ML20082D063
| ML20082D063 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1983 |
| From: | Finlayson F, George Minor, Radford E SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082C880 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8311220305 | |
| Download: ML20082D063 (106) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Cocket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
TESTIMONY OF FRED C. FINLAYSON, GREGORY C. MINOR AND EDWARD P. RADFORD ON BEHALF OF.SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING CONTENTIONS 65. 23.D AND 23.H Q. Please state your names and positions.
A. My name is Fred C. Finlayson. I am Principal Associ-ate of F.C. Finlayson & Associates, 12844 East Cuesta St.
Cerritos, California. A copy of my professional qualifications is attached to this testimony as Attachment 1.
A. My name is Gregory C. Minor. I am a founder and vice-president of MHB Technical Associates, 1723 Hamilton Ave-nue, San Jose, California. A copy of my professional qualifi-cations is attached to this testimony as Attachment 2.
A. My name is Dr. Edward P. Radford, and I am Professor of Epidemiology at University of Pittsburgh. I received my i
l 0311220305 83111s PDR ADOCM 05000322 PDR 9
M.D. degree from the Harvard Medical School in 1946. My specialty is the subject of the health effects of ionizing ra-diation, which I have taught at the Harvard University School of Public Health, the University of Cincinnati School of Medi-cine, Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health, and the University of Pittsburgh. I am presently on leave of absence from Pittsburgh in order to conduct research in Japan on new data-that have been compiled regarding the health effects of the atomic explosions in Japan in 1945. My professional qualifications and background are set forth in my curriculum vita which is Attachment 3 to this testimony.
Q. What is the purpose of this testimony?
A. (Finlayson, Minor, Radford) The purpose of this tes-timony is to address portions of Emergency Planning Contentions 65, 23.D and 23.H.
Contention 65 deals with LILCO's evacuation time estimates. The preamble to that contention states:
(S]uch estimates must be accurate and reli-able so that command and control personnel who are considering what protective actions might be ordered for particular persons can estimate whether, given projected release and dispersion of health-threatening fission products from the Shoreham plant, evacuation can be accomplished before such dispersion takes place. (See 10 CFR i
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. Section 50.47(b)(10); NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.m). A decision to order evacua-tion, if based on inaccurate evacuation time estimates, could result in evacuees' i being trapped in queues or slow moving traffic inside or outside the EPZ, thus exposing them to a release of fission products from the Shoreham plant.
Contention 65 alleges that LILCO's evacuation time estimates 4
are inaccurate, unreliable, and that they should be far longer.
Testimony concerning specific deficiencies in the estimates and why they should be longer is presented by other Suffolk County witnesses. We will address the portion of Contention 65 which states:
3 [U]nder the LILCO Plan an evacuation may be ordered which realistically cannot be completed prior to release and disper-sion of fission products from the Shoreham plant. Evacuees will be caught in queues or delayed in heavily congested traffic within the EPZ. Under many accident conditions, there will be a dispersal of radioactive materials while such traffic conditions still exist, resulting in unacceptable health-threatening exposure to the evacuees. The automobiles of the evacuees will offer essentially no protection from the plume. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, this testimony will discuss the timing of the release and dispersal of fission products under many accident conditions at Shoreham, and the resulting radiation exposure and health consequences to which evacuees caught in queues or traffic will be subjected.
Contention 23 alleges that in the event of s .1 accident at Shoreham, there would be large numbers of persons who would evacuate voluntarily even if not ordered to do so (the "evacua-tion shadow" phenomenon), and that the LILCO Plan fails to take this phenomenon into account. Part D of Contention 23 states that the additional vehicles which will be on the road network as a result of voluntary evacuation will create congestion within the EPZ and in the regions just outside the EPZ. It states, further, that the congestion caused by voluntary evacu-ation will cause queuing and will impede traffic evacuating from the EPZ, and that the LILCO evacuation time estimates are inaccurate for failing to take into account the numbers and lo-cations of voluntary evacuees. These portions of Contention 23.D are addressed in the testimony of Suffolk County witnesses Johnson, Zeigler, Cole, Pigozzi, Herr and Polk. We will address the following portion of Contention 23.D:
The additional congestion caused by volun-tary evacuation will cause adverse health consequences to the public because (a) evacuees from beyond the 10-mile EPZ will impede the evacuation of those within the 10-mile EPZ who are ordered to evacu-ate, resulting in evacuees' receiving health-threatening radiation doses; and (b) those who choose to evacuate will be unable to do so safely and efficiently. . . . If voluntary evacuation were properly taken into account, the LILCO time estimates would increase substantially, rendering evacuation an inadequate protective action
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i foc many accident scenarios. (Emphasis suppil'd).
Thus, this testimony discusses the radiation doses and adverse health consequences to which evacuees will be subject if they are stranded in traffic in the EPZ, and the resulting inadequa-cy of evacuation as a protective action under many accident scenarios if voluntary evacuation, and the resulting evacuation times, were properly taken into account.
Part H of Contention 23 states that the LILCO Plan fails to provide adequate access control measures at the EPZ perime-ter, contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.j. We will address the portion of Contention 23.H which states:
[V]oluntary evacuees from the East End whose chosen evacuation routes may cross the EPZ perimeter, may travel into contami-nated areas and receive health threatening radiation doses. . . .
Thus, we will discuss the contamination which will be in the EPZ in the event of an accident and the radiation doses and re-sulting threats to health to which persons travelling into the EPZ may be subjected.
Q. What is the basis for your testimony concerning Conten-l l tions.65, 23.D and 23.H?
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r A. (Finlayson and Minor) We performed an analysis of the 1 potential consequences of different types of accidents at the i Shoreham plant. Our report, titled " Potential Consequences of Accidents at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant," which describes )
the analysis and the conclusions, is Attachment 4 hereto.
We should note here that for purposes of this testimony, we have assumed that a serious accident has occurred at the Shoreham plant, i.e., the occurrence of the type of accident likely to lead to a core melt with a resultant release of radi-ation to the environment. Such an assumption is appropriate when considering the adequacy of emergency preparedness and planning, since the purpose of such planning is to be prepared for the actual occurrence of a very serious accident. We base our testimony on the results and conclusions in Attachment 4 and tha testimony on evacuation and traffic analyses of Peter Po3k, Phi.4 p Herr, Bruce Pigozzi, the Suffolk County Police Department witnesses, Stephen Cole, James Johnson and Donald Zeigler.
(Radford) My testimony is based on my background and expe-rience in the field of health effects of radiation and the ap-plication of that experience to the circumstances calculated by Dr. Finlayson and Mr. Minor to exist during an accident at Shoreham.
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1 Contention 65 Q. Do you agree with the portions of Contention 65 and its Preamble that are quoted above?
A. (Finlayson, Minor, Radford) Yes, we do.
Q. What is the basis for your agreement with the state-ments in Contention 65 that "Under the LILCO Plan an evacuation may be ordered which realistically cannot be completed prior to release and dispersion of fission products from the Shoreham plant" and the further statement that "Under many accident conditions, there will be a dispersal of radioactive materials while [ queues or heavily congested] traffic conditions still exist, resulting in unacceptable health-threatening exposure to the evacuees?"
A. (Finlayson and Minor) Under many accident conditions, including those which we have analyzed, the release of fission products occurs with very little warning. In genoral, radioac-tive materials can be released into the environment anywhere from one or two hours to a day or more after the initial onset of an accident. However, the actual warning time -- that is, the period before the release when it can be predicted that the release is likely to occur -- is only one or two hours for many
core melt accidents. Thus, for many accidents, there is a maximum warning time of no more than two hours before fission products actually escape to the atmosphere (see Attachment 4, Table 3). ,
Under the LILCO Plan, evacuation will be ordered as a pro-tective action based upon the LILCO-derived evacuation time estimates which range from about 3 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (see OPIP 3.6.1
- p. 39-42) -- that is, based upon an assumption that evacuees will be in the EPZ, potentially expost to radiation, for no more than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. However, as the other Suffolk County witnesses state, the LILCO evacuation time estimates are inac-curate and an evacuation will in reality take much langer.
They have testified that evacuation times to the EPZ boundary can be about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (not including the effects of breakdowns, running out of gas, etc.), which means that evacuees poten-tially will be in the EPZ and exposed to the radiation which the evacuation is designed to enable them to escape, for sub-stantially longer periods of time than LILCO assumes. There-fore, it is likely that the assumed " protection" or reduction-
! in dose upon which the LILCO evacuation recommendation will be based under the LILCO Plan will not be achieved, and, in fact doses may be increased.
Several of the County's witnesses have testified concern-ing the likely evacuation process. In particular, Mr. Polk and Professors Pigozzi and Herr have testified that evacuees will be caught in queues or delayed in heavily congested traffic within the EPZ. Mr. Polk identifies in the attachments to his testimony a number of locations within and near the perimeter of the EPZ where traffic will be heavily congested and queues of automobiles will develop. Figures 1 and 2 attached hereto show the probability that evacuees, caught in queues in several particular roadway segments, will receive severe doses of radi-ation.1/
Figures 1 and 2 each include a map which identifies the critical svacuation routes found to present the highest proba-bility of evacuees' receiving serious doses. The distance column gives the location, with respect to the plant, of potential queues on the critical routes. For these critical routes the " exposure period" represents the range of maximum delays as calculated by the Voorhees analysis at the various
-1/ Automobiles provide essentially no protection from radia-tion doses. The light construction of automobiles offers l
essentially no resistance to penetration by gamma rays from the cloud or ground doses. Some limited protection might be provided from fission products that otherwise could be carried into the lungs while breathing, but even this protection is not in our opinion significant.
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queues. While some exposures may be less than the time in the queue, this is offset by exposures not accounted for, such as being caught in more than one queue or being exposed while ap-proaching the queue. Using dose distance curves of constant dose as a function of exposure time (see Figures 3 and 4), the probability of exceeding serious dose levels was calculated and the values for doses of 200 rems and 30 rems are presented in Figures 1 and 2.
According to Mr. Polk's estimates, evacuees within the EPZ on the William Floyd Parkway (Rt. 46) heading toward and getting onto the Long Island Expressway (Route segments 1 and 2 of Figure 1) might be exposed to radioactivity for periods of from a few minutes to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. As a result of such exposures, and depending upon their locations on those route segments, evacuees would have a 2 to 5 percent chance of receiving life threatening radiation doses in excess of 200 rems. They would have a 30 to 60 percent chance of receiving injury-threatening doses of 30 rems or more. The results of a similar analysis for other critical evacuation route segments are shown in f
Figures 1 and 2.
It is important to note that even if the probable exposure period (that is, the time an evacuee spends in a queue) is 1
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200 REM ISODOSE CURVES; SOURCE TERMS BASED ON BMI MODELS EXPOSURE TIMES OF 24, 12, 6, 2 ann 0.1 HOURS SHIELDING FACTORS: 1.0 CLOUD, 0.7 GROUND G
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FIGURE 4 30 REM ISODOSE CURVES; SOURCE TERMS BASED dN BMI MODELS EXPOSURE TIMES OF 24, 12, 6, 2 AND 0.1 HOURS SHIELDING FACTORS: 1.0 CLOUD, 0.7 GROUND 4
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brief, the exposure level can still be high. For example, an evacuee who is on segment 3 (the Long Island Expressway east of the William Floyd Parkway (Rt. 46)) for only six minutes, nonetheless has a 20 to 30 percent chance of receiving a radia-tion dose in excess of the early injury level of 30 rems or more. For segments with somewhat longer potential exposure periods (i.e., segments 4 to 8 -- with probable exposure times of from 1 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />), the probability of exceeding life threatening doses of 200 rems increases to values as high as 4 percent. Corresponding probabilities of being exposed to early injury threatening doses along these route segments range from a low of 10% to a high of 50%.
Figures 3 and 4 show the effect of distance from the plant and exposure time on the probability of receiving serious doses. Distance from the plant is a dominant influence on the probability of the dose received. Moving a few miles can re-duce the chances of receiving a dose equal to life-threatening levels. For example, an evacuee moving from 3 to 5 miles would go from a 2% chance to a 0.01% chance of receiving a 200 rem dose assuming a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exposure at either location. On the other hand, if he were ntuck.at a 4 mile distance from the plant, an increase in exposure time from 0.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to two hours could increase his chances of a life-threatening dose from a
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negligible value to as much as 2%. Thus, being caught in a queue is also a significant factor in a person's possible expo-sure to health-threatening radiation.
For 30 rem doses, that is, doses leading to early injury rather than a life-threatening situation, Figure 4 shows that t
distance has much less effect in' reducing dose until the evacuee is more than 6 or 10 miles from the plant. This is be-cause of the high probability of receiving at least a 30 rem dose at the closer distances (50-70% out to 6 miles). In fact, most people at these distances would receive even a greater dose. Within the range of 6-12 miles, an increase in exposure time from 0.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> can double or triple the chances of receiving a 30 rem dose. Thus, if a person is caught in a slow moving queue 6-10 miles from the plant for a long period, the potential for a serious dose increases greatly.
