ML20127N025
| ML20127N025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/23/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2289, NUDOCS 8505230419 | |
| Download: ML20127N025 (23) | |
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- DATE ISSUED: April 23, 1985 1
MINUTES OF THE REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE W HNG$N C.
A meeting was held by the ACRS Reactor Operations Subcommittee on March 5, 1985. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss recent plant operat-ing experiences. Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on February 15, 1985 (Attachment A). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B. The list of attendees is in Attachment C. A list of handouts is included in Attachment D. The handouts are filed with the office copy. R. Major was the cognizant staff member for this meeting.
Principal Attendees:
"r. J. Ebersole convened the meeting at 8:30 a.m.
ACRS ACRS Staff J. Ebersole, Chairman R. Major, Cognizant Staff Member C. Michelson, Member H. Alderman, Staff Engineer C. Wylie, Member D. Ward, Member, Part-time NRC Staff:
C. Rossi E. Weiss R. Hernan E. Reeves R. Sheron M. Caruso G. Rivenbark E. McKenna I. Villazua W. Long C. Hodge R. Woodruff Degradation of Safety Injection Pumps at Indian Point #2 - B. Sheron, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, DSI This incident occurred on December 28, 1984. The licensee attempted to use the safety injection pumps to fill accumulators prior to startup.
The SI pumps had inadequate discharge pressure. Boric acid had 8505230419 850423 PDR ACRS 2289 PDR CstIN ::7_Q f
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r MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 2 March 5, 1985 g .
solidified in three pumps. Two pumps were flushed clean, one pump was replaced. The apparent cause was a leaking valve from a Boron injection tank (B.I.T.). The licensee has modified procedures to measure boron concentration in BIT every.four hours and sample suction of pumps daily.
The staff indicated that the high boron concentration was provided to ensure sufficient negative reactivity inserted to overcome positive reactivity insertion during postulated steam line breaks and stuck open steam generator relief valves. Westinghouse has improved steamline break analysis methods. Current methods show that BIT is not required to keep offsite doses during steam line break below 10 CFR 100 guideline core valves.
A letter has gone out to licensees requesting licensees to submit revised steam line break analyses which would remove BIT completely or use reduced boron concentrations. This incident is still under study.
HPCI, RCIC Inoperability, Hatch 1, - R. Rivenback This incident occurred on January 16, 1985.
The reactor was operating at 60 percent power when the vital AC bus was lost and this caused loss of feedwater control so the feedwater pumps ran back. In this case, the primary power supply for the vital AC source was tagged out, so the plant was operating on the alternate source. Within a few minutes, the reason for tagging out the primary source was investigated and it was discovered that the tags could be removed and the primary vital AC source was restored.
In the meantime the feedwater pump ran back causing the level to drop and the HPCI and RCIC came on and refilled the reactor vessel. When the HPCI and RCIC activated they filled the reactor vessel up, and at that .
point the HPCI's and RCIC's and the feedwater turbine tripped on the high reactor vessel level.
, MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 3 March 5, 1985
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In trying to reset the RCIC turbine trip valve to get it ready for future restarts, it could not be reset. Upon inspection of the mechan-ical overspeed device on the turbine, it was found that the mechanical overspeed device had come 5part.
At'the same time it was noted that the HPCI flow was erratic. In-spection of the valve position showed that the valve was stuck _in mid position. The valve was disassembled and a galled???? valve stem was found. _
This incident is still under study.
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CATAWBA Unit 1, Both Safety Injection Pumps Inoperable I. Villaiva, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Events Analysis Branch, DEPER This incident occurred on March 5, 1985.
Safety injection pump IB was out of service for flow test measurements and inservice inspection. The shift supervisor authorized testing of train A solid state protection system. He knew that train "B" SI pump was out of service but he thought that in the event of a demand for safety injection that the fact it was being tested would be by-passed
-and the automatic demand would circumvent whatever testing was in process. When the shift supervisor was informed that both pumps were out of service, he immediately terminated the test that was on going for the solid state protection system.
