ML20090H738
| ML20090H738 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1984 |
| From: | Blake E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SP, NUDOCS 8407270095 | |
| Download: ML20090H738 (91) | |
Text
.
r July 26, 198 b h cI UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '84 Jm. 26 P2:03 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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FEFORE THE COMMISSION ~ , _ : cy In the Matter of )
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 xSZh
) (Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
LICENSEE'S COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO COMMISSION ORDER OF JUNE 1, 1984 By Order, dated June 1, 1984, the Commission requested the j parties to comment on whether, in view of ALAB-772 and all
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I other relevant information, including investigation reports by the Office of Investigations, the management concerns-which led i
l to making the 1979 TMI-I shutdown orders immediately effective
! have been sufficiently resolved so that the Commission should-lift the immediate effectiveness of those orders prior to com-pletion of review of any appeals from ALAB-772.1/ Licensee herewith provides its comments which address: (1) the question 1/ The June 1 Order set June 15, 1984, as the deadline for comments from the parties other than the Staff. 'By Order of June 12, 1984, that deadline was extended to July 6i, 1984; by order of July 5, 1984, the deadline was further extended to July 26, 1984.
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h, whether to proceed with an immediate effectiveness decision without awaitino the results of the merits review; (2) the re-sults of recent OI investigative reports; and (3) other rele-vant information recently available to the Commission which may bear on a decision to restart TMI-1.
Immediate Effectiveness The legal question whether the Commission should proceed with its immediate effectiveness decision without awaiting the outcome of the merits review 2/ is not a new question. The standards governing the Commission's decision of immediate effectiveness were established by the Commission in its Order and Notice of Hearing which started this proceeding five years ago. In pertinent part that Order provided:
The Commission shall issue an order lifting imme-diate effectiveness if it determines that the pub-lic health, safety or interest no longer require immediate effectiveness. The 2ommission's deci-aion on that question shall not affect its direct appellate review of the merits of the Board's de-cision.
CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C. 141, 149 (1979); see also CLI-81-19, 14 N.R.C. 304, 305-6, (1981).
2/ Timing of completion of the merits review is in doubt.
The Licensing Board decisions related to management are favor-able to restart. The Appeal Board in ALAB-772 has ordered the '
hearing reopened and remanded to the Licensing Board to consid-er three subjects. Licensee has sought a stay of the remand and has petitioned for review of ALAB-772. Meanphile, the Li-censing Board has set a hearing schedule which wshld lead to a decision on the remanded issues no earlier than the spring of 1985.
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To alter thatl approach now and decide to await the completion of the merits review before acting on immediate effectiveness would be totally contrary ~to the Commission's initial commit-ment to decida restart within 35 days after the Licensing Board's decisions. It also would be inconsistent with the Com-mission's recognition of its responsibility and obligation to lift the immediately effective suspension of TMI-l's operating authority once the bases for suspension have been removed or rectified. Licensee and the Staff in pleadings over the past five years, in'cluding most recently Licensee's Comments on ALAB-772 filed with the Commission on May 29, 1984, have main-tained that the Commission is legally obligated under those circumstances promptly to lift the extraordinary. suspension it imposed without_ prior hearing in 1979. Licensee has pointed out several times that the Commission had sufficient informa-tion available to it to lift the immediate effectiveness of the shutdown orders. Further, Licensee has argued that the Commis-sion is not confined to the adjudicatory hearing record in-mak--
ing this decision -- again, most 'ecently r in its May 29,'1984 Comments.3/
3/ As early as October of 1981, in addressing immediate effectiveness the. Commission opted to hear directly.from Licensee management rather than; relying' exclusively._onlthe=ad-judicatory record. See Transcript of Oral' Argurent on1Immedi-ate Effectiveness, October:14, 1981. There are many examples since'then'of the Commission considering relevantTinformation outside'the formal adjudicatory record. ,
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p We will not repeat here the legal bases previously cited for our position (see, e.g., Licensee's Comments on ALAB-772 (Management Phase), May 29, 1984, n. 1, 2), except to observe that the distinction in this restart proceeding between the merits review and lifting the suspension has been recognized-explicitly by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the recent so-called Philadelphia Inquirer case.4/
In short the Commission has both the right and the respon-l-
sibility to promptlyslift the suspension of Licensee's authori-l ty to operate TMI-1. 'To await the results of the merits re-
- views / of this proceeding before deciding immediate 4/ The court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 727 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1984) thor-l oughly examined the procedural posture of the proceedings L relating to TMI-1. The court found that that the TMI-1 pro-
! ceedings in fact involve four different proceedings which "the Commission has been careful to conduct separately," 727 F.2d at 1197. Among these different proceedings recognized by the
{ court are the formal-adjudicatory hearings before the Licensing Board (the "On-the-Record Proceeding") and the separate and distinct informal adjudication before the Commission concerning
.when to lift the TMI-1 suspension assuming a favorable Licens-
'ing Board decision (the " interim restart proceeding"). 727 i F.2d at 1197-99.
5/ Similarly, to await the results of the Staff's certifica-tion of every item, or a final physical readiness report, or the results of the steam generator amendment proceeding, or the myriad of other factors which potentially could affect TMI-l's actual operation, would be unjust. The Commission's obligation
.is to decide immediate effectiveness promptly, i.e., just as soon as-it has information sufficient to address the concerns
.. .which led to the 1979 shutdown. The Commission is not obli-gated -- indeed, it is not legally entitled -- to await the elimination of every potential roadblock to actual.startup, be (Continued Next'Page)
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Jeffectiveness would be inconsistent with a course the-Commis-
- 'sion has setLfor five years.- It also would be patently unjust
'and violative of Licensee's rights to an expeditious proceeding
- to consider the extraordinary action taken by the Commission in n, 1979. ;
Recent OI Reports {
'The Office of Investigations (OI) has released over the past few months a number of investigative reports related to TMI. These reports address: (1)~possible harassment of'indi-viduals at TMI-2 for. raising safety concerns (H-83-002); (2) timeliness of Licensee's provision of BETA and_RHR consultant reports-(1-83-013); (3) possible falsification of TMI-1 leak ,
rate tests (l'-83-028);-(4) possible pre-TMI-2-accident' training f irregularities (Q-1-84-004); (5) possible improper influence'on.
, o contractor to' change report (Lucien Report)L(Q-1-84-006);-(6) l possible improper changes in Licensee's TMI-2 accident investi-gation report (Keaten Report) and basis for L'icensee's respo'nse to 1979 Notice of Violation (1-83-012);_(7). four allegations by (Continued). ,
it. physical problems 'with a steam generator or some other in---
stant hurdle; tit--is rather1 obligated expeditiously to make an' immediate effectiveness decision'on' restart, even if. actual.
restart is" conditioned'or' prohibited-for'some'otherJreason.
The Commission's failure to act promptlyfbuilds_into actual 1 Erestart what could be very time consuming and' costly' delays as a result of promised: judicial appellate attempts to further
, , block restart.-
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Harold Hartman other than his allegations involving TMI-2 leak rate testing practices;6/ (8) alleged falsification of radia-tion monitoring reports at TMI-2 (1-83-015); and (9) potential improper management influence on plant operators to change testimony (1-84-005).
None of these reports provides grounds for delaying fur-ther a decision to_ lift the suspension of TMI-l's operation.
We address-each of these reports seriatim. 7/
In early 1983, allegations wtre made by three Licensee employees and one Bechtel employee at TMI-2 that they were ha-rassed or discriminated against for raising safety concerns.
There have been two major investigations of these allegations,
, one by OI and one commissioned by Licensee and performed by Edwin Stier, former Director of the New Jersey Division of 4
Criminal Justice.
After reviewing in excess of 1000 documents and obtaining sworn statements from approximately 80 witnesses, Mr. Stier 6/ No completed OI report on Hartman's allegations regarding leak rate testing at Unit 2 has been released and possibly none
, has been completed. See discussion pages 16-18 infra.
7/ In addition, attached to these comments are copies of three letters from Licensee to Mr. Denton, Director, NRR, in connection with his evaluation of'some of the OI reports. (At-tachments 1-3.) In these letters, Licensee discusses in some detail a number of significant_ elements in the recent OI in-vestigative reports, principally Report No. H-83-002. Licensee is still evaluating the remainder of the recently released OI reports and intends to provide further input to the Staff.
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.found that none of Licensee's employees had harassed these individuals as they alleged:
The allegations that accuse management of following a policy of ignoring problems brought to its attention and of punishing employees who raised the issues are untrue.
Stier Report, ("TMI-2 Report: Management and Safety Allega-tions"), dated November 16, 1983, Volume I at 13.
The corresponding OI Report did not give Licensee manage-ment the same clean. bill'of health. However, it raises no question regarding any Licensee management personnel who are involved with restart and operation of TMI-1 and thus provides no bar to a restart decision.8/
The second matter investigated by OI concerns the timeli-ness of Licensee's provision of two consultant reports (by BETA and RHR) to NRC. 01 determined:
The investigation did not disclose any evi-dence of a deliberate attempt or conscious management decision by GPUN to withhold the information in the BETA and RHR reports from the NRC.
g/ The one individual whose actions were questioned by OI and who had any responsibilities for TMI-l was the then President-of GPUN, Robert Arnold. Mr. Arnold has provided his views on the OI Report to Chairman Palladino in a letter dated June 8, 1984. Since Mr. Arnold has. removed-himself from the management-of GPU Muclear pperations, resolution of his role, if any, in the. alleged hafassment -- or in any of~the other issues in this proceeding -- is no longer necessary to resolution of the-man-agement integrity issues connected with the' restart decision.
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, OI Report 1-83-013, at 4 (emphasis added). Moreover, the NRC l 1
Staff. evaluated the two reports and found: "no information which raised significant safety or regulatory concern."
NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 4 at 2-1 to 2-2 (Oct. 1983). ,
Additionally, the Appeal Board.very recently had occasion to address the reportability of these two consultant reports in deciding a motion to reopen the restart proceeding to take evi-dence on the question. .The Appeal Board stated:
We therefore find no improper action by licensee with regard to the reporting of the BETA and RHR studies and, accordingly, no basis for reopening the record on that count.
ALAB-774 (June 19, 1984), slip op. at 15. Thus, there is no i teason to further withhold authorization to restart TMI-1 based on the BETA and RHR reports.
The third area covered by recent OI reports concerns leak rate test practices at TMI-l during a one-year porlod in
'1978-1979. The overall conclusion of this OI investigation is-
, favorable to Licensee, finding neither a systematic pattern of falsification 9/ nor a motive to falsify the leak rate 9/ The OI conclusion on this issue was:
" Based on the testimony received and the documents ~and analysis reviewed, we have concluded that there was no systematic: pat-tern of falsification'of leak rate' surveil-lance tests at TMI-1 during.the time period
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data.10/ Leak rate test practices at TMI-1 have also been (Continued) in question nor can we prove that any indi-vidual' operator knowingly and willfully at-tempted to manipulate leak rate surveil-lance test results. At the same time, we cannot exclude the possibility that indi-vidual operators may have attempted to ma-nipulate test results for unknown reasons.
The explanations given by the operators and-licensee management,.as to why the hydrogen and particularly the water additions are present during the test periods, are plau-sible given the numerically small number of-tests actually involved and the magnitude of the responsibilities assigned to the shift operators.
Memorandum from the Director, OI, to Regional Administrator, NRC Region I, dated April 16, 1984, forwarding Investigation Report 1-83-028, page 2.
10/ OI concluded as to any motive to falsify leak rate tests:
" Technical analysis has demonstrated that TMI-1 was an inherently ' tight' plant in terms of RCS leakage and that there was minimal difficulty experienced in obtaining acceptable leak rate test results. Addi-tionally, the surveillance tests were per-formed in a conservative fashion in that while the surveillance tests were required by technical specifications to be performed every twenty-four hours, the operators rou-tinely performed the tests every shift. As such, we have'not been able to identify any-motive which would cause'the operators to feel they had a reason to attempt to alter leak rate test.results by making unac-counted for hydrogen or water additions."
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investigated by Edwin Stier at Licensee'sLrequest. In a report
- ("TMI-1 Reactor-Coolant Inventory Balance Testing") dated June 13, 1984, which covers leak rate practices at TMI-l since
.1974,~Mr. Stier concluded.(at pages 9-10; footnote not in orig-
'inal text): ,
-The overwhelming weight of evidence demon-strates that TMI-1 personnel did not manip-ulate or otherwise improperly influence the
. outcome of reactor coolant inventory bal-ance tests.
The leak ~ rate test calculation at TMI-l was essentially accurate within the limitations
- of available plant instrumentation. Its i most significant calculation errors did not l affect the accuracy of reported test re-I
- sults.
-. When averaged over time, test results reflected. actual reactor coolant sys-tem leakage.
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Individual test results varied signif-icantly from one another and a single test could not be relied upon to give ;
a precise measurement of unidentified leakage.
- In September 1974, a practice of discarding .
anc notfotherwise documenting test:results l determined by plant personnel to be invalid I
was established at TMI-1.
