ML20126D799

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Forwards Response to NRC Request for Info on Station Blackout/Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project,Proposing Addition of Two Safeguards EDGs to Upgrade Safeguards Electrical Distribution Sys
ML20126D799
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/1992
From: Parker T
NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
TAC-M80659, TAC-M80660, NUDOCS 9212280167
Download: ML20126D799 (22)


Text

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3 Northem States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, Minnesota $54011927 Telephone (612) 330-5500 December 21, 1992 10 CFR Part 50 Section 50.63(c)(d)

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISIAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos, 50 282 License Nos. DPR 42 50 306 DPR 60 Reply to a Request for Information on the Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade project (TAC Nos. M80659/80660)

Re fe rence : Letter from Thomas M Parker, Northern States Power Company, to U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated December 23, 1991 titl ed

" Design Report for the Station Blackout / Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project," Revision 1 On December 23, 1991, we submitted for NRC Staff review the Design Report (Reference) for our project to add two safeguards emergency diesel generators, to upgrade the safeguards electrical distribution system, and to upgrade the

  1. 121 cooling water pump to become a swing safeguards pump.

The Design Report addresses the seismic independence of the new diesel generator building (DS/D6 Building) and existing buildings. This independence was to be assured by maintaining a specified gap between the new and existing buildings. However, during construction, this gap was partially closed due to cement mortar oczing t'irough the stayforms in an area between the turbine building flood wall at.d the DS/D6 Building stairwell wall, This letter provides the engineering basis that establishes that the seismic design criteria for the DS/D6 Building are still satisfied in spite of the lack of the specified gap between the two walls.

Enclosed is the engineering analysis report titled "Effect of Slumped Concrete and Lack of Cap on the Turbine and D5/D6 Buildings", prepared by Fluor Daniel, Incorporated (the architect / engineer for the project), We have reviewed and accepted this analysis, In addition to this analysis, we reviewed documentation related to gaps between the existing and new concrete foundations. This review is part of the additional disposition of our original Nonconformance Report for the stayform E li O O R 9212280167 921221 2 gfM PDR ADOCK 0500 P ,

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l Nodhern States Power Company U S NRC December 21, 1992 Page 2 of 2 failure. Reviewed documents included contract information requests from Borson Corporation (the civil contractor) to Northern States Power Company regarding materials to be used to maintain isolation gaps, Engine < ring Change Requests issued to clarify the gap requirements, photographs taken of in place styrofoam used to maintain clearances, Quality Control signoffs for application of fiberboard (to maintain gaps) and waterproofing membrane application requirements that stipulated 1/4 inch protection boards to be placed.

Based on the above, our conclusions are:

(a) Drawings, specifications, procedures, and formal correspondence between Borson Corporation and Northern States Power Company ensured that personnel involved were made aware of gap requirements between new and existing concreta structures.

(b) Vertical and horizontal clearar.cco were maintained at the foundation level between the Turbino Building and the D5/D6 Buildin6 and at the walls between the Auxiliary Building and the D5/D6 Building using styrofoam layers and 1/2 inch fiberboard.

(c) The only area where concrete to concrete contact does exist is between the Turbine Building floodwall and the DS/D6 Building stairwell wall, elevations 695' to 705', where stayforms were used. This situation has been analyzed and found acceptable by Fluor Daniel, Incorporated (see attached report). We will submit a revision to the Design Report which reflects this condition.

Please contact Jack Leveille (612 388-1121. Ext. 4662) if you have any questions related to this letter.

MAkNf Thomas M Parker Director Nuclear Licensing c: Regional Administrator Region 1:1 NRC Senior Resident Inspector, NRC NRR Project Manager, NRC J E S11 berg

Attachment:

Effect of Slumped Concrete-and Lack of Cap on the Turbine and D5/D6 Buildings l

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EFFECT OF SLUMPED CONCRETE AND LACK OF GAP ON THE TURBINE AND D5/D6 DUILDINGS 31BJECT 1 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission hl9 requested Northarn States Power Corp. to verify if the failure of the stayforms between the elevation of 718' and 725' has affected the structural independence of the Turbine Building flood wall and the stairwell wall of the newly constructed D5/D6 Diesel Generator Building between the column rows 15 and 16.6 at the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant; and to provide justification for the lack of gap between the existing Turbine Building flood wall and the stairwell wall of the DS/D6 Building.

