ML20082D030
| ML20082D030 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1983 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Zeigler D SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082C880 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8311220297 | |
| Download: ML20082D030 (78) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. .6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) )
)
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DONALD J. ZEIGLER AND JAMES H. JOHNSON, JR. ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY CONCERNING CONTENTION 23 (Evacuation Shadow Lhenomenon)
Background
O. Please state your names and describe your qualifications. A. My name is Donald J. Zeigler. I am currently an Assistant Professor of Geography at Old Dominion University and special-ize in the field of social geography. My professional qualifi-cations are detailed in the curriculum vitae which is Attach-ment 1 hereto. Briefly, I received my Ph.D. in geography from Michigan State University, and my M.A. in geography from the University of Rhode Island. I have published several articles and reports on evacuation from nuclear power plant accidents, 8311220297 83111e : PDR ADOCK 05000322 PDR _
on the social impact of rising energy costs, and in the general field of technological hazards. Currently, I am teaching a seminar on natural and technological hazards. I am a member of the Association of American Geographers and the Society for Risk Analysis. My name is James H. Johnson, Jr. I am currently an Assis-tant Professor of Geography at UCLA. I, too, specialize in the field of social geography. My professional qualifications are detailed in the curriculum vitae Which is Attachment 2 hereto. Briefly, I hold degrees in geography from North Carolina Central University (B.S., 1975), University of Wisconsin at Madison (M.S., 1977), and Michigan State University (Ph.D, 1980). My current research concerns human responses to hazards of technological origin, especially nuclear power plant accients, and I have authored or co-authored several papers on actual and intended evacu'a tion behavior in a radiological emer-gency. O. What is the purpose of this testimony? A. The purpose of this testimony is to address Emergency Planning Contention 23 and to explain What has come to be known as the evacuation shadow phenomenon and its impact on planning and preparedness for a radiological emergency. To summarize briefly, the term evacuation shadow phenomenon results from
O p I voluntary or spontaneous evacuation. The term describes the propensity for people to evacuate from an area threatened by or perceived to be threatend by a hazard, although they are not ordered or advised to do so. In cases where the disaster agent is radiation, the magnftude of the evacuation shadow phenomenon is likely to be muc'h greater than for other disasters and thus is likely to pose a serious problem for emergency planning and preparedness. Our studies in Suffolk County, building upon research commenced at Three Mile Island ("TMI"), reveal that in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, hundreds of thousands of families will disregard official recommendations and attempt to evacuate. As we discuss below, the effect of such voluntary evacuation will be to reduce the effectiveness of LILCO's recommended protective actions, thus increasing the risk of exposure to health-threatening doses of radiation. The concern expressed in Contention 23 -- with which we agree -- is that LILCO has largely ignored the evacuation shadow phenomenon and its impact on emergency planning and preparedness. In devising and recommending protective actions, the LILCO Plan does not account for the many hundreds of thou-sands of families who will attempt to evacuate in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, regardless of the advice f .
e a or recommendations of LILCO during the emergency. Since voluntary evacuation of this magnitude will reduce signifi-cantly the effectiveness of sheltering and of evacuation, the LILCO Plan does not offer adequate protection to the popula-tion. O. Explain how the field of social geography is relevant to the study of the evacuation shadow phenumenon and its effect on emergency planning and preparedness. A. Geography has often been defined as a study of the rela-tionships between human beings and their environments. Social geographers specialize in human spatial behavior -- that is, the way individuals and groups behave in geographic space. Social geographers examine flows of people over space, the-processes which set those flows in motion, and the distribu-tional patterns Which result. Since behavior is linked to per-ception, social geographers also examine the' ways people per-ceive their environment and react to it. The scientific study of hazard perception is a particular subspecialty of social. geography. We have both studied actual and intended human behavioral responses to radiological emergencies. We were both members of a Michigan State Univer-sity team Which conducted a survey of the TMI area residents one month after the TMI accident in 1979. More recently, we 4'-
e o participated in the construction, design, and analysis of social surveys which were conducted on Long Island to study in-tended behavior in the event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Q. Please explain in more detail the meaning of the evacua-tion shadow phenomenon. A. In crisis situations, the public is confronted with the problem of how to protect itself from the disaster agent. Emergency "esponse officials, or in the case of Shoreham, LILCO officials, may order or recommend that the population they per-ceive to be at risk should take certain protective actions. In a radiological emergency, for instance, some or all of the re-sidents within a 10 raile radius of a malfunctioning reactor may be advised to evacuate. Oftentimes in crisis situations, how-ever, people other than those targeted by emergency response officials will perceive themselves to be in danger and th'us voluntarily take protective action (s). The evacuation shadow phenomenon is the tendency in an emergency for people who believe themselves to be at risk to evacuate even though not ordered to do so. In a radiological emergency, the evacuation shadow phenom-enon takes on far greater significance than in other types of crises. Our studies indicate that in emergencies involving 5- __ _ _- - _ __ _____-__-_ a
radiation, a large proportion of the population outside the ! officially designated zone of danger (as well as persons within l 1 l the designated zone of danger who are not advised to evacuate) ) will voluntarily move away from the perceived source of danger. Indeed, if an accident occurs at Shoreham, the proportion of voluntary evacuees -- that is, the evacuation " shadow" -- on Long Island, will remain at a high level even in areas substan-tially beyond the 10-mile EPZ. The " evacuation shadow" will only begin to diminish significantly at about 25 miles from the plant. The details of our views on the evacuation shadow phenome-non are set forth below, beginning with a discussion of the im-portant data from TMI which documents the need for emergency planners to consider this issue carefully when devising a preparedness scheme. The TMI Survey Q. On what do you base your opinion that there will be a large evacuation shadow phenomenon on Long Island? A. Our opinion is based on the actual response of residents l of south central Pennsylvania to the TMI accident in March, 1979, and on the results of a survey which we assisted in conducting on Long Island to elicit an expression from the l l l ___J
. a residents of Suffolk and Nassau counties as to how they intend to respond to an accident at Shoreham. In collaboration with our colleague, Dr. Stanley D. Brunn of the University of Kentucky, we cenducted one of the first social surveys investigating the behavioral responses of the south central Pennsylvania area residents to the TMI accident of March, 1979.1/ Our TMI survey focused on (1) attitudes to-ward nuclear power before and after the accident, (2) behavioral responses to the accident, and (3) perceived social and environmental impacts of the accident. The most significant finding of our TMI study was the high degree of overreaction 2/ to the accident. Specifically, during. the emergency the state of Pennsylvania advised evacuation of all pregnant women and pre-achool age children within a five-mile radius of the plant. If only those people who were
-1/ In September of 1979 we published, in collaboration with Dr. Brunn, the results of our survey of Three Mile Island area residents in a monograph entitled Final Report On A Social Survey of Three Mile Island Residents. In January of 1981, we published an excerpt from that monograph enti-tied " Evacuation From A Nuclear Technological Disaster",
in the Geographical Review. A copy of the article appears with this testimony as Attachment 3.
-2/ In this testimony, the term "cverreaction" is used to de-scribe conduct which goes beyond that suggested by emer-gency officials. This should not be construed to imply that the person's conduct was wrong or irrational.
1
, e advised to evacuate had done so, about 2,500 people would have evacuated. Instead, approximately 144,000, or approximately 39 i percent of the population within a 15-mile radius of the plant, i actually evacuated. Further, our survey revealed that nine percent of the population in three communities beyond 15 miles of the plant also evccuated. (See, Figure 1). This fact led i us to coin the term " evacuation shadow phenomenon" to describe the tendency of people to evacuate from a widespread area, al-though they have not been advised or ordered to do so.
l TMI was not the first time that the evacuation shadow phe-4 nomenon had been identified. Previous studies of human re-sponse to non-radiological disasters have noted a tendency for some people to overreact in crisis situations. However, the proportion of the population who tend to overreact during natural disasters and non-radiological technological disasters has generally been relatively small. The significant finding of our TMI study was that a substantially larger proportion of a the population tended to overreact to the nuclear accident at TMI than had been observed in other kinds of emergencies. 1 In addition to the high rate of voluntary evacuation, we noted in our TMI survey that the TMI evacuees tended-to travel - distances much greater than had been observed in previous
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. e median distance traveled by evacuees was 85 miles. The implication of these findings is that any radiological emergen-cy response plan that is to be capable of implementation must
- take such behavior into account and must take steps to acconao-date or mitigate that behavior.
Q. Were the results of your studies of the TMI accident cor-roborated by any other studies of the accident? A. Yes, they were corroborated by at least two other studies: one conducted by Mountain West Research, and one conducted by a team of geographers at Rutgers University.3/ Essentially, their results were very similar to our findings, particularly with respect to the estimates of the number of people who evac-uated and the factors contributing to their decision to evacu-ate. Both of these other studies also observed the teudency of people from beyond the designated zone of danger to overreact, although neither study referred to this type of behavior as the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
~3/ K. Barnes, J. Brosius, S. Cutter, and J.K. Mitchell.