This' practice was not intended to con-ceal actual reactor coolant system leakage.
'The failure to document the-
' invalidation of test'results.was con -
- Ltrary to the. intent of TMI-l Technical-Specifications-and procedures.
The company.did not create or permit a de-g fact in makeup tank level. instrumentation that provided a means to manipulate leak t-s
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rate tests.11/
- The makeup tank level transmitter was installed according to manufacturer's specifications, which called for the installation of a condensation collec-tion point and drain valve on the low pressure line below the level of the transmitter.
No discernible inaccuracy existed in the makeup tank level transmitter until September 1977, when water col-lection in the low pressure line became excessive.
The Maintenance Department took steps to remove water from the low pressure line, but was not successful in pre-venting excessive accumulation.
It is not likely that water accumula-tion in the low pressure line of the level transmitter had a significant effect on the evaluation of reactor coolant system leakage during any pe-riod of TMI-l operation.
Yhus, the subject of TMI-l leak rate testing does not provide a basis for delaying a decision on restart of TMI-1.
11/ The " defect" is the absence of a drain valve which would have allowed for the removal of water that could accumulate in the low pressure line of the makeup tank transmitter. Exis-tence of water buildup in this region ("a loop seal") could allow hydrogen additives to affect leakrate measurement. This problem was first identified by Eaegre and Benson in their 1980 review of leakrate testing at TMI-2. OI stated that even after Faegre and Benson identified the problem at Unit 2, Licensee took no affirmative actions ta determine whether a potential for the same problem existed at Unit 1 -- until an NRC related inspection in September 1983. OI's observation is simply wrong. As Mr. Stier's investigation bears out (pages 32-34),
Licensee took steps to apply the learnings of the Faegre and Benson report to TMI-1 years before the September 1983 NRC in-spe-tion.
t The fourth area which is the subject of recent O! reports relates to possible training irregularities at TMI in the peri-od prior to the March, 1979 accident at TMI-2. The OI investi-gation was' prompted by a 1976 memorandum written by a former supervisor of-training at TMI, Mr. Tsaggaris. OI concluded:
This. investigation has not produced any information to indicate.that the TSAGGARIS-memorandum was in reference to actual con-ditions of noncompliance with any require-ments of the requalification program, nor was there any testimony to indicate that the licensee willfully concealed informa-tion concerning ncncompliances from the NRC. Additionally, an NRC Region I in-
- spection performed within several months of L.
the TSAGGARIS memorandum did not identify any instances of noncompliance which should have been reported. 1 OI Report No. Q-1-84-004 at 6.
The Appeal Board recently was asked to reopen the rescart
- hearing record on the basis of this same O! report. In denying the motion to reopen, the Appeal Board found
It follows that (the information in the OI <
report) would not have likely affected the Licensing Board's decision on training --
or, for that matter, ours in ALAB-772 --
in any significant respect.
ALAB-774, slip op at 8 (footnote omitted). Thus, pre-accident training practices discussed in this 01 report do not. provide a basis for withholding a restart decision.
The fifth subject'of recently releaned O! reports relating to TMI oxplored whether improper influence by management or by individuals from Licensee's startup and test organization had y
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been exerted on a contractor whose 1980 report on pre-accident practices at TMI-2 was critical of Licensee. OI's findings were evaluated by NRR. NRR concluded that the information developed by OI concerning the contractor report did not raise questions concerning the integrity of management or the Licens-ee employees involved, and further determined that the individ-ual employees have been contributors to important changes in
'the present startup and test program at TMI-1 which Region I
. characterised as exceptional. Memorandum from the Deputy Di-rector, Division of Human Factors Safety to the Director, Of-fice of Invectigations, Region I, Field Office, dated April 24, 1984, at 4-5 (Exhibit 6 to 01 Investigation Report _Q-1-84-006).
Thus, there is no reason to delay restart on the basis of this o report.
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Another recently released OI investigation report explores j management involvement in changes to drafts of the Keaten Re-l port and the basis for Licensee's 1979 response to a Notice of Violation. This OI report finds no fault with any member of L
Licensee's management who would be involved with restart or operation of THI-1.12/ The OI report raises questions l 12/ Specifically, the investigation did not produce any infor-mation which would implicate Messrs. Kuhns, Clark,.Hukill and Ross in any conduct which had the effect of influencing changes
.in the Keaten Report. While OI finds Mr. Dieckamp did influ-ence the addition of information on the Davis-Besse precursor ovent, 01 found the adder! information did not appear to be ei-(Continued Next Page)
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.concerning t'wo-individuals with respect to a change in the 1
2 Keaten' Report.and with respect to the accuracy of Licensee's r'esponse in 1979 to an NRC-Notice of Violation. Neither of
< sthese individuals is-involved with restart of TMI-1, and there is thus no. reason'to withhold restart authorization on the a- I
- basis.of this. report., even if OI's questions regarding the'two b*. GPU individuals are valid. -
submittals tio 'the
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The seventh area addressed'in re,ent OI Commission is not a' ccnventiorial 01 report but -an OI evaluation of allegations by Harold Hartman other than.liis ' allegations ,
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.concerning pre-acc'ident. leak-rate testing at T'MI-2. The/OI -'
evaluation provided to.the Commission in June, 1984, reflects -
no recent investigat3.ve effort by OI. Rather, it consists
.largely of a collection of investigative reports based on work.'
in 1979 and 1980, with OI's " Observations"- inclucked. 'OI-re-ports no conclusions.
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- There are four'different subjects addressed by these- 2
- .x y Hartman.allegati~ons. ~'Ons relates ~to-.his-recollection of whethU
- , er procedures for estimatingt critical rod. position' were gfol- -
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- inaccurate ors cont'rary: to the :Keaten' Task Force's conclu-- ~
'sions. ' None "ofitheise individuals werefound- to have contrib-
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P utedito alleged inaccura,cies in Licensee's response toithe:1979L x.
Notice-of Violation.' ,
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TMI-2. OI observes that "some of the information...provides --
8 some indication that the incident occurred." Others who were j!
y involved in that startup flatly deny any knowledge of impropri- as ety and the records alone are not sufficient to resolve the j E
issue. We see no relationship to TMI-1 restart in any event. 25 M
A second allegation concerns difficulties with surveillance M
tests for the emergency feedwater pumps at TMI-2. 1980 infor- dB
-J mation reviewed by OI indicates there were problems with sur- =i
!!!E veillance tests conducted on these pumps in 1978-1979. This ;3 issue wasn't characterized even by Hartman as involving delib- 1 J
erate violation or falsification of procedures. Clearly, there IE is no link to TMI-1 restart in any event. The third issue in- jE volved the circumstances of Hartman's resignation.
B OI observed mg that while information concerning the details of his resigna- jf tion was inconsistent, if not contradictory, Hartman did not indicate that he was the subject of any intimidation or ha- p 1
ra s sme.n t . Any connection with restart is totally lacking. The g fourth Hartman allegation concerns the recollection of a f
licensed operator that shortly before the accident at TMI-2 a
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shift supervisor called the system dispatcher about taking q TMI-2 off-line to check out plant leakage. The shift supervi-l sor in question (who no longer works for Licensee) denies any such call and there is no record of such a call. As in the case of the other three Hartman allegations, we see no link to restart. It is instructive particularly to note OI's view that jj
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none of these Hartman allegations warrant any further in-vestigative effort.
The eighth and ninth areas addressed in recent OI in-vestigative reports concern the falsification of radiological monitoring reports by a TMI-2 employee and the potential that management improperly influenced operators to change their testimony in the GPU litigation with B&W. Neither of these re-ports reflects negatively on Licensee's management. The fal-sification of three radiological monitoring reports by the TMI-2 employee was uncovered by Licensee management,_investi-gated and reported to the NRC. The employee was terminated as a result of Licensee's investigation and OI simply confirms Licensee's work. OI reports no evidence that Licensee manage-
- ment influenced or made any attempt to influence the testimony.
of the operators in the B&W litigation. The operators' testi-mony was based on their recollection of events during the acci-dent and their review of technical data compiled and provided to the operators during the course of the litigation.
There remains just one area to Licensee's knowledge which is the subject of an OI investigative effort and is'not. avail-able now to the parties. That one' area' concerns TMI-2. leak ~
rate-testing practices prior to the' accident'.~ Licensee.took steps more than a year ago to remove any cloud over restart-which might obtain due to the pendency of this issue. Thus,.in Licensee's letter to Chairman Palladino.of June 10, 1983, we
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pointed out that no member of Met Ed's/TMI senior management is now invol.ved with TMI.
Four levels of management, the Met Ed president, vice-president, station manager, and both unit man-agers responsible for TMI at the time of the accident are not with-the present operator, GPU Nuclear. Moreover, Licensee com-mitted to reassign personnel such that no TMI-2 licensed opera-tor (who therefore could have been involved in leak rate testing at TMI-2) would operate TMI-1;13/ that commitment has been fully carried out. To provide added assurance that any inappropriate attitudes or practices of the past are not car-ried forward to GPU Nuclear's operations, Licensee further com-4 mitt'ed to remove from any role in overview assessment, analysis or audit of TMI-1 plant activities all personnel'with pre-accident involvement as Met Ed exempt employees at either TMI-l or TMI-2; this commitment, too, has been fully imple-mented. Thus, today at TMI-1-there is no licensed operator, nor. member of the plant's operatin'g management all the way up to and including the president of GPU Nuclear, nor member of any overseeing or auditing group of plant activities,.who is reasonably suspected to have played a role-in TMI-2' pre-accident leak rate test practices. In short, as-the NRC staff and the Commission itself.have noted, the lack of a final.
13/ .The sole 1 potential exception'is the current Supervisor of
, Operations at TMI-1,'Mr..Ross. He has uniformly been cleared
-ofLpotential involvement in_any; wrongdoing.
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closeout of this subject by OI'ought to play no role in a deci-t Jsion'to ' allow restart.
ALAB-772 And Other Relevant Information As the Commission observed in its Order of June 12, 1984, the parties previously have provided their views on immediate effectiveness "on numerous occasions." Thus, the Commission.
asked the parties in their instant comments to address only the effect, if any, of newly available information and ALAB-772.
Licensee has already provided its views on the effect of ALAB-772 on an immediate effectiveness decision. See Licens-ee's Comments on ALAB-772 (Management Phase), dated May 29, 1984. Licencee maintained in those views that ALAB-772, including its remand for additional evidence in three areas, does not justify further delay in the Commission's restart de-cision.14/
One important new piece of information regarding ALA'B-772 does warrant particular emphasis. Clearly, the Appeal Board's concern with training, particularly the perceived'need for'ad-ditional input from Licensee's OARP Review Committee.(training
- experts) since the discovery of cheating'and' ensuing reopened hearing, is the most significant issue the Appeal Board re-manded. Shortly after ALAB-772,was issued, Licensee
- 14/. In fact, Licensee disputes that a remand _ is - justified.
See note 2 supra.
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f reconstituted the OARP Review Committee. The Reconstituted OARP Review Committee has reviewed pertinent documents, con-ducted personnel interviews and made first-hand observations of training at TMI. By notice.of' July 3, 1984 Licensee provided to the Commission,. Boards and parties a report of the findings of Licensee's Reconstitued OARP Review Committee on the con- j
'l cerns expressed by the Appeal Board in ALAB-772.15/ That Com- I mittee's conclusions are:
(1) The Committee is pleased at the response of GPU Nuclear Training and Education Depart-4 ment'to the recommendations contained in the 1980 OARP Review Report. It-feels that progress has been outstanding and that the o GPU Nuclear Training and Education Depart-ment now ranks among the top utility pro-grams in the United States.
(2) The commitment of resources and dedication
- of-the training personnel is indicativeLof
~
the interest and commitment of top manage-ment in the development of the training program. The confidence in the GPU Nuclear management, expressed by-the Committee in 1980 has been justified.
(3) The~ management of the training program is well qualified and.the specific management hierarchy is appropriate. The diversity of
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background and the extensive practical i
15/ The Reconstituted OARP Review Committee Report titl'e page bears the date-June 12,-1984. Counsel is-infarmed the title page was signed on that date by the Committee members in antic--
ipation of_ filing ~the document by June 15~. When;the-Commission extended the comment period on ALAB-772 by its Order of.
June 12,_the Committee decided tottake more_ time to complete its report. -The reportfas' finalized was provided by letter dated June:28,11984, and. received by.Mr.1 Clark, President of
-GPUN, on July 2,.1984. ' Additional copies;were~made-and deliv -
ered by messenger to counsel on July 3'for prompt service on the Commission, Boards and parties.
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operational. experience of the training per-
.sonnel~are commendable.
'(4) The_ instructor _ development program is ap-propriate and should prove to be' effective.
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.(5) The examination development, control,.and security procedures are more extensive than anyythat the Committee has seen in industry or academia.
4 (6)
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The commitment to the use of task analysis as a basis for the establishment of' learn-ing objectives.in the development of course and examination content is an example of the extra effort being committed to relate
.' training to on the job performance and to- ,
increase the safety of plant-operations.