NRC inspection report 92010, dated Sept 14, 1992, item 3h

" Expansion of Stayform for D5/D6 Building Wall during Construction", identified the issue of structural independence of the buildings as an Inspector Follow-up Item. The concern was the loading of the slumped concrete on the Turbine Building flood wall.

In response to the NRC inspection report 92010 resulting from the failure of the stayforms between the elevations 718' and 725' on August 19, 1992, the damaged siding immediately above the flood wall was removed. This identified that the slumped concrete of the D5/D6 stairwell wall indeed was resting on the flood wall to a depth of 1 1/2 to 2 inch. The slumped concrete was then chipped back to clear the top of the flood wall. NRC Inspection Report

) 92019 closed the above finding.

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! During the NRC exit meeting of 10/23/1992, Mr. John Niesler identified a concern with the lack of horizontal gap between the Turbine Building flood wall and the stairwell vall of the DS/D6 Building. The D5/D6 Building is a Seismic Category I structure and was analyzed as structurally independent of the Turbine Building. .

The remainder of this report discusses the impact of the lack of gap between the flood wall and stairwell wall.

OVERVIEW AND

SUMMARY

t A three story concrete building to house two safeguard diesels is constructed adjacent to the existing Turbins and Auxiliary buildings of the nuclear ~ power plant and was designed to be seismically independent of the existing buildings. Seismic independence was to be assured by the inclusion of a gap between the existing structures and the new building and their foundations.

The newly constructed building has a stairwell on its north east corner. The exterior walls of the stairwell are 8" thick. The wr.11 1

4 and its foundation were designed to have a one-half inch _ gap from the Turbine Building flood wall and its foundation. The stayforms were used for the formwork for the exterior of the stairvell wall.

The oozing of mortar from the construction forms has caused the gap i between the walls to be non-uniform and probably closed at. same

! locations.

i The specified gap for the stairwell wall foundation was maintained by placement of styrofoam between the two adjacent foundations.

No safety related equipment is located on or in the vicinity of the

, stairwell wall. The Turbine Building is a non safety related structure.

l' The DS/D6 Building shares the existing wall with the Auxiliary Building. A two inch gap was provided between the auxiliary i Building wall and D5/D6 Building floor slabs. The gap between the i concrete floors of the D5/D6 building and the exterior wall of the l Auxiliary Building is filled up with compressible-material.

I This report presents the engineering study done by FDI to evaluate i

the seismic loads and their effect on the Turbine ard D5/D6 buildings due to the lack of gap between the flood wal? ta 6 the stairwell wall.

The study concludes that the overall seismic . responses -of the-i

, Turbine and D5/D6 Buildings _are not affected by the. lack of gap between the walls; and the stairwell wall and the flood wall are capable of carrying the conservatively evaluated seismic forces without exceeding their code' allowable stresses.

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SEISMIC EVALUATION FOR THE LACK OF GAP BETWEEN THE TURBINE l BUILDING FLOOD WALL AND THE D5/D6 BUILDING STAIRWELL WALL Backaround Information

! Northern States power Corp. has added a three story Class I 3

concrete D5/D6 Diesel Generator Building to house two new safeguard

SACM diesel generators for the station blackout and electrical
system upgrade project.

Figure A, attached to this report, shows the location of the DS/D6 building in relation to the existing plant buildings. The new building is located immediately south of the column line G of the Turbine Building and west of the column line 15 of the-Auxiliary Building.

The newly constructed building has a stairwell on its north east

, corner. The exterior wall of the stairwell is an eight inch thick l concrete wall.

The D5/D6 Building and its foundations were engineered to be

independent of the Turbine and the Auxiliary Buildings and their foundations. Figures B and C provide section views of the D5/D6 4

Building and show the specified gap between the D5/D6 Building and the adjoining structures.

As shown in figure B, a one-half inch gap was specified between the foundations of the D5/D6 Building and the Turbine ~ Building along column line G. The gap was also to be maintained between the two

. superstructures. Similarly, a one-half inch gap was specified between the foundations of the D5/D6 Building and the Auxiliary i Building along column line 15. A two inch gap between the D5/D6 -

j Building floors and the Auxiliary Building was. specified along column line 15.

The section of the G line wall of the Turbine Building between column lines 15 and 17 consists of a thirteen inch thick concrete flood wall between tne elevations of 695' and 705'. Above this- '

elevation, the wall consists of metal panel wall siding. The section of the D5/D6 Building wall along line G between lines 15 ,

and 16.6 consists of an eight inch thick concrete stairwell j enclosure wall (See- Figure B). The wall was designed as a, 1
partition wall, and was not required to support the building l floors.

