Text

Forwards Draft Responses to Advanced BWR Ssar Chapter 8 non-ITAAC Draft FSER Items.Listed Items Will Be Addressed by 930208
	ML20128C086
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	01/29/1993
From:	Fox J; GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NUDOCS 9302030307
	Download: ML20128C086 (72)
	v • d • e

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GE Nuclear Energy

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w,e,, umacna, 175 cvw Aense &n k s CA 95US January 29,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule

Dear Chet:

Enclosed are draft .esponses to the ABWR SSAR Chapter 8 non-ITAAC DFSER items with the exception of the following items which will be addressed by February 8,1993:

Open items Confirmatory Items COL ltems 8.3.5-1 8.3.3.3 1 8.2.2.61 8.3.3.6 1 8.3.3.10-1 8.3.6.2 1 This transmittal includes (1) DSFER cross-reference, (2) a roadmap,'(3) inserts for the markup, and (4) markup of Chapter 8 and other associated chapters.

Sincerely,

. bsf ack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Bob Strong (GE)

Norman Fletcher f ~

0b /

= 020053 Lf 9302030307 93o129 PDR ADOCK 0520 1 7

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I FSER # TYPE REF SSAR SECTION SSAR PACE 8.2.1.1-1 CONF 1 3.1.2.2.8.2.2 3.1 11 8.2.1.2 1 CONF 2 8.1.2.1 8.1 1 8.2.1.3 1 CONF 3 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.2.1.3-2 CONF 4 8.2.3 8.2 4 8.2.1.3 3 CONF 5 8.2.3(16) 8.2 5 8.2.1.3 4 CONF 6 8.2.3(2) 8.2-4

8.2.1.3 5 CONF 7 8.2.3(4) 8.2 4 i

8.2.1.3-6 CONF 8 8.2.3(5) 8.2 4 8.2.1.3 7 CONF 9 8.2.3 & 8.2.1 8.2-4 & 1 8.2.1.3 8 CONF 10 8.2.3(4) 8.2 4 8.2.1.3 9 CONF 11 8.2.1, 8.2.3 8.2 1, 4 8.2.1.4 1 ITAAC 12 ( LATER) 8.2.2.1-1 CONF 13 8.2.2.1 8.2 3

8.2.2.1-2 CONF 14 8.2.1.3 8.2 2 8.2.2.2-1 CONF 15 8.2.1.3 8.2-2 4

8.2.2.3 1 CONF 16 8.2.1.3 8.2-3 8.2.2.4-1 CONF 17 8.2.2.1 8.2 3 8.2.2.4-1 COL 17 (SEE ROADMAP) 8.2-5 8.2.2.5-1 COL 18 8.2.2.1(3) 8.2-3 8.2.2.6-1 CONF 19 8.2.2,1(2). 8.2.1.2 8.2 3, 1 8.2.2.6-1 COL 19 (LATER) 8.2.2.7-1 CONF 21 (SEE ROADMAP) 8A.1-1 8.2.2.8-1 OPEN 20 Table 8.2 1 8.2-6 8.2.2.9-1 CONF 22 8.3.1.2.1(4)(b) 8.3-12 8.2.3.1 1 CONF 23 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.2.3.2 1 CONF 24 8.3.1.1.7(8,8.3.4.31 8.3-8, -23.3 8.2.3.2-1 COL 24 8.3.4.20 8.3 23.3 8.2.3.3 1 CONF 25 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.2.3.3-1 COL 25 (NO CE ACTION) 8.2.3.3-2 CONF 26 8.3.1.1.7(6) 8.3-8 8.2.3.3-2 COL 26 8.3.4.21 8.3-23.3 8.2.3.3 3 CONF 27 8. 3.1. 2 .1( 2) (j ) 8.3 11 8.2.3.3-3 COL 27 8.3.4.22 8.3 23.3 8.2.3.3 4 CONF 28 8.3.1.1.6.4 8.3-7 8.'.3.3-4 COL 28 8.3,4.23 8.3-23,3 8.2.3.4-1 CONF 29 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.2.3.5-1 CONF 30 8.2.1.3 8.2-3 8.2.3.5-1 OPEN 31 8.2.3(4), 8 3.4.9 +F 8.2-4,3-23.2 8.2.4-1 COL 32 8.3.4.9 8.3-23.2 8.3-1 CONF 33 8.3.1.1.3 8.3-4 8.3-1 COL 33 8.3.1.1.3 8.3-4 8.3.1-1 CONF 34 1.2.1.1.2(11) 1.2-2 8.3.1.1-1 CONF 35 8.1.2.0, Tab.8.2-1 + 8.1-1, 2-6 +

8.3.1.2-1 CONF 36 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.2.1-1 CONF 37 (AMENDMENT 21) 8,3.2.2-1 CONF 38 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.2.3-1 CONF 39 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.2.4-1 CONF 40 8.3.1.4.1.2(7) 8.3-15 8.3.2.4-2 CONF 41 8.3.1.4.1.2(7) 8.3-15

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. REPORT FORM FSERSTAN TO PRINI FSER # TYPE REF SSAR SECTION SSAR PAGE 8.3.2.4-3 CONF 58 8.3.1.4.1.2(7) 8.3-15 8.3.2.5-1 CONF 48 (SEE REENUMBER 59) 8.3.2.5-1 CONF 59 8.3.1.1.5.1 8.3 5 8.3.2.6 1 CONF 60 (No GE ACTION) 8.3.2.7-1 CONF 61 (NO GE ACTION) 8.3.2.7-1 COL 61 8.3.4.26 8.3-23.3 8.3.2.8-1 CONF 62 (NO GE ACTION) 8.3.2.9 1 CONF 42 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.2.9-2 OPEN 63 8.3.1.3.1.3, 9.5,3 8.3 14,9.5 3 8.3.3.1 1 CONF 64 8.1.3.1.2.1 (+2) 8.1-4 (+2) 8.3.3.1-1 COL 64 8.3,4.4 8.3 23.2 8.3.3.10 1 CONF 71 (LATER) 8.3.3.10-1 COL 71 8.3.4.27 8.3 23.3 8.3.3.11-1 CONF 45 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.12-1 CONF 46 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.13 1 CONF 47 ( AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.14-1 COL 72 8.3.4.28 8.3-23.3 8.3.3.14-2 OPEN 72 8.3.1.1.4.2.2(7) 8.3-5 8.3.3.15-1 CONF 49 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.15-1 COL 49 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.16 1 CONF 73 ( AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.16-1 COL 73 8.3.4.19 8.3 23.3 8.3.3.3-1 CONF 66 (LATER) 8.3.3.4-1 CONF 67 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.3.5-1 OPEN 68 (SEE ROADMAP) N/A 8.3.3.6-1 CONF 69 (LATER) 8.3-3 8.3.3.7-1 CONF 70 8.3.1.1.6.4 8.3-7 8.3.3.7-1 COL 70 8.3.4.22 8.3.23-3 8.3.3.8-1 CONF 43 ( AMENDMENT 21)

E.3.3.8 1 COL 43 8.3.4.24 8.3-23.3 8.3.3.9-1 CONF 44 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.4 1 CONF 74 8.3.2.1.3.1 8.3-20 8.3.4-1 COL 74 8.3.4.18 8.3 23.3 8.3.4.1-1 CONF 50a 8.3.2.1.3.1 8.3-21 8.3.4.1-1 CONF 50b 8.3.2.1.3.1 8.3-21 8.3.4.1-1 COL 50b 8.3.4.18, Fig 8.3-4 8.3-23.3,-33 8.3.4.2-1 CONF 51 ( AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.4.3-1 CONF 52 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.4.4-1 CONF 53 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.4.4-1 COL 75 8.3.4.29 8.3-23.3 8.3.4.4-2 CONF 75 8.3.1.1.1 8.3-4 8.3.5 1 CONF 54 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.5-1 COL 54 8.3.4.25 8.3-23.3

, 8.3.5 1 OPEN 76 (LATER) 8.3.6.1-1 CONF 55 (AMENDMENT 21) 8.3.6.2-1 CONF 77 (LATER) ALL 8.3.7-1 CONF 78 8.1.3.1.1.3 8.1-4 8.3.7-1 COL 78 8.3.4.30 8.3-23.3 8.3.7-1 OPEN 79 (SEE ROADMAP) N/A m

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FSER # TYPE REF SSAR SECTION SSAR PAGE 1

8.3.8.1-1 CONF 56 (AMENDMENT 21) l 8.3.8.2-1 CONF 81 8.3.2.1.1.1,8.3.5 +R 8,3 20, 23,4 8.3.8.2 1 COL 81 8.3.4.33 8.3 23.3 8.3,8.3-1 CONF 57 (AMENDMENT 21) 8,3.8.4 1 CONF 82 (SEE ROADMAP) 8.3 9 8.3.8.4 1 COL 82 8.3.4.36 8.3 23.3 8.3.8.5 1 CONF 83 8.3.1.1.4.2.1 8.3-4 8.3.8.5-1 COL 83 8.3.4.34 8.3 23.3 8.3.8.6-1 CONF 84 8.3.2.1.1 8.3-20 8.3.8.6 1 COL 84 8.3.4.35 8.3 23.3 8.3.8,7-1 CONF 85 8.3.1.1.5.3 8,3 7 8,3.8 7-1 COL 85 (SEE ROADMAP) 8.3-23.3 8.3.9 1 COL 86 8.3.4.16 8.3-23.3 8.3.9.1-1 CONF 80 8.3.1.1.8.3 8,3 9 8.3.9.2-1 CONF 86 (SEE ROADMAP) 8.3-22 8.3,9.3 1 CONF 87 (SEE ROADMAP) N/A N/A ITAAC 100 8.3.1.1.8.6 8.3 10 N/A N/A 101 8.3.1.4.2.2.3 8.3 17 N/A N/A 102 8.3.1.4.2.3 8,3-18 & -19 N/A N/A 103 8.3.5 8.3 23.3 N/A N/A 104 8.3.5 8.3 23.4 N/A N/A 105 8.3.5 8.3-23.4 N/A N/A 106 8.2.4 8.2-5

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.D0 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT OFSER ITEM NUMSER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE CE COMMENTS 8.2.2.4 1 COL With regard to periodic testing of 8.2.3(17)(a) This COL applicant information has the systems, eqJipment, and been added per reference, j components, the staff has the ;

following mderstandings:

Periodic verification will ensure that the normal and alternate offsite power circuits are energized and connected to the appropriate Class _1E distribution system division at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Q.2.2.4 1 COL Tests and inspections will be (See CE Consnent) This is inherently done when the

. performed at appropriately scheduled plant is being shut down, but cannot intervals for each of the items be done during plant operation. The highlighted above. (These are staff indicated this buttet would be itemized as follows:1 either modified or deleted.

The generator breaker can open on demand.

G.2.2.4 1 COL The instrumentation, control, and 8.2.3(17)(b) This COL applicant information has protection systems, e w ipment, and been added per reference, components associated with the normal and alternate offsite preferred circuits are properly calibrated and perform their required functions.

G.2.2.4-1 COL The instrunentation and control (See GE Comment) The staf f indicated this bullet was systems, equipment, and components to be deleted from the DFSER.

associated with the system used to prevent incorrect synchronization are property calibrated and perform their required functions.

8.2.2.4 1 COL The required Class IE and non-Class '8.2.3(17)(c) This COL applicant information has 1E toaos can be powered from their been added per reference, c%signated preferred power swty within the capacity and capability margins specified in the SSAR for the offsite system circuits.

G.2.2.4 1 COL The loss of the offsite preferred 8.2.3(17)(d) This COL applicant information has power supply can be detected. been added per reference.

8.2.2.4 1 COL Switching between preferred power 8.2.3(17)(e) This COL applicant information has supplies can be acconplished. been added per reference.

8.2.2.4 1 COL The batteries and chargers associated 8.2.3(17)(f) This COL applicant information has.

with the preferred power system can been added per reference.

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4 Page No. 2 01/29/93 ROADMAP FOR SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 DF5ER ISSUES

.D0 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT DFSER ITEM WUMBER OFSER BULLET STATEMENT S$AR REFERENCE GE COMMENTS meet the requirements of their design (cads.

8.2.2.4 1 COL The test ard inspection intervals 8.2.3(17) (end) This COL applicant information has will be established and maintained been added per reference, with the according to the guidelines of IEEE caveat "...as appropriate for 338 1977, section 6.5. non class it systems ti.e., items (4) and (7) of Section 6.5.1 are not applicable)."

8.2.2.7 1 CONF Based on discussions with GE, it is 8A.1.1 (4th para.) This buttet is backed by a similar the staf f's urderstanding that CE statement in referenced section, will meet the following Electric Amenchent 21.

Power Research Institute (EPRI) plant grounding guidelines:

A station grounding grid. consisting of bare copper cables, will be provided that will limit step-and touch potentials to safe values under att fault conditions.

8.2.2.7 1 CONF Bare copper risers will be furnished 8A.1.1 (3rd para.) This buttet is sacked by a similar for all underground electrical ducts staterent in refe*enced section, and equisnent, and for connections to Amendrent 21.

the gro W ing systems within buildings.

8.2.2.? 1 CONF The design and analysis of the 8A.1.2(3) This bullet is backed by a similar grounding system wlll follow the statement in referenced section, proce&res and reconnendations Amendment 21.

specified by the latest revision of IEEE 665, " Guide for Generation Station Grounding."

8.2.2.7 1 CONF Each building will be equipped with 84.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this bullet grounding systems connected to the has been eeJed per reference, station grounding grid. As a minimin, every other steel coltann of the building perimeter will connect directly to the grounding grid.

8.2.2.7-1 CONF The plant's main generator will be 8A.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this bullet grounded with a neutrat grounding has been added per reference.

device. The inpedance of that device will limit the maximum phase current mder short* circuit conditions to a value not greater than that for a three-phase fault at its terminals.

8.2.2.7-1 CONF Provisions will be included to ensure 8A.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this bullet

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I DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT S$AR REFERENCE GE COMMENTS proper grounding of the isophase has been added per reference.

l buses when the generator is f disconnected.

i

,f 8.2.2.7 1 CONF The onsite, medi e voltage ac 8A.1.1 (new addition.. .~A statement reflecting this bullet j distribution system will be has been added per reference, resistance grounded at the neutral i point of the low-voltage windings of j the unit auxiliary and reserve-i transformers (see 8.3.1.1.6.2).

J f

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8.2.2.7 1 CONF The neutral point of the generator. 8A.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this bullet

) windings of the onsite, standby power has been added per reference.

surply units safety and

} non safety related, will be through i distribution type transformers and

loading resistors, sited for 1

continuous operation in the event of j e ground fault.

J j 8.2.2.7 1 CONF The neutral point of the low voltage 8A.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this buttet ac distribution systems will be has been added per reference, j either solidly or impedance grounded,

as necessary, to ensure proper l coordination of ground fault j protection, a

i 8.2.2.7 1 CONF The de systems will be lef t 8A.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this bullet j mgromded. has been added per reference, j 8.2.2.7 1 CONF Each major piece of equipment, metal 8A.1.1 (3rd para.) This bull'et is back'ed by a similar j structure, or metattle tank will be statement in referenced section, f equipped with two ground connections Amenchent 21.

1 diagonally opposite each other.

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J 8.2.2.7 1 CONF The ground bus of att switchgear. 8A.1.1 (3rd para.) .This bullet is backed by a similar

$ asseelies, motor controt centers, statement in referenced section, j and control cabinets will be Amenchent 21.

connected to the station ground grid through at least two parattel paths.

, 8.2.2.7 1 CONF One bare copper cable wiLL be BA.1.1 (3rd pare.) This bullet is backed by a similar 4 installed with each underground statement in referenced section, )

electrical duct run, and att metallic Amenchent 21.

hardware in each manhole will be' 2 corriected to this cable.

$ 8.2.2.7-1 CONF Plant instrunentation will be 8A.1.1 (2nd para.)- -This bullet is backed by a similar

grounded through separate radial statement in referenced section, grounding systems consisting of Amenchent 21. However,.the last isolated instrunentation ground buses sentence was modified to add "...and i

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0FSER 11EM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT- $$AR REFERENCE CE COMMENTS l and insulated cables. .The wlLL be insulted from all other 1 instrumentation grounding systems . grounding circuits."

l will be connected to the station i grounding grid at only one point and will be insulated from att other gromding circuits.

G.2.2.7 1 CONF Separate instrumentation grounding 8A.1.1 (new addition A statement reflecting this bullet systems shall be provided for plant has been ackled per reference, with

, analog and digital instrwentation the clcrification for " analog" systems, meaning relays, solenoids, etc.

G.2.2.7 1 CONF A lightning protection system will be 8A.1.2(5) In Amenchent 21, most of this' bullet provided for each major plant is backed by a similar statement in structure, including the containment the last paragraph of 8A.1.1, and -

enclosure building. The design and NFPA 78 is included in 8A.1.2(4). A installation of these systems will new reference to the NE'I A docunent comty with the National Fire was added as 8A.1.2(5).

Protection Association's Lightning Protection Code, NFPA 78, and the Nuclear Energy Property insurance Associations (NEPIA's) " Basic Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" document. ,

8.2.2.7 1 CONF Lightning arresters wlll be provided 8A.1.1 (lat 'Mra.) In Amenchent 21, most of this bullet in each phase of all tie lines is eacked by a similar statement in connecting the plant electrical the last paragraph of 8A.1.1 The systems to the switching station (s) sentence "These arresters are and offsite transmission system, connected to the high voltage These arresters will be connected to terminals of the main step up and the high-voltage terminals of the reserve transformers." was added per main step up and reserve mark up.

transformers.

8.2.2.7-1 CONF Plant instrumentation and monitoring 8A.1.1 (last paro.) In Amenchent 21, this bullet is equipment located outdoors or backed by a sieller statement in the conneted to cabling that runs last paragraph (Last sentence) of outdoors will be equipped with 8A.1.1.

built in surge a w pression devices to protect the equipemt from-tIghtning inchaced surges.

8.3.3.5 1 OPEN Section 8.3.3.1 of SSAR Amenchent 10 : (See GE Comnent) The end of $$AR Section 8.3.3.1 stated that the electrical cable states: "The cable instattation installation is such that direct (i.e., redundant divisions separated imingement of fire suppressant will by fire barriers) is such that direct not prevent safe reactor shutdown. Igingement of fire suppressant will it was not clear whether I g ingement not prevent safe reactor shutdown, of fire suppressant would or would even if failure of the cable occurs, nct cause failure of cable systems. Cables are specified to be

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.00 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT _ SSAR REFERENCE' GE COMMENTS

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The staf f was concerned that cables submersible, however ($ee the fourth and other electric equipment might requirement /conptlance in Subsection not be designed and quattfled to 9.5.1.0)." The compliance portion of.

perform their safety function while 9.5.1.0 states: "The fire barrier being subjected to the direct system confines smoke,. hot gases, inpingement of fire suppressant. ... fire suppressant to the division of the fire. The smoke control system l After reviewing Information presented maintains the areas for the two in Chapter 8 of $$AR Amen eent 21 and redundant. divisions at a positive Section 94.5 of $$AR Amen *ents 6, 16 pressure with respect to the area of ;

and 18, the staf f is uwbte to reach the' division experiencing the fire, conclusions as to the acceptablLity Any leakage through the fire barrier of the level of protection to be system is to the fire." In light of afforded Class 1E power systems due the above, GE could not understand to fatture of redundant Class 1E the staff's concern.

congsonents that can be subjected to envirornents of the same design basis in follow up discussions, the staff ~I event (including fire, fire requested CE to supply better ;

suppressant, and non-seismic analysis for exceptions in 9A.5, and I structures) for which they may not be show why these do not affect the designed or qualified. Information Class 1E power suprLies. This and design commitments presented in section was recently updated per Chapter 8 and Section 9A.5 are Amendments 22 and 23 (submitted inconsistent. 9/18/92 and 11/20/92, respectfully).

These amenenents incorporated extensive additional information related to the staff's concerns. For example,'section 9A.5.7 " Typical Circuits Analysis of Special Cases" and Table 9A.5 2 were added. We believe the staff 8s review of these new amendments will resolve this issue.

8.3.7 1 OPEN An acceptable level of reliability' (See GE Caprnant) GE questioned the Intent and will be established by CE for the subsequent requirement for this remaining operable safety systems by bullet. The staff (John Knox) a probability risk analysis. indicated it was Section 5,_ttem (4) of IEEE 338-1977, as referenced by Section 5.7 of IEEE 603 1980. GE reviewed these sections and determined they are related specificalty'to testing (as opposed :

to maintenance) of class 1E -f equipment. Furthermore, it appears {

the intent of item (4) is more i relevant to control and instrunent _

channels, where a channel may be actually taken out of service for l testing purposes. -The ABWR has four battery-backed divisions of I

d

Page No. 6 01/29/93 ROADMAP 70R SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 0FSER ISSUES

.00 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT OFSER ITEM NUMBER OFSER BULLET STATEMENT $$AR REFERENCE GE COMMENis instrumentation and control, with two out of four logic, such that it would still meet the single fatture criterion with one channel out of service for testing.

Testing of equipnent within a Class 1E toad group (i.e., one of the three diesel backed divisions providing 480v AC and above) during plant operation is typically done in such a manner that the po+,r distribution system itself is not actually taken "out of service". For instance, if a diesel is undergol g parallel testing and an accident signal occurs, the diesel automatically reverts to its emergency atanct)y mode (see 8.3.1.1.8.8). If a diesel or any other Class it power equipment is removed from service such that it cannot function in an emergency, the plant is subjected to LCO's appropriate to conditions defined by technical specifications. Such a condition is not within the context of testing as delineated by 5(4) of IEEE 338, and a separate probability risk analysis is not required.

8.3.8.2-1 CONF Based on discussions with CE and (See GE Coment) This data was based on the battery information presented in Section load capacity analysis sent to the 8.3.2.1.3.1 of SSAR Amerdnent 21, the staff on 11 27 91. The staff staff understands that each of the questioned the use of 70F as a four Class 1E 125 volt batteries minimum cett tenperature, rather than will: 60F believed by the staff to be more comon. The basis for 21C(70F) came (7th bullet) have a 25 percent f rom the envirorvnental specification capacity design margin to ecnpensate for the ABWR battery rooms, which for battery aging, have a 4 percent identifles a minimum tenperature of capacity design margin to attow for 21C for both normat and accident the Lowest expected electrolyte conditions, tenperature of 21 degrees C (70 degrees F).

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. Based on discussions with GE and 8.3,1.1.8.2(1)&(2) Atreedy contained in Amendnent 21 of information presented in SSAR identified reference.

Amendnent 21, the staf f understands that each standby (diesel generator) power source wills l

Page No. 7 01/29/93 ROADMAP FOR SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 DFSER ISSUES

.00 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT DFSER 11EM NUMBER OFSER BULLET STATEMENT $$AR REFERENCE GE COMMENTS be capable of energiting or starting and accelerating to rated speed, in the required segaence, all the required safety system Loads, 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. be capable of attaining rated 8.3.1.1.8.2(4) . ALready contained in Amenchent 21 of freq;ency and voltage within 20 identified reference.

seconds after receipt of a start si gnal,'

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. have a continuous load rating of 6.25 8.3.1.1.8.2(5) Already contained in Amenennt 21 of MVA G 0.8 power factor, identified reference.

have a short time rating of 110

~

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. - 8.3.1.1.8.2(5) Already contained in Amen e ent 21 of percent of the continuous load rating identified reference, for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months period out of any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period, without exceed the manufacturer's design timits and without reducing the maintenance intervat established for the continuous rating .

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. be avaltable following the loss of 8.3.1.1.8.2(4) Already contained in Ameneent 21 of the preferred power supply within a identified reference.

time consistent with the requirements of the safety function under normal and accident conditions, 8.3.8.4-1 CONF. have stored energy (fuel) at the site 9.5.4.1.l(2) Since this is contained in Chapter 9, in its own storage tank with the an insert was added as item (6) in capacity to operate .the stancR>y Section 8.3.1.1.8.2, which states the diesel generator power supply, while. design consnitment as written in the supplying post accident power DFSER and references Chapter 9, requirements to a unit for seven days, 8.3.8.4-1 CONF. have stored energy (fuel) at the site 9.5.4.2 (5th para.) Since this is contained in Chapter 9, in its own day tank with the capacity an insert was added as item (7) in to operate the standby diesel Section 8.3.1.1.8.2, wh;ch states the-

-generator power supply, while design consnitment as written in the supplying post accident power DFSER and references Chapter 9.

- requirements for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. have a fuel transfer system with the 9.5.4.2 (5th&6th per Since this is contained in Chapter 9, capability.of automatically an insert was added as item (7) in replenishing the day tank from the Section 8.3.1.1.8.2, which states the storace tank such that the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months design comitment as written in the fuel capacity of the day tank is DFSER and references Chapter 9.

maintained.

8.3.8.4-1 CONF. be capable of operating in its 8.3.1.1.8.2(8) Although this is obvious from a

Page No. Q 01/29/93 ROADMAP FOR SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 DFSER ISSUES

.00 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP 10 PRlhi DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE GE COMMENTS

service envircrvnent during and af ter reading of 8.3.1.1.8.3, (i.e., Diesel any design basis event, without generators ... start automatically on support from the prefere d w wer loss of bus voltage., etc.), we have supply, added the specific DFSER statement per the indicated reference.

G.3.8.4 1 CONF. be capable of starting, accelerating, 8.3.1.1.8.2(1)t(2) This design comitment is already ami being loaded with the design stated in Amenrh nt 21 of the noted load, within an acceptable ti m - reference, from the diesel engine's normal standby condition, 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. be capable of starting, accelerating, 8.3.1.1.8.2(8) This design comitment was already and being loaded with the design stated in the S$AR in 20.3 RAl 16, load, within an acceptable time - Question / Answer 430.282. However, with no cooling available, for a time the statement was added to Item (8) equivalent to that required to bring with a reference to Chapter 20.

the cooling equipment into service with energy from the diesel generator unit, 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. be capable of starting, accelerating, 8.3.1.1.8.2(9) This design comitment was added to and being loaded with the design the reference section as indicated.

load, within an acceptable time on a restart with an initial engine tenverature equal to the continuous rating full load engine tenperature, 8.3.8.4-1 CONF. be capable of accepting design load 8.3.1.1.8.2(10) This design comitment was added to following operation at light or no the reference section as indicated.

Load for a period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , However, this capability is to be placed on the manufacturer and should be type tested only at the factory.

Such tests are specifically execpted from the site periodic testing requirements to avoid undue stress on the diesel.

8.3.8.4*1 CONF. be capable of maintaining voltage and (See GE Comment) This design comitment is already frequency at the generator terminals stated in Amendnent 21, Sections within limits that will not degrade 8.3.1.1.8.2(2). 8.2.3(2), and the performance of any of the loads o.a.*, 1.5.2( 0.

conprising the design load below their mininsa requirements, including I the duration of transients caused by load application or load removal, 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. be capable of carrying its continuous 8.3.1.1.8.2(11) This design comitment is already in l Load rating for 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months followed by the Technical Specifications (Chapter l 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of operation at its short 16). However, it has also been added time rating, as a new insert (11) as indicated.

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! I 1 1 Page No. 9 01/29/93 I ROADMAP FOR SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 DFSER ISSUES ~

!- .00 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP 10 PWINT i

DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE GE COMMENTS i

i 1

j 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. start from each automatic and remote ~ (See GE Coment) This design comitment is already

. manual signal and then accelerate to stated in Sections 8.3,1.1.7(1) and j rated Voltage and frequency, and then 8.3.1.1.8.3 (1st paragraph) of j properly se@ enc 6 its toads if there Amenchnent 21 of the SAR.

l Is no offsite power available or i operate at no load if offsite power is available,

{

i 8.3.8.4 1 CONF. start but not sewence its loads by'a (See GE coment) This design convoltment is already j tocal manual start signal, stated in Sections 8.3.1.1.7(1) and j 8.3.1.1.8.3 (1st paragraph) of j Amenchnent 21 of the SAR.

l 8.3.8.4*1 CONF. be capable of being manually started (See CE Coment) The SSAR has been changed to indicate f without ac or de external electric ' the diesel 8s dependence on the j power, station Class 1E batteries for their l starting control and instrument power. The NRC staff agreed there l was no requirement that the diesels l be Independent of external de power.

j Therefore, the NRC should change the j . wordire of .this bullet to delete "or j de" from the sentence. Since this j now

enders the bullet redundant to j another bullet above (i.e.,

j "...without support from the j _ preferred power supply,"), this-j t4Jllet can be deleted altogether from the DFSER.

