ML20086K082
| ML20086K082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1984 |
| From: | Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086K073 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8401260214 | |
| Download: ML20086K082 (9) | |
Text
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AAM -
1/24/84 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS:
Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky Thomss Roberts James Asselstine Frederick Bernthal I
)
In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.
)
Docket 50-289
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Generating Station, Unit 1)
)
)
SUPPLEMENT TO AAMODT COMMENTS OF JANUARY 7,1984 CONCERNING NRC STAFF PROPOSAL FOR STARIUP OF UNIT 1 AT 25% POWER Introduction The Commission invited the Parties to comment on the written version of the NRC Staff's proposal for startup of the TMI-1 reactor to 257. of power. We have.aiready provided comments concerning the Staff's initial presentation during the Commission meeting on December 5,1983.
We are providing these comments to supplement those served on January 7,1984.
l Comments On January 5,- 1984, the NRC Staff presented in writing its proposal that would allow startup of Unit I up to 257, of full power prior to the resolution of the open management integrity / competency issues and the Commission's decision concerning restart.
We view the Staff's proposal as irresponsible and an obstruction of justice in the Restart Proceeding.
The open management issues, which it would appear the Staff would like to cleanse through the OI investigations and Staff's resolution, are of 8401260214 840123 PDR ADOCK 05000289 O
~
2 major significance. Of most significance are the matters of the operation of both units in violation of technical specifications, specifically with excess leakage of radioactive water in quantities presently unknown, for periods of time presently undefined, by personnel presently unidentified.
The operation of Unit 2 in this manner for most,1f not all,of its operating life was the cause of the TFE-2 accident (1). This matter has not been heard in the Restart Proceeding or resolved elsewhere. The NRC Staff had this cause of the accident identified by their own investigator Harold Ornstein in 1979, following his interview of Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr.,
an operator (2).
Independently, we came to the same conclusion af ter studying the information available in documents of the GPU v. B&W court trial..,
The leak rate irregularities and the falsification of the records of these irregularities at Units 1 and 2 should have been the central issue of the Restart Proceeding. These matters were unique to the GPU operation of nuclear power plants. They were the cause of the accident in conditioning the operators to ignore significant signals of loss of the core inventory, (1).
They provide clear evidence of the attitude and character of management who would operate a plant in violation of technical specifications, at risk to the public, to enhance company profits. This management deliberately falsified reports required by NRC (3) and then concealed the entire matter to this day despite the numerous opportunities to come clean (4).
The company managed this enormous coverup to near perfection, flawed only by the information provided by Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr. According to a guard, the means used to perpetrate this coverup included coercion (5).
Personnel were instructed to remain silent and threatened and beaten up if they spoke freely with reporters. According to media reports, the Department of Justice's investigation of the leak rate matter was thwarted by the GPU attorneys' influence on the operators called to be interviewed (6).
Here sus a company which knew it had caused an accident and had increasingly l
apparent motivation to conceal the seriousness of the accident.
The misleading information provided to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not stand aloner It is an outgrowth of the deliberately daring scheme to operate a nuclear plant,. plagued with problems and marked by
" incidents", at 100% p6wer in violation of technical specifications.
Whether the advise to do so came from Jim Floyd, manager of the THI plant, Gary Miller, John Herbein or Robert Arnold, all uow furioughed from the TMI organization, the fact remains that they could not have carried it out and covered it up until now without the cooperation of the entire organization --
including Dr. Robert Long, Clarn. Dieckamp, the operators, maintenance personnel (7)
I and technical functions personnel. The point to remember is that only l
Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr. was sufficiently troubled by operating in violation of technical specifications that he sought his shif t supervisors' concurrence, in vain, and finally aired the matter on WOR in New York City. The rest of the organization has been content to let Hartman stand alone.
The NRC Staff would have the Commission separate the integrity issue from the matter of competency.
But where is there a record which supports competency? The Board looked at resumes and organization charts. (8).