, Responses of Impacted' Population to the Three Mile Island and Nuclear Reactor Accident. Discussion Paper No. 13. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University, October 1979. C.B. Flynn, Three Mile Island Telephone Survey. Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG/CR-1093). Tempe, AZ: Mountain West Research, October, 1979. I I l I l
, o 1
More recently, there has been further confirmation of the
- existence of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. Lindell and i 4
Perry recently wrote about the evacuation shadow phenomenon at TMI in Transactions, published by the American Nuclear Society. Noting the large number of voluntary evacuees during the TMI incident, they stated even if one assumes that all families with any pregnant women or preschool children evacuated as a unit, and that therefore as many as 10,000 persons evacuated
- " appropriately," this is still an over-
! response of more than an order of magni-l tude.4/ Elsewhere, Perry and Lindell, whose previous research has been ! in the area of natural disaster studies, conclude that the i j evacuation shadow phenomenon should be taken into account in planning for a radiological emergency.5/ The TMI experience is undeniably important to emergency planning. It demonstrates that if a radiological emergency occurs, planners must anticipate dealing with a much larger number of people than might otherwise be expected. This TMI
-4/ M.K. Lindell, and R.W.' Perry. " Protective Action Recom-mendations: How Would the Public Respond?" Transactions of the American~ Nuclear Society 41-(1982): 423-424.
~5/^ M.K. Lindell and R.W. Perry. " Nuclear Power Plant Emer-gency Warning: Sow Would the Public Respond?," Nuclear News 26'(February 1983): 49-53.
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experience is particularly important for emergency planning on Long Island because a County survey, described in the next section, documents that the shadow phenomenon is expected to be a major factor in the event of an accident at the Shoreham plant. The Long Island Survey O. Please describe the purpose of the survey conducted on Long Island. A. In light of the actual human response to the TMI accident, Suffolk Cou ty decided to investigate whether a similar human response might occur if there was an accident at Shoreham. Ac-cordingly, Suffolk County conducted a survey on Long Island for the purpose of determining how residents intended to respond to an accident at Shoreham. Suffolk County retained us to design and conduct this survey so that the County coul6 determine, among other things, what people actually intended to do, and whether an evacuation shadow phenomenon was likely in the event of an accident at Shoreham. O. Who were your colleagaes in this study? A. Our team consisted of Professor Kai Erikson of Yale, Dr. Stephen Cole of Stony Brook (see generally; Cole Testimony on Contention 23), Dr. Walter C. Farrell; Jr., a geographer and _ ll _
- l public health expert at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, Dr. David Stevenson, a sociologist formerly with the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Chicago (now on
; the faculty at Oberlin College) and ourselves. Dr. Cole, a professor of sociology at Stony Brook and president of Social Data Analysts, Inc., a social survey research finm, adminis-tered the survey. We worked together as a team to design a survey instrument that would ascertain, among other informa-tion, perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes about nuclear power plants, and behavioral intention in the event of an accident at the Shoreham plant.
Q. Describe how the survey instrument was developed. A. The entire team contributed to the development of the instrument; however, in the final analysis, Dr. Cole developed the final version of the questionnaire that was used to survey the Long Island population. He took the questions that the team put together and formulated them in a fashion that was conducive to telephone interviewing. We then reduced the length of the instrument so the telephone interview's would av-erage about 15 minutes. That was the maximum length of time we wanted to keep people on the telephone. O. What occurred after the instrument was developed? I
\
l l l l l 1 A. Once the instrument was developed, it was pre-tested by Dr. Cole. That is, a dry run was conducted to determine wheth-er the questions were clear and distinct and whether the inverviews could be conducted in approximately 15 minutes. After the pre-testing and further consultation with the team, Dr. Cole prepared and administered the final version of the survey. Q. How was the gurvey administered? A. Dr. Cole discusses this in his testimony on Contention 23. Brie fly, it was administered to a sample of the Long Island population. A sample is a representative group of a larger population. The survey was administered to about 2,600 households, which is a very large sample of the population of Long Island when you consider that public opinion polls of the entire nation are normally based on a sample _ of around 1,200 to 1,500 households. Q. Was the sample a random one of the entire population of Long Island? A. It was a stratified random sample. We .,tratified the sam-ple into 5 groups. First there were two five-mile distance zones, the first stratification being zero to five miles from the plant and the second stratification being six to 10 miles _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ D
from the plant. Beyond 10 miles, we surveyed a sample of the households to the east of the plant in Suffolk County and a sample of households to the west of the plant in both Suffolk and Nassau counties. Q. What was the basis for stratifying the sample in that manner? A. We were interested in developing detailed data about the evacuation shadow phenomenon. We stratified the sample by di-rection because we were particularly concerned about the people who live east of the plant. If they were to evacuate, they might have to move toward the plant or through the EPZ. The added number of people thus using the roadway network would po- . tentially have an impact on the ability of those within the EPZ
^o evacuate.
We therefore wanted to look at the probability that people to the east of the plant might take such action. Q. Why were the individuals west of the plant also surveyed? A. Again, because we wanted to assess the potential impact on recommended protective actions of the evacuation shadow phenom-enon. The Long Island population becomes more dense as you move further west from the plant. If people west of the plant are inclined to evacuate voluntarily, it would put a greater number of people on the roads. This could cause increased 14 - ,
. a l
l traffic congestion through substantially greater road usage and, in addition, could have a detrimental impact upon evacua-tion by persons residing to the east, including those close to I the plant who might be directly ordered to evacuate in a radiological emergency. O. What kinds of questions were asked to determine the exis-tence and magnitude of the evacuation shadow phenomenon in Suffolk County in the event of a radiological emergency?
- A. Three scenarios -- or hypothetical questions -- were presented to each person interviewed, each of which contained the type of emergency information that might be conveyed if l
there actually were an accident at the plant. The first sce-nario stated as follows: i Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are in-terested in knowing what you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Sup-pose that you and your family were at home, and there was an accident at Shoreham. All people who live within fivc miles of the plant were advised to stay indoors. Do you think that you and the other members of your family would:
- 1. go about your normal business, or
- 2. stay inside your home, or -
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
The second scenario stated:
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Suppose that you and your family were at home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant. All pregnant women and pre-school children living within five miles of the plant were advised to evacuate and everyone living between six and ten miles from the plant were advised to remain indoors. Would you and other members of your family: l 1. go about your normal business, or
- 2. stay inside your home, or l
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
l This scenario is similar to the official advisory issued TMI. 1 The third scenario stated: Suppose that you and your family were at i home and there was an accident at the Shoreham nuclear power plant. Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacunte. Would you and other members of your family: !
- 1. go about your normal business, or
- 2. stay inside your home, or
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
O. What was the purpose of presenting three different scenar-ios? A. We wanted to get some idea of how people would respond to accidents of different magnitudes. We were particularly concerned with the numbers of people who expressed an intention to evacuate under each of the different scenarios.- This t I (
I . . l l l information was deemed important to a determination of the l i extent to which the effectiveness of recommended protective l l actions might be affected by voluntary evacuation. For in-stance, data on the number of voluntary evacuees would provide insights on the traffic conditions that would prevail during an emergency, thus enabling one to develop realistic evacuation time estimates reflecting those conditions. The data are also useful to an assessment of the effectiveness of a sheltering order. Q. Please describe how these scenarios were chosen. A. Basically, we used the evacuation scenario at TMI (Scenar-io 2 -- evacuation advised for pregnant women and children within 5 n ,.i s., and sheltering for residents within 10 miles ) as the benchmark, so to speak. Then we chose one scenario that was less severe than at TMI (Scenario 1 -- sheltering advised for residents within 5 miles) and one that postulated a more severe accident (Scenario 3 -- evacuation' advised for residents within 10 miles). O. Nhat were the results of the survey relative to the evacu-ation shadow phenomenon? A. See Dr. Cole's testimony for a more detailed discussion of the overall results. Briefly stated, however, under Scenario 1, where an advisory of sheltering within five miles was given, we found that 217,000 families, or 25 percent of the total pop-ulation of Long Island (including both Suffolk and Nassau ! Counties) would evacuate. Under Scenario 2, which was an ad-I visory for evacuation of pregnant women and pre-school age children within five miles and sheltering within ten miles, an j estimated 290,000 households would evacuate, that is, 34 percent of the Long Island population. Under the third scenar-io, . evacuation recommended for persons within ten miles of the plant, 432,000 families, or 50 percent.of the Long Island popu-lation would evacuate. Thus, the people who indicated they would evacuate live as far as 50 miles from the plant. For the + details of the percent intending to evacuate by distance see 1 Figure 3. Figure 4 provides an example of the distribution of evacuees by distances and direction for the third scenario. As Figure 3 shows, in all three scenarios, the evacuation shadow phenomenon is evident and is highly significant in planning for a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Figure 3 also demon - strates that high percentages of residents as far as 50 miles from the plant and beyond would seek to evacuate. Q. Can you be more specific as to how the survey results evi-dence the evacuation shadow phenomenon? . 4
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A. Yes. Take as an example the second scenario, which is similar to the TMI evacuation advisory. As we mentioned earli-er, at TMI about 2,500 people would have evacuated if only the people who were advised to evacuate had left. Instead, a total of 144,000 people, within 15 miles of the plant, and thousands more beyond 15 miles, actually evacuated. Now, if one compares that result with the Shoreham evacuation survey responses, one finds that not only is there a high degree of intended evacua-tion within five miles of the plant, where nearly half of the people would leave, but there is also a high degree of intended evacuation from beyond the five mile zone. In fact, two-thirds of the population that is likely to evacuate under the second scenario live outside the five-mile designated zone. The number of households with pregnant women and pre-school chil-dren is 2,700. The evacuation shadow is comprised of all other households within and beyond the five mile zone who indicated that they would evacuate (about 287.000 families). In addition; if one compares the actual evacuation behavior at TMI, and the intended evacuation behavior at Shoreham as shown in the survey; in terms of distance from the . plant, the results are very similar for the areas within 10 miles of the respective plants. As Figure 5 illustrates, for example, at TMI approximately 59 percent of the population within five miles of the plant evacuated. In our Shoreham
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL EVACUATION BEHAVIOR AT TMI i AND INTENDED EVACUATION ; BEHAVIOR AT SHOREHAM j Scenario 2 l 100- .. Actual evacuation (TMI) r0 2 0 80- Intended evacuation _ g (Shoreham) y 60- -
- a. -
O
- n. 40- a $a 8 5 -
20- g g g i O a , u ,8 ,E ,- , O 5 10 15 25- 40 .