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, BORSON Corp, the civil construction contractor, used stayforms for. j the- outside formwork of the DS/D6 building stairwell wall l (reference 16). On December 21, 1990 the stayforms failed during concreting of the wall between the elevations of 718'_and 725'.

The failure of the stayform in this segment of the wall was due to

. incorrect assembly of the stayforms. The metal siding and the girt l framing of the Turbine Building above elevation 705' and 725' and l 3 L

the column rows 15 and 17 was damaged due to the pressure exerted by the wet concrete.

. FDI investigated the incident and established that the damage to the metal siding and the girt framing was structurally acceptable and recommended minor repairs of the Turbine Building steel and installation of new siding.- FDI's investigation is documented in reference 12. The report relied on the telecon information that styrofoam materia) was used between the flood wall and stairwell wall to maintain the one-half inch gap, and hence it did not address the issue of the lack of gap between the flood wall and the stairwell wall.

NSP QA had issued NCR 91 for the Building project.

Gan Investication Followina the NRC Insnection Report 92010 :

On September 30, 1992, NSP took four core samples from the stairwell wall of D5/D6 Building. From the inspection of core holes and the samples, NSP concluded that contrary to FDI's statement in their report (reference 12), no compressible material was placed between the flood wall and the stayforms. Compressible material was neither specified nor required for this area by the FDI drawings and specifications. However, a gap was specified. The SBO/ESU project design report (reference 14), also, had indicated in section 4.3.2.2 that any required gap would be filled with compressible material.

The inspection of the cores revealed that some mortar had oozed out of the stayforms into the gap between the walls at some locations.

Also, in some places the stayforms seemed to have deflected slightly due to the pressure of the wet concrete.

Reasons For The Soecified Gan :

A 1/2" gap between the flood wall (between 695' to 705') of the Turbine Building and the stairwell wall of the D5/D6 Building and their foundations was specified in the design dratings by FDI. The primary objective of the gap was to maintain the independence of the foundations and superstructures of the buildings, and to avoid the lateral pressure of the wet concrete on the Turbine Building flood wall.

Independence of Buildino Foundations :

A styrofoam was specified (reference 13) to be placed on top of the existing concrete foundation of the Turbine Building flood wall.

This was done to assure that the newly constructed D5/D6 wall is independently supported by its own foundation.

The gap is also maintained between the foundation of the Auxiliary Building wall and the floor slabs of the newly constructed DS/D6 4

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building.

The Prairie Island plant was built on the engineered compacted granular soil to elevation 645', a depth of 50 feet (see reference 5). The soil under the newly constructed D5/D6 Building was also engineered and compacted during the original plant construction.

The excavation of the soil for the construction of the D5/D6 Building foundations was controlled to the required depths. The engineered back-fill, where required, was compacted to 100% of the maximum dry density as per AASHTO T180-57 (See reference 7).

The soil characteristics supporting the D5/D6 Building foundations and the existing structures in the vicinity are considered to be the same as those existing prior to the construction of the new building.

Lateral Pressure on the Flood Wall Durina Construction :

stayforms will withstand the lateral pressure of the wet concrete when it is poured in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. The concreting was controlled by Borson Corporation within these guide lines. The use of the stayforms for F e construction of the D5/D6 walls had, therefore, successfully voided lateral loads of wet concrete on the flood wall during the concreting process. The slight oozing of the cement mortar was anticipated from the stayforms; this does not induce lateral loads on the wall.

Impact on The Seismic Responses of Structures :

The subject of the seismic response of the Turbine Building and the DS/D6 Building is studied in two parts. The objectives, the quantitative response, and conclusion for each objective are presented in the following sections:

OBJECTIVE 1 :

  • To establish that the overall seismic behavior of the Turbine Building is not affected by the exclusion of the thirteen inch thick concrete flood wall in the John Blume structural model; and similarly, the overall seismic behavior of the D5/D6 Diesel Generator Building is not affected by the exclusion of the eight inch thick stairwell wall in the FDI model of the DS/D6 building, j 1

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ANALYSIS 1:  !

J Backaround:

Descriotion of John Blume Model for Turbine Buildina:

The seismic analysis of the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating l

, Station was done by using Dames & Moore spectra _ for .06g zero '

l period acceleration (ZPA) for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) d acceleration in the horizontal direction and .04g ZPA in the vertical direction.