G.3.8.4 1 CONF. be capable of automatic acceleration - (See GE Conenent)- The $$AR has been changed to indicate

.to rated voltage and frequency the diesel 8s dependence on the

! without ac and de external electric station C; ass 1E batteries for their power and, starting control and instrunent f

power. The NRC staff agreed there

} was no requirement that the diesets i be independent of external de power.

I Therefore, tne NRC should change the

! wording of this bullet to delete "and

{ dc" from the sentence. ,Since thia l now renders the bullet redundant to i another buttet above (i.e.,

j "...without support from the .

I preferred power supply,"), this I- bullet can be deleted altogether from the DFSER.

}

j 8.3.8.4-1 CONF. be capable of allowing the bus to be (See GE Ccanent) The bus is dependent on the station i

manually energized without ac or de Class 1E batteries for breaker external electric power. solenoid control, and for protective 4

- , , - ,-,, . ~, . ,, , ~ , . . , _-,,me,. . i _.m.wr., - , -

1

Page No. 10

01/29/03 ROADMAP FOR SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 DFSER llSUES-

] .D0 ROADMAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP 70 PRlNT i DFSER ITEM NUMBER DFSER BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE CE COMMENTS i

j

- relay equipment power. The N*C staff j agreed there was no requirenent that the bus transfer be independent of j external de power. Therefore, the j- NRC should change the wording of this j butlet to delete."or de" from the j sentence. Since this now tenders the i bullet redundant to another buttet l above (i.e., "...without s@ port from - ,

j' the preferred power supply,"), this

j. bullet can be deleted attegether from

} the DFSER.

i e

l 0.3.8.4 1 CONF. The staff also understands the- 8.3.1.1.8.2(12) *his requirement was not found in j following: A menchent 21 of the SSAR, Chapter 8.

j However, it has been inserted as i The maximun loads expected to occur referenced.

, for each division (according to l- nameplate ratings) will not exceed 90

, percent of the continuous power outpu *ating of the dieset li generstw.

j 8.3.11.4 1 CONF. Each diesel renerator's air receiver 8.3.1.1.8.2(13) This requirement is already stated in j tanks will have sufficient capacity the 3rd paragraph of Section 9.5.6.2.

! for five starts without recharging. However, it has been added to t

i Chapter 8, as indicated, along with a

!: reference to Chapter 9.

I

j. Following one successf1l manual start G.3.8.4 1 CONF. 8.3.1.1.8.2(13) This statement is erroneous and

! of the diesel generator without ac or should be deleted from the DFSER.

l~ de external power, each dieset The statement does not (Imit the j generator's air receiver tanks will- ruber of start attespts before the have sufficient air remaining for first successful start, yet does not 5 four more starts. allow recharging power. A precise

conformance would require an infinite

[ air supply tank. The'SSAR si gly l states "Each independent air starting i system section has sufficient f; capacity for cranking the engine for l five automatic or manual starts-without recharging the tanks." (See 9.5.6.2.s i-j G.3.8.4 1 CONF. Following one unsuccessful a,anual or 8.3.1.1.8.?t13) Inese Last three buttets should be automatic start of the dieset conbined into one, which simly

.. generator' with and without ac or de states GE's design as written in'the l' external power, each diesel $$AR; namely: "Each independent air generator's air receiver tanks will starting system section has have sufficient air remaining for sufficient capacity for cranking the l three more successful starts without engine for five automatic or manual' I

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age No. 11 01/29/93 ROADMAP FOR SELECTED ABWR CHAPTER 8 DFSER ISSUES

.00 ROADNAP . REPORT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT DFSER ITEM NUMBER OFSEQ BULLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE GE CCMMENTS recharging, starts without recharging the tanks."

(See 9.5.6.2.)

8.3.8.4 1 C00 Automatic load sequence will begin at 8.3.1.1.8.2(4) The, requirement is already stated in

<= 20 seconds and will end at <= 65 Amen & ent 21 at referenced, secords .

Q.3.8.4 1 CONF. Following application of each load 8.3.1.1.8.2(2) The requirement is already stated in during load sequencing, voltage will Amen s ent 21 at referenced, not drop more than 25 percent from nominal voltage measured at the bus.

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. Following application of each toad 8.3.1,1.8.2(2) Consistent with Reg Guide 1.9, during load sequencing, frequency subsection 8.3.1.1.8.2(2) has been will not drop more than 5 percent enterged to state "Each diesel from nominal frequency measured at generator la capable of starting, the bus. accelerating and supplying its loads in their proper sequence without exceeding a 25% voltage drop, or a 5%

frequency drop, measured at the bus."

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. Frequency wlLL be restored to within 8.3.1.1.8.2(14) This requirement was stated 2 percent of nominat, and voltage indirectt tvia reference to RG 1.9 in will be restored to within 10 percent $$AR Subsection 8.3.1.1.8.3 (2nd of nominal within 60 percent of each paragraph). However, it has been load sequence time intervet, explicitly added as referenced.

G.3.8.4 1 CONF. During recovery from transients 8.3.1.1.8.2(15) This requirement was stated caused by step load increases or indirectly via reference to RG 1.0 in resulting from the disconnection of SSAR Subsection 8.3.1.1.8.3 (2nd the largest single load, the speed of paragre@). However, it has been the diesel generator unit will not explicitly added as referenced, exceed the nominal speed plus 75 percent of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint or 115 percent of nominal, wnichever is lower.

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. The transient following the conplete 8.3.1.1.8.2(16) This requirement was stated toss of load will not cause the speed indirectly via reference to RG 1.9 in of the unit to attain the overspeed SSAR Subsection 8.3.1.1.8.3 (2nd trip setpoint. paragraph). However, it has been explicitly added as referenced.

8.3.8.4 1 CONF. Bus voltage and frequency will 8.3.1.1.8.2(17) This requirement was been explicitly recover to 6.9kv+ 10% at 60+ 2 added as referenced.

percent H2 within 10 seconds following trip and restart of the largest load.

8.3.8.4-1 CONF. Each of the above design conunitments 8.3.1.1.8.2(18) This requirement was been explicitly

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Page No. 12 01/29/93 j ROADMAP FOR SELECTED M WR CHAPTER 8 DFSER ISSUES j- .00 ROADMAP .REroRT FORM ROADMAP TO PRINT

+

DFSER ITEM WUMSER OFSER ButLET STATEMENT SSAR REFERENCE .GE COMMENTS

{' will have the capability of being added as referenced, but with periodically verified. exception for the no* load test es i explained in 8.3.1.1.8.2(10).

j Q.3.8.7 1 COL The staff also understands that the 8.3.4.30. 8.3.4.33 Both are newty added COL ltems.

! above capacity consnitment for each 8.3.4.30 and 8.3.4.33 cover periodic distribution circuit will testing of oc distribution and dc

{' periodically be verified. The staff battery systems respectively.

j will verify that GE has specified in f a future SSAR amendnent that the COL apptirant sust include this verification in appropriate plant procedures.

] G.3.8.7 1 CONF. The staff understands that each Class 8.3.1.1.5.3 The capability for periodic testing 1E distribution circuit will be for the Class 1E distribution system capable of tre'smitting sufficient is declared per Amendnent 21 of the

{ energy to start ard operate all SSAR, as Indicated in the reference.

required loads in that circuit for all plant conditions described in the e

design basis and the design will also permit periodic verification of this required capacity for each distribution circuit.

8.3.9.2 1 COL in acidition, the staff understands 8.3.4.16 This COL action was added as 8.3.4.16 that adninistrative controts will be at Amendment 21, included to assure that Division II, Division !!!, and Olvision IV battery system loads will be shutdown assuning Division I battery system instrunentation toads are functioning property.

8.3.e.2-1 CONF The plant design is to be such that 8.3.4.30. 8.3.4.33 Both are newly added COL ltems.

specified tesperature limits will not 8.3.4.30 and 8.3.4.33 cover periodic be exceeded in the RCIC or control testing of ac distribution and de rooms for at least eight hours battery systems respectively.

following station blackout.

8.3.9.2 1 CONF The plant design _is to be such that 8.3.2.1.3.5, 19E.2.1 The cross reference from 8.3.2.1.3.5 specified tenperature Limits will not. to 19E.2.1.2.2 in Amendment 22 be exceeded in the RCIC or control matches this bullet. (See rooms for at least eight hours 19E2.1.2.2.2, Subsections 5) ard 6).1 following station blackout.

8.3.9.2*1 CONF Equipment required for the 580 event 8.3.2.1.3.5, 19E.2.1 The cross reference from 8.3.2.1.3.5 tocated in the RCIC room will be tt 19E.2.1.2.2 in Amendnent 22 designed and quallfled to a addresses this buttet. (See tenperature in excess of 151 degrees 19E2.1.2.2.2, subsection 5).1 F (the specified temperature lim u). However, the bullet should be

. - - . . , _ . u

Pago Co. 13 01/29/93 ROADMAP f 0R SittCitD ASWR CHAPitt 8 Dil!R ll$Utl

.00 #0ADNAP .itMat FORM ROAbuAP 10 tilWT DFSER lit 4 M Bit DiltR BULtti ST Af tMtut $$At RifttthCt CC COMMENil corrected in the Di$tt to be consistent with the $$AR in that "The ABWR plant wlll tv designed to prevent the ro m tepperature from reaching the equit cent design tenperature of 151 F (66 C),..."

8.3.9.2 1 LONF toalgeent required for the $80 event 8.3.2.1.3.5, 19t.*

the cross reference from

1.2.1.3.5 located in the control room will be to 196.2.1.2,2 in Amende it 22 designed and quattfled !a e acHresses tila bullet. (See tenversture in excess of 122 degrees 1982.1.2.2.2, tubsection 6).)

F (the sgecified tengerature tielt). However, the buttet should be corrected in the DF$tt to be consistent with the $$AR in that *The AbwR plant will be designed to prevent the room tenperature f rort reaching this equirment design tenperature (i.e.122 F (50 C)) for et least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ,..."

8.3.9.2 1 CohF the inittel tenperature in the 8.3.2.1.3.5, 196.2.1 .he cross reference from 8.3.2.1.3.5 heet*up calculations of 104 7 (A0 C) to 19E.2.1.2.2 in Amencknent 22 for the RCIC Room wlLL prevent the matches this bullet. [See equipnent f rom reaching the design 19t2.1.2.2.2, $uteection 5).1 tenterature of ill F (61 C) for et least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

8.3.9.2 1 CONF The inttlet tenperature in the 8.3.2.1.3.5, 19t.2.1 The cross reference f rom 8.3.2.1.3.5 heat up calculations of 79 F (26 C) to 19t.2.1.2.2 in Amerdnent 22 for the Main Control Room will matches this bullet. (See arevent the equipment from reaching 19E2.1.2.2.2, $d section 6).1

Oesign tenperature of 122 F (50 for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

8.3.9.2 1 CONF Envircrvnents expected during and 8.3.2.1.3.5, 191.2.1 The Cross reference from 8.3.2.1.3.$

following the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months coping time to 19E.2.1.2.2 in Ameronent 22 thn ..hout the plant for the station addressed the intent this buttet.

blackout event will not exceed the However, the bullet needs to be environment for which equipnent is corrected in the DF$tt with addition riesigned and quellfled, highlighted in brackets O es follows: $' Environments expected during and following the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months coptry time throughout the plant for the station blackout event wlll not exceed the environment for which equipnent (required for safe shutdown) is designed and qualified."

s 8.3.9.2 1 CONF The Division I battery will be sited 8.3.2.1.3.1 (4th par this bullet should be rewritten with sufficient capacity to supply consistent with the wording of the ett required $B0 loads without Load ref eronced paragraph in the $$AR,

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Pope Wo. 14 01/29/93 l RDADMAP FOR SittCilD Agwe CHAPitt 8 Df $tt ISSUtl

.00 ROADmAP .itPORT FORM ROADNAP to PRikt DF$tt If!M WUM8it Distr llULLET $1AftMthf %$AR ktftRtWCl GE COMMtutt shewing. which inclWes the sentence: "the Divlelon I battery, which controls '

the RCIC system, is sufficient for eight hours of coping during station blackout." The words "without load s'tdding" should te deleted because the operator would likely desire to shed tone loads to e enterve the battery's power to the matemei eatent possible.

8.3.9.2 1 CokF the RCIC systems will have sufficient 5.4.6.1($) this bullet stateneat is misleading capacity and capability to maintain and should te rewritten or deleted the plant in a safe shutdown to avse " safe shutdown" is not condition for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . defined. but may be assuned to tusn the vessel is no longer producing stert the RCIC la driven by a steem turb: e which receives steam from the vessel cLeing high pressure conditions (1.6., prior to AD$).

However, it may ',4 stated that the RCIC system is designed to perform its function without AC power for et least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months (see $$AR Amenckent 20 (or hip er), Subsection 5.4.6.1($1.

J 8.3.9.3 1 CohF the staf f mderstands that the ABWR 8.1.3.1.1.1 First paragraph of referenced

, design will include a futly quattfled subsection identiften the C10. GE alternative ac power source. The maintains the position that the ABWR staff understands tnet this alternate can cope with a station blackout ac power source wills without the C1G (see 8.3.2.2.2(2)(j) and 9.5.11.3). Therefore, it is be a contustion turbine Jenerator, uncertain what is intended by the

, staff ner the words in DF$tR Section 8.3.9.3: " .. fully quellfled alternative ac power source." ;

Regarding bullets within that )

, section, those consistent with good engineering practice are incorporated into the $$AR as indicated below.

However, we assune no regulatory <

requirements are being inposed on the nm C'ess it CfG pending NRC/GE managenent negotiation concerning SECY 90 016.

8.3.9.3 1 CONF te provided With a fuel supply that 9.$.11.2 (rew insert This das{gn comitment has been acMed is separate f rcen the f.sel surely for at the referenced point in Chapter 9.

the onsite emergency ac power sysiem Also, a general reference to Section

, (that is, a separate day tank 9.5.11 has been added to Section supplied fecrn a ccanon storage tank). 8.1.3.1.1.1.

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e Page No. 15 '

01/29/93

ROADMAP FOR $tLICitD AgWR CNAPitt 8 Di$tt l$$Vil

.D0 ROADMAP JtPott 80eM Ro!.DMAP 10 PRitt Di$th ITEM WUM6tR Of5ft pVLLLI STAffMEW1 $$At Ptf(R(ht! GE COMMENil 8.3.9.3 1 C0ht be provided with a fuel aultly that 9.$.11.2 (new Insert thlt design cemsnitment has been added is sagted and analysed consistent at the referenced point In Chapter 9.

with applicant r*endards.

8.3.9.3 1 CohF be capable of operating during and 8.2.1.3 (5th pers.) the referenced s esection s w ets af ter a station blackout without any this bullet statement. A similar oc surgsort systems powered from the design basis is stated in preferred power supply or the Class 9.$.11.2(1).

It power sources of f acted by the event, i

Q.3.9.3+1 CONF be designed to power all the normat 8.2.1.3 ($th pare.) The referenced subsection supports !

and/or Class it shutdown loads this tullet statement in that the ctg necessary within i hour er less of is 80% larger than each diesel the orset of the station blackout, -generator which, of itself, is such that the plant is capable of capable of amaintaining core cooling maintaining core cooling and and contalment integelty." See also ccetalment Integrity, 8.3.1.0.1, 3rd paragraph. subsection 9.$.11.1(1) states the capability of the C10 to assune its load within two minutes.

6.3.9.3 1 CONF be protected f rom design tests 8.3.1 (3rd para.) The location of the Cf 0 within the weather events (eacept seismic and Turbine tull ding supports this missites) to the extent that there bullet.

will be no consnon mode f altures between offsite preferred sources and the conh4stion turbine generator power source, 8.3.9.3 1 CONF be subject to quality assurance (none) The C10 is not safety related, and it guldelines consnensurate with its is not clear what is igl led by the I gortance to safety, staffl "...conenensurate with its I g ortance to safety". This bullet should be deleted, or Gt wit t add supporting text into the star,.

depending on the outcome of the GE/NAC negotletions concerning $tCY 90 016.

Q.3.9.3 1 CONF have sufficient capacity and 8.2.1.3 (5th par 4.) The referenced subsection supports capability to supply one divlslon of this bullet statement in that the CTG Class it loads, is 80% larger than each diesel

- generator which, of itself, is capable of one division of Class it- l (cads.

l 8.3.9.3 1 CONF have sufficient capacity and 8.3.1.2.1(2)(k) The referenced subsection (second capability to supply the normal paragraph) supports this bullet ]

non Class it loads used for safe statement in that the C1G is 80% l 4

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.* Pcge No. 16 01/29/93 e ROADMAP FOR $tlttitD ABWR CHAPitR 8 DF$tt 155Utl

.b0 ROADMAP .tf0007 FORM ROADMAP 10 Ptiki DF$tt litM NUMBLR DF$ta BULLtf $1AftMIWT slAR RiftRthCE 01 CCMMENil shutdown, larger than each diesel generator which, of itself, is capable of accwplishing such (osd requirements.

8.3.9.3 1 Conf undergo f actory testing cimilar to 9.5.11.6 (1st para.) The referenced section surports this those required f or the Class it bullet statement with the cavest that diesel generatne, such tests may be waived if reliability of .99 over $ years la attained.

8.3.9.3 1 CONF not supply power to ructeer safety 0.5.11.3 (1st pars.) the referenced section supports this related equipment except on corufition bullet statenent. See also of conplete f ailure of the emergency subsection 8.2.1.3 (6th paragrarA),

diesel generators and all offsite Power, 8.3.9.3 1 Cour not be a single point vulnerability 9.5.11.3 (1st pare.) the referenced section supports this with onsite emergency ac power bullet statement. A simiter sources, statement was also added to 9.5.11.2 as shown in the markup attached.

8.3.9.3 1 CONF be ad> Ject to site acceptance 9.5.11.4 (2nd pare.) the ref erenced section surports this testing, periodic preventative bullet statement.

mainte wnee, inspections, etc.

i

INSERTS FOR DTSER/ DES)GN VERIFICATION CHANCES ABVR SSAR CHAPTER 8 . JAN.'93 INSERT 8 The offsite transmission line to the main power switching station, the main power switching statiou, the tie lines from the main power switching station to the main power transforaer and the main power transformer shall be separated by a minimum of 15.24 meters (50 feet) from the offsite transmission line to the reserve power switching station, the reserve power switching station, the tie lines from the reserve power switching station to the reserve auxiliary transformer, and the reserve power auxiliary transformer, The output _ feeders of the reserve auxiliary transformer to the medium voltage (6.9 kV) switchgear shall be separated from the output of the main power and unit auxiliary transformers by a minimum of 15.24 meters (50 feet) outsida the turbine building or as described in Section 8.2.1.3. Instrument *'d control circuits of the main and reserve power systems shall be separatwo in the same manner as the power feeders. The switching stations may be in the same switchyard or separate switchyards provided the required minimum separation is maintained.

INSERT 9a Transformers shall be provided with separate oil collection pits and drains to a safe disposal area, and shall be provided with fire protection deluge systems as specified in Section 9A 4.6. Transformers shall also be provided with lightning protection systems and grounded to the plant grounding grid.

INSERT 9b This section provides a description of the design and performance requirements for the offsite power system. The offolte power system, as defined in the USNRC Standard Review Plan Section 8.2, consists of the following:

(Applicant Scope) a) The offsite transmission system, b) The plant switchyard (s),

c) The separated switching stations, d) The high voltage tie lines from the switching stations to the main power transformers, and to the reserve auxiliary transformer, e) The main step up power transformers, (ABWR Standard Plant Scope) f) The reserve auxiliary transformer, g) The three unit auxiliary transformers, h) The plant main generator,

1) The combustion turbine generator, j) The isolated phase buses from the main power transformer to the main generator circuit breaker, and to the unit auxiliary transformers, k) The main generator circuit breaker,

1) The non segregated phase buses from the unit auxiliary transformers to the input terminals of the medium voltage (6.9 kV) switchgear, c \ow62\nrcquest/ Insert:3.wp = January 29, 1993 1

m) The non. segregated phase bus and power cables from the reserve auxiliary transformer to the input terminals of the non safety related and safety related medium voltage (6.9 kV) switchgear, and n) The power cables from the combustion turbine generator to medium voltage (6.9 kV) switchgear, including the disconnect and interconnecting bus.

INSERT 9c The offsite electrical power system components within the scope of the applicant include items a) through e) identified in Subsection 8.2.1.1. The remaining items f) through n) are within the scope of the ABWR standard plant design.

INSERT 13 Separation of offsite equipment is discussed in 8.2.1.3. The plant fire protection system is discussed in 9.5.1.

INSERT 15 Offsite system circuits derive their control, protection, and instrument DC power from non Class 1E DC sources in the same non Class 1E load group, and are independent of the class 1E DC sources.

INSERT 16 Feeder circuit breakers from the unit auxiliary and reserve auxiliary transformers to the medium voltage (6.9 kV) switchgear are interlocked to prevent paralleling the normal and alternate power sources.

INSERT 17 Isolated and non segregated phase bus ducts provide access for inspection and maintenance. They also have provisions for excluding debris and fluids, and for draind.ng condensates.

INSERT 17 COL (17) Appropriate plant procedures shall include peric tic testing and/or verification to ensure the following:

(a) The normal and alternate offsite power circuits are energized and connected to the appropriate Class 1E distribution system division at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(b) The instrumentation, control, and protection systems, equipment, and components associated with the normal and alternate offsite preferred circuits are properly calibrated and perform their required functions, c \ow62\nrcquest/ Inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 2-

__-_--__--n

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . ~ _ _ _ _ . _ . -. _ _ ___.__

i i .

4 i (c) The required Class 1E and non-Class 1E loads can be powered from their j designated preferred power supply within the capacity and capability margins specified in the S5AR for the offsite system circuits.

(d) The loss of the offsite preferred power supply can be detected.

I

! (e) Switching between preferred power supplies can be accomplished.

1 i (f) The batteries and chargers associated with the preferred power system i

can meet the requirements of their design loads.

i The test and inspection intervals will be established and maintained according

' to the guidelines of IEEE 338 1977, Section 6.5, as appropriate for non class 1E systems (i.e. , Items (4) and (7) of Section 6.5.1 are not applicable) .

INSERT 21

Each building is equipped with grounding systems connected to the station grounding grid. As a minimum, every other steel column of the building perimeter will connect directly to the grounding grid.

The plant's main generator is grounded with a neutral grounding device. The impedance of that device will limit the maximum phase current under short circuit conditions to a value not greater than that for a three phase fault ac its terminals. Provisions are included to ensure proper grounding of

, the isophase buses when the generator is disconnected.

The onsite, medium voltage ac distribution system is resistance grounded at the neutral point of the low voltage windings of the unit auxiliary and reserve transfermers.

The neutral point of the-generator windings of the onsite, standby power supply units (1,e., the diesel generators and the combustion turbine generator), is through distribution type transformers and loading resistors, sized for continuous operation in the event of a ground fault.

The neutral point of the low voltage ac distribution systems are either solidly or impedance grounded, as necessary, to ensure proper coordination of ground fault protection. The de systems are ungrounded.

INSERT 21a The instrumentation grounding systems are connected to the-station grounding grid at only one point and are insulated from all other grounding circuits.

Separate instrumentation grounding systems are provided for plant analog (i.e.

relays, solenoids, etc.) and digital instrumentation systems, c:\ow62\nrcquest/ inserts 3 wp January 29, 1993 3-

i Ih/ERT.21h Nuclear Energy Property Insurance Association (NEPIA) document titled: " Basic Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants" )

i INSERT 21e These arresters are connected to the high voltage terminals of the main step.up and reserve transformers.

INSERT 22 This policy issue states that "...an alternate power source be provided to a sufficient string of non safety loads so that forced circulation could be maintained, and the operator would have available to him the complement of non safety equipment that would most facilitate his ability to bring the plant to a stable shutdown condition, following a loss of the normal power supply and plant trip." (Quote from EPRI Evolutionary SER, Section 4.2.1 Page 11.4 4, May 1992.)

The ABVR reserve auxiliary transformer has the same rating as the three unit auxiliary transformers, and therefore can assume the full load of any one unit auxiliary transformer (see last paragraph of Section 8.2.1.2). The interconnection capability for the ABWR is such that any plant loads can be manually connected to receive power from any of the six sources (i.e., the two switchyards, the combustion turbine, and the three diesel generators). The ABWR therefore exceeds the requirements of the policy issue.

INSERT 24a Simultaneously, a protective relay timer is started to allow the operator to take corrective action. The timer settings are based on the system load analysis such that the respective feeder breaker trips before any of the Class 1E loads experience damaging low voltage levels (see 8.3.4.31). This assures such loads will restart when the diesel generator assumes the degraded bus and sequences its loads. If the bus voltage recovers within the time delay period, the protective timer will reset. Should a LOCA occur during the time delay, the feeder breaker with the undervoltage will be tripped instantly. Subsequent bus transfer will be as described above. These bus voltage monitoring schemes are designed in accordance with Section 5.1.2 of IEEE 741.

INSERT 24b 8.3.4.31. . Power Distribution System Load Analysis A complete load analysis shall be performed for the Power Distribution System to demonstrate proper sizing of power source and distribution equipment. Such analysis chall provide the basis for the degraded voltage protective relay timer settings [see 8.3.1.1.7 (8)] and other protective relay settings, c \ow62inrcquest/ inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 4-L

l J

I 4

l j INSERT 24 COL j

! 8.3.4.20 Periodic Testing of Voltage Protection Equipment 1

l Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of instruments, I timers, and other electrical equipment designed to protect the distribution l system from: 1) loss of offsite voltage, and 2) degradation of offsite voltage.

These protection features are described in Subsection 8.3.1.1.7.

I lElf.RT 26 COL 8.3.4.21 Diesel Cenerator Parallel Test Mode

) The technical specifications require periodic testing of the diesel generator i loading capabilities by operating the diesel generators in parallel with the offsite power source. Appropriate procedures shall require that the duration 4

of the connection between the preferred power supply and the standby power supply shall be minimized in accordance with Section 6.1.3 of IEEE 308.

3 INSERT 27 COL i

i 8.3.4.22 Periodic Testing of Diesel Cenerator Protective Relaying Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of all diesel

, generator protective relaying, bypass circuitry and annunciation.

1 4

INSERT 28 Synchronizing interlocks are provided to prevent incorrect synchronization whenever the diesel generator is required to operate in parallel with the preferred power supply (see Section 5.1.4.2 of IEEE 741). Such interlocks shall be periodically tested (see Subsection 8.3.4.23).

4 1

INSERT 28 COL 8.3.4.23 Feriodic Testing of Diesel Generator Synchronizing Interlocks Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of diesel generator synchronizing interlocks (see 8.3.1.1.6.4).

4 INSERT 30 Class 1E rotating equipment, which could produce potential missile hazards, are not located in the same room, as feeder circuits from the offsite to the Class 1E busses, unless protective barriers are installed to preclude possible interaction between offsite and onsite systems.

c \ow62\nrcquest/ Inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 .$.

i j,*

INSERT 31 4

l The selection of that division should be based on the Class 1E bus loads, and j on the separation of the offsite feeds as they pass through the divisional

< areas.

, Based on local conditions, and on the reliability / stability of the main

transmission circuit, the COL applicant shall address the need for constraints l l (if any) on operation during auxiliary circuit maintenance periods when all j three Class 1E buses need to be fed from the main circuit.

i INSERT 35a

Automatic dead bus transfers are used to transfer from the preferred power I supply to the onsite AC source. Manual dead bus transfers are used between l l preferred power supplies, and to transfer from the onsite source back to the !