The examples above show the significant effect of distance and the potential exposure period to radiation on the probabil-)
ity of receiving substantial doses. The results suggest that as the time of evacuation increases, chances of receiving doses of 30 rems or more also increases dramatically.
Q. How do your conclusions concerning evacuation times and potential exposure to radiation doses relate to the 12 -
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recommendation of evacuation as a protective action under the LILCO Plan?
A. (Finlayson and Minor) As other County witnesses discuss, the queue lengths and evacuation times which are like-ly in an actual evacuation can be substantially longer than those used by LILCO in deciding to recommend evacuation as a protective action. (OPIP 3.6.1 at 39-42). Our analysis shows that if the assumptions concerning evacuation times used by LILCO adequately took into account traffic congestion, queuing delays, and the exposure times for evacuees, the resulting ra-diation doses would be substantially larger. Thus, under the Plan and as a result of its inaccurate assumptions, LILCO is likely to recommend evacuation in circumstances that are like-ly, in fact, to threaten a large number of evacuees with serious radiation doses and health consequences.
Q. How do the radiation doses described by Dr. Finlayson and Mr. Minor threaten health as stated in Contantion 65?
A. (Radford) If a person receives a radiation dose of 30 rems, that person's chances of cancer induction will in-crease by approximately six percentage points. Thus, instead of normal probability of appr,oximately 28 percent, he would have a 34 percent chance of contracting cancer. If an 13 -
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individual received a dose of 200 rems, he would be likely to experience acute illness, and might suffer a 100 percent in-crease in his chance of cancer induction over his lifetime.
Thus, he would have a 56 percent chance of cancer induction.
When one considers the thousands of persons projected to be caught in queues and thus potentially exposed to radiation of at least 30 rems, the potential increases in cancer must be considered serious. Attached hereto as Attachment 5 is a Sum-mary of Health Effects of Ionizing Radiation for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant which explains the analysis upon which my conclusions are based.
Q. Can you 31ve a quantitative example of the probabili-ty values in Figures 1 and 2?
- Q. (Finlayson and Minor) Yes. One of the worst conges-l tion points is projected to occur at the Long Island Expressway l
- near the junctions of Routes 112 and 16. This location is 10-4
- 11 miles from the plant and on the edge of the EPZ as defined j by LILCO. The Voorhees data show that the longest queues may l involve 2049 automobiles containing over 6500 people with a delay time extending to 14.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (see route segment 2 in
- Figure 1). This results in a probability of up to 30% that a
! person in the queue would receive a dose of 30 rems. The i
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calculated probability of an evacuee receiving a 200 rem dose for a maximum assumed exposure time equal to the delay time is up to 2%. This means that if you analyzed 100 serious accidents assumed to occur at Shoreham, 30 of them would result in exposures of 30 rems or more at a distance of 10 miles, while 2 of the accidents would subject the people in the queue to a dose of 200 rems or more. Thus, we see that in this exam-ple, <% of the severe accidents would subject 6500 people in the queue to potentially life threatening doses and 30% of the accidents would subject the 6500 people to doses significant enough to cause health effects.
Q. Dr. Radford, can you quantify the health effects for that example?
A. (Radford) Yes. If all the people in the queue, (i.e. approximately 6500 people) receive a 200 rem dose, they could experience acute illness and/or a 100 percent increase in their chances of cancer induction during their lifetimes, just as a result of the radiation exposure while in the queue. This could add as many as 1820 cancer inductions.
l Similarly, assuming the 6500 people at that location l received a lesser but still serious 30 rem dose, they woul.d ex- i perience a 21 percent increase in their chances of cancer'
induction. The result is an increase of 390 cancer inductions (from 1820 to 2210). This single examp.le of exposure in just one queue emphasizes the importance of avoiding stranding peo-ple at any location.
Contentions 23.D and 23.H Q. Do you agree with the statements quoted above from Contentions 23.D and 23.H?
A. (Finlayson and Minor) Yes. The additional conges-tion that will be caused by voluntary evacuation and the re-sulting impedence of evacuees' travel from within the EPZ is addressed in the testimony of Pigozzi, Herr, Polk and the Suffolk County Police Department witnesses. Assuming that persons from within the EPZ who have been advised to evacuate will be caught in congested traffic in their automobiles inside the EPZ for periods of time longer than those estimated by LILCO, under many accident scenarios, the probability of receiving life threatening doses will be increased, as explained above, as a result of longer delays which will in-crease exposure times. Moreover, LILCO's failure to take the j evacuation shadow phenomenon into account properly will in-l crease the probability of receiving health threatening doses for all those shadow evacuees from the east end of the island l
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who take the principal east-west routes of Routes 25, the Long Island Expressway and the Sunrise Highway as has been discussed above.
Q. Can you give an example of the concerns represented in Contention 23.H.?
A. (Finlayson and Minor) Yes. At the east boundary of the EPZ is an example where entering traffic from the east end causes delays and increases the probability of serious expo-sures. See, for example, the eastern termini of route segments 7 and 8 on Figure 2. East end evacuees are likely to be on these route segments, to enter the EPZ, and to cause delays.
At the northern terminus of the Northville Turnpike (Route 51 at Route 27), a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> queue, involving approximately 376 cars is projected to occur. The people in that queue, some of whom will be from the North Fork, have a 10 to 20 percent chance of receiving a 30 rem dose. Those people passing through the above junction will likely proceed down Route 51 to its inter-section with the Sunrise Highway. At that intersection, they are likely to be joined by others from the South Fork and a 5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> queue is projected, involving 794 cars. These people also have a 10 to 20 percent chance of experiencing a health threatening dose of 30 rems. Thus the influence of east end i
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Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
A. (Finlayson, Minor, Radford) Yes.
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ATTACHMENT 1 0
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l FRED C. FINLAYSON REACTOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT F.C. FINLAYSON & ASSOCIATES PROBABILISTIC RISK 12844 E. CUESTA STREET ASSESSMENT CERRITOS, CALIFORNIA 90701 REACTOR ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT ENERGY SYSTEMS DESIGN AND ANALYSIS BACKGROUND
SUMMARY
Dr. Finlayson has extensive experience in the field of assessment of the safety, reliability and risks of nuclear power reactors. He has recently conducted an evaluation of potential risks and consequences of severe reactor accidents in the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. He supported an evaluation of the bmpact and application of BWR suppres-sion pool scrubbing capabilities on emergency planning as part of an evaluation of a probabilistic risk assessment of General Electric's BWR-6, standardized nuclear power plant design. He also provided technical direction of the probabilistic risk analyses conducted for the State of California's evaluation of Emergency Planning Zone requirements. He was the principal investigator and program manager of the NRC's first investigation of the adequacy of lauman engineering in nuclear power plant control rooms under severe accident conditions.
He is currently conducting an investigat' ion for the NRC o'f the feasi-bility of instituting a voluntary non-punitive reporting system for human errors in nuclear power plants. Dr. Finlayson was also the manager of The Aerospace Corporation program that provided systems integration and technical direction of the California Energy Commis-sion's study of underground nuclear power plant designs, costs, and their relative effectiveness in reducing the consequences of extremely severe accidents.
Dr. Finlayson has been a consultant to the NRC, U.S. General Account-ing Office, and other federal and state governmental agencies on nuclear safety related issues such as site-specific risk analyses, human engineering, large-scale reactor test program design and effec-tiveness, sabotage, waste transport hazards, and a wide variety of other related topics. He is currently a member of the American Physical. Society's Review Committee for evaluation of the status and adequacy of source terms for product releases from severe nuclear power plant accidents. He served on several review committees for the "PRA Procedures Guide" (NUREG/CR-2300) for probabilistic risk' assessments for nuclear power plants. He was a member of the NRC's 1980/1981 LOFT Special Review Group and was consultant to the NRC's Rogovin Special Inquiry Group in their investigation of human engi- 1 neering factors associated with the Three Mile Island incident. H3 has performed several assessments of the design and effectiveness of ECCS for LWRs, including the analysis which he prepared as a member of the American Physical Society's Review Committee (1975) on Light Water Reactor Safety.
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EDUCATION BS Mechanical Engineering, Brigham Young University, 1958 PhD Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern University, 1964 EXPERIENCE The Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, CA (1972-Present). Dr.
Finlayson is currently Manager, Nuclear Systems and Safety, Energy and Resources Division. In this capacity, he is responsible for programs dealing with nuclear power plant safety, reliability and risk assessment. He directed the systems engineering and technical management efforts for the recent California study of statewide nuclear power plant risks and associated emergency planning zone requirements; and directed a similar program for a major study of underground nuclear power plant siting. He was also the program i manager for an assessment of the impact of plutonium fuel cycle safeguards, and an evaluation of nuclear control room human engi-neering. He has also managed and performed systems analyses of industrial process heat applications of geothermal power as well as conceptual design and evaluation studies of hybrid solar / geothermal i
power systems. Studies of local and national energy consumption patterns and the effectiveness of selected conservation measures have also been performed under his direction.
! Physics International Company, San Lean'dro, CA (1968-1972). Dr.
Finlayson directed and conducted research in strategic and tactical weapon systems survivability / vulnerability, numerical analyses of the propagation of strong shocks in geologic media and structural materials, and structure-medium interactions.
The Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, CA (1964-1968). Dr. Finlayson conducted investigations of ground based system survivability to all relevant effects of nuclear weapons.
The General American Transportation Corporation, Chicago, IL (1960-1964).
Dr. Finlayson conducted research on the interactions of strong shocks in air and earth materials with above-ground and buried structures.
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Dr. Finlayson is a registered Professional Nuclear Engineer in the State of California. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (Reliability
- Society).
PUBLICATIONS
" Closures for Hardened Protective Hangers", AFSWC-TDR-62-77, MRD Division of General American Transport Corporation, Niles, Illinois, August 1962.
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" Air Blast Load Reduction on Above Ground Structures", Proceedings of the 32nd Symposium on Shock, Vibration, and Associated Environments, Part II, Bulletin No. 32, Office of the Director of Defense Research j and Engineering, November 1963.
" Design Procedures for Shock Isolation Systems of Underground Protective Structures, Volume II, Structure Interior Motions Due to Directly Transmitted Ground Shock", AFWL RTD-TRD-63-3096, Vol. II, General American Transportation Corporation, Niles, Illinois, December 1965.
(Coauthor).
" Wave Interaction of a Viscoelastic Medium with an Elastic Cylindrical Shell", Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 1496-1500, December 1966. (Coauthor).
" System vulnerabilities to Craters and Ejecta", (U) Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear Craters and Ejecta, Vol. I, SAMSO-TR-68-107,
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November 1967 (S-RD) .
Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear Craters and Ejecta, (U) Vol. I and II, SAMSO-TR-68-107, November 1967 (S-RD). (Coeditor).
"A Theoretical and Experimental Study of Detonations in Connection with Decoupling," DASA 2505, Physics International Company, San Leandro, California, November 1969. (Coauthor).
" Deep Based Sanguine System Survivability" (U) PIFR-327, Physics International Company, San Leandro, California, August 1971 (S-RD). ,
(Coauthor).
" Estimated SPRINT II Ground Motions" PITR 350-4, Physic International Company, San Leandro, California, March 1972 (S-3). (Coauthor).
" Relative Effectiveness of Energy Conservation Measures Taken in the Pacific Northwest," Aerospace Report No. ATR-74(8166)-1, January 1974.
l " Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Reactors," EQL Report No. 9, California Institute of Technology, Environmental Quality 3 Laboratory, May 1975.
Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, Reviews of Modern Physics, Volume 47, Supplement No. 1, Summer 1975. (Coauthor) .
" Integrated Solar / Geothermal Power Systems Conceptual Design and Analysis", ATR-75(7512)-1, July 1975. (Coauthor).
" Nuclear Reactor Safety: A View from the Outside", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1975, pp. 20-25.
" Review of the NRC/ERDA Loss-of-Fluid Test Facility", 19 November 1975, pp.67-108 of Enclosure A to This Country's Most Expensive Light Water Reactor Safety Facility, GAO document RED-76-68 A, May 26, 1976.
" Effectiveness of Safeguards Program for the LWR Plutonium Recycling Industry", ATR-76(6879)-1, April 1976. (Coauthor).
" Poor Management of a Nuclear Light Water Reactor Safety Project,"
GAO document EMD-76-4, 25 August 1976. (Coauthor). Documentation of review of ERDA/NRC Plenum Fill Experiment Program.
" Transportation Risks for New and Spent Fuels and Radioactive Wastes with Respect to Road Accident Hazards and Purposeful Diversion", Direct Testimony, SDG&E Sundesert NOI Hearings, 30 November 1976.
" Technical Brief - Issues of Record Related to Plans for Protection Against Sabotage and Diversion of Nuclear Materials for the Sundesert Nuclear Power Plant", SDG&E Sundesert NOI Proceedings, 29 December 1976.
l " Technical Brief - Issues of Record Related to Transportation Risks for New and Spent Reactor Fuels and Radioactive Waste", SDG&E Sundesert NOI Proceedings, 30 December 1976.
