ML20082D048

Testimony of PA Polk on Contentions 23.D & 65 Re Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon & Evacuation Time Estimates

ML20082D048
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	11/18/1983
From:	Polk P PLANNING RESEARCH CORP., SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
To:
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References
ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8311220302
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, )

Unit 1) )

)

Testimony of Peter A. Polk on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contentions 23.D (Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon) and 65 (Evacuation Time Estimates)

Ba ckground O. Please state your name.

A. Peter A. Polk.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. ' By profession, I am a civil engineer specializing in transportation planning. I am an Associate Vice President of PRC Engineering, a division of Planning Research Cor oration located in McLean, Virginia. The transportation planning group within PRC Engineering was known formerly as PRC Voorhees.

Since the name PRC Voorhees has been used throughout the j l

8311220302 831118 PDR ADOCK 05000322 .

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history of this . litigation, I will continue to refer to the firm by that name for the purposes of this testimony. A copy of my resume is attached to this testimony as Attachment 1.

Q. What is transportation planning?

A. It is a planning discipline focusing on transportation and traffic analyses. Such analyses include estimating the magni-tude and direction of traffic that would be generated under a variety of circumstances -- the development of time estimates for evacuation of the population from an area in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant is an example of such an analysis.

C. Have you been engaged in developing evacuation time estimates for radiological emergencies?

A. Yes. PRC Voorhees develops evacuation . time estimates through the use of a sophisticated computerized traffic model.

We have been involved in planning for radiological emergencies since the accident at TMI. I have personally been involved in developing time estimates for the Susquehanna, Beaver Valley, Perry, Ibrth Anna, Surrey, Callaway, Oconee, and Fermi 2 sites.

Most recently, I was in charge of developing a draft emergency plan and time estimates for Suffolk County pertaining to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.

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I Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon O. What is the concern addressed in Contention 23.D?

A. Contention 23.D addresses the fact that LILCO's evacuation i

tLme estimates, as reported in Appendix A of its plan, do not account for congestion or other problems arising from evacua-tion by persons living outside of the EPZ or persons residing i

inside the EPZ who evacuate without being advised to do so. As Drs. Zeigler and Johnson have testified (Zeigler/ Johnson testi-mony on Contention 23.D), such voluntary evacuees in large

! numbers will seek to evacuate during a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Yet, LILCO's time estimates have ignored the ad-ditional volume of traffic, and resulting congestion, that such voluntary evacuation would generate. As a result, the conten-tion asserts that LILCO's time estimates substantially underestimate evacuation times.

Q. Do you agree with Contention 23.D?

A. Yes. Evidence discussed by Drs. Cole, Johnson and Zeigler has demonstrated that in the event of an accident in which evacuation of the 10-mile Shoreham.EPZ is the recommended pro-tective action, fully one-half of Long Island would seek to evacuate. Of the persons east of the EPZ who indicated they 2

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i would attempt to evacuate, the overwhelming majority stated 4

that they would travel west. The only way for them to do so is to use routes (particularly the Long Island Expressway and the i

Sunrise Highway) passing through or along the edge of the EPZ

-- the same routes to be utilized by evacuees attempting to leave the EPZ. (See Figure 1). The many additional numbers'of cars will increase congestion along these and other routes, ,

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causing significantly longer queues (both inside and outside the EPZ) and increased evacuation times. Of course, the in-crease in evacuation times will mean that people will be in the area of danger for longer periods, thus increasing their risk of exposure to radiation. The situation will be particularly hazardous for motorists standing in queues who could be stranded on the roads, in the path of the plume, in the event of a release from the plant prior to a complete evacuation.

1 There will also be a problem created by voluntary evacuees c living west of the EPZ. As one moves west from the plant, the l

I density of the population increases significantly. (See popu-lation table, Attachment 2). Large numbers of voluntary evacuees from the densely populated area west of the EPZ could cause delays for people attempting to leave the EPZ due to con-gestion on the evacuation routes directly outside and to the west of the EPZ.

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Q. Have you evaluated the effects of the evacuation shadow phenomenon on time estimates for evacuation from the Shoreham EPZ?

j A. Yes. PRC Voorhees has recently completed a computer simu-lation of an evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ including data con-cerning the evacuation shadow phenomenon derived by Drs.

Zeigler, Johnson and Cole. (See Attachment 3). This analysis, which was completed in mid-November, 1983, shows that during the summer months, under normal weather conditions and assuming no breakdowns or other road impediments, evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ could take approximately 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. During the rest of the year, evacuation would take approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> under normal weather conditions. Of course, under adverse weather conditions these times could rise still further. These times contrast sharply with the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 35 minute evacuation time reported by LILCO in Appendix A for normal conditions but with-out considering the shadow effect. It should be recognized that the KLD estimates and the PRC estimates were derived using different traffic models. The methodology used in both models is roughly comparable except that KLD's trip assignments are predicated more heavily on route optimization. (See Pigozzi testimony for discussion of optimization) . The PRC model as-sumes that optimization will not be achievable during an emergency.

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l It is especially important to note the effect of evacua-tion from the East End, and the length and duration of the i

queues along critical portions of the evacuation network. For instance, queues along the Long Island Expressway will extend from within the EPZ westerly, and can be expected to last for almost 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />. Congestion along Sunrise Highway at the southern edge of the EPZ will continue for a similar period of t ime , with queues west of the EPZ not dissipating for over 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. There will also be substantial queues along Route 25A, Route 347 and Route 25, among others. Thus, thousands of cars i

will be virtually immobile along these routes for many hours.

(See Attachment 3 for further details of the analysis. ) I might add that these estimates are probably low because they do not include the effects of accidents and other such impediments . (See discussion of accidents below).