4 (7) The management of the training program rec-
! ognizes its_ responsibility associated with theJcheating incident. Theychave.taken- .
specific steps to correct this situation and are: dedicated'to' assuring that.it.never happens agsin.
- (8) Theyredesign of the Control Room shows that= '
- - .GPU Nuclear management is determined to' . ,
2-
' provide aLwell-human engineered control. ~
-rcom to complement the_ training program.
(9) The development-'and procurement of.the .
Basic' Principles Trainer Simulator'and-the
j securing'of aireplica simulator ~are-further' evidence of GPU' Nuclear' management'sicom- _
7 mitment to excellence'in'the' training, pro--
. gram. ,
t 4
(10)- ~The " bottom 111ne" asJfar as theJCommittee
- is1 concerned is-that'the GPU. Nuclear training-program produces qualified opera-tors ~and.is adequate to support 1thel restart-of TMI-1. -
- -Special report of the;OARP_' 2 Reconstituted; Review Committee" .
- (June 12,)1984),Jat.82-83. '
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I In addition to ALAB-772,.there are several other recent developments that'may warrant Commission attention. Included in Licensee's discussion below are the indictment of a former employee, the current status of plant readiness for operations, including the area of emergency preparedness, and the Common-wealth of Pennsylvania's interim' comments on the June 1 Commis- i sion Order. In' Licensee's view, none of these developments constitutes any basis for delaying a restart decision.
On June 19, 1984, Licensee gave notice that a federal grand jury had indicted a former Supervisor of Operations at TMI-2. In our Notice to the Commission, we pointed out that this individual is not employed by GPU or any of its subsidiaries and, even when'he was employed in the'GPU System, he played no role in TMI-1 restart activities.
On July 5, 1984, we responded to a. Licensing Board request for a status report on the physical readiness of TMI-1 to oper-ate. We informed the Board that-TMI-1 was ready then to oper-ate and could be-restarted.any time shcrtly after receiving au-thorization, allowing about ten days for final operational .
. readiness activities. On July.18, 1984,swe updated that report to say that TMI-1 would be. ready to operate in August.
On June 25, 1984, the Executive Director forLOperations,.
Mr. William J. Dircks, forwarded to the Commissioners a memo--
randum'on " Emergency Preparedness. Deficiencies for TMI-1." ' At -
pages 7,.and 8 of the Dircks Memorandum!the Staff: summarizes its l
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views on the handling of remaining emergency preparedness
. issues in the TMI-1~ Restart proceeding. As Licensee under-stands the Staff position, it is:
(1) The communication aspects of the FEMA Category A deficiencies need to be resolved prior.to restart; (2) The remaining FEMA Category A deficiencies shculd be handled separate from the restart pro-ceeding; I
(3) The recent D'.C. Circuit decision on emergency planning (UCS v. NRC) does not affect the restart of TMI-1; and (4) But for Staff certification relating to the com-munication aspects of the FEMA Category A deficiencies, the emergency. preparedness part of the TMI-1 Restart proceeding has been concluded.
Licensee generally agrees with these conclusions. In par-ticular, the last three Staff conclusions correctly analyze the relevant TMI-l restart concerns. As to the first Staff conclu-sion, Licensee believes that, since TMI-1 is by Commission order to be treated like any other operating plant,'the noted communications deficiencies also should be resolved outside the restart proceeding. However, the Commissioners need not reach that issue, since drill activities at TMI during June and July, 1984 adequately responded to the communication issues identi-fied in the FEMA Category A deficiencies.
Attached (Attachment 4) is a' July 25, 1984 lett'er from Licensee -(H.D. Hukill) tothefStaff (J.F. Stolz) describing those emergency preparedness drill activities. As-indicated in y
S the letter, on June 18 and July 17, 1984, communications drills were run with the counties surrounding TMI. Those drills successfully demonstrated the ability of the counties to re-ceive, record and transmit emergency declaration notices and protective action recommendations under simulated emergency conditions. This is sufficient for the Commission to favorably
- resolve all outstanding restart-related emergency preparedness issues.
i Finally, we take this opportunity to react to the Common-wealth of Pennsylvania's initial comments of June 15 in re-sponse to the Commission's June 1 Order. Those comments relate
~
to the impacts of Unit 2 decontamination efforts on the safe operation of Unit 1. The Commonwealth identifies two specific issues which-it asserts need to be resolved prior to restart (at p. 4):
(1) the safety' impacts to Unit 1 from the' damaged Unit 2 reactor,-and (2) the financial impacts arising from th'e asserted failure to secure total funding for the Unit 2 decontamination effort.
Both issues identified by the Commonwealth previously have been addressed in this proceeding, one through-litigation before the Licensing Board (issue 1)'and'the other:through Commission Order'with the. support'of the Commonwealth (issue 2). . Licensee is thus at a-total loss..tonunderstand'the basis on which the-Commonwealth seeks to-have these. issues reinjected;into the proceedi~ng;at this-time.
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With respect to the safety impacts to Unit 1 from the dam-
' aged Unit 2 reactor and from cleanup operations at Unit 2, that issue was fully litigated before the Licensing Board; the Com-monwealth participated through cross-examination of both Licensee's and Staff's witnesses; and the Commonwealth filed proposed-findings of fact on the issue. In its partial initial decision of December 14, 1981, the Licensing Board accepted some of the Commonwealth's arguments and rejected others. See LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1424-55 (1981). The Board conclud-ed:
On our evaluation of evidence of Licensee's ability to maintain the. Unit 2 reactor in a safe condition and of1the potential radio-
. active releases from. Unit 2 cleanup cpera-tions, we find reasonable assurance that the decontamination and restoration of Unit 2 will not affect safe operations at Unit 1.
Id., at 1432. The Commonwealth took no appeals from this as-pect of the Board's 1981 decision nor otherwise questioned it in the intervening two and one-half years. Given the compre-hensive treatment the Licensing Board devoted to this issue, it is not surprising that the Commonwealth filing contains no evi-dence of t any adverse impact from Unit 2 cleanup activities cn1 Unit 1 operations. Instead,'it merely raises again-a question which was adequately resolved by the Licensing Board,.com-
~
pletely ignoring the1 existence of the record and the Board dea cision.
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With respect to the financial impacts inquiry, that was an issue in the proceeding until removed by the Commission in its order of March 23, 1981. See CLI-81-3, 13 N.R.C. 291 (1981).
In taking this action, the Commission described the Common-wealth's position as follows (Id. at 296, emphasis added):
. Counsel for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, representing the Governor of that State, believes that while it is im-portant for the licensee to demonstrate its financial ability to operate TMI-1 simulta-neously with the cleanup of Unit 2, the Commonwealth believes that the return of TMI-l to commercial operation would improve, rather than impair, the licensee's financial health. For example, return of the unit would produce operating revenues and return of the unit to the utility's rate base also might increase the licens-ee's credit rating and its abilities to obtain capital. Therefore, the Commonwealth supports the staff position (to postpone the financial issues until after restart.)
The current Commonwealth position is inconsistent with this clear, unequivocal, and well-founded statement of position. In its recent filing, the Commonwealth totally ignores the incon-sistency, introducing no new evidence to support their revised position. In fact, in the last two and one-half years substan-tial progress has been made in cleanup and in assuring funding for the cleanup. See, e.g. Letter of William G. Kuhns, Chair-man, GPU, to NRC Commissioners, dated June 20, 1984. The Com-monwealth's position should be rejected by the Commission.
1 I
The Commission's deliberations on the restart of TMI-1 have been~ stymied for about two years. In this intervening time the Commission has sought to resolve the meaning of the operator cheating incident, the implications of past practices 5
brought to light in the GPU vs. B&W litigation and, during the past year, the Meted indictment and the items enumerated in the Dircks memorandum of May 15, 1983. Repeatedly over this two year time period, Licensee's management and its operations have been scrutinized in unprecedented detail. Mere repetition of allegations has taken a toll. Innumerable investigations have not shown any conscious pattern of improper behavior on the part of management. However, the agency's concentration on al-legations of wrongdoing has virtually excluded recognition of the aggressive and forward-looking actions that Licensee's man-agement has initiated and implemented. To the extent that the investigations reveal imperfections, or_ focus on differing
. judgments, these realities need to be judged in the light of Licensee's total performance. A reading of the recent F01 re-lease of the record of a number of closed Commission' meetings during a portion of the-past three years strongly-suggests a need for the Commission to step back and review the matter of management's commitment to' safe' operations with the full record, positive and' negative, in mind.
In this regard,,we would urge the Commission to be mindful of what we consider to be the meaningful'and positive indicia sof management-integrity,.namely:
O
=
s .
(1) The Company responded fully and -cooperated with '
all investigations of the accident. From the be-
, ginning itifelt a' deep. obligation to ensure that the' learnings of-the accident were fully de-
~
rived.
(2) The Company moved immediately to embrace the majorflearnings of the' accident, i e., the need for.more competent technical resources. A~new,.
single purpose organization, GPU' Nuclear, was formed; numerous senior' experienced' management personnel have been added; the people and dollar resources devoted to nuclear operations have been greatly: increased.
(3) GPU Nuclear was designed with the overriding ob-ligation of nuclear safety clearly in mind. The concept of a shift' technical advisor was immedi-ately embraced; the organization.provides.for multiple checks and balances;. safety _ committees with meaningful outside participation continue to be'a strong element.
(4) The Board of Directors of GPU Nuclear has been strengthened with an'outside chairman and three additionalEoutside members. -These three members constitute a Nuclear Safety and Compliance Com-mittee of the Bcard. That Committee has'se-lected an outside: contractor to provide indepen-- '
dent support-'for. visibility into plant operations and :ompliance.
'(5) GPU Nuc1'earfhas greatly expanded the commitment- o
.to training. .Today's GPU Nuclear ~ training staff numbers 1106; its 1984-budget is $7.~6 million.
This is more than:an order of.magnitudeeinerease-in both_ staff and budget since-the TMI-2 acci- ,
dent.. TMI-l'has.enough111 censed' operators for: .,
six shift; operations which allows one shift in!
six for' training. . A basic principles trainerfis-Lavailable.and;a full replica' simulator-with, '
- advanced software 1will be-on' site.in 1985.,.INPO accreditation-is in process.
-(6): GPU; Nuclear ~hac responded ~ aggressively'.to:the<
clessons-learned requirements of NUREG-0737.[ Fur-
'ther, GPU. Nuclear has played a lead: role.in:.the:
B&W Owners Group.
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- That the-above steps:have been effective is established by the very favorable 1903 and.1984 SALP reports for TMI-1. The posi-tive impact of GPU Nuclear management on practices, hardware, and procedures and the current capability to safely operate TMI-l is recognized in those reports.
In conclusion, neither ALAB-772 nor other recently avail-able information bars a Commission' decision to lift the immedi-ately effective suspension placed on TMI-1 operation in 1979.
The Commission remains legally obligated to act promptly on this decision. It has information sufficient to address the concerns which formed the basis for the 1979 shutdown and ;
i should act now to lift the immediately effective suspension. l Completion of NRC Staff certification items as a prerequisite to actual restart can then p oceed as was contemplated in the August, 1979 Order which initiated this five-year long proceed-
[
ing.
~
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE k A h.
Ernest L. Blake, Jr., P.C.
Counsel.for Licensee July 26, 1984 c _ e e A
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(
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 J126 P2:03 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LFr .
000 !! :S ._ SO ,
BEFORE THE COMMISSION 3 RANCH In the Matter of )
) Docket No. 50-289 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) (Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Comments in Response to Commission Order of June 1, 1984", dated July 26, 1984, were served on those on the attached Service List by de-posit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, or where in-dicated by an asterisk (*) by hand delivery,-this 26th day of July, 1984.
f W. / W ,ft*
Ernest-L. Blake, Jr., P.C.
DATED: July-26, 1984
y l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR . REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission 2
In the Matter of. ')
)
, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) -Docket'No. 50-289 SP
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
~
.) (Restart - Management Phase)
Station,. Unit No. 1) ')
SERVICE LIST
- Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John H. Buck y Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety;& Licensing Appeal Board Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
"' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission , Washington, D.C. 20555-washington, D.C. 20555-I *
' Administrative Judge James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Christine N. Kohl U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission AtomicSafety'&Lkcensing. Appeal-Washington, D.C. 20555 Board lU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Frederick ~Bernthal,' Commissioner Washington,'D.C. 20555~
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,.D.C. 20555' Administrative = Judge-Ivan'W. Smith, Chairmanc Lando W. Zeck, Jr., Commissioner . Atomic Safetyt& Licensing-Board U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission .U.S. Nuclear; Regulatory-Commission.
-Washington, D.C., 20555 1 Washington,-D.C. 20555-1 Administrative l Judge JAdministrative~ Judge-Gary J. Edles,: Chairman. 'Sheldon J.1Wolfe.
