ML20125A077

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

General Electric-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC - Issuance of Amendment No. 24 to Facility License No. R-33 for Vallecitos Nuclear Center Radiological Emergency Plan
ML20125A077
Person / Time
Site: Vallecitos Nuclear Center
Issue date: 02/12/2021
From: Duane Hardesty
NRC/NRR/DANU/UNPL
To: Feyrer M
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas
Duane Hardesty, NRR/DANU/UNPL, 415-3274
References
EPID L-2019-LLA-0159
Download: ML20125A077 (22)


Text

February 12, 2021 Mr. Matthew Feyrer, Site Manager GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Vallecitos Nuclear Center 6705 Vallecitos Road Sunol, CA 94586

SUBJECT:

GENERAL ELECTRIC-HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY AMERICAS, LLC -

ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 24 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-33 FOR VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN (EPID NO. L-2019-LLA-0159)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 24 to Facility License No. R-33 for the General Electric-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC (GEH), Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC), Nuclear Test Reactor (NTR). This amendment consists of changes to the facility operating license and radiological emergency plan (REP) in response to your application dated July 17, 2019, as supplemented by letter dated February 27, 2020.

This amendment authorizes GEH to implement changes to the REP for the GEH VNC site pursuant to Section 50.54(q), Emergency plans, of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), which GEH documented as reductions in effectiveness to the GEH VNC REP in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).

M. Feyrer A copy of the NRC staffs safety evaluation is also enclosed. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-3724, or by electronic mail at Duane.Hardesty@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Duane A. Hardesty, Senior Project Manager Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility Licensing Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.50-073 License No. R-33

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 24 to Facility Operating License No. R-33
2. Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosures: See next page

General Electric Docket No.50-073 cc:

Jeffrey Smyly, Manager Regulatory Compliance GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Vallecitos Nuclear Center 6705 Vallecitos Road Sunol, CA 94586 Thomas McConnell, Manager Nuclear Test Reactor GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Vallecitos Nuclear Center 6705 Vallecitos Road Sunol, CA 94586 Scott Murray, Manager Facility Licensing GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy 3901 Castle Hayne Road Wilmington, NC 28401 David Heckman, Vallecitos Reg Affairs & Licensing Lead GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Vallecitos Nuclear Center 6705 Vallecitos Road Sunol, CA 94586 Commissioner California Energy Commission 1516 Ninth Street, MS-34 Sacramento, CA 95814 California Department of Health ATTN: Chief Radiologic Health Branch P.O. Box 997414, MS 7610 Sacramento, CA 95899-7414 Test, Research and Training Reactor Newsletter Attention: Ms. Amber Johnson Dept of Materials Science and Engineering University of Maryland 4418 Stadium Drive College Park, MD 20742-2115

ML20125A077 *concurrence via email NRR-058 OFFICE NRR/DANU/PM* NRR/DANU/LA* OGC/NLO* NRR/DANU/BC* NRR/DANU/PM*

NAME DHarderty NParker MYoung GCasto DHardesty DATE 5/13/2020 5/12/2020 2/11/2021 2/12/2021 2/12/2021 GE-HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY AMERICAS, LLC DOCKET NO.50-073 NUCLEAR TEST REACTOR AMENDMENT TO FACILITY LICENSE Amendment No. 24 License No. R-33

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for an amendment filed by GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC (the licensee), dated July 17, 2019, supplemented by letter dated February 27, 2020, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance that (i) the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; E. The issuance of this license amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied; and F. Prior notice of this amendment was not required by 10 CFR 2.105, Notice of proposed action, and publication of a notice of issuance for this amendment is not required by 10 CFR 2.106, Notice of issuance.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended to approve the revisions to the emergency plan described in the aforementioned application, as supplemented, and evaluated in the NRC staffs safety evaluation, dated February 12, 2021, and to reflect the issuance of this amendment, paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility License No. R-33 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment 24, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Greg A. Casto, Chief Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility Licensing Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Facility License No. R-33 Date of Issuance: February 12, 2021

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 24 FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-33 DOCKET NO.50-073 Replace the following page of the Facility License No. R-33 with the revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Insert 3 3 Attachment

possess and use 2,000 curies of either activated solids as contained in but not limited to such items as encapsulating materials, structural material and irradiated components or as contained materials; (b) any byproduct materials necessary for purposes of instrument calibration and startup sources; (c) 10 curies of tritium for pulsed neutron sources; and (d) to possess, but not to separate (except for byproduct material produced as allowed for experiments),

such byproduct material as may be produced by the operation of the reactor.

(4) Pursuant to the Act and Title 10 CFR Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source Material, to receive, possess and use 9.1 kg. of uranium and thorium as source material for experimental devices.