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DISTANCE FROM PLANT t Figure 5
i i l l survey, the comparable figure was 57 percent of the population. Within the six to 10 mile zone at TMI, one half of the popula-tion evacuated. Our survey reveals that 53 percent of the pop-ulation is likely to evacuate in the event of the accident at the Shoreham plant. Beyond the 10-mile zone, the results at Shoreham suggest an even larger evacuation shadow than at TMI. Specifically, within 10 to 15 miles of TMI, one-third of the population evac-uated. At Shoreham , an estimated one-half of the population within the 10 to 15 mile zone is likely to evacuate. If one compares actual evacuat:toa behavior at TMI and intended evacua-tion behavior at Shorehar. beyond 15 miles of the plant (see Figure 5), one finds that within the 15 to 25 mile distance zone at TMI, only about 12 percent of the population evacuated; at Shoreham, approximately 33 percent of the population in this distance zone said they would evacuate. Outside the 40-mile zone, less than one percent of the people at TMI evacuated, but one-fourth of the population in this zone on Long Island said they would evacuate. Several factors may account for the anticipated higher evacuation rate at Shcreham: (1) a basic distrust of the Long Island Lighting Company which has been brewing for years; (2) the fear of being trapped on Long Island in the event that a 1 l l l I
more extensive evacuation is ordered; (3) the longstanding controversy over the Shoreham plant; and (4) the perceptions and recollections of the TMI accident. The first two factors, in particular, are likely to assure a high rate of spontaneous evacuation. LILCO, with its low level of credibility among the population, will not be perceived as a reliable source of in-formation in an emergency. It is also well established that extreme behavior is likely when people perceive the routes of egress to be limited, as in the case of Long Island, or feel that those routes could quickly become impassable, a likely possibility during an evacuation from a radiological accident. The latter two factors listed above will exacerbate the tenden-4 cy to overreact. O. Have the results obtained from the survey conducted by Suffolk County been corroborated by other studies? A. Yes. As Dr. Cole has described in his testimony on Con-tention 23, he conducted two surveys for Newsday which, among other issues, evaluated the extent of the evacuation shadow phenomenon. Both surveys (one was conducted in February of 1983, the other in September,1983) showed results very similar to the survey conducted on Suffolk~ County's behalf (see Cole testimony for details). l l l
- = ..
l . . l I l ! l l In addition, earlier this year LILCO commissioned Bill Johnson and Associates and the firm of Yankelovich, Skelly and
- White ("YSW") to conduct surveys of the residents of Long Is-land. Both surveys, using somewhat different instruments, ob-tained results that were nevertheless similar to the County's Shoreham evacuation survey. Though the YSW survey's findings on the number of people who would evacuate in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham were consistently somewhat lower than the findings of the County, Newsday, and Bill Johnson surveys, they still showed an evacuation shadow of sig-nificant proportions.
Using three accident scenarios that were similar (with some modification) to the County's accident scenarios, YSW found that under the first scenario, 17% of the families on i Long Island (or about 143,000 families) would evacuate; none would be responding in accordance with instructions. Under the second scenario, 28% (235,890) of Long Island families would evacuate; fewer than 2,000 families would be following LILCO's instructions. Under the third scenario 43% (362,000 families) would evacuate; only 31,000 families would be following instructions.6/
-C/ Yankelovich, Skelley and White. Status Report On Public Response To Emergency Planning Efforts (July, 1983) [here-inaf ter YSW Report or Survey] .
A subsequent " follow-up" question reduced the above figures to 12% (100,000 families), 21% (about 177,000 families) and 29% (about 245,000 families), respectively. Certain flaws in the YSW survey and invalid tabulation procedures (see discussion infra and discussion in Cole testimony for details) indicate that these figures should be higher. Nevertheless, even accepting YSW's numbers, the survey confirms the existence
, of a substantial evacuation shadow phenomenon and the fact that many thousands of families will attempt to evacuate in the event of an accident at Shoreham even though not advised to do so.
Q. You mentioned earlier that in your opinion a radiological emergency is likely to evoke a much greater evacuation shadow response than other types of disasters. Please explain why. A. The reason stems largely from the nature of the disaster agent and the way in which the public perceives it. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1979)l/ have found that radiation is the disaster agent most dreaded by the public except for terrorism and warfare. Radiation is imperceptible to the human senses. One is therefore unable to determine when one is in its presence. Fear of radiation is enhanced by the uncertainty
-7/ P. Slovic, B. Fischoff, and S. Lichtenstein, " Rating the Risks," Environment 21, 14-39 (April, 1979).
l l i 23 - l
1 l I l of the consequences of exposure. Exposure may eventually be fatal, but the consequences may be latent -- not appearing for many years after exposure. In most disasters, direct sensory evidence of the hazard is available to the public and the information media. The re-sidents of a flood plain can corroborate the reports of 4 authorities and the news media through personal observation of rising waters and the information network of family and friends. Thus, at each stage in the flow of iniormation, reported events can be directly compared with events as they are occurring, which means that inconsistencies can be resolved as they occur. In contrast, in the event of a nuclear disas-ter, the news media and the public have access only to second-ary sources of information and even government officials must depend in large part on secondary data made avadlable by the utility companies. Sensory data are not available for the identification and evaluation of a nuclear accident; almost all information is acquired through remote inspection with instruments that monitor the internal behavior of the reactor vessel or with dosimeters that measure the level of invisible radiation.8/ These contrasts in the flow of information are
-8/ S.D. Brunn, J.H. Johnson, Jr., and D.J. Zeigler, Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area l Residents. East Lansing, MI: Department of Geography, Michigan State University, August, 1971.
f 1 1 l
l l 1 diagrammed in Figure 6. 1 Another factor which further explains the public's height-l l ened fear of nuclear power arises from its controversial histo-ry. Studies have shown that a large proportion of the public relates the fear of nuclear power to the use of nuclear weap-ons. Looming large in the social memory of the public are the deaths and human suffering caused by the bombing of Japan dur-ing World War II.9/ Ef fect on Sheltering O. What is the concern stated in Contention 23 with respect to sheltering? A. Contention 23 raises the concern that the evacuation shadow phenomenon will have an adverse impact on the effec-tiveness of the protective actions proposed in the LILCO Plan, including sheltering. The actual behavior of persons following the TMI accident, as well as the Shoreham surveys we have discussed, indicate that sheltering advisories made under the LILCO Plan will i
-9/ E. Cook, "The Role of History in the Acceptance of Nucle-ar Power." Social Science Quarterly 63 (1982): 3-15.