Atomic'Safetyf& Licensing Appeal ~ Atomic; Safety & Licensing Board' Board' '
' U . S . ! Nuclear - Regulatory 1 Commis sion :,
U.S.~ Nuclear _ Regulatory Commission-Washington,fD.C.. 120555l
, : Washington,.D.C.- '20555 m
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Administrative Judge Mr. Henry D. Hukill Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. Vice President Atomic Safety & Licensing Board GPU Nuclear Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 480 Washington, D.C. 20555 Middletown, PA 17057
- Docketing and Service Section (3) _Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt Office of the Secretary R.D. 5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coatesville, PA 19320 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Louise Bradford Atomic Safety & Licensing Board TMI ALERT Panel 1011 Green Street
- U.S. Nuclear Regalatory Commission Harrisburg, PA 17102 Washington, D.C. 20555 Joanne Doroshow, Esquire Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal The Cnristic Institute Board Panel 1324 North Capitol Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20002 Washington, D.C. 20555 Lynne Ber"abei, Esq.
- '. s . .. ountability Jack R. Goldberg, Esq. (4)
Office of the Executive Legal 15 5 Connecticut Avenue ashington, D.C. 20009 U.S Nuc ear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Thomas Y. Au, Esq. 2001 S. Street, N.W., Suite 430 Office of Chief Counsel Washington, D.C. 20009 Department of Environmental Resources Michael F. McBride, Esq.
505 Executive House LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae P.O. Box 2357 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Harrisburg, PA 17120 Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 4 w -
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ATTACHMENT 1 s
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- d G !! Nuclear Mantr-Parsiccarty. New Jersey 07054 1
201 263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Writer' Direct Dial Number.
(201 263-6797 July 20, 1984 Mr. Harold R. Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
Re: Metropolitan Edison Company Three Mile Island Unit 2, Docket Number 50-320 NRC Office of Investigations Report #H-83-002, Three Mile Island NGS, Unit 2, Allegations Regarding Discrimination Fo; Raising Safety Related Concerns, May 18, 1984.
Based on a March 25, 1983 memorandum from the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of Investigations initiated an investigation of allegations presented to the NRC concerning alleged improper activities in the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Recovery and Cleanup Program. The investigation conducted by the Office of Investige.tions culminated in a September 1, 1983 interim investigation report and a second investigation report dated May 18, 1984.
GPU Nuclear Corporation responded to the September 1, 1983 interim report in its letter to you dated January 16,.1984, which provided detailed comments on the subject and concluded "that the total information now available does not support the preliminary conclusions on the major issues which can be drawn from that memorandum (September 1, 1983 memorandum from the Director of OI to Chairman Palladino]."
This letter responds to the Office of Investigations Report 4H-83-002 dated May 18, 1984, dealing with allegations regard-ing discrimination against individuals for raising safety related concerns. We have reviewed that report and have compared its findings and conclusions with those in a report by Mr. Edwin Stier of his investigation conducted on behalf of GPU Nuclear Corporation. Mr. Stier concludes in his report that the claims that GPU management was unconcerned about the safety of the TMI-2 recovery effort and retaliated against employees GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utihties Corporation
. . 59 * %
who attempted to call deficiencies to management's attention are contradicted by the weight of the evidence. Our comparison y attached shows the weakness of the bases for OI's views where they are contrary to Stier's.
Our review has focused on those aspects of the report which might be relevant to resolution of issues being considered'in connection with the restart of TMI-1. We may submit further, more general comments at a later time.
GPU Nuclesr Corporation has maintained and continues to main-tain a policy'of protecting its employees, contractors and subcontractors from discrimination as a result of raising safety concerns. This policy was recently confirmed in a letter from me to Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut dated June 29, 1984 in which I set forth details regarding GPU Nuclear Corporation's policies on employee protection and Company conmunications.
GPU Nuclear Corporation believes that the subject OI investi-gation dealing with allegations regarding discrimination for
, raising safety related concerns does not disclose any findings adverse to a favorable determination by the Commission on the restart of TMI-1.
Sincerely, P. R. Clark President
. PRC/fk Attachment cc: Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
r ALLEGATIONS REGARDING DISCFIMINATION FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS (H-83-002)
OI REPORT #H-83-002 Edwin H. Gischel In June, 1981 Edwin H. Gischel joined GPU Nuclear Corp. as the TMI-2 Plant Engineering Director. In this position he was responsible for supervision and technical direction of a staff of engineers that provided technical support for the operations and maintenance staffs of TMI-2. He also was assigned to the unit's emergency response organization as the supervisor for technical support to the emergency director.
In June, 1982 Mr. Gischel suffered a stroke and was absent from work until October, 1982 at which time he returned to work on a part time basis. In November, 1982 he resumed full time employment. Upon his return to work in October, Gischel con-sulted with Corporate Stress Control, Inc., (Stress Control) a contractor to GPU Nuclear Corp. (GPUN), concerning the visual and memory problems he continued to experience as a result of his stroke. Stress Control recommended to Mr..Gischel that he
e take a neuropsychological evaluation to assess the extent of his intellectual impairment and made arrangements for the evaluation.
l In March, 1982, upon being. advised by Stress Control that Gischel was resisting taking the evaluation which Stress
. Control felt was necessary, GPUN began efforts to have Mr. Gischel comply with Stress Control's recommendation.
During the following months GPUN worked to accommodate both Gischel's concerns and Stress Control's recommendation. GPUN agreed to pay for the evaluation, to pay for his wife's expenses incurred in accompanying him to the evaluation and agreed to allow the evaluation to be done by anyone selected by Gischel provided the person. selected was qualified as required by Stress Control.
On June 17 Gischel informed GPUN that he had decided.to seek a transfer within the GPU System. He subsequently accepted such a reassignment.
Allegations Mr. Gischel alleged that he was required to undergo the I
neuropsychological evaluation as a prerequisite to continuing as TMI-2 Plant Engineering Director co harass or retaliate
, , . , - - , , . - - -,e,,, ,,ew- ,. .
4 against him because he raised safety concerns. II) It is undisputed that the recommendation that Gischel be evaluated was initiated by a GPUN contractor, Corporate Stress Control, {l l
Inc. (Stress Control) on the basis of information Gischel voluntarily gave to Stress Control. In support of his harassment allegation, however, Gischel suggests that GPUN l
conspired in the first instance to cause Stress Control to raise the neuropsychological matter with Gischel. Mr. Stier and OI investigated this contention and found no support for it whats oever . On this point Mr. Stier concluded:
i (1) Mr. Gischel also alleged he was harassed by John Bar ton, Deputy Director of TMI-2, through criticism of 2
the productivity of his staff, disapproval of excused time of f with pay, requiring submittal of a weekly
! status report and installing windows in doors in Site Operations office areas. These allegations were made
. after Stier concluded his investigation and were therefore not addressed by him, however, OI apparently found nothing which supported those allegations and
- reached no conclusions regarding them.
In addition Mr. Gischel alleged that Mr. Arnold of fer-ed to back down from requiring the neuropsychological evaluation if Mr. Gischel refrained from testifying at an April 26, 1983 hearing by the Udall Committee and threatened further retaliation if he did testify.
GPUN knows of no evidence which supports this allega-tion, and Arnold specifically denied it when question-i ed by OI. (Office of Investigations Report .
- 11-83-002, "Three Mile Island NGS Unit 2, Allegations Regarding Discrimination for Raising Safety Related Concerns , " May 18, 1984, (OI Report), Exhibit 16, pages 82-85). OI reaches no conclusion on the issue, and no suggestion has been made that anyone presently involved in the operation of 1MI-l was involved.
l l
l
On February 10, 1983, i
King criticizing Evaluation Report (StheER) .
Polar Crane Load Test um SafetyGischel to h the 17th, a series of meet 1 resolve Gischel's concerns.ings took place in an effort toFrom I l
From the sequence February 10, it of events that led to Jenkins' is clearmemorandum letter and the Gischel that the dateswere of thepurely Jenkinsletter on coincidental There was no participation in the preparation of the .
Jenkins letter by any representative of GPUN.
That letter Control begi,nning in _ October aimed at encouraging to submit to the examination. Jenkins ' expression of concern 15, January about Gischel not having taken the examination on 1983 displayed' in his February 10 letter.was wholly consistent with the attitude he in the level of concern occurred within Stress Control atTherefore, no chan the time Gischel began to raise objections to thy polar crane Load Test in February. (footnotes omitted)t2 /
In his oral presentation of the OI report to the Commission ,
Ronald A. Meeks, the lead OI investigator on this matter, said:
i our investigation, the evidence doesn 't show any involve-Control in anyway to have Mr. Gischel take the exam at that time Control or at to have Mr.anytime Gischeldid they tlye to take try to influence Stress There 's no evidence to indicate that.13) examination.
Gischel's suggestion, then, that GPUN somehow conspired with Stress Control against Gischel simply is incorrect Likewise , .
Gischel's allegation that GPUNC was harassing Gischel by ,
(2)
Stier Report, Vol. III, "Gischel Harassment Allega tions ", pages 9 and 10 (3)
US NRC Public Hearing transcript, May 23, 1984,
" Discussion of Completed '!MI Investigations", Page 36 .
1
. . -__.. - - _. - . _ . . - = . .__
requiring him to take a neuropsychological exam is wholly without merit.
Mr. Stier, in his investigation and report, !
throughly analyzed this allegation and rejected it. OI in its investigation reached no final conclusion on the matter.
However, OI in its summary makes a nusber of statements which might be read as supporting Gischel's allegation. These 4
statements are factually incorrect or immaterial or both, and they do not support Gischel's allegations.
i First is the statement that:
i coincidentally, this [Gischel's a requirement until af ter Mr. Gischel evaluation 3 did not become concerning the TMI-2 recovery program.pa{ L41 sed safety issues i
Af ter reviewing the evidence, Stier concludes that the recommendations of Stress Control were formulated before Gischel made his safety allegations and i
I I
(4)
Memorandum from the Director, Of fice of Investigations to the NRC Commissioners, forwarding the Of fice of Inves tigations Repor t #N-83-002, dated May 18, 1984 (OI memorandum), page 1.
I
without the participation of GPUN.
OI discovered no evidence to the contrary. OI's characterization of the timing of this event as " coincidental" i.e. , not causally rela ted, supports Stier 's conclusion.
Secondly, OI states:
This employment requirement [the evaluation) was pursued despite the fact that Mr. Gischel's supervisors did not consider that his phy 1 his work performance.9 tSipal impairments seriously affected The basis for that statement is unclear. The following from the OI Report reflects that Gischel's first and second line supervisors recognized Gischel was not pt:rforming at full capacity in his assignment as 'IMI-2 Plant Engineering Director.
Mr. BAR' TON sta ted th at he was aware, through Mr. GISCHEL's supervisor, Lawrenea P. KING, that Mr. GISCHEL was having work. and memory retention problems when he returned to vision Mr. BAR'!ON related that Mr. GISCHEL, upon returning to work, WARREN, acted more as a consultant to Mr. Ronald P.
functions. was, operationally, assuming Mr. GISCHEL's who Messrs. BAR'!ON and KING discussed how rapidly they should allow Mr. GISCHEL to assume full responsibil-ities his ownandpace it wasasdecided to allow the Director Mr. GISCHEL to afvynce at of Plant Engineering. t 6; I
(5) 3 ., pages 1 and 2. '
(6) OI Report, page 14..
I l
1
Barton further emphasized Gischel's limitations when, in responding to OI's questioning on why Gischel was treated differently than another person suffering a similar i j he n ury, s ta ted
. . .[ unnamed individual] unlike Mr. GISCHEL, work fully recovered and performed very yellreturned in the to function that he had before his illness.17)
These statements clearly show that dischel's supervisors felt that his physical impairments seriously af fected his work performance.
The impairments noticed caused the supervisors to accommodate Gischel by not requiring him to resume full responsibilities .
Arnold also stated to OI that it was his understanding that upon returning to work af ter the stroke, Gischel was permitted to work at a pace established by himself, being supported in his job functicrt by Warren. (8)
( 7) Id . , page 15.
l (8)
Id . , Exhibit 16, psges 9-10 i
f I
Lastly, OI states:
I The examination' requirement was also' in con flict with the medical opinions furnished by both Mr. Gischel's personal physician and a GPUN contract phys ician . Bc th doctors examined Mr. Gischel and concluded that he was fit to perform his assigned duties at TMI- 2. ( 9)
It is uncontested that neither of these two physicians were trained psychologists or psychiatrists. Also, GRIN- upper management was unaware of the results of Mr. Gischel's routino.
annual physical examination by Dr. Imber, and Mr. Gischel never mentioned to GPUN management that he had been examined by Dr. ,
Imber, despite having had many opportunities to do so. GPUN i management can hardly be faulted for giving no impert'ance to a s2 ject to which Gischel himself apparentiy ascribed 'no importance until months later inE his OI interview. Dr . Jon es -
(Mr. Gischel's personal physician), for his part, believed Gischel was fit, but "strongly recommended" Gischel take the exam which was all the Co:npany was requesting of Gischel.