" Control Room Human Engineering Influences on Operator Performance",
Proceedings of Topical Meetino on Thermal Reactor Safety. CONF-770708, Sun Valley, Idaho, 31 July - 4 August 1977.
" Systems Management Support for ERCDC Study of Undergrounding and Berm j Containment: Interim Report, Preliminary Program Assessment and Follow-on Program Development", ATR-77(7652-01)-1, August 1977. (Coauthor).
Review and Critique of Draft " Report to the U.S. Congress,on NRC's Plans for Research Directed Toward the Improvement of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plant Safety", Letter report, 22 February 1978.
" Evaluation of the Feasibility, Economic Impact, and Effectiveness of Underground Nuclear Power Plants - Final Technical Report", ATR-78 (7652-14)-1, May 1978. (Coauthor).
" Underground Siting of Nuclear Power Reactors - An Analysis of the California Energy Commission Study", Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, Vol. 32, 1979 Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA., June 3-7, l 1979, pp. 553, 554. (Coauthor). l
" Human Engineering Influences on the Performance of Nuclear Power Plant Operators", Testimony for the record of the May 22-24 1979 Hearings on Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 255-270.
" Residential Photovoltaic Systems - A Review and Comparative Evaluation of Four Independent Studies of Potential Concepts", ATR-80 (7823)-1, December 1979 (also published as SAND 80-7010, Sandia National Labora-tories, October 1980).
" Review of Rogovin Special Investigative Group Staff Report on Human Factors Evaluation Related to the Three Mile Island Accident", Letter Report, 30 November 1979.
" Industrial Process Heat Applications of Solar and Geothermal Energy and Human Engineering Influences on the Performance of Nuclear Power Plants", ATR-79 (9538)-1, September 1979.
" Emergency Planning Zones for Serious Nuclear Power Plant Accidents", i State of California - Office of Emergency Services, November 1980.
(Coauthor).
"The Technical Basis for Emergency Planning Zones for Serious Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants in California", ATR-81(7870)-1, November 1980.
" Report of the LOFT Special Review Group", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0758, February 1981. (Coauthor).
"The Feasibility and Effectiveness of Underground Nuclear Power Plants -
a Review of the California Energy Commission's Study", pp. 19-33, Proceedings of the Symposium on Underground Siting of Nuclear Power Plants, Hanover, West Germany (16-20 March 1981), E Schweizerbart' sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (Nagele u Obermiller) Stuttgart, 1982.
" Development of Emergency Planning Zones for Nuclear Accidents in California", American Nuclear Society Transactions, 1981 Annual Meeting, Miami, Florida, June 7-11, 1982, TANSAO 38 1-776 (1981), June 1981, pp. 124-126.
" Basis for Selection l of Emergency Planning Zones from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York," F.C. Finlayson &
Associates, October, 1982 (Coauthor with Edward P. Radford, M.D.)
" Impact and Application of Suppression Pool Scrubbing Capability to Emergency Planning," Future Resources Associates, Inc., December, 1982. (Coauthor with Robert J. Budnitz)
" Nuclear Power Safety Reporting System, Vol. I: Feasibility Analysis,"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-3119 (Vol. I), February, 1983. (Coauthor with J.R. Ims)
" Nuclear Power Safety Reporting System, Vol. II: Concept Description,"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-3119 (Vol. II), April, 1983
" Nuclear Power Safety Reporting System - Feasibility Analysis and i Concept Description," Transactions of the lith Water Reactor Safety Research Information Meeting, NUREG/CP-0047, October 1983. (Coauthor with J.R. Ims and T.A. Hussman)
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i PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF GREGORY C. MINOR GREGORY C. MINOR MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K -
San Jose, California 95125 (408) 266-2716 EXPERIENCE:
1976 to PRESENT Vice-President - MHB Technical Associates, San Jose, California i
Engineering and energy consultant to state, federal, and private organizations and individuals. Major activities include studies of safety 3
and risk involved in energy generation, providing technical consulting to legislative, regulatory, public and private groups and expert witness in behalf of state organizations and citizens' groups. Was co-editor of a critique of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) for the Union of Concerned Scientists and co-author of a risk analysis of Swedish reactors for the Swedish Energy Commission. Served on the Peer Review Grcup of the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group (Rogovin Committee). Actively involved in the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee work for the Instrument Society of America (ISA).
1972-1976 Manager, Advanced Control and Instrumentation Engineering, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed a design and development group of thirty-four engineers and support j personnel designing systems for use in the measurement, control and i operation of nuclear reactors. Involved coordination with other reactor design organizations, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and customers, -
both overseas and domestic. Responsibilities included coordinating and managing and design and development of control systems, safety systems, and new control concepts for use on the next generation aof reactors. The position included responsibility for standards applicable to control and instrumentation, as well as the design of short-term solutions to field problems. The disciplines involved included electrical and mechanical engineering, seismic design and process computer control / programming, and equipment qualification. ,
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. 1970 - 1972 Manager, Reactor Control Systems Design, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Managed a group of seven engineers and two support personnel in the design and preparation of the detailed system drawings and control documents relating to safety and emergency systems for nuclear reactors.
Responsibility required coordination with other design organizations and interaction with the customer's engineering personnel, as well as regulatory personnel.
1963 - 1970 Design Engineer, General Electric Company, Nuclear Energy Division, San Jose, California Responsible for the design of specific-control and instrumentation systems
- for nuclear reactors. Lead design respon'sibility for various subsystems of instrumentation used to measure neutron flux in the reactor during startup and intermediate power operation. Performed lead system design function in
( the design of a major system for measurir.g the power generated in nuclear reactors. Other responsibilities included on-site checkout and testing.of a complete reactor control system at an experimental reactor in the Southwest. Received patent for Nuclear Power Monitoring System.
1960 - 1963 Advanced Engineering Program, General Electric Company; Assignments in Washington, California, and Arizona Rotating assignments in a variety of disciplines:
i Engineer, reactor maintenance and instrument design, KE and D reactors, Hanford, Washington, circuit design and equipment '
maintenance coordination.
Design ~ engineer, Microwave Department, Palo Alto, California. Worked on design of cavity couplers for Microwave Traveling Wave Tubes (TWT).
Design engineer, Computer Department, Phoenix, Arizona. Design of
, core driving circuitry.
Design engineer, Atomic Power Equipment Department, San Jose, i
i California. Circuit design and analysis, Design engineer, Space Systems Department, Santa Barbara, California.
Prepared control portion 'of satellite proposal. -
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Technical Staff - Technical Military Planning operation. (TEMPO),
Santa Barbara, California. Prepare analyses of missile exchanges.
During this period, completed three-year General Electric program of extensive education in advanced engineering principles of higher mathematics, probability and analysis. Also completed courses in Kepner-Tregoe, Effective Presentation, Management Training Program, and various technical seminars.
EDUCATION University of California at Berkeley, BSEE, 1960. .
Advanced Course in Engineering - three-year curriculum, General Electric Company, 1963.
Stanford University, MSEE, 1966.
HONORS AND ASSOCIATIONS Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honorary Society Co-holder of U.S. Patent No. 3,565-760, " Nuclear Reactor Power Monitoring System," February, 1971.
Member: American Association for Advance of Science.
Member: Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee, Instrument Society of America. -
PERSONAL DATA Born: June 7, 1937 Married, three children Residence: San Jose, California
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PUBLICATIONS AND TESTIMONY
- 1. G. C. Minor, S. E. Moore,'" Control Rod Signal Multiplexing," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. NS-19, February, 1972.
- 2. G. C. Minor..W. G. Milam, "An Integrated Control Room System for a l Nuclear Power ' Plant," NEDO-10658, presented at International Nuclear I Industries Fair and Technical Meetings, October, 1972, Basle, Switzerland.
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- 3. The above article was also published in the German Technical Magazine, NT, March, 1973.
- 4. Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing held February 18, 1976, and published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- 5. Testimony of G. C. Mi.nor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard before the California State Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, March 8, 1976.
- 6. Test'imony of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard before the California State Senate Committee on Public Utilities, Transit, and Energy, March 23, 1976.
- 7. Testimony of G. C. Minor regarding the Grafenrheinfeld Nuclear Plant, March 16-17, 1977, Wurzburg, Germany.
- 8. Testimony of G. C. Minor before the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry, j Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada, Department 21, 1977, i
- 9. The Risks of Nuclear Power Reactors: A Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/0140), H. Kendall, et al, edited by G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard for the Union of Concerned Scientists, August, 1977. -
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- 10. Swedish Reactor Safety Study: Barseback Risk Assessment, MHB l Technical Associates, January, 1978. (Published by Swedish Department
! of industry as Document Sd1 1978:1)
- 11. Testimony by G. C. Minor before the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, February 13, 1978, Loss of Coolant Accidents: - Their Probability and Consequence.
- 12. Testimony by G. C. Minor before the California Legislature Assembly '
Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, AB 3108, April 26, 1978, Sacramento, California.
- 13. Presentation by G. C. Minor before the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT), Meeting on Reactor Safety Research, Man / Machine
, Interface in Nuclear Reactors ~, August 21, and September 1,1978, Bonn, Germany,
- 14. Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, September 25,'1978, in the matter of Black Fox Nuclear Power Station Construction Permit Hearings, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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- 15. Testimony of G. C. Minor, ASLB Hearings Related to TMI-2 Accident, Rancho Seco Power Plant, on behalf of Friends of the Earth', September l 13, 1979.
- 16. Testimony of G. C. Minor before the Michigan State Legislature, Special Joint Committee on Nuclear Energy, Implications of Three Mile Island Accident for Nuclear Power Plants in Michigan, October 15, 1979.
- 17. A Critical View of Reactor Safety, by C. C. Minor, paper presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Symposium on i Nuclear Reactor Safety, January 7, 1980, San Francisco, California.
- 18. The Effects of Aging on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants., paper.
j presented at Forum on Swedish Nuclear Referendum, S tockholm, Sweden, March 1, 1980.
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- 19. Minnesota Nuclear Plants Caseous Emissions Study, MHB Technical
- Associates, September, 1980, prepared for the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Roseville, MN.
- 20. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New York State Public Service Commission, Shoreham Nuclear Plant Construction l
Schedule, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company Temporary Rate Case, September 22, 1980.
- 21. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Oyster Creek 1980 Refueling Outage Investigation, in the matter of Jeresey Central Power and Light Rate Case, February 19, 1981.
- 22. Systems Interaction and Single Failure Criterion, MHB Technical Associates, January,1981, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
- 23. Systems Interaction and Single Failure Criterion: Phase II Report, '
MHB Technical Associates, February 1982, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
- 24. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on PORV's and Pressurizer Heaters. Diablo Canyon Operating License hearing before ASLB, January 11, 1982.
- 25. Testimony of.G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard on Emergency Response Planning. Diablo Canyon Operating License hearing before'ASLB, January 10, 1982.
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- 26. Testimony of G. C. Minor, R. B. Hubbard , M. W. Goldsmith, S. J.
j Harwood on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and ,
Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, l Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Contention 7B, Safety Classification and Systems Interaction, April 13, 1982.
- 27. Testimony of C. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf cf Suffolk l
County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter.of Long Island Lighting company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 11, Passive Mechanical Valve Failure, April 13, 1982.
- 28. Testimony of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard on behalf of Suffolk -
County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1,
- regarding Suffolk County Contention 27 and SOC Contention 3, Post-Accident Monitoring, May 25, 1982,
- 29. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Wuclear Power Station, Unit 1,
- regarding Suffolk County Contention 22, SRV Test Program, May 25, 1982.
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- 30. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 28(a)(vi) and SOC Contention 7A(6), Reduction of SRV Challenges, June 14, 1982.
- 31. Testimony of G. C. Minor on behalf of Suffolk County, before the
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island i Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, regarding l
Environmental Qualification, January 18, 1983.
i 32. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, on behalf of the Office of Consumer
- Advocate, Regarding the Cost of Constructing the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit I, Re
- Pennsylvania Power and Light, March 18, 1983.
. 33. Supplemental testimony of G. C. Minor, R. B. Hubbard, and M. W.
- Goldsmith'on behalf of Suffolk County,-before the Atomic Safety and.
Licensing' Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding Suffolk County Contention 7B, Safety Classification and Systems Interaction, March 23, 1983.
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- 34. Testimony before the District Court Judge in the case of Sierra Club et al. vs. DOE regarding the Clean-up of Uranium Mill' Tailings. ' June 20, 1983.