The licensee held a training session to alert the operators of this particular problem, and are in the process of checking their procedures to eliminate the potential of this situation occurring again. -
This incident is still under study.
Browns Ferry RHR Valve Failures - W. Long, Project Manager, ORB #2, DOL
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 4 March 5, 1985 The date of this incident is January 30, 19af,.
Valve #73 in the residual . heat removal test line could not be shut electrically. Theendbeliofvalve73hadcomeoff. Valve 73 is a limitorque valve. Flow induced vibration had caused loosening and breaking of the four 1" bolts on the valve operator motor. The valve failed in_t'he open position. The normal position is closed. The licensee resolution of this problem is to replace the bolts with largar diameter bolts.
The second valve failure involved a 14" gate valve in the RHR suction crosstie. This valve is normally kept deenergized to prevent inadver-tent opening. The valve became inoperable in the electric mode due to corroded terminal blocks and switches at the local control station. The valve was also found to be inoperable in the handwheel mode. The tripper adjustment arm in the clutch' tripping mechanism had loosened prevc9 ting the clutch from being latchable in the handwheel mode. The valve failed in the closed position.
This incident is under study.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Logic Robinson 2 - V. Hodge, Engineer and Communications Branch, Inspection and Enforcement This incident occurred on January 5, 2985.
Late last year during a review of MSIV problems at Robinson, the licens-ee decided to do a review of the contr01 air for the MSIV's. On the 5th of January the licensee discovered and reported an error in the logic for those controls.
The MSIV's are swing check valves. The piston is held upward by air admitted under control of solenoid valves. Upon receipt of a closure signal air would be admitted moving the piston downward and closing the valve.
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., MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 5 March 5, 1985 The error found was that both of these open solenofds were controlled by the same logic train.
The steam line break analysis is based upon the possible blow down of I one steam generator even if one MSIV were to fail.
The postulated result of this logic error is in the event of a steam line break.' Two steam generators would blow down to containment. This could present a challenge to the steam generator tubes and possible release of radioactive material. l An information notice regarding this incident is being prepared.
Main Steam Isolation Valve Surveillance, Duane Arnold - R. Woodruff, Senior Nuclear Engineer, Engineering and Generic Communication Branch, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response This incident occurred on March 5, 1985.
l In early February, Duane Arnold experienced a failure of their MSIV's to meet the surveillance test. The Tech. Spec. on leakage is 11.5 standard cubic feet per hour for most plants. Four of the valves failed the test.
I The cause of the failure is not known at this time. In the past, the problem has been attributed to seat wear and packing leaks.
Proposed corrective actions include:
L . Improved on SIV maintenance
. MSIV modifications
. Installation of leakage control system
. More frequent MSIV testing This incident is still under study.
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- MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 6
>. March 5, 1985 t .
Failure of MSIV's to Close - Grand Gulf 1 - E. Weiss, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Events Analysis Branch, Division of Emergency Pre-paredness and Engineering Response This event occurred on Feb'ruary 10, 1985.
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! On February 10, 1985 Grand Gulf reported that two outboard and one inboard MSIV would not remain shut following a nonnal slow closure l procedure. The MSIV's have a slow closure procedure for test purposes.
and a fast closure used in accident situations. The intention was to bring the valves to almost shut using the slow closure procedure, and then closed completely using the fast closure.
i The MSIV's are air operated, using dual-solenoid valves to control air flow. The problem was attributed to overheating of the solenoid valves. l Representative samples of these solenoid valves were placed in an oven but the results are not conclusive. Some sticking was encountered but not directly correlated with temperature.
One of the failed solenoids was disassembled but no trace of foreign material or contaminants was found.