The Turbine Building was classified as class III* (See reference 6). However, the building was included in the 1971 John Blume seismic analysis model for_the plant.

The Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building, Shield i

Building etc. were represented by individual lumped mass vertical cantilevers- (See Figure F). The mass points representing the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building mat foundations, mezzanine and operating floors, and roof levels were rigidly ~ connected in the

' horizontal directions and for rotations about the vertical axis.

The Reactor Building foundation slab and the Auxiliary Building

, foundation slab were also rigidly connected for the horizontal motions. The moment connection between -the- foundations was considered flexible to transmit the bending moments about the horizontal axis.

The soil media was represented by the horizontal, vertical and rotational soil spring elements. The spring constants were calculated as per reference 1.

l The stiffness of the Turbine Building in the east-west and the north-south directions, in the original' John' Blume report, were i computed as follows. For the east-west direction, between i elevations 715' and 790.5 the stiffness was based on the axial deformation of the bracing members along column line A. Between elevations 695' and 715' the stiffness was lased on the . steel bracing and the shear deformation of the ' concrete wall along column line A. ,

For the Turbine Building in the north-south direction, the stiffness between elevations 715' and 790.5' was based on the flexural deformation of the 36 WF 194 ' columns with cover plates along line A on column lines 1 through 17. Between elevations 695' and 715' the stiffness was based on the shear deformation of the concrete walls along lines.8 and 10 between lines A and D.

The stiffness of the shear wall along line G between lines 3 and 15 vere included with the Auxiliary Building.

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The Turbine Building vertical cantilever stick model for the seismic analysis ignored the contribution of ten feet high, thirteen inch thick concrete flood wall along line G between column lines 15 and 17 .

The fundamental frequency for the Turbine Building, Auxiliary ,

Building, Reactor Buildings, and Shield Buildings complex (in the '

horizontal direction) was calculated to be 2.86 Hz (reference 2, Figure 25). The horizontal deflection of the Turbine Building foundation slab in the north south direction was calculated to be 0.11 inch (reference 3, Figure 54).

Description of FDI model for D5/D6 Diesel Generator Buildina :

The seismic analysis of the recently constructed DS/D6 building was generally similar to the John Blume analysis for the power block.

Here, the D5/D6 Building shear walls were represented by the vertical cantilever elements with mass points rigidly connected at the floor slab levels and at the foundation slab levels (See Figure G).

The eight inch thick cxterior concrete wall of the stairwell is ignored in the seismic analysis model for the D5/D6 building as.

being insignificant for the overall seismic response of the D5/D6 Building. The wall was designed for the seismic accelerations but was considered to be a subsystem for the seismic model as per the criteria given in reference 4.

The foundation stiffness was represented by the soil springs elements.

Artificial time histories were generated in accordance with

Standard Review Plan 3.7.1 us ing the regulatory guide 1.60 spectra normalized to 0.06g ZPA for OBE and 0.12g ZPA for the SSE (See reference 8). The time history analysis was performed. The free field motion was used to excite the base of the soil springs.

The contribution of rocking was not significant for the accelerations and deflections of the building at the roundation level.

The north south deflection of- the concrete foundation was calculated to be .069 inch for OBE case.

Descriotion of New Seismic Models to Evaluate the Influence of the Walls on the Overall Behavior of Buildinas :

Earthauake in North South Direction :

In order to demonstrate that the exclusion of the thirteen inch -

thick flood wall and the eight inch thick stairwell vall were l justified in the seismic analyses described earlier, the equivalent l 1

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4 spring mass models shown in Figures la through id for the Turbine and the D5/D6 Buildings were analyzed. The simplified models were designed to represent the response of the two buildings for the fundamental modes. The majority response of the two buildings at or near the foundation level comprises of these fundamental modes.

The mass Mt for the Turbine Building spring mass models was obtained from the John Blume report (ref. 3, table 3) and the value of the soil spring Kt was calculated from the .35 seconds fundamental period (2.86 Hz, frequency) of the Turbine Building (ref. 2, Fig 25). The mass at and spring constant kt in the models represent the mass and stif fness of the cantilever flood wall. The natural frequency of the cantilever flood wall was calculated to be 11.66 Hz (reference 15).

. The mass Md, and the spring constant Ed in the models for the DS/D6 building were described earlier. The mass ad and spring constant kd in the seismic models represent the eight inch thick exterior concrete wall of stairwell, fixed at 695' and 718' floor slab levels. The natural frequency of the wall was computed to be 7.00 Hz (reference 15).