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( 9) OI Men.oraddum, /page 2. .
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In any event, the situation was not one where management could balance the recommendations of independent professionals or even the views of fellow workers or supervisors. It was a situation where a trained, licensed clinical psychologist pro-vided to GPUN his professional opinion that "Mr. Gischel's work per formance is potentially seriously impaired by his disability, but that because of the intricate system of checks and balances at GPU Nuclear that Mr. Gischel's work impairment would be compensated for. " (emphas is added) (10) GWN manage-ment was thoroughly justified in not ignoring that information and resolving any uncertainty in a conservative fashion. The record shows clearly that both Mr. Kuhns and Mr. Arnold attempted to do that appropriately and with as much compassion for Mr. Gischel's anxieties as circumstances permitted. For example, Stier describes the interaction in the following.
excerpt from his report:
Once GPUN became involved on March 9-10, 1983 in urging Gischel to take the examination, the company worked toward reaching an accommodation between Stress Control's recom-mendation and Gischel's concerns. GWN agreed to pay for the examination. Gischel was permitted to have his wife present at the time of the examination. Finally and most aignificantly, Arnold agreed that Gischel could select the person to administer the examination as long as he possess-ed the qualifications specified by Stress gon$rol. These are acts of accommodation, not harassment. Llli (10) Id_. , Exhibit 95.
(11) Stier Deport, Vol. III, "Gischel Harassment Allega tions ", page 10.
's -
Notwithstanding all of the above, OI concludes without support that:
The requirements to take the neuropsychological examination appears to be more in response to something other than plant safety concerns and coincidentally follows Mr. I Gischel's raising safety recovery program. issuesadded)tl (emphasis conpagging i the TMI-2 i
When asked by Commissioner Asselstir.e if that is a nice way of saying there is a reasonable basis for concluding that Gischel was asked to take the test in retaliation for raising safety concerns, the lac'k of evidence suggesting a causal relationship was confirmed. Mr. Hayes replied "Well, we cannot positively say we have the evidence to support that..(13)
Although Mr. Gischel refused to be interviewed by Mr. Stier, and Mr. Stier's investigation.only covered events up until April 4, 1984, the parameters of the dispute.between Mr. Gischel and GPUN were sufficiently developed by that date j to permit Mr. Stier to make a judgment concerning Arnold's motivation over the initial three weeks of the episode. Stier.
concludes:
(12) OI memorandum, page 2. -
(13). US NRC Public Hearing Transcript, May 23, 1984,
" Discussion of Completed TMI' Investigations", page 47.
.--...-..-.-..-.a..-..:.--.
\
The decision to press Gischel to undergo the examination was made entirely by Stress Control which is an independent entity. The company 's actions, in response to Stress control's expreasions of concern, were reasonable and limi ted. (14) i i
(14) Stier Report, Vol. III, "Gischel Harassment
, Allegations", page 11. ~
)
i
! i
- w 4 ' ' ""'-
CDNCLUSION 4
Mr. Gischel's condition clearly raised substantive questions 1 about how safely he could perform his normal work function.
While OI, apparently because of the cer ti fica tions o f Drs .
Jones and Imber and the inves tiga tor 's .own non professional j
assessment of Mr. Gischel's intellectual capabilities, seems reluctant to positively conclude GPUN acted in good I
faith,(l the Director of OI stated, in response to a Comaissial ques tlon:
And I can't sit before you today gentlemen, and say, you know, which is right and which is wrong because I, I just i don 't have a feel for that, to put myself in corporate i management's position if it were a member of my immediate
! staff here, and I'm concerned about them as well as this organization.
1 And that 's a tough one. (16) j Although it is a " tough one" in terms of the personal discom-fort and misfortune for Mr. Gischel - few things are as precious to us as our physical and emotional good health - it is not a " tough one" in terms of the public and worker se fety obligations of GPUN. Far from showing management lack of l
(15)
US NRC Public Hearing transcript, May 23,. 1984,
" Discuss ion of Comple ted 'INI Inves tiga tions ", pages 49-51.
(16) Idd . , supra, page 58.
i 12 -
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integrity, GPUN's actions demons tra te that management recog-nised its obligations and responded properly even th ough it was clear that its actions could be s ented . misunderstood srepre- and mi 1
D d
KING ALLEGATION i
Mr. King charges that GPUN terminated his employsent because he raised cafety concerns and not because of his outside business !
activities.
I Neither OI nor Stier found evidence of any kind which indicated King was terminated because he raised safety concerns. OI's conclusions appear to be based solely on the opinion that Arnold's stated reasons at the time of terminating King were insuf ficien t . OI stated: ,
Although this action [ King's termination] may have been appropriate based on information developed during an internal inves tigation initiated af ter Mr. King's termin-ation; the evidence of alleged impropriety which w known at the time of. the tarmination was not irrefutable. 17)
That conclusion is simply wrong. King could not have refuted the evidence Arnold had when he terminated him since everything
, Arnold knew or suspected was indeed true. The evidence was in i fact " irrefutable." If the meaning of OI's conclusion is that, in their judgment, Arnold should have given King ti fur ther opportunity to refute the evidence against him, we believe i
l (17) OI Memorandum, page 2.
1 . .. . - . - - . . . - . . - - .- - - . . - .-. - . . - - - - . . - - - - - - - _ _ - . . - -
~
ample opportunity was given Mr. King and that the na ture o f l j
King 's rosponse justified Arnold 's conclusion that King should l have been - discharged . One can only review what Arnold knew when he terminated King and then conclude, as Stier did:
The King evidence
's role inisQuiltec clear t at) .18 Arnold terminated King based on Stier stated in his report that Arnold knew, at the time he 4
terminated King:
Quiltec was incorporated in Virginia on June 23, 1981 by King, Benjamin Slone, John Hoade and Gloria King.
King was the president of Quiltec and claimed to own 50% of the stock in that company. King had stated in his answers to questions posed by Arnold that his role was advisory in that all operations had been conducted by Slone. However, in Arnold's judgment King's position as a 50% owner of a closely held corporation, the chief executive officer and the chief operating (18) Stier Report, Vol. I, page 2 8.
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officer of that company made King accountable for the activities of Quiltec regardless of King's claim that he played no active roic in the operation of that company.
Three former employees of GPUN, Slon e, Rek ar t and
! Herlihy, had become employees of Quiltec. From King's answers to Arnold's questions, GPU personnel records ,
and Arnold's conversation with Pollack,(I'} Arnold i'
concluded that at least Rekart and Herlihy had been recruited on behalf of Quiltec prior to their resig- ,
I nation of employment with GPUN and that King was at least aware before they left the employ of GR3N that they were to be employed by Quiltec.
I I
i (19) Milton Pollack is a vice president of Iong Island Lightine, Company who Arnold reported he contacted to inda.Madently determine whether former GPUN employees '
were working for Quiltec under contract with LILCO, the timing of when they were offered for employment, and when they commenced work at LILCo.
I l
[
.=
During July or August of 1982, Parks had requested a Bechtel employee to type resumes during ncnworking hours. She agreed and shortly thereafter received approximately 20 to 25 resumes and Quiltec letterhead stationary on which to retype the resumes she had been given. Most of the individuals whose resumes she was given were GPUN employees . The only names the typist could remember were King, Herlihy, Slone, Rekart ,
William Henry, Austin and Kenneth Lionarons. The typist was paid $75.00 in cash by Parks.
During a discussion with Arnold, probably on March 9, King had admitted that he had provided to Parks the funds which were used to pay the typist. King denied, however, knowing any of the detail s of whose resumes were typed or who did the typing. He characterized his activity as an accommodation to Slone by providing payment to Parks for Quiltec. Arnold's purpose in raising the issue on March 9 with King was to test King's credibility aince King had not indicated in his answers to Arnold's questions that Parks had any involvement with or knowledge of Quiltec.
~
Subsequent to a meeting between King and Arnold on March 12,'1983, King's role in the resume preparation 1 i
was further confirmed. On March 15, 1983, Arnold was advised by Kanga that Parks had informed Bechtel tha t Parks arranged for the typing of t.he resumes on behalf !
of King. On Mar ch 16, 1983, Arnold informed King by a j letter that his employment would be terminated on Mar ch 23. That date was selected to make King avail-able to be interviewed by Griebe and Iowe, independent experts hired by GPUN, concerning his management and safety allegations. Arnold intended to assure King's participation in that interview by retaining him as an employee of GPUN until that time.(
In a letter on his own 'oehalf to the Commissioners,(21)
Arnold identifies the following as also known to him at the time he decided to discharge King:
I
- (20) Stier Report, Vol. III, " King Harassment Allegations",
l pages 15-17.
(21) Letter to the NRC Commissioners from R. C. Arnold, da ted Jtme 8, 1984.
I I
l
- 1. Mr. William Austin, one of the GPUN engineers that the typist had identified as being included among those whose resumes she had typed, stated he did not consent to or know of Quiltec 's use of his resume.
- 2. King had claimed that hih keeociation with Quiltec was well known by management at TMI-2 prior to Dr.
Thiesing 's report of that fact to Mr . Bar ton, the Deputy Director of '!MI-2. However , when asked to substantiate that claim he was either unable or unwilling to do so.
- 3. From discussion with Mr. Pollack, it was clear that Quiltec was " marketing" GPUN employees who worked for King goingwell before(thpse to resign. 22; employees told GRIN they were (22) Id . , page 5.
=
l 00NCLUSION The information Arnold had, summarized above, was more than l
sufficient to support the termination of King. The Depar tment l
l of Labor concluded in its initial determination that King 's discharge was not in r es pon s e to h is rais in g s a fe ty conce r ns .
Thus , since there is no evidence to the contrary, the only conclusion that can be reached is that King's termination was based on his Quiltec activities.
]
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PARKS AILEGATIONS i i
I 1
1 Parks , an employee of Bechtel North American Power Corp. at TMI-2, alleged that he was discriminated against because he raised safety concerns.
Parks made his allegations in a Complaint against Bechtel filed with the Department of Labor. DOL's initial determination supported Parks. While that determination was under appeal, Bechtel and Parks settled the claim, GWN and Parks executed mutual releases and the Complaint was withdrawn. OI conducted no independent investigation of Parks ' allegations.( }
Non e of Parks allegations charge any of the current GPUN of ficers, directors or other management associa ted with the operation of Unit 1 with any involvement in the a: tion claimed by Parks to be discriminatory and GWN considers the matter resolved.
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l (23) US NRC Public Hearing transcript, May 23, 1984,
" Discuss ion of Completed MI Investigations ", pages 2 7 and 28.
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ATTACHMENT 2
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GPU Nuclear Corporation
,1, y
yi .$' g gg 100 lnterpace Parkway Parsippany NewJersey07054 201 263 6500 1ELEX 136 482 d h July 20, 1984 Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
Re: Metropolitan Edison Company Three Mile Island Unit 1 - Docket Number 50-289 NRC Office of Investigations Report #1-83-028, Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) Unit 1-Possible Falsification of Reactor Coolant _ System Inventory Leak Rate Tests, April 16, 1984.
As a result of 'an NRC Region 1 Special Investigation Report (Report No. 50-209/83-20) and its revision which identified possible instances of hydrogen and water being added to the TMI-1 Reactor Coolant System ("RCS") Make-up Tank during the performance of RCS leak rate surveillance tests, without these additions being properly accounted for in the test calcula-tions, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Investigations conducted an investigation of TMI-1 leak rate test practices over a one-year period during 1978-1979. The results of that investigation are set forth in the referenced report.
GPU Nuclear Corporation also had an independent investigation of TMI-1 reactor coolant inventory balance testing conducted.
The results of that investicati prepared by Mr. Edwin H. Stier,on areJune dated provided 13,-1981.in a report Copies of the Stier Report have been sent to the Commission and the Parties to the TMI-1 Restart proceedings. Mr. Stier's report covered the areas reviewed by the Office of Investigations and went beyond. In particular Mr. Stier reviewed leak race testing throughout the full period of TMI-1 operation. He also had rdditional technical analysis conducted and looked in detal.' at GPU Nuclear Corporation's respor.se at TMI-1 to the TMI-2 leak rate test deficiencies and at the '* loop:eal" question.
l GPU Nuc'e? coration is a subscary of tne Geretal Pubtsc Utilites Corporation a
- 1. -
Neither the OI investigation or the Stier investigation found any evidence or testimony of falsification of leak rate test results at TMI-1.
We have reviewed the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's Office of Investigations Report 1-83-028. The results of that review and our comparison to the later investigation report prepared by GPU's investigator, Mr. Stier, arer enclosed.
This review has focused on any facts or conclusions that con-ceivably could be pertinent to the Comission's review of lift-ing the immediate effectiveness of the TMI-1 Orders. Further review may develop other comments not pertinent to this issue. j Any such additional comments will be provided separately.
Based upon the conclusions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of Investigations Report 1-83-028, the conclusions of Mr. Stier's investigative report and a com-parison of the two reports, GPU Nuclear Corporation concludes there are no findings in those reports adverse to a favorable determination on the restart of TMI-1.