The solenoids were shipped to ASCO (the manufacturer) and have been l undergoing tests ever since.
l The licensee has increased surveillance of these valves during startup checking at 625 psi, 25% power and 60% power. During operation surveil-lance wil. be performed once per day during the first week and once every other day during the second week.
Information notice IN85-17 was issued 3/1/85 regarding this event.
Failure of Containment Tendon Field Anchors - Farley 2, E. Reeves, -
Project Manager, ORB #1, D0L This incident was reported in January 28, 1985.
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 7 March 5, 1985 Prior to performance of an integrated leak rate test, it was noticed that the cap that covers the shop anchor head had evidence of something striking up against it. When the cap was removed, it was discovered j that the end buttons on the 170 tendon system had been released. This is the upper end. A check on the lower end revealed the field anchor head in many pieces.
Inspection of the 130 vertical tendons resulted in 30 needing replace-ment. The 93 tendons and the 134 Hoop Tendons were inspected with none needing replacement.
? l The cause of damage was postulated to be hydrogen stress cracking.
Hydrogen was evolved from water reacting with the zine that lines the tube that goes up through the containment.
Information Notice In85-10 was issued 2/6/85.
I Reactor Protection System Malfunction - Sequoyah 2, I. Villalva, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Events Analysis Branch, DEPER This incident occurred on January 12, 1985.
The reactor was operating at nearly 100 percent power when a valid trip signal was received based upon low steam generator level. The operator noted that reactor trip breaker "A" had not opened. The operator promptly manually tripped the breaker.
I The failure of the breaker to open has been attributed to previous maintenance on one train. During surveillance, maintenance personnel were measuring voltage at the under voltage trip coil using a multime-ter. The scale was inadvertently set to the ampere scale rather than the voltage scale. The result was a short circuit drawing excessive ,
current through transistors and causing them to short out. The shorting out of the transistors caused voltage to be always maintained on that under-voltage coil and to the shunt trip relay even upon a valid demand.
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS ,
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- March 5, 1985 It is not clear if post maintenance did not detect this failure or post maintenance was not performed.
Failures of this type, on one train, caused a lack of redundancy.
Failures of this same type or both trains would make the plant suscepti-ble to an ATWS. .
The corrective action includes Region I reviewing and approving the action taken by Sequoyah subsequent to the event. NRR is also reviewing the event and the acceptability of the design.
An Information Notice regarding this event is being prepared.
Loss of Component Cooling Water - Waterford 3, M. Caruso, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Operating Reactors Assessment Branch, D. L.
This incident occurred on February 20, 1985.
On February 20th, while the operators were performing a surveillance test on the core containment spray actuation system, the containment spray was inadvertently actuated. The testing involved the logic and relays. Coincident with the actuation of the containment spray was the isolation of the containment isolation valves in the component cooling water system.
An additional failure in the component cooling water system around the reactor cooling pump seal coolers caused them to have a prolonged delay in restoring component cooling water, and there was some reactor coolant leakage from one reactor coolant pimp. .
Following the error in performing the surveillance test and the sprays coming on, the operators terminated the spray. The primary containment isolation valves closed on actuation of containment spray. The compo- -
nent cooling lines into containment are isolated upon actuation of containment spray. The operators proceeded to reset the isolation
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 9 March 5, 1985 valves in the component cooling water system. The cooling water to three out of four reactor coolant pump seal coolers failed.
The containment spray didnI t appear to create any damage in the contain-ment. One reactor coolant pump seal appeared to leak about 3 gallons per minute. The problem appears to be the air operated isolation valves. Th'e valves close on indicated pressure of 125 pounds gage. The valves will not open until the indicated pressure falls below 125 pounds gage. The pressure switches on the three failed valves failed in a manner that the pressure would never fall below 125 pounds.
The fix for this problem is to now measure line temperature and trip the valves on a high temperature condition. The operators now have the capability to reopen the valves from the control room. A positive valve position indicator has been added to the control room.
This incident is still under study.