R.J. Lifton Death and Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. New-York: Random House, 1968. 4
~ u
! A. THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION IN THE : EVENT OF A NATURAL DISASTER [/ D l Government News Officials -) Media ') Public l
)
Sensory inspection Isensory inspection Sensory inspection l Natural Disaster M Primary Sources of information I I Seconday Sources of Information,
~
B. THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR DISASTER [e D Government - News Officials -
) Media ')
Public Utility Companies Nuclear Disaster i c ! l Figure 6 l
precipitate evacuation by substantial numbers of people. Since an automobile offers essentially no shielding from radiation (see LILCO Plan, Table 3.6.5), people choosing to evacuate rather than to follow an advisory to shelter will be endangered if there has already been a release of radiation, and will not receive the shielding benefit which the LILCO personnel who made the sheltering recommendation would assume to be avail-able. Q. What does the TMI experience tell us about the effec-tiveness of a recommendation to shelter? A. At TMI, sheltering was advised for everyone within 10 miles of the plant (except for those pregnant women and chil-dren wi hin 5 miles who were advised to evacuate). However, over half of the people within 10 miles of TMI evacuated. It is apparent that the people around TMI viewed the sheltering advisory as indicative of enough danger to cause them to evacu-ate. Instead of sheltering, they chose the extra measure of protection that they perceived evacuation would provide. Q. Do the County's survey results confirm the TMI findings? A. Yes. Even in the first scenario, when sheltering was only advised for those within 5 miles of the plant, 40 percent of the population within 10 miles expressed an intention-to I
evacuate. In scenario 2, when sheltering was advised for those between 6 and 10 miles from the plant, 57 percent of the popu-lation in that zone said they would evacuate. Our survey indi-cated that overall, one third of the population of Long Island (235,000 families) would leave under the conditions postulated in scenario 2. Thus, if there were an advisory for those within 5 miles of the plant to shelter, 40 percent of that population -- or approximately 4,000 families -- would be vulnerable to the effects of radiation because they would be unprotected in their cars attempting to evacuate. Similarly, if people living with-i in 6 to 10 miles of the plant were advised to shelter, 52 percent -- or approximately 11,000 families -- would.be vulner-able to the effects of radiation because they would be unprotected attempting to evacuate in their cars. O. Are there other reasons why the evacuation shadow phenome-non will prevent sheltering from being a viable protective action? A. Yes. As alleged in Contention 23.B, it is likely that many people will attempt to evacuate prior to the issuance of a protective action recommendation that is intended to be appli-l cable to them. The Shoreham survey has shown that a sheltering advisory for the 5-mile zone will precipitate widespread 27 - ; 1 l I
i . evacuation from the 6 to 10 mile zone and beyond. In other l words, people will attempt to evacuate even if no protective action advisory has been issued for the zone in which they l live. If these people are on the road when a sheltering advis-ory is issued for an expanded hazard zone, th'ey would be more vulnerable to the effects of radiation in their automobiles than they would have been in their homes. Automobiles offer
- little, if any, protection from radiation.
I The 19 Subzones of the EPZ Q. What is the concern raised in Contention 23.C? A. Contention 23.C reads as follows: Contention 23.C. The LILCO Plan proposes an EPZ consisting of 19 separate zones. In a radiological emergency requiring evacuation of the EPZ, it is LILCO's strategy to conduct "a i systematic area-by-area evacuation downwind of . , the reactor." (Plan, Appendix, A at I-5). The 4 Plan is unrealistic in expecting to evacuate , only certain zones within LILCO's 10-mile EPZ without expecting residents of the bordering zone (s) and probably other zones as well, also to evacuate. People not located in a zone rec-ommended to be evacuated will not wait while their immediate neighbors evacuate in response J. to a protective action recommendation. This is particularly so for people who live close to the plant. Accordingly, LILCO's plan for staged evacuation of the inner EPZ zones is unworkable and thus not in compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and J.10. The defect in LILCO's Plan alleged by Contention 23.C l
J arises from LILCO's decision to divide the 10 mile EPZ into 19 small zones. (See Figure 7). According to the Plan, where evacuation is the recommended protective action, only some of the zones will be evacuated, depending on the direction of the 1 3 plume and the nature of the release. In this manner, LILCO r hopes to reduce the number of evacuees, thus simplifying the evacuation. Howeyer, LILCO's minute subdivision of the EPZ is not based on reality. It is, first of all, highly unrealistic to expect that in a radiological emergency, people will be able to relate to the concept of 19 separate emergency planning subzones. Even though information pertaining to the 19 zones is contained in LILCO's emergency brochure, disaster studies have shown repeat-edly that people rarely, if ever, remember information of this type when they find themselves in an actual crisis situa-tion.lE/ Further, it is very likely that the daily activity 10/ T.F. Saarinen, "The Relationship of Hazard Awareness to Adoption of Approved Mitigation Measures," National Hazards Research and Applications Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1979. V. Preston, S.M. Taylor, and D.C. Hodge, Adjustment to National and Technological Hazards: A Study of An Urban Residential Community, Environment and Behavior 15 (1983): 143-164. J.H. Sims and D.D. Baumann, Educational Prcgrams and Human Response to National Hazards, Environment and Behavior 15 (1983): 165-189. (Footnote. cont'd next page)
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d p i locations (home, workplace(s), school (s), stores, day care l cer' r(s), etc.) of a substantial proportion of the households within 10 miles of the plant encompass more than one of the 19 i zones. Therefore, any effort to evacuate only selected zones
; will increase public anxiety and confusion, especially among 1
those families who are not together as a unit when the initial warning is issued, and thus heighten population overreaction. Moreover, the data assembled from TMI, and from , i the County, Newsday and LILCO surveys, demonstrate that if there is a recommendation to evacuate some portions or subzones I within the EPZ, the majority of the residents of other subzones will evacuate also. It is unrealistic to expect the residents of one subzone to stay in their homes when they hear that re-- i sidents of a neighboring subzone have been ordered to evacuate. Indeed, since the LILCL subzones are so small and the dividing l lines between them are merely designated roads, residents of i one subzone will be likely to see and hear their neighbors I evacuating. Even if their subzone was not advised to evacuate, these residents are unlikely to believe that they are not in danger when they know that their neighbors across the street or (Footnote cont'd from previous page) J.H. Sorensen, " Knowing How to Behave Under the Threat of Disasters Can It Be Explained?" ) l Environment and Behavior 15 (1983): 438-457. 1
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only blocks away have been ordered to evacuate. In short,
- people are not likely to believe that harmful radiation will stop at the dividing line for a LILCO subzone.ll/
Both at TMI arc in the TMI-type scenario for Shoreham, we found very little distance decay (that is, a decrease in the proportion of the population evacuating as distance from the l l plant increases) in the percent of people.who either evacuated (TMI) or intend to evacuate (Shoreham) within 10 miles of the respective power plants even though the evacuation advisory pertained to only the five-mile zone. Furthermore, the i Shoreham evacuation survey found little difference in the rates of evacuation and sheltering between residents of the 5-mile I zone and the 6 to 10 mile zone, even when the residents of those' zones were instructed to behave differently. When there is such little discrimination between two such large zones in terms of following directions, it is unlikely that people will pay attention to differences in direction for 19 much smaller zones. People will choose to undertake the protective actions which they feel will offer them maximum protection; they will , not undertake protective actions just because they have been l l advised to do so by LILCO. Within 10 miles of the plant, 11/ See also Suffolk County Testimony concerning Contention 64. i I
I 1 1 perception of the threat seems to be uniformly high. For this l re son, it is unlikely that the 19 zones proposed by LILCO would be workable. LILCO's failure to consider carefully the evacuation i
- shadow phenomenon means that people will attempt to evacuate, f but will not be protected. It also means that the LILCO evacu-
! ation time estimates are flawed, as discussed below. i I
; Evacuation Time Estimates j Q. What is the concern expressed in Contention 23.D?