The spring mass models for the two buildings were analyzed for the frequencies, mode shapes and spectral responses when subjected to the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectra for 0.069 ZPA. The damping for the soil springs was assigned a value of 10% of critical and the corresponding values for the concrete walls were assigned 4% of critical.

4 The computed frequencies are identified in figure la through id.

The fundamental frequency of the Turbine Building is the same with or without the inclusion of the flood wall in the seismic model.

Similarly, the frequency of the D5/D6 Building is the same when the stairwell wall is included in the model. The forces in the soil foundations also remain unchanged.

4 Earthauake in East West Direction:

For the east west earthquake, the mass of the D5/D6 Building were compared with the mass of the stairwell wall. The ratio of the stairwell wall mass to the building mass is computed to be 0.003.

Besides, the lateral stiffness of the stairwell wall was only 0.5% ,

of the total stiffness of all the shear walls. This indicates that the stairwell wall could be treated as subsystem of the DS/D6 Building (ref. 4). The natural frequencies, the seismic displacements and accelerations of the D5/D6 Building will remain the same with or without the inclusion of the wall in the model.

Similar observations could be made for the seismic responses of the Turbine Building.

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l CONCLUSION 1: I The results of the analyses show that the natural frequencies, and, therefore, the response accelerations of the mass points Mt and Md representing the Turbine and the DS/D6 Buildings do not change with the inclusion of the thirteen inch thick flood wall and eight inch thick concrete stairwell enclosure wall.

OBJECTIVE 2 :

To demonstrate that the seismic responses of the Turbine Building and the D5/D6 Building are not significantly affected by the lack of 1/2" specified gap between the thirteen inch thick flood wall-and the eight inch thick stairwell wall; and that the two walls will be safe for the seismic loads.

ANALYSIS 2:

To conservatively estimate the maximum seismic force the two walls may experience due to the missing gap between the two walls, the seismic analysis was done in two parts. In the first part the two walls were assumed to move in phase; and in the second-part, the walls were assumed to move out of phase.

In-Phase Motion:

One additional spring mass model representing the Turbine and the D5/D6 Buildings, as shown in Figure 1e, was analyzed. In this model, the two masses mt and ud representing the turbine building flood wall and the D5/D6 stairwell vall were connected by a rigid link. The link made the two walls move together. ~

i The natural frequencies for the model were computed as listed on l figure 1e. The model was subjected to the same response spectral accelerations as the previously described models (Figures' la

through'Id).

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The computed displacements, accelerations, and spring forces for model le are presented in table 1 along with the corresponding

) values from the other models (Figures 1b and Id).

! The study of the table shows that the displacements, accelerations '

l and the forces in the soil foundations for the Turbine Building and l the D5/D6 Building remain practically unchanged when the two walls are rigidly connected or are independent (by providing gap between the walls).

I The total seismic lateral force on the flood wall increased from 3.78K to 17.66K and the total lateral force on the stairwell wall increased from 13.14K to 22.38K. The walls are capable to carry

, these loads in flexure for the OBE case and also twice the loads l for the SSE case (reference 15) .

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4 Out-of-Phase Motion:

i If the two buildings move out_of phase, the two walls may impact i each other. The conservative upper bound estimate of the impact

] forces was obtained by adding the mass times accelerations of the

two walls. These forces add up to 15.49K. The estimate is considered to be an upper bound because the accelerations of the

. two walls will not be at their maximum at the time of impact.

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' If the stresses in the walls were doubled for suddenly applied load effects then the maximum equivalent gradually applied load on the walls would be 30.98K. For additional conservatism, one may_ add the seismic forces in spring kt for the Turbine Building flood wall and force in spring kd for the stairwell vall of D5/D6 Building.

The computed maximum values for the OBE case are:

I for Flood wall : 30.98 + 3.78 = 34.76 kips

for Stairwell wall
30.98 + 13.14= 44.12 kips The walls are safe to carry the above loads in flexure for the OBE
case and twice their amounts for the SSE case (reference 15).

CONCLUSION 2:

i The upper bound estimetes for the seismic forces acting on the flood wall of the Turbine Building and the stairwell wall-of the D5/D6 Building due to the lack of the design gap between the two i walls was computed by the simplified spring mass models. The 1 flexural strengths of the walls were compared with the seismic loads and were found to be greater than the computed forces (reference 15). The walls, therefore, have met the criteria for

their design.