The NRC Staff found the Licensee, since the accident, incapable of responding or unwilling tc respond to the generic deficiencies identified by the studies (9) of the TFE-2 accident.
The Staff provides a weak picture of competency, citing INPO reports which rank TFE-1 as average despite the clear focus on Licensee's response to the accident in the Restart Proceeding and Rickover's l
report which found only technical capability. The Licensing Board also found capability, however capability is not evidence of competency only l
achievement is.
The Staff ignored the BETA and RHR audits which provided a clear look at the chaos of the TFE-1 organization (10), These audits l
l
l I'
4 were not designed for tha public sya es was thn well-tailored testimony of Licensee's management and friends in the Restart Proceeding (11).
Although the. Staff and the Licensee have sought to assure the Commission that management competency matters are now resolved, they are not. Audits,
taken at face value, were improperly interpreted (12).
These audits show an organization where people at all levels are doing as they damn well please.(13).
Why? Because the management is hand-cuffed in deference to N
the well-orchestrated job its personnel have done carrying out and covering up the leak rate falsification matters. Why else vould a management tolerate the performance in the radiation control and trdining departments described in BETAl The Staff provides a weak picture of the state of the TMI-1 readiness.
The Staff supports the adequacy of a training program it did not even review (14).
The Staff asserts that there are sufficient Shift Technical Advisors to mann six shifts when Licensee only claims to have three (15) and we believe there is but one (16), who is trained and experienced with the Unit 1 plant. The Unit 1 control room has not been changed to conform to identified human engineering recommendations, The Staff is satisfied with leaving a severely compromised instructor, Husted, in charge of non-licensed operator training and an operator,potentially involved in the Unit 2 falsifications and on shift at the time of the accident, as supervisor of licensed operator training (il7).. The Staff is satisfied with Dr. Robert Long as director of nuclear assurance although the Licensing Board found that Long had not undertaken his responsibility to assure the integrity of the training and testing program and failed to recognize that he had failed (18).
Nearly five full years af ter the accident, after extended litigation, we are back at square one. The single most pertinent issue, the integrity of Licensee management remains an open issue.
We have been engaged in a shell game.The issue of management integrity has been covered up by restructured management charts, a change of name, denial of cheating, stonewalling, testimonials from industry peers, self-serving " studies" and denial of falsifying leak rates, To-date, the NRC Staff has walked this primrose path hand-in-hand with Licensee.
It advocates "decoupling", purging, round-the-clock survellance --
anything, apparently, to let THI-1 restart.
The issue of this Restart Proceeding appears to have devolved from adjudication of edquacy to simply finding a way to renew the license. The path taken to this end has been coverup.
It's time for a change.
It's time for the Commission to look under the shells, As unpleasant as the sight of a corrupt Licensee may be, the
' sight of a corrupted regulatory agency would be worse.
It's time for the NRC to walk hand-in-hand with the public interest, call a spade a spade, and ~ deny GPUN's license to operate TMI-1.
Respectfully submitted,
.s hYtLAtn YkYCOb{
No n O. Aamodt bdt Mb 7*
4 L'we Marjori[)1. Aamodt L
January 24, 1984 Enc 1.osure:' Notes Which Sup9ert Our Findings.
(These are not exhaustive.)
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Notes Which Support Our Findinas (1). In studying the Hartman testimony in the GPU v. B&W court trial documents, we found that the operation of Unit 2 with a leaking POR7 conditioned the operators to ignore the signs of loss of core inventory. Discussed in Aamodt Comments, served April 16, 1083, docketed April 18,1983, pages 14-16 (2) :lemorandum, Harold L. Ornstein,to C. J. Heltemes, Jr., June 6,1983 provided with Dircks' Memorandum to Commissioner Gilinsky, June 10, 1983.