Q. Has LILCO made any attempt to review the effect of the i shadow phenomenon on its time estimates?

A. Yes. In a document entitled " Estimated Evacuation Times for the Entire Population Within the Emergency Planning Zcne for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Considering the Effects 4 of Uncontrolled Evacuation, Voluntary Evacuation, Inclement Weather and Accidents," [ hereinafter, "KLD-TM-77"] LILCO's

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consultant, KLD, did derive some time estimates which purported to account for the evacuation shadow phenomenon. This KLD study has not been incorporated in the LILCO Plan, Revision 2, i and thus it appears that LILCO is not formally taking the I

shadow phenomenon into account in the time estimates it has j submitted for NRC review.

i O. Do you believe the estimates contained in KLD-TM-77 are accurate and useful7 Q. No. With respect to the issue of the shadow phenomenon, j KLD-TM-77 looked at two situations -- evacuation of 25 percent of the population outside the EPZ and then evacuation of 50 percent outside of the EPZ. As reported in KLD-TM-77 at 10, I

the evacuation shadow phenomenon showed an increase in evacua-tion time of only 20 minutes (to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 55 minutes) in the first case and 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 40 minutes (to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 15 minutes) in the second case. In my opinion, however, the analysis is based on unrealistic assumptions.

Q. Please explain.

t A. As described in Appendix A (see pages IV-152, IV-156), the 1

1 i Sunrise Highway defines the southern boundary of the EPZ for a distance of about eight miles. (See Figure 1). KLD-TM-77, 1

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I however, describes the Sunrise Highway as "( just) within the EPZ." (KLD-TM-77 at 8). Whether the Sunrise Highway lies just inside or directly on the EPZ boundary, it is clear that it is a major evacuation route which cannot be ignored in computing time estimates. Thus, in modeling an evacuation, automobiles on that portion of the Sunrise Highway should not be considered to have exited the EPZ until they have left the portion of the Sunrise Highway which defines that edge of the EPZ. Yet, LILCO's time estimates in KLD-TM-77 do not account for automo-biles originating from outside the EPZ traveling along that route (Lieberman Deposition at 192), although KLD-TM-77 does l appear to account for traffic originating within the EPZ.

i LILCO has apparently assumed that since the northern shoulder of Sunrise Highway has been established as the EPZ boundary, it is not necessary to include in its estimates the times required for automobiles from the East End to travel over that portion of the Sunrise Highway which lies several feet beyond the EPZ boundary.1/

-1/ It should be noted that KLD appears to have assumed also that all traffic from the East End would be successfully routed down to the Sunrise Highway under its " planned" evacuation -- that is, assuming the effectiveness of the controls described in Appendix A. (KLD-TM-77 at 8). I 1

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As stated earlier, the Sunrise Highway will be a major route for the many thousands of persons attempting to evacuate from both forks of the East End. It also will be an important evacuation route for many people who evacuate from within the EPZ. (See generally Appendix A). Our analysis indicates that there will be severe congestion along the Sunrise Highway, with queues extending from west of the EPZ boundary to beyond the eastern EPZ boundary. These queues will have a duration of ap-proximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> at the EPZ boundary.

If, in fact, the EPZ, as defined, stops at the northern shoulder of the Sunrise Highway, that is no reason to exclude traffic traveling 10 or 25 feet to the south of that point.

Persons traveling along the Sunrise Highway will be just as much at risk as those 10 feet inside the EPZ. Vast numbers of people will be in queues for hours at the edge of the EPZ.

Since they could be affected by any accident severe enough to warrant evacuation out to 10 miles, their presence on the edge of the EPZ must be taken into account in deriving time estimates in order to give decision makers realistic informa-tion on the population at risk and the time required to remove them from the area of danger.

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i In summary, KLD-TM-77 does not accurately or realistically 4

reflect the full effect of the evacuation shadow phenomenon.

If it did, its results would be more comparable with our own analysis which shows evacuation times (in normal weather conditions and again assuming no breakdowns or other obstacles) of about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> in summer and about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the winter .

Contention 65.D Q. What is the concern expressed in Contention 65.D?

A. The concern is that KLD's evacuation time estimates do not account for accidents, breakdowns, cars running out of gas, and similar events, all of which will create obstructions for evacuating traffic, thus raising evacuation times. If LILCO's estimates did consider the types of obstructions described in Contention 65.D, those estimates would be considerably higher.

Q. Do you agree with Contention 65.D?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you estimated the number of accidents that would occur in the event of an evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ?

l A. Yes. During an evacuation of the entire EPZ, we have es-timated that there could be a substantial number of accidents 4

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-- ranging up to 141 incidents -- on the evacuation network.

See Attachment 4 for the details behind this analysis.

Q. Please explain how you derived that estimate.

A. During an evacuation, it must be assumed that due to the anticipated conditions, traffic will be congested and traveling at a low rate of speed. Research conducted by the Bureau of Public Roads, (now the Federal Highway Administration),2/ re-I veals that accident rates are higher at low speeds than at high speeds. The accident rate at low speeds (10-15 mph) is approx-1 imately 40,000 per 100 million vehicle miles.

Briefly, during an evacuation, it is expected that total vehicle miles will equal approximately 354,672 miles as set forth in Table 1, below.3/

-2/ Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook, ITE (Institute of Transportation Engineers), 816, 818 (2d ed.,

1982).

-3/ Under normal conditions, 354,672 vehicle miles would gen-erate about 8 accidents. (See Attachment 4).

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TABLE 1. EVACUATION ROUTES AND TRAVEL MILEAGE Length Vehicle-Miles Route (Miles) Flow of Travel Broadway 4.2 2,358 9,904 North County 3.8 2,910 11,058 Nesconset 4.0 8,363 33,452 Middle County 2.5 6,376 15,940 Long Island Expressway 5.2 20,502 106,610 Long Island Avenue 5.7 4,475 25,508 Sunrise Highway 12.5 12,176 152,200 Total 354,672 Thus, the number of accidents that can be expected to occur during an emergency equals 40,000 x 354,672 = 141.