Sincerely, fb-P. R. Clark President PRC/fk l Enclosure cc: Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge l
ANALYJilS OF THE OI AND GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION INVESTIGATIONS OF POSSIBLE FALSIFICATION OF TMI - UNIT I LEAK RATE TESTS OI REPORT #1-83-028 Below is a comparison of the essential conclusions of the OI investigation ( } and the GPU Nuclear Corporation sponsored investigation completed by Edwin H. Stier I . Neither investigation found any evidence or elicited any testimony of falsification of leak rate test results.
The following represents the concerns explored by the invest-igators:
- 1. Was thera a systematic pattern of falsification of THI-l reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate sur-veillance tests?
- 2. If any f alsification of RCS leak rate surveillance tests did occur, what management personnel, if any, were involved or knew of any f alsification?
(1) OI Report #1-83-028, "Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) Unit 1 - Possible Falsification of Reactor Coolant System Inventory Leak Rate Tests," (OI Report) April 16, 1984.
(2) "TMI-1 Reactor Coolant Inventory Balance Testing," by Edwin H. Stier (Stj er Report), June 13, 1984.
..M
1 3.. Did the TMI-1 personnel meet the requirements of plant i l
Technical Specifications or procedures relative to documentation of RCS leak rate testing?
4, . Did GPU Nuclear' Corporation management respond
' adequately to information available to them that TMI-l l might be vulnerable to the problems identified in 1980 j with RCS leak rate surveillance testing in TMI-2, especially with regard to the TMI-1 makeup tank level )
instrumentation?
Concern it Systematic Pattern of Falsification. The OI
- conclusion on this issue is
Based on the testimony received and the documents and analysis reviewed, we have concluded that there was no systematic pattern of falsification of leak rate sur-veillance tests at TMI-1 during the time period in question nor can we prove that any individua? operator knowingly and willfully attempted to manipulate leak rate surveillance i test results. At the same time, we cannot exclude the possibility that individual operators may have attempted to manipulate test results for unknown reasons. The explan-ation given by the operators and licensee management, as to why the hydrogen and particularly the water additions are present numerically during thenumber small test periods, of testsare plausible actually givq t,he involvedg3 and shiftthe magnitud,41pf the responsibilities assigned to the operators.t 1
(3) The OI Report identified 25 out of 720 leak rate tests conducted (3.5%) during which additions of hydrogen or water were made. (OI Report, page 16 and Exhibits 18 and 19).
I (4) Memorandum from the Director, Of fice of Investigations to Regional Administrator, NRC Region I, dated April 16, 1984, forwarding Investigation Report 1-83-028, (OI Memorandum) page 2. .
-2.
i-
. .. . = -- _- . . _ _ - __- _ _ .
Stier's conclusion on this ' issue is:
The overwhelming weight of the evidence demonstrates that W I-l personnel did not manipulate or o therwise improperly
} in flu eg 5,
the outcome of reactor coolant inventory balance
- tests. 1 4
Con cer n 2 r Involvement of Management persusnel in falo ifi ca tion of leak ra te t es t ing . Stier 's conclus ion on the firs t concern i mak es the second issue moot for his inv es tiga tion . OI does not reach a conclusion on this concern, although it identi fies
- considerable testimony to reject and no evidence to support an adverse finding.III OI summarizes the results of its investigation of this issue as follows:
During the investigation, every licensed operator employed t
at MI-l during the time period covered by this inves t-igation was interviewed under onth. All of the operators
, interviewed adamantly denied that they had ever at tempted to manipulate the leak rate test results . The operators it.terviewed denied that they had ever been directed to
- manipulate test results in any f ashion 'and denied that there was any management pressure exerted on them that would have forced them to attempt to alter leak rate surveillance tests results. The Shi ft Foremen, the current i
Shift Supervisors and the Supervisor of Operations denied any knowledge or participation in the falsification of leak
- rate surveillance tes ts a t MI-1. The supervisory and management personnel interviewed during the investigation
- e choed th e oper ator s ' tes timony th a t ther e was no r eas on to
! at tempt manipulate leak rate surveillance test results.' and, I
i Subsequent to the completion of the Department. of Justice 's (DOJ) criminal proceedings regarding the alleged falsification of MI-2 RCS leak rate surveillance tests, additional i
( 5) Stier Aspor t, pa ge 9.
( 6) OI Repor t, page 2.
( 7) OI Memorandum, page 2.
l .
interviews were conducted with witnesses to that proceeding l Who were previously unavailable to OI inv estigators at J DOJ's request...none of these witnesses provided any H information that would contradict testimony given by other attestants in this investigation. In sworn testimony these interviewees denied that they were either cognizant or i involved in the falsification of TMI-l RCS leak rate sur-veillance tests. During the questioning of these wit-nes s es , particular emphasis was directed to determine if the current TMI operations Supervisor was either aware of or involved in the f alsification of TMI-2 leak rate sur-veillance tests. None of these interviewees implicated this indivipugl in any improprieties either at TMI-1 or 2.t8i i
l Concern 3r Fulfillment of the requirements of plant Technical I
Specifications and procedures . OI's conclusion on this matter is:
Interviews of the operatoru and their supervisors indicated that it was a common practice to discard test results that were deemed invalid. The testimony provided by Ehe oper-
, ators and supervisory personnel does not give any indica-
- tion that the intent in discarding an invalid test result was to conceal' information from regulatory of ficials, but i
' rather was an apparent lack of understanding among the operators and their superv{spra keeping requirements were. 91 as to what their record l
l Stier reaches a similar conclusion on this issue, namely:
In September 1974, a practice of discarding and not otherwise documenting test results determined by plant personnel to be invalid was established at TMI-1.
This practice was not intended to conceal actual reactor coolant system leakage.
l l
l (S) Id . , page 3.
(9) OI Memorandum, page 3.
The f ailure to document the invalidation of test
, results was contrary to the intent Specifications and procedures.(10) of TMI-l Technical i
Hence, both investigations conclude there was a failure on the Part of Metropolitan Edison Company prior to March 197 9 to meet record keeping requirements set forth in the plant 's Technical Speci fications and administrative procedures . However, both investigations conclude this did not result from improper motives. In addition, GPU Nuclear Corp. has taken action sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the failures described above will not be repeated. After an inspection initiated to evaluate the effectiveness of GPU Nuclear Corp.
actions to ensure adherence to procedures the U.S. NRC Region I Division of Engineering and Technical Programs concluded:
That the ' licensee's policies and practices related to adherence to procedures and license conditions, as reflected in its management organization, procedures, training, reviews and commitment to safety and quality are acceptable and do support the restart of TMI-1.
(10) Stier Report, pages 9 and 10.
. -s-
The numerous changes and improvements in organization, procedural adherence and personnel at 'IMI-l that have occurred since the Hartman allegations provide asa ur ance tha t these aliegations do not now pres ent health and safety concerns that require resolution pr ior to th e res tar t of Uni t 1.
1 Manage men t initiatives observed during the inspection were found to be positive toward safety and reflected k desire and commitment to opera te 'IMI-l sa f ely. (11)
GPU Nuclear Corporation acknowledges that prior to the 'IMI-2 accident, there were shortcomings in Metropolitan Edism 's implementation of requirements for record retention and documentation of RCS leak rate surveillance testing results.
There is no indication that upper level management of Licensee at the time was aware of that failure nor do the facts reflect adversely on the integrity of any of the current 'IMI-l operators and GPU Nuclear Corporation management. The corrective action taken by GPU Nuclear Corporation is suf ficient to provide reasonable assurance that such failures will not be repeated in the future.
I l
I (11) NRC Region I Inspection Paport Number 50-289/ 83-10, page 16-1.
6-
Concern 4r Management response to available information. This is the one issue on which the conclusion of OI and Stier differ substantively. The Maycs memorandum ac:ompanying the OI report states:
What was also identified during thic investigation is that a significant amount of information was available to Plant
, Management (specifically, the Faegre and Benson Investigation Report at TMI-2 and various Unit 1 plant i maintenance memorandums) regarding the hydrogen ef fect caused by the " loop seal" in the RCS MUT and its apparent cause and effect on the leak rate surveillance test.
Despite this information, no affirmative actions were initiated at TMI-l to determine if the potential for the
- same problem exis ted until the IRC Region I Special Inspection in September 1983.(12)
In his memorandum, Hayes arrives at this conclusion notwith-standing the fact that the 01 Report itself indicates that various management personnel at TMI-1 were interviewed to
! determine if TMI-l' was examined in light of the Faegre & Benson Report and all but one manager recalled that TMI-l leak rate
(
procedures and hardware were examined as a result of the Faegre
& Benson report.(1 (12) OI Memorandum, page 3.
(13) OI Report, page 24.
o e
. . . .,e . . , , .--.-.--,,-n,,--._--n- - , - , , , . . . , , , . . , , - . - , - - - , - - . . . - , - - - . - - , , - , - . - , - , - - - ~ - , . - - - - . - , - - , . - -
r Based on facts developed during Stier 's investigation of this i
mat ter, oI's conclus ions that no af firmative actions were !
- initiated at MI-l are not correct. Stier concludes
In May 1980, Rober t C. Arnold, the senior GPU management j repre=entative at Three Mile Island, held a meeting with i
members of the group that had conducted the Faegre & Bensen inves tiga tion . One of the purposes of the meeting was to i discuss further steps to be taken in the investigation of
! leak rate testing at M I-2. Arnold felt itwas impor tant l to use their findings as a guide to examine whether-
- problems found at MI-2 also existed at M I-1. Although l his recollection is somewhat unclear about the details, at the meeting or shortly thereaf ter, Arnold asked whether the loop seal problem found at MI-2 was also present at I M I-1. Later he was advised that there were not similar i hardware configuration defects rit MI-1. Problems were i found, however , in the MI-l 3 aak ra te test procedures .
' Those problems were correcter. in a procedural revision da ted Augus t 25,1981 [before the plant was first placed in an operational mode requiring leak rate testing 3
, In the spring of 1983, prior. to the NRC inspection, Arnold
! speci fically requested Henry D. Hukill, Director of MI-1, to review all of the findings of the Faegre & Benson report and to assure that all of the issues raised in that report had been addressed at MI-1. The e xis tence o f a loop s eal
- was one of the issues about which Arnold inquired. Arnold i
and Hukill were each advised that a loop seal problem fotund at MI-2 did not exis t at MI-1. Neither Arnold nor Hukill
! can specifically recall who provided them with that infor-
, na tion . Our efforts to identify who received the assign-j ment and reported to Arnold and Hukill have been
- un succes s ful .
- Nevertheless, the conclusions in 1980' and again in 1983
- were ess entially correct. A review of the Faegre & Benson
- report, the installation records relating- to the makeup l tank level transmit ter, and the vendor 's ins talla tion l instructions, clearly reveal that the MI-l makeup tank l
level transmit ter had been properly installed and that the MI- 2 loop s eal de fe et as descr 4b eMI in the - Faegr e & Ben son
! report, did not exist at MI-1. Ll4) i I
(14) Steir Repor t, pages 33 and 3 4.
! I
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- ,. 8 Fur ther:
The company did not create or permit a defect in makeup tank level instrumentation that provided a means to manipula te leak ra te tests .
The makeup tank level transmitter was installed according to manufacturer's specifications , which called for the installation of a condensation collection point and drain valve on the low pressure line below the level of the transmitter.
No discernible inaccuracy existed in the makeup tank level transmitter until September 1977, when water collection in the low pressure line became excessive.
The Maintenance Department took steps to remove water from the low pressure line, but was not successful in preventing excessive accumulation.
It is not likely that water accumulation in the low pressure line of the level transmitter had a signifi-cant effect leakage on the during anyevaluation of reactor period of TMI-l coolant) system operation.(15 Stier amplifies these conclusions as follows:
At the time the low pressure line of the makeup tank level transmitter was installed at TMI-1, it included a condon-sation loop below the level of the transmitter which was intended as a collection point for any water in the line.
Tb assure that water accumulation in the line would not interfere with the operation of the level transmitter, a 5-inch pipe and drain valve were installed at the low point of the condensation loop. This design was specifically recommended by the manufacturer and was completely con-sistent with the installation manual, a copy of which can be found in the records at TMI-1.
The construction of dhe low pressure line at TMI-l was, there f ore, fundamentally dif ferent from the TMI-2 low pressure line, which had no similar drain valve. The def e ct identified by Faegre & Benson at TMI-2 was not simply the existence of a loop in the low pressure line, but the absence of a drain valve at that point. The combination of a condensation loop and a drain valve provides an (15) Id . , page 10.
i 4 . . r a
! easy means of keeping water away from the transmitter, collecting it and removing it from the low pressure line.
Without the valve, the condensation loop causes water to be trapped and dif ficult to remove. The makeup tank level
, instrumenta tion a t MI-1 did not suf fer from this de fect .