- 35. Systems Interaction and Single Failure Criterion: Phase 3 Report, NHB Technical Associates, June, 1983, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
- 36. Systematic Evaluation Program: Status Report and Initial Evaluation, MHB Technical Associates, June, 1983, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
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CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Edward Parish Radford, M.D. Social Security No.: 022-16-4231 Birthdate: February 21, 1922 Telephone (Office): (412) 624-3009 Birthplace: Springfield, Massachusetts Citizenship: U.S.A. -
Business Address:
Department of Epidemiology Graduate School of Public Health '
University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA 15261
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EDUCATION AND TRAINING Undergraduate Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1940-43 Biology Graduate Harvard Medical School 1943-46 Medicine M.D. 1946 -
APPOINTMENTS AND POSITIONS Academic 1949-50 Teaching Fellow, Department of Physiology, Harvard Medical School 1950-52 Instructor, Department of Physiology, Harvard Medical School 1952-55 Associate, Department of Physiology, Harvard School of Public Health 1959-65 Associate Professor Physiology, Harvard School of Public Health 1965-68 Professor and Director, Department of Environmental Health Director of Kettering Laboratory: Professor of Physiology, College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati 1968-77 Professor of Environmental Medicine, School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University
- 1975-76 Visiting Professor, Department of Regius Professor of Medicine, ,
i University of Oxford, Oxford, England 1977- Professor of Environmental Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 1979- Director, Center,for Environmental Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA. .
Non-Academic Positions 1947-49 Active Duty, U.S. Air Force Chief of Medical Service, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama
- Radiological Health Officer, Atomic Bomb Tests, Eniwetak Atoll 1948 1955-59 Physiologist, Ha'skell Laboratory for Toxicology and Industrial Medicine, E.I. duPont deNemours and Company, Newark, Delaware
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2 MEMBERSHIPS IN PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES
- American Physiological Society Radiation Research Society l j American Public Health Association 1
Society for Envir,onmental and Occupational Health Society for Epidemiologic Research
- SERVICE ON COMMITTEES OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Member
- Physiology Training Committee, National Institute of General Medical Sciences, 1967-70 Member: National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, 1970-72 .
l Member: Health Research Facilities Scientific Review Committee, National Institutes of Health, 1970-73 -
i Chairman: Power Plants and Human Health and Welf are Studies Group Department of Natural Resources, State of Maryland, 1972-73 Member: The Governor':s Advisory Council on Nuclear Reactors, State of Pennsylvania, 1973-74 j
Consultant in Occupational Health, State of Maryland, Division of Labor and Industries, 1973-75 Medical Consuitang to Council on Environmental Quality, Washington, DC, 1975 Otairman: National Academy of Sciences Advisory , Committee on the Biological Effects
< of. Ionizing Radiation; Chairman; Subcommittee on Somatic Effects, 1977-80 Member: United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrator's Toxic i Substances Advisory Committee, 1977-80 Member: American Public Health Association Technical Panel on Environmental
! Hazards, 1977-Medical Consultant to Westvaco Corporation, New York, NY lbsearch and Training (Current Research) 8/1/80-7/31/81 - Investigation of Le,ad, Carbon Monoxide and Thiocyanate in Blood Samples-from the Third National Health and Nutrition Evaluation i Survey-(HANES III), Department of Energy - $63,250 1
9/15/79-9/30/82 -Center for Environmental Epidemiology, Environmental Protection .
Agency, $1,046,000 Other Activities Editorial board Environmental Research Refereeing: New England J Med i
Science . .
Arch Env Health I
Environmental Research Service, University -
Departmental Admissions. Committee Curriculum Committee, Graduate School of Public Health Honors 1943-46 National Scholar, Harvard Medical School -
1975-76. Macy Faculty Scholar Award .
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PUBLICATIONS .
Radford, EP, Jr. Method for estimating respiratory surface areaof mammalian
- 1. Proc Soc Exp Biol Med 87:58-61, lungs from their physical characteristics.
1954.
- 2. Radford EP, Jr., Ferris BG, Jr., Kriete BC. Clinical use of Na Engl nomogram to J Med estimate proper ventilation during artificial respiration.
251:877-884, 1954.
- 3. Radford EP, Jr. Ventilation standards for use' in artificial respiration.
J Appl Physiol 7:451-460, 1955.
Radford EP, Jr., Lefcoe NM. Effect of bronchoconstriction on elastic prop-4.
erties of excised lungs and bronchi. Am J Physiol 180:479-484, 1955.
Measurement'of lung
- 5. McIlroy MB, Mead J, Selverstone NJ, Radford EP, Jr. J Appl tissue viscous resistance using gases of equal kinematic viscosity.
Physiol 7:485-490, 1955.
- 6. Otis AB, McKerrow CB, Bartlett RA, Mead J, McIlroy MB, Selverstone NJ, Radford, EP, Jr. Me'chanical factors .in distribution of pulmonar'y ventilation.
J Appl Physiol 8:427-443, 1955.
- 7. Radford EP, Jr. Recent studies of mechanical properties of mammalian lungs.
In: Tissue Elasticity. JW Remington, ed. Am Physiol Soc., Washington, DC, '
1957, pp. 177-190.
Mead J, Whittenberger JL, Radford EP, Jr. Surface tension as a factor in
- 8. J Appl Physiol 10:191-196, 1957.
pulmonary volume-pressure hysteresis.
Static volume-pressure inter-
- 9. Frank NR, Radford EP, Jr. , Whittenberger JL.
relations of the lungs and pulmonary blood' vessels in excised cats' lungs.
J Appl Physiol 14:167-173, 1959.
- 10. Radford, EP, Jr. Factors nodifying water metabolism in rats fed dry diets.
Am J Physiol 196:1098-1108, 1959. .
- 11. Brouha L, Radford EP, Jr. The cardiovascular system in muscular activity. In:
Science and Medicine of Exercise and Sports. Harper and Brothers, New York, NY , 1960. pp 178-206.
Radford EP, Jr. Interrelationships between water and el'ectrolyte metabolism 12.
in rats. Am J Cardiol 8:863-869, 1961.
In: Artificial
- 13. Radford EP, Jr. , Whittenberger JL. Mechanical methods.
Respiration: Theory and Applications. JL Whittenberger, ed. Hoeber Medical utvision, narper and Row, New York, NY, 1962, pp 147-172.
- 14. Radford EP, Jr. Mechanical stability'of the lung. Arch Environ Health ,
6:134-138, 1963. .
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- 15. Radford EP, Jr. , Hunt VR, Sherry D. Analysis of teeth and bones for alpha-
' emitting elements. Radiat Res 19:298-315, 1963.
- 16. Hunt VR, Radford EP, Jr., Segall AJ. Comparison of concentrations of alpha-emitting elements in' teeth and bones. Int J Radiat Biol 7:277-287, 1963.
- 17. Radford EP, Jr., Hunt VR. Polonium-210: A volatile radio-element in cigarette..
Science 143:247-249, 1964.
- 18. Kleinman LI, Radford EP, Jr. Ventilation standards for small mammals. J Appl Physiol 19:360-362, 1964.
- 19. Little JB, Radford EP, Jr. Bio-assay for antidiuretic activity in blood'of undisturbed rats. J Appl Physiol 19.179-186, 1964. .
- 20. Radford, EP, Jr., Hunt VR. Cigarettes and Polonium-210. Science 144:247-249, 1964. .
- 21. Laver MB, Morgan J, Bendixen HH, Radford EP, Jr. Lung volume, compliance and arterial oxygen tensions during controlled ventilation. J Appl Physiol 19:
725-733, 1964.
- 22. Little JB, Radford EP, Jr. Effects of ionizing radiation and their importance in anesthesiology. Anesthesiology 25:479-489, 1964.
- 23. Little JB, Radford EP, Jr. Circulating antidiuretic hormone in rats: Effects of dietary electrolytes and protein. Am J Physiol 207-821-825, 1964.
- 24. Radford EP, Jr. The physics of gases. In: Handbook of Physiology, Sec. 3
. Respiration, Vol I. WO Fenn and H R Rahn, eds. Am Physiol Soc, Fashington, DC, 1964, pp 125-152.
- 25. Radford EP, Jr. Static mechanical properties of mammalian lungs. In: Handbook of Physiology, Sec. 3 Respiretion, Vol 1. WO Fenn and H Rahn, eds. Am Physiol Soc, Washington, DC. 1964, pp 429-449,
- 26. Radford EP, Jr., Hunt VR, Little JB. Polonium-210 in cigarette smokers.
Science 146:86-87, 1964.
- 27. Radford EP, Jr. Static mechanical properties of lungs in relation to age. In:
Aging of the Lung. L Cander and JH Moyer, eds. Grune and Stratton, New York.
NY, -1964. pp.152 '155.
- 28. Kleinman LI, Radford EP, Jr., Torelli G. Urea and inulin clearances in un-dinturbed, unanesthetized rats. ku J Physiol 208(3):578-584, 1965.
- 29. Hedley-Whyte J, Radford EP, Jr., Laver MB. Nomogram for temperature correction of electrode calibration during P measurements. J Appl Physiol 20:785-786, 02 1965.
- 30. Laver MB, Murphy AJ, Seifen A, Radford,EP, Jr. Blood 0 content measurements using the oxygen electrode. J Appl Physiol 20:1063-106,, 9 1965.
Fregly MJ, Harper JM,Jr., Radford EP, Jr.
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- 32. Little JB,-Radford EP, Jr., McCombs HL, Hunt VR. Distribution of Polonium-210 in pulmonary tissue of cigarette smokers. N Encl J Med 273:1343-1351, 1965.
- 33. Pontoppidan H., Hedley-Whyte J, Bendixen RH, Laver MB, Radford EP, Jr. Ventilation and oxygen requirements during prolonged artifical ventilation in pat (ents with respiratory failure. N Engl J Med 273-401-409, 1965.
- 34. Little JB, Klevay LM, Radford EP,'Jr., McGandy RB. Antidiuretic hormone in-activation by isolated perfused rat liver. Am J Physiol 211:786-792, 1966.
- 35. Vierling AF, Little JB, Radford EP, Jr. Antidiuretic hormone bio-assay in rats with hereditary hypothalamic diabetes insipidus (Brattleboro strain).
Endocrinology 80:211-214, 1967.
- 36. Little JB, Radford EP, Jr. Polonium-210 in bronchial epithelium of cigarette smokers. Science 155:606-607, 1967. -
- 37. Torelli G, Radford EP, Celentano, F, d'Angelo E. Effetto della concentrazione dell' emoglobina sulla curva di dissociazione con l'0 . Boll Soc Ital di Biol Sper. 44:1447-1449, 1967. 2
- 38. Radford EP, Torelli G. Celentano F, Cortili G. Possibilita di interazioni intermolecolari durante l'ossigenazione dell'emoglobina. Boll Soc Ital di Biol Sper. 44:1449-1452, 1967.
- 39. Bingham E, Pfitzer EA, Barkley W, Radford EP. Alveolar macrophages: Reduced number in rats after prolonged inhalation of lead sesquiozide. Science 162:
1297-1299, 1968. .
- 40. Vierling AF, Radford EP, Little JB. Circulating antidiuretic hormone in the X-irradiated rat. Radiat'Res 36:441-453, 1968.
- 41. Radford EP. Biological aspects of synergisms. In: Environmental Problems.
BR Wilson, ed. JB Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, PA, 1968. pp 160-173.
- 42. Friberg LT (Chairman) and Radford EP (Vice-Chairman). Report of the first Karolinska Institute Symposium on Environmental Health. " Maximum allowable concentrations of mercury compounds." Arch Env Health 19:891-905, 1969.
Science 165:312, 1969. .
. 44'. , Tepper LB, Radford EP. Pulmonary reactions due to the inhalation'of noxious acents. In: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine. 6th edition. -
M Wintrobe and uw Inorn, ecs. McGraw-ulli, new York, KY, 1970, pp. 1322-27.
- 45. Goldsmith JR, Radford EP. Medical aspects of air pollution. In: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 6th edition. MM Wintrobe and GW Thorn, eds.
McGraw-Hill New York; NY, 1970, pp 1329-1332. -
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- 46. Hunt VR, Radford EP, Segall AJ. Naturally occurring concentrations of alpha-cmitting isotopes in a New England population. Health Phys 19:235-243, 1970.
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- 47. Radford EP (Chairmani,Cederlof R, Epstein FH, Friberg LT, Hrubec Z . Repo.rt of the 2nd Karolinska Institute Symposium on Environmental Health. " Twin registries in the study of chronic disease." Acta Med Sc~and Suppl 523, 1971, pp. 1-40.
- 43. Radford EP. Environmental issues and the medical profession. New Physician 20:230-232, 1971.
- 49. Small KA, Radford EP, Frazier JM, Rodkey FL, Collison H. A rapid method for simultaneous measurement of carboxy-and methemoglobin in blood. J Appl Physiol 31:154-160, 1971.
- 50. Lindvall T, Radford EP. Report of the 4th Karolinska Insitute Symposium on Environmental Health. " Measurement of annoyance due to exposure to environmental factors." Environ Res 6:1-36, 1973. -
hazards in Maryland. Report for the Division of Labor and Industry, State of Maryland, 1973,
- 52. Radford EP. Mecanismes d' action des polluants adriens, particulidrment le plomb, les oxydes d' azote et les aldehydes. Rev Epidem Mao Soc et Sante Publ 22:673-686, 1974.