C. This License shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in Parts 20, 30, 40, 50, 51, 55, 70, and 73 of 10 CFR Chapter I, to all applicable provisions of the Act, and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now, or hereafter in effect, and to the additional conditions specified below:

(1) Maximum Power Level The licensee may operate the reactor at power levels not in excess of 100 kilowatts (thermal).

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 24, are hereby incorporated in the License. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(3) Physical Security Plan The licensee shall maintain and fully implement all provisions of the Commissions approved physical security plan, including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The approved security plan consists of the General Electric document, withheld from pubic disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d), entitled, Security Plan for the Protection of Reactor Facilities, submitted by letters dated October 13, 1992, as amended by letter dated September 28, 1994, April 25, and June 26, 1996, and April 16, 1998, under License R-33.

(4) GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC, as stated in the General Electric Companys (GEs) application dated January 19, 2007, and supplemented on January 25, 2007, February 23, 2007, March 2, 2007, March 26, 2007, May 16, 2007, May 18, 2007, June 4, 2007, July 6, 2007, and August 9, 2007, will abide by all commitments and representations previously made by GE with respect to the license. These include, but are not limited to, maintaining decommissioning records, implementing decontamination activities, and eventually decommissioning the facility.

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 24 TO FACILITY LICENSE NO. R-33 GE-HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY AMERICAS, LLC GE-HITACHI NUCLEAR TEST REACTOR DOCKET NO.50-073

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated July 17, 2019 (Ref. 1), as supplemented by letter dated February 27, 2020 (Ref. 2), pursuant to Section 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) and 10 CFR 50.54(q) Emergency plans, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas, LLC (GEH) requested an amendment to Facility License No. R-33 for the Nuclear Test Reactor (NTR) to revise the Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) radiological emergency plan (REP). GEH documented some of the requested changes to the REP as reductions in effectiveness that would require prior U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The application also proposes an emergency action level (EAL) scheme that is based on the latest guidance in the American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS)-15.16-2015, Emergency Planning for Research Reactors (Ref. 3).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 Regulations This safety evaluation addresses the acceptability of the proposed VNC REP. The proposed changes for the REP are required to meet the following regulations:

  • 10 CFR 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, paragraph (b)(6)(v), states, in part: [Licensee shall have] Plans for coping with emergencies, which shall include the items specified in appendix E.
  • 10 CFR 50.54, Conditions of licenses, paragraph (q)(4), states, in part: The changes to a licensee's emergency plan that reduce the effectiveness of the plan as defined in paragraph (q)(1)(iv) of this section may not be implemented without Enclosure 2

prior approval by the NRC. A licensee desiring to make such a change after February 21, 2012 shall submit an application for an amendment to its license.

In addition to the filing requirements of 10 CFR 50.90 and 50.91, the request must include all emergency plan pages affected by that change and must be accompanied by a forwarding letter identifying the change, the reason for the change, and the basis for concluding that the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements in appendix E to this part.

  • 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,Section I.3, states: The potential radiological hazards to the public associated with the operation of research and test reactors and fuel facilities licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 and 70 involve considerations different than those associated with nuclear power reactors. Consequently, the size of Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for facilities other than power reactors and the degree to which compliance with the requirements of this section and sections II, III, IV, and V of this appendix as necessary will be determined on a case-by-case basis [footnotes omitted].
  • 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A, Organization, states, in part: The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensees emergency organization.
  • 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.2 states, in part: A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency action level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change.

[Emergency Planning for Research and Test Reactors] will be used as guidance for the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency response plans.

  • 10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material, Section 70.22(i)(1)(i), states that an emergency plan is not required if the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to a release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.

2.2 Guidance The guidance documents on which the NRC staff based its acceptance and evaluation of the proposed REP against the regulatory requirements cited above are as follows:

  • NRC RG 2.6, Revision 2, dated September 2017 (Ref. 4), which endorses the consensus standard, ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015, as a means for research and test reactors (RTR) and other non-power production and utilization facility (NPUF) licensees to comply with 50.34(a)(10), 50.34(b)(6)(v), 50.54(q), and Part 50 Appendix E.
  • ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015, dated February 2015 (Ref. 3), which identifies the elements of an emergency plan that describes the approach to coping with emergencies and minimizing the consequences of accidents at research and test reactors and other non-power production and utilization facilities, including the criteria for EAL radiation dose levels.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff reviewed the licensees analysis in support of the proposed REP changes, as described in the application dated July 17, 2019, as supplemented by letter dated February 27, 2020. The NRC staff technical evaluation is detailed below.