1 preferred power supply. )

i 1 INSERT 35b 1

l 8.1.2.0 Definitions I

! The definitions used throughout Chapter 8 are consistent with Section 3 of IEEE 308 with the following important clarifications for the ABVR:

division. The designation applied to a given safety related system or set of i components that enables the establishment and maintenance of physical, l electrical, and functional independence from other redundant sets of components. (The term " safety related" is added to the IEEE 308 definition.)

load group. An arrangement of buses, transformers, switching equipment, and loads fed from a common power supply. (The-last-three words "...within a division" are deleted with respect to the IEEE 308 definition.) A-load group may be safety related or non safety related depending on its common power i supply.

4 safety related. Any Class 1E power or protection system device included in the scope of IEEE 279 or IEEE 308. (This term is explicitly defined in IEEE 100, though not in IEEE 308.) Note that " safety related" includes both electrical

, and non electrical equipment, whereas " Class 1E" pertains only to electrical equipment (i.e., any equipment which has an electrical interface).

INSERT 43 COL 8.3.4.24 Periodic Testing of Thermal Overloads and Bypass circuitry Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of thermal overloads and associated bypass circuitry-for Class 1E HOVs.

c:\ow62\necquest/ inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 -6+

_. - _ . - - _ - _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _. -.- _, ., e

i

) INSERT $0b i

j 8.3.4.18 Administrative Controls for Switching 125 VDC Standby Charger I Administrative controls shall be provided to assure all input and output I circuit breakers are normally open when standby battery chargers are not in use (See Figure 8.3 4, Note 1). Administrative controls shall also be provided to j assure at least two circuit breakers (in series) are open 1.etween redundant I divisions when placing the standby charger into service. This includes

! controls for the keys associated with the switching interlocks. The only i exception is an emergency condition requiring one division's loads be assumed by a redundnt division by manual connection via the standby charger interface, j INSERT 54 COL

^

! 8.3.4.25 Periodic Inspection / Testing of Lighting Systems

] Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic inspections of all lighting i systems installed in safety related areas, and in passageways leading to and i

from these areas. In addition, lighting systems installed in such areas which l are normally de energized (e.g., guide lamps) shall be periodically tested.

1 1

d INSERT 58 f The separation of electric penetration assemblies exceeds the requirements for cables and raceways given in Section 6.1.5 of IEEE 384. Separation by distance l (without barriers) is allowed only within the inerted containment. Here, the minimum allowable distances of .9 meters (3 feet) and 1.5 neters (5 feet) j apply, as delineated,in Section 6.1.5 of IEEE 384. However, the lesser j distances allowed by IEEE 384 for enclosed raceways does not apply to the j containment penetrations themselves.

For the other ends of the penetrations, which are outside the containment in the non inerted areas, separation by distance alone is not allowed. These will

be separated by separate rooms, or barriers, or different floor levels. Such l walls, barriers or floors are 3-hour fire-rated.

] Such separation criteria applies to the following:

1. Between redundant penetrations, 4

2. Between penetrations containing non Class 1E and penetrations containing l

Class 1E or associated Class 1E circuits, and 3, Between penetrations containing Class 1E circuits and uther divisional or non divisional cables.

1 c \ow62\nrcquest/ inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 7

e INSERT 61 COL 8.3.4.26 Controls for Limiting Potential Hazards into Cable Chases Appropriate plant procedures shall provide administrative control of operations and maintenance activities to control and limit introduction of potential i hazards into cable chases and the control room area. l INSERT 64 Fuses cannot be periodically tested and are exempt from such requirements per Section 4.1.7 of IEEE 741. )

l INSERT 64 COL (3) Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of protective and/or curront limiting devices (except fuses) to demonstrate their functional capability to perform their required safety functions.

INSERT 69 The fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD) drive motors derive their power from the Division I Class lE bus.

INSERT 71 COL 8.3.4.27 Periodic Testing of Class lE Equipment Protective Relaying Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of all protective relaying and/or thermal overloads associated vith Class lE motors and switchgear.

INSERT 72 COL 8.3.4.28 Periodic Testing of CVCF Power Supplies and EPA's Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of the CVCF power supplies and associated electrical protection assemblies (EPA's) which provide power to the Reactor Protection System.

INSERT 73 COL 8.3.4.19 Control of Access to Class 1E Power Equipment Administrative control of access to Class lE power equipment areas and/or distribution panels shall be provided (see Section 13.6.3).

l l

c:\ow62\nrcquest/ insert:3.wp January 29, 1993 8-l

__ . ._ __ .- _ ~ _ - - - ~ _- _ _ _ . -. __ _ - - _ .

INSERT 75 The circuits associated with the FMCRD motors from the output of the load center transformer are classified as non-Class 1E and are physically and electrically independent of all Class 1E circuits (that is the circuit cables will not be routed in the same raceway with cables of any Class 1E division or in the same raceway with cables that are considered isolated from a Class 1E division by devices defined in Section 7.2.2.2 of IEEE 384.

INSERT 75 COL 8.3.4.29 Periodic Testing of Class 1E Circuit Breakers Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic calibration and functional testing of the fault interrupt capability of all Class 1E breakers, fault interrupt coordination between the supply and load breakers for each Class 1E load and the Division I non Class 1E load, and the zone selective interlock feature of the breaker for the non Class 1E load.

INSERT 78 8.1,3.1.1.3 controls and Indication The ABWR electrical system design provides controls and indicators in accordance with IEEE 308 guidelines. The specific design bases are described as follows:

1. The ABVR electrical system provides controls and indicators in the main control room.

2. The design provides for control and indication outside the main control room for; i

a. Circuit breakers that switch Class 1E buses between the preferred and standby power supply,

! b. The standby power supply, and i

c. Circuit breakers and other equipment as required for safety systems that must function to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition.

l l 3. Operational status information is provided for Class 1E power systems.

l

4. Class 1E power systems required to be controlled from outside the main control room also have operational status information provided outside the central control room at the equipment itself, or at its power supply, or at an alternate central location.

5. The operator is provided with accurate, complete, and timely information pertinent to the status of the execute features in the control room, l c \ow62\nrcquest/ Inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 9-l I *

l. '

i. -

i j 6. Indication is provided in the control room of protective actions and j execute features unavailability.

j

7. Electric power systems and equipment has the capability of being i periodically tested.

1 j~ 8. Testability of electrical systems and equipment is not so burdensome operationally that required testing intervals cannot be included, i

1 i INSERT 78 COL ,

I 8.3.4.30 Periodic Testing of Electrical Systems & Equipment

{ Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of all Class lE l electrical systems and equipment in accordance with Section 7 of IEEE 308.

{

INSERT Bla J

The batteries are installed in accordance, with industry recommended practice as 4

defined in IEEE 484, and meet the recommendations of Section 5 of IEEE 946 (see i 8.3.4.32).

. INSERT 81b IEEE Std 484 Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation j of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and i

Substations.

! INSERT 81c 8.3.4.32 Class 1E Battery Installation and Maintenance Requirements

The installation, maintenance, testing, and replacement of the Class 1E station j batteries shall meet the requirements of IEEE 484 and Section 5 of IEEE 946, i

INSERT 81d

! IEEE Std 741 Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class IE Power Systems and Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

IEEE Std 946 Recommended Practice for the Design of Safety Related DC Auxiliary Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations c \ow62\nrequest/ inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 10-

_ - _ _. , , _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .__ C

4 q INSERT 81 COL 8.3.4.33 Periodic Testing of Class 1E Batteries

)'

Appropriate p 4nt procedures shall include periodic testing of Class 1E

batteries to assure they have sufficient capacity and capability to supply power to their connucted loads.

j INSERT 82 j (6) Each diesel generator has stored energy (fuel) at the site in its own I storage tank with the capacity to operate the standby diesel generator power supply, while suppying post accident power requirements to a unit for seven j

days (see 9.5.4.1.1).

(7) Each diesel generator has stored energy (fuel) at the site in its own day tank with the capacity to operate the standby diesel generator power supply while supplying post accident power requirements for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . The fuel transfer system automatically maintains the capacity of the day tank (see 9.5.4.2).

(8) Each diesel generator is capable of operating in its service environment during and after any design basis event, without support from the preferred power supply. It can start up and run, with no cooling available, for the time required to bring the cooling equipment into service as it sequences onto the bus (see 20.3 RAI 16, Question / Answer 430.282).

(9) Each diesel generator is capable of rertarting with an initial engine temperature equal to the continuous rating full load engine temperature.

(10) Each diesel generator is capable of accepting design load following operation at light or no load for a period of 4. hours. This capability shall be demonstrated by the supplier prior to shipment, but is exempt from periodic testing to avoid undue strt- i to the diesel engine.

(11) Each diesel generator is capable of carrying its contint.ous load rating of 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months followed by 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of operation at its short time rating.

(12) The maximum loads expected to occur for each division (according to nameplate rating of the ratings) dieseldo not exceed 90 percent of the continuous power output generator.

(13) Each diesel generator's air receiver tanks have sufficient capacity for five starts without recharging (see 9.5.6.2).

(14) During diesel generator load sequencing, the frequency will be restored to-within 2% of nominal, and voltage will be restored to within 10% of nominal within 1.9). 60% of each load sequence time interval (see C 4 of Regulatory Guide i

i c:\ow62\nrcquest/ Inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 11-o

. -- _- -. ~. . . ~ - _ - _ - - - . .-._- . - ~ --

i s

I (15) During recovery from transients caused by step load increases or resulting from the disconnection of the largest single load, the speed of the diesel generator unit will not exceed the nominal speed plus 75% of the difference i between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint or 115% of nominal, j whichever is lower (see C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.9).

(16) The transient following the complete loss of load will not cause the speed i of the diesel generator unit to attain the overspeed trip setpoint (see C.4 of I Regulatory Guide 1.9).

1

)'

(17) Bus voltage and frequency will recover to 6.9 kV110% at 60f2% Hz within 10 seconds following trip and restart of the largest load.

l (18) Each of the above design criteria has the capability of being periodically t

verified (see 8.3.4.36). However, note exception for Item (10).

] INSERT 82 COL 8.3,4.3A Periodic Testing of Class 1E Diesel Generators Appropriate plant procedures and/or technical specifications shall include periodic testing and/or analysis of Class 1E diesel generators to demonstrate their capability to supply the actual full design basis load current for each sequenced load step (see 8.3.1.1.8.2). INSERT 83 The capacity of each of the four redundant Class 1E CVCF power supplies is based on the largest combined demands of the various continuous loads, plus the largest combination of non continuous loads that would likely be connected to the power supply simultaneously during normal or accident plant operation, whichever is higher (see 8.3.4.34).

INSERT 83 COL 8.3.4.34 Periodic Testing of Class 1E CVCF Power Supplies Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of Class 1E constant voltage constant frequency (CVCF) power supplies to assure they have sufficient capacity to supply power to their connected loads (see j

8.3.1.1.4.2.1).

INSERT 84 The capacity of each of the four redundant Class 1E battery chargers is based on the largest combined demands of the various continuous steady state loads, plus charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state within the time stated in the design basis, regardless of the status of the plant during which these demands occur (see 8.3.4.35).

c:\ow62\ntcquest/ inserts 3.wp January 27, 1993 12-

INSERT 84 COL 8.3.4.35 Periodic Testing of Class 1E Battery Chargers Appropriate plant procedures shall include periodic testing of Class 1E battery chargers to assure they have sufficient capacity to supply power to their connected loads (see 8.3.2,1.1). Such periodic tests shall be in conformance with Section 7.5.1 of IEEE 308 (i.e., IEEE 338).

1 INSERT 87 The CTG is provided with a fuel supply that is separate from the fuel supply for the onsite emergency ac power system (that is, a separate day tank supplied from a common storage tank). The fuel shall be sampled and analyzed to maintain quality consistent with standards recommended by the CTG manufacturer.

The CTG is completely independent, and located in a separate building, from the the emergency ac power sources. Thus, no single point vulnerability exists between them.

INSERT 100 Control room indications are provided for system output, i.e., volts, amps, watts, vars, frequency, synchronization, field volts, field amps, enbine speed, and watt hours. Diesel generator status (i.e., "RUN", "STOP") indication is provided for the Remote Shutdown System.

INSERT 101 i

Solid or flexible metalic conduit is considered an acceptable barrier, providing 2.54 cm (1 inch) separation is maintained between the outside wall of the conduit and other wiring not of the same division.

INSERT 102 (Note that in Table 8.3 1, diesel generator "A" corresponds with Class 1E electrical division "I", "B" with "II", and "C" with "III".)

INSERT 103 Qualification of Actuators for Power Operated Valve Assemblies with Safety Related Functions for Nuclear Power Plants, et\ow62\nrequest/ Inserts 3.wp January 29, 1993 y

i*

INSERT 104 IPCEA 46 426/ Power Cable Ampacities i IEEE S.135 INSERT 105 ;

.. l

.j UL.44 UL Standard for Safety Rubber Insulates' *,' ires and Cables l i

4 INSERT 106 4

k' hen coordinated with the design of the reserve auxiliary transformer, the j transmission line shall support a maximum allowable voltage dip of 20% during the starting of large motors.

i i

T l

c:\ow62\nrcquest/ inserts 3.wp Jerwary 29,1M3 14

ABWR mme Standard Plant uv c (7) Radiation shielding is provided and access allowances for natural environmental control patterns are established to allow a disturbances such as earthquakes, floods, ,

properly trained operating staff to control and storms at the station site, radiation doses within the limits of applicable regulations in any mode of normal (15) Standby electrical power sources have plant operations. sufficient capacity to power all safety j related systems requiring electrical power l (8) Those portions of the nuclear system that concurrently. I form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are designed to retain integrity as (16) Standby electrical power sources are a radioactive material containtnent barrier provided to allow prompt reactor shutdown i following abnormal operational transients and removal of decay heat under circum-and accidents. stances where normal auxiliary power is not available.

(9) Nuclear safety systems and engineered safety 1 features function to assure that no damage (17) A containment is provided that completely l to the reactor coolant pressure boundary encloses the reactor systems, drywell, and l results from internal pressures caused by suppression chambers. The containment l abnormal operational transients and employs the pressure suppression concept. 1 accidents. ;

(18) It is possible to test primary contain-ment integrity and leak tightness at (10) Where positive, precise action is immediate-ly required in response to abnormal opera- periodic latervals.

tional transients and accidents, such action is automatic and requires no decision or (19' A secondary containment is previded that manipulation of controls by plant operations completely encloses the primary containment pert,onnel, above the reactor building basemat. This secondary containment provides for a !

(11) Safety related actions are provided by controlled, monitored release of any equipment of sufficient redundance and inde- potential radioactive leakage from the pendence so that no single failure of active primary containmen;.

components, or of passive components in cer.

tain cases in the long _ term, will prevent (20) The primary containnent and secondary the required actio_ns.)For . stems com containment in con unction with other nents t which EE 27 apply, ingle 11]- safety related feat ures limit radio-p urcs I cith active r pass' e ele rical logical effects of arcidents resulting in co onents te consi redi ecog lon o the release of radior etive material to the t e high antic' ated ilure ates ! containment volumes to less than the assive lectrica comp ents elativ to prescribed accep'able limits, passiv mecha ' cal co onen .

(21) Provisions are made for removing energy (12) Provisions are made for control of active from the primary containment as necessary

components of safety related systems from to maintalo the integrity of the the control room, containment system following accidents that release energy to the containment.

(13) Safety related systems are designed to permit demonstration of their functional (22) Piping that penetrates the primary performance requirements, containment and could serve as a path for the uncontrolled release of radioactive f (14) The design of safety related systems, material to the environs is automatically componenta and structures includes is olated when necessary to limit the Amendment 23 124

dM u .a..a pi...

nutous mn (1) specified acceptable fuel designs limits and There are three ladependent AC load groups

} design conditions of the reactor coolant provided to assure ladepudence and redundancy pressure boundary are not exceeded as a of equipment function. These meet the safety result of anticipated operational requirements, assuelag a 61a61 e failure, since:

o c c u r r e n e. e s , a n d (1) each load group is ladspendently capable of (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity isolation from the offsite power sources, and other vital functions are maintained in and the event of postulated accidents.

(2) each load group has separate circuits to The onsite electric power supplies including independent power sources.

the batteries, and the onsite electric dis.

tribution system shall have sufficient For each of the three AC load groups there independence, redundancy, and testability to are independent batteries which furalsh DC load perform their safety functions assuming a single and control power for the corresponding divi.

failure. sions. An additional battely furalsbes DC load and control power for the safety system logic Electric power from the transmission network and control (S$1.C) Division IV bus.

to the ossite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent cir. The reactor protection lastrumentation is cults (not necessarily os separate riShts of way) powered from four ladependent AC/DC power !

designed and located to inialmize to the extent sources.

practical the likelihood of simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and envi. The ossite electric power systems are roamental ened!ticas. A switchyard common to designed to meet the reluirements of Criterion both circuits is acceptable. Each of these cit. 17. For further discussion, see the following cults shall be designed to be available in suffi. sections:

cicat time following a loss of all onsite alter.

noting current power supplies and the other off. Chapter /

site electric power circuit to assure that spect. Eadalen Ihls fled acceptable fuel design limits and design condillons of the reactor er olant pressure boun. (1) 1.2 General Plant Description dary are not exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few (2) 3.10 Seismic Quali5 cation of Seismic seconds following a loss of coolant accident to Category!!astrumentation and assure that the core cooling, containment late. ElectricalEquipment grity, and other vital safety functions are asintsined. (3) 3.11 EsvircascatalQuali5 cation of Safety Related Mechanica! sad Provisions shall be included to mialmize the ElectricalEquipment probability of loslag electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of or (4) 83 Oasite Fower Systems coincident with, the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from 3.1.2.1A1.2 Oshite E3sterte Power System the transmission network, or the loss of power A tof M from the oasite electric power supplies. Ih1esign of the offsite power systems is out of the scope of the ABWR design.4%e ABWR 3.1.2.212 Evaluation Agalast Criterlos 17 Stsadard Plant /;: :' ' c'; ;rr sym laterfacesVare araeawa m addressed y[ in Sabeestion s.23#do.

3.1.2.212.1 Oasite Electric Power Systeen

- / /e.rce 1 40 s f bs,cy,,e, sfp w/ M N " "

R A8 kresupPluths@ na N Cey g l,on d len p n de b n m m, ., S4ra f a 12.I.I s o V I'2' u.n

f ABWR mmo Standard Plant nov n

8.1 INTRODUCTION

power, which is backfed from the ofnite powema n.osmurofl%4-over the main power circuit to the unit auxiliary 8.1.1 Utility Grid Description transformers. The two low voltage windings of the reserve transformer are rated 18.75 MVA each.

The description of the utility grid system is out of the AllWR Standard Plant scope however there are 8.1.2.2 Description of Onsite AC Power Distribution interface requirements contained in Section 8.2.3.1 Sptem which must be complied with by the Utility. rM H- C.lo JJ /6 Thrce O

g' "" ; .'. :6:y ::!r:

8.1.2 Electric Power Distribution System o p 'x? ;=:; and one m::= 5";*jpuses fe C lau /t d C8.1.2.1 Description of Offsite Electrical :h:;2 * , . division receive power from the Power [ single unit auxiliary transformer Mb load group. l. cad groups A, B and C line up with Sptem Divisions I,!! and lit, respectively. One winding of The scope of the offsite electrical power system the reserve auxiliary transformg'may bge tilized to includes the entire system from d; ::: !rox ' t supply reserve power to C. -. thenar .nfety.k' g ig buses either directly or indirectly through bus the transmission lines comingjpg:..; .wjitggo c: . ... v' I tie reakers. The three farcry reinted) buses may be

,t! _ the termination of the bus dutte. -

'f# fg

, -& % ;:ng :Mt the input terminals of the supplied power from the other winding of the reserve

" ~ circuit breakers for the 7.2KV switchgear. Tbc auxiliary transformer.

applicant has design responsibility for portions of the # CI*3I lb offsite power system. The scope split is as oefined in A combustion turbin{ generator supplies standby the detailed description of the offsite power system power to permanent ton.mse3 toads.S S: 4

?'1'* - $d!" ; These loads are gLouped on one of in Section 8.2.1.1.

the 6.9KV buses per load group. Kpwer emppMee-4 The 1500MVA main power transformer is a is also provided from the combustion turbinefto the F*

bank of three single phase transformers. One single three Class 1E medium voltage buses k S: ::=: -

phase installed spare transformer is provided. y ti!!!r;; via breakers that are normally racked out roeid cirevir for Divisions I and 111 and remote manually closed Ageneratorrbretker upWe of interrupting the under administrative contr r Division 11.

maximum available fault current is provided. This (P/c r4/c allowsp ggegog M9n off line and the in general,i m )otors arger than 300 KW are maid {pwi (o be udlized'as a power source for the supplied from the 6.9Kv bus. Motors 300KW or unit auxiliary transformers and their loads, both smaller but larger than 100KW are supplied power Class 1E and non. Class 1E. This is also the start.up from 480V power cente switchgear Motors 100KW power source for the unit, j4g \or smauer are_ supplied power from 480V motor

/ control center),The 6.9KV and 480V single line There are three unit auxiliary transformers, diagrams are shown in iigure 8.31.

connected to supply power to three approximately equalload groups of equipment. The ' Normal During normal plant operatibTall of the non.

Preferred' power feed is from the unit auxiliary Class 1E buses and two of he Class'1E buses are transformers so that there normally are no bus supplied with power fro th$ urb' 2e generator transfers required when the unit is tripped off the through the unit auxiliary t ansfor ers. TheWniMet): ne M "

line. lie -om the reserve (Cbu h My' Class 1E bus thosformer. Thiis s ivision is immediately available, without a us transfer,if the normal One, three.windin . 7.5 MVA unit reserve sujliary transfortner is supplied to provide power via preferred power is lost to the other two divisions.

o'Ec[nSi#g for them;_:y buses as an alternate hov,, to the

Normal Preferred' power. The other Three di sel generator-standby ac s power supplies

' da pndary winding supplies reserve power to the provide feetruha:::p buses,b :H "+; 5.':2: ;R Class If!separagonsi,tp

!rf ,, awVen norf source of power for eachkl or alterna This is truly a reserve transformer because unit preferred'pewer sup li Lare1Fot' available. The startup is accomplished from the normal preferred transfer from the normal preferred or alternate Amendment 21 8.11

ABM 334sioo40 nvs Standard Plant ECCS derives its power from the four divisions of preferred power supplies to the diesel generator is 125V de buses. The four buses provide the automatic. The transfer back to the normal redundancy for various instrumentation, logic and preferred or the alternate preferred power source is a manual transfer.

trip circulis and solenoid valves. The SSLC power supply is further described in Subsection 8.13.L1.2.

The Division I. II and ill standby ac power '

supplies consist of an independent 6.9Kv Class 1E 8.1.23 Safety Loads diesel generator, one for each division. Each DG may be connected to its respective 6.9Kv Class 1E The safety loads utilire various Class 1E ac and/or de sources for instrumentation and tuotive or switchgear bus through a p circuit bresker control power or both for all systems required for located in the switchgear, g

safety. Combinations of power sources may be involved in performing a single safety function. For The standby ac power system is [iown Ij thepa example, le oflow voltage de power in the control logic providing the required power to safely reactor after loss of preferred power ( d/or may provide an actuation signal to control a 6.9kV to mai ain the circuit breaker to drive a large ac powered pump )

loss of coolant accident (LOCA '

safe shutdown condition and operate the Class 1E motor. The systems required for safety are listed auxiliaries necest,ary for plant safety 1_ 3I after below:

shutdown,4 xy r M ' ' ;

n! 4 (1) Safety System Logic and Control Power Supplies 1

greerc-C including the Reactor Protection System p

The plant 480 VAC m:':q power system distributes sufficient power for normal auxiliary and (2) Core and Containment Cooling Systems Class 1E 480 volt plant loads. All Class 1E elements zy power distribution system are (a) Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)

WOW tit ~the';

supplied via the 6.9Kv Class 1E switchgear and, therefore, are capable of being fed by the normal (b) High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) preferred, alternate preferred, standby or System combustion turbine generator power supplies.

(c) Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

The 120 VAC non- its E instrumentation power system, Figure 8. gp ovides power for (d) Leak Detection and Isolation System (LDS) non Class 1E control and entation loads. (c) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Systern f (RCIC)

The Class E 12 VAC instrument power system, Figure 8. fp vides for Class 1E plant (3) ESF Support Systems controls and ins u entation. The system is separated into Divisions 1,11 and 111 with distribution (a) Diesel generator Sets and Class 1E ac/dc panels fed from their respective divisional sources. power distribution sptems.

The 125V de power distribution system provides (b) 11VAC Emergency Cooling Water System four independent and redundant onsite battery (HECW) sources of power for operation of Class 1E de loads.

The 125V de non Class 1E power is supplied from (c) Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW)

System three 125V de batteries located in the turbine building. A separate non Class 1E 250V battery is id l S prodded to supply uninterruptible power / to the plantcomputers and non C (c) Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

The safety system and logic control (SSLC) for RPS and MSIV derives its power from four (f) Reactor Building Emergency HVAC System uninterruptible 120 VACgbuses. The SSLC for the dinrifr,/ (g) Control Building HVAC System Sce f joc S*0}'

812 Amendment 21

ABWR msioua uvn Standard Plant (h) High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply Sptem all divisional buses on the loss of only one of the offs power supplies.The transfer to themissfiinseeo th e t-(4) Safe Shutdown Spteris preletted feeder is manual. During the interim, power is automatically supplied by the dicsci (a) Standby Liquid Control Spiem (SLCS) generators.

WrYlO/0 n !

(b) Nuclear Boiler iystem The redundant Class 1E electricaW:M. _,.

(Divisions I,11, and 111) are provided with 69parate Safety /F.elief Valves (SRVs) onsite standby ac power supplies, electrIqbuses, (i)

(ii) Steam Supply Shutoff Portion distribution cables, controls, relays and other electrical devices. Red,tpdapt partg #of the system are (c) Residuallieat Removal (RilR) system phnically separated a'nMolepYa' dent to the extent decay heat rempval that in any design basis event with any result 5g loss Q[

(5) p,g'_g

-#efefec4 Monitoring Systems of equipment, the plant can still be shut down with either of the remaining two divisions. Independent E

/ raceway systema are provided to meet '" -

' cable separation requirements for Divisions I,11, and (a) Neutron Monitoring Sptem 111.

(b) Process Radation Monitoring Sptem Divisions I, II, and !!! standby ac power supplies (c) Coatalament Atmosphere Monitoring have sufficient capacity to provide power to all their System respective loads. Loss of the normal preferred power supply, as detected by 6.9Kv Class 1E bus (d) Suppression PoolTemperature Monitoring under voitage relays, will cause the standby power System supplies to stan and connect automatically, in suffi-cient time to ditaintain the reactor in a safe condition For detailed listings of Didsion 1,11 and 111 loads, safely shut down the reactor or limit the see Tables 831 and 83 2. consequences of afGgn bash accident (DBA) to acceptable limitsf The standby power supplies are 8.1.3 Design Bases capable of being started and stopped manually and are not W stopped automatically during 8.13.1 Safety Design Bases -Onsite Power emergency operation unless required to preserve integrity. Automatic start will also occur on receipt 8.1J.1.1 General Functional Requirements of a level 1 1/2 signal (HPCF laitiate), level 1M 5

8.1J.1.1.1 Onsite Power Systems General The Class 1E 6.9Kv Divisions I,11, and til ploff lE switchgear buses, and associated 6.9Kv diesel The unit's totaLA ' -- Joad s divided into three divisions,4 ': d ,- ,". 'Eai /f -Tis generators,480 VAC distribution systems,120 VAC fed by an ind ndent 6.9Kv Class 1E bus, and each and 125 VDC power and control systems conform to

. M ;;:%

n ' access to one, god two offsite Seismic Category I requirements and are housed in

/ power sources. An additional wer source is Seismic Category I structures. Seismic Qualification provided by the combustion tur Ine e ne r;.= is in accordance with IEEE Standard 344. (See (Cr0 l,h o f t!' c 5 Section 3.10)

{S,l} pro ded A deseqS in cT,on 9*S. Il*y Ea:h of the two normally energizedfpower feeders 8.13.1.1.2 SSLC (Safety System Logic and Control) Power Supply System Design Bases 7.are provided for thg ops I,11 and 111 Class 1E systems. Normally twoA are fed frojn thp normal preferred power source and the -c thir(",e la order to provide redundant, reliable power of acceptable quality and availability to support the pe is fed from the alternate preferred power safety logic and control functions during normal, source. Both feeders are used during normal plant operation to prevent simultaneous deenergiration of and accident conditions, the following design it n Crm l P re f e r1co' cs od a ltey n,te g pm l f'rC ICIF#d f et.)er) s13 Amendment 21

ABWR swimw nev ti Standard Plant .