Partial Loss of AC Power and Diesel Generator Degradation, WNP-2, - Eric Weiss, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Events Analysis Branch, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response On January 31, 1985, WNP 2 was at 100 percent power when a lockout relay, used in th' offsite power supply fast transfer logic, spuriously tripped. This was an abnormal partial actuation that caused the 500 KV generator output breaker to open and the circuit breakers from the startup transformer to close on the plant buses even though the normal auxiliary transformers were not disconnected from the same plant buses.
The opening of the 500 kV output breaker initiated the digi-tal-electrohydraulic control system overspeed protection circuit which closed the turbine control valves. The turbine control valve fast .
closure caused a reactor scram as designed.
As a result of this abnormal condition, the generator remained connected to the 230 kV grid via the auxiliary and startup transformers. After 4 seconds, a breaker in the 230 kV line to the startup transformer opened,
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 10 March 5, 1985 leaving the plant without non-safety-related power. Two of the buses without power, SM-1 and SM-3, ordinarily feed. safety-related buses SM-7 and SM-8. As a result of losing power to two safety-related buses, the
. backup transformer, which 'is powered by a 115 Kv line, was automatically
. connected to the safety-related buses and the diesel generators for these buses started, but were not required to assume load.
In the control room, there were false indications such as high contain-ment pressure and valid indications of vessel low level (level 2, -50 inches). The high pressure core spray (hPCS) and reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) started on the low level signal.
' Eventually, the main generator's protective circuits actuated the balance of the fast transfer logic, causing the auxiliary transformer to separate from the plant buses.
After the event,-it was found that the output voltage had been set incorrectly on diesel generators DG-1 and DG-2. If the backup trans-former or its supply had failed, the diesel generators would not have loaded on the safety buses because the voltage regulators were set at
-their lowest voltage set point. The safety buses have protective relaying-that prevents the diesel generators from loading on the safe-ty-related buses if their output voltage deviates too much from nominal.
There was not control room alarm indicating.the diesel generat6r output voltage was too low to permit loading diesel generators on their safe-ty-related buses.
The condition was caused during troubleshooting of the voltage regula-tors for DG-1 and DG-2. These voltage regulators have a manual
" raise / lower" handle in the control room which permitted their output
. voltage to be adjusted even though the diesel was not running. If the diesels were not running, as was the case during the troubleshooting, there was not indication of the generator output voltage and, thus, no indication of the voltage setting of the voltage regulator. The type of voltage regulator used on DG-1 and DG-2 allowed for inadvertent degrada-tion without indication or alarm in the control room. This situation
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 11 March 5, 1985
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did not exist on DG-3, which is dedicated solely for the HPCS and has an automatic voltage set point reset upon start of the diesel generator.
Diesel Generator Problems,' Zion 1 and 2 - I. Villava, Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, Events Analyses Branch, DEPER This incident occurred on January 13, 1985.
Zion has two dedicated diesel per unit plus one swing diesel for both units. On January 13th diesel 1-B was taken out of service for surveil-lance testing. Zion Unit I was then placed on a 7-Day LCO and diesel generator 1A on the swing diesel DG-0 were required to be tested daily.
The swing diesel generator-0 tripped on 1/15/85 because o{ high bearing temperature.
Because there was only one diesel generator remaining on Unit 1, Zion Unit I was placed in a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LC0 for which the unit was brought to a controlled shutdown within four hours. Zion Unit 2 was placed in a 7 day LC0 and diesel generators IA and 2A and 28 had to be tested daily.
Diesel generator 2B tripped during daily surveillance testing on 1/25/85 because of an apparent loss of DC while Zion Unit I was being brought to a controlled hot shutdown and Zion Unit 2 was operating at 100% power.
Zion Unit 2 was placed on a 4 AR LCO. The LCO was cancelled with I hour after DC-2B was inspected and successfully tested.