To the extent that the NRC's inspection and OI reports I imply that the configuration of the low pressure 1:,ne was i
de fe ctive , they are incorrect. ( foo tno tes omit ted ) l,16 )
l and, i
j The possible existence of a loop s eal in the low pressure
- line of the . makeup tank level transmitter at 2I-1 was not
- raised with company management until the preliminary findings of the Faegre & Benson report on MI-2 were
, pres ented in 1980. At that time, upper management was
! unaware of the history of problems with the 21-1 makeup i tank level transmitter. Knowledge of the work requests and the responses by the Maintenance Department did not rise i
above superv:;qp/
Depar tuents. 4 s in the Operations and Maintenance j CONCLUS ION Neither OI nor Stier discovered any conduct by GRJN in con-
! nection with RQE leak rate tosting at MI-1 Whidh adversely '
\ .
t impacts on any issue relevant to a decis ion on th r es tart o f M I- 1.
I l
(16) 3., pahs 2 8 and 2 9. .
(17) %,d d . , page 32. t
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GPU Nuclear Corporation 100 lnterpace Parkway ParsspDar y,New Jersey 07054 201 263 6500 TELEX 136 482 O N $.Y3 b h7 July ~20, 1984 Mr. Harold R. Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear _ Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
Re: Metropolitsn. Edison Company Three Mile Island Unit 1, Docket Number 50-289 NRC Office of Investigations Report #1-83-013, General Public Utilities Nuclear - Alleged Failure to Provide BETA and RHR Consultant Reports to the NRC in
_a More Timely Fashion, Ap~ril 15 1984; Report #Q-1-84-004, General Public Utilities Nuclear (GPUN)Possible'Trt.ining Irregularities, March 22, 1984 In June of 1983 the NRC's Executive Director for Operations requested the NRC's Office of Investigations to investigate the circumstances and reasons why GPU Nuclear Corpccation did not provide the BETA and RHR reports to the NRC ct an earlier date. On April 16, 1984 the Office of Investigations released the results of their investigation. The OI report, #1-83-013, states that "[t]he investigation did not disclose any evidence of a deliberate attempt or conscious management decision by GPUN to withhold thE informa:: ion-in the BETA and RHR reports' from the NRC." -
Weconclude~$ hat ' the finding of OI 41-83-013 support a favorable determination on the. restart of TMI-1. This con- ,
clusion is also' supported by the' Atomic ~ Safety.& L'icensing Appeal Board determination that~a licensee is entitled to a reasonable period _cf time for; internal corporate = review of '
documents like repcrts prepared _by outside consultants and that'u "the time during which licensee ~ reviewed lthe PSR and rather comprehensivo BETA reports, befort any? mention.or disclosure of them to.the RRC, isein'our view such'a reasonable time (ALAB 774, 19 N.R.C; (Ju.e 19y 1984), slip. op, at 12-13). A.more detailed discussicrf.of this matter,is/ attached. ,
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The Office of Investigations also undertook an investigation into possible training irregularities in Metropolitan Edison's preaccident training program, concern with which arose out of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's review of the GPU v.
B&W lawsuit papers (toported in NUREG-1020LD). The results of that investigation were set forth in report #Q-1-84-004 dated March 22, 1984. OI found no substantive reasons for any adverse conclusion. Their investigation did not reveal in-formation, allegations, or testimony relating to these matters that could form a basis for continuing the immediate effective-ness of the NRC's "hutdown orders. We conclude that their findings support a .avorable determination on the restart of TMI-1.
Sincerely, f f.
P. R. Clark President Attachment cc: Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
4 Alleged Failure to Timely Provide BETA and RHR Consultant Repor ts to the NRC in a Timely Fashion OI Repor t # 1-83-013 i
On April 16, 1984, the Of fice of Inves tigations (OI) issued Repor t 1-83-013, entitled " General Public Utilities Nuclear -
Alleged Failure to Provide BETA and RHR Consultant Repor ts to the NRC in a Timely Fashion. " This investigation examined whether there is any evidence of a lack of integrity by Licensee or its management relating to the timing of Licensee 's disclosure of the BETA and RHR Reports. OI Repor t 1-83-013 is supported by some 500 pages of backup documentation, which entailed some 50 days of NRC Staff work on this inquiry.
Commission Public Meeting of April 26, 1984 at transcript (Tr.)
13, 14 (Messrs. K. Chris topher and B. Hayes, OI) .
This extensive inquiry unquestionably supports the li fting of the immediately effective 1MI-1 suspension order.
Spe ci fically, "[t]he investigation did not disclose any evidence of a deliverate attempt or conscious management decision by GRIN to withhold the informaticn in the BETA and RHR r epor ts from the NRC, " OI Repor t 1-83-013 a t 4 (emph as is added), nor did it otherwise find evidence that impugned Licensee's character or integrity.
To the contrary the facts rela ted to the disclosure of these repor ts emphas ize Licensee 's determination to fulfill its af firmative disclosure obligations and, in doing so, to act wi th integrity.
l The initial disclosure to the NRC Staff of the RHR and BETA Reports was made by the Vice President of 'IMI-1, who voluntar fly showeo these reports to onsite rogiona1 inspectors
- in an effort to establish Liconsee 's continuing positive actions to improve itself . OI Report 1-83-013 at 2 and Exhibit (Exh . ) 11 at 20-21 ( H. D. Huk ill ) . This action dispells any f suggestion that Licensee intended to conceal the s ubs tance of th e r epor ts . Cf . OI Repor t 1 013, Exh . 1 a t 2 8-29 (company management expectation that BETA Report would be come p411c).
I We did not believe the reports were of safety significance and needed to be publicly released. Licensee 's position on these reports simply reflected our underatanding of the- law and our sensitivity as an employer about the public disclosure of (i) its operators' confidences to a psychologist, which were part -
of an ongoing study (RHR Report) and (ii) sugges ted company staffing reductions (BETA Repor t). Id . , Exh . 1 at 17-18, 24-29, 3 8 40, 5 5 ( R. C. Arnold) ; Exh. 2 a t 6-8, 14-16-2 2, 2 9- 31, 3 4-3 6, 44- 46 ( P. R. Clark) Exh . 11 at 12, 18-19, 20-22, 25-26, 35-37, 42-4 5 , 4 9 - 5 3 ( H. D. Huk ill) : Exh. 21 a t 6-8, 11-13, 15-20, 22- 27 ( H. M . Dieck amp) .
The record shows that GRJN has submit ted innumerable reports and information to the res tart proceeding participants and tribunals in an ef fort to satisfy its af firmative
. disclosure obligations under the so-called McGaire doctrine.
- See, e.g., let ter s of June 4, Oct . 1 and Nw. 3, 1981, March j 11, April-22, Au g . 10 , Oct . 5 , Oct . 7 and De c. 3, 1982, Jan.
i
- 31, Apr il 14, May 4, Ma y 6, May 16, J tm e 28, Se pt . 7, - Nw . 3 l
l
and Nov. 22, 1983, and Jan. 9, April 4 and June 1, 1984 from Licensee's counsel to the Licensing Board (and/or Appeal Board) and the parties. These submittals demonstrate that we have been responsible in fulfilling our affirmative disclosure obligations.
There is considerable uncertainty about the detailed-implementation of the law with respect to affirmative disclosure obligations. We believe the necessary premise of the OI investigation was that before the NRC Staff expressed its view on the subject of disclosure of the BETA and RHR reports, Licensee indeed was obligated to publicly disclose the reports. This premise has not been established. See n.1, infra. Most recently, the uncertainty regarding implementation of the law on affirmative disclosure is reflected in the agency's statement of intent to reconsider what constitutes a material talse statement. See NRC General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions, 49 Fed. Reg. 8583, 8584 (1984). Recognizing the importance of its affirmative disclosure obligations, the ambiguitities in the law and its responsibility to act properly, Licensee has actively sought guidance from the NRC staff on how it should decide what information must be publicly disclosed. See OI Report 1-83-013, Exh. 2 at 20-21 (P. R. Clark). In the. interim, :
Licensee has adopted a procedure which is designed to ensure that documents, such as the BETA and RHR Reports, are systematically reviewed to establish their reportability.
Letter from P. R. Clark to H. R. Denton, Oct. 21, 1983.
Finally, the Commission has added assurance tnat the BETA and RHR Reports controversy does no t reflect adversely on Licensee 's character from the Appeal Board 's consideration and rejection of two motions to reopen the TMI-l restar t proceeding on the BETA and RHR Repor ts filed by intervenor Three Mile Island Aler t (1MIA) . Se e AIAB-73 8, 18 N. R. C. 177, 197-99 (1983) ; ALAB-7 74, 19 N.R.C. (J une 19 , 1984).
In May of 1983, 1MIA filed a motion to reopen the record on the basis of the BETA and RHR Reports and the timeliness of Licensee 's disclosure of thes e documents . Se e Three Mile Island Alert 2 tion to Reopen the aneord, May 23, 1983. The Appeal Board denied the motion, noting that it was preacture to consider these mat ters because the NRC Staf f investigation was atill underway. AIAB-73 8, 19 N. R. C. a t 197. However , the Appeal Board also .found that "'IM IA h as failed to call to our attention anything so far that might have made a difference in the Licens ing Board 's decis icri. " Id . In the Appeal Board 's j udgmen t , s ome por tion s of th es e r epor ts w er e cr iti cal o f 'IMI j management; other portions were favorable. Id . Noting that th e BETA Re por t di d not fo cu s on s a fe ty ma tter s , id. at 1983, and that the RHR Report was described by a oo-au thor as "one-sided" and possibly included confusing questions and answers , and was not desiyted to address management in te grity directly, the Appeal Board concluded:
Given the limitations in bo th repor ts and -- more important
-- th e fa ct th at th e . ground cov er ed th er ein (including the cr i ti ci s ms ) w as w ell tr av er sed a t th e h ear in g b elow , w e ar e ,
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unable to conclude that any of the matter called to our attention mi9tt have made a dif ference in the Licensing
. Board 's decis ion . Marther, we would not want to discourage any licensee from undertaking su& reviews of its managenent and operations (and disclos ing their results )
for fear of reopening a closed _ record . Our perusal of the
. BETA Repor t, in particular , shows it to be an extremely use ful document , upon whidt licensee can rely to improve its operation overall.
AIAB -73 8, 18 N. R. C. a t 198- 99 . Thus , on the basis of the subs tance of the BETA and RER Repor ts , themselves , and the in formatio'n developed on Licensee 's dis closure of thes e )
reports, the Appeal Board found no bas is to reopen the res tart l proceeding and consider the matter fur th er .
Af ter issuance of the OI Report and supporting materials on the reportab11ity af the BEM and RHR Reports , 'IMIA filed another motion to reopen the proceeding on the adequacy of Licensee 's disclosure of the BETA and RHR .Repor ts . In ALAB-7 74, the Appeal Board rejected this 'IMIA motion. The i Appeal Board first made clear that "there is no bas is " for it to alter its viet that the proceeding need not be reopened to consider the substantive content of the BETA and RHR reports.
ALAB-774, slip op at 9. The Appeal Board sta ted:
Ins tead, - 1MIA contends that licensee 's failure to . submit -
the BETA and RRR reports earlier and without reluctance shows a lack .of integrity on the par t of licensee 's manage ment . The necessary predica te o f _such a. conclus ion, however, is that licensee was legally obligated to release the amterlais more promptly and " voluntarily" than it, in-fa ct , ' d i d. We are smable to reach such a conclusion on the facts of this case.
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M. at 10. Although the Appeal Board did not decide whether the BETA or RHR Reports are "ma ter f al, " and thus a ubje et to the af firumtive disclosure obligatias in the first ins tance , I i
)
it did conelude that once Licon se knw that ther e was
" reasonable doubt " as to tha repor ts ' materlality based on the 1
NRC Sta ff 's views, Lihnsee was obliga ted to dis cloa e the repor ts . H. , slip op , at 12-13.
Thus , even though licensee dispu ted s ta ff counsel 's claim that the material should be submitted via a Board Mo ti fi ca ton , th e pr oper cour se was to dis clos e th e reports. .That is exactly what licensee did, within a matter of days from being confronted squarely with the issu e by the s ta f f . The qu es tion then is whe ther licensee 's expres sed reluctance to do so and failure to provide the reports even earlier constitu to culpable i
conduet. We th ink not.
As to the latter point, an applicant or a licensee is entitled to a reasonable period of time for internal cor por a te r ev i.ew o f do cumen ts l ik e r epo r ts pr epar ed by outside consultants. Indeed it is during such time that an applicant or a licensee should also review the document in the context of its reporting responsibilities. The time during whids licensee reviewed the RHR and rather comprehens ive BETA reports , be fore any mention or dis clos ur e of th em to th e NRC, is in our view such a reasonable time.
(1) In the Appeal Board's view, "[w]heth er the BETA or RHR l report can be properly charaeterized as material
! evidence is a ques tion not readily answered. "
ALAB-774, slip op. a t 12. This view sugges ts tha t befor e Li cen see k new o f th e Sta f f 's con tr ar y v iew on the s ub je ct , Licensee was not wrone; in not publicly dis clos in g th e r epor ts beca us e o f i te v iew th at th ey did not contain material information.