(1) SSLC power has four sepatate and independent (2) RG 1.9 - S eiection, Design and l Class IE inverter coastant voltage constant Qualification of Diesel generator

. frequency (CYCF) power supplies each backed Units Used as Standby (Onsite) by separate Class 1E batteries. Electric Power Systems at Nuclear ecsf eri"C Power Plants, I (2) Prousion is made for automatic witching to the )

alternate bypass supply from it ivision in case (3) RG 132 - Criteria for Safety Helated Elec. (

of a failure of the inverter power supply. The tric Power Systems for Nuclear I J

inverter power supply b synchronized in both Power Plants; frequency and phase with the alternate bypass I

supply, so that unacceptable volta 6e spikes will (4) RG 1.47 - Dypassed and inoperable Status ,

l be avoided in case of an automatic transfer from Indication for Nuclear Power normal to s! ternate supply. The SSt C uninter. Plant Safety Systems; i ruptible power supply complies with IEEE Std.

'I I[ \

-b 944. (5) RG 1.63 - Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Light Water Cooled Nuclear j ' 8.1.3.1.2 Regulatory Requirements Power Plants;

.__./

The following list of criteria is addressed in accordance with Table 8.1 1 which is based on Table (6) RG 1.75 - PhysicalIndependence of Electric 81 of the Standard Review Plan. In general, the Systems; ABWR ls d: signed in accordance with all criteria.

Any exceptions or clarifications are so noted. Isolation between Class 1E power supplies and non Class 1E loads is discussed in Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.1 General Design Criteria 83.1.1.1.

(1) GDC 2 - Design Bases for Protection against * (7) RG 1.81 - Shared Emergency and Shutdon Natural Phenomesa; Electric Systems for Multi Unit PpaWc Effeefs. N9 clear Power Plants; (2) GDC 4 - Environmen[tal and ?:dyDesign Bases;

( w .-

The ABWR is designed as a single. unit plant, Therefore, this Regulatory Guide is not (3) GDC 5 - Sharing of Structures, Systems and applicable.

Components; (8) RG 1.106 Thermal Overload Protection for The ABWR is a single unit pisut design. Electric Motors on Motor.

Thersfore, this GDC is not applicable. Operated Valves; (4) GDC 17 Electric Power Systems; (9) RG 1.108 Periodic Testing oI Dicse1 Generator Units Used as Onsite (5) GDC 18 Inspection and Testing of Electrical Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Systems; Power Plants; (6) GDC 50 Containment Design flases. (10) RG 1.118- Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems 8.1.3.1.2.2 NRC Regulatory Guldes (a t) R(r l,Id [,y[$$1g,p og; 7{l'(([jl[; pg (1) RG 1.6 - Independence Between Redundant f (IN86I'l#3 N INI) N f Ob RG 1.153- Criteria for Power, instrument. *'I Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems; 8 ation, and Control Portions of Safety Systems; RG 1.155- Station Blackout

--- g a cc H .- ,

k MN 33A6100A0 nev s

. Standard Plant 1

8.1J.1.2J Branch Techalcal Positions (3) TMI Action item II.G.1. Emergency Power for Pressuriar Equipment; (1) BTP ICSB 4 (PSB) . Requirements on Motor-Operated Valves in the ECCS Accumulator This criteria is applicable only to PWRs and 1.ines: does not app.T to the ABWR.

I This BTP is written for Pressurized Water 8.1.4 COL License Information i

Reactor (PWR) plants only and is therefore not l applicable to the ABWR, 8.1.4.1 Diesel Generator Reliability (2) BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) . Use of Diesel generator NUREO/CP. 0660 pertaining to the enhancement l Sets for Peaking: - of onsite diesel generator reliability through ,

operating procedures and training of personnel will

{

j The diesel generator sets are not used for be addressed by the applicant (see Subsection i peaking in the ABWR design. Therefore, this 8.13.1.2.4(1)).

i criteria is satisfied.

l 8.1.5 References l (3) BTP ICSB 11 (PSB) . Stability of Offsite Power Systems; IEEE Std 944, Recommended Practice for the Application and Testing of Uninterruptible Power 1 Supplies for Power Generating Stations. j (4) BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) . Application of the Single l

l Failure Criterion to Manually. Controlled l Electrically-Operated Valves; '

i j (5) BTP ICSB 21. Ouldance for Appilcation of i Regulatory Guide 1.47; 4

I (6) BTP PSB 1. Adequacy of Station Electric 1

Distribution System Voltages;

[See Subsection 83.1.1.7 (8)}

(7) BTP PSB 2. Criteria for Alarms and Indications i Associated with Diesel. Generator Unit l Bypassed and looperable Status; 8.13.1.2.4 Other SRP Criteria i

j (1) NUREO/CR 0660. Enhancement of Onsite Diesel Generator Reliability; Operating procedures and the training of

' personnel are outside the scope of the ABWR Standard Plant. NUREO/CR 0660 is there.

fore imposed as an interface ' ment for the applicant. See Subsectio , or interface requirement. g, (2) TM1 Action item II.EJ.1. . Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heater;-

This criteria is applicable only to PWRs and

. does not apply to the ABWR.

J 8.13 Amendment 21

, _ _ _ . _ . . _ , , _ . . _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . = . _ _ , _ , - . , , _ _ _ _

AmW a34r,icoxo any o Sinndard Plant 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.2.1.2 Descrip;1on or offsite Power Sysicm 8.2.1. Description The offsidlectri power s dem w' rhin the 8.2.1.1 Scope scope of f ABWR ndard d gn con sts of the isolat phase s duct u to the w volt ge

[hWA qC.

' ter als of I aiu pow transf9 tmer,is 4ted This s tion proside description (the4pt . p se bus toigu puxilla f tratufo ers, a design d the perfor ance require ents for the

" encrator reaker, ree unit uxiliary offsi power syst . The offsi poyer syste transfo ers, a resft ve auxir ry trans rmer, d I

-s 6.9k ' connectlyfs from e unit miliar ad fg k I eo ists the ctrical circu' pefassoci d te rye transf niers to elopu minal fthe j

qh p uspme

.--C%nt f-.,S Hme::- d aJa; ;c iA . mw r4 edium volt e Wite ear,as thet{7.2kV~ 00M3'line ding' ram, F f & rd::= 9+b w: : I uded the pipft switchyards, e main step u are ansformer ,

indicated ower tr h

ormer, lie high Itage ds th unit auxilia tra nsfortu e , the tes e h[The o the mal , the swit yards d the 'liary

'tchyard nsformer, t igh voltag e lines fr the equ' ent for t se portio s of th ystem eg switchyards t he transfor ts, the iso ed phase d e of the ar, >licantf buses with ett auxilla ystems Inc ding relays and loc instrumen ion and c trols, and e Air cooled isolated phase bus duct rated 36kA is non. regated ase bus d a from t unit provided for a power feed to the main power Mtfansformer,7end.

"' W '"

F "unit

avrgPny tmtfm"r au nary and r erve transf erstot medium tage swit ear.

/ A generathber is provided in the isolated T offsite p er syste includea phase bus duct at an intermediate location between tr mission sys and the itchyard. It at the main generator apd the main power transformer.

e terminals he plant . generator d at the The generat% Maker provided is capable of cir c ui_t_br er input rminals of e mediumj interrupting a maximum fault current of 275kA o' voltage kV) swite arfThe desigh scope for the symmetrical and 340kA asymmetrical at 5 cycles V~ standard plant ends at the low voltage terminals of after initiation of the fault. This corresponds to the the main power transformer and the high voltage n.aximum allowable interface fa tenninals Although the .=

ppogJggry,e f..~.-_

.c agxi,llargrpsgrgeg:

r allows the generator to be

, in taken Section 8.2.3.

g'e' derat 8t flaker off line and the e

is not in the scope of the standard plant design, the main grid to be utilized as a power source by backfeeding to the unit auxiliary transformers and

$gp,pdard plant design is based system ::d " ' 4 2 which rneck certain design on peonessnee their loads, both Class 1E and non-Class 1E. This is concepts. Design bases (10CFR Part 52 interface also the start up power sou ce for the unit.

' requirements) consistent with theu concepts are i included in Section 8.2.3 for COL applicant. Unit sy Meeting the stated design bases will ensure that the 7 r m't,gonization will ngmally be through total power system design is consistent and meets all three out of three logic scheme and synchrocheck o,n regulatory requirements, relays are used to prevent faulty synchronizationsa Q,';?

Dual trip coils are provided on thehaker t.nd

- The portions of the offsite power system which control power is supplied from redundant load fall under the design responsibility of the COL groups of the de;y .cL;e4 onsite 125V DC epplicant will be unique to each COL application. It powegSpten) h:-085FM is the responsibility of all concerned parties to insure that the total completed design of equipment and it is a design bases requirement that syn.

systems falling within the scope of this SSAR section chronization be possible through the switching be in line with the description ar.d requirements station's circuit breakers (See Section 8.2.3),

stated in this SSARM See Section 8.2.3 for a There are thr e unit auxiliary transformers.Ed nee detailed listing and description of the design bases requirements. transformer 7 jhree windings and each trans-former feeds one Class 1E bus directly, two non-Class 1E buses directly, and one non Class 1E bus 8.21 Amendment 21

l ABM b'we,, i uc vi~ 1 234sion40 Standard Plant n t'v n o Osu IE Is.M mehrs indirectly through a non 1 to non IE bus tie. The transfortuers by a mln' cum distance oho feel it is

,q medium voltage buses are in a three load group a requiremen sthat th 60 fooI minimu'm sepa' ration be maintainedh the incomin)g tie lines, a6nA The j arrangent wit _b three 65i%ddbuses and C g[ (

1 onegammlates bus per load group. Each unit transformers are provided with oil collection pits and auxiliary transformer has an oll/ alt rating at 65 drains to a safe disposal area.

degrees centigrade of 37.5Mva for the prirnary j winding and 18.75Mva for each secondary winding. Reference is made to Figures 8.31 for the single j m The forced air / forced oil rating is 62.5 and line diagrams showing the method of feeding the ect.dat M 31.25/31.25Mva respectively. The normalloading of loads. Separation of the normal preferred and jfYf the six]transformeis is balanced with the heaviest loaded winding carrying a load of 17.7Mvs The alternate preferred power feeds is accomplished by floors and walls over their routes through the u/

heaviest transformer loading occurs when one of the turbine, control and reactor bu ldinAsy- tgigg three unit auxiliary transformers is out of senice ,tje gitchgear rooms wher with the plant operating at full power. Under these ey r _~

-M A tae sgme switcgegr lineys. he gmalpreferred h[

conditions the heaviest loaded winding experiences a feed 1Mr"eYoSted'ir8Wd M [lu#Ude t Ufbe turbine load of 21.$va, which is about~ two thirds of it_s ); building in an electrical tunnel from the unit auxiliary forced alt / forced oil rating.,1(ce Tallis.pyor a transformers to the turbine building switchgear d

(mo}e'detailfd)UFnmagof thyfonds. / / rooms as shown on Figure 8.21. (An undergrourel duct bank is an acceptable alternate.) From there Disconnect links are provided in the isolated phase the feed th~eactor building exit the turbine bus duct feeding the unit auxiliary transformers so ulldin a atinue across the roof on the that any single failed transformer may be taken out ivisions and side of the control building (Figure of senice and operation continue <! on the other tkyD hey drop down the side of the control building in the space between the control and reactor

, nprmally fed by the failed transformer would buildings where have tunit they enter theauxiliary transformers.

reactor building and O i' b.eg W $ 2: the reserve auxiliary transformer 1 g continue on through the Divisions I and III side _of ,

order to' keep all reactor internal pumps operating so 4 the reactor building to the respective @ c:J as to attsin full power. The reserve auxiliary switchgear rooms in the reactor building.

transformer is sized for this type of senice.

The alternate preferred feeds from the reserve One, three winding 37.5MVAdreserve auxiliary transformer are routed inside the turbine d N l $ 9taidformer i JM :: provide [ power as an building. The turbine building switchgear feed from alternate to the ' Normal Preferred

power. One of the reserve auxiliary transformer is routed directly to the equally rated secondary windings supplies reserve the turbine building switchgear rooms. The feed to Myg gpowo the nine (three tbrough cross ties) the control building is routed in corridors outside of r wi the turbine building switchgear rogms. It exits the hoamy-J:.#y buses and the og3 ging I @l '('buses. The combined load of the threkW on the opposite side of the controlb'uilding from the supplies reserve power to the three, ..Jcp turbine building and crosses the conitol building roof

.m6.wd buses is equal to the oil / air the rating orthe route for the normal preferred power feeds. The I transformer winding sening them. This is equal to steam tunnel is located between the normal

~ 60% of the forced air / forced oil rating of the preferred feeds and the alternate preferred feeds l across the stepped roof of the control building. The transformer winding. The transformer is truly a reserve transformer because unit startup is alternate preferred power feed turns down between accomplished from the normal preferred power, the control and reactor building and enters the which is backfed over the main power circuit to the reactor building on the Division 11 side of the reactor unit auxiliary transformers. The reserve auxiliary building. From there it continues on to the respec-d, transformer serves no startup function. tive switchgear rooms in the reactor building, k

,I V8.2.1.3 Separation Instrument and control cables for the unit auxiliary pov er. transformedare neb touted in solid metal rgeyys 3 Tbc location of the main; transformer, unit auxiliary yend separate fr m the nernal preferred poweracable (m' transformers, and reserve auxiliary transformer are racewayrM eparation is equivalent to that shown on Figure 8.21. The reserve auxiliary provided for the powye M The reserve auxiliary 4sb*

transformer is separated from the unit auxiliary cableyney not sharefaceway with any other cables,

V W

%. b M0F ' .22 t0 Amendment 21 chto

7 ABWR n w m4a pd Standard Plant q cgab7e-c nriv n (h i f m The instrumenta unit antillary transformeri, tion an,d fnDeneratorAbre_aler control t uted by two completely separate paths through ofk <M the #for turbme the ,,*cuit buildmg control building and reactor P may be routed in the raceways correspond.ng to the building to their destinatioris in the emergency r4Q,,e l[gg'Aq k I oup of their power source. electrical rooms. Although these ir.ai;. g gg pester ( CT(r) are non Class 1E, such separation assures the e d A com untion turbmefsupplies standby power to physicalindependence tcquirements of GDC 17 M on~.w w W.Ed'_:S ' "% buses which are preserved.

ga supply _tbe permanentP '9 ri.:l loads. It is se'/WN y; 'ii9MW rated self. contained unit which is capable of operation without external auxiliary systems, The transformers are proiided withkoil collection pits and drains to a safe disposal area. This f.

N Although it is located on site,it is treated as an separation meets the requirements of BTP m additional offsite source in that it supplies power to CMED 9.51 and is therefore deemed adequate 4@I j(3) GDCC multiple load groups,f a-t h._2 .D a d'6(

18. Inspection and Testing of jq j Electrica%

l O

)d,anually controlled breakers provide the Power Systems; capability of conne ting the combustion turbine main circgir o genergtor to any of the emergency buses if all Thei 2 , generator #reaker adas open,4on a otherfpower sources are lost. turbine trip g ig' nin the normal preferred power is Iocated m the hb,.e 8velde.as, a nd supply to thd buses. This breaker cannot be Th '

Yombustipgbine generator tested during normal operation of the plant. bm '

Qwgre

~(CTG is_shown on Figure 8.2,y The CTG standby power feedsfor the turbine building is routed directly g'are

( publisnerator breakers test resirits showing are extremely r a retrability t

M f' to the switchgear rooms in the turbine building. The

' - - ' to the reactor building M'[ routed adjacent to numb f 0.9967 foy[0 close o crations per, year, Th' compares I orably wit the proba lity of) 7 d7,~~

W ilure from o er causes the norma refertpf 7T(fe%hhe

' alternate preferred feeds $wer

/ reactor buildings. across suoniv the control ande . 4 .,

b 8.2.2 Analysis All other equipmen itner oc testea ourWg~

normal plant operation orfts continually tested by in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan virtue ofits operation during normal plant operation (NUREG 0800), Table 81 and Section 8.2, the offsite power distribution system is designed consistent with the following criteria, so far as it and prefer i(fed power ato the tened buses following turbine trip. C. 'e s t /E

-p

'gC S applies to the non Class 1E equipment. Any exceptions or clarifications are so noted.

(4) RG's 1.32,1.47, and BTP ICSB 21; y !r[

8.2.2.1 General Design Criteria These distribution load groups are non-Class 1E and non safety related. Therefore, this criteria is (1) GDC 5 and RG 1.81 Sharing of Structures, not applicable.

Systems and Components; (5) RG 1.153 Criteria For Power, instrumentation The ABWR is a single unit plant design. and Control Portions of Safety Sptems Therefore, these criteria are not applicable.

(6) RG 1.155 Station Blackout (2) GDC 17. Electric Power Systems; (7) BTP ICSD 11 (PSB) . Stability of Offsite Power As shown in Figure 8.31, each of the Class IE Systems; dinsional 6.9 kV M/C buses can receive power (8) Appendix A to SRP Section 8.2 from multiple utility feeds souregbeg from the station ,(agtepjratevialthe main Fue transformerl'and ""' " - 3 the reserve tjgand auxiliary transformer). The unit auxiliary it is a requiremg: hat the design, installation of the,g -ig generato; tys,4reaker I

transformer output power feeds and the reserve meet the specific guidelines of this appendix, auxiliary transformer output power feeds are Amendmeni 21 8.23

< -----.J .,

MN $-hYe 6100A0 nev n Standtrd Plant -

therefore compliance with the appendix is probability risk analysis [ g analysis, assured. r it ia octermmed thaythe availabir of the powye

' fr the alternde preferred'p'ower sour is (9) IEEE Sid 765, IEEE Standard for Preferred gnificantly/liss reliabgthan the op al (31)

Power Supply for Nuclear Powtred Generating preferred wet, normaroperation 'all plant '

Stations buses fr the normyfpieferred er sourc table and re(ommended.

is a It is a requirement that the total design provided by GE and the applicant tneet the requirements (5) The main and reserve offsite power circuits shell4-,

of this IEEE standard as modified'b'ysthe h a m : n !!y M n o a us .o d rh i i i L following specific additional requirep%stations

' ents had y The- which _ -, shall be connected to switching are independent and separate.

explanatory statements in Table 8.

additional requirements are more restrictive They shall be connected to different ^

[hateLI

~

than the requirements which they replace or transmission c eyesome.line5.Q modify from the IEEE standard. Any stated requirements in the SSAR which are in conflict (6) The switching station to which the main offsite (

w% the requirements stated in this standard power circuit is connected shall have at least two take precedence over the requirements of the full capacity main buses arranged such that:

standard.

(a) Any incoming or outgoing transmission line 8.2.3,. C CLDr.m Desigw LIcewJe (LM:AcIdomotio9 O can be switched without affecting another

-Reaini m Ms)e linet The standard design of the ABWR is based on (b) Any single circuit breaker can be isolated {

certain assumptions concerning the design bases for maintenance without interrupting

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whichMbe met by the COL applicant in designing service to any circuit; the portion of the offsite power system in his scope, as defined in Section 8.2.1.1. Thote design bases (c) Faults of a single main bus are isolated without interrupting service to any circuit.

gtions are listed h:re which the COL applicant V

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_ _ _ _. meet.

M (7) The main power transforiner shall be three (1) In case of failureji the normal preferred power normally energized single phase transformers supply sevevf(alternate preferred power should with an additionalinstalled spare. Provisions g n=-My remain available to the reserve shall be made to permit connecting and auxiliary transformer. energizing the spare transformer in no more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months following a failure of one of the of ne tTdasMissio" 58sfem (2) Voltage variationsghall be no more than plus or normally energized transformers.

minus 10 percent of their nominalvalue during normal steady state operation. frhe' should (8) The mida transformer shall be designed to meet

[li volta dip of more 'an 20 cent d mg the requirements of ANSI Standard C57.12.00, (d mot startin It is e cred t t the s' ng of th unit a illary ndre rve a illa General Requirements for Liquid Immersed Distribution, Power and Regulating

< ansfor rs, (se ection .2,1'.7) ill in r Transformers. -

at this oltage requir ent is et. _ _

sh U 6e (9) Phys' Isepar on between-transformeryind) g'g"he norma steady state frequencyo' ofllectio ed afdated Mr firr/

(3) be p Tre,Ibe.gpewes system within plus or minus 2 cycles . rotection Section 9

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.4.6. i per second of 60 cycles per second during recoverable periods of system instabilit7. d (10) Circuit breakers and disconnect switches shall be sized and designed in accordance with the 3 Shat 6e m a3ze Il (4}) /.4de site specific onfiguration of thelatest revision of ANSI Standard C37.06, fincoming pomoe line o assure that the expected Preferred htings and Related Capabiliti:s for

' ')

D availability of the offsite power.is as good as the as:,umptions made in perfor :aing the plant AC High Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis.

4 Amendment 21 8.2-4

ABM 234siooro uve Sandard Plant _

rila r n (11) Although unit yachronization is normally to the main power traasformer low voltage terminals.

through theb vam,Jp generator circult The rated conditions for this interface is 1500 MVA breaker, provisions shall be snade to at a power factor of 0.9 and a voltage of 26.325 kV synchronize the unit through the switching plus or minus 10 per cent. It is a requirement that station's circuit breakers. This makes it the COL applicant provide sufficient impedance in possible to re.synchronire with the system the main power transformer and the high voltage following a load rejection within the steam circuit to limit the primary side maximum available bypass capability of the generating unit. fault current contribution from the system to no more than 275 kA symmetrical and 340 kA asym.

(12) All relay schemes used for protection of the metrical at 5 cycles from inception of the fault.

offsite power circuits and t,f the switching These values should be acceptable to most COL station's equipment shall be redundant and applicants. When all equipment and system include backup protection features. All parameters are known, a refined calculation based breakers shall be equipped with dual trip coils, on the known values with a fault located at the y /,o //

Euch redundant protection circuit which generator side of the generator breaker ad. g supplies a trip signal shall be cannected to a mader "'

7.;;- . k n- 4 i a L. A d 0 ._-'- '""f separate trip coil. All equipment and cabling associated with each redundant system shall bc

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to

de fe' The second power scope split interface occurs at physically separated. setcb statron 0 the high voltage terminals of the reserve auxiliary (13) The de power needed to perate redundant transformer. The rated load is 37.5 MVA at a 0.9 protection and control eq pment of the offsite power factor. The voltage and frequency will be the power system shall be supplied from two COL applicants standard with the aggues to bg g separate, dedicated -- -,xd battenes, each determined at contract award. Tolerances 3ar$us with a battery charger fed from a separate ac or minus 10 per cent of nominal for voltage and plus bus. Each battery shall be capable of supplying or minus 2 per cent of nominal for frequency.

the de power required for normal operation of Frequency may vary plus or minus 2 cycles per m

och cky second during periods of recoverable system A,-----.

the USbs sytching Yofe VEbhr5wsjation'ssbar&,

egp$g instability. Tb = ' == d?=6h 1.w dy (14) Two redundant low voltage ac power supply # I4 S w.._, " , =s;' 2^ "# --- ' _fp q systems shall be provided to supply ac power to the switching station's auxiliary loads. Each Protective relaying scope split interfaces for the system shall be supplied from separate, two power system interfaces are to be defined during independent ac buses. The capacity of each the detail design phase following contract award, system shall be adequate to meet tLe ac power requirements for normal operation of the 8.2.5 References switching station's equipment.

(1) ANSI Std C37.06, Prcierred Ratings and (15) Each transformer shall have primary and Related Capabilities for AC High Voltage backup protective devices. DC power to the Circuit Brea*u es Rated on a Symmetrical primary and backup devices shall be supplied Current Basis, from separate de sources.

(2) ANSI Std C57.12.00, General Requirements for ,

(16) The requirements of IEEE Std 765, Preferred Liquid. Immersed Distribution, Power and Power Supply for Nuclear Generating Stations, Regulating Transformers.

as modified by Section 8.2.2.1(9) of this SSAR J shall be met, h6tAf O lr7c0V 8.2.4 Scope Split (Interfaces Require-ments)

The interface point between the ABWR design and the COL applicant design for the main generator output is .t the connection of the isolated phase bus Amendment 21 82-5

. . _ - ~. - . _- - . _ ._ _. ._.

i ABWR 334simso nrzv n Standard Plant Table 8.21 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS IEEE STD 765 IEEE STD765 Referenu Requirement or Erplanatory Note t

4.1 General SSAR Figure 831 should be used as the reference single line instead of the IEEE Std example, Figures 2, (a), (b) and (c).

4 h_ , 9-~

4.2 Safety Classification T[r ada single 4p catio

,inde n f aceaseparation a ilu c,rcriteria called for in c'

(3W o talTod &2 apter _ the S must be met.

g.gAwJahoIty The ABWR design utilizes direct connection of the two

-4 a- N .m m f{

preferred _ power circuits to the Class 1E buses. One circuit 6Fgr6n>aficatl u . lies power to the Class 1E i

buses following an aca ent, g gj --

Can smre s~ dog 5.1.2 Transmission System Additional analysis is required per Section

. Reliability 8.23{

5.13 Transmission System Independence

5.13.2 Specifle requirements for tolerance to equipment failures are stated in the SSAR and must be met.

I 5.133 Since a separation of at least 50 feet is required for the

< exposed circuits,@i IM, ihet?a common takeoff

used. M

! structure COnno@f 53.2 Class 1E Power System See 5.133 comments.

Interface Independence 533 Connections with Class 1E Systems o 533.2 Jt.[3h Mal gd autefeatic dead bas traesfersdre used) (3 f Automatic hve ous transfers are not required and are

' not used.

533' Only standby power sources may be paralleled with the preferred power sources for load testing. The available fault current must be less thus the rating of the breakers.

It is not required and not allowed for the normal and i alternate preferred power supply breakers for a bus to be closed simultaneously so there is no time that the ava"abl %1t turrent at a bus exceeds the equipment 2

rating, j 7.0 Multi Unit Considerations The ABWR is a single unit design, therefore there is no sharing of preferred power supplies between units.

8.24 Amendment 21

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ABM isisiooro Standard Plant nev n 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS feedwater pumps, three circulating water purnps, three turbine building supply and exhaust fans).

8.3.1 AC Power Systems Within each load group there is one bus which The onsite power system interfaces with the supplies power production loads which do not offsite power system at the input terminals to the provide water to the pressure vessel. Each one of supply breakers for the normal and alternate power

~

these buses has access to power from one Mnding of '

feeds to the~rnedIu'nivoitage (742kV) switchgear. It its assigned unit auxiliary transformer. It also has syste access to the reserve auxiliary transformer as an is a three of consisting load& dgrog..d %gwith and 4 gesp !d %load d group alternate source if its unit auxilivy transformer fails portiong The thge or during maintenance outages for the normal feed.