2 A. Contention 23.D addresses a major flaw in LILCO's plan. As we har. discussed, an accident at Shoreham for which evacua- ! tion was the recommended protective action (at least for some i j people) would result in the evacuation of not only those people residing in the identified zone of danger, but also thousands
-- perhaps hundreds of thousands of people, even by LILCO's count -- from outside that area. LILCO's time estimates, how-ever, do not take into account those additional vehicles that.
will be attempting to use the roadways on Long Island. This is a serious oversight, particularly given Long Island's geography and the limited number of east-west roadways. The County's survey revealed that in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham requiring evacuation of the a
10-mile EPZ, approximately 46 percent of the people living east of the EPZ would attempt to evacuate. The vast majority stated that they would seek to go west, thus avoiding being " trapped" at the tip of the island. In order to do so, the East End evacuees would most likely be required to travel on the Long Island Expressway or the Sunrise Highway (Route 27). (See ! Figure 8). Both of those roads, however, are major evacuation routes for evacuees from inside the EPZ. (See evacuation route maps for zones A-J, L-P, R-S, Appendix A at Section IV). As Professor Pigozzi discusses in more detail, the result will be that cars from the East End will be competing for available ca-pacity with cars leaving from the EPZ. The County's survey also indicates that large numbers of voluntary evacuees will depart from the area west of the EPZ; 190,000 families under scenario 1, 255,000 families under sce-nario 2, and 380,000 families under scenario 3. The importance of this fact is that the population of Long Island becomes more dense as one moves west from the plant. As Professors Pigozzi and Herr have testified, the large numbers of evacuees using
- the evacuation routes to the west of the EPZ, particularly l
those families residing just west of the EPZ, could clog the evacuation routes, thus obstructing the expeditious departure of evacuees from the EPZ. l
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4 . l i , j Q. What is the effect of LILCO's failure to account for the j evacuation shadow phenomenon in deriving its evacuation time estimates? i j A. The effect is that LILCO has underestimated the time it ' i 1 will actually take to evacuate the EPZ. This is clear from the i l time estimates produced by PRC Voorhees which do account for voluntary evacuation. Those estimates show that it would take ] ! about 18 hours to evacuate the EPZ under normal weather conditions, rather than the 4 to 6 hours that LILCO estimates 1 in Appendix A. Since PRC Voorhees' estimates consider the shadow phenomenon, it is our opinion that their estimates are i , far more accurate than LILCO's. i l Q. Has LILCO attempted to study the effects.of the evacuation J shadow phenomenom on evacuation time estimates? i l A. Yes. KLD purported to conduct such a study in a document known as KLD-TM-77.12/ We agree with the testimony of
! Professors Herr and Pigozzi, however, that KLD-TM-77 has under-i 1
estimated the effect of the shadow phenomenom through the use of flawed assumptions and incomplete data. (See Herr and 12/
~~
KLD Associates, Inc., " Estimated Evacuation Times for the Entire Population Within the Emergency Planning Zone for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Considering the Effects of Uncontrolled Evacuation, Voluntary Evacuation, l Inclement Weather and Accidents," (undated). l l t
l l Pigozzi Testimony on Contentions 65 and 23.D for a detailed explanation of the flaws in KLD-TM-77) . The Ef fect of Warning Messages O. What effect will warning messages have on the magnitude of the evacuation shadow phenomenon? A. It has been suggested that LILCO will be able to control the behavior of the public -- and thus significantly reduce voluntary evacuation -- through its Emergency Broadcast System i messages. We disagree. We believe it is unrealistic to expect any significant diminution of voluntary evacuation by this or , any other mechanism. Clear, precise, consistent, timely and accurate warning messages may have some marginal effect in reducing the shadow
! phenemenon. However, there is no basis on which to conclude that such messages will be the determining factor in human re-sponse to a radiological emergency. Our TMI study found that fear of impending harm, not conflicting information, was the overriding factor in triggering evacuation. Research indicates
( that decisions regarding the most appropriate protective l l action (s) to take in crisis situations are related not only to the type, content, and frequency of warnings, but also to uch
- factors as fear of the impending crisis and perception of the 1
35 - I _,_ . ~
i; , . 1 i likelihood that it will materialize; distance and direction j from the source; level of faith or trust in emergency response i officials; prior disaster experience; the individual's socio- , i economic status and stage-in-life cycle characteristics; and the icvel of family cohesiveness.13/ All of these factors, [ ! which are not in LILCO's control, will contribute to decisions i j to evacuate or take other protective actions. While the impor-i i tance of good warning messages is not to be discounted, a very
; large evacuation shadow is likely to occur even if LILCO develops good warning messages. Thus, LILCO's EBS messages are unlikely to override the public's fear of radiation, their mis-t trust of LILCO, and the other factors we have discussed which will lead to substantial voluntary evacuation.
1 j Survey data reveals that LILCO is held in very low regard i l, by the population of Long Island. As will be discussed in the Suffolk County testimony on Contention 15 (Credibility), it is 1-therefore likely that many people will not heed LILCO's mes-sages because they deem LILCO to be untrustworthy. Thus, even i, i 13/ R.W. Perry, " Evacuation Decision-Making in National Disas- '
! ters," Mass Emergencies 4 (1979): 25-38;~H.J.oOtway,
! " Risk Assessment and the Social Response to Nuclear Power. " Journal of the British Nuclear Energy Society 16 (1977): 327-333; P. Slovic and B. Fischhoff, " How Sa fe is } Sa fe Enough? ", in L. Gould and E.A. Walker (eds.) The l Management of Nuclear Wastes. New Haven, Connecticut: l Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 42-64. i I i
1 1 if LILCO's messages are assumed to be perfect, they may be ineffective. Fur thenmore , LILCO will not be the only source of information available. Indeed, in light of LILCO's low credi-bility, it is likely that people will seek alternate sources of info rmation. The alternate sources available to the population are likely to be the news media. Yet, the news media performed dismally at TMI. In fact, they contributed to the conflicting information which was one cause for the overreaction of the population there. At TMI, local radio stations were the prime source of emergency information for most of the people (62 percent) in southcentral Pennsylvania during the TMI crisis.ld/ In its final report to the President on the accident at TMI, the Kemeny Commission concluded that the news media contributed, along with government and utility officials, to the conflicting information being disseminated about the accident.15/ Com-menting on the coverage of the TMI accident by the news media, the Kemeny Commission noted that: 14/ D.M. Rubin, et al., Staff Report to the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island. Report of the Public's Right to Information Task Force. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 15
-/ President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Is-land. The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.
. even personnel representing the major national news media [not to mention local media personnel] often did not have suf fi-cient scientific and engineering background to understand thoroughly what they heard, and did not have available to them people to explain the information. . . . Many of the stories were so garbled as to make them useless as sources of information.
There is no evidence that the situation will be any better in the event of an accident at Shoreham. In summary, it is not realistic to assume that warning messages issued by LILCO will serve to decrease the shadow phe-nomenon by any significant degree. O. Please summarize your conclusions. A. Evidence observed at TMI and data gathered on Long Island indicate that there will be a substantial evacuation shadow in the event of an accident at Shoreham. Large numbers of people from both east and west of the EPZ are likely to ignore any non-evacuation instructions. Instead, they will seek to evacu-ate -- mostly in a westerly direction leading to congested roadway conditions and increased risks of exposure to radia-tion. Thus, the large number of voluntary evacuees are likely to render LILCO's recommended protective actions ineffective. i
e 6 ATTACm4ENT 1 l l I e e
ATTACHMENT 1 DONALD J. ZEIGLER Assistant Professor of Geography Department of Political Science and Geography Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23508 Tel. (804) 440-3845 Home Address: 5816 Roxbury Place, Virginia Beach, VA 23462 Tel. (804) 490-1060 ' Educat*on Ph.D. ,1980, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 Specializations: Urban Social and Economic Geography, Population Geography M.A. ,1976, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island 02881 Specializations: Urban Social Geography, Economic Geography, Population Geography B.S. ,1972, Shippensburg Univeraity of Fennsylvania, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania 17257 Major: Geography. Minors: Social Science and Education Present Position ASSISTANT PROFESSOR (since 1980) and DIRECTOR OF THE GEOGRAPHY PROGRAM (since 1983) Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 23508 Courses Taught: Economic Geography Geography of Energy
! Geography of the City Marine Geography Cartography Introduction to Cultural Geography Seminar in Geography Introduction to Physical Geography Hazards Seminar Innovations in Instruction:
Designed a series of textbook-based graph and map interpretation exercises for the introductory physical geography classes. Organized field trips to NASA's technology house, Norfolk International Terminals, N&W Coal Terminals, Norfolk School of Traditional Boat-building Coast Guard Station at Wormley Creek, NOAA's Coastal Mapping Center, Farc Fresh Super Savings Center, the Norfolk-Virginia Beach coastline, and interpretive walks into the surrounding neighborhoods. Taught several introductory physical and cultural geography courses for students in the Academic Opportunity Program. Participated in the Exxon-sponsored Guided Design Workshop at the NCCE annual meeting in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Service to the Geography Program: Participated in the development of the new B.A. program in geography, including requirements and courses. , Prepared and carried through the production process a brochure on the geogeaphy program.
2 Organized and coordinated a successful World Population Day at Old Dominion University. l Initiated a serial publication in support of the geography program l entitled "Research Notes in Geography." Served as advisor to the Geography Club whose activities have included field trips and public lectures. Wrote the Library acquisitions request that resulted in the expansion of the periodical collection in geography. Presented a proposal to the Teacher Education Task Force for the
< expansion of geography's role in teacher training.
