Manager and Unit Superintendent in developing the April 9,
1990 diesel generator start data.
For the reasons set forth in GPC's reply to the Notice of Violation', I do not believe that this is a correct premise.
It is true that I committed, during j
l the August 17, 1990 meeting with the special team to provide a j
clarification of the April 9 letter to the NRC.
My recollection is that the special inspections team or teagtleader confirmed the correctness of the revised LER, but suggpsfed a submittal t6 correct or axplain gy diffarent informanon www w ihe. apriA 97 4
lettom.
My contemporaneous notes from the team's August 17, 1990
\\
exit meeting indicates that GPC " offered to supply additional
\\
data, if necessary."
(office of Investigations Report 2-90-020R, j
Exhibit 29, page 141).
This is consistent with the way in which j
I dealt with the NRC throughout this time frame, and the manner i
in which I expected my subordinates to similarly act.
If j
information would be helpful, we would gladly provide that j
information.
The data was in question, not the performance of the General Manager and the Unit Superintendent, because the i
j NRC's special team inspector had reviewed the performance of GDC personnel and had concluded no " intentional errors" were comunitted.
Therefore, as would be expected, start data was the focus of the August 30, 1990 letter.
l I exercised reasonable oversight, I believe, by initiating i
the letter.
My emphasis.was on providing accurate and complete
1 I'
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GeorgiaPower A qm i
Mr. Lieberman l
August 5, 1994 l
Page 5 i
start date.
This was the issue which I believed was important on l
Auryust 30, 1990.
The data was relevant because that data had a bearing on safety.
The data was relevant because it had a direct bearing on the NRC's review of the start data previously provided j
by GPC. The data was relevant as to whether we had reported diesel generator " failures" correctly, which was the other diesel l
generator "open" item of the special team at the time.
We had already, in my mind, acknowledged in June that prior diesel generator statements were not precise in terminology or in the time periods covered by the start count and were incorrect.
An i
analysis of the actions of GPC individuals involved in developing l
the historic statements was not directly related to the need for additional data, which I believed was the issue which had to be j
1 addressed. :I; Delievedithat -
s:=='i--E concerns - had been 5 7
-- by the NRC s"illESTWdFdien l
addressed.amid! resolved ~ al team.
Had I been told, or otherwise known, of an NRC desire for j
a " root cause" examination, it certainly would have been
,IJog'piarce ^ ' TMsR, in late August of 41WTur% giry
.he4 e that j
performed.
Howev 1990k either.lEf Negor GPC 1
into the actions' of'the' Unit Superintendent or the VEGP h neral Manager).
The operative facts were known to both parties as a i
result of the inspection.
While I obviously cannot be sure, my i
impression is that the NRC subsequently, by September of 1990, had been provided the pertinent information which serves as the factual basis for Violation A (pertaining to the April 9, 1990 l
GPC statements) and Violation C (pertaining to the April 19, 1990 LER).
Ity* handwritten notesifor;Septembere393.1999; indicate that Mr.,Arockman alsoiconsidered tha2NRCc24 %a s ?a1L the%reaevept infgr'e'a' ties'and.,eneunderst== % etewhat,ensurred;intApeil/ sit j
.199F"'(Office of Investigations ' Report 2-90-020R, Exhibit 29, page i
106).
Neither of us at that time apparently saw any need for the sort of investigative effort implied by the Demand for Infornation.
D.
An explanation of the corrective actions taken, or planned by the Licensee to address Mr. McCoy's performance failures.
The subject matter of the Notice of Violation has been discussed and reviewed by officers of GPC, including me, with the intent that we learn from our mistakes.
My performance has also been reviewed.
I am not aware of<eny corrective' action planned
,.by,GPC,to address my management performance during the time e dar review.
Moreover,.I4do netsbelieveecorrectivg.
, periods n action.is.warrantap.
Yet, I have learned from this experience
'that effective internal communications are essential to effective external communications with the NRC.
I have, always known this, but the magnitude of adverse impact associr.ted with these
1 Georgia Power A I
Mr. Lieberman August 5, 1994 Page 6 i
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communication weaknesses has been sobering.
Four years of investigative and enforcement review from what might be viewed as minor misstatements could not have been foreseen.
We will be l
better because of the experience, even though I disagree with the selected enforcement actions.
l I have attempted over the yer rs to create an atmosphere that promotes open and complete communication with the NRC and, on an i
objective basis, I have been successful in this endeavor.
I i
trust that cognizant NRC personnel will agree that the performance of Plant Vogtle has improved significantly under my management and leadership.
While this enforcement process has been troubling to me based on my views of my personal performance, I accept the responsibility for our actions.
I Regardless of the outcome, I will continue to make sure that we i
learn from our mistakes.
E.
An explanation as to why NRC should have confidence that the Licensee, with the involvement of Mr. McCoy, in the future will conduct licensed activities in accordance with NRC requirements.
1 I believe that the NRC should have complete confidence that i
GPC, with my involvement, will in the future conduct licensed activities in accordance with all NRC requirements, including the requirement of 10 CFR S 50.9, " Completeness and accuracy of information."
It is and continues to be a foremost policy of GPC 8
f and me personally to provide open, complete and accurate communication to the NRC at all times.
That policy is j
fundamental to the successful operation of Plant Vogtle.
We take i
extra effort to assure that you are as knowledgeable as we are 1
about significant issues.
I have reinforced this policy consistently and diligently since I began my employment with GPC in June of 1988.
For example, I share with the NRC our " plant i
problems" list of significant challenges to our operations.
I i
have periodic meetings with my NRC counterparts at all levels.