100,000,000 The number of accidents predicted for each major highway is listed in Table 2 below:

TABLE 2. ESTIMATE OF ACCIDENTS BY MAJOR ROUTE Number of Accid ents

, Route i

Broadway 4 North County 4 Nesconset 13 Middle County 6 Long Island Expressway 43 Long Island Avenue 10 Sunrise Highway 61 141 l Q. Have you estimated the numbers of vehicles that are likely to run out of gas during a radiological emergency 7 i

l A. Yes. We have estimated that 277 cars will run out of gas during an evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ. (See Attachment 4).

We derived these figures in the following manner.

First, we made the following assumptions:

o Under normal circumstances, no vehicle has less than one gallon of fuel in the tank at any time.

o All vehicles have on average a 16.33-gallon capacity fuel tank.4/

o The amount of gasoline in tanks is normally distributed about a mean value of 8.66 gallons ( see Figure 2).

o Mo s t, or all, gasoline stations within the evacuation zone will be closed. LILCO has no agreements with gas stations to stay open.

o The average idling fuel flow rate of vehicles of 0.67 gallons per hour.5/

~4/ Automotive News, Detroit, April 1983. (Mean of 197 gas tank capacities).

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It . H . Evans and T.M. Lam. " Gasoline Consumption in Urban Traffic." Research Labs, General Motors Corporation, Soci-ety of Automotive Engineers, Automative Engineering Congress and Exposition (Feburary 1976).

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1 8.66 16.33 Gallons of Fuel Figure 2. Assumed Distribution of Fuel in Vehicles Used for Evacuation 0.5 o

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I 1 1 4:00 12:20 Potential Queuing Time (Hours) l Figure 3. Probability of Not Having Fuel Reserves for a Given Queuing Time

o All vehicles have a fuel consumption of 20 miles por gallon under normal driving conditions.

A o The calculation has been sbmplified by only consid-ering EFZ originating trips, for which the average trip length for evacuating from the EPZ is 10 miles (under an all-west evacuation strategy). Thus, there was no consideration of the evacuation shadow phenom-enon in this analysis.

Second, we estimated fuel consumption. There are two fuel consumption aspects to the travel out of the EPZ, actual travel and queuing. On average, the traveling portion of the trip will consume 0. 5 gallons of fuel for a ten-mile journey at a fuel consumption level of 20 mpg. The remaining fuel reserves in vehicles will, thus, be depleted by 1/2 gallon. This means that the mean level of gas left for operation in queues is 8 gallons.

Queuing times were estimated based on the evacuation time estimate analysis described above (without considering the in-fluence of the shadow phenomenon). It can be assumed that the shifted range of the fuel reserve distribution (0.5 gallons to l

15.83 gallons) is equivalent to +3 standard deviations (i.e. ,

99.73 percent of all vehicle fuel reserves will fall within 14 -

, this range) with a mean value of 8.1 gallons. This distribution can be transformed to potential queuing time by using the vehicle idling fuel consumption rate of 0.67 gallons per hour factor. The resultant distribution is still normal within the following characteristics:

o Mean value = 12. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> o Standard deviation = 3.81 hours9.375e-4 days <br />0.0225 hours <br />1.339286e-4 weeks <br />3.08205e-5 months <br /> 1

The estimated evacuation queuing time and the potential queuing time (based on fuel reserves) must be linked empiri-cally.

The probable number of vehicles running out of fuel by 1/2

, hour queuing time intervals is shown in Table 3. Out of a f

total of about 55,000 vehicles used in the evacuation (again excluding voluntary evacuees), 0.5 percent are expected to run out of fuel.

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l TABLE 3. NONBER OF VEHICLES EXPECTED TO l l

RUN OUT OF FUEL BY QUEUING TIME INTERVAL l

Number of Proportion Number of l Queuing Vehicles Queuing of Vehicles Vehicles

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Time For This Time Running Out Running Out (Hrs, Min) Interval of Fuel of Fuel 0:00 to 0:30 7393 .0021 16 0:30 to 1:00 7239 .0031 22 1:00 to 1:30 7220 .0045 32 1:30 to 2:00 7166 .0066 47 2:00 to 2:30 6429 .0094 60 2:30 to 3:00 3103 .0132 41 3:00 to 3:30 1509 .0183 28 3:30 to 4:00 1021 .0250 26 4:00 to 4:30 159 .0336 5 Total 277 Q. What will be the effect of the presence of so_many dis-abled vehicles on the roadway 7 A. The presence of so many disabled vehicles is likely to se-riously impede an evacuation. (See Testimony of Suffolk County Police Department witnesses). The impact of a single disabled vehicle on the vehicular flow during an evacuation is dependent on the site-specific circumstances of the roadway facility on which vehicles become disabled. In general, the impacts can be of the following types o The disabled vehicle blocks a travel lane on a two-lane roadway;

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o The disabled vehicle blocks a travel lane on a multi-ple lane highway; or o The disabled vehicle has been moved onto the shoulder or verge of the roadway.

Since traffic in most instances will be highly directional, the impact of a disabled vehicle in the travel lane of a two lane road is not likely to reduce capacity substantially. It is as-sumed that traffic will move into the opposing travel lane to bypass the disabled vehicle. This will have some impact on headways between vehicles, and consequently the level of service of that roadway.

The impact of a disabled vehicle will be most significant on multi-lane facilities. In the event of a lane blockage, the merging of two lanes into one lane, or three lanes into two lanes has an impact on the capacity of the remaining unblocked lcnes. Indeed, such capacity losses may range from 60 to 80 percent of the normal capacity.1/ The impact of this substantial loss of capacity is likely to be severe resulting in evacuation times several hours above those calculated with-out considering disabled vehicles.

6/ Highway Research Record, Number 349, National Research i Council.

l Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

A. Yes.

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ATTACHMENT 1 l

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ATTACIIMENT 1 PETER A. POLK Associate Vice President Education Northeastern University, B.S. in Civil Engineering Boston University, M.B. A.