3.1 Background

GEH owns and operates the VNC, located in the west central portion of the State of California, about 15 miles east of the southern end of San Francisco Bay, approximately 35 air miles east-southeast of San Francisco and 20 air miles north of San Jose. It lies on the north side of the Vallecitos Valley. The nearest towns are Pleasanton, located 4.1 miles to the north-northwest and Livermore, located 6.2 miles to the northeast.

Four reactor facilities at VNC have NRC licenses issued under 10 CFR Part 50 requirements.

These facilities include the NTR, which has an operating license (License No. R-33), and the following three permanently defueled reactor facilities that are in a SAFSTOR1 decommissioning mode, which GEH is authorized to possess, but not operate:

  • Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor (VBWR), Docket 50-018, License No. DPR-1,
  • GE Test Reactor (GETR), Docket 50 070, License No. TR-1, and
  • ESADA-Vallecitos Experimental Superheat Reactor (EVESR), Docket 50-183, License No. DR-10.

The original REP was based upon ANSI/ANS-15.16-1982 (Ref. 5). GEH states that it developed the VNC REP(Ref. 6) to update the plan to include the SAFSTOR reactor facilities that are also located on the VNC site, and to comply with NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(v), 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, 10 CFR 50.54(q), consistent with the guidance in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 (Ref. 3), which is endorsed by NRC RG 2.6 (Ref. 4).

GEH also has an NRC materials license, License No. SNM-960, that authorizes GEH to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer byproduct, source, and special nuclear material at the licensees non-reactor facilities in the VNC (Ref. 7). GEH proposed to remove these non-reactor related activities from the VNC REP because GEH previously demonstrated that the radioactive materials that GEH may possess under the SNM-960 license do not require an emergency plan under 10 CFR 70.22, Contents of applications, paragraph (i)(1).

3.2 Proposed Changes In its application dated July 17, 2019, as supplemented by letter dated February 27, 2020, GEH requested that the NRC staff review and approve the proposed VNC REP that has been 1

SAFSTOR is a method of decommissioning in which a nuclear facility is placed and maintained in a condition that allows the facility to be safely stored and subsequently decontaminated (deferred decontamination) to levels that permit release for unrestricted use.

updated to conform to the current guidance contained in RG 2.6, including a proposed EAL scheme that is based on ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015.

The proposed changes that GEH considered as a decrease in effectiveness are: (1) removal of VNC REP requirements regarding the places of use authorized by NRC License No. SNM-960, which are not reactor-related facilities; (2) relaxation of the requirement for an on-site Emergency Director to allow absences when NTR and SAFSTOR reactor facility operations are not in progress, and (3) revision of the VNC REP EALs to conform to the initiating conditions contained in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015, which includes development of a site-specific technical basis for each threshold indication and removal of the current Site Area Emergency (SAE) classification level at the VNC. Additionally, GEH proposed other changes to: (1) add a state notification requirement of one hour (the current VNC REP does not specify a notification time requirement), and (2) revise the document format of the REP to be consistent with ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 and with the level of detail specified in the NUREG-0849, Standard Review Plan for the Review and Evaluation of Emergency Plans for Research and Test Reactors.

3.3 Evaluation The NRC staff reviewed the changes to the current VNC REP, including the licensees evaluation of the changes, to verify that the proposed REP and EAL scheme meets the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the guidance in RG 2.6 and ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015.

3.3.1 Removal of VNC SNM License Activities On October 1982, General Electric Company (GE), the previous licensee, submitted the emergency plan for the entire VNC site (Ref. 6) to the NRC for approval. The emergency plan was developed as an integrated site-wide plan and designed to cope with emergencies resulting from, or in connection with, reactor operations (NTR, VBWR, EVESR, and GETR) and other licensed radiological activities conducted under a 10 CFR Part 70 materials license (SNM-960).

The VNC site includes several facilities where activities are conducted under multiple NRC and California State licenses. Examples of these activities are the manufacturing of sealed sources, and experiments and analyses with irradiated reactor fuels. The NRC approved this version of the VNC REP in a letter dated May 16, 1984 (Ref. 8).

Following a revision to the emergency preparedness regulations in 10 CFR 70.22(i) for fuel cycle facilities (54 Federal Register 14063; April 7, 1989), GE evaluated the potential accidents and their offsite effects from the SNM-960 licensed activities and offered an option to demonstrate that an emergency plan was not needed and determined that a radiological contingency plan was not necessary. By letter dated December 20, 1990 (Ref. 9), the NRC staff approved the deletion of SNM-960 License, Condition 12, which required VNC to follow the provisions of the radiological contingency plan submitted to the NRC in October 1982 from the SNM-960 License. This approval was based on the evaluation that credible accidents involving the release of radioactive material would not result in a maximum dose, to a member of the public, that would not exceed 0.01 Sievert (1 rem) effective dose equivalent or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.