I l
frequently pick up the telephone and call my Region II
]
counterpart (Pierce Skinner) about plant problems and visit often 1
with our Resident Inspectors.
A shared common understanding of j
matters important to safety is mutually beneficial to us and to j
the public, i
I have provided communication direction to our employees on many occasions.
In this regard, unknown to me, one of the more significant occasions was captured on a secret tape recording on i
May 8, 1990 (NRC Tape 99, Side A).
I invite you to listen to the recording,,and observe the tone and content of my messages.
j specific to statements about diesel generators, a review of my 1
1
_-._____.____,_.___.____._.~._._._.__.________m.
l GeorgisPower A Mr. Lieberman l
August 5, 1994 i
Page 7 2
l actions will show an on-going effort to be frank with the NRC.
j (See, e.g., Office of Investigations Report 2-90-020R, Exhibit 113, pages 20-21).. I would request that you inquire also of i
knowledgeable NRC representatives about me.
I believe I have i
provided also a positive example to GPC employees by my personal l
actions.
That positive direction has taken hold in a plant i
culture that respects problem identification, open communication, j
teamwork and thorough resolution of problems.
)
l I have always maintained the attitude of being open and
{
l j
frank with employees of GPC as well as with the NRC.
I am i
approachable and responsive to my employees, regardless of their level.
I attempt to explain my decisions and build a sense of
}
commitment to operational safety by example.
Look at vogtle four
{
years ago; then examine Vogtle today.
I deserve the NRC's confidence, as do all the Vogtle employees.
l The foregoing is true and correct based on my knowledge and i
belief.
i Sincerely yours, 1
/
l
?
C. Kenneth McCoy SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME this M day of August, 1994 hun f
O Notary Public My Commission Expires:
2//c/9 C (NOTARIAL SEAL)
Enclosure
j Georgia Power A Mr. Lieberman August 5, 1994 Page 8 i
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i xc:
Mr. H. A. Franklin Mr. W. G. Hairston, III Mr. J. D. Woodard 4
Mr. S. D. Ebneter (USNRC Region II)
Assistant General Counsel of Hearings and Enforcement (USNRC, Washington, D. C.)
i s
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i fd.G-08-1994 09:13 FRG1 NUCLEAPTECHNICALSEPJICES. TO 913015043431 P.02 acuthem Nucier operstmg Company Post Olhoe box ama,e
.u.1295 saos 4,
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Teephone (tos) 677 7437 4
l, Southem Nudear Operating Company oe.,,e e
l 5,1r%m annoumem etr.:re system i
)
- August 5,1994 i
i i
ur. James ti.bennan l
Director, OfEce ofEnforcement l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comminaion Wa=hia**an, D.C. 20555 RE:
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY vogele Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 5642550 425 License Nos. NFF-68/NPF-81 EA94-037 RESPONSE 10 DEMAND FORINFORMATION REGARDING GEORGE BOCKHOLD, JR.
I, George Bockhoki, Jr. file this PW to the Demand for Infonnstion dated May 9,1994. I appreciate the m~rk.siy to address the questions posed. I would respectibEy request that my responses be nnneidered by the Nuclear Pe.idg enmmi mian in d Q that no ibrther action is necessary to restrict my participation in NRC licensed and regulated activities. Portions of my responses are based on information submitted in pending Ecense amandman proceedings reg-dius Plant Vogde (Atomic Safety and licensing Board 93 671-01 0LA-3.)
I have tried to be open and cands! G.@ my career. My experience at the United States Naval Academy has left an indelible conviction the candor and honesty are a way oflife. While I acimowledge that every human is capable of making mistalras, I have tried to conduct my affairs with openness and candor. I believe that the information which I submit to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will h that I did not act with careless disregard or indifference to re'idary requirunauts.
My spedfic responses to Paragraphs A,B,C,D,E,F,G and H are as foHows:
Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Fr edom of Information Act, exemptions f01A-f si W di-405TWM w
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g AUG-08-1994 09:14 FROM tAJCLEARTECHNICALSERVICES. TO 91,915043431 P.03
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7 Mr.Jamesuebennan l
August 5,1994 I
Page2 4
j Paragraph A:
t j
"A descsiption ofMr. George Bc e-M Jr.'s arrent poshion and nsponsibilities."
Basonnen.
l I am hJy employed by Southam Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (Southern Nuclear) as j
General Manager, Nuclear TN Services. My respaaaih=h include corporate support for work j
controi nengineering,==N with Plants Farley, Hatch, and Vogde, advanced reactor activities and j
other special projects. De nungineering r.ag-awh include mqior process improvemmes and i
organiational changes for approximateiy 1200 1,a involved with work activities at these thne plants. Advanced reactor nuponsibilities indule the innplernematian of Southern's Strategic Plan to j
maintain a leadership role for new museer smarution, ir.1 L4 managing and being involved with j
drverse industry interests (ARC, EPRI, Vendor Daign Teams, NEI, INPO and NRC.) I report to Mr.
i Louis B. I. cog, Vice President, Tednical Services, Southern Nuclear.
l Paragraph B:
- 4 j
"An explanation ofwhy, notwithstandag his knowledge of the NRC's imenst in DG reliability and j
the importance afinfbrmation on this issue to an NRC decision on restart, Mr. Mrwehald fhiled to take j
=h steps to ensure that information pramansart to the NRC in the April 9,1990 g:--- ^d,s and j
letter regarding DG i=y was accurate and na-d* "
1 4
j Let me assure you that my acnons in 1990 were designed to provide both accurate and complete information to the NRC. A lhir evahiation of anyone's N +===+ has to begin with an analysis of the T
i historical setting in which the perint=a w-is to be judged. Ase-4 4;y, the p *=readon to the NRC Region II in Atlanta on April 9,1990 and the letter to the NRC of the same date needs to be reviewed in light ofthe evens surrounding those g=adaamd amivities.