Georgia institute of Technology, Traffic Engineering Previous Louis Berger & Associates, Inc., 1974-1973. Project Manager Positions C.E. Maguire, Inc., 1971-1974. Transportation Engineer Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc., 1969-1971 Department of Traffic & Parking, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967-1969 Experience Transoortation Planning. Experience includes travel demand pro-jection and alternatives analysis for a variety of long- and short-range programs. In Pawtucket, Rhode Island was involved in development of a transportation plan which included traffic circu-lation and transit system improvements based on future land use and predicted population shif ts. Estimated future travel demand, developed location alternatives, and assessed environmental and economic impact under several highway corridor planning studies.

Developed traffic forecasts and trip assignments for evacuation of population in a 10 mile radius around nuclear power facilities in Pennsylvania and Ohio.

Emergency Management Planning. Developed travel forecasting and trip assignment methodology for evacuation time studi.es for

) Susquehanna and Beaver Valley nuclear plants in Pennsylvania.

Directed studies on mass notification and evacuation feasibility for the Callaway Power Station in Missouri. Participated in emer-gency response plan development for the Fermi 2 Plant in Michi-gan. Project Manager for the alert system design at the Fermi 2 Plant.

Multimodal Planning. Project Manager for Corridor Planning Study for Medford, Massachusetts CBD involving transit system improve-ments, implementation of an auto-restricted zone, and develop-ment of a transit mall concept through the' downtown area.

Involved in station location and access studies for Boston's South-west Corridor requiring coordination of plans for extension of rapid transit system, proposed bus routing, and traffic circulation improvements.

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Polk, Continued Downtown Revitalization. Project manager for design of revitali-zation plans for Chicopee, Massachusetts CBD including develop-ment of traffic circulation improvements, design of landscaping and amenties, and revised bus routing. Studied feasibility of implementing an auto-restricted zone in Paterson, New Jersey.

Project manager for design of redevelopment area improvements in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.

Traffic Ooerations and Management. Directed traf fic ' operations projects under various programs including Urban Systems, TOPICS, the elimination of railroad-highway grade crossings, urban renewal projects, and bridge replacements. Project Manager for traffic safety improvement project comprising 17 Eastern Massachusetts comrnunities and involving the development of conceptual designs, preparation of study reports, presentation of recommendations at public hearings, and all phases of design including final contract documents.

Traffic Signal Systems. Prepared plans, specifications, and cost estimates for the installation of all types of traffic signals includ-ing metropolitan area signal systems. Conducted studies and developed designs for a statewide program to increase the effi-ciency of traffic signal systems throughout Rhode Island. Directed the design of numerous traffic signal installations and signal

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systems in Massachusetts under the Urban Systems program.

Roadway Design. Responsible for the preparation of final design plans and contract documents for intersection improvements, high-way engineering projects, and redevelopment programs. Directed the Engineering Study for a section of U.S. Route 1 in Massa-chusetts. Participated in design of several sections of I-95 in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

Environmental and Economic Planning. Directed the Environ-mental Impact Study for the replacement of the Route 116 bridge over the Connecticut River between Holyoke and South Hadley, Massachusetts. Prepared environmental assessments and impact l statements for several roadway projects. Participated in a U.S.

! Army, Corps of Engineers Study to develop and analyze alter-natives for the removal of debris from Boston Harbor. Assessed future needs and recommended plan alternatives for the New Hampshire State Prison System.

Licenses Registered Professional Engineer in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, l

and Connecticut Affiliations Institute of Transportation Engineers American Society of Civil Engineers O

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ATTACHMENT 2 4

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1985 PROJECTED YEAR-ROUND AND SUMMER RING AND SECTOR POPULATION SURROUNDING Tite LILCO SitOREllAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION I

22.5* DIRECTIONAL SECTORS Miles From Distance Plant Site ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSW SW WSW W Totals 0-1 M 100 100 321 321 381 381 381 381 381 2,797 (78) (157) (157) (414) (414) (414) (414) (414) (414) (414) (3,2y0) 1-2 150 400 400 150 821 881 881 88: 381 381 5.326 (235) (627) (627) (235) (964) (964) (964) (964) (414) (414) (6,408) 2-1 430 430 430 1,172 1,022 1,022 1,300 800 800 7,406 (674) (674) (674) (1,335) (1,100) (1,100) (1,375) (825) (625) (8,582) 3-4 480 480 480 750 1,022 1,022 1,626 1,626 1,500 8,986 (732) (732) (752) (942) (1,100) (1,100) (1,767) (1,767) (1,560) (10,492) 4-5 366 440 366 M6 620 1,022 1,~050 1,731 4,923 10,884 (573) (689) (573) (573) (673) (1,100) (1,150) (1,882) (3,348) (12,561) 5-6 366 366 366 366 620 1,275 1,080 2,270 4,923 11,632 (573) (573) (373) (573) (673) (I,390) (1,175) (2,477) (5,348) (13,355) 6-7 %6 366 680 314 620 1,072 1,374 2,165 3,375 10,305 -

(373) (373) (1,700 (870) (673) (1,168) * (1,463) (2,352) (3,667) (11,039) 7-8 366 366 887 887 _ 820- IIll 3,347 2,'50 5 ~ 3,375 13,964 (573) (373) (%5) (965) (890) (1,532) (3,463) (2,721) (3,667) (13,349) 8-9 %6 180 887 887 3,510 1,411 7,447 8,540 1,557 24,785 (573) (280) (965) (965) (3,814) (1,532) (8,263) (9,277) (1,692) (27,361) 9-10 583 1,550 887 887 3,410 1,604 5,500 10.518 3,119 -28,058 (913) (2.284) (965) (%5) (3,705) (1,743) (5,975) (11.425) (3,389) (31,364)

