ML20086K071

Motion for Reopening of Record to Examine Alleged Leak Rate Falsification.Falsification of Leak Rates & Rept of False Calculations to NRC Involved Elaborate Sys of Cheating

ML20086K071
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/23/1984
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
Shared Package
ML20086K073	List: ML20086K071 ML20086K082 ML20086K096
References
NUDOCS 8401260208
Download: ML20086K071 (9)

Text

. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ~ ~

.- NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION

' ' ^

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of ) 00CKETED

) USNRC HETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. ) Docket 50-289

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) '84 5125 P12:i5 Generating Station, Unit 1) )

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1 AAMODI MOTION FOR REOPENING TO EXAMINE LEAK RATE FALSIFICATION AT UNIT-1 Introduction on January 11, 1984, in appearing before the Appeal Board, we motioned for a reopening of the record to examine the matter of alleged leak rate falsification at Unit 1, a significant safety-related matter, misrepresented by the NRC. Staff in the Restart Proceeding.

Chairman Edles declined to entertain an oral motion, but he expressed no prejudice toward a written motion.

, Background The NRC Staff provided the following testimony in the Restart 1

Proceeding (Exhibit 13) as part of a discussion of alleged falsification of leak rate reports at Unit 2:

Further, although the NRC investigation is not complete, and the examination of Unit I records was limited, no indication of practices at Unit 1 similar to those alleged at Unit 2 were identified.

The Staff did not pursue the Unit 1 matter until shortly before September 1983, possibly because this matter was likely to have been raised in the hearing of Unit 2 practices scheduled to begin in the fall of

_1/ Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG-0680, Supplement No. 2.

8401260208 840123 gDRADOCK 05000289 PDR 0

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, ~1983 During cn NRC inspecticn, th3 Stoff Evidently ccme upsn r: cards which caused it to question its testimony in the Restart Proceeding.

(See Memorandum, Eisenhut to Commissioners, September 2,1983.) The Staff stated its intent to further* investigate the matter. Provided with this communication to the Commissioners was the data on which the testimony in the Restart Proceeding had been based. From examination of this data and the investigator's notes, it can be readily concluded that the Staff withheld information which indicared leak rate falsification at Unit I similar to 3

practices alleged by Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr. at Unit 2 and provided misleading information instead.

The NRC investigator, Keith Christopher, summarized his data, gathered from a " limited" examination of THI-1 records in 1980, as follows:

four (4) incidents were discovered in which water was added to the Makeup tank without a corresponding input --------- to the computer identifying the addition. In addition an examination of the Makeup tank Step Chart confirms that water was in 4 fact added during the leak rate test time interval.

By September 23, 1983, the Staff came to the conclusion that leak rate reports had been falsified at Unit 1 by practices similar to those used at Unit 2 prior to the accident. (See Memorandum Eisenhut to Commissioners, September 23, 1983, Board Notification 83-138.) The Staff provided its report, in camera, to the Commissioners and the Boards. (See Memorandu' m ,'Eisenhut to Cormissioners, October 6,1983, Board Notification 83 -138B.) The Commission's Office of Investigations (OI) was requested to investigate the circumstances surrounditg the matter.

2/ This hearing was stayed by Commission Order, October 7, 1983.

3/ These practices were verified by the NRC Staff in 1980 according to the principal investigator Tim Martin. (See Commission Meeting, May 24, 1983, Tr. 14.- 16.) .

4/ Our best interpretation of Christopher's handwriting.

]

The Licensee had been given the opportunity to explain 33  ;

identified irregularities in leak rate reports and 25 missing calculations by discussions between Dr. Chung of the Staff and THI plant personnel, specifically Henry Shipman, an engineer who writes procedures and reports to Michael Ross, supervisor of operations.

(See Memorandum Murley to Denton, October 7,1983 and Letter, Thorpe to Starostecki, August 18, 1983.) Subsequent written explanations provided by Licensee were considered redundant. (See Id.) The conclusion is that Licensee's extemporaneous and considered explanations were

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identical and insufficient.

The Staff indicated that it interpreted Lice..see's provision of written explanations to be an attempt to influence. Murley's memorandum expressed Staff resistance: "we have neither replied to their letter nor sent them a copy of the inspection report." (See Memorandum, Hurley to Denton, October 7,1983.)

" After the report issued. , the Staff appeared to bend over backwards to explain the leak rate irregularities and falsified reports. The Staff initiated a study to determine whether problecs with leakage in excess of technical specifications were common to Babcock and Wilcox reactors.