On March 20,1990, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared at Georgia Power Company's Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) in Waynesboro, Georgia. At the time of the SAE, I was the General Manager ofVEGP, responsible for the sdsty of 1150 employees and the pubbe, includag the
-=*y ofWaynesboro. As General Manager, it was necomary and proper to delegate assignments and responsibiHties for diffbrens activities. Similarly, it was r==anshia, as General Manager, to rely on the infonostion received tom uboniinsens in response to delegated assignments, The delegation of assignments and reliance on other employees is a normal day-to day occurnnee in any in&ctry ne SAE was a dauengs and required an even greater delegation of assignments and rahance on information received by me. The SAE required VEGP personnel to focus on manerous important
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% 1994 09:14 FROt1 NUCLE 4TECrt41CALEEFulCEs. TO v1301501; 31
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Mr. James Ueberman Augut 5,1994 j
Page 3 i
)
issues that needed to be addressed in adequatdy inWg=+iaa the event. Technical reviews needed to j
be <=aAW in the many. areas: truck and vehicle access to the switch yard; off-site emergency t
ran"-d-v.: personod accountability dunng emergency events, ma==*= tina <hh*ian bet-a the j
site and corporate office; loss of core cooling capabikties during the loss of off-site power due to i
reduced water inventories as a result of planned outage activities; and diesel generator pais-a4 j
On March 23, 1990, the NRC issued a Confi* ration of Action I.etter (CAL) to Georgia Power j
Company (GPC) that confinned that GPC would not teturn VEGP Unit I to criticality until the j
Regional M...J-mor was satisfied that appropriate corrective action had been taken and that the i
P ant could safdy retum to power operations i
l l
l The sheer raunbar of these tasks and the preparation of a pr=== nan required the General Manager to delegate i-yci ;b;Ges and to rely on the responses supplied by his staff. An analogous situation is the NRC's reliance on delegated responsibilities that went given to the Augmented IWon Team (AIT) and to the Incident InMa*'iaa Team (Irr.) In at these cases, as managers, we rely on co-workers who we view as competent and knod '
ble.
As General Manager, I had to use my staff to provide me with the level of detad to be adequately l
Jvirostive. There is amply no other way I could have addressed or nemmplinhad these functions or 3
tasks without delegation and reliance on staff personost I did so by assigning several VEGP
--ykW who were famdiar with rpeafic
- to assist in, and to p infbrmation to theNRC.
l In preparation for the April 9,1990 -z..t NRC, I assigned a senior of the Event cri*im Team, a degreed SRO censed superi* Mr. Cash to provide me with the supp.=Gug diesel generator data for meeting In my opinion, it was reasonable for me to expect 4
that Mr. Cash would use special and be sure that the information that be provided was accurate for this ;-yoruist meeting. I instruceed Mr. Cash to teview the logbooks and dsesumine how many consampve aw==and diesel asesnnor starts had been made with no signi6 mat psetdeses. It was reasonable for me to delegate this assignment to a staff member ofMr. Cash's experience and training.
W I believed that Mr. Cash did understand his assignment. He did not give any indication to me that there would be, or had been, any difficuhies in et=xe the requested information. Additionally, the anmber deonsecutive===Ad starta was not known to me when I requessed that Mr. Cash count success 5d starts. The detads i=ipd g the DG starts was not information which I had.
Again, this level of detail (i.e., a munber) was not something I would have known, given my overall a
4-yer#vny for the plant (including SAE recovery, day-to-day oversight and ITT interface.) I was dedinitely aware of the general activities of testing and was briefed on the testing status
=*=aoraneous with those events. I was very aware of the fact that there had been m-rous DG starts, but an exact munber was beyond my knowledge. A-Mi, my rahance on Mr. Cash's work product was both renw==hle and normal under the carmnetmaree
AUG-08-1994 09:15 FROM HUCLERRTECHNICALSERVICES. TO 913015043431 P.05 Mr. James i Mar =*a Augme 5,1994 Page 4 In w=jwucios with noeiving infbanation from Mr. Cash, and others, I had manerous transparencies prepared for use at the April 9,1990 meding in Atlaata. Mr. Cash asasted by obtaming the " start ocants." Mr. Cash knew that the transparency and his count annbers were for the piW to the NRC. Yet, during the tranrpnney preparation, Mr. Cash never notdied me that he had any problems obtaimag the diced generator stat count numbers-the "Mr Cash he w wn.t.ms o
a s rts w t.gs.m.t - wi. ore.
sea.-
and zusched the regsired wdlage and Aequenor. Mr. Cash interpreted "sissilisant probians" be anything whkin would have powW the dissai Aos operusing in an emergency " " Messrs. Cash,
. Be 2 *', McCoy and Hsirston believed and a p-+-' the NRC personnel at the meeting (April 9, 1990] to understand that the 18 and 19 awa=Ai1 starts were conseative aw==sil starts." Ah=h I do not remember the specdc teminology that I used when I tasked Mr. Casin, Mr. Cash's ramIW supports my firm behof that the tasidng was adepate for Mr. Cash to count causecutive successful diesel starts Sinos I kasw that the IB &asel had statt prothuns derhis overtpal, I did not haveto sendtv or know the start dans or time est Mr. Cash saned his count
- ,,,4 tir ma nC" 9 8-
--tm w-M ha --w Aom the aussbar Mr. Cash gave for I
.ag W And, based on my recoBection, my unennemy to OI in August,1990, and my review of April 19,1990 conversations, at.the ties Dnew his diesel count stating point was star overbal and
~ to sensor entensina smHegistessing. Finally, this knowledge was consistent with the diesel testung presented at the April 9,1990 meeting which showed au the IB special testag 1 ' ' _ 4 suomedd sensorcalibrasionand seeing.