Diesel Generator 1B was restored to service later on 1/15/85, making all DG's except swing, operable.
Diesel generator 1A declared inoperable during daily surveillance ;
testing on 1/19/85 because of a leaking oil line. Zion Unit 1 operating in a hot shutdown mode and Zion Unit 2 at 100% power at the tilne of the event.
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i MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 12 March 5, 1985 1
Zion Unit I was placed on a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> LCO to cold shutdown. However, the leak was repaired within six hours after which the D.G. was declared operable and the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> action statement cancelled.
Swing diesel was restored'to service on 1/21/85, making all the DG's operable and removing all LCO's.
This incident is still under study.
REcent Major Emergency Diesel Generator Events - E. McKenna, Senior Project Manager, ORAS, DL The first event Ms. McKenna discussed was the failure of the diesel generators to start at Fort St. Vrain.
This incident occurred on December 18, 1984 Fort St. Vrain has three safety related busses. The number 1 bus is powered from the 1A diesel generator. The number 3 bus is powered from the IB diesel generator and the number 2 bus by either D/G on a "first come/first serve basis."
At the time of this event, the logic of this "first serve" was being tested on a semi-annual basis.
The breakers were lifted to simulate a loss of offsite power. Load shedding occurred as planned, all four engines started. Shortly after one of the engines on the IB train tripped. Both output breakers failed to close. At this time power was restored by closing the breakers from
-the 4160 busses and at this point both engines on the diesel IA tripped.
The bottom line of this event is normally the vital AC instrument bus would have backup power through an inverter from DC power. The battery -
had a bad cell, so it lost power. The sensors failed low and the diesels failed when power was restored.
13 MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS-March 5, 1985 This particular system of cross connects and logic is being studied by the power systems branch.
The second incident occurred at Fermi 2 on January 10, 1985. The number 11 engine tripped on low tube oil pressure and high crankcase pressure.
This has been attributed by the licensee to inadequate lubrication during fast starts.
The corrective actions proposed by the licensee:
. Revise procedures and T.S.'s for engine start and warmup during surveillance tests
. Inspect oil filters and strainers quarterly
. Conduct bearing inspections periodically Two events occurred at North Anna.
In December 1984 they were having trips on high crankcase pressure, and as a result on December 9th, both diesels on Unit 2 were out at the same time. Upon inspection on one diesel engine, the lower piston rings were damaged and en the other engine the piston and cylinder lines were leaking.
The licensee believes that the fast start and fast loading requirements are a contributor to the wear and the thermal stresses induced and have proposed to change the surveillance test requirements to allow slow starts and slow loads.
North Anna 1 had a problem'in February. On February 2 the jacket head tank was essentially empty. It was refilled and then two days later it was found to be empty. Upon inspection, it was found that in the upper numbers 3 cylinder the liner was scored and cracked and the piston and .
piston pin bushings were worn.
MIN. REACTOR OPERATIONS 14 March 5, 1985-The apparent cause of this problem is water jacket seal failure which allowed water into the oil which dilated the oil. This caused overheat-
.ing of the pistons and the.other damage.
The last event occurred at McGuire 2.
This incide'nt occurred in late January 1985. During a test the diesel tripped on low tube oil pressure. When the diesel was started again, an unusual noise was noticed. The diesel was manually tripped.
Upon inspection, brass was found in the tube oil and in the crankcase.
Bearing wear was noticed. The crankshaft is being replaced.
The exact cause of this problem is not known but it is suspected that there was an alignment problem on the lower crankcase bed.
The meeting was adjourned at 1:45 p.m.
The next reactor Reactor Operations Subcommittee meeting will be May 6, 1985.
NOTE: A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H St., NW., Washington, D.C. or can be obtained at cost from ACE Federal Reports, Inc., 444 N.
Capitol St., Washington, D.C. 20001, telephone (202) 347-3700.