Committee Assignments: Ph.D. in Urban Services Policy Committee (1980-present) Urban Research and Services Center Steering Committee (1980-1981) Arts and Letters Curriculum Committee (1983-present) Arts and Letters Committee for Non-Credit Short Courses (1981-1983) Arts and Letters Election Committee (1981-1982) Departmental Graduate Studies Committee (1981-1982) Departmental Resources Committee (1982-present) i University Religious Council (1982-present) Board of Directors. Tidewater Wesley Foundation (1982-present) Previous Experience RESEARCH ASSISTANT (1980), Center for Environmental Quality Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 Responsibilities: Assisted in organizing a series of community and state level energy workshops; participated in the preparation of the final reports on the workshop project for the Michigan Energy Administration. TEACHING ASSISTANT (1977-1979), Department of Geography Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824 - Responsibilities: Taught economic geography (2 terms); assisted in field tech-niques in geography (5 terms) and in geography of environmental quality (1 term). I ARCHIVES ASSISTANT. (Summers 1978 and 1979), State of Michigan Archives l l Michigan History Division Department of State, Lansing, Michigan 48918 Responsibilities: Organized newly acquired archival record groups and manuscript collections; wrote finding aids to facilitate public access to primary source material. GEOGRAPHER (1976-1977), Geographical Statistical Areas Branch U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C. 20233 Responsibilities: Analyzed statistical and cartographic data in order to prepare and revise census tract plans and establish other statistical areas in the Southern states in cooperation with local planning agencies. INSTRUCTOR (1976), Department of Geography University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island 02881 Responsibilities: Taught economic geography (2 terms); directed a tutorial in geographic education; served as University College advisor. TEACHER (1974-1976), Social Studies Department South Kingstown High School, Wakefield, Rhode Island 02879
3 GRADUATE ASSISTANT (1973-1974), Department of Geography University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island 02881 TEACHER (1973), Social Studies Department Hershey Senior High School, Hershey, Pennsylvania 17033 DEPARTMENTAL ASSISTANT AND CARTOGRAPHER (1970-1972), Department of Geography Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania 17257 Research and Publications ARTICLES:
"A Spatial Analysis of Evacuation Intentions at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station." In M. J. Pasqualetti and K. D. Pijawka, editors, Nuclear Power: Assessing and Managing Hazardous Technology: forthcoming.
(With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
" Distinguishing Human Responses to Radiological Emergencies." Economic Geography:
forthcoming. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
" Energy Change and Evolving Nonmetropolitan Land Use Patterns." In G. Macinko and R. H. Platt, editors, Beyond the Urban Fringe: Land Use Issues of Nonmetropolitan America. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. pp. 305-312. (With L. M. Sommers)
" Changing Regional Patterns of Central City Credit Ratings: 1960-1980."
Urban Geography 2 (July-September 1981): 269-283.
" Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster." Geographical Review 71 (January 1981): 1-16. (Principal author; with S. D. Brunn and J. H. Johnson, Jr.) This article was entered into testimony and accepted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 4, 1981.
" Human Settlements in Sparsely Populated Areas: A Conceptual Overview." In R. E. Lonsdale and J. W. Holmes, editors Human Settlements in Sparsely Populated Regions. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.
pp. 14-52. (With S. D. Brunn)
"Geopolitical Fragmentation and the Pattern of Growth and Need: Defining and Cleavage Between Sunbelt and Frostbelt Metroplises." In S. D. Brunn and J. O. Wheeler, editors, The American Metropolitan System: Present and Future. New York: Edward Arnold, 1980. pp. 77-92.
"The Regional and Environmental Social Studies: Frontiers for Geography and the PCGE." The Pennsylvania Geographer 13 (July 1975); reprinted December 1976.
" Federal Support for Public Education: A Rationale." Kappa Delta Pi Record 12 (October 1975).
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4 MONOCRAPHS Technological Hazards. Resource Publication in Geography series. Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, forthcoming. (Principal ) author; with J. H. Johnson, Jr. , and S. D. Brunn j l I BOOK REVIEWS l Review of David L. Sills, C. P. Wol.f, and Vivien B. Shelanski, Accident at ! Three Mile Island: The Human Dimensions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1982) in the Professional Geographer 34 (November 1982): 485-486. Review of Ronald W. Perry, Michael K. Lindell, and Marjorie R. Greer., Evacuation Planning in Emergency Management (Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath, 1981) in Geographical Review 72 (July 1983): 425-427. REPORTS: Further Analysis and Interpretation of the Shoreham Evacuation Survey. In Volume 3 of the Suf folk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan, November 1982. 71 p p. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr. ) Energy and the Adaptation of Human Settlements edited by H. E. Koenig and L. M. l Sommers. East Lansing, Michigan: Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State University,1980. (Contributor: pp. 6-19, 22-25, 28-40, 43, 123-129) Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents. East Lansing, ! Michigan: Department of Ceography, Michigan State University, August 1979. 281 pp. (With S. D. Brunn and J. H. Johnson, Jr. ) Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents. Eas t Lansing, Michigan: Department of Geography, Michigan State University, May 1979. (With S. D. Brunn and J. H. Johnson, Jr.) ' PAPERS:
"The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon: Comparing Behavioral Responses to duelear Accidents." Paper presented at the annual meeting of l
j the Southeastern Division of the Association of American Geog- ! raphers, Orlando, Florida, Novembe- 21, 1983. (with J.H. Johnson, Jr.)
" Covered Bridges: Requiem or Renaissance?" Paper presented a: the annual meeting of the New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society, Burlington, Vermont, Novemtar 5,1983.
" Printing in Tongues: The Fcreign-Language Press in the United States." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American j Geographers, Denver, Colorado, April 26, 1983.
" Energy'-Ef ficient Metropolitan Regions: A' Conceptual Model of Adaptations to a High-Cost Energy Future." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Division of the Association of American Geographers, Atlanta, Georgia, November 23, 1981.
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" Energy and the Transformation of a M:tropolitan Landscapo: Contrasting Contemporary and Future Settlement Geographies." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Council for Geographic Education, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 29, 1981. (Available on microfiche as part of the ERIC document collection: ED 214815.)
" Changing Regional Patterns of Central City Credit Ratings: 1960-1980."
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Division of the Association of American Geographers, Blacksburg, Virginir , November 24, 1980.
"From Three Mile Island to Worlds End: Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disa ster." Paper r cesented at the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania Council for Geography Education, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, October 11.
1980.
"The Spatial Correlates of Municipal Bonds: A Geography of Assigned Credit Ratings." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 23, 1979.
(With S. D. Brunn) TESTIMONY:
" Testimony Before the Suf folk County Legislature in the Matter of the Shoreham Nuclear Station Emergency Planning Proceedings." Hauppauge, New York, January 24, 1983. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
" Testimony Before the Governor's Commission on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station." New York, New York, June 28, 1983. (With J. H. Johnson, Jr.)
DISSERTATION:
" Central City Credit Ratings: Regional Patterns and Spatial Correlates,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Department of Geography, Michigan State University,1980. (Advisor: Stanley D. Brunn. Committee Members: Joe T. Darden and Ian M. Matley.) THESIS:
" Selected Quality of Life Indicators and Demographic Characteristics of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States," unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Geography, University of Rhode Island, 1976. (Advisor: Gerald H. Krausse. Second Reader: Henry J. Warman. )
FIELD TRIP GUIDE: Environmental Land Usr. in the Cumberland Valley. Field trip booklet written for the annual conference of the Pennsylvania Council for Geography Education held at Shippensburg State College, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania, l May 1, 1971. 80 pp. I FILM STRIP SERIES (Consultant): Seeing the New England States, Coronet Instructional Media,1975.
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! Old Dominion University, Summer Faculty Research Fellowship: " Municipal Bond i Rating Dynamics and the Geopolitical Fragmentation of Metropolitan Areas."