V
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.~
lhe April 9,1990 was im=rimi to rate that the Vogtle Unit I diesel generators were operable and that Unit I could be pennitted to restart. Because there was some
./
concern about the rehability of the CAILON sensors, GPC's presentation showed that diesels had been started a manificant number of tunes in succession without any problems or faihares In other words, a manbar of starts would dantmeses that the ewee=Gil operabihty test ("also called a surveiBanoe") was not a fluke. I never imeviarl the munber of diesci starts to relate to the diesel generator valid tasts as the tenn is used in the NRC Regulatory Guide, since the starts largely occurred prior to the time the diesels were declared operable and the Apri 9,1990 pr==rmirm showed many diesti run tests before the diesels were dedared operable Wimle ilar annsber ef semes waso misvant to the issoWtteest opamiabty, it was not sissiEsemt to me wbsther there were missessa or twelve starts Als the 199G. I observe that GPC and NRC personnel reached the same rearenaire - the diesels were operable and the unit couki be safety returned to service, even with some lesser numbers of starts for the 1B DG. Pw-beibre the Atomic Safety and ucensing Board given by NRC staff (P. Skinner and O. Chopra) support my observations and similady, the OI Report ofImeervieviwith Milton D.
Hunt. A signinens number, a total of at least thirty successful stats on a===einny 1,lareirm1 diesels, coupled with anveillance tests and other special testms provided sufficient evidence that the diesels 4
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!I' AUG-08-1994 09:16 FPOM toCLEARTECHt4!CALSEPVICES. TO 9130150.C431 P.06 i
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Mr.JamesIjeberman i
August 5,1994 l
Page5 i
l met NRC regulatory operabihty/reliM*y requimnents. 'Ibe NRC staff supported this W at the l
time.
l k is unRutanate that Mr. Cash made an naimaminnel niistake in counting diesel starts, by inchading
.stans which wom ant indladve of ap-=wayhssabaity.hseek However, ifMr. Cash had provided me with twelve====Ad starts for the IB diesel, the twelve starts for the IB desel would have been pressmeed at the April 9,1990 meeting. Assin, I viewed it, the operabiblyheliabikty datarminarian was j
not dependent on the==nl=r of aw-fid starts of nineteen for the IB deset Twelve would have l
beenrms to conveymyimmadad manage.
Purther, as h=namad by the HT transcripts, I, NRC ngional and HT sedC and NRC management were aware of IB disesi starts with probisms, beamma we had tegnant di= =iaan concerning diesel problems coming out of overhaul The afety-signi6 cant probisms of concern were i
the diesel engine inse=nawadan 'The pr===r**iaa I ands to the NItC en April 9,1990 induded a transparency contaming IB dieselinsenanssa problues, speci6calyinstmassets that were quar =*inad, some associated with "probism" starts. I was prepared to discuss these "probissa" seerts.
The Apnl 9,1990 letter was based on the same information provided in the transparencies.
Accv>LJy, since I relied on the information provided by Mr. Cash, I have the same posaion relative to the April 9,1990 letter.
]
i In punmary I r=anaWy rehed upon a senior n=a4=r of event critique team, a degreed SRO heensed unit super =tand=* to provide me with the required data conostning success &d diesel generasor stasts There was no indication at the time that the information given to me was inaccurate or incomplete. AcceQy, I did take raaaaanMa steps to ensure the information presented to the NRC in the Apnl 9,1990 meeting and letter were accurate to the best ofmy kscwkJe t that time.
a tb.
Paragraph C "An @Maa ofwhy, meM Z.1 bis lack of a sound basis for agreeing that the term CTP was 4.i. to convey wbst he ineandad (i.e., that the DG start count being used as the basis for the April 19,19901.ER began aAar testing of the DG control systems that did not require diesel starts,)
Mr. Bockhold aBowed this language to be inchaded in the April 19,1990 LER."
amannse:
'Ibe terms "the consul syssener of both engines have been sut$ect to a =, " '
- w test program" are a subest of the sann @as used in the Notice ofVlaimian 'Ihe LER's tenns do convey what I intended. Therefore, I r=aaaanMy aBowed these tenns to be induded in the April 19,1990 IE.R.
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Mr. Jameslh--s Y
August 5,1994 i
Page 6 i
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On April 19,1990, I contmued to beBeve that Mr. Cash had taken special care to be are that the l
diesel count information was accurate I did not know that the other individuals might interpret the l
LER language ddferent than what I view as the plain syntax of the Fnplish lanF*** My staff (Mr.
l Aufd='==r+) had told me that his people were verzfying the diesel count for the IER. Based on this l
information, I had raaaaaahle basis to agree to the use of this language in the Apil 19,1990 LER. If Mr. Aufdaahmaa's group (Tehnical Support) foural the data laciang, antahlidwd practice would be i
for that group to change the language or to contact more senior managers for assistanna Further, I
4Whe43Mugagsassest ibulimuiranuses as c6 l
JysG9P,9999 but could
}hsing to individuals who were not knowledgeable of diesel testing i
activnies.
i 1
Iview the period from April 9 to April 19,1990 as the critical startup period after the SAE.