' power sysicin"[are epeIEfent di, load of each gry other. Theof the Bus Class transfer is1E manual dead bus transfer and not principal elements of the auxiliary ac electric power automatic. . de.ftiecs( /Mfeh-ed poQCr ht(C!

systems are shown on the single line diagrams (SLD) in Figure 8.31,4,5 and 7. Another bus within each load group supplies power to pumps which are capable of supplying water to the Each Class 1E division has a dedicated diesel pressure vessel during normal power operation (i.e.,

generator, which automatically starts on high drywell the condensate and feedwater pumps). These buses pressure, low reactor vessel level or loss of voltage normally receive power from the unit auxiliary on the didsion's 6.9 kV bus. Each 6.9 kV Class 1E transformer and supply power to the third bus (plant bus feeds it's associated 480V unit substation investment protection (PIP)) in the load group through a 6.9 kV/ 480/277V power center trans- through a cross tie. The cross tic automatically former. opens on loss of power but may be manually reclosed if it is desired to operate a condensate or feedwater g W' Standby power is provided to permanent pump from the combustion turbine or the reserve

_ loads in all three load groups by a auxiliary transformer which are connectable to the y5g _

combustion turbine generator located ia the turbine PIP buses. This cross-tic arrangement allows building. advantage to be taken of the fact that the feedwater pumps are motor driven through an adjustable speed AC power is supplied at 6.9KV for motor loads drive so that they have low starting currents and can larger than 300KW and transformed to 480 V for be started and run at low power. The combustion smaller loads. The 480V system is further turbine and reserve auxiliary transformer have transformed into lower voltages as required for sufficient capacity to start either or both of the instrumeats, lighting, and controls. In general, reactor feedwater and condensate pum 'nyoad motors larger than 300KW are supplied from the group. This provides three load groups f non-sdety 6.9KV buses. Motors 300KW or smaller but larger grade equipment in addition to the dii ionfa@hjbad than 100KW are supplied power form 480V groups which may be used to suppl ,a_tetto te the switchgear. Motors 100KW or smaller are supplied reactor wsselin emergencies, power from 480V motor control centers.

A third bus supplies power to permanent non safety See Subsection 8.3.4.9 for COL license lo. M such as the turbine building HVAC, the information. turbine building service water and the turbine pj[tm - C IMI /E building closed cooling water systems. On loss of 8.3.1.0 Q$7 SelEMElERAC Pont System normal preferred power the cross-tic to the power g3,.c(asr /[ ' production bus is automatically tripped open and the 8.3.1.0.17:: r---; - =iMedium Voltage Power permanenF li gratyr bus is automatically Distribution System transferred (two out I the three buses in the load j e d4M $ groups transfer) vi a dead bus transfer to the The dn ammv-reuted medium voltage power combustion turbin which automatically starts on distribution system consists of nine 6.9KV buses loss of power. Th permanent service systems for divided into three load groups. The three load group each load group tomatically restart to support configuration was chosen to match the mechanical their load groups. _

syst:ms which are mostly three trains (TLree ,, c(y y j g Amendment 21 83-1

4 ABWR mumw Standard Plant _.

nev n t

4 The buses are comprised of 7.2KV.500MVA '

power has been restored and maintained for metal clid saitchgearsith~a~ buffull load'rsting 5fi approximately 60 seconds.

2000A. Maximum calcialated fullload short time current is 1700A, Dus ratings of 3000 amperes are The second switching mode is from ac to de for the available for the switchgear as insurance against power source, if the voltage of the input ac power is future load growth,if necessary. The required less than 88% of the rated voltage, the input is interrupting capacity is 41,000 amperes. switched to the de power supply. The input is

. switched back to the ac power aftcr a confirmation The 6.9kV buses supply power to adjustable period of approximately 60 seconds.

speed drives for the feedwater and reactor internal pnmps. These adjustable speed drives are designed The third switching mode is between the inverter and to the requirements of IEEE Std 519, Guide for the voltage regulating transformer. If any of the Harmonic Control and Reactive Compensation of conditions listed below occur, the power supply is Static Power Converters. Voltage distortion limits switched to the voltage regulating transformer, are as stated in Table 4 of the IEEE Std.

1 OM- C be55 T (a) Output voltage out of rating by more than plus

' 83.1.0.2 ' a6sfetwffelddlow Voltage Powr or minus 10 per cent Distribution System he h (b) Output frequency out of rating by more than Power for the 480V auxiliaries is suppli from plus or minus 3 per cent

. power centers consisting of 6.9KV 480 volt transformers and associated metalcla switchgear, (c) High temperature inside of panel Figure 831. There are six@r r J.@, two per load group, power centers. One power center (d) 1oss cf control power supply q

per load group is supplied power from the permanent non safety but for the load group. (c) Commutation failure ,

4 8J.1.03 Non C!:m W VI. I AC Power Supply (f) Overcurrent of smoothing condenser System

' (g) loss of control power for gate circuit The function of the acn Class 1E Vital ac Power Supply System is to provide reliable 120V unin. b) Incoming MCCB trip terruptible ac power for importantGm ~ _ yr1tH ds.r /L loads that are required for continuity of power plant (i) Cooling fan trip operation. The system consists of three 120V ac uninterruptible constant voltage, constant frequency Following correction of any of the above events (CVCF) power supplies, each including a static transfer back is by manual initiation only.

inverter, ac and de static transfer switches, a reg ting stepdown transformer (as an alternate ac

p. er strpply), and a distribution panel (Figure iMs 83.1.0.4 " . - ra.4 (b-C/,s.r Computer Vital /EAC Pour Supply) 8 /)) e primary source of power comes from the Two constant voltage and constant frequency nnC ss 1E ac motor control centers. The see a ary source is the non Class 1E 125 VDC power supplies are provided to power the process central distribution panels, computers. Each of th,e power supplies consists of an ac to de rectifierpafi verter, a bypass There are three automatic switching modes for the transformer anfde anjigiptate transfer CVCF power supplies, any of which may be initiated switches (Figuro 8.3-#)hThe al feed for the manually. First, the frequency of the output of the power supplies iq from no ass 1E power center inverter is normally synchronized with the input ac supplied from titcy anent non safety related power. If the frequency of the input power goes out buses which receive power from the combustion of range, the power supply switches over to internal turbine if offsite power is lost. The backup for the synchronization to restore the frequency of its normal feeds is from the 250VDC battery. Each output. Switching back to external synchronization is power supply is provided with a backup ac feed automatic and occurs if the frequency of the ac though isolation transformers and a 8.32 Amendment 21

= _ _ ..

ABWR *

- u.uim4a nov s Standard Plant

}- _-

static transfer switch. The backup feed is provided j e Divisi Is ety- lat ' bu < hayone for alternate use during maintenance periods. n .saf re ed to on'. T loa is ajpowpr . ADbf Switching of the power supply is similar to that ent wh' sup ies ~ wer o t fin /moffo3 described for the non vital ac power supply r,ystem, co ol r drive C ) tor though these above. See Subsection 83.1.03.

motors are agb[tb..w, the and scram drives are of may be special

(~/4Jr /4 83.1.1 W ".i ' AC Power Distribution inserted as a Bac l importance because of this. It is important that the l

O System 1 first available standby power be available for the i C W /4 motors, therefore, a diesel supplied bus was chosen as the first source of standby ac power and the 83.1.1.1 Medium Voltage _ _ ,A_ APower combustion turbine as the second backup source.

Distribution System 4 Division I was chosen because it was the most lightly Class 1E ac power loads are divided into three loaded diesel generator, divisions (Didsions I, II, and !!!), each fed from an independent 6.9 kV Class 1E bus. During normal The load breaker in the Division I swi ,

e is operation (which includes all modes of plant part of the isolation scggeen (b operation; i.e., shutdown, refueling, startup, and -od power and thDr: m dM ad. In run.), two of the three divisions are fed from an [ addition to the normal overcurrent tripping of this offsite normal preferred power supply. The isolation breaker, zone' selective interlocking is remaining division shall be fed from the alternate peovided between it and its upstream Class 1E bus power source (See Subsection 83.4.9). feed breaker.

Each 6.9 kV bus has a safety grounding circuit if fault current flows in ths non Class 1E load,it breaker designed to protect personnel during is sensed by the Class 1E current device for the maintenance operations (see Figure 83-1). During isolation breaker and a trip blockmg signal is sent to periods when the buses are energized, these breakers the upstream Class 1E feed breaker. This blocking

- are racked out (i.e.,in the disconnect position). A lasts for about 75 milliseconds. This allows the control room annunciator sounds whenever any of isolation breaker to trip in its normal instantancous

these breakers are racked in for sc.rvice. tripping time of 35 to 50 milliseconds,if the magnitude of the fault current is high enough. This The interlocks for the bus grounding devices are as assures that the fault current has been terminated j follows: before the Class 1E upstream breaker is free to trip.

For fault currents of lesser magnitude, the blocking

, (1) Undervoltage relays must be actuated. delay will time out without either breaker tripping, i

but the isolation breaker will eventually trip and

(2) Bus Feeder breakers must be in the disconnect always before the upstream breaker, This order of l position. tripping is assured by the coordination between the two breakers provided by long time pickup, (3) Voltage for bus instrumentation available, long-time delay and instantaneous pickup trip device characteristics. Tripping of the Class 1E feed Conversely, the bus feeder breakers are breaker is normal for faults which occur on the Class i interlocked such that they cannot close unless their 1E bus it feeds. Coordination is provided between i associated grounding breakers are in their disconnect the bus main feed breakers and the load breakers.

l positions.

The zone selective interlock is a feature of the trip unit for the breaker and is tested when the other Standby AC power for Class 1E buses is supplied by diesel generators at 6.9 kV and distributed by the features such as current setting and long-time delay Class 1E power distribution system. Division 1,11 are tested.

and 111 buses are automatically transferred to the diesel generators when the normal preferred power A pair of interlocked breakers are provided at supply to these buses is lost. the input to the power center transformer to supply l

power to the transformer from either the safety-related diesel generator backed bus or the non- ,

safety related combustion turbine backed bus.

Amendment 21 8.33 l

t I

ABWR -m uwmxo Standard Plant C/a# /ff ) uvo wCow IE Source '

Switchover to thef! ;:xj_:p is au ' fr[on Starters for the control of 460v motors 100kW or loss of power from the saim .J smaller are MCC mounted, across the line magneti-Switching back to the uhty-;;'e:cpower 7 ource.

is b cally operated, air break type. Power circuits leading manual action only. The breaker in the r:f:# from the electrical penetration assemblies into the Aod" ::!::d leg of the power supply is Division I containment area have a fuse in series with the I

f associated The breaker in the rgj.d:y d::d leg circuit breakers as a backup protection for a fault

'9$f g , is u.Anuhd on the basis of the electrical current in the penetration in the event of circuit isolation of its controls, the fact that there are two breaker overcurrent or fault protection failure, breakers between it and the Class 1E 6.9kV bus and that the transfer breakers are interlocked such that 8J.1.13 120/240V Distribution System only one can be in the closed condition.

Individual transformers and distribution panels are Tbc c' cuits on/be out d side f the ower located in the vicinity of the loads requiring A center tr asfctme[are no safety elated on the 12 240v nower. This power is used for lighting, s basis o the isol ion proi ed by e two pstre l break rs and th power ter tr form . It is al ,

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and other 1 loads.

tt y a re irement hat the ~ nnot class' ed anyt ng 8J.1.1.4 Instnament Power Supply Systems

}[ ot rthan n safety elated that t ey can ver C/sf.r M b route as as ciate with ables anyj 83.1.1.4.1 120V AC 9':q N:d Instrument fety rel ed dii on. j Power System 4

-- , M_ J Power Individual transfo er strpply 120V ac instru.

8J.1.1.2 Distribution Low Voltage "7 C lasy /6 System ment power (Figure ch Class 1E divisional transformer is suppli fro a 480V MCC in the 8J.1.1.2.1 Power Centers same division. There e three divisions, each backed up by its divisional diesel generator as the Power for 480V auxiliaries is supplied from power source when the offsite source is lost. Power is centers consisting of 6.9.kV/480V transformers and distributed to the individual loads from distribution associated metal clad switchgear, Figure 83-1. panels, and to logic level circuits through thi. control Class 1E 480V power centers supplying Class 1E Cf(j3f /6 loads are arranged as independent radial systems, 83.1.1.4.2 120V AC,7'::j "d J.

with each 480V bus fed by its own power Vital AC Power Supply System transformer. Each 480V Class 1E bus in a division is physically and electrically independent of the other 83.1.1.4.2.1 Constant Voltage, Constant Frequency 480V buses in other divisions. (CVCF) Power Supply for the Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC) -

The 480V unit substation breakers supply motor control centers and motor loads up to and including jTh po r supply for the SSLC is shown in Figure 300KW. Switchgear for the 480V load centers is of 83- 'th each of the four buses supplying power indoor, metal enclosed type with drawout circuit rthe dependent trip systems of the SSLC system, breakers. Control power is from the Class 1E 125 nstant voltage, constant frequency (CVCF)

VDC power system of the same division. control power buses (Divisions I, II, Ill, and IV) have been established. They are each normally 83.1.1.2.2 Motor Control Centers supplied independently from inverters which, in turn, are normally supplied power via a static switch from The 480V MCCs feed motors 100kW or smaller, a rectifier which receives 480V divisional power. A control power transformers, process heaters, 125V de battery provides an alternate source o motor operated valves and other small electrically power throu gh the static switch. g#

operated auxiliaries, including 480120V and 480-240V transformers. Class 1E motor control cen.

QFor Divisions I, II, and III, the AC supply is from a h ters are isolated in separate load groups 480 V MCC for each division. The backup de supply corresponding to divisions established by the 480V is via a static switch and a de/ac inverter from the unit substations. 125VDC central / distribution board for the Amendment 21 BM

ABWR axumaa Standard Plant _

nev n division. A second static switch also is capable of (6) a manual transfer switch for maintenance.

transferring from the inverter to a dircet feed (external to Me ever f 0Wer su/4)b/ /

through a voltage regulating transformer from a (7) an output power monitopbhich monitors the 480V motor control center for each of the three 120 VAC power from the CVCF power supply divisions. to its output power distribution cabinet if the

.I voltage or frequency of the ac power gets out of Since there is no 480V ac Divis' n IV power, its design range, the power monitor trips and Division IV is fed from a Divisi otor control interrupts the power supply to the distribution center. Otherwise, the ac supply fo he Division IV cabinet. The purpose of the power monitor is to CVCF power supply is similar to the other three .

protect the scram solenoids from voltage levels divisions. The de supply for Division IV is back and frequencies which could result in their by a separate Division IV battery, pc g[.Qf et of damage.

The CVCF power supply buses are est e to 83.1.1.4.2.3 Operating Con!1guration )

provide logic and control power to the four division de .

,U s 2

SSLC system that operates)hc-RPS. [The SSLC for Tbc four 120 VAQ.%$$ power syp' plies oper-the ECCS derives its p er from the 125 VDC te independentiv. nroviding four dipons of CVCF power system (Figure 3 T[g he ac buses also p5wer supplies for the SSLThThegormallineup for supply power to the ne monitoring system and each division is through aLfEcssentiap480 VAC power parts of the process radiation monitoring system and supply, the ac/dc rectifier, the inverter and the static MSIV function in the 1.ak detection system. Power transfer switch. The bus for the RPS A solenoids is distribution is arranged to prevent inadvertent supplied bv the Division 11 CVCF power supply. The operation of the reactor scram initiation or MSIV RPS B solenoids bus is supplied from the Division isolation upon loss of any single power supply. III CVCF power supply. The #3 soleniods for the MSIVs are powered from the Division I CVCF; and Routine maintenance can be conducted on the #2 soleniods, from the Division II CVCF power equipment associated with the CVCF power supply, supply.

Inverters and solid state switches can be inspected, serviced and tested channel by channel without 8J.1.1J Class 1E Electric Equipment tripping the RPS logic. Considerations 8J.1.1.4.2.2 Components The following guidelines are utilized for Class 1E equipment.

Each of the four Class 1E CVCF power supplies ~

includes the following components: 8J.1.1.5.1 Physical Separ3 tion and

,u;gg, (1) a power distribut. ion cab.inet, includ.ing the I*fIlende sop ro fr O i n t e c e W e f@prao ,,e c r ,;

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g ; (,,f , ,

CVCF 120 VAC bus and circuit breakers for the All electrical equipment is sepa, rated in accordance SSLC loads; with IEEE Std 384, Regulatory Guide 1.75 and General Design Criterion 17, with the following (2) a solid state inverter, to convert 125 VDC power clarifying interpretations of IEEE Std 384:

to 120 VAC uninterruptible power supply; Cfg$$ (E (1) Enclosed solid metal raceway 3 are required for separation between@j dspor associated (3) a solid. state transfer switch to sense inverter failure and automatically switch to alternate 120 ([s55 cables of different safety divisions or between VAC power; I E u.- .J.@or associated cables and non-( [asy/f 4., . AM cabje (4) a 480'.'/120V bypass transformer for the al-ternate power supply; 9 distance isve'less fech reetha[pf11gv feep and the cables are in the same fire area; (5) a solid state transfer switch to sense ac input power failure and automatically switch to (2) Both groupings of cables requiring separation alternate 125 VDC power, per item one must be enclosed in solid metal raceways be Sermf (rd at le,st a d aws f2. 5 4 c w' (f iars). "' N j

83-5 Arnendment 21

ABWR mum 40 Standard Plant nev o To meet the provisions of Policy issue SECY 89 Associated cables, if any, are treated as Class 1E 013, which relates to fire tolerance, three hour rated circuits and routed in their corresponding divisional fire barriers are provided between areas of different raceways. Separation requirements are the same as safety divisions throughout the plant except in the for Class 1E circuits. Associated cables are required primary containment and the control room complex. to meet all of the requirements for Class IE cables.

See Section 9.5.1.0 for a detailed description of how the provisions of the Policy Issue are met. The careful placing of equipment is important to the necessary segregation of circuits by division.

The overall design objective is to locate the Deliberate routing in separate fire areas on different divisional equipment and its associated control, floor levels, and in embedded ducts is employed to instrumentation, electrical supporting systems and achieve physicalindependence, interconnecting cabling such that separation is maintained among all dhisions. Redundant divisions 83.1.1.5.2 Class IE Electric Equipment Design of electric equipment and cabling are located in Bases and Criteria separate rooms or fire areas wherever possible.

(1) Motors are sized in accordance with NEMA Electric equipment and wiring for the Class 1E standards. The manufacturers' ratings are at systems which are segregated into separate divisions least large enough to produce the starting, are separated so that no design basis event is capable pull in and driving torque needed for the of disabling more than one division of any ESF total particular application, with due consideration function. for capabilities of the power sources. Plant dp.r,r /5 design specifications for electrical equipment Thepi+ datett divisional ac switchgear, power require such equipment be capable of contin-centers, battery rooms and de distribution panels and uous operation for voltage fluctuations of +/-

MCCs are located to provide separation and elec. 10%. In addition, Class 1E motors must be able trical isolation among the divisions. Separation is to withstand voltage drops to 70% rated during provided among divisional cables being routed starting transients, between the equipment rooms, the Main Control Room, containment and other processing areas. (2) Power sources, distribution systems and branch Equipment in these areas is divided into Divisions I, circuits are designed to maintain voltage and II, III and IV and separated by barriers formed by frequency within acceptable limits.

walls, floors, and ceilings. The equipment is located to facilitate divisional separation of cable trays and to (3) The selection of motor insulation such as Class provide access to electrical penetration assemblies. F, H or B is a design consideration based on Exceptions to this separation objective are identified service requirements and environment. The and analyzed as to equivalency and acceptability in Class 1E motors are qualified by tests in the fire hazard analysis. (See Appendix 9A.5) accordance with IEEE Std 334.

The penetration assemblies are located around the (4) Interrupting capacity of switchgear, power periphery of the containment and at different centers, motor control centers, and distribution elevations to facilitate reasonably direct routing to panels is equal to or greater than the maximum and from the equipment. No penetration carries available fault current to which it is exposed cables of more than one division. under all modes of operation.

.,e Q p .

Separation within the main control room is Interrupting capacity requirements of the 7.2kV designed in accordance with IEEE 384, and is Class 1E switchgear is selected to accommollate discussed in Subsection 83.1.4.1. the available short-circuit current at the switchgear terminals. Circuit breaker and Wiring for all Class 1E equipment indicating lights applications are in accordance with ANSI is an integral part of the Class IE cables used for Standards. (See Subsection 8.3,4.1 for COL control of the same equipment and are considered to license information) be Class 1E circuits.

Unit substation transformers are sized and impedances chosen to facilitate the selection of Amendment 21 W l

l

o l

\ 33A6100A0 l Standard Plant nev s :

low. voltage switchgear, MCCs and distribution (3) 6.9kV feeders for heat exchanger building panels, which are optimized within the manufac. substations have inverse time overcurrent and turcr's recommended ratings for interrupting ground fault protection.

capacity and coordination of overcurrent devices.

Impedance of connecting upstream cable is factored (4) 6.9kV feeders used for motor starters have in for a specific physicallayout, instantaneous, inverse time overcurrent, ground 4

fault and motor protection.

83.1.1.53 Testing (5) 480V bus incoming line and feeder circuits have The design provides for periodically testing the inverse time overcurrent and ground fault chain of system elements from sensing devices protection.

through driven equipment to assure that Class 1E equipment is functioning in accordance with design 8.3.1.1.6.4 Protection Requirements

! requirements. Such on.line testing is greatly enhanced by the design, which utilizes three When the diesel. generators are called upon to independent divisions, any one of which can safely operate during LOCA conditions, the only protective i shut down the plant. The requirernents of IEEE Std devices which shut down, the diesel are the generator 379 Regulatory Guide L118 and IEEE 338 are met. differential relays, and the engine overspeed trip.

These protection devices are retained under accident 83.1.1.6 Circuit Protection conditions to protect against possible, significant damage. Other protective relays, s s loss of 8.3.1.1.6.1 Philosophy of Protection excitation, antimotoring (reverse po ergo etc rest voltage restraint, low ' .

t wat r ss ej h' Lh Simplicity of load grouping facilitates the use of jacket water temperatje an low lu e oil res e, conventional, protective relaying practices for are used to protect e chine when ope ting in isolation of faults. Emphasis has been placed on parallel with the no al power system, during preserving function and limiting loss of Class 1E periodic testsy 2h(relays are automatically isolated equipment function in situations of power loss or from theJripp* ircults during LOCA conditions.

equipment failure. However, all, a barameters are annunciated _

in the maing 400 (se g em 3 1.

i re,1,.g.,

alfy g} (M set as j, Circuit protection of the Class 1E buses contained The bypasses at tes I within the nuclear island is interfaced with the design required by Positi ' uide 1.9 No trips are bypassed during LOPP or testing.

l of the overall protection system outside the nuclear island. C~ M b'p' l

8.3.1.1.7 14ad Shedding and Sequencing on 83.1.1.6.2 Grounding Methods Class 1E Buses The medium voltage system is low resis. This subsection addresses Class 1E Divisions I, II, l tance grounded except that each diesel gerierator is and 111. Load shedding, bus transfer and sequencing j high resistance on a 6.9kV Class 1E bus is initiated on loss of bus j

(s ee y A.1,1 [ounded to maximize availabilityb voltage. Only LOPP signals are used to trip the t 8.3.1.1.63 Bus Protection loads. However, the presence of a LOCA during LOPP reduces the time delay for initiation of bus

, Bus protectionis as follows: transfer from 3 seconds to 0.4 seconds. The load sequencing for the diesels is given on Table 83-4.

(1) 6.9kV bus incoming circuits have inverse time overcurrent, ground fault, bus differential and Load shedding and buses ready to load signals are undervoltage protect on. generated by the control system for the electrical power distribution system. Individual timers for each (2) 6.9kV feeders for power centers have instan. major load are reset and started by their electrical taneous, inverse time overcurrent and ground power distribution systems signals.

j l

fault protection.

(1) Loss of Preferred Power (LOPP) : The 6.9kV Class 1E buses are normally energized from the 83-7 Amendment 21 f

l l

i -_ __

l 23A6100AG Standatd Plant uvo l normal or alternate preferred power supplies, occurs when the diesel generator is paralled with Should the bus voltage decay to below 70% of either the normal preferred power or the its nominal rated value 6r a predetermined tim alternate preferred power source, the D/G will a bus transfer is initiated and the signal will trip automatically be disconnected from the-6.9 KV the supply breaker, and start the diesel gener- emergency bus regradless of whether the test is ator. When the bus voltage decays to 30%,large being conducted from the local control panel or pump motor breakers are tripped. The transfer , the main control room. ~ ~~

y proceeds to the diesel generator. If the standby k _. -

diesel generator is ready to accept load (i.e., (6) LOPP during diesel generator paralleling test:

voltage and frequency are within normal limits If the normal preferred power supply is lost and no lockout exists, and the normal and during the diesel-generator paralleling test, the alternate preferred supply breakers are open), diesel-generator circuit breaker is automatically then the diesel-generator breaker is signalled to tripped. Transfer to the diesel generator then close, accomplishing automatic transfer of the proceeds as described in (1).

Class 1E bus to the diesel generator. Large motor loads will be sequence started as required if the alternate preferred souten i md for load and shown on Table 8.3-4. testing the diesel generato- 4e alternate (2) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA): When a preferred source is lost 4m 4^C' p$ QN.

the diesel generator breakc at -

LOCA occurs, with or without a LOPP, the load - ~ m r M L ,. . - - -... d r. (%

sequence timers are started if the 6.9 KV / Load shedding and bus transfer will proceed as emergency bus voltage is greater than 70% and described in (1).

loads are applied to the bus at the end of preset times. (7) Restomtion of offstle power: Upon restoration of offsite power, the Class 1E bus (es) can be Each load has an individual load sequence timer transferrrJ back to the offsite source by manual which will start if a LOCA occurs and the 6.9 operatir,n only.

KV emergency bus vMtage is greater than 70%,

regard! css of whether the bus voltage source is (8) Pro.ection against degraded voltage: For normal or alternate preferred power or the puection of the Division I,11 and 111 electrical diesel generator. The load sequence timers are equipment against the effects of a sustained part of the low level circuit logic for each LOCA (egraded voltage, the 6.9 kV ESF bus voltages load and do not provide a means of common a re monitored. When the bus voltage degrades mode failure that would render both onsite and to 90% or below of its rated value and after a offsite power unavailable. If a timer failed, the time delay (to prevent triggering by transients),

LOCA load could be applied manually provided the bus voltage is greater than 70%.

undervolt e will be annunciated in the con room S' utta ously a 5 min e timer is g'g[

( /starte o allo e oper or to e corrective bf (3) LOPP following LOCA: If the bus voltage acti Aft 5 minu s, the rtspect/c feed (

(normal or alternate preferred power) is lost b aker th the nderv/tage M trip d. f during post-accident operation, transfer to diesel hould LOCA cur dynag the.5 min, time generator power occurs as described in (1) above.

dela the fe breaker with the unpervoltaget w' be trjpped insfantly 'Subse h_[0 ansfer,vfdl be as d'esribed / )Above. ' q (4) LOCA following LOPP: If a LOCA occurs fol-lowing loss of the normal or alternate preferred 8.3.1.1.8 Standby AC Power System power supplies, the LOCA signal starts ESF equipment as required. Running loads are not The diesel generators comprising the Divisions I,11 tripped. Automatic (LOCA + LOPP) time and 111 standby ac power supplies are designed to delayed load sequencing assures that the quickly restore power to their respective Class 1E diesel generator will not be overloaded. distribution system divisions as required to achieve

. safe shutdown of the plant and/or to mitizate the (5) LOCA when diesel generator is parallel with consequences of a LOCA in the event of a$incidec(

preferred power source during test: If a LOCA LOPP. Figure 8.31 shows the interconnections %

Amendment 21 8M

ABWR ux6im^o nev o Standard Plant between the preferred power supplies and the (5) Each diesel generator has a continuous load Divisions I,11 and 111 diesel generator standby power rating of 6.25 MVA @ 0.8 power factor (see supplies. Figure 831). The overload rating is 110% of the rated output for a two-hour narind nut of a 83.1.1.8.1 Redundant Standby AC Power 24-hour period, gp Supplies ( dee bubsectigs

_j 8.3.4.2 for COL licenst Each standby power system division, including the information. he C/ f n i de 7UW #fAr #

diesel generator, its auxiliary systems and the [Q[f/[ML/IM'/cM.#" ~

(8J.1.1.83 Starting urcuits and Systems distribution of power to va bus Class IE loads through the 6.9kV and 48C'. systems,is segregated and separated from the other divisions. No Diesel generators I, II and III start automatically automatic interconnection is provided between the on loss of bus voltage. Under voltage relays are used Class 1E divisions. Each diesel generator set is j to start each diesel engine in the event of a drop in operated independently of the other sets and is [ bus yo t' i below preset values for a predetermined connected to the utility power system by manual period' time. Low-water level switches and drywell control, only during testing or for bus transfer. high pressure switches in each division are used to igitiate diesel start u cident conditions 83.1.1.8.2 Ratings and Capability Manual start capabili sfeTed et doTow g0)

(also provided.fThe transfer of the Class 1E buses to The size of each of the diesel generators serving standby power supply is aut mitic should this Divisions I,11 and 111 satisfies the requirements of become necessary on loss o .a& referred power.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Std 387 and After the breakers connecting the buses to the conforms to the following criteria: preferred power supplies are open the diesel-generator breaker is closed when required generator (1) Each diesel generator is capable of starting, voltage and frquency are established.

accelerating and supplying its loads in the e

' el) generators I, II and III are designed to start sequence shown in Table 83-4. p/

n,d attain rated voltage and frequency within 20 (2) Each diesel generator is capable of starting, seconds. The generator, and voltage regulator are accelerating and supplying its loads in their designed to permit the set to accept the load and to proper sequence' without . exceeding a 25% " accelerate the motors in the sequence within the vy"ltage P rne85 drop % {tjesiepnIn,alsjor a t ' phe (wf . a 5% -licyewey ti2mc requirements. The voltage drop c starting the large motors does not exceed the

) Each diesel generator is capable of starting, requirements set forth in Regulato'ry Guide 1.9, and acceTe~3ttug r and4naning its largest motor at"any proper acceleration of these motors is ensured, time after the automatic loading sequence is Control and timing circuits are provided, as completed, assuming that the motor had failed appropriate, to ensure that each load is applied auto-to start initially, matically at the correct time. Each diesel generator set is provided with two independent starting air (4) The criteria is for each diesel generator to be systems, capable of reaching full speed and voltage within 20 seconds after receiving a signal to start, and 83.1.1.8.4 Automatic Shedding, Loading and capable of being fully loaded within the next 65 Isolation seconds as shown in Table 83-4. The limiting condition is for the RHR and HPCF injection The diesel generator is connected to its Class 1E valves to be open 36 seconds after the receipt of bus only when the incoming preferred source a high drywell or low reactor vessel level signal. breakers have been tripped (Subsection 83.1.1.7).