Tot:1 Population 200 3,823 4,678 5,454 6,771 12,906 11,101 23,959 30,917 24,334 124,143 Cithin 10 Miles (313) (5,988) (7,182) (7,816) (8,566) (14,006) (12.043) (26,009) (33,554) (26,324) (141,801) 10-12 3,333 4,465 2,662 7,833 14.320 =15,670 ' 26,585 29,455 8,805 113,128 (5,221) (9,497) (4,695) (8,510) (15,555) (17,022) (28,880) (31,999) (9,566) (130,945) 12-14 2,083 1,324 3,249 6,251 13,488 19,315 28,980 29,392 8,466 112,548 (3,263) (3,758) (7,927) (6,792) (14,652) (20,989) (31,480) (31,930) (9,197) (129,948) 14-16 1,500 1,324 3,987 12,274 32,153 21,195 19,859 1,830 94,122 8 (2,350) (3,758) (11,%3) (13,333) (34,9%)

16-20 1,027 2,332 (27,370) (21,573) (1,988) (116,676) y 15,553 2,003 27,513 74.935 68.123 191,486 O (2.131) (4.839) (39,278) (5,688) (29.889) (74.935) (68.123) (224,883)

M Totil Population 1,227 13,07I 27,344 17,355 20,855 52,988 105,752 175,691 177,746 43,435 635,427 Z Uithin 20 Miles (2,444) (21,661) (63,473) (37,494) (23,868) (57,546) (114,879) (thA,674) (187,179) (47,075) (744,293) 8 M

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1985 Year-Round and Summer Population Projection, Page Two 22.5" DIRECTIONAL SECTORS Miles From Distance Plant Site ENE E ESE SE SSE 5 55W SW* W5wa wa Totals 20-25 5,027 4,427 4,523 81,747 81,760 4, 300 181,784 (10,433) (11,769) (12,821) (202,830) 25-30 7,741 10,392 1,456 115,800 138,112 10,000 283,501 (17,983) (23,969) (4,127) (309,991) 30-35 1,839 7,588 150,418 165,438 8,943 334,226 (3,817) (28,124) (356,740) 35-40 3,9 34 114,000 214,400 23,000 357,334 (23,343) (374,743) 40-45 1,939 40,057 398,172 12,500 452,668 (7,631) (458,360) l 45-50 I,939 29,600 612,572 5,000 649,111 l (7.(11) (654.803) l l Titst Population 15,834 45,290 33,323 17,355 20,855 52,988 105,752 707,276 1,788,200 107,178 2,894,051 l l

Cithin 50 Miles (34,677) (124,128) (80,421) (37,494) (23,868) (57,546) (114,879) (720,2%) (1,797,600) (110,818) (3,101,727) tThe summer and year-round populations of these distance / directional zones are approximately equal

( ) The number in parend. eses is the total summes ;opulation Assumptions: 1. 200,000 Queens residents are included in the 45-50 mile ring

2. No Connecticut population figures were included

3. Nassau County growth rates taken from projections in the 208 Waste Man.agement Report

4. All population assumed evenly distributed over the census delineation area, e.g., tract, town

5. Summer residents for Sulfolk County are apportioned according to year-round resident ratios

6. Summer ter; dent growth rate in Sulfok County was assumed to equal the year-round population growth rate

7. No summer residents were included in Nassau County population figures

8. Sulfok County growth rates a numed to equal those of the 1970-1980 time period i

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ATTACHMENT 3 i

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ATTACHMENT 3 l

SUMMARY

EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES '

FOR THE

10 MILE EPZ WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE

, SHADOW PHENOMENON 1

I PRC VOORHEES November 1983

g - - m o e i

1985 SUPJ1ER POPULAT10N r =

I i

'i 10/28/83 '95 Summer LILCO EPZ with Shadown 1

1 1

i j

.i 1

1 1

) ROUTE Jericho Turnpike

SUMMARY

j START OF END OF : MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM TIME OF INTER- QUEUE QUEUE lALL LEGS LEG OUEUE DELAY MAX OUEUE SECTION: (HR: MIN) (HR: MIN): (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES) (HR: MIN)

---

:-------- --------:--------- --------- --------- ----_-- 2

! 1 1 1:15 6: O : 341 341 210 2:15 2 in15 7: 0*: 234 111 105 2:30 1

3 1:15 8:15 : 148 92 75 2:30 4 l 1:30 9:15 295 116 75 2:15

---

_----------------_--------==.

MAX. TIME TO EVACUATE = 9:15 HOURS 1

8 l INTERSECTIONS:

i 1= top 2=Setauket 3= Head of Harbor 4= Village of Branch 1

• EPZ BOUNDARY l

i 1

1 1

)

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l

• --r - - . . , - . -

.. .- . . ~ . . , , , . x -

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I

! 10/28/83 '85 Summer LILCO EPZ with Shadows 1

i

! ROUTE I

Sunrise Highway

SUMMARY

l START OF END OF l MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM TIME OF

) INTER- l QUEUE QUEUE lALL LEGS LEG OUEUE DELAY MAX QUEUE l SECTION!(HR: MIN) (HR: MIN): (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES) (HR: MIN)

_-___-_:_-_-__-_ --=

_-=:-__-_-_______------_-______ -__----_-

l 1 1:15 10:15  : 978 978 465 2:30 2  : 1:15 10:45  : 51 50 30 2:30 3 1:15 14: 30  : 482 384 225 2:45 4 l 1:15 8: 45  : 883 717 330 2:30 5  : 1:15 8: 0  : 166 147 30 2:45 6 1:15 11:30 1 523 362 165 2:45 7 l 1:15 15:30 794 633 300 2:45 8  : 1:15 15:30 1 54 54 15 2:30 I 9 1:15 16: 0  : 105 105 15

' 2:45 10  : 1:15 77: 0*l 303 261 60 2:45 11  : 1:15 20:45 l 1001 1001 240 16:45 12  : 1:15 22:15  : 384 380 90 3 45 13  : 1:15 14:30 1499 1499 705 2:30 MAX TIME TO EVACUATE =22:15 HOURS 1

INTERSECTIONS:

1= East Hampton 2= Shelter Island 3=S. Hampton into Sunctse 4=E-65 5=E-64 6=E-63 7=E-61 8= Wading R,etc into Sunrise 9=Wm Floyd Pkwy 10=Rt101 Area 11=Rt97 Area 12=Rt93 Area 13=Rt. 85 EPZ BOUNDARY

1

. , i 10/28/83 '85 Summer LILCO EPZ with Shadows ROUTE Rt 047  !