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We also believe that an applicant or a license -
indeed, any party -- has a right to ass er t a reasonable position as to any claimed obligation -- including the dis clos ur e of os ten a ib ly na ter ial in for ma tion . No th in g in the oI report or its -underlying.
documents gives us a reasonable basis upon which to doubt li censee 's mo tiv es in openly res isting for a limited time th e ful l pub li c di s cl os ur e of th e BETA and RHR r epor ts .
l Id . at 13-14 (footno tes and cita tion omitted; emphas is added ) . l In summary, the Appeal Board has carefully considered the very questian be fore the Commiss ion in connection with the issue of the repor tability of the BETA and RHR Repor ts , namely, 2e ther Licensee 's actions re fle ct nega tively on Licensee 'r-ch ar act er . The Appeal Board has unequivomily rejected such claims.
In conclus ion , th e inves tiga tion into the reportability of the BETA and RHR Reports , which is closed, presents no obs tacle
- to a r es tar t de ci s ion by th e C ommis s ion ; in fact , it offers some additional assurance of Licensee 's integrity because of its proper h andling o f this ma tter . Af ter an exhaustive investigation, OI found no evidence of bad faith or a lack of integrity by Licensee in its disclosure decision 'with respect to the BETA and RHR Reports. The Appeal Board has echoed this view in AIAB-774. Licensee has now instituted a procedure designed to ensure that sys tematic consideration will be given to all such reports, particularly in view of the uncertainties in the law -in this area and the BETA and RHR s tudies exper ience . In sum, the Commission has conclusive assurance '
that Liconse e .has handled this mat ter properly, and will handle other af firmative disclosure nat ters properly in the fu ture ,
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ATTACHMENT 4 J
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MNuoloar GPU Nuoleer Corporation m.v,::=
Middletown. Pennsylvania 17067-0191 717 944 7821 TELEX 84 23e8 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
July 25, 1984 5211-84-2191 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosnission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Stolz:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I (TMI-1) l
' Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Resolution of Emergency Planning Deficiencies The ASLB Partial Initial Decision (PID) on the restart of THI-l identified several emergency planning conditions to be satisfied prior to restart.
Item 2010g oi the PID required a comunications drill to be held as a result of problems identified by FEMA in the June 2,1981 TMI Annual Exercise.
This drill was conducted on October 14,1981 and judged rufficient by the NRC Staff and NRC restart certification item #144 was certified as complete (see NRC Letter dated July 25,1983).
' The November 16. 1983 TMI Annual Exercise, however, identified conrunications deficiencies similar to those discussed in the PID. On June 25, 1984 Mr. William Dircks wrote a memorandum to the NRC Commissioners providing the staff's recomrendations toward the resolution of emergenc; eparedness related TMI-1 restart issues. GPU Nuclear met with reprer ntatives of FEMA Region III and NRC Region I to discuss resolution of the comunications deficiencies. Subsequently, a comrunications exercise with all 5 risk i
counties was conducted July 17, 1984. Attached is a letter of July 16, 1984 from GPUN to FEMA Region III describing the objectives of the exercise and the scenario used. GPUN provided observers, through the use of Emergency Management Services, Inc. (EMS) at all County E0C's. A detailed analysis by EMS of the cosuunications exercise is included (Attachment 2). The report indicates that the exercise successfully demonstrated the communications capability of the five counties surrounding TMI. As is to be expected.
l
' areas needing further attention were identified and GPUN, through the efforts of EMS, will address these matters as part of its continuing program of assistance to the counties.
GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subeldlary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
l Mr. John F. Stoltz 52;;-84-2191 Prior to the July 17, 1984 conwunications exercise, a special consunications drill was conducted to address communications deficiencies in Dauphin and Lancaster Counties identified by fem in the 1983 TMI Annual Exercise.
This drill, held June 18, 1984, involved TMI TMI risk counties and the Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP). The drill scenario simulated a break-down in the notification scheme between TMI and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEM) thereby requiring Dauphin County to assume the lead role in the notification process. In addition, the scenario included the protective action reconwendation of sheltering to be passed. Representatives from FEM Region III and PEM were observers. The drill identified the need for the development of.a Standard Operating Procedure and for conducting specialized training dealing with notifications and comrunications. Emergency Management Services, Inc. provided specialized training dealing with notifi-cations for Dauphin County. EMS also developed a Standard Operating Procedure which was adopted for use by all five TMI risk counties. These actions were performed prior to the July 17, 1984 Connunication Exercise.
GPUN believes that the July 17, 1984 conwunications exercise resolves the conwunications aspects of the deficiencies identified in the 1983 TMI Annual
' Exercise and forms the basis for the NRC Staff to re-certify completion of PID item 2010g. '
The Category A deficiencies identified in the 1983 TMI Annual Exercise will be further addressed in exercises scheduled for the third quarter of 1984.
These exercises should resolve any remaining concerns about the adequacy of offsite Emergency Planning for TMI. ,
Sincerely, u
Director, TMI-1 HDH/GJG/SMD/djb Attachmeat(2) cc: D. Matthews, NRC Headquarters .
R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector
' T. Martin, NRC Region I R. Wilkerson, fem Headquarters J. Asher, FEM Region III J. Patten PEm l
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ATTACHMENT 1 OPU Nuclear Corporation
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%c; 6'swn. Pen s, var..a *.7c57 CE 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 23Ds Wnter's Direct olal Number:
(717)948-8440 6400-84-65 Jely 16, 1984 Mr. J. Asher, RAC Chairman FEMA Region III Curtis 8tilding Seventh Floor Sixth and Walnut Streets Philadelphia, PA 19106 I
Dear Mr. Asher:
Pursuant to our meeting of July 3,1984 and in accordance with Mr. William J. Dircks' June 25, 1984 memo to the NRC Comrissioners, a con unications exercise is scheduled for July 17, 1984 This exercise will involve the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), Bureau of Radiation Protectior. (BRF-), Otughin, Lancaster,-
York, Cumberland and Lebanon Cotnties and TMI risk municipalities.
Attached for your informt.tfon is the scenario for this exercise.
The objectivas for the exercise include:
- Satisfactorily-perform the TMI-l restart condition item 2010 9 (NRC certification item #144) imposed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
There must be held prior to restart of TMI-l at least ont com unications drill similar to that suggested by the Comnonwealth (PF fil8). The drill should . include ideally, comm.unications between: Licensee and PEMA, PEMA and each 1
risk county and its key officials and each municipality and its key officials. Such a drill should 69 structured to test telephone service and the various radio systems.
If possible, stress should be placed on the communications systems to test the possible effect on an emergency overload situation. ,
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. J. Asher . July 16, ?:
- Dauphin County will demor. strate its ability to promptly implement the notification and alerting responsibility upon a breakdown in commur.ications between PEMA and TMI. Notifications shall incluct other TMI risk counties, PEMA and Dauphin County risk municipalities.
- Lancaster County will demcnstrate its ability to prechtly notify the Lancaster County risk municipalities of TMI emergency declarations and protective action recomnendations.
Please inform nie at ycur earliest convenience as to whether the objectivet have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Again, I would like to thank you for the support and cooptratfore you have provided towards the prompt resolution of exercise deficiencies.
Since rely, r
j l([we, G. J.'Giang' GPUN Manager.
Emergency Preparedness 1sg Attachment ec: R. Wilkerson, FEMA Headquarters P. Giordano, Director, FEMt. Region III D. Mathews, NRC Headquarters B. Crocker, NF.C Region I J. Patten, PEMA D. Taylor, PEMA 9 8 w - -
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SCEhAR:0 -
l Clocktime/ Scenario time l 10C0 T=0 THI-l Centrol Rocm notifies Da phin
. County and PIMA that a Site Emergency was declared at TMI-l at 0950 due i to a large leak within the Reactor Building. Minor j amounts of radioactivity is being released to the '
i envircnment bt t is expected to terminate within 30 minutes.
Expected Actions:
PEMA'should contact BRP and the TMI risk counties.
Dauphin County should contact the risk municipalities.
BRP should contact TMI-l.
- 100:0 7 = 20 TMI-l recommends sheltering for a 2 mile radiu! around TMI to BRP. At this point it will be assumed that neither BRP nor TMI can contact PEMA requiring Cauphin County to assume the lead role.
Expected Actions:
Datphin County should contact the risk cc.untiis, Dauphin County risk municipalities and attemi.t to co1 tact PEMA.
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ATTACHMENT 2 l tMS g.orgency u.n.eement s.rvie.s, inc.
Suite 105 355 North 21st Sweet Camp Hill. RA 17011 (7171737 5677 July 18, 1984 JUL 19 9841 Mr. George Giangi Manager, Emergency Preparedness i
GPU Nuclear P.O. Box 480 i Middletown, PA 17057
Dear . George:
In accord with your instructions, EMS assigned personnel to each of the five TMI risk counties to independently observe player partici-pation in the communications exercise. The observers were orally briefed on the general scheme of the drill and instructed to observe the effective-ness of message handling (authentication and accuracy), dissemination of messages (both internally and to risk municipalities), the amount of realism (actual play vs. simulation), and finally to assess the overall demonstrated capability of the observed county to conduct operations under emergency conditions. Due to some early concerns expressed by county EMCs, the introduction of these observers into the framework of the exercise were not as official critics. Consequently, the observations listed below should be treated as a basis for GPU/ EMS continuing effort to assist the counties in the development of more effective organizations and improved operational procedures.
The comments are not listed in any priority manner.
Favorable comment:
- a. The counties participated to the degree to which they had planned to participate, and notf.fied all risk municipalitie's in an acceptable time frame, which in itself is a major undertaking that severely tests the saturation point of the inplace telephone communications system.
f b. All counties demonstrated that their respective listing of municipal ENCs and incticutional points of contact were up to date.
l c. The existing notification systems were adequate.
- d. Telephone communications,.although slow, were sufficient to meet the initial message disseeaination requirements.
- e. On duty shif ts (full time employees) were adequate to handle the initial message dissemination surge.
l l
I e
g.
Initial response personnel demonstrated their general knowledge of the RERP as it applied to dissemination of the triggering message.
- g. In two instances, Lebanon and York Counties, second echelons of leadership demonstrated their respective capacities to fill' the EMC roles due to the absence of the EHC. The Dauphin County Ett i
handled the responsibilities of the assistant EMC during the ' initial notification requirement and demonstrated that the county has the capability-to accoanodate the loss of key personnel and Operate effectively.
- h. _ Dauphin County demonstrated that'it has the capacity to assume net control from PEMA in the event of a communications failure by use of existing radio and/or telephone channels.
1.
Of special interest were the actions of Lancaster County.
This county extended the drill beyond the communications objectives to include radio setting up of the E0C; activating RACES, PEMARS and local government nets; alert system. and, the planning and preparation for triggering of the public Two volunteel" staff members physically reported to the EOC j and set-up for continued operations,
- j. Dauphin County is to be commended for its full call-out effort which included municipalities,' school districts, nursing homes, etc.
Especially noteworthy was the effort to locate primary points of contact and the cooperation and coordination among those disseminating the initial message in sharing tha notification burden.
- k. Positive attitudes toward the drill and its importance for preparedness were observed in all counties.
Areas needing attention:
a.
The recording of energency notification messages needs additional practice to insure completeness, accuracy and timeliness.
b.
- All asssages, incoming and outgoing, should be in writing.
This would ensure that when several individuals are disseminating inforestion that the identical information is being delivered.
l c.
l PENA. Lebanon County did not receive the initial message froa l
d.
- During drills cad tests (cosaunications) some administrative 1
arrangements of the municipal EMC.to be developed which does not require the personal response need of the EMC and having the individual called or paged only to discover it .is a coanunications drill is not received enthusiastically by either-the employee (EMC) or the employer.
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- e. Four of the five county RERPs include an Incident Notification Form, designed to be used for the transmission of information from the State to the County. The Lancaster County RERP does not include ]
l the form. The forms being used by the four counties are not identical.
(Tork County uses a form shown as Change fl. July 1983 and the remaining counties use the form distributed with their initial RERP). The York l County form includes redundant information in paragraph II. and III.8. l
- f. The initial notification message from some counties to municipalities and institutions was too lengthy.
- g. The role of the log / journal needs to be emphasized during subsequent training sessions and a" log / journal clerk" needs to be identified and instructed in its maintenance, in some instances.
EMS provided observers to the Counties as follows:
Cumberland County..................M. Starry Dauphin Coun ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .K. Henderson Lancaster County. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .R. Carroll Lebanon County.....................W. Vinnetta York Coun ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. 'fhomas The FEMA provided J. Asher as an observer to ther Dauphin County and K. Lawson to the Lancaster County. The PEMA similarly assigned P. Robbins to Dauphin County and R. Foor to Lancaster County. FEMA and PEMA did r.ot have representatives at the other EOCs.
Sincerely.
ORAN K. HENDERSON OKH:kar
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