By letter dated April 20, 2001 (Ref. 10), the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 21 for Facility License No. R-33 and renewed the license for 20 years. As part of the renewal, the NRC staff stated:

The NRC staff reviewed the Emergency Response Plan for the VNC Site, dated March 1996. The NRC staff concluded that this plan maintains acceptable compliance with applicable portions of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

By letter dated August 9, 2017 (Ref. 11), the NRC staff renewed the SNM-960 License for a term of ten years. As part of the renewal of the materials license, the NRC staff asked GEH to provide technical justification for why the bounding scenarios of the accident analysis were still valid and why the basis for eliminating the VNCs REP for the SNM-960 license was still valid.

GEHs analysis, dated April 21, 1999, showed that the maximum dose to a member of the public due to a release of radioactive material would not exceed 0.01 Sv (1 Rem) effective dose equivalent or an intake of 2 mg of soluble uranium. The NRC staff determined that GEHs analysis adequately demonstrated that, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(i), the maximum dose to a member of the public due to a release of radioactive material would not exceed 0.01 Sievert (Sv) (1 Rem) effective dose equivalent or an intake of 2 milligrams (mg) of soluble uranium. As a result, the NRC staff stated in the safety evaluation that the licensees analysis, dated April 21, 1989 (GEH, 1989), remains valid and meets the requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(i) and as such, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(i), no

[SNM-960 License] emergency plan is necessary for the VNC.

GEH expanded the scope of the VNC REP, in a 2013 revision, to include VNC non-reactor radiological facilities, but the licensee did not submit the change for prior NRC approval. GEH concluded that the 2013 change was not a reduction in effectiveness because it it expanded the scope of the VNC REP to include NRC License No. SNM-960 activities, which are radiological activities that are unrelated to any of the reactors at the VNC and conducted in other GEH facilities on the VNC site.

In its amendment application (Ref. 1), the licensee stated that the inclusion in the 2013 REP of facilities where SNM-960 licensed activities are conducted was inappropriate and not based on physical or operational changes at those facilities or changes in radiological consequences.

The proposed revision removes the SNM-960 licensed activities from the REP, consistent with the SMN-960 license and the 1996 version of the REP approved by the NRC during the 2001 renewal of the R-33 license. The licensee further stated that the reduced scope of the proposed REP with the removal of SNM-960 licensed activities, continues to meet all aspects of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and RG 2.6 applicable to the NTR and continues to cover the SAFSTOR reactor facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50.

Because GEH included the SNM-960 licensed activities in the scope of the 2013 revision of the VNC REP, GEH concluded that the removal of the SNM-960 licensed activities from the VNC REP constituted a reduction in effectiveness of the VNC REP as defined in 10 CFR 50.54(q).

Based on the NRC staffs previous determinations in 1990, 2001, and 2017, which concluded that radiological emergency planning was not required for the SNM-960 license activities because the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to a release of radioactive materials does not exceed the 0.01 Sievert (1 rem) effective dose equivalent or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium of 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(i). Therefore, the NRC staff finds that removal of the SNM-960 licensed activities from the proposed VNC REP is acceptable.

3.3.2 Emergency Director Continuous Coverage and Title Change GEH requests NRC approval to reduce the VNC REP requirement that the Emergency Director be present on-site to only when the NTR, License No. R 33, is operational or SAFSTOR operations at the three reactor facilities which are in a shutdown are in progress. The 1996 version of the VNC REP, approved by the NRC in 2001 license renewal, states that GEH will maintain an Emergency Operations Coordinator (the title is Emergency Director in the 2019 proposed VNC REP) on-site to provide continuous coverage on a three-shift, seven-day-per-week basis. GEH states the requested change will make VNC Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staffing consistent with other research and test reactor sites. The application listed the following examples:

  • Purdue University PUR-1 reactor Emergency Plan does not require that an Emergency Director be on-site during off-hours. Campus police are responsible for contacting the Emergency Director when they are not on site.
  • North Carolina State University PULSTAR reactor Emergency Plan does not require that an Emergency Director be on-site during off-hours. Campus police are responsible for contacting the Emergency Director when they are not on site.
  • University of Massachusetts Lowell research reactor Emergency Plan does not require that an Emergency Director be on-site during off-hours. Campus police are responsible for contacting the Emergency Director when they are not on site.

In its application, GEH states that the 2013 revision of the VNC REP changed the Emergency Director continuous coverage requirement without prior NRC approval. GEH further states that the removal of the REP requirement that an ERO member be present onsite continuously was made in conjunction with site operational and staffing reductions. GEH concludes that this change constituted a reduction in effectiveness to the NRC-approved REP and stated that the change was implemented without obtaining prior NRC approval.