Since the motor operated valves are not tripped Under this condition, major loads are tripped from off the buses, they start to open, if requested to the Class 1E bus, except for the Class 1E 480V unit I do so by their controls, when power is restored substation feeders, before closing the diesel l to the bus at 20 seconds. This gives them an generator breaker.

allowable travel time of 16 seconds, which is attainable for the valves. The large motor loads are later reapplied I

SM Amendment 21

ABWR aA6im^o REV D Standard Plant I sequentially and automatically to the bus after 8.3.1.119 Reliability Qualification Testing l closing of the diesel generator breaker.

The qualification tests are performed on the diesel l 83.1.1.8.5 Protection Systems generator per IEEE Std. 387 as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements.

The diesel generator is shut down and the I generator breaker tripped under the following See Subsection 8.3.4.10 for interface require.

conditions during all modes of operation and testing ments, operation:

83.1.2 Analysis (1) engine overspeed trip; and 83.1.2.1 General AC Power Systerns (2) generator differential relay trip.

The general ac power systems are illustrated in These and other protective functions (alarms and Figure 8.31. The analysis demonstrates compliance trips) of the engine or the generator breaker and of the Class 1E ac power system to NRC General other off. normal conditions are annunciated in the Design Criteria (GDC), NRC Regulatory Guides main control room and/or locally as shown in Table and other criteria consistent with the Standard 8.3 5. Local alarm / annunciation points have Review Plan (SRP).

auxiliary iscined switch outputs which provide inputs Table 8.1 11dentifies the onsite power system and to alarm / annunciator refresh un.it s in the main control room which identifies the diesel generator the associated codes and standards applied in and general anomaly concerned. Those anomalies accordance with Table 81 of the SRP. Criteria are which cause the respective D/G to become listed in order of the listing on the table, and the degree of conformance is discussed for each. Any inoperitive Regulatory Guideare1.47 soand indicated BTP PSB in 2. accordance with~ ' exceptions or clarifications are so noted.

83.1.1.8.6 Local and Remote Co 01 e/Jwdiesf th (1) eneral Design Criteria (GDC):

Each diesel generator is capable being started or (a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17,18 and 50.

stopped manually from the main conhuiiuom.

Start /stop control and bus transfer control may be (b) Conformance: The ac power system is in transferred to a local control station in the diesel compliance with these GDCs. The GDCs generator area by operating key switches at that are generically addressed in Subsection 3.1.2.

n*g hstation.

v*/8 83.1.117 Engine Mechanical Systems and (2) RegulatoryGuides(RGs):

Accessories (a) RG 1.6 - Independence Between he Descriptions of these systems and accessories are dundant Standby (Onsite) given in Section 9.5. Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems 8J.1.1.8.8 Interlocks and Testability (b) RG 1.9 - Selection, Design, and Qua-Each diesel generator, when operating other than lification of Diesel Generator in test mode,is totally independent of the preferred Units Used as Standby power supply. Additionalinterlocks to the LOCA (Onsite) Electric Power Sys-and LOPP sensing circuits terminate parallel tems at Nuclear Power Plants operation test and cause the diesel generator to automatically revert and reset to its standby mode if (c) RG 132- Criteria for Safety-Related either signal appears during a test. A lockout or Electric Power Systems for l maintenance mode removes the diesel generator Nuclear Power Plants from service. The inoperable status is indicated in the control room. h/@ N I 8.3 10 Amendment 21

i i

ABWR 334sioo40 nev s j

Standard Plant-(d) RG 1.47. Bypassed and inoperable Sia- There are three 6.9 KV electrical divisions which a

tus Indication for Nuclear are independent load groups backed by individual Power Plant Safety Systems diesel generator sets. The low voltage ac systems l

' consists of four divisions which are backed by (c) RG 1.63 Electric Penetration Assem. independent de battery, charger and inverter blics in Containment Struc- systems. g tures for Light. Water Cooled .E

, Nuclear Power Plants The standby power system redundancy is ba/e onj the capability of any one of the Divisions /, or 5

[

(f) RG 135 - Physicai 1adependeoee of load groups to provide the minimum safety functions Electric Systems necessary to manually shut down the unit from the

> control room in case of an accident and maintain it (g) RG 1.106. Thermal Overload Protection in the safe shutdown condition. Two of the four for Electric Motors on Mo- instrument and control divisions are required to be tor Operated Valves functional to accomplish an automatic safe shutdown. r ..

4 Safety functions which are required to go to _

ld/VIS' M -

completion for safety have their thermal There is no sharing f standb

. overload protection devices in force during components betwee H ,, %y , power and theresystem is no normal plant operation but the overloads sharing of diesel generator p wer-sources between are bypassed under accident conditions per units, since the ABWR is a ' gig-plant esign.

Regulatory Postion 1.(b) of the guide, , TtJWf Each (b) RG Generator 1.108.UnitsPeriodic Used as On-Testing of Diesel y '" .jtgdbyowe y composed of single getferator driven site Electric Power Systems at sized in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9.

Nuc. car Power Plants Table 8.3-1 and 8.3-2 show the rating of each of the (i) RG 1.118- Periodic Testing of Electric Divisions I, II and III diesel generators, respectively, power and Protection Systems and the maximum coincidentalload for each.

(j) RG 1.153 - Criteria for Power, Instrumen- (3) Branch Technical Positions (BTPs):

'*M. tation, and Control Portions of Safety Systems (a) BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel-b 2 Generator Sets for Peaking

' hF/))

gy (k) RG 1.155 Station Blackout #gl (b) BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) - Application of the Regarding Positioe C 1 of Regulatory Guide 135 Single Failure Criterion to Manually-(see Seetion 8.3.1.1.1), the Ann ~mm Wm) Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves.

FMCRD motors and brakes are supplied pgwer from the Division 1 Class 1E p%;; +% bus (c) BTP ICSB 21 - Guidance for Application through a dedicated power center transformer. The of Regulatory Guide 1.47 Class 1E load breaker for the bus is tripped by fault current for faults in the non'sMoad. There is (d) BTP PSB 1. Adequacy of Station Electric 4 also a zone selective interlock provided from the load Distribution System Voltages i breaker to the Class 1E bus supply breaker so that the supply breaker is blocked f m t i ping while (c) BTP PSB 2 - Criteria for Alarms and in-fault current is flowing in the non oad feeder. dications Associated with Diesel-Gene.

This meets the intent of the Regulatory Guide rator Unit Bypassed and Inoperable position in that the main supply breaker is prevented Status from tripping on faults in the non safety related loads. A second isolation device is provided by the The onsite ac power system is designed power center transformer, which is associated and consistent with these positions.

meets 1E requirements.

[D r.s ytde endorses IESE 6 03,

\

8}ll Amendment 21 W heb 4 M f "I 1 oN.N8 I k q g w h p. *,'c%[8P.3 clrese g e w riehr I t

prolfriSCf 1 (T c. , f rotCCinc Vt d .;

d

] 33A6100A0 Standard Plant -.-....,,. nov n RIPS con ue to operate optimize the rat a (4) Other SRP Criteria: f of recire'ulation flow re etion until the MD .

(a) NUREG/CR 0660 - Enhancement of sets)Iave coasted doyn to the ASD cut'off I.

Onsite Diesel Generator Reliability po, int, at which time he remaining RIPS are ;

PPed. /

As indicated in Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.4, the { /

operating procedures and training of personnel The only n d to restart a/ RIP is in !

are outside of the Nuclear Island scope of preparation r restart of theplint, at which a supply. NUREG/CR 0669js_therefore im. time nor al power must have been restored 1 posed as an interface re ulreml t for the' to the n. safety buses, ghe operator may,-

applicant.(See Subsection 8.1 4) then estart any of theJtiPs, providing that .

l (b) NRC Policy Issue On Al rn O Power for tb temperature d'fference between,t'he ssel dome (a indicated by the ome ,

cad is

)

[.- ') Non safety leads '

pressure indic r) and the botto within alloy (ble limits. A s rt inhibit J

/

(

hb ll polic/ issue stat s that

An interlock i{ provided to infu e that the te limits are satisfied before a RIP

/

g '),. ) evolutionarf ALWR desi should include temper

,/ an alternate power sour to the non safety is star d.

loadyfaless the de ' n can demonstrat tharthe design mar s in the evolutto ry y non safety Ipads which should be ALWR will res m transients for a i of estarted immediately are orvfhe plant

/'non safety pow, r event that are a more ses. These severe that/those associated ith the investment buses are p)cked up protfction autopra (PIP)[tically b turbine trip /only event in cur at existing combustiots turbine. For j the remainp' rg

. plant depsgns.' A subseque clarification non safe.rf buses there,is no requiremptit to statedAhat the transfe should be a immedfately restore p6wer and for simplicity I auto $atic slow bus tr sfer to pickup t considerations auromatic transfers are not i

1 least one of the non an ABWR.

set driven RIP or proNded. /' ,./ j i / 8.3.1.2.2 Deleted An automat' transfer has ot been }

- provided for o reasons: 8.3.1.2.3 Quality Assurance Requirements (1) T coast down pro ded by the MG,/l A planned quality assurance program .s provided ets is equivale to the coastdow in Chapter 17. This program includes a comprehen-

provided by th recirculation pu p sive system to ensure that the purchased niaterial, j inertia on the urrent plants. mant facture, fabrication, testing and quality control i of the equipment in the emergency electric power i I(2) The ma er in which the ABWR system conforms to the evaluation of the emergency

't functio on the loss of o 'ite power electric power system equipment vendor quality I does et require a bus ansfer. Tht 1 assurance programs and preparation of pro-fo RIPS which ar not suppliedf. curement specifications incorporating quality

fr m the high inert' MG sets receiy assurance requirements. The administrative i trip comman immediately 6n responsibility and control provided are also des-i tripping of t e unit. Thi trip cribed in Chapter 17.

I command riginates rom j turbine / loa rejection trip, w vessel These quality assurance requirements include an j water le 1 (level 3) t p or high appropriate vendor quality assurance program and I

vessel ome pressu trip. The organization, purchaser surveillance as required, supply reakers to tie high inerti vendor preparation and maintenance of appropriate MGjsets are also ttIpped to preves test and inspection records, certificates and other 4 p9wer being rawn from e quality assurance documentation, and vendor (lywheels by t other large tors submittal of quality control records considered

/on the buse . The remaini'ng six necessary for purchaser retention to verify quality of

,/ / completed work.

~ _ . -

4 Amendment 2t 8.3 12

ABWR u4aoo40 Standard Plant nev n A necessary condition for receipt, installation and non-Class 1E circuits beicc in an enclosed placing of equipment in service has been the signing raceway without the req sired physical and auditing of OA/OC verification data and the separation or barriers between the enclosed placing of this data in permanent onsite storage files. raceway and the Class 1E or associated cables makes the circuits (related to the non Class 1E 83.1.2.4 Environmental Considerations cable in the enclosed raceway) associated circuits.

In addition to the effects of operation in normal service enviro:: ment, all Class 1E equipment is 83.1.3.1.1 Equipment identification designed to operate during and after any design basis event,in the accident environment expected in the Equipment (Panels, racks, junction or pull boxes) area in which it is located. All Class 1E electric of each division of the Class 1E electric system and equipment is qualified to IEEE 323 (see Section -

various CVCF power supply divisions are identified 3.11) as follows:

8.3.1J Physleal ldentification of Safety. (1) The background of the name plate for the Related Equipment equipment of a division has the same color as the cable jacket markers and the raceway 8.3.1.3.1 Power, Instrumentation and Control markers associated with that division.

Systems (2) Power system distribution equipment (e.g.,

Electrical and control equipment, assemblies, motor control centers, switchgear, trans-devices, and cables grouped into separate divisions formers, distribution panels, batteries, chargers) shall be identified so that their electrical divisional is tagged with an equipment number the same assignment is apparent and so that an observer can as indicated on the single-line diagrams, visually differentiate between Class 1E equipment and wiring of different divisions, and between Class (3) The nameplates are laminated black and white IE and non Class 1E equipment and wires. The plastic, arranged to show black engraving on a identification method shall be placed on color white background for non Class 1E equipment, coding. All markers within a division shall have the For Class 1E equipment, the name plates have same color. For associated cables (if any) treated as color coded background with black engradng.

l Class 1E (see Note 1) , there shall be an 'A' appended to the divi.ional designation (e.g.,"Al'). 83.1J.1.2 Cable Identification The latter 'A' stands for associated. '!f shall be used for nondivisional cables. Associated cables are All cables for Class 1E systems and associated uniquely identified by a longitudinal stripe or other circuits (except those routed in conduits) are tagged

color coded method and the data on the label. The every 5 ft prior to (or during) installation. All cables j color of the cable marker for associated cables shall are tagged at their terminations with a unique be the same as the related Class 1E cable. Divisional identifying number (cable number), in addition to separation requirements of individual pieces of the marking characteristics shown below, hardware are shown in the system elementary diagrams. Identification of raceways, cables, etc., Cables shall be marked in a manner of sufficient shall be compatible with the identification of the durability to be legible throughout the life cf the Class IE equipment with which it interfaces. Loca- plant, and to facilitate initial verification that the tion of identification shall be such that points of installation is in conformance with the separation change of circuit classification (at isolation devices, criteria.

etc.) are readily identifiable.

Such markings shall be colored to uniquely identify Note 1 Associated circuits added beyond the the division (or non division) of the cable, certified design must be specifically Generally, individual conductors exposed by i identified and justified per Subsection stripping the jacket are also color c ed or color i 83.4.13. Associated circuits are defined in tagged (at intervals not to excee such that Section 5.5.1 of IEEE 384-1981, with the their division is still discernable. Exceptions are clarification for items (3) and (4) that permitted for individual conductors ' thin cabinets ,

tv9 Amendment 21 8

83 13

._,.- - - - - ~ ~_. . . ..- - + ~ . . - - . . . . - . .

ABM 33xsioo40 Standard Plant arv s i

or panels where all wiring is unique to a single equipment for safety.related systems shall be division. Any non divisional cable within such identified by suffix letters. Sensing lines are j cabinets shall be appropriately marked to distinguish discussed in Section 7.7.1.1.

it from the divisional cables.

4 83.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems i 83.1J.1J Raceway Identifcatloa rf gets All conduit is similar ta ed with a unique conduit number, in a ition o the marking cha. The Class 1E onsite electric power systems and

- racts.ristics shown elow, a 5 ft) intervals, at major components of the separate power divisions is discontinuities, at p !! boxes, at points of entrance shown on Figure 83-1, 4 and exit of rooms ad at origin and destination of Independence of the electric equipment and equipment. Con 'ts containing cables operating at above 600V (i.e., .9kV) are also tagged to indicate raceway systems between the different divisions is

the operating v tage. These markings are applied maintained primarily by firewall type separation as

! prior to the inst tion of the cables, decribed in Subsection 83.1.4.2.~ Any exceptions are

, justified in Appendix 9A, Subsection 9A.5.5.5, j All Class IE .able raceways are marked with the

< division col and with their proper raceway The physical independence of electric power

identification a ft)tervals on straight sections, at systems complies with the requirements of IEEE

! turning points nd at points of entry and exit from StandardC^." Mp84, General Design Criteria 17,

enclosed areas. Cable trays are marked prior to 18 and 21 and NRC Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.75.

, installation of their cables.

8J.1.4.1.1 Class 1E Electric Equipment To help distinguish the neutron monitoring and Arrangement -

4 scram solenoid cables from other type cables, the

following unique voltage class designations and (1) Class 1E electric equipment and wiring is

markings are used: segregated into separate divisions so that no single credible event is capable of disabling Type of Unique enough equipment to hinder reactor shutdown i Special Cables Voltage Class and removal of decay heat by either of two unaffected divisionalload groups or prevent l Neutron monitoring VN isolation of the containment in the event of an

. accident. Separation requirements are applied

. Scram solenoid cables VS to control power and motive ower for all 3 N Neutron-monitoring cables are run in their own systems involved. CCESI TD Idar /E 7 ij gi OFVy[j$N,h,$h

divisional conduits and cable trays, separately from (2) Equipment arrangement and/or protective bar.

all other power, instrumentation and control cables. riers are provided such that no locally ge.

Scram solenoid cables are run in a separate conduit nerated force or missile can destroy any re.

for each rod scram group. dundant RPS, NSSS, ECCS, or ESF functions.

In addition, arrangement and/or separation The redundant Class 1E, equipment and circuits, barriers are provided to ensure that such assigned to redundant Class 1E divisions and disturbances do not affect both HPCF and non Class 1E system equipment and circuits are RCIC systems.

readily distinguishable from each other without the necessity for consulting reference materials. This is (3) Routing of wiring / cabling is arranged such as to accomplished by color coding of equipment, eliminate, insofar as practical, all potential for name plates, cables and raceways, as described fire damage to cables and to separate the above. ,

redundant divisions so that fire in one division will not propagate to another didsion. Class 1E 83.13.1.4 Sensory Equipment Grouping and and non Class IE cables are separated in Designation letten accordance with IEEE 384 and R.G.1.75 (see Figures 9A.4-1 through 9A.4-16).

Redundant sensory logic / control and actuation Amendment 21 ohe VM or VS marki o'c . suferoyd s.w CM Tte ( b v t slina f co W ? y tMe$l}r d$ f!dCT a t v.c ss-e w er d

ABWR aA6tm^o Standard Plant REV B (4) An independent raceway system is provided for (3) Sharing of cable trays All divisiens of Class 1E cach division of the Class 1E electric system. ac and de systems are provided with The raceways are arranged, physically, top to todependent raceway systems, bottom, as follows (based on the function and the voltage class of the cables): (4) Cable fire protection and detection For details of cable fire protection and detection, refer to (a) V4 - Medium voltage power,6.9kV (8ky Subsections 833 and 9.5.1.

insulation class).

(5) Cable and raceway markings All cables (except (b) V3 = Low voltage power including 480 lighting and nonvital communications) are VAC,120 VAC,125 VDC power and tagged at their terminations with a unique all instrumentation and control identifying number. Colors used for identi-power supply feeders (600V fication of cables and raceways are covered in insulation class). Subsection 83.13.

(c) V2 = High level signal and control, (6) Spacing of wiring and components la control including 125 VDC and 120 VAC boardt, panels and relay racks Separation is controls which carry less than 20A of accomplished by mounting the redundant current and 250 VDC or ac for relay - devices or other components on physically.

contactor control. separated control boards if, from a pleut operational point of view, this is feasible. Whe's (d) V1 = Low level signal and control, operational design dictates that redundant including liber optic cables and equipment be in close proximity, separation is metallic cables with analog signals up achieved by a barrier or enclosure to retard to 55 VDC and digital signal up to 12 internal fire or by a maintained air space in VDC. accordance with criteria given in Subsection 83.1.4.2.

Power cables (V3) are routed in flexible metallic CIdII /E conduit under the raised floor of the control In this hse, redundant circuits wluch serve the room, samesawm...Jfunction enter the control panel through separated apertures and i 8.3.1.4.1.2 Electric Cable Installation terminate on separate and reparated terminal

blocks. Where redundant circuits unavoidably (1) Cable Derating and cable tray fill Base terminate on the same device, barriers are t

ampacity rating of cables is established as _ provided between the device terminations to

[ described in Subsection 833.1. Electric cables ensure circuit separation approved isolators l

of a discrete Class 1E electric system division . (generally optical) are used.

are installed in a cable tray system provided for the same division. Cables are installed in trays (7) Electric penetration assembly.. Electric in accordance with their voltage ratings and as described in Subsection 83.1.4.1. Tray fillis as . division ration assemblies or ottlerent tia separat: d by three ho e rated.

established in Subsection 833.1. barriers, i.e., arate rcoms /or locations I l }

i on separate floor le . ation by distance ck (2) Cable' routiog la potentially hostile (w'thout barriers) i ed only within the

( areas -Circuits of different safety divisions are inerted contal nt. (See 'on 203, RAIS,f (tf f)

~

not routed through the same potentially hostile area, with the exception of main steam line

Response

and 31). Separation bet n divisional penetrations sha division' h /

instrumentation and control circuits and main . cordance with IEEE 384/Groupmg of ciremts steam line isolation valves circuits which are 'In penetration assemblies follows the same .

exposed to possible steam line oreak and turbine raceway voltage groupings as described in l l' missiles, respectively. Cable routing in the Subsection 83.1.4.1.

drywellis discussed in association with the equipment it serves in the "Special Cases" Redundant overcurrent interrupting devices are Section 9A.S. provided for all electrical circuits (including all D

~

l Amendment 21 8M

1 MN 33A6t00A0 nev n

- Standard Plant instrumentation and control devices, as well as Once the safety related equipment has been power circuits) going through containment identified with a Class 1E safety division, the penetrations,if the maximum available fault divisional assignment dictates a characteristic color

, current (including failure of upstream devices) is (Subsection 83.13) for positive visual identification.

greater than the continuous current rating of the Likewise, the divisionalidentification of all ancillary penetration. This avoids penetration damage in equipment, cable and raceways match the divisional the event of failure of any single overcurrent assignment of the system it supports, desice to clear a fault within the penetration or beyond it. (See Subsection 8.3.4.4 for COL 83.1.4.2 Independence of Redundant Cla 55 /E license infonnation. T :a "J .i4 Instrumentation and Control

! Systems ggg 8.3.1.4.1.3 Control of Compilance with i Separation Criteria During Design and This subsection /lefines independence criteria Installation applied to(safetyrelatec0 electrical systems and instrumentation and control equiptaent. Safety.

Cocapliance with the criteria which insures related systems to which the criteria apply are those independence of redundant systems is a supervisory necessary to mitigate the effects of anticipated and responsibility during both the design and installation abnormal operational transients or design basis phases. The responsibility is discharged by; accidents. This includes all those systems and functions enumerated in Subsections 7.1.1.3, 7.1.1.4, i (1) identifying applicable criteria; 7.1.1.5, and 7.1.1.6. The term ' systems

includes the overall complex of actuated equipment, actuation (2) issuing working procedure to implement these devices (actuators), logic, instrument channels, criteria; controls, and interconnecting cables which are -

required to perform system safety functions. The (3) modifying procedures to keep them current and - criteria outlines the separation requirements workable; necessary to achieve independence of safety-related functions compatible with the redundant and/or j

l (4) checking the manufacturer's drawings and diverse equipment provided and postulated events.

! specifications to ensure compliance with procedures; and 8.3.1.4.2.1 General -

l (5) controlling installation and procurement to Separation of the equipment for the systems l

assure compliance with approved and issued referred to in Subsections 7.1.13,7.1.1.4,7.1.1.5,'and I drawings and specifications. 7.1.1.6 is accomplished so that they are in compliance l with 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria Tbc equipment nomenclature used on the ABWR 3,17,21 and 22, and NRC Regulatory Guides 1.75 l standard design is one of the primary mechanisms (IEEE 384) and 1.53 (IEEE 379).

for ensuring proper separation. Each equipment and/or assembly of equipment carries a single Independence of mutually redundant and/or di-number, (e.g., the item numbers for motor drivers verse Class 1E equipment, devices, and cables is are the same as the machinery driven). Based on achieved by three. hour fire-rated barriers and elec-g(,la55 IE- these ification numbers, each iten. can be ded to identified a pf,sf trical isolation. This protectiongpv}dkd maintain the independence of nuclear ..;y ?

r(nificarentlail and each circuits and equipment so that tb protective Mtem can further identified to its safety function required during and following a design basis separation division. Th' is carried through and dictates appropriate t .atment at the design level event including a single fire anywhere in the plant or during preparation of e 'amanhe~'= drawinat a single failure in any circuit or equipment can be fl0H - C I4 5r /E] accomplished. The exceptiocal cases where it is not Non-Class 1E equipment is separated where de. possible to install such barriers have been analyzed sired to enhance power generation reliability, and justified in Appendix 9A.S.

although such separation is not a safety consid-eration.

8.3 16

- Amendment 2t

MN 33A6100A0 arv n Standard Plant 83.1.4.2.2 Separation Techniques instrument racks will not contain circuits or devices of the redundant protection system or ESF systems The methods used to protect redundant safety except:

systems from resuhs of single failures or events are utilization of safety class structures, three hour fire. (1) Certain operator interface control panels may rated protective barriers, and isolation devices. have operational considerations which dictate that redundant protection system or ESF system 8.3.1.4.2.2.1 Safety Class Structure circuits or devices be located in a single panel.

These circuits and devices are separated The basic design consideration of plant layout is orizontall and ve(tically by a minimum such that redundant circuits and equipment ar distance o inches)or by steel barriers or located in separate safety class areas (i.e., separate fire zones) insofar as possible. The separation of Ql0 I enclosures. g 2tf cm Class 1E circuits and equipment is such that the (2) Class 1E circuits and devices will also be required independence will not be compromised by separated from the non Class 1E circuits and the failure of mechanical systerns served by the Class from each other horizontally and vertically by a IE electrical system. For example, Class 1E circuits 6 inches)or by steel are routed or protected so that failure of related barriers or enclosuresj [-ISM y C Ptm mechanical equipment of one system cannot disable Class 1E circuits or equipment essertial to the (3) Where electricalinterfaces between Class 1E operation of a redundant system. This separation of and non Class 1E circuits or between Class 1E Class 1E circuits and equipments make effective use circuits of different divisions cannot be avoided, of features inherent in the plant design such as using Class 1E isolation devices are used (Subsection different rooms or floors. 83.1.4.2.2.4)j 83.1.4.2.2.2 Three Ilour Fire Rated Protective (4) If two panels containing circuits of different Barriers separation divisions are less than 3 feet apart, there shall be a ste:1 barrier between the two Three hour fire rated protective barriers shall be panels. Panel ends closed by steel end plates such that no locally generated fire, or missile are considered to be acceptable barriers resulting from a design basis event (DBE) or from provided that terminal boards and wireways are random failure of Seismic Category I equipment can spaced a minimum o inch} rom the end plate.

disable a safety rela.ed function. The exceptional 2 5q cm cases where it is not possible to install such barriers (5) Penetration of separation barriers within a have been analzed and justified in Appendix 9A.S. subdivided panel is permitted , provided that such penetrations are scaled or otherwise Separation in all safety equipment or cable areas treated so that fire generated by an electrical shall equal or exceed the requirements of IEEE 384. fault could not reasonably propagate from one section to the other and disable a protective 8J.1.4.2.2.3 Main Control Room and Relay Room function.