l i j Media Interviews i Radio: WKAR, East Lansing, Michigan, on the Three Mile Island survey,1979. I NBC-Radio, New York, N.Y. , for national syndication. Television: WELM, East Lansing, Michigan, on the Three Mile Island survey,1979. t Membership in Professional Organizations j Association af American Geographers (since 1968) Southeastern Division, Association of American Geographers (since 1980)
- National Council for Geographic Education (since 1967)
Pennsylvania Geographical Society (since 1970) Virginia Geographical Society (since 1982) 3 l Society for Risk Analysis (since 1981) j Gamma Theta Upsilon (inducted 1970) Kappa Delta Pi (inducted 1971) i i Personal Birth Date: November 26, 1951 State of Health: Excellent , i Birthplace: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Married, with two children i n i i l l I i l P
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4 ATTACHMENT 2 l G -
ATTACHMENT 2 CURRICULUM VITAE l James H. Johnson, Jr. ) l Mailing Address Home Address Department of Geography 15325 Magnolia Blvd. f305 University of California Sherman Oaks, CA. 91403 Los Angeles, CA. 90024 (213) 789-6121/789-5506 (213) 825-1415/825-1071 l EDUCATION: B.S., Geography, North Carolina Central' University,1975. M.S., Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madison,1977. Ph.D., Geography, Michigan State University,1980. FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION: Teaching and Research-Systematic: energy policy and planning, urban, social geography of the inner city. Methods: reseach design, theory and methodology in geography. SPECIAL HONORS: Recipient of the Theodore R. Speigner kard for the highest academic average, Department of Geography, North Carolina Central University,1975. Suma Cum Laude Graduate, Department of Geography, North Carolina Central University,1975. Selected as an Outstar. ding Young Man in America by the' Jaycees in 1976. Graduate Fellow, Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975-77. Recipient of the first place award ($100) for the best graduate student paper presented at the East Lakes Division of the Association of American Geographers Annual Meetings, Michigan State University, September 15-16', 1978. JOB EXPERIENCE: Job
Title:
Assistant Professor , Location: Department of Geography, UCLA Duties: Teach courses in urban, social, and cultural geography; and environmental quality. Years: 1980 to present. ! Job
Title:
Research. Assistant Location: Michigan Department of Comerce, Energy. Administration, Lansing Duties: Review grant proposals for schools and hospitals for energy con - servation assistance. Research on vanpooling. Years: June 1980 to August 1980. Job
Title:
Research Assistant (Quarter Time) - Location: Center for Urban Affairs, College of Urban Development, Michigan State University Duties: Computer analysis of data for various projects. Years: Summer 1978 to Spring 1980
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Jam:s H. Johnson, Jr. Page 2 JOB EXPERIENCE (Cont'd.): Job
Title:
Research Assistant (Half Time) Location: Departments of Geography and Agricultural Economics, Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State University Duties: Research and writing of reports and presentations to legislative and consumer groups regarding Electric Utility Rate Reform in Michigan (under contract #71-3698). Years: Summer 1979 to Spring 1980. Job
Title:
Teaching Assistant (Half Time) Location: Department of Geography, Michigan State University Duties : Range from directing discussion sections to lecturing in the following courses: Future Worlds - Fall 1977; Spring 1978 Geography of Culture - Winter 1978 World Regional Geography - Winter 1978 American City and Region - Winter 1979 Quantitative Methods in Geography - Spring 1978; Fall 1978; Spring 1979. 3 Advanced Quantitative Methods - Winter 1979. Years: Fall 1977 to Spring 1979. Job
Title:
Field Laboratory Technician Location: Air Pollution Monitoring Field Project, Tulsa, Oklahoma Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park Durham
.. North Carolina Duties: Operated and maintained two air pollution monitoring field research stations; analyzed data from 0 ,3NO and N02 monitors daily.
Years: June 1977 to Septenber 1977. Job
Title:
Junior Computer Operator Location: Duke University Computation Center, Durham, North Carolina Duties: Command IBM /360 Years: February 1975 to August 1975. Job
Title:
Engineer's Assistant Location: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park. Durham, North Carolina Duties: Run Chemical Analysis for double alkali scrubber systems. Years: 1972-75 (Stay in School Program). PROFESSIONAL AND CIVIC AFFILIATIONS: j Church: Member, St. John Missionary Baptist Church Falkland, North Carolina Other Organizations: Gama Pi Chapter, Gamma Theta Upsilon Association of American Geographers , Triangle Geographers Association i Association of Pacific Coast Geographers Western Social Science Association American Association for the Advancement of Science
James H. Johnson, Jr. Page 3 RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:
"Vanpool Program::: Their Evolution and Potential Improvement Through the Application of a Location-Allocation Model." (submitted for publication consideration).
" Evacuation Planning for Radiological Emergencies." (submitted for publication consideration).
"Following Directions During Radiological Emergencies." (submitted for publication consideration).
" Black Migration to the South, 1970-80." (submitte'd for publication con-sideration).
" Black Suburbanization in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area During the 1970's,"
invited chapter for The Geoaraphy of Afro-Americans, edited by R.A. Obudho (to be published in 1983).
" Determinants of Evacuation Behavior During Nuclear Accidents," invited chaptir for The Nuclear Power Plant: A Geographical Perspective on Technology Assessmag, edited by Mike Pasqualetti (to be published in 1983).
" Human Response to Radiological Emergencies." (to be submitted for publication consideration in February,1983).
" Distinguishing Public Reactions Toward a Hazardous Waste Dump in West Covina, California." (to be submitted for publication consideration in March,1983).
" Technology as Hazard." AAG Resource Publications in Geography to be published in 1983 (with Donald J. Zeigler and Stanley D. Brunn).
PUBLICATIONS: 1977 " Black Migration as a Response to Social Psychological Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters, 1916-1918," Proceedings, New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society, Vol. 6, pp. 42-46 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1978 " Black Migration as a Response to Social-Psychological Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters, 1916-1918," The Geographical Survey, Vol. 7, pp. 22-27 (with Walter C Farrell, Jr.); a revised version. 1978 " Black Philadelphians: A Factorial Ecology," Proceedings, Pennsylvania Academy of Sciences, Vol. 52, pp. 91-95 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr. and John D. Oliver). 1979 "The Quality of. Afro-American Life in Houston, Texas: A Geographical Perspective," in J. Pinder and R. Proctor, Perspectives on the Urban South: Selected Papers from the Fourth Annual Conference, pp. 207-221. Norfolk, Virginia: Norfolk State College ano Old Dominion University, 1979, (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr. and Patricia Johnson).
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James H. Johnson, Jr. ( Page 4 i l l PUBLICATIONS (Cont'd.): 1979 "Recent Methodological Developments and the Geography of Black i Ameri ca ," The Pennsylvania Geographer, Vol.17, pp.19-30 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1979 "Phenomenology in Geography," The Geographical Survey, Vol . 8, pp. 3-9 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1979 " Educational Concern of Inner City Black Parents," ERIC Doctsnent ' (June 1979), #106-297 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1979 " Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." Department of Geography, Michigan State University, i May 1979 (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler). 1979 " Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents."
! Department of Geography, Michigan State University, August 1979, 220 pp.
(with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler). 1979 " Preliminary Review and Analysis of Electric Utility Rate Reform: Implications for Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan." Report for Michigan Comunity Action Agency Association and Oakland-Livingston Human Services Agency, under contract #71-3698. Departments of Geography and Agricultural Economics and Center for Environmental Quality, Michigan State University, September 24,1979 (with Bradley 4 T. Cullen). 1979 " Spatial Patterns of Alcohol Outlets in the Washington, D.C. Black Community," Proceedings, Pennsylvania Acaderry of Sciences, Vol . 53, pp. 89-97 (with Marvin P. Dawkins and Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1980 " Residential Preference Patterns of Afro-American College Students in Three Different States," The Professional Geographer, Vol . 32, pp. 37-42 (with Stanley D. Brunn). <l 1980 " Spatial and Behavioral Aspects of Counterstream Migration of Blacks to the South," in Brunn Stanley D. and James 0. Wheeler, eds., The American Metropolitan System: Present and Future. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Scripta Series in Geography, Victor Winston Publisher, 1980, pp. 59-75 (with Stanley D. Brunn). I 1980 "Locational Conflict and Public Attitudes Regarding the Burial of Nuclear j Waste: The Alpena, Michigan Experience," East Lakes Geographer, Vol .15, i pp. 24-40 (with Stanley D. Brunn and Brian Eirr). , 1981 " Evacuation from the Nuclear Technological Disaster at Three Mile Island," The Geos raphical Review, Vol .17, pp.1-16 (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald 6. Ze1 gler) . 1981 " Household Energy Consumption in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan: Some Patterns, Alternatives and Policy Implications." A Report for the Michigan Community Action Agency Association and the ! Oakland-Livingston Human Service Agency. East Lansing: Michigan State i University, 65 pp. (wit- L.M. Somers, G.A. Woods, and T.C. Miller).
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James H. Johnson, Jr. Page 5 PUBLICATIONS (Cont'd. ): l 1981 " Spatial Perspectives on Counter-stream Black tiigration to the South," i CAAS Newsletter, Vol . 5, tiay, pp. 9-10 ( Abstract). I 1981 " Gentrification and Incumbent Upgrading: Benefits and Costs," CAAS Newsletter, Vol . 6, November, pp.10,16. 1981 " Community Reaction Toward an Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dump," in Proceedings of Applied Geography Conference, edited by J.W. Frazier and B.J. Epstein, Vol . 4, pp. 423-424 ( Abstract). 1982 " Implications of the Black Move to the South," Black Enterprise, Vol .12, January, p. 21 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1982 " Impact of Electricity Utility Rate Reform in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," Journal of Environmental Systems, Vol .12, pp. 27-36 (with Bradley T. Cullen and Lawrence M. Somers). 1982 "A Note on Black Migration to the South," Geographical Perspectives, Nunber 49, pp. 38-43. 1982 "Further Analysis and Interpretation of the Shoreham Evacuation Survey," prepared for Suffolk County, Long Island, New York, Novenber, 71 pp. (with Donald J. Zeigler). 1982 " Basis for Selection of Emergency Planning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York." F.C. Finlayson and Associates, Cerritos, Ca., October (with F.C. Finlayson). 1983 "The Role of Community Action in Neighborhood Revitalization: A Study of the Eastown Community, Grand Rapids," Urban Geography, forthcoming. 1983 " Implications of Electric Utility Rate Reform Legislation for Low Income Households in Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," Social Science Journal, forthcoming (with B.T. Cullen and L.M. Soniners). 1983 Review of Revitalizing Cities, by H. braviel Holconb and Robert Beauregard. The Professional Geographer, forthcoming. 1983 Review of Not on My Street, by M.J. Dear and S.M. Taylor. Environment and Planning A, forthcoming. . 1983 Review of Alley Life in Washington, by James Borchert, Historical Geography Newsletter, forthcoming. PRESENTATIONS - PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS: 1976 Annual Meeting, New England-St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society,
'" Black Migration as a Response to Psycho-Social Stress: A Note on Migrant Letters," Salem, Massachusetts.