Section 3.1, VNC Emergency Response Organization (ERO), of the proposed VNC REP states that an Emergency Director is to be present onsite when operations are in progress at the NTR or entries into the SAFSTOR reactor facilities are in progress. The Emergency Director may be off-site when no NTR operations are in progress or no entries into the SAFSTOR reactor facilities are in progress. Security personnel, on duty 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day / 7 days a week (24/7), maintain a roster and a list of qualified Emergency Directors. Section 3.1.2, Security Shift Supervisor / Site Security Force of the VNC REP states, the Security Shift Supervisor will immediately notify the Emergency Director of the nature and location of an off-normal condition on site.

GEH states that the NTR technical specifications (TS) do not require a licensed operator or an ERO member to be present on site when the reactor is secured (Ref. 12). NTR TS 1.2.20 defines secured under either of the following two conditions:

1. The core contains insufficient fissile material to attain criticality under optimum conditions of moderation and reflection.
2. That overall condition where all of the following conditions are satisfied:
a. Reactor is shut down.
b. Console keylock switch is off and the console key is in proper custody.
c. No work is in progress involving in-core components. installed rod drives, or experiments in an experimental facility.

NTR TS 6.1.3, Staffing, requires a licensed operator in the control room, a second person present at the site familiar with NTR Emergency Procedures and capable of carrying out facility written procedures, and a licensed senior reactor operator present at the NTR facility or readily available on call when the NTR reactor is not secured.

ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015, Section 3.3, Organization and responsibilities, provides guidance regarding the emergency organization that would be activated to cope with radiological emergencies that includes the on-site emergency organization during an emergency and provides that the organizational description shall include, in part:

The identification by title of the person in charge of directing emergency operations, the line of succession, and their responsibilities and authorities.

NRC RG 2.6, Section 3.1, Facility Emergency Organization, states:

The mobilization billets of staff personnel for emergency situations should be described.

Include the position title of that person who is designated to take charge of emergency control measures and the specific line of succession for this authority.

However, the guidance in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 or NRC RG 2.6 does not specify that an Emergency Director to be present onsite continuously.

Based on the NRC staffs review of the information described above, the NRC staff finds that the removal of the requirement to have an Emergency Director onsite 24/7 from the proposed VNC REP is acceptable because the NTR does not operate 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day and entries into VNC SAFSTOR facilities are scheduled in advance. Additionally, the NRC staff finds that 24/7 presence of VNC security personnel onsite and the REP requirement that security personnel notify a qualified Emergency Director if an off-normal condition on-site occurs will ensure that the Emergency Director is available, when needed, to direct the licensees response to radiological emergencies.

Additionally, the NRC staff finds that the position title change from Emergency Operations Coordinator to Emergency Director is acceptable because this minor editorial revision does not alter the duties of the position or the effectiveness of the VNC REP. Additionally, the proposed title is consistent with NRC-approved emergency plans at other research reactor facilities.

3.3.3 Site Area Emergency Classification Level and EALs Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 specifies the emergency preparedness requirements with regard to notifying off-site authorities and initiating protective actions on the basis of severity of facility damage and radiological releases that are occurring or have occurred. The regulations also require the identification of a spectrum of radiological emergencies applicable to a reactor facility and the grouping of these emergencies into specified classes of emergencies.

Emergency classes are standardized into four groups according to the severity of off-site radiological consequences. Each class of emergency is associated with an EAL and the immediate actions to provide the appropriate response. The classes, in order of increasing severity, are Notification of unusual event, Alert, Site area emergency (SAE), and General

emergency. Table 1, Emergency classes, of ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 lists the recommended action levels and response for research reactors.

According to ANSI/ANS-15.5-2015, most research reactors have potential emergency situations that may occur (e.g., personnel injury with contamination, fire, etc.) that have less severe off-site consequences than the least severe standard class, Notification of unusual events.

GEH proposed a change that would also delete the SAE, the highest emergency class in the current REP, from the EAL scheme. The requested change also revises the remaining EALs to conform with the criteria in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015, including revisions to the technical basis of actions to cope with an emergency for the applicable site-specific EAL thresholds. The licensee proposed EAL thresholds are for events that only involve or affect the NTR or the SAFSTOR reactor facilities.

The calculated values for deep dose equivalent (or committed dose equivalent to the thyroid) listed in Table 13-3 of the GEH SAR (Ref. 13) are below the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and 1-hour exposure thresholds specified for an SAE. Chapter 13.0, Accident Analyses, of the NTR safety analysis report (SAR) dated, November 20, 1997 (Ref. ), also includes an evaluation of the actions taken in response to postulated events that can occur at the NTR facility.