(See Memorandum, DeYoung to Dircks , November 7,1983.) Folleving a comprehensive study of two B&W plants, randomly selected, the Staff concluded that leak rate problems were not inherent to B&W plants.

(See Id., Enclosures 1 and 2.)

OI has not concluded its investigation of the Unit 1 leak rate reports. However, the parties need not wait the conclusion of the investigation to move for a reopening of the record. To delay would be contrary to Commission's guidance in the order of August 9,1979 which initiated the Restart Proceeding.

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Any dairy may precluda o h20 ring of ths 1cck rato falsificaticn matter. The Staff would oppose the investigation of the operators if the plant is operating, viewing the stress of an investigation as detrimental to the operation of the plant. ( d Commission Meeting, December 5, 1983, Tr. 141. )

The Motion The Aamodts motion the Appeal Board to reopen the record of the

. Restart Proceeding to provide for the correction of the record ,

concerning the leak rate falsification at Unit 1 and to examine the circumstances surrounding the matter.

Standards for Reopening A motion to reopen a hearing can be filed by any party to the

- proceeding. The motion need not be supported by an affidavit, and the w vant is free to rely on, for example, Staff-applicant correspondence to establish the existence of a. newly discovered issue. Vermont Yankee Nudlear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), AIAB-124, 6 AEC 358 (1973). The hearing must be reopened whenever a "significant" unresolved safety question is involved. Id. , Vermont Yankee, AIAB-138, 6 AEC'523 (1973), Vermont Yankee, AIAB-124, 6 AEC 358, 365 at n. 10 (1973).

The motion must satisfy the tripartitie test (1) Is it timely?,

(2) Does it addressaa significant safety (or environmental) issue?, and (3) liight a different result have been reached had the newly proffered material beeri considered initially? Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo I

Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), AIAB -598,11 NRC 876, 879 (1980).

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The Motion Meets the Standards (1) It is Timely.

The first report of falsification of leak rate reports at Unit I was provided by the NRC Staff by service of September 2,1983. We did not move at that time for a reopening since it appeared appropriate to move for a hearing of Unit 1 practices in the pechearing conference scheduled for October 1983 concerning the Unit 2 practices. That conference dia nce take place since the Commission stayed the hearing of Unit 2 falsification of leak rates. (See Commission Order, October 7,1983.)

When the Commission acted to stay the Unit 2 hearing, we became uncertain whether a motion for reop'ening on Unit 1 practices was appropriate.

Any motion to reopen on management issues appeared awkward since the Commission had directed the parties to propose * ' a way in place of the reopening (on the Unit 2 falsification matter) to resolve the management 5

integrity / competency issue. (See Id.)

The responses to the Commission diverted our resources and attention from the present action of motioning for a reopening, until January 14, 1984 when we received an invitation from the Commission to comment on a single proposal, that of the NRC Staff. (See Memorandum, Clerents to Parties, served January 10, 1984.) We do n'ot see that our proposals, that would have obviated the need for a motion to reopen on the Unit 1 leak rate report falsifications, are being taken seriously by the Commission, t

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i 5/ We motioned the Commission to resolve the management issues by denial of the license at Unit 1 or to lift the stay on the hearing of the Unit 2 leak rate report falsifications. (See Aamodt to Commissioners, October 27, 1983 and November 11, 1983.)

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, Our motion is not premature. To await the conclusion of the OI investigation would be delaying the Restart Proceeding unnecessarily.

The ERC frowns on the Staff's resolution of significant safety-related issues, therefore, even if we could expect a full and fair resolution by the Staff, a reopening is appropriate. Since we do not expect a 6

full and fair resolution by the Staff and since we have been warned.by the Staff that it will seek to prevent our access to the operators if the plant is restarted, our motion is not premature.

Our motion is, therefore, neither late nor premature.

(2) It Addresses Several Significant Safety Issues.

The operation of a nuclear plant with leak rates of radioactive water in excess of technical specifications is a significant safety issue.

(The measure of leak rate provided the indication of boundary leakage of

' radioactivity. The leak rate irregularities may, therefore be an environmental 6

issue as well ) At a minimum, such operation is an indication of perscanal incompetency, and . fifty-eight.' of these personnel remain. (See Commission Meeting, December 5,1983, Tr.140.) of greater importance is the evidence

of lack of integrity across the entire organization,. including the present l

organization, which ordered, permitted and covered-up the entire matter despite the extended opportunity to bring the matter forth. Of most importance toward public health and safety is the evidence of the attitude /of the THI-1 organization and its personnel who did not oppose operating a plant in violation of its technical specifications.