Dunng this period, I focused first on safety (hour-by-hour, and day by-day) of the plant, and then on efficient operation. I did not aHow IER preparation to dilute my main respnamihihties associated with l
lP ant safety t-
, by practice, I could rely on my staff to accurately prepare the LER. Even then, I l
did review the LER for accxaracy. An W of my focus was that I ordered extra diesel surveillance j
testing beyond that required by Technical Sr-"=: ens to ensure diesel operabihty/ruiiabikty. I did hear a limited amount of appropriate questioning conversation wig the LER gw.Jos, but I l
4U$hserthat,peessusasassistatssehWWW An j
example 4Nis type of conversation that I heard was "maybe the counts should be revised upward" to reflect that the diesels had been started during the 10 day period between April 9 and 19. Additionally, the language in the April 19,1990 LER did not have to rely on a new diesel count because the terms j
"at least" were used. I rehed upon the normal process, my staff, for LER yipeGon. This process l
required the people responsible for crafting the LER language to understand and/or comnumicate with j
the technical experts who provided the data and technical details, and required PRB review and only j
then General Manager approval. Mr. Aufdenkampe indicated to me that the nonnal LER process was l
being foHowed by specificaHy saying that his people were venfying the diesci count munbers. The NRC i
wiH observe, in reviewing taped conversations, that the noanal process did continue, but with less than clear resulta Since the LER oevered the cetire SAE, the facts associated with diesel starts were only a small portion of the LER. I stiu expected that &esel count language would be consistent with Mr.
Cash's r ount because Lhad an nemann to hausun ent W. Cash's count was wroeg.
i I beheved that the count Mr. Cash made (ccesemaive accesudhby suurts without 969 i
was eter.the problegas tigt tbs 18 diesel had coming out aftbo owedsul peripd. I hnew that j
1B diesel had problems hdge abs 4ssel come algoeuw kede sueugt. The LER language (a subset l
NRC term CTP "After the 3-20-90 est the ofboth engines have been subject i
a tothis DGIA and DG1B have been started -
j least 18 tunes each no or problems have ocorred during any of these starts " was used i
convey the same message that was marained in the dies d transparencies used at the NRC April 9, j
990 meeting. The precedmg IER langua8e did convey t e message that I wanted to convey at the l
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AUG-08-1994 69:17 FROP1 tOCLEAPTECHNICALSEPJICES.
TO 91201504 421 P.08 Mr.Jamesliebennan August 5,1994 l
Page 7 l
time on April 19,1990. However, I also W that those responsible for IIR hhion would j
either confinn the lana =y statement or seek further managemet direction.
J It is not reasonable, in context, to irahyid that the preceding IER language was associated with l
the first successful test to demonstrate operabikty. The language simply does not say this. The tr-i-r-=wy used during the April 9,1990 meeting sherws " Diesel Operable" neer'the end of the i
testing. Furthermore, connraations recorded on April 19 casady show that my undastandag of Mr.
i Cash's work product was abared with other managers. If the language was indientive of operabihty, j
even these managers missed that implication. On April 19,1990, I did not know that other indrviduals might interpret the IIR language different than the plain syntax of the English language, therefore, I l
had rumsonable basis to agree to the language in the IIR. As I viewed it, we were mahng clearer the April 9 statement. The language did specify what I intaded at that time and other GPC personnel assodated with the IER preparation also had my, or a similar, uiwk-rw.disg of the language's 4
manning Paragraph D:
{
"An explanation of why, notwh==-% his knowledge that questions had bem raised regarding the accuracy of the DG start information and his knowledge of the informal maann by which the data he was relying on was dcvckped, Mr. Bockhold failed to take sufficient steps to ensure that l
information included in the April 19,1990 LERwas complete and accunte" i
Bassonse:
l l
I beheve that I did take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that lofwirurdion presented to the NRC in the April 19,1990 IIR was accurate to the best ofmy knowledge at the time because of j
the following.
l 1.
I continued to believe that Mr. Cash had taken special care to be sure that the diesel count nivsusdon was acoarate, and iw -_S
====Ad starts without problems
]
N 2.
I knew that before logic testing for the IB Mthere had been problems and failures, and after logic testag, we had enaAW a mi J"mM number of consecutive =_ Mil starts d
{
ofthe IB diesel generator.
l 3.
I knew that additional consecutrve exWul starts were being W-1*W on the diesels. /
Ihad ordered these starts l
1
5 1
1 AUG-08-1994 09:18 FROM NUCLEARTECHNICALSERVICES.
TO 913015043431 P.09 i
l i*
l m
j Mr.JamesI.iebermu l
August 5,1994 l
Page 8 4.
I did hear alisiend annunt erappropriate guideeing convernadon concerning the.12R w w..w, but did not beer est m. cas's anast was muss haemp ee.suhanniggbe j
Apsil19,"1990IR 5.
My stafr(Mr. Aufdenkampe) had told me that his people were verifying the diesel reunt for the12R.
6.
I shared my understandag of Mr. Cash's count data with others involved in the 12R l
verification process nsy did coment<Mr. Cash sid, unbelmown to nurweselsevided explanations at odds wish nry understadst Considenng the above, I believe there was a r=aanahle basis to agree to the language induded in the April 19,1990 IIR. I was not aware that the data developed by Mr. Cash was Sj infonnal, l
quicidy assembled or indbrmally reported.