The operational occurrences analyzed in chapter 13 of the SAR are: loss of electric power, loss of secondary cooling, loss of facility air supply, inadvertent start of primary pump, and fuel handling errors. GEH states that the accident analyses demonstrate that there are no credible events that could cause fuel melt or a significant release of fission products from the NTR fuel.

GEH also states that compaction of the fuel would not cause the reactor to go critical because water loss, increased self-shielding in the fuel, and the geometry change due to flattening of the cylindrical core, all create negative reactivity effects. In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, the loss of water would shut down the reactor and no fuel melting would occur.

The three shutdown reactors are all in a defueled, SAFSTOR condition, and have permanently ceased operations. GEH stated (Ref. 14) that no fuel assemblies from these SAFESTOR reactors remain on-site. GEH also stated that all systems are dry and only residual contamination exists. The reactors under License No. DPR-1 and License DR-10, have undergone extensive source reduction work and only a few components remain within the containments. The facility under license TR-1, is also defueled and dry.

Based on the NRC staffs review of GEHs analysis provided in its application, the accident analysis provided in Chapter 13 of the NTR SAR, the radiological status of the SAFSTOR reactors and given that the spent fuel from the shutdown reactors is no longer onsite, the NRC staff finds that there are no credible events that could cause fuel melt or a significant release of fission products from the fuel. Therefore, the NRC staff finds removal the SAE classification level from the VNC REP is acceptable because the SAE classification level is not applicable at the VNC and an Alert is acceptable as the highest classification level for emergencies at GEH VNC NTR. Additionally, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, the SNM-960 licensed activities do not require emergency planning. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed emergency classes and EAL thresholds for events that only involve or affect the NTR or the SAFSTOR reactor facilities are acceptable.

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed revisions to the VNC REP to establish Alert as the highest emergency classification level for the GEH VNC NTR and finds that changes to the

EALs comply with the applicable requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Section IV.B.,

Assessment Actions and Section IV.C. Activation of Emergency organization The NRC staff also finds that the EAL scheme revisions are consistent with the guidance in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 and RG 2.6, because the plan includes the remaining standard emergency classes appropriate for dealing with accident consequences determined to be credible for the GEH VNC. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the changes acceptable.

3.3.4 State of California and NRC Notification Time Requirement The NRC staff reviewed the proposed addition of a timing requirement for notifications to the State of California and the NRC. The NRC-approved, 1996 version and the 2013 version of the VNC REP references compliance with Title 17 of the California Code of Regulations and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, but does not specify a specific timeliness criteria for notification of the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) or the NRC following declaration of an emergency. GEH proposes to establish a state notification requirement of one hour in the VNC REP. The proposed REP also provides that the NRC will be notified immediately after notification of California OES and not later than one hour after event declaration (initial or an escalation).

In the Statement of Considerations in the proposed and final rule revision to NRC emergency planning regulations (44 Federal Register (FR) 75173, December 19, 1979; and 45 FR 55407, August 19, 1980), the NRC explained that the purpose of the requirement that power reactor licensees notify State and local agencies in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3, within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency is to ensure prompt notification of the public. Each holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license is also required by 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) to notify the NRC Operations Center immediately after notifications of the appropriate State or local agencies and not later than one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the emergency classes. Although, there is no NRC regulation or guidance that specifies a time limit for research and test reactors to notify the NRC after an event declaration, GEH proposed to include in the VNC REP a one hour notification requirement to the NRC. The NRC staff finds that the GEH notification proposal is consistent with notification times for power reactors and a conservative emergency plan requirement for the GEH VNC NTR.

As stated in Section 3.3.3 of this SE, the NRC staff finds that the highest emergency classification level applicable to the GEH VNC NTR is an Alert. An Alert classification level does not require assistance from off-site state agencies for protection of members of the public.

Thus, the NRC staff finds that GEHs proposed notification time exceeds regulatory requirements, is voluntary, and does not reduce the effectiveness of the REP. The NRC staff finds the one-hour state and NRC notification REP provisions are consistent with time periods required for nuclear power reactor licenses under 10 CFR 50.72 and exceed the requirements for other NRC-licensed RTRs under Part 50, Appendix E. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed emergency plan revision requiring that the NRC be notified immediately after notification of California OES and not later than one hour after event declaration (initial or an escalation) is acceptable.