(3)
Leak rate falaification was first verified by the NRC Staff according to Tim Martin, the principal investigator, who asserted in a Commission Meeting, Nhy 24,1983 Crr.14-16) that prior to referral of the matter to the Department of Justice in the spring of 1980:
I can tell you for a fact that the records were falsified, that much we knew...we were able to, through analysis of records and looking at various physical charts that were available, ve were able to demonstrate that water was added, the computer was not told, there were falsified leak rates. We were able to demonstrate that hydrogen was added which caused a change in the reference lag level, the apparent pressure there which falsified the leak rate.
Leak rate falsification was verified independently by Licensee's consultants in September 1980, however this information was withheld until the spring of 1983 We analyzed ths Faegre & Bensso findings and presented them as Appendix A to Aamodt Response, July 1,1983 The report is voluminous, presented in four volumes. We drew together the essential findings of F&B which were hidden in summary which bore the marks we have come to recognize as GPU's legal manuevering.
The Department of Justice handed down an 11 count criminal indictment against the Licensee based on DQI's finding of falsification of leak rates at Unit 2, November 7,1983, provided to parties, boards and Commissioners by Aamodt Response, November 11, 1983.
Leak rate falsification at Unit I was detected in 1980 by NRC but withheld f rom the Restart Hearing. The Staff roexamined records in th,e late summer of 1983 and concluded that there'was leak rate falsification at Unit 1.
The inspection report was provided in camera to the Commission and boards on October 7, 1983 Licensee was given the opportunity to explain the leak rate " irregularities" and missing data, however the explanations provided were not adequate.
Information provided by Goldberg service of October 25, 1983
.(4) Dieckamp's heated denial during the Commission meeting, May 24, 1983, Tr. 19:
l We must ob}ect to the suggestion of falsification of records.
I know I
of no Commission report that demonstrates that to be the case. Our own consultant's report on this matter does not lead to the conclusion of falsification of records.
(5) Harry C. Williams, a guard at TMI at the time of the accident, provided us with this information.
A reporter confirmed the reluctance of TFE personnel to speak with him.
'N*tts. pans 2 (6) Charles R. Babcock of Washington Post reported in May 1980:
Sources said that prosecutors felt so stymied by uncooperative TPE witnesses that they once asked the judge to dismiss the THI employees' attorneys.
(7)
Dr. Long appears to have had a direct connection nith the falsification.
of leak rates.
Long was manager of Generation Productivity at the time of the accident.
B&W alleged that leak rates were falsified to avoid purchase of replacement power.
Dieckamp met Miller and Herbein on the steps outside the Governor's office and spoke with them at length prior to providing misleading information to the Commonwealth on March 29, 1979.
Dieckamp mailgram to Udall.
The Licensing Board feiled to investigate this entire matter. See PID, August. 27,1981, pages 257-287, particularly conclusions para.
493, 503.
' (B)
Chairman Palladino quizzed Arnold concerning the lack of evidence concerning management functioning -- competency -- in the Licensing Board's PID, August 27, 1981:
Before we leave this slide, maybe you would want to cover this later. I recognize that it is necessary to develop boxes around which to build organizations, but more important than the boxes themselves is how well the organizations interact both under routine operation conditions and under non-routine conditions.
I am interested in how you expect this organization to function.
There are benefits by compartmentalization, but also that is where many of the problems arise.
Tr. 32 v
Arnold had no answer See Tr. 32-33 (9)
Comnission Meeting, December 5,1983, Murley and Denton opinions that Lic.ensee had not leaned to complying with TMI-2 related requirements.
- (1,0)
The Staff dismissed the BETA and RHR audits in NUREG-0680, Supp. 4, page 2-1 2:
"the team could identify no information which raised significant safety or regulatory concern."
The Staff has not moved this supplement of its SER into the record.
It would not survive cross-questioning.
(11)
Dr. Long was unfamiliar with his own pre-filed testimony. Tr. 24,941-2 This was concerning the matter of compromise of the RWP tests.
Aauodt Findings, Fkrch 4,1982, para. 270.