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y ,...ATTACMMENT.$ , ,
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15,1985 f Notices -
' 9' tit
' Federal Register / Vol. 50, No. 32 / Priday, February Aninterfra loan -o H wS be' '
dylsory Committee on Reactor SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE- utilized the perio3 tawhich , , ,
Saf;guarda, Subcommittee oa Reactor COMMISSION - ** '~ equipment la pland underte y Operations; Meeting
^8 --
fMeinee No.33596;794051] , , . . wm a au b ~
. %e ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor 1.3755 over the rete of ylsid-a Operations wm hold a maeung on Central Ohlo Coal Co., et at; Proposal 30. day dealer.placed Fundles '
March 5,1985, Room 1048,1717 H Street to Entarinto Leaalng Agreement Corporation commacialpapa enas NW, Washington.DC. - - 15th day of the pHoe month. Sed reens -
ne entire meeting will be open to February a. tees. would be fixed for eed anoth.
public attendance. pany De 8PplienSon am! any -W= .
ne agenda for subject* meeting shall oCoal thereto are availabfe for public . ,
("C C **) ',
Company ("SOCCo"), andWindsor -
be as foHows:
Power House Coal Company ' . I[*C';*"p,fy g ybesday. hfarch s,1965-830 a.m. until Windsor")[coUectively the Who m est the conclusion ofbusinesa { appli cants',), whoUy owned coal a hearing should submit their views in )
The Subcommittee will discuss recent mining subsidiaries of Ohio Power W M 54985 @ f plant opersting expenence. ' Secretary, Securities and N4=nge '
Oral statements may be presented by *[,he) hty su a Commish Was on.RC. ap. , ,
members of the public with the American E!ectric Power Campany, Inc., and serve a copy on e applicants at l tered holding 1 the address speciBed aboes. Proof of-concurrence of the Subcommittee [ Ide Plaza, Col ua, hio 43215, "" -
Chairman; written statements will be aHWnty C' ID *at law, h ce6'I' 8"**Beste)shou have filed an application with this cecepted and made available to the Committee. Recordings wiU ofbe thepermitted Commission Public Utility Holding Company subject to Sections D 9 and to f ed withI cnly during those portions of the of fact orlaw th are A meeting when a transcript is being kept. Act of 1935 ("Act"). I Each Applicant proposes to enter into person who so eatswillbenotlSed ' i and questions may be asked only by ordered. and wiD '
a Master Leasing Agreement ("Lessfag nembers of the Subcommittee,its of any hearing, receive a o f any notice or order consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring Agreement")with non-affiliates I lasued in thia matter. After said data,the to make oral statements should notify (" Lessors") pursuant to =vhich Lesson application,as Bled or as it may be the ACRS staff member named below as wiU commit to leese through June amended.may 30, be sothorised. -
1986 to such companies, mining far in advance as practicable so that For the Comunission.by the Divistaa af equipment with a total aggregate cppropriate arrangementa can be made. acquistion cost not exceeding $50 t pa ,,
During the initial portion of the mulfon.Of th s $50 million.$45.e64.000 ,
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meeting. the Subcommittee, along m'ithor approxhnetely 94% is for replacement any ofits consultants who may be present,may exchange prettminary equipment. %e remaining $2.783,000 la for new e gulpment.
[7R De 45-an33 Fued 3-tm tes- amt views regarding matters to be 'ILE IAasing Agreement provides that -
considered during the balance of the suma cose s***Hs each quarterly payment for 1985 of basic meeting. The Subcommittee wi!! then . rent with respect to a unit of equipment .