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References:

i 1 Whitman and Richart paper " Design Procedures for Dynamically Loaded Foundations" Jour, of the Soil Mechanics and Foundation

Division, ASCE, SM6, Nov 1967.

2 John Blume Report # JAB-PS-04. ,

3 John Blume Report # JAB-PS-02.

i

4 Standard Review Plan Section 3.7.2 " Seismic System Analysis",

j section II.3b, ' Decoupling criteria for Subsystems'.

! 5 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant -Updated Safety-

Analysis Report, Volume 1, section-2.5.5 1 6 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Updated Safety ,

i Analysis Report, Volume 4, section 12.2.1.lf2 7 Drawing NF-116976, i 8 Fluor Daniel Calculations S-376-SG-005.

9 Regulatory Guide 1.60, Rev. 1 " Design = Response Spectra for l Design of Nuclear Power Plants".

l 10 Regulatory Guide 1.61, " Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants".

11 Standard Review Plan Section 3.7.1 Rev 1 " Seismic Design Parameters"

. 12 FDI letter FN-11200, Dated October 23,-1991 to NSP.

l 13 Drawing NF-117014, (section A-A).

l 14 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, SBO/ESU Project, DESIGN REPORT, Revision 1.

i Fluor Daniel Calculations S-376-SG-034.

15 16 ECRs 89Y973 -162 and 163.

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l 17 -Nonconformance Report #91, dated 1/3/91 issued by John I Bystrzycki, NSP QA I

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Table la l

l Quantity of Interest TurbineBldg D5/D6 Bldg Combined Figure Ib Figure 1d Figure le Frequencies (Hz) 2.86,11.67 S.22,7.01 2.87,5.23, 9.23 1

Displacement of Mt-(in) 0.1613 NA 0.1606 Displacement of mt (in) 0.1715 NA 0.1199 Displacement of Md (in) NA 0.0441 0.0439 Displacement of md (in) NA 0.1083 0.1199 Accelerations of Mt (g) 0.1342 NA 0.1348 Accelerations of at (g) 0.1431 NA 0.1220 Accelerations of Md (g) NA 0.1227 0.1228 Accelerations of md (g) NA 0.3515 0.1220 Force on flood wall (K) 3.78 NA 17.66 Force on stair wall (K) NA 13.14 22.38 I

Force on Turbine 2296 NA 2287

! Building foundation (K)

Force on DS/D6 Building NA 3138 3126 i

foundation (K)

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Kt Mt f = 2.86 Hz FIGURE 1A MODEL FOR TURBINE BUILDIN'd Kt Mt kg mt i t= 2.86 Hz M -O r2 = 11.67 Hz FIGURE 18 MODEL FOR TURBINE BUILDING WITH FLOOD WALL Kd Md r = 5.22 Hz FIGURE 1C MODEL FOR 05/06 BUILDING K

md.kd- M d d -

f = 5 22 Hz f 2= 7.01 Hz FIGURE 10 MODEL FOR 05/06 BUILDING WITH STAIRWELL WALL Kg Mt kt mt md k d Md Kd rg7 2.87 'Hz p/ f 2= 5.23 Hz 4

sN f3= 9.23 Hz RIGID LINK ~

) FIGURE 1E MODEL' FOR TURBINE BUILDING AND j DS/D6 BUILDING WITH FLOODWALL AND STAIRWELL" WALL -

1 K t = TURBINE BLOG. SOIL SPRING STIFFNESS 4= 1.424:X 10 K/IN M t- = TURBINE BLOG. MASS = 17080/g K:  ;

k g . = TURBINE BLDG FLOOD WALL' STIFFNESS = 3.668 X 10 2 K/IN i

mt : TURBINE BLDG. FLOOD WALL MASS = 26.4/g .

K' K '

d = 05/06 BLOG. SOIL SPRING STIFFNESS = 7.1167 ~ X 10 4 K/IN j- ~Md = 05/06 BLOG. MASS = 25500/g K k l d = 05/06 BLDG. STAIRWELL WALL. STIFFNESS = 1.871 X 102 k/IN '

- md = D5/06. BLDG. STAIRWELL WALL MASS = 37.4/g K FIGURE 1 -

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SECTION A-A (FIGURE A) @

SEE DETAIL 1 FIGURE B (FROM DWG. NF-116990 <gic,URE j E)f)

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