4

SUMMARY

l l START OF END OF l MAX OUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM TIME OF INTER- : QUEUE QUEUE lALL LEGS LEG OUEUE DELAY MAX QUEUE SECTION: (HR: MIN) (HR: MIN): (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES) (HR: MIN)

! 1 1:15 6: 45 * : 537 537 255 2:15 1 2 1:30 3:30 133 51 30 2:15 2

3 1:15 6: 0 308 265 75 3: 0 4  : 1:15 7:15  : 208 199 45 2:45 5  ! 1:15 16: 30 2399 2143 555 3: 0 6 1:15 19: 0  : 655 530 150 4: 30

-==______________________________

MAX. TIME TO EVACUATE =19: O HOURS

! INTERSECTIONS:

i= Top 2= Canal & Rt112 3=Old Town Rd Area 4=Rt97 Area 5=Rt 25 6=Nesconset Area i

• EPZ BOUNDARY l

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s

+.- -

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• l 10/28/83 '85 Summer LILCO EPZ with Shadows I

ROUTE Long Island X-way

SUMMARY

START OF END OF : MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM TIME OF 3

INTER- ! QUEUE QUEUE lALL LEGS LEG OUEUE DELAY MAX OUEUE SECTION: (HR: MIN) (HR: MIN): (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES) (HR: MIN) 4

-______;--_-__--==-- _==:

1  : 0: O 0: O O O O 0: O 2  : 1:45 2:15 11 11 0 2: 0 3 0: O 0: O : O O O 0: O 4  : 1:15 7:15 : 632 604 285 2:15 5  : 1:15. 6: O  : 513 413 195 2:15 6  : 1:15 18: 0*l 2047 1862 870 3: 0 7 l 1:15 7:30 : 402 253 75 2:45 8 1:15 8: O l 142 141 15 2:45 9 l 1:15 8:45 276 254 30 2:45 10  : 1:15 9: 30 l 193 193 30 2:45 11 l 1:15 11:30 l 629 329 150 2:45

---

___---------__----_----__-----_ _= _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - - - _ - - - _ _ _

r MAX. TIME TO EVACUATE =18: O HOURS I

j INTERSECTIONS:

i

.! 1=E-72.E-73 2=E-71

! 3=E-69,E-70 4=E-68 5=E-66 6=E-64 7=E-63 8=E-62 9=E-61 10=E-59,E-60 l 11=E-57

)

• EPZ BOUNDARY t

i

4 9 1985 WINTER POPULATION i

1

i 10:31l83 '85 Minter LILCO EPZ uith Shadous ROUTE Sunrise HighNay

SUMMARY

l START OF END OF l MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM INTER- l QUEUE QUEUE TIME OF lALL LEGS LEG QUEUE DELAY MAX QUEUE SECTIONl(HR: MIN) (HR: MIN)l (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES) (HR: MIN)

---

l--------- ---------

1 l 1:30 4: O l 207 207 2 1:30 90 2:15 l 4:15 l 16 16 15 3 l 1:15 5:30 2:30 l 167 86 75 2:45 4 l 1:30 4:15 l 246 226 105 2:15 5 l 1:30 4:30 l 101 6 99 15 2:30 l 1:15 6: O l 358 273 7 1:15 75 3:30 l 7:45 l 529 385 105 8 l 1:15 8:30 4:45 l 236 181 45 2:45 9 l 1:15 9: O l 101 10 101 15 2:45 l 1:15 10: 0*l 289 254 11 1:15 60 2:45 l 12:15 l 620 620 150 12 l 1:15 14: O l 405 9:45 13 1:15 311 90 3: 0 l 14:30 l 1496

---

___-1496 705 2:30 MAX. TIME TO EVACUATE =14:30 HOURS INTERSECTIONS:

!= East Hampton 3=S. Hampton into Sunrise 2= Shelter Island 5=E-64 4=E-65 7=E-61 6=E-63 9=Ma Floyd Pkuy 8=Mading R,etc into Sunrise 11=Rt97 Area 10=Rt101 Area 13=Rt. 85 12=Rt93 Area

• EPZ BOUNDARY

I 1

'85 Minter LILCO EPZ uith Shadows \

f 10/31/83 .1 ROUTE Jericho Turnpike

SUMMARY

l START OF END OF l MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM TIME OF INTER- l QUEUE QUEUE lALL LEGS LEG QUEUE DELAY MAX QUEUE SECTIONl{NR: MIN) (HR: MIN)l (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES)

_______;________ ________;_________ _________ _________ _________ (HR: MIN) 1 l 1:15 6: 0 l 333 333 195 2:15 2 l 1:15 7: 0* l 243 118 120 3

2:30 l 1:15 8:15 l 156 93 75 2:30

) 4 l 1: 30 9:30 l 320 128 75 2:15

) MAX. TIME TO EVACUATE = 9:30 HOURS INTERSECTIONS:

!= top 2,g,g,ug,g j 3" Head of Harbor 4, Village of Branch f

a

• EPZ BOUNDARY l

i 1

l

i 20/31/83 '85 Minter LILCO EPZ uith Shadous ROUTE Rt 347

SUMMARY

l START OF END OF l MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM INTER- l QUEUE QUEUE TIME OF lALL LEGS LEG QUEUE DELAY NAX QUEUE SECTION: (NR: MIN) (NR: MIN)l (VEN) (VEH) (MINUTES) (NR: MIN) l-------- --------l--------- --------- --------- ---------

1 l 1:15 6:30* l 503 503 240 2 1:30 2:15 l 3:30 l 129 49 30 2:15 3 l 1:15 5:45 281 4

l 231 60 2:45 l 1:15 7: 0 l 201 193 45 5 l 1:15 16:15 2:45 l 2368 2112 555 3, o 6 l 1:15 18:45 l 697 266 2s45