In addition, there is the significant matter of falsification of reports required by NRC, which is material false witness and for which revocation of the license is a stated penalty.

6/ We cannot help but remember the testimony of Dr. Weber, a veterinarian on .

the west shore of TFE who related animal problems to the startup of Unit 1 in 1973 and noted that these problems deminished following shutdown in 1979.

7 The NRC Staff considers the leak rate report falsification a significant metter. The Staff reconsidered its position concerning management integrity /

competency, held throughout the Restart Proceeding, on April 19, 1983 following our comments and motion to the commission which laid out the significance of the matter at Unit 2 as alleged by Harold Hartman, an operator. <

(See Aamodt Comments, served April 16, 1983, docketed April 18, 1983; Staff Comments, docketed April 19, 1983, dated April 18, 1983,) Although the Staff then found that it could " decouple" the Unit 2 leak rate report falsification from restart of Unit 1 b'y removal of potentially involved personnel, the Staff recognized that such a position was untenable concerning Unit 1 leak rate falsification. (See Commission Meeting, December 5,1983, Tr. 98; Memorandum, Dircks to Commissioners, January 3,1984, pages 3, 7, 8.)

The Unit i leak rate report falsifications are, by the Staff's admission, significant and related to the restart of Unit 1.

(3) A Different Result Would Have Been Reached by the Licensing Board Concerning thnagenent Intecrity/Comoetenev had It Considcted the i

Unit 1 Leak Rate IrreRularicies during the Restart Proceeding.

The evidence of leak rate report falsifications at Unit 1 invalidates l

l' all findings and conclusigns of the Licencing Board concerning Licensee's management and personnel competency, integrity and attitude. All THI-1 personne1' are potentially involved. The number who may have participated in the crimes is large -- one-half of the operators,r for instance.

(See Commission Meeting, December 5,1983, Tr. 139.) This estimate does

! not cover those in management, technical functions and maintenance who l

7 l may have participated in or covered up the matter.

2/ There is evidence of a deliberate attempt to cover-up provided by the Thorpe communication of August 18, 1983 to Starostecki and the Murley memorandum of October 7,1983 to Denton. (See page 3, para. 3, supra.)

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8-Michael Ross, supervisor of operations since April 1978 and before that a_ shift supervisor at Unit:1, is most likely involved. The Board predicated its findings relative to the safe operation of the plant on the impression Ross made in his appearances before the Board. This impression was Ross's capability to buoy-up the testimony of management officials who had no plant knowledge or experience. (See August 27, 1981, Partial Initial Decision, pages 89-90, para.155.) The Board's judgment of Ross's competency assumed Ross's integrity. Noone could judge whether Ross's responses were correct, only that. they seemed correct. Since the Staff has determined that B&W plante are not so defective in design that they cannot be operated within technical specifications for leakage, Ross's compe'tency is now an open issue as well. (See p' age 3, para. 3, supra.)

Other personnel in key management and technical positions are i

j* potentially involved. The Licensee describes an interface between Henry Shipman, an engineer who writes procedures, and the investigators which reveals knowledge on Shipman's part of the falsifications. Shipman I

i had ample opportunity to provide such information during the Restart t

l Proceeding, having been called as a witness. (See Letter, Thorpe to Starostecki, August 18, 1983; page 3 supra.)

The Board's decision concerning specific individuals, such as Shipman (who provided a candidate for licensing with an answer during the examination),

l could be significantly changed.as well as its conclusion that there was no evidence of a system of cheating. Clearly, the falsification of leak rates and report of these false calculations to NRC involved an elaborate system of cheating. The Licensing Board's prirary interest in reopening sua sponte concerning the cheating on examinations was to determine if a system of cheating was in place. The logical inference is that if such a system was found, the Board would have altered its conclusions concerning

managhmentcndcouldnothavarcacamendedrstartcfUnit.l.

Conclusions The Aamodt motion for a reopening to examine the evidence concerning the leak rate report irregularities and falsifier.tions at Unit 1 meets all applicable standards for a reopening of the record of a proceeding.

Respe tfully submitted

,)ki ikv' b' ' l'Ah!? A t

f l* .

Norman O. Aamodt ld! /E - hadl -

Mar ie M. Aamodt January 23, 1984 I J

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