- 53. Radford EP, Neuberger JS. Review of human health criteria for ambient air quality standards in Maryland. Report to the Bureau of Air Quality Control, State of Maryland, 1-61, 1974.
54'. Kuller LH, Radford EP, Swift D, Perper J, Fisher R. The relationship between ambient carbon monoxide _ levels, post mortem carboxydemoglobin, sudden death and myocardial infarction. Arch Environ Health 30:477-482, 1975.
- 55. Halpin BM, Radford.EP, Fisher RF, Caplan Y. A fire fatality study. Fire Journal 69(3):11-13,98-99, 1975.
'56. Whorton MD, Levine MS, Radford EP. A preventable death from an electrical hand tool malfunction. J Occ Med 17(9):589-591, 1975.
- 57. Radford EP. Biomedical aspects of trace metals. AIChE Symposium Series 71:39-46, 1976.
'58. Radford EP. Health aspects of housing. J Occ Med 18:105-108, 1976.
- 60. Radford EP. Cancer mortality in the steel industry. Ann NY Acad Sci 271:228-238, 1976.
~
fighters. J Occ Med 18:628-632, 1976.
- 62. Radford EP, Pitt B, Halpin B, Caplan Y, Fisher R, Schweda P. Study of fire deaths in Maryland. In Physiological and Toxicological Aspects of Combustion Products. International Symposium conducted by Committee on Fire Research Commission on Sociotechnical Systems. National Academy Sciences, Washington, '
DC, 26-35, 1976.
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- 63. Radford EP, Martell EA. Polonium-210: Lead-210 ratios as an index of residence times of insoluble particles from cigarette smoke in bronchial epithelium.
Inhaled Particles IV. Edited by WH Walton, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1977 pp 567-580. .
- 64. Radford EP, Doll R, Smith PG. Mortality among patients with ankylosing spondylitis not given X-ray therapy. New Engl J Med 297:572-576, 1977.
- 65. Smith PG, Doll R, Radford EP. Cancer mortality among patients with inkylosing spondylitis not given X-ray therapy. Br J Radiol 50:728-734, 1977.
- 66. Levine M, Radford EP. Fire victims: Medical outcomes and demographic character-istics. Am J Public Health 67:1077-1079, 1977.
- 67. Laver MB, Jackson E, Sherperel M, Tung C, Tung W, Radford, EP. Hemoglobin-0 affinity regulati n: DPG, monovalent anions and hemoglobin concentration.
2 J Appl Physiol 43:632-642, 1977. .
- 68. Torelli G, Celentano F, Cortili G, D'Angelo E, Cazzaniga A, Radford, EP.
Hemoglobin-oxygen equilibrium at different hemoglobin and 2,3-diphosphoglycerate concentrations. Physiol Chem & Physics 9i21-38, 1977.
- 69. Levine M, Radford EP. Occupational exposures to cyanide in Baltimore fire fighters. J Occ Med 20:53-56, 1978.
- 70. Spivey GH, Radford EP. Inner-city housing and respiratory disease in children--
a pilot study. Arch Environ Health 34(1):23-30, 1979. ~
and cyanide on cerebral circulation and metabolism. Arch Environ Health 34(5)354-359, 1979. s
- 72. Radford, EP. . Health ef fects o f ionizing radiation. Symposium on Energy and Human Health: Human Costs of Electric Power Generation. EPA-600/9-60-030 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington. U.c., May 1980, pp.365-379.
- 73. Radford, EP. Impacts on human health from the coal and nuclear fuel cycles and other technologies associated with electric power generation and transmiss' ion.
Report to the Ohio River Basin \ Energy Study. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington DC, May 1980.
- 74. Radford, EP. Health effects of ionizing radiation. In: Health and Implications of New Energy Technologies. William N. Rom and Victor E. Archer, Eds. Ann Arbor.
Science, Ann Arbor, MI,1980. pp 67-J7.
- 75. Radford, EP. Human health effects of low doses of ionizing radiation: The
' BEIR III C ontroversy. . Radiation Res, 84:369-394, 1980.
Banbury Report 9: Quantification of Occupational Cancer. Cold Spring Harbor Lab.,-
Cold Spring Harbor, NY. ,1981, pp'151-163. (In press.)
- 77. Radford, EP. Sensitivity on health-end points: Effects on conclusions of studies.
' Environmental Health Perspectives. 42:45-51, 1982. (Id press.)
United States, 1976-80. Advancedata Report, National Center for Health Statistics, No. 76, March 17, 1982.
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r 4 ATTACHMENT 4 i POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
- OF ACCIDENTS AT THE I SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BY: F.C. FINLAYSON, Ph.D.
G.C. MINOR PREPARED FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY November, 1983 I
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POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS AT THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1.0 INTRODUCTION
If an accident involving a release of radiation were to occur at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, one of several pro-tective actions may be recommended in a effort to reduce the radiation exposure to the public. One of these involves the evacuation of some of the people in the vicinity of the plant.
In addition, there are likely to be many people who will decide to evacuate even if not advised to do so. This report analyzes the probable radiation exposure of people who may be caught in the traffic congestion during their attempt to evacuate for the cases where no protective action is recommended and where evac-uation is recommended.
2.0 THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR PLANT SITE As indicated in Figure 1, the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ("SNPS") is located on the Long Island Sound adjacent to Wading River. The plant is located about 5 miles north of the DOE Brookhaven National Laboratory, 20 miles northeast of Hauppauge, and about 12 miles west of Riverhead. Long Island is approximately 15 miles wide at the point where Shoreham is located. The major roadways in this region of the Island run
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l east-west and north-south. The plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ") designated by LILCO for SNPS is nominally 10 miles in radius (See Fig. 1) and extends from Port Jefferson on the west, to near Riverhead on the east, and along part of the Sunrice Highway (State Route 27) on the south, i
The annual meteorological conditions that have been measured for the Shoreham site and recommended by LILCO as being representative ot' typical annual conditions are presented in Table 1 (Ref. 1). The wind and weather data have been cate-i gorized in " bins" in accordance with rainfall conditions (R),
major changes (slowdowns) in wind speed (S), and wind speed and stability categories as shown in Table 1. The data show 281
- annual hours of rainfall with an accumulated annual rainfall ,
total of 33.38 inches. Wind speeds were measured at less than 5 mph for about 20% of the hours in the year, while they equalled or exceeded about 10 mph approximately 45% of the hours in the year.
As shown in Table 1, the wind at the site blows most fre-quently towards the NNE (blowing from the SSW which is repre-sented as column 2 in the Table). This occurred about 14% of the time during the year of record. The next most probable wind directions (with annual frequencies greater than 10% of .
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the time) were for winds blowing towards the NE (column 3 at 10%), ESE (column 6 at 10.4%), and SE (column 7 at 10.4%). The i probability of the wind blowing in the westerly direction --
towards Nassau County and New York City -- (columns 11, 12, and
- 13) is relatively low (about 4 to 5% for each of the direc-tions). For comparison purposes, if there were no preferred direction for the wind to blow (i.e., the probability / frequency a of the wind were constant in all directions), the uniform windrose probability would be 6.25% for each of the 16 standard
! windrose subdivisions (16 sectors of 22-1/2 degrees each).
3.0 SHOREHAM PLANT DESIGN i
The SNPS is powered by a relatively large Boiling Water Reactor ("BWR") of about 2400 MW thermal power, producing about 850 MW electrical power at rated gross power output. The phys-ical layout of the reactor within its protective containment structure is shown in Figure 2. The typical fission product inventory of the reactor core under full-power, equilibrium conditions is shown in Table 2.
The cross-sectional view of the reactor within its primary and secondary containment structures shows that the reactor pressure vessel is located near the top of the primary contain-ment structure. In the event of an accident, the containment
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Figure 2. Shoreham Mark II Containment
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Table 2. Typical Fission Product Inventory for a BWR of Shoreham S'ize hUPBER AAPE GRCUF PAREAT IN IT I A L ( CU R IES ) H A LF- LICE ( C Af S) i CC-58 7 5. 5 9 5E +0 5 7.130E+01 2 C C-6 C 7 3.371E+03 1.921E+03 3 KE-8 5 1 4. 979E+0 5 3.919E+03 4 KE-85M i 2 345E+07 1 867E-01 5 KE-87 1 4. 27; ? +07 5.278E-02 6 KE-88 1 5 768E+07 -
1 167E-01 7 EE-86 4 3.' 611E + 0 4 1 865E+01 8 SE-80 6 7.191E+07 5.200E+01 9 SE-9C E 3.878E+06 1.026E+04 10 SE-91 6 9 285E407 3. 9 5 0 E- 01 11 Y c0 8 SR.e0 4 160E+06 2.670E+00 12 Y ci 8 SE-91 8.768E+07 5 880E+01 13 ZE-95 8 1.117E+08 6.550E+01 14 Zg.e7 8 1 171E+08 7. 0 0 0 E- 01 15 NE-95 8 ZE-95 1 055E+08 3. 510 E + 31 16 MC-90 7 1 241E+08 2.751E+00 17 TC-9eM 7 MC-ge 1.071E+08 2.508E-01 18 EU-103 7 9.330E+0 7 3.959E+01 19 EU-105 7 6.158E+07 1.850E-01 20 EU-106 7 2 169E+07 3.690E+02 21 Eh-105 7 FU-105 4 .181E +0 7 1 479E+00 22 SE-127 5 5.790E+06 3.8COE+00 23 SE-129 5 2 036E+07 1.808E-01 24 TE-127 5 SE-127 5.589E+06 3. 8 9 6 E- 01 25 TE-127M 5 7.379E+05 1 090E+02 26 -
TE-129 5 SE-12e 1 910E+07 4.861E-02 27 TE-129M 5 5 024E+06 3.340E+01 28 TE-131M S 9.608E+06 1 2 5 0 E+ 00 29 TE-132 5 9.510E+07 3.250E+00 30 1-131 3 TE-131H 6. 553 E +0 7 8.040E+00 21 1-132 3 TE-132 "
9.645E+07 9.521E-02 22 I-133 3 1 380E+08 8.667E-01 23 1-134 3 1 513E+08 3.653E-02 34 I-135 3 1.301E+08 2 744E-01 35 *E-133 i I-133 1 381E+08 5. 29 0 E+ 00 36
- E-13 5 1 I-135 2.850E+07 3.82iE-01 37 CS-134 4 9 458E+06 7.524E+02 28 CS-126 4 2.933E+06 1 3COE+01 39 CS-137 4 4 903E+06 1.099E+04 40 EA-140 6 1 261E+08 1.279E+01 41 LA-140 8 BA-140 1.238E+08 1 676E+00 42 CE-141 8 1 145E+08 3 253E+01 .
43 CE-143 8 1.114E+08 1.375E+00 44 CE-144 8 6. 86 7 E +0 7 2.844E+02 l 45 FR-143 8 CE-143 1.091E408 1.358E+01 l 46 hC-147 8 4.897E+07 1.C99E+0i 47 NF-239 8 1.388E+39 2.350E+00
, 48 Ft-238 8 CF-242 8.760E+04 3.251E+04 l 49 Ft-23e 8 hF-23e 1 936E+04 8.912E+06 50 FL-240 8 CM-244 2.170E+04 2.469E+06 51 FU-241 8 4.066E+06 5.333E+03 52 AM-241 8 Ft-241 2 718E+03 1.581E+05 53 CM-242 8 1.027E+C6 1.630E+02 i
, 54 CM-244 8 6. 3 05E +3 4 6.611E+03 i l
1 I
1 has been designed to cause steam released from the reactor vessel to flow through the drywell region into the downcomer pipes to the wetwell and suppression pool located in the bottom of the primary containment structure.
The principal design function of the suppression pool is to condense the steam released by the accident, thereby reduc-ing the pressure within the primary containment. Under design basis accident conditions, the suppression system is designed to condense the steam and thus absorb the energy in the form of heat which is released by the accident. However, when accident conditions are severe, sufficient steam may be generated so that the temperature of the pool reaches the boiling point as-sociated with the pressure within the primary containment structure (the so-called " saturation" condition). At this point, the effectiveness of the condensation process is sub- ,
stantially reduced and the steam temperature and pressure with-in the containment structure will increase unless the accident can be brought under control.
If the accident is not brought under control, sufficient energy may be released to cause the pressure of the steam, com-bined with the pressure of noncondensible gases released in the accident, to exceed the strength of the primary containment l
l 1
structure walls and the containment could fail. With the failure of the primary containment structure, fission product laden vapors and gases would escape to the secondary contain-ment structure. If the accident were controlled before core melting was extensive (as it was at Three Mile Island, for ex-ample) the vaporized and particulate fission produ ts could be substantially filtered before they were released, as they passed through the station ventilation systems. However, larger, relatively unfiltered releases to the external environ-ment could occur if the ventilation filters became saturated and clogged with vaporized material from the melting core and lost their filtering effectiveness.