+
l I did hear a limited amount of appropriate gn== inning conversation concerning the LER 1
preparation, but I did not hear that Mr. Cash's diesel count was wrces before the pd=nh*=1 of the April
{
19,1990 IER. The questions that I heard did not raise =Aciant concern for rne to take special action to modify the normal IER process. IAR prepeation painonnel.andJheir Medpding tiep, Acans Animent osmand Mensper nepandhis er eis snaion,-(le.WWei msponsihte w cmains amounce IJIR lungarDk By understanding and/or communicating with tariiniemi experts who j
provide the data sad +=ehnical details, this 12R group has fhli flextility to obtain supponive, j
wof,, Ag information or to revise 12R language.cAmy persas an.the.psensus siiidd havei and should j
lurve raised spanions to Mr. Cashif they had comosses about se accusaqy of the IRR diessit count intbrmstf6tt All personnel had an obligation to stop the nonnal IER process if any individual believed 1
l that the data was not correct. Further, Mr. Aufdenir=y irubcated to me that the nonnalIER process ws,being foBowed.
As indicated p.4Mj, I was not aware that the data developed by Mr. Cash was uniquely informal, quiddy===arnhiad or infonnaly reported. To the w
.y, my ' upression was that he had
===adad dihgest eEbrts and was qualdled to make the count. I bdieved that a senior degreed SRO j
licensed Unit Sgarin*=ad=> would treet the data that he provided the General Manager for an important NRC meeting with spedal cars and he would be sure that it was accurate Dis is even more reasonable in that this was a narrow tasic assigned and either thould have been easily perfonned or 1
j clarincation requested. %lipWge!gg,the Apsil 19,;1990 phone call,2 -aime souviesed tint Mc i
Cash's data was conect 'and in that conversmios espnosed n y conviction by using the teamsFven5ad
{
corms
- by the Unit Superinsendant iso went timous the logs." I was not seese ofigsplicesions that -
coher members ofG'C may have drawn toen these tenas i
In Nhe, I acimowledge that on April 19, I Bay shapid.have Ab5 owed ay an anse spedSc '
tuning ofMr. Mosbaugh and Mr. Aid =ir=5= to complete their vairiEmiEn of diend counts The i
e'
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.evc.--
w
AUG-08-1994 09:19 FROM NUCLEARTECHalCALSERVICES. TO 913015043431 P.10 l
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i
)
I+
l Mr. James Lieberman i
August 5,1994 l
Page9 j
mere fact that members of my staff had to ask me about the diesel count information indicates that j
maybe they wera not canying out their duties tc verify the count 6h. h In short, I take i
responsibihty for the faults of our verification edic.ts W, in hindsight I might have missed l
indications of the i----Sy of failure. I do believe, however, that others were in a much beeter positiontoinpacttheIR dunh*M otheNRC, 1
t 1
4 i
j Paragraph E:
l l
"An -plana *ina ofwm not_ withstanding his review ofthe June 29,1990 letter, which stated that it j
would clardy the April 9,1990 letter, Mr. Bockhold failed to ensure that the June 29,1990 cover letter clarilled the April 9,1990 letter."
i l
~
. e tyr : m.u n w : : a.i n 4
l Today, I believe that, for the purpose of.10 C.FA 50.73, the syntax of the June 29,1990 cover j
letter and LER does ciandy infbemation maaaria'ad with both the April 9,1990 letter and the April 19, 1990 IER. However, the June 29,1990 cover letter and LER do not address the issues ma=acia+=d j
with Mr. Mosbsugh's allegations 6r the subsegu~ent investigations. On that basis, the letter could be condming to an NRC investigster reviewing these allegations 'Ibe June 29,1990 cover letter and LER j
does clarify and provide additianal inibanstion associated with diesel operabilityheliability (a purpose j
ofthe April 9,1990 letter) and identifies *Maianal start fhilures associated with the IB 2esel inckxhng i
refereexang the Tar *airal Specification Special Report 44. 'Iberedbre, fer the stated purpose of the letter,10 C.FA 50.73 reporting, the June 29,1990 cover letter and LER does clarify the April 9,1990 leeter
{
I was not directly responsible Apr ther preparation of the tachair=1 details supporting the June 29, j
1990 cover letter or the preperst' ct'the letter. On April 30,1990, Mr. Mosbaugh gave me a hsting l
of IB DG starts, which snowedthat the start count reported in the April 9 preesemation were irdows.
j when r was passened wbh en sammedag daia,.I du. seed Mrcuosharbee.obtain es conost Maa=adaa and pgen tbs appropeisse.h.so;be sentWWi4Crisiif conea_the j
,paiasiiFeed h During May,1990, the plus staff had proLA deMdoping a clear diesel 4
count, and in endy June, I was inibaned that this job was assigned *o the Supervisor of SAER. The SAER group (our QA group) had complete indapand=r* from the piam stsif as they reported dnectly to a corporate manager reporting to the VEGP Vice President. The corporate orgnairarian and their
)
supervision were responsNe for the message cr=*ainad in the June 29, 1990 cover letter and rruaplaaaana of the letter. I was not awars of the ar==ainaa that Mr. Mosbaugh had with members of a
j i
my staff and/or the Plam Review Board. I did expect my staff, including the Plant Rpview Board, to review the June 29,1950 cover letter considering their knowledge and rarrwan=nd revisions as were appropriate. My personal review was fbr accuracy based upon my renallsweian of the facts==aaeia*M l
with diesel starts. In mM* inn, I strongly feel that it is appropnate that a QA orgei=*ian should be able
~
i to present its findings and conchisions with an appropriate degree of indepandance from the 1
1
AUG-08-1994 09:19 FROM NUCLEARTECHNICALSERV]CES. TO 913015043431 P.11 m
Mr. James Lieberman August 5,1994 Pass 10 eqpniratian that has been audited, in this case namely the VEGP Genend Manager and his staff.