Panels 8.3.14.2.2.4 Isol on DeTiter The protection system and ESF control, logic, and f s instrument panels / racks shall be located in a safety Where ele icalinterfaces tjetween Class 1 and' class structure in which there are no potential non-Class circuits or be en Class 1E cire its of V sources of missiles or pipe breaks that could different ivisions canno be avoided, Cl ss 1E jeopardize redundant cabinets and raceways. isolati devices will b used. AC isolat' n (The FMC D drives on Di sion 1 is the ont case.) is Control, relay, and instrument panels / racks will be pro ided by interl ked circuit brea er coordi-designed in accordance with the following general on and an isola on transformer a escribed in criteria to preclude failure of non safety circuits from bsection 83.1. 5 causing failure of any safety circuit and to preclude failure of one safety circuit from causing failure of Wiring fro Class 1E equipme or circuits which j any other redundant safety circuit. Single panels or interface wit non-Class 1E equi ent circuits (i 5 517 Amendment 21 ,

! M\ 23A6100A0 nev s Standard Plant 80.1.4.2.2.4 Isolation Devices $lg als sent from one division to another sucit as maintain electrical isolation between Where electricalinterfaces between Class 1E divisions, and non. Class IE circuits or between Class IE circuits of different divisions cannot be avoided, (3) Sensor wiring for several trip variables Class 1E isolation devices will be used. AC isolation associated with the trip channels of one division (the FMCRD drives on Division 1 is the only case) is may be run together in the same conduits or in provided by interlocked circuit breaker coordination the same raceways of that same and only and an isolation transformer as described in division. Sensor wiring associat A with one Subsection 83.1.1.1. d ' ' n will not be routed with a b ;l@ 4 imuy Qany wiring or cabling associated :

Wiring from Class 1E equipment or circuits f wuh a redundant division.

4 which interface with non. Class 1E equipment circuits (i.e., annunciators or data loggers) is treated as Class (4) The scram solenoid circuits. from the actuation IE and retain its divisional identification up to and devices to the solenoids of the scram pilot valves

, including its isolation device. The ot tput circuits of the CRD hydraulic control units, will be run from this isolation device are classi'ied as non- in grounded steel conduits, with no other wiring

divisional and shall be physically separated from the contained within the conduits,'so that each divisional wiring. scram group is prctected against a hot short to any other wiring by a grounded enclosure. Short 8.3.1.4.2.3 System separation Requirements hatt[ sections (less than one meter) of flexible

/02j_ metallic conduit will be permitted for making Specific divisional assignment of safety related connections within panels and the connections system., and equipment is given in Table 8.31. to the solenoids.

Other separation requirements pertaining to the RPS and other ESF systems are given in the (5) Separate grounded steel conduits will be following subsections. provided for the scram solenoid wiring for each i of four scram groups. Separate grounded steel 83.1.4.23.1 Reactor Protection (Trip) System conduits will also be provided for both the A (RPS) solenoid wiring circuits and for the B solenoid The folicwing separation requirements apply to the RPS wiring: (6) Scram group conduits will have unique ident-ification and will be separately routed as (1) RPS sensors, sensor input circuit wiring, trip Division II and III conduits for the A and B channels and trip logic equipment will be solenoids of the scram pilot valves, respectively, arranged in four functionally independent and- This corresponds to the divisional assignment of divisionally separate groups designated Dinsions their power sources. The conduits containing 1, II, II and IV. The trip channel wiring the scram solenoid group wiring of any one associated with the sensor input signals for each scram group will also be physically parated by of the four divisions provides inputs to divisional a minimum separation distance o' inch from i

logic cabinets which are in the same divisional the conduit of any other scram grobp, gd and group as the sensors and trip channels and metal ene gpysghich colturn~either

, which are functionally independent and divisional .J (non. divisional) physically separated from the logic cabinets of circuits. The scram group conduits may not bc the redundant divisions, routed within the confines of any other tray or raceway system. The RPS conduits containing (2) Where trip channel data originating from the scram group wiring for the A and B sensors of one division are required for solenoids of the scram pilot valves (associated coincident trip logie circuits in other divisions, with Divisions II and III, respectively), shall be Class 1E isolation devices (i.e., fiber optic separated from non-enclosed raceways medium) will be used as interfac; elements for associated with any of the four electrical divisions or non divisicaal cables in accordance !

svittiIEEE 384 and Regulatory Guide 1.75J-

l. e 9 A m Q Ft.) knwato6 D V~

Amendment 21 /. 5 m (5'ft) voTio I o r- a sua j

barriev. l

ABWR mumo Standard Plant nev n Annunciator and computer inputs from non. 6.9 kV and 480V switchgear, control relays, meters Class 1E equipment or circuits do not require and indicators, multiplexers, vital ac power supplies, isolation devices, as well as de components used in the reactor core ,

isolation cooling system.

8.3.2 DC Power Systems The four didstons that are essential to the safe 8J.2.1 Description shutdown of the reactor are supplied from four i inde ndent 125 g VDC buses.

8J.2.1.1 General Sptems Clag (E /

83.2. J Station Batteries and Battery A DC power system is provided for switchgear Charged,'Getidal Considerations control, control power, instrumentation, critical motors and emergency lighting in control rooms, The four ESF ' i;;=divisio.is;3are supplied frop,Te switchgear rooms and fuel handling areas. Four four Class 1E 115 VDC systems (See Figure 8(3 7)

.M independent Class 1E 125VDC divisions, three Each of the Class 1E 125 VDC systems has Q25 !

N independe en7salcty.related)125VDC load groups' VDC battery, a battery charger and a distributioY (I# g anu une on. safety.relatef250VDC .:ompute Jand panel. One standby battery charger can be

$ motor power supply are provided. See Figures 3 connected to either of two divisions and another for the single lines, standby battery charger can be connected to either of two other divisions. Kirk key interlocks prevent Each battery is separately housed in a ventilated cross connection between divisions. The main de room apart from its charger and distribution panels, distribution buses include distribution panels, Each battery feeds a de distribution switchgear panel drawout type breakers and molded case circuit which in turn feeds local distribution panels and de breakers.

motor control centers. An emergency eye wash is supplied in each battery room. The Class 1E 125 VDC systems supply de power to Divisions I, !!, III and IV, respectively, and are All batteries are sized so that required loads will designed as Class 1E equipment in accordance with not exceed warranted capacity at end.of. installed. life IEEE Std 308. They are designed so that no single

. 'th 100% desiga demand, failure in any 125 VDC system will result in conditions that prevent safe shutdown of the plant

()l N <loa A

All . rgers are tea to sju py me c muous j emand to t tr bus restorin atteriesjef with either of the two remaining ac power divisions, The plant design and circuit layout from these de a.fillly charged ate. _ systems provide physical separation of the equipment, cabling and instrumentation essential to 83.2.1.1.1 Class 1E 125 VDC System plant safety.

The 125 VDC system provides a reliable control Each division of the system is located in an area and switching power source for the Class IE sptem . separated physically from other divisions. All the components of Class 1E 125 VDC systems are Each 125 VDC battery is provided with a charger, housed in Seismic Category I structures.

and a standby charger shared by two divisions, each of which is capable of recharging its battery from a 8J.2.1J.1 12 ~Cyystems Configuration discharged state to a fully charged state while Q handling the normal, steady state de load. Figure 3./ sno els the overall 125 VDC system provided f Clas 1E Divisions I, II, III and IV.

Batteries are sized for the de load in accordance One division tery charger is used to supply each I with IEEE Standard 485. divisional de distribution panel bus and its associated

$nM[

8@

-S 8.3.2.1.2 Class 1E DC Loads battery. The divisional battery charger is normally m

y fed from its divisional 480V MCC bus}es.f k no auto *he tranfer befween uv ;

The 125 VDC Class 1E power is required for Each Class 1E 125 VDC battery is provided with emergency lighting, diesel. generator field flashing, a charger, and a standby charger shared by two control and switching functions such as the control of divisions, each of which is capable of recharging its Amendment 21 8.3 20

l ABWR as^sioo^o

. Standard Plant Revn

\

Class 15 (7) Any scram grou onduit msy be routed advantage of the mechanical protection afforded l by the valve operator or other available alongside of an able or raceway containing either circuits (of any dission), or post- structural barriers not susceptible to disabling any cable or raceway containing(frowsatnyt Ops.* damage from the pipe line break. Additional o MMcircuits, as long as the conduit itself is /f mechanical protection (barriers) shall be Inot within the boundary of any raceway which interposed as necessary between wiring and i contains either the divisional or the non- potential sources of disabling mechanical

safety related circuits and is physically separated damage consequential to a break downstream of from said cables and raceway boundaries as the outboard valve, stated in (6) above. Any one scram group conduit may also be routed along with scram (4) The several systems comprising the ECCS l ave group conduits of the same scram group or with their various sensors, logics, actuating devices

conduits of any of the three other scram groups and power supplies assigned to divisions in 4 n k ;;- the minimum separation distance of accordance with Table 8.31 so that no single g2n1 (one inch 2.5 cm is maintained.

failure can disable a redundant ECCS function. g)-

J This is accomplished by limiting consequences (8) The standby liquid control system redundant of a single failure to equipment listed in any one _

l Class 1E controls will be run as Division I and division of Table 83-14The wiring to the ADS Division 11 so that no failure of standby liquid solenoid valves within the drywell shall run in l

control (SLC) function will result from a single rigid conduit. ADS conduit for solenoid A shall electrical failure in a RPS circuit. be divisionally separated from solenoid B conduit, Short pieces (less than 2 feet) of (9) The startup range monitoring (SRNM) flexible conduit may be used in thefvicin'

subsystem cabling of the NMS cabling under the the valve solenoids, p I vessel is treated as divisional. The SRNM .6 M cables will be assigned to Division I, II, III and (5) Electricalequipment and raceways or systems IV. Under the vessel, cables will be enclosed listed in Table 8.31 shall not be located in close l

i and separated as defined in Appendix 9A.5.5.5. proximity to primary steam piping (steam leakage zone), or be designed for short term l 8J.1 A.2J.2 Other Safety Related Sptems exposure to the high temperature leak.

1 (1) Separation of redundant systems or portions of (6) Class 1E electrical equipment located in the a system shall be such that no single failure can suppression pool level swell zone is limited to prevent initiation and completion of an suppression pool temperature monitors, which engineered safeguard function. have their terminations scaled such that operation would not be impaired by sub.

l (2) The inboard and outboard isolation valves are mersion due to pool swell or LOCA. Consistent redundant to each other so they are made with their Class 1E status, these devices are also independent of and protected from each other qualified to the requirements of IEEE 323 for to the extent that no single failure can prevent the environment in which they are located.

l

! the operation of at least one of an inboard /

l outboard pair, (7) Containment penetrations are so arranged that no design basis event can disable cabling in (3) Isolation valve circuits require special attention more than one division. Penetrations do not because of their function in limiting the contain cables of more than one divisional consequences of a pipe break outside the assignment.

primary containment. Isolation valve control and power circuits are required to be protected (8) Annunciator and computer inputs from Class 1E from the pipe lines that they are responsible for equipment or circuits are treated as Class 1E isolating. and retain their divisionalidentification up to a C.la.6 E Class 1E isolation device. The output circuit

[*pl lation valve wirmg in the vicinity of from this isolation device is classified as the outboard valve (or downstream of the valve) nondivisional.

shall be installed in conduits and routed to take 8319 Amendment 21

I ABWR atuoaxo Standard Plant avo battery from a discharged state to a fully charged operation is with bus tie breakers open and inter-state while handling the normal, steady-state de load, locks prevent paralleling batteries. Each load Cross connection between two divisions through a group's battery and charger may be ternoved from standby charger is prevented by at least two service as a unit for rnaintenance or testing. A l interlocked breakers in series in each potential battery can be recharged by its charger prior to being cross. connect path. (Sec f r pre 8 3-4 a ed placed back into service.

(%' STheh$ uf th 8 3 d{ If maximum equalizing charge voltage for Class One backup charger is provided and is 1E batteries is 140 VDC. The de system minimum connectable to any of the three buses, one bus at a discharge voltage at the end of the discharge period time, under control of Kirk key interlocks to:

is 1.75 VDC per cell (105 volts for the battery). The operating voltage range of Class 1E de loads is 100 to (a) Perform extended maintenance on the normal 140V. charger for the load group.

As a general requirement, the batteries have (b) To make a live transfer of a bus to supply power Lufficient stored energy to operate connected from the bus of another load group without kifgfepgi aoads continuously for at least two hours pM Mhout recharging. The Division I battery, which paralleling the two batteries.

controls the RCIC system, is sufficient for eight The chargers are load limiting battery replacement hours of coping during station blackout. During this type chargers capable of operation without a battery event scenario, the load reductions on Divisions II, connected to the bus. The backup charger may be III, and IV also extend the times these batteries are supplied from the ac supply of any one of the three available (See Appendix Subsection 19E.2.1.2.2), load groups. It may be used to charge any one Each distribution circuit is capable of transmitting battery at a given time. For example the load group sufficient energy to start and operate all required B battery may be charged from load group A or B or loads in that circuit. C ac power via the backup charger.

/

[ A load capacity analysis has been performed, Each bus is connectable to either of the other

~' based on IEEE 4851978, for estimard Mass 1E de two buses via Kirk key interlocked tie breakers. The

{

\ batteryIpa,ds ofeSep, tem r

-ny989. ,[u.e l 44k interlock system allows paralleling of p.e d/ 4 Kirk keychargers.

wu. Since the chargers are self load limiting, An initial composite test of onsi:e ac and de power parallel operation is acceptable. The Kirk key systems is called for as a prerequisite to initial fuel interlock system prevents parallel operation of loading. This test will verify that each battery batteries. This is to prevent the possibility of capacity is sufficient to satisfy a safety load demand paralleling batteries which have different terminal profile under the conditions of a LOCA and loss of voltages and experiencing a large circulating current preferred power. as a result.

Thereafter, periodic capacity tests may be con- The battery output breaker has an overcurrent trip ducted in accordance with IEEE Std 450. These and interrupts fault current flow from the battery to tests will ensure that the battery has the capacity to a bus fault. A combination disconnect switch and continue to meet safety load demands. fuse is an acceptable alternate for the battery output breaker. The charger output breaker and the bus See Subsection 8.3.4.6 for COL license input breaker do not have overcurrent trips as the informations. charger is load limiting and therefore protects itself.

They are used as disconnect switches only. Bus load

$8311.3.2 Non-Class 1E 125V DC Power Supply breakers have overcurrent trips coordinated with the

} mn{Id55 If-A non. class 1E 125VDC power / supply, Figure battery output breaker. Tripping current for the load breakers is supplied by the battery.

L 837, is provided for (dh-saicmc4as3 switchgear, valves ( converters, transducers, controis and 83.2.133 Non Class 1E 250V DC Pont Supply w instrn' mentation. The system has three load groups AA non class 1E 250VDC power supply, Figure with one battery, charger and bus per load group.

There are bus tie breakers between buses. Normal 83/,is provided for the computers and the turbine 83-21 Amendment 21 s

ABM 3346ioo40 nev o Standard Plant turning gear motor. The power supply consists of (2) The differential relays in one didsion and all the one 250VDC battery and two chargers. The normal interlocks associated with these relays are from charger is fed by 480VAC from either the load one 125 VDC system only, thereby elimina3inr Group A or load Group C turbine building load cen. any cross connections between the redundadt Ac /

ters. Selection of the desire g,sypply is by a systems. OV mechanically interlocked tra si' switch. Tbc standby charger is fed from a load Group A control 83.2.2.2 Regulatory Requirements building motor control center. Selection of the normal or the standby charger is controlled by key The following analyses demonstrate com #ance of interlocked breakers. A 250VDC central distri- the Class 1E Divisions I, II, til and I ge pbwer bution board is provided for connection of the loads, systems to NRC General Design Cr tem, NRC all of which are non class 1E. Regulatory Guides and other criteria consistent with the standard review plan. The analyses establish the 83.2.1.3.4 Ventilation ability of the system to sustain credible single failures and retain their capacity to function.

Battery rooms are ventilated to remove the minor amounts of gas produced during the charging of The following list of criteria is addressed in batteries. accordance with Table 8.1 1 which is based on Table 81 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP). In general, 83.2.13.5 Station Blackout the ABWR is designed in accordance with all criteria. Any exceptions or clarifications are so Station blackout performance is discussed in noted.

Subsection 19E.2.1.2.2.

(1) General Design Criteria (GDC):

83.2.2 Analysis (a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17, and 18.

8J.2.2.1 General DC Power Systems (b) Conformance: *'he s DC power system is The 480 VAC power supplies for the divisional in compliance with these GDCs . The battery chargers are frogthe individual class 1E GDCs are generically addressed in MCC to which th partitular 125 VDC system Subsection 3.1.2.

belongs (Figure 8 #)hl this way, separation between the indep dent tems is maintained and (2) RegulatoryGuides(RGs):

t power provide he chargers can be from er preferred or standl[ (a) RG 1.6 - Indepeudence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite)

[4cternal system failure thh probability of t de resulting in loss Power ofandt[g-system Sources Between is power system is extremely low. Important s Their Distribution Systems components are either self alartaing on failure or capable of clearing igults or being tested during (b) RG 132- Criteria for Safety Related service to detect faults. Eech battery set is located in _

Eleetric Power Systems for a

its own ventilated battery cr'.. All abnormal Nuclear Power Plants i*

conditions of important system parameters such as b charger failure or low bus voltage are annunciated in c RG 1,47 Bypassed and Inoperable Sta, the main control room and/or locally. tus Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems y

AC dgspitchgear power circuit breakers in each d visiott receive control power from the (d) RG 1.63 - Electric Penetration Assem.

batteries in the respective load grouips ensuring the blies in Containment Struc-following- tures for Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (1) The unlikely loss of one 125 VDC system does not jeopardize the Class 1E feed supply to the (e) RG 1.75- Physical Independence of Class 1E buses. Electric Systems 8322 Amendment 21

ABWR 33uimo Standard Plant uvn

\ ,en3e cy Th sic p@alth,uiNstandby lighting ortions of Safety Systems y vst r6'streuits up to the lighting fixtures are ' #fd k I Class 1 Mand are routed in scismic ' @) KUti Station Blackout Category I raceways. However, the lighting fixtures themselves are not seismically The Class 1 de ower system is designed in qualified, but are seismically supported, accordance ith" e listed Regulatory Guides.

The cables and circuits from the power yt is designe with sufficient capacity, inde-pendence and redundancy to assure that the source to the lighting fixtures are Class 1E,f".g required power suppor The This isbul}s, we cannop':=._!m;"""nea gas,e u- m,i,calgal,i, fig ;g containment integrity and other v,tal i functions as a4! C!2a; I mpnwi b; smin!!y L maintained in the event of a postulated accident, q assuming a single failure.

I =er!!&d.

th efore doThe bulbs can not represent only fail a hazard open and to the Class IE power sources. The batteries consist of industrial type storage cells, designed for the type of service in which Associated circuits added beyond the they are used. Ample capacity is available to certified design must be specifically serve the loads connected to the system for the identified and justified per Subsection duration of the time that alternating current is 8.3.4.13. Associated circuits are defined in not available to the battery charger. Each Section 5.5.1 of IEEE 384 1981, with the division of Class 1E equipment is provided with clarification for items (3) and (4) that a separate and independent 125 VDC system.

non-Class IE circuits being in an enclosed raceway without the required physical The DC power system is designed to permit separation or barriers between the enclosed inspection and testing of allimportant areas and raceway and the Class 1E or associated features, especially those which have a standby cables makes the circuits (related to the function and whose operation is not normally non Class 1E cable in the enclosed demonstrated.

raceway) associated circuits.

(i) RG 1.153 Criteria For Power, Instru-(f) RG 1.106 Thermal Overload Protection mentation, and Control Por-for Electric Motors on tions of Safety Systems Motor-Operated Valves (j) RG 1.155 Station Blackout Safety functions which are required to go to completion for safety have their thermal Credit is not taken for the CTG as an overload protection devices in force during alternate AC source (AAC) so Section normal plant operation but the overloads 3.3.5 of RG 1.155 is not required to be are bypassed under accident conditions per m et. (The CTG does meet the Regulatory Postion 1.(b) of the guide, requirements of Section 3.3.5, however.)

See Section 19E.2.1.2.2 for a discussion of (g) RG 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric compliance with RG 1.155.

Power and Protection Systems (3) Branch Technical Pcsitions (BTPs):

(h) RG 1.128. Installation Designs and In-stallation of Large Lead Stor- BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application of age Batteries for Nuclear Regulatory Guide l.47.

Power Plants The de power system is designed consistent with (i) RG 1.129 Maintenanee, Testing, and this criteria.

Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear (4) Other SRP Criteria:

Power Plants According to Table 8-1 of the SRP, there are no (j) RG 1.153 Criteria for Power, instru- other criteria applicable to de power systems, mentation, and Control Amendment 2t 83 23

ABWR MA6100A0 neu n Standard Plant 8JJ Fire Protection of Cable Systems 8JJ.2 localisation of Fires i

4 The basic concept of fire protection for the cable la the event of a fire, the installation design wi'l 1 system in the ABWR design is that it is incorporated localire the physical effects of the fire by preventing into the design and installation rather than added its spread to adjunt areas or to adjacent raceways onto the systems. By use of fire resistant and of different divisions. Localization of the effect of j nonpropagating cables, conservative application in fires on the electric system is accomplished by regard to ampacity ratings and raceway fill, and by separation of redundant cable systems and separation, fire protection is built into the system, equipment as described in Subsection 8.3.1.4.

Fire suppression systems (e.g.; automatic sprinkler Floors and walls are effectively used to provide vertical and horizontal fire resistive separations systems) are provided as listed in Table 9.5.1 1.

i between redundant cable didsions.

8JJ.1 Resistance of Cables to Combustion in any given fire area an attempt is made to The electrical cable insulation is designed to resist hat there is equipment from only one the onset of combustion by limiting cable ampacity to C gngrgMdS division. This design objective is not

levels which prevent overheating and insulation always met due to other over riding design failures (and resultant possibility of fire) and by requirements. IEEE Std 384 and Regulatory Guide choice of insulation and jacket materials which have 1.75 are always complied with, however, in addition

- flame resistive and self extinguishing characteristics, an analysis is made and documented in Section Polyvinyl chloride or neoprene cable insulation is not 9A.S.5 to ascertain that the requirernent of being used in the ABWR. All cable trays are fabricated able to safely shut the plant down with complete from noncombustible material. Base ampacity rating burnout of the fire area without recovery of the

of the cables was established as published in equipment is met. The fire detection, fire IPCEA 46 426/IEEE S 135 and IPCEA 54-440/ stppression and fire containment systems provided NEMA WC 51. Each coaxial cable, each single should assure that a fire of this magnitu<tc does not conductor cable and each conductor in multi- occur, however.

conductor cable is specified to pass the vertical flame i test in accordance with UL-4 s. Maximum separation of equipment is provided.

nN through location of rpg't_equipmen J divisio In addition, each power, control and instru. separate fire areas. Th y ,

gg i mentation cable is specified to pass the vertical tray unit substations, motor control centers, a d /

flame test in accordance with IEEE 383. distribution panels are located to provide sep{s

- ration and electricalisolation between the diWsions!

Power and control cables are specified to con- Clear access to and from the main switchgear rooms tinue to operate at a conductor temperature not is also provided. Cable chases are ventilated and exceeding 90 C and to withstand an emergency smoke removal capability is provided. Local overload temperature of up to 130"C in accordance instrument panels and racks are separated by safety with IPCEA S-66 524/ NEMA WC 7 Appendix D. division and located to facilitate required separation

Each power cable has stranded conductor and of cabling, flame resistive and radiation resistant covering.

Conductor" are specified to continue to operate at 8JJJ Fire Detection and Protection Systems 100% relative humidity with a service life expectancy of 60 years. Also, Class 1E cables are designed and All areas of the plant are covered by a fire qualified to survive the LOCA ambient condition at detection and alard system. Double manual hose the end of the 60-yr life span. The cable installation coverage is provided'throughout the buildings.

(i.e., redundant divisions separated by fire barriers) Sprinkler systems are provided as listed on Table 3

is such that direct impingement of fire suppressant 9.5.11. The diesel generator rooms and day tank will not prevent safe reactor shutdown, even if failure rooms are piotected by foam sprinkler systems.

of the cable occurs. Cables are specified to be The foam sprinfler systems are dry pipe systems submersible, however (See the fourth requirement / with pre action valves which are actuated by com-j compliance in Subsection 9.5.1.0), pensated rate of heat rise and ultraviolet flame

- detectors. Individual sprinkler heads art, opened by their thermallinks.

Amendment 11 8M1

ABWR nasmo Sapdard Plant ,,,,,,

n ov n l

8.3.4 COL License Inforrnation (1)Show that maximum available fault current i (including failure of upstream devices)is less 8J.4.1 Interrupting Capacity of Electrical than ibe maximurn continuous current capacity Distribution Equipment (based on no damage to the penetration) of the conductor within the penetration; or The interrupting capacity of the switchgear and circuit interrupting devices must be shown to be (2) Show that redundant circuit protection desices compatible with the magnitude of the available fault are prodded, and are adequately designed and current based on final selection of the transfctmer set to laterrupt current,in spite of single failure, impedence, etc. (See Subsection 83.1.1.5.2(4)). at a value below the maximum continuous current capacity (based on no damage to the 83.4.2 Diesel Generator Desigu Details penetration) of the conductor within the penetration. Such devices must be located in Subsection 83.1.1.8.2 (4) requires the diesel separate panels or be separated by barriers and generators be capable of reaching fullspeed and must be independent such that failure of one voltage within 20 seconds after the signal to start, will not adversly affect the other. Furthermore, Demonstrate the reliability of the diesel generator they must not be dependent on the same power c.

start.up circuitry designed to accomplish this. supply.

g'e t p/cu- y 83.4J Certified Proof Tests on . (deleted)

Cable Samples Subsection C3.1.2.4 requires certified proof tests on cables to demonstrr.te 60 year life, and resis. ltage analpis showing battery Provide a fc tance to radiation, flame and the environment, terminai olta and worst case de load terminal Demoratrete the testing methodology to assure such voltage at ca step of the Class 1E battery loading attributes are acceptable for the 60. year life, profile. (See Subsection 83.2.1) 83.4.4 Electrical Penetration Assemblies Provide the manufactuer's ampere. hour rating of the batteries at the two hour rate and at the eight Subsection 8.3,1.4.1.2. (7) specifies design hour rate, and provide the one minute am iere requirements for electrical penettation assemblies, rating of the batteries (see Subsection 832.13. ).