---

__-----_-_______________165 ______________

MAX. TIME TO EVACUATE =18:45 NOURS INTERSECTIONS:

1= Top 3=Old Town Rd Area 2= Canal & Rt!!2 5=Rt 25 4=Rt97 Area 6=Nesconset Area

• EPZ BOUNDARY 1

l l

l

10:31/83 '85 Minter LILCD EPZ uith Sh r.do u s ROUTE Long Island X-may

SUMMARY

/ START OF END OF l MAX QUEUE LONGEST MAXIMUM TIME OF INTER- l QUEUE QUEUE lALL LEGS LEG QUEUE DELAY MAX QUEUE SECTIONl(HR: MIN) (HR: MIN): (VEH) (VEH) (MINUTES) (NR: MIN)

_______l________ ________l_________ ___-__-__ -________ _________

1 l 0: 0 0: 0 l 0 0 0 2 0: O 0: 0 l 0: 0 l 0 0 0 3 l 0: 0 0: 0 0: 0

/ 0 0 0 0: 0 4 l 1:15 6:30 490 l 490 225 2:15 5 l 1:15 5:45 447 l 396 180 2:15 6 l 1:15 12: 0* 1283 l 1154 540 2:30 7 l 1:15 7: 0 386 l 244 60 2:45 9 l 1:15 7:15 l 140 139 15 2:45 9 l 1:15 8: 0 l 228 224 30 2:45 10 l 1:15 8:45 l 201 201 30 2:45 11 l 1:15 10:45 l 669 339 3: 0

_________________________________________________165 ______________

MAX. TIME TO El'ACUATE=12: 0 HOURS INTERSECTIONS:

1=E-72,E-73 2=E-71 3=E-69,E-70 4=E-63 5=E-66 6=E-64 7=E-63 8=E-62 9=E-61 10=E-59,E-60 11=E-57

• EPZ BOUNDARY

• O i

ATTACIDiENT 4 i

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l ATTACHMENT 4 ACCIDENTS AND DISABLED VEHICLES:

IMPACT DURING EVACUATION The impact of vehicular accidents or disabled vehicles on the flow of traffic is usually quite significant. It is, therefore, reasonable to examine such possible adverse traffic flow impact during an evacuation of the population from the vicinity of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.

There are basically two types of traffic incidents that may produce significant impediment to vehicular flow on the evacuation routes in the area:

e Vehicular accidents e Vehicles becoming disabled This technical paper summarizes an analysis of the likely occurrences of accidents and vehicle disablements during an evacuation of a nominal 10-mile radius area around the power plant. Potential impacts on evacuation times from such occurrences have been estimated on the basis of assun.ed public agency response times in the removal of disabled vehicles.

ESTIMATES OF ACCIDENT OCCURRENCES It is generally accepted that an evacuation of the population within a nominal 10-mile radius area from the Shoreham plant will generate significant traffic congestion on most evacuation routes. It is expected that average vehicle speeds during such an evacuation will be in the order of 15 mph or less. This level of widespread congestion throughout the area is likely to generate a number of accidents.

Accidents can be categorized in a number of ways to aid in the development of causal relationships between environmental circumstances and the frequency of  ;

\

accident occurrences. There is no suitable data base to relate vehicular accident '

frequency directly into mass evacuation at a nuclear power plant. For purposes of 1

estimating a probability order of magnitude of accidents during an evacuation, the following generalized accident rates have been considered.

Generalized United States Accident Experience I Ba;ed on information from the National . Safety Council and the Federal Highway Administration,I an overall accident involvement rate of 2,238 per 100 million vehicle miles has been derived. The rate of non-fatality injury accidents is 131 per 100 million vehicle miles.2 Impact of Speed on Accident Rate Federally sponsored research identifies a substantial rise of accident rates when correlated with travel speed. At low speeds, accident rates rise to an excess of 40,000 occurrences per 100 million vehicle-miles of travel. It is assumed that this rise in accidents may be due primarily to major variations in operating speeds from the mean speed.

Expected Travel During an Evacuation For purposes of estimating the vehicle-miles of travel during an evacuation, only the outbound traffic on the major evacuation routes has been considered. Accident occurrences on local streets that are feeders to the main routes are not likely to have a major impact on overall evacuation times. A summary of the main routes, their lengths, and anticipated traffic flow are shown in Table 1.

i

1. The 1981 Highway Safety Stewardship Report, Office of Highway Safety, FHWA, April 1981.

l 2. Fatal and Injury Accident Rates, U.S. DOT, FHWA, June 1982.

l 3. Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook, ITE,2nd Ed.,1982. (pp. 816 and 818).

2

TABLE 1. EVACUATION ROUTES AND TRAVEL MILEAGE Length Vehicle-Miles Route (Miles) Flow of Travel Broadway 4.2 2,353 9,904 North County 3.8 2,910 11,058 Nesconset 4.0 8,363 33,452 Middle County 2.5 6,376 15,940 Long Island Expressway 5.2 20,502 106,610 Long Island Avenue 5.7 4,475 25,508 Sunrise Highway 12.5 12,176 152,200 Total 354,672 The data in Table 1 are based on an "all-west" evacuation strategy. The lengths of the routes are taken from estimated population centers to the limit of a nominal 10-mile radius from the plant.

Estimate of Accidents The accident rates noted above generate widely ranging accident rates when applied to the expected traffic volumes that would occur during an evacuation.

The low end of this range of accident occurrences, estimated at about eight incidents, reflects an average condition of traffic circumstances and is therefore an order of magnitude approximation of the accident occurrences that may be experienced on a typical weekday within the nominal ten-mile radius of the plant.

The higher end of the range of accident occurrences, estimated at 141 incidents, reflects a heavily congested traffic condition similar to that which would exist during an evacuation.

Based on these data, it is estimated that the likelihood of accidents occurring on a specific route during an evacuation is as shown in Table 2.