In a severe core melt accident, the suppression pool could fulfill another significant role besides its primary function of condensing the steam released in the accident. The water in the pool itself could be an effective trap for released fission product vapors and particulates. Under ideal conditions, a large portion of the released gases and vapors would have to flow through the suppression pool before they would escape from a damaged containment structure and be released through the vent stacks. As long as water remained above the level of the downcomers in the pool, it would serve as an effective mecha-nism for scrubbing many of the more hazardous fission products i
4
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I i
from the vapors escaping from the molten reactor core as they 1 flowed through the pool. However, for some accidents, the sup-pression pool could be bypassed and the scrubbing action of the water in the pool would not occur. Accident sequences which bypass the suppression pool, though they are projected to be relatively low in probability, could be especially severe.
4.0 SEVERE ACCIDENT SEQUENCES AND CHARACTERISTICS 1
The principal failure mechanisms by which fission products I could be released from the primary containment structure are by overpressurization leading to a rupture of the wall; leakage through penetration openings provided for passing pipes and electrical conduits through the containment walls, manned access ways, etc.; and by pipe breaks that may be associated with loss-of-coolant accidents occuring outside the primary containment structure. Five principal accident categories for BWRs in which substantial losses of fission products to the at-mosphere could occur were defined in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1400) prepared by the NRC (Ref. 2). These accident categories and descriptions of the associated releases are shown in Table 3. Also shown in Table 3 are the five Shoreham-specific accident categories and releases that were developed by Science Applications, Inc. ("SAI") for use in the I
l 1
i
TAB [E 3 .
SLD9 FRY OF MEIDENTAL REIEASE CA11XX) RIES
. NO ASSOCIA1TD RADIOtCCLIDE SOLBCE 1TRPG CDPfrAIP4fNr DlEATION MRNIDG EIEVATION DEPGY PROBABILITY TIPE OF OF TIPE EUR OF REIEASE E1UCTION OF CNE IPNENIORY REIEASED .
REIEASE per Rt2 EASE REIEASE EVKUATION REIEASE 6
CAurx*Y Reactor-Yr (itr) (lir) (fir) (Meters) (10 BtuAir) Xe-Kr I Cs-Rb 1b-Sb Eb-Sr Ru(88 la(b)
WASil-1400 RESULTS
-6
- 1.0 0.40 0.40 0.70 0.05 0.50 0.005 IMt 1 1x10 2.0 2.0 1.5 25 130
~0 1.0 0.90 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.004 EMt 2 6x10 30.0 3.0 2.0 0 30 IMt 3 2x10~ 30.0 3.0 2.0 25 20 1.0 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.020 0.003
-6 ~4 ~3 -3 ~4 But 4 2x10 5.0 2.0 2.0 25 WA 0.6 8x10 5x10 4x10 6x10 6x10 - 0.0001
-4 ~4 6x10
~II 4x10
~9 8x10
-12 8x10
~I IMt 5 1x10 3.5 5.0 WA 150 N/A 5x10 O O 8
3} Sis 0RDIAM SPECIFIC RESULTS SAI 1 1x10~ 2.0 6.0 1.5 60 10 0.99 0.024 0.039 0.17 0.0039 0.0220 0.0038 *
-4 0.98 0.0425 0.082 0.15 0.003 0.015 0.0023 5AI2 1x10 25.0 20.0 2.0 60 50 SAI 3 4x10~ 2.0 6.0 1.5 60 10 0.99 0.0127 0.044 0.17 0.005 0.020 0.0039
-6 0.99 0.058 0.10 0.21 0.022 SAI 4 6x10 1.5 10.0 1.0 60 60 0.'0041 0.0034
-8 0.99 0.725 0.69 0.59 0.18 0.039 0.0061 SAI 5 2x10 1.0 1.0 0 60 6 KDEL OF IMI KOIFICATIOf610 WASH-1400 IMI 1 ...... 30.0 3.0 2.0 25 20 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.02 0.003 (t) Includes M), Rh, 1b, Co.
(b) Incluttrs NJ, Y, Ce, Pr, la, M), Asa, On, Pu, f(), Zr.
.4 Y
l probablistic risk assessment ("PRA") for SNPS which it performed for LILCO (Ref. 1). The probabilities for the SAI accident sequences were revised based upon the results of a Suffolk County-sponsored review of the SAI PRA that was conducted by Future Resources Associations, Inc. ("FRA") (Ref.
3). Table 3 also includes a model of the fission product releases defined by Battelle Memorial Institute ("BMI") in their as yet unpublished report on the results of the current NRC studies of possible revisions to WASH 1400 source terms for i severe reactor accidents in BWRs (Ref. 4).
The WASH 1400 BWR release characteristics are included be-cause they represent the most thoroughly reviewed and analyzed source term values for fission product releases from severe core melt accidents that have been approved by the NRC. They are also the only source term definitions that have been approved by the NRC for use in emergency planning to date. The SAI/FRA values are included because they are based on a more up to date, but as yet unapproved, technical foundation than the WASH 1400 estimates. Moreover, the SAI source terms were spe-cifically developed to represent the Shoreham Plant character-istics in a LILCO-sponsored study (See also Ref. 1). The ex-trapolated values resulting from the on-going BMI study were included because they represent potential state-of-the-art 9
I improvements to the WASH 1400 BWR releases. The modelled results are based upon accident sequences corresponding approx-imately to the BWR 2 and 3 release categories of WASH-1400.
This new source term model has been included for comparison purposes. The values shown in Table 3 for the model of the BMI releases assume a priori that there has been an accident (i.e.,
no absolute values have been projected for the probability of the accident sequence). For emergency planning purposes, the relative probability of the accident is assumed to be equal to 1.
No attempt has been made in this^ report to select the "best" source term model for releases from the Shoreham plant.
Though other models for source terms have been proposed, those shown in Table 3 are believed to be representative of the source term models available within the current state-of-the-art.
Several critical parameters for emergency planning purposes are defined for the accident categories in Table 3.
They are the time of release (after accident initiation); the duration of the release; the warning time for evacuation; and the radionuclide release fra'ctions. Values for the release times vary between one hour and about one day for WASH 1400, the BMI-models and the SAI categories. The quantities of fission products available for release to the atmosphere are related to the release times by the half-lives of the fission products. The release rate for fission products from the con-tainment structure is related to the quantities available at the release time and the duration of the release. Most of the accidents are associated with relatively brief initial puff-like releases (of the order of one hour in duration).
However, a few of the accidents are associated with very long, nearly one day, release periods. Long release periods reduce the fission-product release rates for such accidents to rela-tively low values, with consequent reductions in potential doses compared to other accident categories with puff-like releases of equivalent quantities of fission products. As in-dicated in Table 3, the warning times that have been assessed for evacuation for all of the categories shown are very short, ranging from zero to two hours.
The radionuclide release fractions for four of the five SAI accident categories (Categories 1 through 4) are quite similar to one another. These SAI fission product release source terms are somewhat smaller (in general) than the WASH-1400, BWR 1 and BWR 2 source terms. The SAI source terms for SAI 1 through SAI 4 compare most directly with the BWR 3 source
terms of WASH-1400 or the BMI modifications to the WASH-1400 source terms.
When consequence results are calculated and integrated for all the individual release source term categories for a repre-sentative set of core melt accidents (i.e., the five WASH-1400 source term categories, or the five SAI source term categories), the results depend strongly upon the times and du-rations of releases defined for the set and the absolute condi-l tional (or corresponding) probabilities of the categorized se-quences themselves. Mean values of the probabilities of the accident classes are shown in Table 3. The absolute values of the mean frequencies of the accident categories are all low.
The most probable accident classes, SAI Categories 1 and 2, have mean expected frequencies of the order of 1:10,000 years (1 x 10-4/ year), in accordance with the County's estimates de-rived by Future Resources Associates, Inc. (Ref. 3, p. 65).
The least probable accident category considered is SAI Category 5.
l l
I
5.0 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS Probable doses at various distances and for various expo-sure times have been computed for the individual categories of all the accident source term sequences shown in Table 3. The results for complete sets of sequences were then integrated in accordance with the conditional probabilities of the individual source term categories. These integrated results for the l
WASH-1400 sets of release source term categories, the SAI l
release categories, and the BMI models are presented and discussed below. The presentation is subdivided into an analysis of consequences which might occur if no special pro-tective actiono were taken by the public and those that might occur if evacuation was used as a protective action mode.
The results were calculated using the state-of-the-art statistical consequence analysis code, CRAC2. (CRAC2: Calcu-lation of Reactor Accident Consequences, Modification 2). The CRAC2 code was used with the meteorological input for the Shoreham site of Table 1, and the fission-product inventory
- defined in Table 2 in the performances of the calculations.
Over 100 individual accident sequences were calculated for each accident source term category and the results were statisti-cally sampled from data representing cloud transport conditions
- l. . .
O O for a year's unique meteorological conditions for the site.
The statistical results of these radioactive cloud transport and corresponding health effects calculations are discussed below.
5.1 Consequences of Accidents Where No Special Protective Actions Are Taken by the Public.
The results of the consequence calculations described above are shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5 for a model of public response where the people are assumed to take no special pro-tective actions for an entire day in response to the accident conditions. The model characterizes the public as going about their daily lives as though conditions were normal for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period of exposure to the radioactive fission products released in the event.
The characteristic average shielding factors that were used to model these conditions were based upon the factors used for similar models in the NRC's original planning document, NUREG-0396. The representative shielding factors as they were used in the CRAC2 calculations are shown in Table 4 for " normal activity -- no protective actions". The NUREG-0396 cloud shielding factor of 0.75 represents a relatively substantial shielding factor. When compared with LILCO's estimate of the
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Table 4. Shielding Factor Projections Population Shielding Factors Status Cloud Ground Preparing 0.75 0.33 Evacuationfgr _/
During Evacuation S! 1.0 0.7 During Sheltering $! 0.7 0.1 Normal Activity 0.75 0.33
-- No Pro ective Actions _4 l
b! Data from NUREG 0396 S! Data from PRA Procedures Guide NUREG/CR 2300 Vol. II
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i! Data from NUREG 0396
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average cloud shielding factor for the Long Island area about the Shoreham site of 0.7, it can be seen that " normal activity"
, would seem to imply that a considerable fraction of each day (about 80%) is spent within some form of rather effective shel-i ter. The ground dose shielding factor of 0.33 is also a substantial reduction over the relatively unsheltered conditions experienced during evacuation -- where the ground dose shielding factor is only 0.7.
A comparison of Figures 3, 4 and 5 shows that the WASH-1400 source term results produce the most serious consequences
! of the three sets of accident categories reviewed. At the edge of the 10-mile EPZ, the WASH-1400 source terms yield a proba-bility of about 2% of exceeding 200 rems -- the threshold dose for the induction of early fatalities. The probability of ex-ceeding 30 rems -- the threshold dose for induction of early injuries -- is slightly over 30% at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ. Inside the EPZ, there is 50% probability of exceeding 100 rems at 2 miles, of exceeding 50 rems at 5 miles, and of ex-ceeding 30 rems at 7 miles, for the "no protective action" case.
The modest reduction in the source terms associated with I
the model of the BMI modifications to the WASH-1400 source
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. I terms, as shown in Figure ~4, produces rather substantial reductions in the calculated consequences. The probability of I
exceeding 200 rems at the EPZ boundary is reduced to about 0.2%. The probability of exceeding 30 rems remains at about 30% at the edge of the EPZ. Within the EPZ, however, a proba-bility of 50% or more of exceeding 100 rems exists out to about 3 miles, of exceeding 50 rems at 5 miles, of exceeding 30 rems at about 7 miles. Thus, results for the probabilities of ex-ceeding doses of 100 rems (or less) are quite similar to those of WASH-1400 within the EPZ for the BMI model of potentially reduced BWR source terms. The most significant differences are observed for the 200 rem threshold for life threatening doses.
The consequences calculated for the SAI derived, Shoreham-specific source terms (with FRA's modifications to the conditional probabilities for the set of sequences) show a rather substantial similarity to the BMI modifications. There is a slightly lower probability of about a 1% of exceeding 200 rems at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ. But at 40%, the probabil-ity of exceeding 30 rems at the same distance is somewhat higher than the corresponding BMI model probability. Again, l l
the 50% probability results for exceeding doses of 100, 50, and 30 rems within the EPZ are very similar for all three sets of source terms. A 50% probability exists of exceeding 100 rems l
. 6 at a distance of 2 miles from the plant, or 50 rems at 5 miles, or 30 rems at 8 miles for the SAI source terms as well as the WASH-1400 set. At doses lower than 200 rems, and probabilities of exceeding the doses of the order of 50%, the differences between consequence calculations for the several sets of source terms are not major.