Provide fault current clearing. time curves of the electrical penetrations' primary and secondary 83.4.7 (deleted 3-current interrupting devices plotted against the thermal capability (I*t) curve of the penetration (to 83.4J (deleted) maintain mechanicalintegrity). Provide an analysis showing proper coordination of these curves. Also, 83.4.9 Offsite Power Supply Arrangement provide a simplified one.line diagram showing the location of the protective devices in the penetration Operating procedures shall require one of the circuit, and indicate the maximum available fault three divisional buses of Figure 831 be fed by the currem of the circuit. alternate power source during normal operation; in order to prevent simultaneous deenergization of all Provide specific identification and location of divisional buseton.the lau nf nnk naa of the offsite power supplies used to provide external control power supplies.jEr 5%indl.1:$j pgyT power foi tripping primary and backup electrical ,9 g penettation breakers (if utilized). 83.4.10 Diesel Generator Qualification Tests Provide an analysis demonstrating the thermal capability of all electrical conductors within The schedule for qualification testing of the diesel penetrations is perserved and protected by one of the generators, and the subsequent results of those following: tests, must be provided. The tests shall be in 8S212 Amendment 21

ABWR msmo Standard Plant . uvn accordance with IEEE 387 and Regulatory Guide COL applicants should provide instructions in 1.9. (See Susbsection 83.1.1.8.9) their plant Emergency Operating Procedures for operator actions during a postulated station 8J.4.11 (dritted) blackout event. Spa.cifically, if Division 1 instrumentation is functioning properly, the 8J.4.12 Minimura Starting Voltages for redundant Didslons II,Ill, a04 IV should be shut Class IE Motors down in order to 1) reduce heat dissipation in the control room while HVAC is lost, and 2) conserve Prodde the minimum required starting voltages for battery energy for additional SRV capaciG, or other Class 1E motors. Compare these minimum required specific functions, as needed, throughout the event, voltages to the voltages that will be supplied at the motor terminals during the starting translent when 8.3.4.17 Comanos Industrial Standards opersting on offsite power and when operating on Referenced la Purchase Specifications the diesel generators.

In addition to the regulatory codes and stat.iards 8.3.4.13 Identification aad Justitlestion of required for licensing, purchase specifications shall Associated Circulta contain a list of common industrail standards, as e appropriate, for the assurance of quality Prior to the implementation stage of the design, manufacturing of both Fet _ l , ... M the only ' associated circuits * (as defined by IEEE equipment. Such standards would include ANSI, 384) known to exist in the ABWR Standard Plant design are for the FMCRD drive power feed taken f)C ASTM. lEEE, NEMA, U et .

3 g pg,y /f 4" g Q

Y [. from the division 16.9Kv safety.related bus (see f 8.3.5 References Subsection 83.1.1.1). In the irr.plementation design, provide 1) assurance that this is still a true statement.

,,C fa 55 /

In addition to those codes and standards or 2) specincally identifiy and justify any other such . required by the SRP the following codes and circuits in the ADWR SSARt and show they meet the standards will be used and have been referenced in u requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75, position C.4. the text of this chapter of the SSAR.

8.3.4.14 Administrative Controls for Bus IEEE Std 323 0uallfying Class 1E Grounding Circuit Breakers l Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations Figure 831 shows bus grounding circuit breakers, _

9-which are intended to provide safety grounds during IEEE Std 334 CStandrd fo3 Type Test of maintenance operations. Administrative controls ,

Continuous Duty Class 1E shall be provided to keep these circuit breakers Motors for Nuclear Power

. racked out (i.e., in the disconnect position) whenever Generating Stations

! corresponding buses are energized. Furthermore, G-annunciation shall be provided to alarm in the IEEE Std 379 TStan(ar@ Applications of

, control room whenever the breakers are racked in the Single Failure Criterion

, for service. ro Nuc1 ear Power Generating Stations Clait t 8.3.4.15 Testing of'Iberusal Overload Bypass lE .535f*"5 1 Contacts for MOVs IEEE Std 382 t of Sa yR G ,..is ho ;

, Thermal overlaod protection for Class 1E MOVs is oy bypassed only during LOCA events. A means for SL-

. testing the bypass function shall be implemented, in IEEE Std 383 @dgGjoDType Test of accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Clast 1E Electrical Cables, Guide 1.106. Fleid A lfces, and Connec iMg)5 br Nuclear 8J 4.16 Emergency Operating Procedures for Station Blackout

(=-$bW Power Generating Stations

--"~~

ht 51 #1 6th $ W Wtl.*.

OL l 50 6, DCOL) 2 NCOL. '1GCcL., N N !

Amendment 21 'l8 COL j 9 3 C 0 I- J b (O L ) 6l(0 Lj g.3 23.3

? 2 CO L, (15 COL 1 '18 Cot. ; Q Tic. s 8'IC O I") '

e g3 COL)R4 COL;V:Lc ot-

's ,

_. . _. ./ I ~

ABWR maimo Standard Plant nov n IEEE Std 387 Standard Criteria for Diesel. Underwr:ter's Laboretories Standard No. 845 Generator Units Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Low Voltage Circuit Breakers Nuclear Power Generating Stations ANSI C37.13 Low Voltage Power Circuit Breakers IEEE Std 450 Recommended Practice for l frpet,7 }. ) Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating ANSI 07.16 Preferred Ratings and Related Requirements for Low Voltage

'p/

,/j., N

/ Stations and Substations AC Power Circuit Breakers and AC Power Service Protectors IEEE Std 485 Recommended Practice for Siring Large Lead Storage ANSI C37.17 t rip D e vic e s f o r A C a n d Batteries for Generating General Purpose DC Low. ,

Stations and Substations Vol: age Power Circuit Breakers l IEEE Std 519 Guide for flarmonic Control ANSI 0750 Test Procedures for Low I and Reactive Cornpensation Voltage AC Power Circuit ;

d4 Breakers Used in Endosures ha fIcl -P of Static Power Converters MPCEA S-66-402 Thermoplassic Insulated (h Wire & Cable for the Molded Case Circuit Breakers

/9 Transmission and Distri.

bution of Electrical Energy UL 489 Branch Circuit and Service Circuit Breakers

\ ~

i IPCEA 54-440/ Ampacities Cables in Open. NEMA AB 1 MoIded Case Circuit NEMA WC 51 top Cable Trays Breakers

. e mo IPCEA S-66-524/ Cron Linked Thermoset. 7.2Kv metalciad Switchgear NEMA WC 7 ting Polyethlene Insulated Wire and Cable for the ANSI O7.01 Application Guide for Power Transmission and Distri. Circuit Breakers bution of Electrical Energy ANSIO7D4 AC Power Circuit Breaker SECY 89-013 Stello, Victor, Jr., Design Re- Rating Structure quirements Related To 17se Evolutionary Advanced Light ANSI 07.06 Prefetted Ratings of Powet Water Reactors (ALIVRS), Circuit Breakers Policy issue, SECY 89 013, The Commissioners, Uni- ANSIO7.09 Test Procedure for Power

,r '[} ted State Nuclear Regula- Circait Breakers tory Commission, January

- rN 19,1989 ANSI O7.11 Power Circuit Breaker Control A partiallisting of other common industry standards which may be used as applicable is given ANSI 07.20 Switchgear Assemblics and below. There are many more standards referenced Metal Enclosed Bus in the standards which are listed below:

ANSI O7.100 Definitions for Power Motor Control Centers Switchgear NEMA ICS 2 Standards for Industrial Control Devices, Con-

, trollers and Assemblies Amendment 21 83234

ABM .wioaro arv.n Standard Plant TABLE 8.31 D/G LOAD TABLE.LOCA + LOPP COMNftWQ LOAOS SYS. LOAD RATING NOTE

NO. DESCRIPTION (kW) A B C

- MOTOR ope val.VES 231x3 X ,

(2)

C12 FMCRD

(@> 0.25p0

'210x1 (840 KVA)

X p (4)

C41 SLC PUMP 45x2 MX %X ~ (5)

E11 RHR PUMP

- Fill Pump'

-540:3 3.7x3 g 540 -

7 54; X

HPCF PUMP 1400x2 .. 1400 1400 L !

G41[FPC PU[ ,

f 75x2

/ 78.9 <

.9 [' ..

P21 RCW PUMP 4 h --

ct: -

rx P25 HECW PUMP 22x5 44- 44 HECW REFRIGERATOR 135x5 135 / 270 270 l P41 RSW PUMP" 270x6 540 540 540 i

i

\

l

R23 P/C TRANSF. LOSS 84.2 84.2 84.2 R42 DC 125V CHGR div. ! 70x1 70 - ~

l div. II,I!!,IV 34x3 M.0 Mg 34 (11) 125V DC siby charger 70 : - 34 i

l See Table 83 3for Notes

" Pan of 7%ineIsland i

i I

i SS24 '

Amendment 21 -

4 s_.-,_..._,.,;,,_,.. ., - . , . . .u ;. ., ,u , , _ . , . - ~ _ . . . . . . . . . , _ , - _ . , _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . , . _ . . , - . - . - . _ . , ~ , - - . . . . .

4 amimo ABWR Standard Plant Rrv n i

TAHLE 8.31 j D/G LOAD TABLE.LOCA + LOPP (Continued)

Couritiff LCPf!

l GENERATOR m, . . ..' l(kW)

RATING NOTE

LOAD SYS, DESCRIPTION (kW) A B C NO.

i i R46 VITAL CVCF O I (Div.1,2,3) 20x3 $ 2 20 (Div. 4) 20 20 TRANSF, C/R INST 20x6 40 40 40 R47 3 100:3 100 100 100 RS2 LIGHTING 18.5 -

T22 SGTS FAN 18.5x2 18.5

' 30 -

SOTS HEATER 10x6 30 1

l

)

T49 FCS HEATER j30 75050t) IJ01 elf FCS BLOWER 12 /2teioj 12 tre U41 MCR HVAC FANS BC 74.5X4 .. 149 149 (13)

MCR RECIRC FANS B-C 14X4 28 28 (13) i J C/B ELEC EQUIP AREA HVAC FANS A C 14X6 28 28 28 (13) /

j R/B DG/ELEC EQUIP AREA 84X6 168 168 168 (13)

HVAC FANS A.C l R/B DG ROOM EMERGENCY SUPPLY FANS A C 46 S (6 93 93 93 (13) j R/B EQUIP AREA ROOM COOLERS A C 89 107 84 (13) i 62.5 _

OTHER LOADS TOTAL CONNECTED LOADS e TOTAL STANDBY LOADS AND ]

SHORT TIME LOADS J 5'

TOTAL OPERATING LOADS 9

M.6 Gl .2.

4 05 7

.E9 M4iTJ.7 k_ -

1 See TaNe 83 3for Notes J

4 8 3-25 Amendment 21 A

! ABWR m.mo

Standard Plant uvs

2 j TABLE 8.3 3 i NOTES FOR TABLES 8.31 AND 8.3 2 i

i 1 '

i (1) ..' shows that the load is not connected to the switchgear of this division.

i i X: shows that the load is not counted for D/G continuous output calculation by the

! reasons shown on other notes.

4 i (2) ' Motor .perated valves

are operated only 30 60 seconds. Therefore they are not i counted for the DG continuous output calculation.

j f (3) Deleted (4) D operating time (about 2 minutes) is not counted for the DG continuous output v iclenf beron c cne enTr e host is ac hieved in is le #

the diesels ca n opevofe at teo d I

1 (5) .Debeeedhao((mowfes. Sin ce at trorro wied had$vYtyr sesee cabuns are not cou 1r/-

(6) Deleted 4.poh,.wo->t h e 9 6- co n s onvevs ul* +n n

(

4 (7) Deleted i

i (8) Deleted l (9) Deleted 1

j (10) Deleted 6 Q (11) Div. IV battery charger is fed from Div7 motor control center, ,

T (12) 1.oad description acronyms are interpeted as follows:

i

! C/B Control Building HX Heat M :er ,

! COMP Computer 1A . Instrument Air j CRD . Control Rod Drive MCR - Main Control Room i CUW . Clean Up Water MUWC . Make Up Water System (condensed) ,

j CVCF . Constant Voltage Constant Frequency NPSS . Nuclear Protection Safety System -

DG . Diesel Generator R/B . Reactor Building l RCW . Reacsor Cooling Water (building)

FCS . Flammability Control System FPC . Fuel Pool Cooling RHR . ResidualHeat Removal FMCRD . Fine Motion Cotrol Rod Drive RSW Reactor Sea Water :

i HECW . Emergency Cooling Water SBGT . StandbyGasTreatment HPCF . High Pressure Core Flooder St.C - . Standby Liquid Control ;

i (13) Redundant units, one unit of a division and one unit is in standby in case the j operating unit shuts down. Total connected load is shown on they tabic 6 vt apen b q t oads etre kal{ (kese d aevaT5.

i i-i s

i 8.3 2a

. Amendment 21

?

i t

Table 8.3-4 i

[ D/G LOAD SEQUENCE DIAGRAM i MAJOR LOADS [ l l

(Response to Questions 43114 & 43115) "

n, i

i

f "U m u <xu auxm maxu uncne aux 1s awcns euxu man aunu y y T=. <msacy ossao cnseo <=saa tes seo awsa) <n un tosao Ama esec n ;

Home Dep. Asse Momens i

nFW DGSfvAC R Orrum , DCw rumy Rswrump stsw rum, sGfs (W st C rum, a rum, f tore a see Te sescw re-, m/s Emme sfvAC m ye seeiw am , -

th C/S Esme lfvAC 9.

q ,

uov Do uvAC acw e.-e acwr , Rswee-, aswe=e, sers or stC r , =>.=r, torr a see Te sencw rump becR ffvAC R/S Em OfvaC M Te whCw a m e, A 3 tm C/B E==r 88VAC #9t r==eM f

uuv couvAC acw r , acwr-, asw r.=, as=ri , o wecw m,.a c , j tore na s a.7, seecw rum, esca sfvAC R/BEmerNVAC N Fe meerg I tagns=, C/sEmsw.MVAC toCA sua Tr DoswAC sencw r==p R/s E=== NWAC m ie sentw eg f

tore rucmo-t HOV m% p% W M Rsw % 6 % stC reimp m n'

1OCA 88MTramp DG BfvAC 90ECW remy MCROfvAC R/S Emme efvAC OUe sfalar anty 6

! a a sese Te C/ssewe NVAC s '

J r

Lore IJg88eAg a

EN N O O M Ef0Mg p

o. s go toCA $WCT russy EX, OfVAC 0 6 rosy EllfvAC R/W Emmet.19VAC N - " .

A tem Te C/D Esmer NVAC 4

J sore tu t

=a t

Name* FMC1tDe ese ease easy Neo Came 1E hade se the DG beues

+ - -

3

\ 23A6100A0 i Standard Plant nov n TABLE 8.3 5 DIESEL GENERATOR ALARMS

Annunciation DOS DTS DTT GDT GCB GTT LHP l

Engine Overspeed Trip X X X X Generator Differential Relay Trip X X X X i Generator Ground Overeurtent X X X l 1 Generator Voltage Restraint Overeunent X X X Generator Bus Underfrequency X X X 4

Generator Reverse Power X X X X Generator leu of Field .

X X X X Generator Bus Differential Relay Trip X i

3

{ High High Jacket Water Temperature X X X X j

D/G Bearing High Temperature Low 14w Lube Oil Temperature X

X

%/

X X

X X, X X

D/G Bearings High Vibration X X

}

j High High Lube OilTemperature X X X'

X

$ ,; XX ,

Low Low Lube Oil Pressure X X X X l i High Crankcase Preuure X X X X !

4 Low Low Jacket Water Preuure X X X X Low Level- Jacket Water X Low Preuure - Jacket Water X towTemperature Jacket WaterIn X 4

High Temperature - Jacket Water Out X Low Level- Lube Oil Mark X i Law Temperature - Lube Oilin X j High Temperature - Lube Oil Out X

] High Diff. Pressure - Lube Oil Filter ,b Low Preuure - Turbo Oil Right/left Bank V K Low Preuure Lube Oil X j

Control Circuit Fuse Failure X l Diesel Generator,OFr ltage X i Low Pressure - st i in Maintenance (j /mita.y; AirM3de' X X

X i D G Unit Fails to Start X Phase Overcurrent X j g ev8 N ut of Service X X

Lockout Relay Operated X X X l Low High Level- Fuel Day Tank X j Low Level- Fuel Storage Tank X 4

Low Preuure - Fuel Oil X High Diff. Preuure - Fuel Filter X

. In local control Only X l

Amendment 21 BS29.1

. _ _ , _ _ , . _ . . . . _ . . . _ _ . _ - _ _ - . . . . . , _ . . , . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . - _ , . _ _ - . _ . ~.

I ABWR m aim 40 nev n Standard Plant 8A MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL as necessary to meet the target ground resistance SYSTEMS value.

8A.1 Station Grounding and Surge The lightning nrotection system covers all major Protection plant structures and is designed to prevent direct lightning strikes to the buildings, electric power 8A.I.1 Description equipment and instruments. It consists of air terminals, bare downcomers and buried grounding The electrical grounding system is comprised of: electrodes which are separate from the normal grounding system. Lightning arresters are provided for each phase of all tie lines connecting the plant n (1) an instrument grounding network, electrical systems to the switchyard and offsite line. pe2d Plant instrumentation located outdoors or 3k (2) an equipment grounding network for grounding electrical equipment (e.g. switchgear, motors, connected to cabling running outdoors is provided distribution panels, cables, etc.) and selected with surge suppression devices to protect the mechanical components (e.g. fuel tanks, equipment from lightning induced surges.

chemical tanks, etc.),

8A.1.2 Analysis (3) a plant grounding grid, and p p;/ancisPrmde/

jo SRP or regulatoryfy--- for (4) a lightning protection network for protection of the grounding and lightning protection system. It is structures, transformers and equipment located designed and required to be lastalled to the outside buildings. applicable sections of the following codes and standards.

The plant instrumentation is grounded through a separate insulated radial grounding system (1) IEEE Std 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substation comprised of buses and (mulated cables.i;".i.e ' . ". Grounding SC97 g %. . r u.a. = A ....~.. #g:1 '

(2)lEEE Std 81, Guide for Measuring Earth The equipment grounding network is such that Resistivity, Ground Impedance, and Earth all major equipment, structures and tanks are Surface Potentials of a Ground System pg/ 7 grounded with two diagonally opposite ground

, connections. The ground bus of all switchgear (3)IEEE Std 665, Guide f( eneration Station l

i assemblies, motor control centers and control cabinets are connected to the station ground grid Grounding C7)7 i

through at least two parallel paths. One bare copper (4) NFPA 78, National Fire Protection Association's cable is installed with each underground electrical Lightning Protection Code l

duct run, and all metallic hardware in each manhole is connected to the cable. This code is utilized as recommended practices only. It does not apply to electrical generatin I [ A plant grounding grid consisting of bare copper ants, f-( cables is provided to limit step and touch potentials 8A. COL Ucense Information 1g s to safe values under all fault conditions. The buried grid is located at the switchyard and connected to systems within the buildings by a 500 MCM bare It is the responsibility of the COL applicant to i copper loop which encircles all buildings (See Figure perform grout d resistance measurements to determine that the required value of 0.05 ohms or

,h

' f 8A.11 less has been met and to make additions to the

$l The target value of ground resistance is 0.05 ohms or less for the reactor, turbine, control, senice system if necessary to meet the target resistance, and radwaste buildings. If the target grounding 8A.1.4 References resistance is not achieved by the ground grid, auxiliary ground grids, shallow buried ground rods or (1) IEEE Std 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substation I deep buried ground rods will be used in combination Grounding BA l*1 Arnendment 21 I

_m---- ,-

. na m u a,- m,,, @ u_,4 s a 4 a_

1 y BURIED GRID IN SWITCHYARD g g BURIED 500MCM COPPER LOOP

,~ y-2 10 l so E

~

. _______J I' 1 l l NO. FACLITY =

1 1 ET 1 REACTOR CONTAlf4 MENT ::2

! ! ~

2 REACTOR BUILD 24G l I 3 CONTROL BUILDriG l 8 l 4 MARJ STEAufEEDWATER TUNNEi g 5 TURBRJE BUILD'NG l

6 SERVICE BUILDnJG

! 5 7 RADWASTE BUILDING l l 8 house eOitER l l 9 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK g 10 MA!N TRANSFORMER g

11 NORMAL SWITCtGEAR p--------l 11

! 12 DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK (3) l 9 l l-- - - - q 13 14 STACK l ECUlPMENT ENTRY LOCK l

g 7 {-] I l

15 FIRE PROTECTON WATER I 3 STCRAGE TANK (2) 3 4 [ 6 16 l FIRE PROTECTON PUMPHOUSE I i l

L_---- i m g

1 1 .

,t_ _ _ _

l hl l I

l1i 2.0 13 [e\(

I l

is I Ol ' i l I

l g STRUCTURES AND BUILDINGS TO BE GROUNDED hlL _ _O_l L.

[2 i

O 12 TO THE YARD LOOP PER THE FOLLOW 2JG SPECI-c^'o"S:

A. ELECTRICAL GROUNDING REQUIREMENTS 34 SPECIFICATONS

{ --l B. LIGHTRJG PROTECTON SPECIFICATON z$

E ag cO FIGURE 8A.1-1 SITE PLAN (GROUNDING)

4 ABWR 334sim^o arv n j Standard Plant l 8A.3 Electric Heat Tracing 8A.3.1 Description l.

l The electric heat tracing system provides freeze j protection where required for outdoor service i

i components and fluid warming of process fluids if

. required, either in or out doors, if the operation of ,

' the heat tracing is required for proper operation of a j safety.related system, the heat tracing for the safety.related system is required to be '..,n AyCN##

Power for heat tracing is supplied from buses backed by the onsite standby generators. Non-CidJr /6 j a

[:coE, ::!ddheat mbustion turbinetracing generatorhas access through to load the same the l group as the components protected.h Ont /E

, heat tracing is assigned to the appropriate division

! for a source of(GIery relate $ power.

8A.3.2 Analysis

)

i There are no SRP or regulatory requirements j for cathodic protection systems. They are required to be designed and installed to the applicable j sections of the following codes and standards.

i (1) IEEE Std 622, Recommended Practice for the -

{

Design and Installation of Elcetric Heat Tracing i Systems in Nuclear Power Generad g Stations l'

(2) IEEE Std 622A, Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of Electric Pipe Heating j Control and Alarm Systems in Nuclear Power

Generating Stations J

! 8A.3J COL License leformation I

i No COL applicant information is required.

l 8AJA References The following codes and standards have been l referenced in this section of the SSAR.

) (1) IEEE Std 622, Recommended Practice for the j Design and Installation of Electric Heat Tracing Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations j

l. (2) IEEE Std 622A, Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of Electric Pipe Heating

! Control and Alarm Systems in Nuclear Power Generating Stations i

RA.3-1 Amendment 21 1

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AMVR awowi wn Standard Plant 9.5.3 Lighting and Ser@ lng Power detection. Supply System 9.5.3.1 Design flases The plant lighting is eomprised of four independent lighting systems. They are the 93.3.1.1 General Design Bases normal lighting system, the standby lighting system, the emergency lighting system, and the The general design bases for the Nuclear Is. guide lamp lighting system. The normallighting land portion of the lighting systems are as fol-system is non Class 1E. The other three lighting lows: systems are comprised of both safety related and non safety related subsystems. (1) The lighting guidelines shall be based on Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) rec. Alllighting systems are designed to provide ommended intensities. These shall be in- l intensities consistent with the lighting needs of service values as shown on Table 9.51 !!!u. the areas in which they are located, and with mination Levels. Reflected glare will be , their intended purpose. The lighting design minimized. I considers the effects of glare and shadows on control panels, video display devices, and other (2) Control room lighting is designed with re- I equipment, and the mirror effects on glass and spect to reduction of glare and shadows on 3 pools. Lighting and other equipment maintenance, the control boards. in addition to the safety of personnel, plant equipment, and plant operation is considered in (3) Lighting systems and components are in con-the design. Areas containing flammable materials formity with the electrical standards of (e.g. battery rooms, fuel tanks) have explosion NFPA and OSHA as applicable for safety of proof lighting systems. Areas subject to high personnel, plant and equipment. moisture have water proof installations (e.g.

;      drywell, washdown areas). Plant AC lighting         (4) Each of the normal, standby or emergency systems are generally of the fluorescent type,            lighting systems has the following arrange-with mercury lamps provided for high ceiling and          ment criteria:

yard lighting, except where breakage could introduce mercury into the reactor coolant (a) Areas without doors and hatches (where system. Incandescent lamps are used for DC access is impossible) have no lighting. lighting systems and above the reactor, fuel pools, and other areas where lamp breakage could (b) Normal (non essential) lighting shall introduce mercury into the reactor coolant. have on/off switches if the rooms are also used as passage (e.g. patrol Lighting systems and their distribution panels routes), and cables are identified according to their essentiality and type. Safety related lighting (c) For high radiation areas, the on/off systems are Class 1E, located in Seismic Category swItchea sha11 be arraoged to 1 structures, and are electrically independent facilitate maintenance and to obtain and physically separated. Cables are routed in maximum service life from the lamps, their respective divisional raceways. Normal lighting is separated from standby lighting. DC (d) The switches shall be located at the en. lighting cables are not routed with any other" trance to the rooms, or the side of the 0CL passage. cables ud are disTimiM by "!ce may &%! n0ssaso t on w {oeeon dy.n Th e C 0 (f}"%l a Pt la Service ses supply power and heavy duty (c) Normal lighting power for the small service outlets to equipment not generally used rooms with on/off switches shall be during normal plant power operation (e.g. turbine supplied from one power bus, building and refueling floor cranes, welding Note: A small room tacans a room with equipment). Service outlets have grounded three or less lighting fixtures, except connections and the outlets in wet or moist areas for instrument rack rooms and electri-are supplied from breakers with ground current cal panel rooms. Amendment 22 95-3

ABWR -mm RfN n Standard Plant (2) The target reliability of the CTG unit, still deficient, power is automatically 3 based on successful starts and successful transferred from the unit auxiliary transfor -er:,) load runs, shall be > 0.98, as calculated by to the CTG. methods defined in NSAC 108. The Reliabi'ity of Emergency Diesel Generators at US Nuc! car Manually controlled breakers also provide the Power Plants. capability of connecting the combustion turbine generator to any one of the errengency buses if (3) The gas turbin hall have an ISO rating all other power sources are lost. j ha/ g t (continuous rat ing at 59 0F and at sea TICTG consists of a completely packaged, . level) of at least@mW, with nominal output voltage of 6.9 kV at 60 Hz. fully assembled and tested, skid. mounted unit with the following components: (4) The generator output shall have a steady state voltage regulation within 0.5% (1) A gas turbine with diesel hydraulle start of rated voltage when the load is varied system (i.e., capable of black start). The from no load to rated kVA and all transients unit shall be operated with liquid fuel, have decayed to zero. (2) A generator with brushless excitation system (5) The transient response of the generator and terminal box. shall he capable of assuming sudden application of up to 20% of the generator (3) A reduction drive gear system between the NEMA rating when the generator, exciter, and turbine and generator. regulator are operating at no load, and rated voltage and frequency results in less (4) Lubrication system. than 25% excursion from rated voltage. Recovery shall be within 5% of rated (5) An air cooling system with radiator and AC voltage, with no more than one undershoot or motor driven fans for oil cooling. one overshoot within one second. (6) Accessory gearbox. (6) With the generator initially operating at rated voltage, and with a constant load (7) Air intake and exhaust equipment. between 0 and 100% at rated power factor, the change in the regulated output shall not (8) Microprocessor based control system with exceed 1% of rated voltage for aay 30- control and protective circuits. minute period at a constant ambient 1 temperature. (9) Panels, junctica boxes and other accessories as required. 9.5.11.2 System Description 9.5.11.3 Safety Evaluations j The interconnections for the CTG are shown on the power distribution system single line diagram The CTG is non Class 1E and its failure will I (SLD), Figure 8.3-1. not affect safe shutdown of the plant. The unit is not required for safety, but is provided to 7// "ofThe tAeCTG N ee) is designed '.o supply standby power to assist in mitigating the consequences of a l Yoh orth ( twAurbine building (non Class 1E) station blackout event. However, the plant can f 6.9kV buses which carry the plant investrnent cope with a station blackout without the CTG. l protection loads. jTb o t h e rjnve s t rpe n t The CTG does not supply power to nuclear safety frote on bus ceives ack up, power fpfm t related equipment except on condition of n e au iary tr- sform fed frein the after te complete failure of the emergency diesel f site po er sou e.VTbc CTG automatically generators and all off site power. Under this starts on detection of a voltage drop of less condition, the CTG can proside emergency back up than 70% on its downstream bus. When the CTG is power through manually actuated Class 1E ready to synchronize, if the voltage level is breakers in the same interface manner as the off site power sources. This provides a diverse 93 10.2 Amendment 10}}

ML20128C086

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8.1 INTRODUCTION

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ML20128C086

Text

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Dear Chet:

8.1 INTRODUCTION

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