Nelson Brown (now in charge of emergency response) misrepresented, under oath, the true conditions of test administration in the training department where he was supervisor of licensed operator training.
Nttes, pago 3 We concluded that management directed Brown to falsify his testimony since Long had committed Licensee to the position in the main hearing.
- Judge Milhollin considered Licensee's influence made it:
"necessary to pull the evidence of cooperation out of the i
operators on the witness stand... in effect Licensee's litigation strategy was to maintain the credibility of its
~
training program by characterizing the cooperation on the weekly quizzes as " cheating" when the operators did not regard it as such at the time it happened." SMR, para. 329.
Judge Milhollin concluded:
" r. Arnold's concern that an operator not 'be completely on his own to look out for himself' is either a concern that the operator 'on his own' might divulge something detrimental to himself -- which is not a proper concern if there is something i
detrimental to divulge -- or a concern that the operator
'on his own' might devulge something detrimental to management --
which is not a proper concern either." SMR, para.188 Testimony of Duke Power Company President William Lee (PID August 27, 1981 is marginall' ~ independent.
para.120-121., page 73) y BETA's testimony in the hearing conflicts with BETA audit performed subsequently. BETA appeared as Licensee's witnesses.
PID, August 27, 1981, pages 71, 72, 74. However note at-para, 123:
"It was only when pushed by the Board that Mr. Wegner of BETA commented favorably on the attitude of Licensee's high-level management."
.(12) NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 4 is a white-wash of the BETA and RHR audits.
i(13) A Report on A Review of Current and Projected Expenditures and Manpower Utilization for GPU Nuclear Corporation, conducted by Basic Energy i
-Technology Associates, Inc., Arlington, Va dated February 28, 1983, at pages 26, 57, 58:
i There are too many instances where radiological controls are not as.
Sood as they should be...it can be called average in comparison with other utilities...there are far too many deficiencies...there are too many cases of loose control of radioactive contamination...there is too much radioactive waste...the performance of personnel is often poor.
...there should be concern over classroom performance... job inattention noted... supervisors, who were present, did not react to situations where instructors were not performing their assigned tasks... (this) appears typical of the nornal mode of operation...
the Training Department... lacked the degree of toughness, accounta-bility, and insistence on performance needed in the nuclear profession.
...there existed an attitude, not only within the THI Training Department, but also at the plant of almost patronizing the students.
There seemed always to be excuses why students did poorly, why operators
-made mistakes', or if there were cheating, why it occurred.
Netan, pan' 4 (14)- July 27,1982 PID, Para 2345;' Boger ff. Tr. 25,480 at 2-3 The Staff made completely unsupported assertions that it had reviewed the training program, during oral arguments January 11, 1984 before the Appeal Board.
(13)
Licensee attorney in response to Appeal Board, January 11, 1984.
(16) I. Summary of Meeting with GPU, December 16, 1983,
Enclosure:
09erator Experience in 1983 lists at 2.B : Operations Senior Engineer -1 SRO Under Future Plans - 8.B. 1 Operations Engineer - Begin CR0 Training -Feb.1984 i
This information is misleading. Itstates that
- 1.
Have not had a licensed operator resignation in 1983 (only had one in 1982).d This circumvents the fact reported by Mr. Blake that two STAS KK and WW, involved in cheating incidents, had resigned. There may be other attrition disguised in this report.
The numbers include other than operations duty personnel, for instance instructors. Believe the operations duty personnel who are licensed are approximately 23 in number.
BETA found (study cited above ) serious deficiences in STA program:
There are a number of' problems associated withthe STA program...
These problems involve attrition, the STA training program, and proper utilization of STAS...there is a serious lack of understanding on the part of the Shift Supervisors...on the role of the STA...
there is an element of distrust of the STA's ability and of their motives...The Shift Technical Advisor program...n eeds to be reviewed and strengthened.
J (17)
Fredericks (18) July 27,1982 PID, pa ra. 2406, 2407, 2323 t
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