1 5.2 Accident Consequences Associated with Evacuation Proce-dures A set of calculations was performed for each of the individual accident release categories defined in the WASH-1400, SAI Shoreham specific, and BMI model source terms of Table 3. In these calculations, estimates of the impact of people being essentially immobilized in the EPZ as a result of their being caught in stagnant traffic queues were made by varying exposure durations from very short times (0.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) to an entire 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period as an extreme case. The evacuation shielding factors from Table 4 (cloud shielding = 1.0; ground shielding = 0.7) were used to model the conditions that would be experienced by passengers in an automobile, if they were im-mobilized in the traffic congestion induced queue for the parametrically investigated exposure times. Composite results are shown in Figures 6 thru 11 for integrated source term sets F
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l for the probability of exceeding a 200 rem threshold dose for early fatalities and for a 30 rem threshold case for early injuries. (See Ref. 1, page 14 for further explanation of threshold doses). The results are displayed in the figures as a function of the exposure time parameters for the probabilites of exceeding the various doses.
An evacuation model was developed and employed by PRC Voorhees to estimate evacuation times for the 10 mile EPZ as-suming there were an evacuation advisory and that substantial numbers of persons not advised to evacuate did go voluntarily.
Figures 12 and 13 show the critical segments of evacuation routes within or crossing into the EPZ on which significant consequences may occur as a result of traffic congestion. The results of the time estimates for traffic congestion-induced queues and resul ting potential periods of exposure to radioactivity are tabulated on Figures 12 and 13. With maximum probable exposure times derived from projected traffic delays at critical traffic flow points, the data from Figures 6 to 11 were applied to estimate the probabilities of exceeding the threshold doses for early fatalities (200 rems) and injuries (30 rems). Those results are also tabulated on the Figures 12 and 13 along with corresponding distances and maximum probable exposure periods.
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- 3. Rt. 495: tung Island 7- 8 miles 0.1 hrs <0.01
- 0.1% 10 - 30%
Dipresswsy (E. of Rt. 46 to Rt. 25. Midfie Omsity Rd.)
- 4. Rt. 25A: (Pert Jefferscm to - 15 miles 2- 4 hrs .01 - In 20 - 30%
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(S. of 27As Sound Ave. to ,
Rt. 27: Exit 61)
- 8. Rt. 27: Sunrise Express- 10 - !! miles 0.3 - 5 hrs <.01 - 0.2% 10 - 20%
way (W. of Exit 61 to Exit 58: No. Floyd Pkwy)
FICLNtE 13
It can be seen that the most severe potential consequences occur for evacuees moving directly south from the Shoreham site along the William Floyd Parkway (Route 46 on Figure 12). Three major points of traffic congestion occur along Route 46 between Route 25A (passing near the plant boundary) and the intersec-tion with the Long Island Expressway (a point about 8 miles south of the plant). Though delays are nominal in the closest in congestion point (about 3 miles south of the plant), expo-sures as short as six minutes (0.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) at this location result in a 1 to 5% probability of receiving a radiation dose of 200 rems or greater. At the same location and for corre-sponding potential exposure periods, there is a probability of 40 to 60% of exceeding a 30 rem dose. Though longer exposure periods could be experienced at other congestion points along this route (up to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> delays have been projected) the corre-sponding probabilities of exceeding the threshold doses for early fatalities (200 rem) are relatively low (on the order of 0.01%), while the probability of exceeding the 30 rem threshold for early injuries covers a range of from 40 to 50%.
Similar estimates were made for the other critical routes as tabulated in Figures 12 and 13. Although the portions of the Long Island Expressway which are within the EPZ are 7-10 miles from the plant, relatively large probabilities of
exceeding threshold doses were calculated for critical sections of the LIE. East of Route 46, traffic is projected to flow i relatively freely. But even at nominal levels of projected ex-1 posure of 0.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the probability of exceeding 30 rems ranges i from 10 to 30% along this sector. West of Route 46, traffic j
d congestion is expected to mount rapidly and evacuees at criti-i cal intersections are projected to experience substantial j delays on the order of 3 to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. Under these conditions, the probability of receiving threshold doses exceeding 200 rem ranges from 0.2% to 2%. The probability of exceeding 30 rems under such conditions is projected at a range of 20% to 30%.
There are also critical areas of congestion alona Route 25A on sector 4 (see Figure 12) and sector 5 which includes parts of Routes 25A and 347 (see Figure 13). Although potential exposure limits are somewhat shorter along these
, routes than those projected for the LIE west of Route 46, the probabilities of receiving doses in excess of 200 rems are still estimated to be as high as 1% to 4% for the two routes respectively. Probabilities of exposures to doses in excess of 30 rems along these two route segments (4 and 5) range from 20%
to 50%.
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For route sectors 6 to 8, the probabilities of exceeding I life threatening doses are somewhat smaller than those l l
discussed above. However, the potential for exceeding injury related threshold doses is still quite high. These probabilities range from 10% to 40% -- the highest value being calculated to occur at the closest in congestion point on Route 25 (sector 6 in Figure 13).
6.0 CONCLUSION
S The studies which have been conducted show the effect of the distance from the plant and the period of potential expo-sure to radiation on the probability of receiving substantial doses. The results suggest that if the evacuation is not -
accomplished rapidly within the EPZ, the chances of receiving doses of 30 rems or more could increase dramatically with time of exposure. The results also show that the exposure times will be increased due to congestion at critical traffic loca-tions which result in large queues of up to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> in dura-tion. These queues are caused by a combination of people rec-ommended to evacuate and those who voluntarily evacuate. The queues are long enough to cause evacuees to receive serious doses from a passing plume and/or a ground dose. In some cases there are people, such as voluntary evacuees from the east end, 1
i . o I
i
- whose chosen evacuation routes may actually take them closer to the plant (e.g. LIE Routes and Route 27A when traveling from east to west), and subject them to greater potential radiation i exposure. For the case where no protective action is taken the potentially long exposure times will result in serious doses to those within the EPZ.
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References
- 1. F.C. Finlayson Ph.D., E.P. Radford M.D., " Basis for Selec-tion of Emergency Planning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plants, Suffolk County, New York." F.C. Finlayson and Associates, October 1982.
- 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reactor Safety Study:
An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-75/014 (Main Report), October 1975,
- p. 78.
- 3. Budnitz, R.J.; Davis, P.R.; Fabic S; Lambert, H.E.,
" Review and Critique of Previous Probabilistic Accident Assessments for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," Fu-ture Resources Associates, Inc., (in two Volumes) 17 September 1982.
- 4. J.A. Gieseki, P. Cybulskis, R.S. Denning, M.R. Kuhlman, K.W. Lee, "Radionuclide Release Under Specific LWR Accident Conditions -- Vol. II BWR, MARK I Design" Bat-telle Columbus Laboratories' BMI-2104s DRAFT (To Be Published), Received at NRC July 1983.
9 4 ATTACilMENT 5 1
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Attachment 5 4
s HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION AT THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT i
I
- Prepared By
. Edward P. Radford, M.D.
i November 18,.1983.
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HEALTH EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION AT THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT The effects of exposure to radiation may be divided into two categories, early or delayed. They are not necessarily mu-tually exclusive. The early effects of radiation exposure can readily be determined by the relatively rapid onset of charac-teristic symptoms and signs. The delayed effects of radiation i
occur only after long periods of apparent dormancy following exposure (sometimes a matter of decades) and are generally assessed chiefly on a statistical basis.
Early effects (sometimes called " acute" effects), general-ly occur from within a few days up to 60 to 90 days after expo-sure. They may include fatalities and/or illnesses. Delayed effects (sometimes called " latent" effects), may occur at any time throughout the normal lifetime of an individual. Latent periods of 10 years or more (during which no effects would be medically observed in an exposed individual) are common to most delayed radiological health effects.
A. Early Effects The main contributors to early fatalities are bone marrow depletion and lung damage due to exposure to (a) the radioac-tive cloud, (b) fission products deposited on the ground by the passing cloud, and (c) inhalation or ingestion of radionuclides in the cloud. Of the radionuclides in the cloud and on the
ground, the dominant contributors to these early effects are Kr-88, Sr-89, Ru-106, Te-132, I-131, I-132, I-133 and I-135, Cs-134, Ba-140 and Ce-144. Early illnesses are dominated by cases of respiratory impairment and/or temporary discomfort from vomiting. Not everyone exposed to radioactive doses suf-ficiently large to induce some early fatalities or illnesses may be victims of such effects. However, survivors of early effects may subsequently experience delayed effects.
The probability of occurrence of early fatalities goes i
)
from zero to unity over a rather narrow range of radiation dose. The threshold level at which early deaths may occur is associated with whole body doses of about 200 rem, irrespective of treatment methods for exposed individuals. On the assump-tion that minimal standards of medical treatment are taken, the mid-range (50 percent probability) of individual risks of early fatalities within 60 days (the so-called "LD-50/60" value) is about 300 rem. If substantial hospitalization and medical support were available to those exposed to such levels, the risks for early fatalities with " supportive" treatment ranges from chances of about 3 percent at 400 rem; to 50 percent at 510 rem; to about 100 percent at 615 rem.
Other specific physical effects may also result from local doses, e.g., thyroid cancers and localized thyroid doses. How-ever, the whole-body dose (a generalized dose to the entire body) is a more broadly applicable dose for assessing the
health impacts of a wide variety of effects. At a given distance from the reactor, bone marrow doses would frequently be slightly larger than whole-body doses. However, for all practical purposes, the magnitudes of the whole body doses may be considered to be essentially equivalent to the magnitudes of projected bone marrow doses. Therefore, all further discussion .
of doses will be in whole body doses.
The range of doses over which the probability of early illnesses (as opposed to fatalities) goes from zero to unity is also quite narrow. The individual risks of early illness range from a 30 percent chance at 100 rem, to 80 percent at 300 rem, to almost 100 percent at 400 rem. The chances of incurring early illnesses that might require treatment become negligible at doses of less than 50 rem. The threshold of detectable changes in blood cells is commonly associated with doses of about 25 to 30 rem. At such dose levels, cellular changes would only be observable temporarily.
There is now relatively little controversy over the dose-health effects relationships for early fatalities and ill-nesses. Risk relationships at these relatively high-dose levels are supported by human evidence gathered from a number of instances of accidental overexposures. However, when single
(" point") values are given for a probabilistically determined parameter, such as the LD-50/60 (50% deaths in 60 days), it must be recognized that the probabilistic definition of the i
l
. 4 parameter is incomplete without some specification of the range of uncertaincy in the given point value. For instance, the un-certainty in the nominal LD-50/60 estimates cited above for ex-tensive supportive treatment (510 rems) covers a range from 400 to 600 rem.
B. Delayed Effects Delayed effects can include cancers, teratogenic effects on the developing fetus, or genetic effects. However, the great majority of delayed radiation-induced health effects are the solid cancers (primarily cancer of the thyroid, the lung, the breast in women, most digestive organs, and the urinary tract). In my opinion, these delayed effects constitute a major potential health threat in a nuclear plant accident and they must be carefully considered in emergency planning.
The evolving evidence suggests that radiation can induce cancer in any tissue in the body. Radiation induced solid cancers characteristically have long latent periods after irradiation before tangible evidence of their existence can be found in a group of individuals. Except for leukemia, cancers seldom appear before 10 years after irradiation. Thereafter, the cancers have a probability (depending on exposure levels) of appearing at any time throughout an individual's lifetime, this probability remaining constant relative to the likelihood of developing cancer as age increases. Prior to the BEIR III report, this period of constant probability -- a co-called
. 4
" plateau" period -- was sometimes assumed to end at 30 years following exposure, after which the incremental probability of cancer induction from the exposure to radiation was assumed to drop to negligible levels. Since the BEIR III re-analysis of cancer induction data, the plateau period has generally been extended indefinitely until death occurs -- a period which may substantially exceed 30 years.
In addition, it shorld be noted that cancers induced by radiation are indistinguishable from those occurring naturally.
As suggested by the individual probabilities of radiation-induced cancer induction, the existence of radiation-induced cancers in a segment of the population exposed to relatively low doses of radiation (i.e., on the order of a few rems or less) could only be inferred on the basis of statistical observations that indicate an excess in cancer occurrence above natural incidence levels. At current mortality rates, an L
l individual's lifetime probability of death by cancer is about 0.175 (i.e., in a million deaths, 175,000 would result from cancer). With respect to human populations, a valuable source of statistical data on cancer incidence and mortality is the populations of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, who were subjected to widespread doses of radiation as a result of the atomic bomb explosions in those cities during World War II.
The available evidence indicates that the risk of cancer increases linearly in direct proportion to the level of I' -
radiation dose received by an individual. The risk of additional cancers caused by radiation is often expressed in dose terms'of person-rems -- that is, the sum of the total dose received by a all of the persons exposed to a particular event.
For instance, if an accident occurred in which one million peo-ple were each exposed to one rem, that population would receive a million person-rems. Until recently, it was commonly accept-ed that in a population receiving a million person-rems, an ad-ditional 150 cancer mortalities would occur above normal levels (i.e., 150 in excess of the 175,000 cancer deaths per million natural deaths). Now, however, it is becoming increasingly clear from new data on the populations of Nagasaki and Hiroshima that risks of cancer mortality are substantially greater.