3.3.5 Other Changes GEH stated in the LAR that the proposed REP revisions are based upon the latest guidance contained in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015. These revisions are identified in Attachment 1 to the LAR (Ref. 1) and include reorganizing the REP into introduction, objective, and scope sections consistent with guidance in ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015. GEH also proposed revisions that add

VNC-specific definitions developed using ANSI/ANS-15.16 definitions and that remove definitions that are no longer used or applicable due, in part, to the removal of the SNM-960 activities and the SAE action level. GEH also stated that the proposed revisions to correct typographical errors, spelling, grammar, punctuation, title, formatting, and paragraph numbering do not change the intent of the REP or reduce the licensees capability to perform an emergency plan function. The NRC staff finds that removal of information related to the SNM-960 activities and changes to reflect the deletion of SAE as a EAL are consistent with the revised scope of the GEH REP and are acceptable. The NRC staff also finds that the editorial changes to correct typographical, spelling, grammar, punctuation, title, formatting and paragraph numbering enhance the readability of the REP without changing any requirements for the REP and are acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental assessment or environmental impact statement is required for any action within the category of actions listed in 10 CFR 51.22(c),

for which the Commission has declared to be a categorical exclusion by finding that the action does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

The issuance of this amendment that authorizes emergency plan revisions, including EAL revisions, changes to the requirements with respect to use of the facility within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 because the emergency plan is required for operation of the facility. Thus, the issuance of the proposed amendment is subject to the categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) if it meets each of the criteria below:

(i) The amendment or exemption involves no significant hazards consideration;

[10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i)]

The NRCs regulations in 10 CFR 50.92(c) state that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility, in accordance with the proposed amendment, would not:

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or [10 CFR 50.92(c)(1)]

The proposed amendment, in part, would (1) revise REP EALs by removing the SAE emergency classification level, providing a technical basis for each event threshold, and make editorial format changes to align the REP with the NRC-approved guidance; (2) remove VNC REP provisions regarding places of use authorized by NRC Materials License No. SNM-960, activities that are not related to reactor facilities; and (3) limit the VNC REP requirement that an Emergency Director be on site to times when NTR operational activities or entries into VNC SAFTSTOR facilities are in progress. As discussed in Section 3.3 of this SER, the NRC staff considered accidents previously evaluated for the GEH NTR and determined that the maximum dose to the public and occupational workers from SNM-960-licensed activities do not meet the consequence threshold that requires emergency planning in 10 CFR 70.22(i)(1)(i). Additionally, as discussed in Section 3.3.2 of this SER, 24/7 security personnel will make the appropriate announcements and contact the Emergency Director if an off-normal event occurs.

Further, the Alert is the appropriate highest emergency classification based on accident analyses that show there is no credible accident that would result in significant fission product release and other REP format and editorial changes made are consistent with

guidance. Because (1) these REP revisions do not alter the way the NTR is operated, including the maximum power level, or increase the amount of nuclear material at the facility, and (2) emergency planning provisions remain consistent with guidance used to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, the changes do not affect the probability or consequences of the licensees bounding analysis of a plutonium capsule fueled experiment failure accident (which does not result in doses in excess of 0.5 rem whole body or 1.5 rem thyroid to a person in an unrestricted area continuously exposed for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) or any other accident analyzed at the facility. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that these changes do not involve any significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or [10 CFR 50.92(c)(2)]

The proposed REP revisions would remove plan provisions associated with activities that are not related to reactor facilities, limit the requirement for an onsite Emergency Director to times when NTR operations or SAFSTOR facilities entries are in progress, provide appropriate EALs based on consideration of all credible accident scenarios at the VNC and their consequences, and make other editorial, content, or format revisions consistent with NRC regulations and guidance. The proposed amendment would not authorize any changes to design of any hardware at the NTR, the maximum power level at the facility, the existing radiological protection program, or any existing TS limits.

Thus, the REP revisions do not create any new accident precursors or scenarios or otherwise create the potential for an accident is new or different from any previously accident previously evaluated at the NTR. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed REP changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety [10 CFR 50.92(c)(3)]

The proposed REP changes that require the onsite presence of the Emergency Director consistent with the hazards posed by activities at the NTR and SAFSTOR facilities, confine the scope of the REP to reactor facilities consistent with the threshold for emergency planning in NRC regulations, and provide appropriate EALs based on analyses of releases from credible accidents, and REP format and content, consistent with NRC guidance. These changes do not alter any existing TS safety limits, safety settings, limiting conditions for operation, or administrative controls. For example, TS 6.3 still requires GEH to apply a radiation safety program to the public, to all facility staff, users, and visitors, and to the environment, that meets 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. Additionally, the GEH REP is commensurate with emergency planning for other NRC-regulated research reactor facilities and continues to reasonably assure that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of an emergency. Therefore, the proposed REP revisions do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

(ii) There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and [10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(ii)]