Therefore, I rehed upon the corporate eqpniratian to appropriately present their findags consistent with my personal knowledge. Sace carher GPC had notified the NRC that we had made an error in counting diesel starts, II.aM the June 29,1990 cover letter to mean that in the April 9,1990 letter and the Apri! 19,1990 IER, we should have had mere darity of terminology, so that better tv===== air =*ian between GPC and NRC would result (i.e. "nere ussiht inammanna ") *Ibersibre, the plant should have reported aMininaal count information based on dined generator operability tests.
Further, at that time, I believed that the letter was indicating that a osuse ofMr. Cash's ocunt error (an incorrect number) was that he had dif5culty in interpreting our logs, in other words diNir=*y due to our recard keeping practices and the inronnation available to him.
In summary, I relied upon corporate sist, includag the SAER organization, to conduct a tr=nat=*e audit and craft the lanpapelo A June 29,1990 covar letter, and sqy pamonal avview was Air amouracy, based upon my raramarmiaa(W Aists. I also relied upon my staffincluding the Plant Review Board, to identify any N i believe the June 29 letter was accurses reistive to all of our knowledge S J ".j, the June 29,1990 =*=nietal does clarify prior st=*=nants and provides at the time.
i
=Miria==1 new inibunstion conostning significant saihty jeums associated with diesel operabikty/reliabikty (a purpose of the April 9,1990 letter) by identihing =Midaani start fhdures
==aci=*=d with the IB diesel (aciuding.14 the Tednical sparinertian Spedal Report 1 94.) Further, at the time, I believed that the letter was indicating. Jirst, that a cause ofMr. Cash's count error was that Mr. Cash had trouble with our record keeping practions in the preparation of his diesel count infbrmazian, and second, the VEGP General Mensger and his staff should have done a betterjob in the preparation and review.af the.Apsil 9,1990 letter and April 19,1990 LER bypsviding'1eese
'dibnnneine about stads"adociated with ap=hhRh[ AMitianally, sinos my in=nadiata mire vi vis, Mr.
McCoy and Mr. Hairston, had duect involvement in the preparation of.this =*=nistal and separate ~
diern==iaan with NRC managemet about diesel _h. I also believed that the submittal addressed NRC ananerna from their puspective.
Paragraph F:
"An arplaandaa of why, notwithstanding his knowledge tix.t the Unit Superintendent was not confused about the distinction between successful starts and valid tests when the Unit Sp ' '=
collected start data for the April 9,1990 pr=,an*=*ian and lateur, Mr. Starhald alowed the indbrmation to be included in the August 30,1990 letter as one of the reasons fbr the error in the April 9,1990 letter."
I bebeve that the syntax of the August 30,1990 letter is correct today. Some NRC personnel and
~
GPC personnel were confused with the tenninology of"sucosesibt sarts." This tenninology origmated in the prepensions for the April 9,1990 prenantatian, and therefore was one of the reasons for the
......,.....-...n.-..~_.....
- .....~~.
r.--
j.
l t
i l
m i
l Mr. James Lieberman t
August 5,1994 i
Pee 11 j
<=8% Thus, NRC ewhh containM in DFI section III, page 9, are not correct, har-a the l
confusion was relevant to the April 9,1990 letter. The language of the August 30,1990 letter is misquoted in the Notice of Violation and cannot romanamhly be constmed as identifying one of the l
causes ofthe errorin the Apri19,1990 letter as Mr. Cash's confbsion.
At the time, I did not know that the NRC wanted us to provide aMirianal information about root
)
cause of the errors by investigating my and Mr. Cash's perfbrmance. AMirinnany, since both I and my i
Ma supervisor, Mr. McCoy had dirom involvement in discussions with NRC maanganwnt about j
the kiviwdion that the NRC wanted, I also believed that the edunntal addressed NRC concerns from j
Mr. McCoy's perspective. FineDy, any a&htional GPC concerns about the August 30,1990 letter were j
rasched when the PRB unanimausly agreed to the letter worthag. As with piior correspondence, this letter addressed wha: I understood u the relevant issue (start indbrmation) and was accurate and
}
complete forthat purpose.
l Paragraph G:
4
}
"An explanation of the corrective actions taken, or planned by the ikwanaa to address Mr.
Bockhold's ph=w failures "
Rasponse;
[
l As==pe =4 in the prd: I believe that I acted in a r=aanashie fashion as the VEGP General l
Managw.
During May,1990 the NRC +
,: some gdM concems about VEGP personnel Instead i
of denying these perceptions, I accepted responsibility for implementing corrective adion to eam a change in adverse NRC perceptions of VEGP. On May 8,1990 Mr._McCoy and I met with the managers of the plant and openly discussed the NRC's concerns. I recognimod and discussed my own j
natural erwnnamirariana style including short comings manaen=+M with my management style.
]
An*=chment.1 is the authne that l used to conduct this diamanian SpecificaDy, I stated that while I l
believe I consider at aspects of a problem i do make decisions quickly and an== rim = in too forerAd of a communication style. I stated that I must alks time ihr all aspects of a problem to be aired and to i
i make sure that people I inta1 hoe with feel that they have an opportunity to fbuy cypress their opinions.
I have learned a valuable lesson fhun this experience. I bebeve that my padar==aaa over the past j
several years has reflected this lemon learned.
1 j
Upon reflection, I believe that ifI had the foresight to include both the munber ofvalid diesel tests and "=nnamahl starts" in the Apri19,1990 pr=aarvatina, then the confusion assodated with this matter
{
would have been mitigated or aliminstM My April 9,1990 pr=aan*=tian did show that the diesel test j
("surveiBance") that we used to declare the diessis operable wwe completed late in the test pmgram, but the presentation did not spedscany list the munber ofvalid desel tests.