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. o TABLE 2. ESTIMATE OF ACCIDENTS BY MAJOR ROUTE

• Number of Route Accidents Broadway 4 North County 4 Nesconset 13 Middle County 6 Long Island Expressway 43 Long Island Avenue 10 Sunrise Highway 61 141

• Assumes extensive congestion and low average speed.

On the two expressways that are part of the major evacuation routes, it is estimated that on average an accident will occur about every 15 minutes during an evacuation.

ESTIMATES OF VEHICLES RUNNING OUT OF FUEL The normal driving time and gasoline consumption within the area for a 10-to-15 mile trip is rather minimal (usually less than one gallon of fuel). Because of this experience by the local residents, it is unlikely that there will be any strong attempt to refuel (if this were possible) prior to evacuation.

Any estimate of vehicles running out of fuel during an evacuation must be based upon a distribution of the amount of gasoline in automobile tanks at any time.

l 4

Basic Assumptions The estimate put forth in this technical paper of the number of vehicles running out of fuelis based on the following assumptions:

e Unner normal circumstances, no vehicle has less than one gallon of fuelin the tank at any time.

e The amount of gasoline in tanks is normally distributed about a mean value of 3.66 gallons (see Figure 1).

e Most, or all, gasoline stations within the evacuation zone will be closed.

e The average idling fuel flow rate of vehicles is 0.67 gallons per hour.I e All vehicles have a fuel consumption of 20 miles per gallon under normal driving conditions.

e The average trip length for evacuating from the EPZ is 10 miles (under an all-west evacuation strategy).

. All vehicles have on average a 16.33-gallon capacity fuel tank.2 There are two fuel consumption aspects to the travel out of the EPZ:

e Actual traveling e Queuing On average, the traveling portion of the trip will consume 0.5 gallons of fuel for a ten-mile journey at a fuel consumption level of 20 mpg. The remaining fuel reserves in vehicles will, thus, be depleted by 1/2 gallon, which has the effect of shifting the distribution curve in Figure I to the left.

1. R. H. Evans and T. M. Lam. " Gasoline Consumption in Urban Traffic."

Research Labs, General Motors Corporation, Society of Automotive Engineers, Automative Engineering Congress and Exposition (February 1976).

2. Automotive News, Detroit, April 1983. (Mean of 197 gas tank capacities).

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1 8.66 16.33 Gallons of Fuel Figure 1. Assumed Distribution of Fuel in Vehicles Used for Evacuation 0.5 o

e -

1 1

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.. l 2 El I

a.  :::. .

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1 1 4:00 12:20 Potential Queuing Time (Hours)

Figure 2. Probability of Not Having Fuel Reserves for a Given Queuing Time 6

f It can be assumed that the shif ted range of the fuel reserve distribution (0.5 gallons to 15.33 gallons) is equivalent to 2 3 standard deviations (i.e.,99.73 percent of all vehicle fuel reserves will fall within t'ais range) with a mean value of 8.1 gallons.

~

This distribution can be transformed to potential queuing time by using the vehicle

.I idling fuel consumption rate of 0.67 gallons per hour factor. The resultant distribution'is still normal within the fo!!owing characteristics:

o Atean value = 12.2 hou's e Standard deviation = 3.31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> The potential queuing time distribution is illustrated in Figure 2. The shaded area in the figure indicates that proportion of vehicles which has fuel reserves to allow queuing for less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. From this distribution and from the queuing times derived from the evacuation time estimates, the probable number of vehicles which will run out of gas can be estimated.

The probable number of vehicles running out of fuel by 1/2 hour queuing time intervals is shown in Table 3. Out of a total of about 53,000 vehicles used in the evacuation (excluding voluntary evacuees) 0.5 percent are expected to run out of fuel.

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DISABLED VEHICLES The impact of a disabled vehicle on the vehicular flow during an evacuation is dependent on the site specific circumstances of the roadway facility on which vehicles become disabled. In general, the Impacts can be of the following type:

e The disabled vehicle blocks a travellane on a two-lane roadway e The disabled vehicle blocks a travel lane on a multiple lane roadway e The disabled vehicle has moved onto the shoulder or verge of the roadway.

7

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- o TABLE 3. NUMBER OF VEHICLES EXPECTED TO RUN OUT OF FUEL BY QUEUING TIME INTERVAL Number of Proportion Number of Queuing Vehicles Queuing of Vehicles Vehicles Time For This Time Running Out Running Out (Hrs, Min) Interval of Fuel of Fuel 0:00 to 0:30 7393 .0021 16 0:30 to 1:00 7239 .0031 22 1:00 to 1:30 7220 .0045 32 1:30 to 2:00 7166 .0066 47 2:00 to 2:30 6429 .0094 60 2:30 to 3:00 3103 .0132 41 3:00 to 3:30 1509 .0183 28 l 3:30 to 4:00 1021 .0250 26 4:00 to 4:30 159 .0336 5 Total 277 With the estimated highly directional traffic flow during an evacuation, the impact of a disabled vehicle in the travel lane of a two lare road is not likely to reduce capacity substantially. It is assumed that traffic will move into the opposing travel lane to bypass the disabled vehicle. This will have some impact on headways between vehicles, and consequently the utilization level of that roadway.

Disabled vehicles on the shoulder or verge of the roadway are assumed not to have an impact on overall evacuation time, even though at the location of the disabled vehicle there may be slight reduction in speed and a slight increase in vehicle headways.

On multi-lane facilities the impact of a disabled vehicle is likely to be significant.

In the event of a lane blockage, the merging of two Ianes into one lane, or three lanes into tv.o lanes has an impact on the capacity utilization of the remaining unblocked lanes. Such capacity losses may range from 60 to 80 percent from the normal utilization level if there were no blockage in the adjacent lane I, resulting

1. Highway Research Record, Number 349, National Research Council.

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r in evacuation times several hours greater than those in which the impact of disabled vehicles is not considered.

9