The new Japanese data consist largely of two new pieces of evidence. The first is the discovery that the dosimetry used to estimate the doses received by the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was faulty and in fact generally overestimated the exposure doses. See, e.g., " Reassessment of Atomic Bomb Radia-tion Dosimetry on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Report of a Joint U.S.-Japanese Workshop," Radiation Effects Research Foundation (Feb. 1983). Thus, the increased fatal cancers (above natural incidences) that are evident in these Japanese populations are a result of lower doses than originally believed. This implies that the dose-to-fatal-cancer incidence relationships l
l previously derived should be increased to account for this new observation.
The second piece of evidence stems from recent followup studies of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki populations. See, e.g.,
Wakabayashi, Kato, Ikeda, and Schull, " Studies of the Mortality of A-Bomb Survivors, Report 7; Part III - Incidents of Cancer in 1956-1968 Based on the Tumor Registry, Nagasaki," Radiation Research, Vol. 93 (Jan. 1983). These studies show that excess cancers are now rising sharply among that portion of the Japanese population which was under 20 at the time of the atom-ic bomb explosions (almost 40 years ago). As the latency period for this population has extended, the evidence shows that far more cancer cases are occurring than would be expected based upon the commonly-used figure of 150 additional fatal cancers per million person-rems. Therefore, in light of the new Japanese data, the point estimate of the expected number of fatal cancers must be increased to at least 400 fatal cancers per million person-rems. This figure is " conservative," howev-er, in the sense that the new data could also support as many as 800 fatal cancers per million person-rems.
When considering radiation-induced cancers, however, it is important to take into account not only cancer fatalities, but all incident cancers. This is true for many reasons. First, cancer is probably the most feared of all potentially life-threatening diseases, and the psychological impact of-l
contracting cancer can be profound. Second, cancer treatments often involve mutilating surgery or the ose of very powerful drugs with major side effects. These treatments can be seri-ously debilitating in both a physical and psychological sense and are frequently very expensive in terms of both time and money. Finally, the residual effects of treatments can persist for the rest of person's life; e.g., the necessity to take thy-roid hormone replacement if the thyroid tissue is completely removed by surgery for a thyrcid cancer.
For all these reasons, the exclusive use of fatal cancers as the sole basis for determining radiogenic cancer risk is unwarranted, especially in light of the accumulating evidence about the numerical incidence of radiation-induced cancers that are not necessarily the primary cause of death, or for which long-term cure rates are achieved. Important cancers in this category are cancers of the female breast, with a five-year survival rate of 50 percent or more, and thyroid cancer, with a cure rate for the types induced by radiation of 80 percent or more. Because cancers other than skin cancer have an overall fatality rate of about 50 percent, use of cancer incidence as a criterion of risk from radiation results in a doubling of the risk estimates derived for cancer mortality projections. Thus, for total incidence of cancers, a value of about 800 cases of cancer per million person-rems is a conservative good current' estimate based on the absolute risk model. However, the new
Nagasaki tumor registry data appear to support a somewhat higher value in the range of 1200 to 1600. Thus, based upon !
the newly interpreted Japanese data, the range of uncertainty for the current estimates is believed to be about a factor of two either way.
C. The Health Effects Associated With An Accident at Shoreham Data developed by Dr. Finlayson and Mr. Minor indicate that people located in a queue approximately 10 miles from the Shoreham plant would have a 30 percent chance of receiving a 30 rem whole body dose in the event of a serious accident. Those people probably would not experience any acute effects; howev-er,.their lifetime chance of developing cancer would increase by about 21 percent over the normal rate. While this incremental increase may not seem particularly dramatic, the statistics become more alarming when many members of a popula-tion of thousands of people receive 30 rems. Such a situation becomes likely where the local population distribution is more dense or people attempting to flee an accident are caught in traffic queues. For instance, in the case of Shoreham, this could occur if the plume was blowing to the west of the plant (an area which is heavily populated) or to the south where the County's traffic experts project that thoucands of people will be sitting in slow-moving queues on the Sunrise Highway (which is right on the edge of the 10-mile EPZ).
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Data developed by Dr. Finlayson and Mr. Minor also indi- !
cate that a person located in a queue approximately 10 miles from the plant might have a two percent chance of receiving a dose of 200 rems. Acute illnesses will likely be experienced by the persons who receive this dose and there would be a small chance of some early deaths. If individuals received doses of this level, they might also suffer a 100 percent increase in their chances of cancer induction over their lifetimes.
D. Conclusion The most recent evidence indicates that the risk of cancer induction as a result of exposure to radiation are higher than has been projected previously. This fact has serious consequences for implementing protective actions within an EPZ.
Radiological emergency response plans and protective action criteria must now be developed with an extra measure of conser-vatism so as to reduce the probability, insofar as it is rea-sonable, that people might be accidentally exposed to ionizing radiation.
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somewhat different attitudes than those firemen whom we were able to contact.1/
All the interviewing was conducted from a rented telephone facility in Melville, New York. Interviewing was done on the evenings of September 28, September 30, and during the day on Saturday, October 2, 1982. Evening calls were made between the hours of 6:00 and 10:00 p.m., and Saturday calls were made between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All the inter-viewers were experienced and trained people who had previously performed surveys for Social Data Analysts, Inc.
Q. Please describe the questionnaire used in the firemen
. survey.
A. The questionnaire was prepared by me in consultation with Drs. Erikson and Johnson.
We conducted an informal pretest with the Riverhead fire Commissioners, and a telephone pretest with six firemen.
-1/ of the 323 firemen we were able to contact on the tele-phone, 32, or 10 percent, refused to participate in the survey. For the majority of the remaining firemen with whom we did not complete interviews (i.e., the 144 firemen other than the 323 who were actually contacted), we were unable to reach them, either receiving no answer or busy signals on the four or more attempts we made.
(These six were not called upon to respond to the final questionnaire.) Based upon the telephone pretest, the final questionnaire was prepared after consultation with Dr. Erikson.
A copy of the questionnaire is Attachment 3 hereto.
After the telephone interviews were completed, the survey instruments were checked to make sure that they had been filled out properly, the data were entered directly onto the computer, verified for entry errors, and analyzed using a standard sta-tistical program.
O. Please describe the results of the volunteer firemen survey.
A. The questionnaire asked, among others, the following question:
Assuming that the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you were at work on a weekday morning and there was an accident at Shoreham. Everyone living within ten miles of plant was advised to evacuate. Volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation. What do you think you would do first?
first, you would report to the fire station so that you could help with fire fighting and evacuation in the 12 -
I
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- evacuation zone, or first; you would make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone, or first; you would leave the evacuation Zone to make sure that you were in a safe place, or first; you would do something else (SPECIFY) .
Don't know.
The survey results indicate that a significant percentage of firemen would first ensure the safety of their families before attempting to report for duty. In response to the above question; 68 percent of the firemen said that they would first make sure that their families were safely out of the evacuation zone, whereas only 21 percent said that they would first report to the fire station to help with evacuation or firefighting.
One percent said that they would leave the evacuation zone; 7 percent said that they would do something else (generally involving an activity which would delay their reporting to duty), and 4 percent said that they did not know what they would do.
For those firemen who said that they would first make sure l that their fanily was safely out of the evacuation zone, we i
asked the tollowing question:
i I
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t How would you make sure that your family was safely out of the evacuation zone?
,go home and drive your family to a safe place out of the evacuation zone call home and tell your family to leave without you
., \
sode other way (SPECIFY) .
Don't know.
Fifty-one percent said that they would call home and tell their family to leave without them; 32 percent said that they would drive their family to a safe place outside the evacuation zone; 12 percent,said that they would seek to protect their ik family in some other way (generally involving an activity such-as taking a boat to Connecticut which would delay their re-porting to work); and 5 percent said that they did not know what they would do. These results are shown in Table 2, which is Attachment 4 hereto.
Combining the answers to these two questions, we.a constructed an index which suggests that 55 percent would at- >
tempt to report to work relatively quickly; 36 percent would >#
look after the safety of themselves and their family in a way
\
which wo0ld prevent them from reporting quickly to duty, and 8 percent did not know what they would do.2/'
\
l 2/' In constructing this index; we defined those who would
" report to work quickly"'as those who said.they would (Footnote cont'dLnext page) i
i 4
From both the pretests and the actual interviews with the firemen, it was evident that the situation we posed for them did produce significant role conflict. Most of the firemen
- \ ( would want to help in an emergency such as would be created in
>\
the event of a nuclear accident; but they also feel a strong sense of obligation t$ their families. The data lead to the conclusion that at least a significant minority of firemen would resolve this role conflict by attending to the needs of their families rather than reporting to duty.
(
(Footnote cont'd from previous page) first report\ to th fire station (response 1 to question 18), or those'Who said they would first make sure that their family wa'sgshfely out of the evacuation zone by calling home and telling the family to leave without them (response 2 to question 19, following response 2 to question 18). We defined those "who would not report quickly for duty".as those who said they would leave the evacuation zone to make sure they were in a safe place (response 3 to question 18), those who said they would go home and drive their families to a safe place out of the evacuation zone ( r'e spons e 1 to question 19, following re-sponse 2 to question 8), those who said they would do something else first (response 4 to question 18), or those s who would make sure their families were safe some other way (response 3 to question'19, aftar response 2 to
! question 18). An examination of th'en specific responses given by firemen wie responded to the "something else" option in questionE 18 or 19, indicatedfthat they would i ,
deal with the role conflict in some way which would make it difficult for'them to report to work quickly. For ex- l c s ample, several of them said they would:try to evacuate by l boat. !
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15 -
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i This conclusion was supported by answers given to the l agree / disagree questions. For example, 92 percent of the l
firemen agreed that: "In the event of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, it would be the obligation of everyone to first look after the health and safety7 of their family." Only 5 percent disagreed with this and 3 percent had no opinion. On the other i
hand, only 17 percent agreed with the statement that: "In the event of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, a volunteer fireman must-pl' ace, duty to the fire' department over duty to family."
- Seventy-seven pbrcent disagreed with this and 6 percent had no i
opinion. ,
I
! C. In your opinion, do the results of these two surveys support the contention that a substantial number of emergency 3
workers relied upon by LILCO will not report promptly for duty in the event of a Shoreham accident?
A. Yes. First, the school bus drivers surveyed include individuals who are actually relied upon by LILCO to drive children home from school in the event of an emergency. Thus, the Plan states that the Middle Island, Riverhead, Shoreham-Wading River, and South Manor school districts "have r school buildings which are physically located within the ten-mile planning area," and that the boundaries ef the Eastport i
Union Free School District " include residences within the ten-mil e area. " (Appendix A, at IV-167 to 168) LILCO states, further, that in the event of an emergency at Shoreham, the above districts, among others, "probably [will] be advised to institute an early dismissal" (Appendix A, at IV-169), and:
If an emergency occurs during normal school hours, schools within the ten-mile EPZ will be instructed via telephone and the Emergency Broadcast System to dismiss school children in accordance with their early dismissal plans.
(Plan at 3.6-7).
(See also EBS Sample Messages, OPIP 3.8.2, Attachment 5.) As noted above, the survey was of the population of school bus drivers who drive the school buses for these districts, and who, under the LILCO Plan, are expected to drive school buses to implement early dismissals. (See Contention 25.C.) Al-though the answers given by individual bus drivers to this survey may not predict exactly either which bus drivers or how many bus drivers would not show up for emergency duty, the re-sponses 7.llow us to estimate that substantial numbers of school bus drivers will not report promptly for duty in a Shoreham emergency.
Second, even though volunteer firemen are not specifically relied upon by LILCO under the LILCO Plan, their responses to I
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the survey also provide an indication of the relative proportion of individuals accustomed to reacting to emergency situations who would not report promptly for duty if there were an accident at Shoreham. These results would apply, for exam-ple, to the LILCO employees who may be members of volunteer t
fire departments; ambulance drivers; medical and paramedical personnel; and American Red Cross volunteers.
Third, the results of the school bus driver and volunteer firemen surveys also provide an indication of hew other people, who are expected by LILCO to perform emergency fu... ' ions (such as LILCO employees, BNL employees, school, medical, transporta-tion and volunteer personnel), are lixely to respond. As Drs.
Erikson and Johnson discuss in their testimony on Contention 25, there is no reason to believe that these other emergency workers relied upon by LILCO will react any differently to a role conflict-producing situation than did the people surveyed.
Indeed, many of these workers relied upon by LILCO are even more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of their f amily responsibilities than the firemen surveyed, since, unlike vol-unteer firemen they are not experienced in responding to life-or health-threatening situations, nor are they accustomed to
) working under military-type discipline or organizational struc-tures.
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Q. Does that conclude your testimony?
A. Yes.
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ATTACHMENT 1 I
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