4 i
Aua-se-1994 09:21 FROM NUCLEARTECHNICALSERVICES. TO 913015043431 P.13 4
- m t
I Mr. JamesIJsbennan August 5,1994 Page 12 h
Raamatly, the Senior Vice Pasident of GPC and my immediate supervisor met with me and l
reviewed my actions and responsibihees which are the sutject of the NOV and the DFI. His review focused on the mistakes made by my orga+*iaa and my personal i,.&=== failms to assure that d my responsibilities, including delegated respr Wh were canied out without vialmian of NRC l
regulations. This review also addressed ways to improve my management capabikties. I view this review m a learning asperience to condane to Imam Acm my mistains and mistakes of others and to j
i"Taanwar isseons learned in a safe, pedassina=I, and responsble manner.
l I have and wil cami== to the best of my abikty to conduct hamaand activitiss in accordance with j
d NRC requirements and rantimw to work onimproving my maangamant capabiEties.
Paragraph H:
l "Given the four vioistions of NRC aquirements, an explanation as to why NRC abound have l
anafid= ace that r W, with the involvement of Mr. Bc t' *', wiR in the fhture conduct bcensed i _
activities in accordance with d NRC requirements, hah 4 the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.9, l
F =;'r-- and accuracy ofinformation."
4 l
Esassard 1
l As explained in the preceding, I believe I acted in a reasonshie f==hina as the. VEGP General l
Manager and I will always senve to provide @e and accurate infonnstion to the NRC and wiB continue to work on improving my nanagement style. Therefore, the NRC sixadd have con 6%ce in my involvement in heensed activities in the fbture.
Since my receipt of the Demand fbr L%, I have resected long and hard on my actions in i
1990 and my capabilities and waalramare In hindsight, my strengths as a manager (e.g. delegation to j
competent individuals of speciSc tasks, rdance on ti.e work product of subordinates, conviction in ray i
raranarvina of events and 6 ability) became wealmesses. I am honestly concerned that the NRC believes that =Animat
- dicaws were available to me to have, in runt time, changed the I
=
coures of events. I respectibly request the NRC to ask the question based on svuots as they unfolded and not bened on hindsight, would a pmdent manager in the same or similar position be reasonably expected to have foresent the d=Aci= aria, and failures idenedied in the Notice of Viointion? I simply do l
not bdeve that he or she would have fbnmesa thue ruults. Moreover, my e5 bets tiroughout this tinn were directed at assuring that both GPC and the NRC managers had d the correct material
]
infonnation necessary fo-them to be u knowledgeable as they could be, so that decisions made were infonned decisions which assured nacieur sufbey. -
I i
s 1
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4 -
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i, AL.G-08-1994 09: 21. FROf1 NUCLEARTECHN! CAL. SERVICES. TO 913015043431 P.14 1 e i
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Mr. James Liebennan i
August 5,1994
{
Page13 f
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j In conclusion, I have and wE continue to the best of zny abuity to conduct licensed activities in
]
accordance with aB NRC requirunents and caatiaw to work on improving my management j
capabihties. The fwW is true and ccrrect based on my knowledge and belief i
a j
VeryrespectfhDy, a
b GeorgeMW Jr.
t
{
Swom to and subscribed qmethis / day i
of/+' - M
.1994.
U i
[
aceA/ G
_ ni hotaryP6 >lic My camenitaian expires:
M&?!t.*NGfUSKG2f 12.It0F
[ NOTARIAL SEAL) xc: U.S. Nuclear Randatosv Ceesmissian Mr. S.D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Amistant General CounsellbrHearings and Enforcement xc: Geormig PowerComagsv Mr. RA. Franidin Mr.W.G. Hairston Mr. J.D. Woodard 9
8 xc: Southesu Nadaar Mr. L.B. Laos
i AUG-08-1994 09:22 FROM NUCLEM TECHNICALSERVICES. TO 913015043431 P.15 1
i i
ATTACHMENT 1 E194411C1818 IIRC Cestst!CATIGIS 4 EEY PRIIICIPLt3 0F 11E IRICLEAR PROFES8tellAL l
j
.Some imC Percestfons l
surprised and shocked. did not think j
Cut corners j
Cockey, did not follow procedures i
v.. Cavalier, souber attitude Non-senservative setten Not open with IINC communications haunttted to change perception i
j FuC:te' MM1aar Professional princiales Breatesh respect for core Maxfaire marg)in for core safety Sets technion help (proceduros, managers, experts) i Voet' a tummeles = percention Problem i
' su as tr
- S H Isrc.d.1 s -41% 2 Ifeense - RIR check valve i
3*.. >,
- Site area'emergenc
- Outage probles y -
f sprey valves. PZR cooldown, site glass desten. tygen i
tube, level drop. MAC esamunfeatten OI Investigation kdpe tiens app to yout
- Bent cosa cation -
and other departerents
- Use preceduros terrectly De,6 rvfess<enal,
4 i
See oe lockheid's personal 4 r- :.s $tvle Open communicasten
- Constant 1 wert for taprovensat
- Partnersfaprofessionalism:
} (
P y
Pride p
Deafre 3
i Knowlsege F [r l
Attentien to detail i n g Fellowup g g j
j g
e j
Followue er eedbeek j
'd h r
1 putage se seule i hilesePhy P
i F
<ll 1
- procedures i
- Overall - Positive t
(
. Better te know t.
p aI i
i
- Chance to taprove Gn l j
Summary a g 1
Personal essettnent te change perceptions i
- continue to taprove NRC communication
{ g Mornias meeting i
WI to Residest semmunication x
g 1
.