The proposed REP changes do not authorize or involve any changes in the fission products generated by operation of the NTR or already present in the reactor fuel and the changes do not alter the NTR design, operations, maximum power level, amount of radioactive materials possessed at the NTR, or effluent release limits in TSs 3.4.3 and 3.5.3 so that the release of all gaseous, particulate, or volatile components from the encapsulation cannot result in doses in excess of 10% of the equivalent annual dose limits stated in 10 CFR Part 20. Also, the amendment does not change potential release paths from the facility. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

(iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

[10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(iii)]

The amendment would authorize changes to emergency planning requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, but does not alter the licensed power level, design, or operation, or limits applicable to the facility. NTR TSs 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 continue to require a radiation protection program that keeps exposure as low as reasonable achievable and meets NRC requirements. Accordingly, the occupational dose remains unchanged and well within the regulatory limits of 10 CFR Part 20. Furthermore, the amendment will not change existing administrative controls or the radiation protection program at the NTR for limiting individual or cumulative occupational radiation doses. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Additionally, the proposed amendment would revise the license to authorize VNC REP revisions that: (1) add a state and NRC emergency notification requirement of one hour (the current VNC REP does not specify a notification time requirement); and (2) change an emergency response organization position title from Emergency Operations Coordinator to Emergency Director. Thus, the issuance of the amendment also changes recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements and changes the position title of an officer of the licensee, actions that are categorically excluded under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10)(ii) and (c)(10)(iv).

Accordingly, the NRC staff has determined that this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusions set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10)(ii) and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10)(iv). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Based on review of the proposed VNC REP, the NRC staff finds that the proposed removal of the SNM-960-licensed activities from the REP, the Emergency Director position title change, the reduced onsite emergency coverage for that position, the revisions to remove the SAE classification level at the VNC, the addition of State and NRC notification timing requirements, and other minor editorial changes are consistent with RG 2.6 guidance for emergency planning at a research reactors, commensurate with emergency planning for other research reactor facilities, or consistent with NRC regulations regarding notifications for other facilities.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees proposed changes to the VNC REP in its letter dated July 17, 2019, as supplemented by letter dated February 27, 2020, are acceptable and that the licensee's emergency plan, as revised, will continue to meet the requirements in

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. 50-73, 50-18, 50-183, and 50-70, License Amendment Request -

Revision to Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) Public, dated July 17, 2019 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML19182A197).

2. Letter from GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. 50-73, 50-18, 50-183, and 50-70, License Amendment Request -

Revision to Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) - GEH Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI), dated February 27, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20058G791).

3. ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015, Emergency Planning for Research Reactors, dated February 2015.
4. NRC Regulatory Guide 2.6, Emergency Planning for Research and Test Reactors and other Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities, dated September 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17137A096).
5. ANSI/ANS-15.16-1982, Emergency Planning for Research Reactors, dated October 1982.
6. Letter from GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket No. 50-70 and 50-73, Vallecitos Nuclear Center Radiological Emergency Plan, dated October 29, 1982 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19268B360).
7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Materials License, Amendment 1, License No. SNM-960, Docket No.70-754, dated May 17, 2019. (ADAMS Accession No. ML19100A214) (portions redacted; security-related information withheld under 10 CFR 2.390).
8. Letter and enclosure from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to General Electric Company, evaluating and approving the Vallecitos Nuclear Center Radiological Emergency Plan, dated October 1981 (revised November 1982) (ADAMS Accession No. ML20091A249).
9. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to General Electric Company, forwarding Amendment 5 to License SNM-960, deleting License Condition 12, dated December 20, 1990 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20065S773).
10. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to General Electric Company, Issuance of Amendment No. 21 to Facility License No. R General Electric Nuclear Test Reactor (TAC No. MA0226), dated April 20, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML003775776.
11. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, [NRC Approval of SNM-960] License Renewal Application for the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center (Cost Activity Code L36034), dated August 9, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17097A188). (Enclosures 1 and 2 of this document contain security-related information withheld per 10 CFR 2.390)
12. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to General Electric Company, Enclosure 2. Conforming Amendments to Facility Licenses Nos.: DPR-1, TR-1, R-33, DR-10, dated September 6, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071500618).
13. General Electric Nuclear Test Reactor, License No. R-33, Docket No. 50-73, License Renewal Application Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications, Redacted Version dated November 20, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19162A313).
14. Letter from GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. 50-18, 50-70 and 50-183, GEH Vallecitos Nuclear Center Emergency Planning (EP) Requirements, dated May 24, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13144A752).

Principal Contributors: J. Arce, NSIR M. Norris, NSIR D. Hardesty, NRR Date: February 12, 2021