hear presentations by and bold covered by the I.assing Agreement shah ,
discussions with representatives of the be in an amount equal to the product of p p y,73y NRC Staff Subcommittee consultants, (i) the basic lease rete factor applicable and other interested persons regarding Cameron fron Works,Inc.; Apptostion to that unit and (ii) the 14ssora . To Withdraw From Usting and this review" acquisition cost. Each installment of basic rent shall be paid quartarly in negletration Further information regarding topics '
- to be discussed, whether the meeting arrears.The lease rats factors February 4,1885. '
has been cancelled or rescheduled. the will applicab;e to the first six months of tees ne above namedissuerhas Bled an Chairman's ruling on requests for the be :ietennfred by combining (1) a application with the Securities and opportunity to present oral statementa new fixed debt rate (to be determined in Exchange Commission pursuant to and the time allotted therefor can be late 1985) for the fir st six months of 1986 Section 12(d) of the Securities Enchange with (2) Les sors' original econendes obtained by e prepaid telephone call to Act of 1934 ("Act"] and Rule 12d2-2(d) the cognizant ACRS staff member.Mr. embodied in the 1985 lease rate facton. promulgated thereunder, to withdraw Richard Major (telephone 202/634-1413) The lease rate factora for the fint six months of 1986 will necessarily be the speciBed security frma listing and between 8:15 a.m. and 5.00 p.m., EST, registration on the New York Stock higher than those in 1985 if the debt rate ,
Persons planmng to attend this meeting is above 12.25% and necessarily lower if reason Exchange, are urged to contact the above named The allegedInc. ("NYSE").
in the applicatism ;
se debt rate is below 12.255. for withdrawing thia securityirosa individual one or two days before the The Lessor will borrow a portion of scheduled meeting to be advised of any listing and segistratica include the the funds required to purchase the following' ti changes in schedule, etc., whicA may equipment to be placed under lea'se from .
have occurred, The Prudentia!Insorance Compsny of CamerrnIronWorka.Inc. .
(* Company") issued $50.000.000 eted abruary 12.m America on a non. recourse basis.The principal amount of the 10%% Notes dae Morton W. ina" debt intereet rate is a itxed 12.255 foe November 15,1966 ("Notas") on 1985. Such lender will be granted a first November 15,1982. On December 1.,
Assistant E=ecutive Arvdarfur Profscf security Interest in the Imesing 1982, the NYSE (" Exchange") advised A*'i'*-
Agreement and the rental payments doe
( (T1t Doc. 85-3002 h5 216-as; aas am] the Company that the Exchange had thereunder.
saAme coot nms .
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ATTACNMENT B a
9 PROPOSED SCHEDULE -
ACRS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING MARCH 5, 1985 '
. WASHINGTON, DC 10 min
- 1. Chairman'sIntroduction(0 pen) 8:30 a.m. ,
3 hrs, 55 min
- 2. Discuss Recent P1' ant Operating 8:40 a.m.
Experience A. Discovery of a broken Containment Vertical Tendon Field Anchor at Farley Unit 2. PNO~ issued January 29, 1985.
B. Failure of Grand Gulf Mein Steam Isolation Valves to Remain Shut.
February 10, 1985.
C. Removal Browns (RHR Ferry)1 and 2, Residual HeatValves Fail to f D. Catawba 1, January 15,1985, loss of instrument air to the containment chill water system and resulting loss of coolant to RCP motors.
E. OTHERS - SEE ATTACHED LIST OF INCIDENTS SELECTED BY IE/NRR FOR DISCUSSION NOTE:
This meeting will be entirely open to public attendance.
- BREAK 10 min.
10:30 a.m. 15 min
- 3. Select items to be presented to the full 12:45 a.m. ACRS on Friday, March 8, 1985 from 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.
1:00 p.m. 4. ADJOURN
Attachment:
List for item 2 above e
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4 ITEM 2.s As cf2/26/85 1
. RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presented by Resoonse Plant Event Date ECCS PUMP PROBLEMS Under Study NRR ~
Degradation of Safety - ,
12/28/85 Indian Injection Pumps Point 2 NRR(Rivenbark)
HPCI RCIC Inoperability Under Study 1/16/85 Hatch 1 IE(V111alva)
Both 51 Pumps Inoperable Under Study 2/7/85 Catawba 1 NRR Under Study RHR Pump Valve Failure
' Browns Ferry 3/31/85 i
MSIV Closure Logic Info Notice Robinson 2 in Preparation 2/5/85 Under Study IE(Woodruff)
Duane Arnold MSIV Surveillance 2/6/85 IE(Weiss) '
Info Notice Grand Gulf MSIVs Fail to Close in Preparation 2/10/85 i NRR(R,eeves)
I PJISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS Under Study Failure of Containment 1/28/85 _Farley 2 Tendons >
IE(Villa 1va) I l
Reactor Protection Sys Info Notice Sequoyah 2 in Preparation 2 1/12/85 Malfunction f Under Study NRR(Caruso)
Reactor Coolant Pump 2/20/85 Waterford .
Seal Failures 4
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l 5 Item 2.E (Continued)
' DIE!EL GENERATOR PROBLEMS Info Notice IE(E. Weiss)
Scram, Partial Loss of in Preparation .
- 3/31/85 ..
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- Degradation ,
t Under Study
Zion 1 & 2 Diesel Gen Problems .,
1/13/85 Under Study ~
12/18/84 Ft. St. Vrain Diesel Gen Problem Info Notice -
McGuire Diesel Gen Failure in Preparation j 1/31/85 NRR(E.McKenna)
. Info Notice Fermi 1 Diesel Gen Problems in Preparation 1/10/85 Info Notica North Anna 2 Diesel Gen Failure in Preparition 12/9/85 (Update)
, Under Study North Anna 1 Diesel Gen Failure 2/4/85 i
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C,RS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON ROOM 1046, 1717 H Street, N.U., Washincton, DC
.0 CAT,10:1:
MARCII 5,1985 MTE:
ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT: -
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' HANDOUTS e
As of 2/26/85 Tentative Agenda for ACRS Subcommittee Meeting on March 5, 1984
- 8:30 a.m.
Room 1046, H Street
.RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presented Response by Date Plant Event ECCS PUMP PROBLEMS Degradation of Safety Under Study N'RR 12/28/85 Indian Injection Pumps Point 2 HPCI, RCIC Inoperability Under Study NRR(Rivenbark) 1/16/05 Hatch 1 Both SI Pumps Inoperable Under Study IE(Villalva) 2/7/85 Catawba 1 RHR Pump Valve Failure Under Study NRR 1/31/85 Browns Ferry 1&2 MSIV PROBLEMS Info Notice IE(Hodge)
Robinson 2 MSIV Closure Logic 1/5/85 in Preparation Under Study IE(Woodruff) 2/6/85 Duane Arnold MSIV Surveillance Info Notice IE(Weiss) 2/10/85 Grand Gulf MSIVs Fail to Close in Preparation MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS Under Study NRR(R,eeves) 1/28/85 Farley 2 Failure of Containment Tendons Reactor Protection Sys Info Notice IE(V111alva) 1/12/85 Sequoyah 2 in Preparation Malfunction Under Study NRR(Caruso)
Waterford Reactor Coolant Pump 2/20/85 ,
Seal Failures 1
pj_ESELGENERATORPROBLEMS Scram, Partial loss of Info Notice IE(E. Weiss) 1/31/85 WNP 2 in Preparation
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AC Power. Diesel Gen
- Degradation Under Study Zion 1 & 2 Diesel Gen Problems 1/13/85 Under Study -
12/18/84 Ft. St. Vrain Diesel Gen Problem Diesel Gen Failure Info Notice 1/31/85 McGuire in Preparation Info Notice NRR(E.McKenna)
Fermi 1 Diesel Gen Problems in Preparation 1/10/85 Diesel Gen Failure Info Notice 12/9/85 North Anna 2 in Preparation (Update)
Under Study 2/4/85 North Anna 1 Diesel Gen Failure l
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