1976 Annual Meeting, Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, Comentator for session " Considerations in Culture," Chicago, Illinois.
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j i James H. Jo % son, Jr. Page 6 t PRESENTATIONS - PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS (Cont'd.): 1977 Annual Meeting, Popular Culture Association, " Folk Reasons for Early l 20th Century Black Migration," Baltimore, Maryland (with Walter C. ! Farrell, Jr. and Phillip Kitchart). 4 1978 Annual Meeting Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University Con-ference on the Urban South, "The Quality of Afm-American Life in i Houston, Texas: A Geographical Perspective," Norfolk, Virginia (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). j 1978 Annual Meeting, Michigan Acadenly of Scienc.es, " Factors Influencing the j Decline of White and Non-White Operated Farms in the Central Coastal Plains of North Carolina, 1945-1969," Ypsilanti, Michigan (with Walter C. Fa rrell , J r. ) . t 2 1978 Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Academy of Science, " Black Philadelphians: A Factorial Ecology," Champion, Pennsylvania (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). l 1978 Annual Meeting, East Lakes Division, Association of American Geographers.
" Spatial Variations in Attitudes Toward Nuclear Waste Disposal in Alpena, l
Mi chigan," East Lansing, Michigan (with Brian J. McGirr). ! 1979 Annual Meeting, Norfolk State College and Old Dominion University Con-a ference on the Urban South, " Black Migration to the South: A Focus on , Durham, North Carolina," Norfolk, Virginia (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1.979 Sixth Annual National Conference on the Black Family, " Searching for
- Elbow Room: A Perspective on Southern Black Migration," Louisville, -
Kentucky (with Walter C. Farmll, Jr.). 1979 Annual Meeting, Michigan Academy of Sciences, " Urban Homesteading and Historic Preservation: Problems and Prospects," Mt. Pleasant, Michigan (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). , f 1979 Annual Meeting, Pennsylvania Academy of Science, " Spatial Patterns of Alcohol Outlets in the Washington, D.C. Black Community," Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania (with Marvin P. Dawkins and Walter C. Farm 11, Jr.). 1979 Annual Meeting, East Lakes Division, Association of American Geographers,
" Electricity Utility Rate Reform or Maintenance of the Status Quo?"
i Akron, Ohio (with Bradley T. Cullen). 1979 Quarterly Meeting, Michigan Consnunity Action Agency Association, " Pre-liminary Review and Analysis of Electric Utility Rate Reform: Implica-tions for Oakland and Livingston Counties, Michigan," Lansing, Michigan ~. 1979 Monthly Meeting Oakland-Livingston Hunan Service Agency, " Benefits and l Costs of Lifeline Electric Utility Rate Reform," Pontiac, Michigan. 1979 Annual Meeting, Southeast Division, Association of American Geographers, "Locational Conflict and Public Attitudes Regarding the Burial of Nuclear Waste: The Alpena, Michigan Experience," Nashville, Tennessee (with Stanley D. Brunn and Brian J. McGirr). 1 3- -- p g.--s,, --.e
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James H. Johnson, Jr. Page 7 PRESENTATIONS - PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS (Cont'd.): i 1981 Annuai Meeting, Western Social Science Association, " Electric Utility Rate Refom: The Significance of the Spatial Factor," San Diego, l l California. 1981 Annual Meeting, Southwestern Economics Association, "Conbinational Programming Solution to a Park and Ride Mass Transit Problem," Dallas, Texas (with Bradley T. Cullen). 1981 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, " Location-Allocation Model of Vanpool Park and Ride Sites: The Lansing, Michigan Example," Los Angeles, California (with Bradley T. Cullen and Lawrence M. Somers). 1982 Annual Meeting, Association of American Geographers, "Regionalization as a Step Toward Developing a National Energy Policy," San Antonio, Texas. INVITED PRESENTATIONS AND TESTIMONY: 1976 Prairie View A&M University, Department of Economics, Geography, and Social Science and the School of Agriculture, "The Effects of Mechaniza-tion on the Production of Flue-Cured Tobacco in the Coastal Plains of North Carolina," Prairie View, Texas. 1977 Cheyney State College, Urban Studies Department, " Data Gathering Techniques in the Social Sciences," Cheyney, Pennsylvania. 197L Monthly Meeting, Woodbridge Neighborhood Citizens Council, " Benefits and Costs of Neighborhood Revitalization," Detroit, Michigan. 1980 Coments on the Revision of Chapter 90 (Liquor and Tavern Regulation) of the Milwaukee Code and Related Concerns. Presented to the Utilities and Licenses Comittee of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Comon Council, November 3 (with Walter C. Farrell, Jr.). 1981 Faculty Seminar Series, Center for Afro-American Studies, " Spatial Perspectives on Counter-stream Migration to the South," University of California at Los Angeles. 1981 Special 1981 Faculty Lecture Series, UCLA Bi-Centennial Symposium on the Human and Physical Ecology of the City, "The Ghettoization of Blacks in Los Angeles," University of California at Los Angeles. 1982 Testimony Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Comission. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) (Emergency Planning Proceedings), January 19, 1982. 1983' " Evacuation Planning for Radiological Emergencies," Department of Geography, University of California a+, Davis, Davis, Ca., January, l l
James H. Johnson, Jr. Page 8 INVITED PRESENTATIONS AND TESTIMONY (Cont'd.): 1983 Testimony Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the Matter of Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322 (OL) (Emergency Planning Proceedings), January. i MEDIA INTERVIEWS AND PUBLICATIONS: 1977 " Incentive to Poor?" response to editorial "No Free Abortion," Tulsa World (August 26,1977), p. 5. i 1978 WKAR (radio), East Lansing, Michigan. " Nuclear Waste Disposal in North-i eastern Michigan." 1979 " Lifeline Bill Will Not Aid Poor." The State News (October 9,1979) with Bradley T. Cullen. 1979 WKAR (radio), East Lansing, Michigan. " Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." (with Stanley D. Brunn and Donald Zeigler). 1979 WELM, Channel 11, East Lansing, Michigan. " Preliminary Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents." (with Stanley D. i Brunn and Donald J. Zeigler). ARTICLES WRITTEN BY OTHERS REGARDING MY WORK: 1978 Fran Murray, "Alpena Residents Still Oppose Nuclear Waste Site," press release, Department of Information Services, Michigan State University,
- East Lansing, Michigan, September 21, 1978.
1978 United Press International. "Alpena County Still Against a Waste Dump Si te," Detroit News (September 24,1978). A nunber of other Michigan cities' newspapers carried accounts from the original news release. 1979 Fran Murray, " Residents of Three Mile Island Area Fear Impact of Disaster," press release, Department of Information Services, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, May 18, 1979. 1979 Fran Murray, "U Survey of Three Mile Island Area Issue," MSU News Bulletin (October 31, 1919), p. 2. 1979 Ellis Cose, "In the Aftermath of Three Mile Island," Detroit Free Press (October 31,1979), p.10A. 4 1979 Karen Zurawski, "Eastown Community Association Study Movements of People," Photo Reporter (October 1,1979), p.1. 1982 Frances Cerra, " Evacuation Plan Stirs Old Doubts," New York Times (May 16,1982), Section 21, p.1. t l 1
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i . . ADDENDUM PUBLICATIONS i 1. James H. Johnson, Jr., " Planning for Spontaneous Evacuation During A Radiological Emergency," Nuclear Safety, forthcoming.
- 2. James H. Johnson, Jr., and Donald J. Zeigler, " Distinguishing Human Responses to Radiological Emergencies," Economic i
Geography, forthcoming.
- 3. James H. Johnson, Jr., and Donald J. Zeigler, "A Spatial i
Analysis of Evacuation Intentions at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," in Nuclear Power: Assessing and Managing Hazardous Technology, edited by M. J. Pasquoletti and K. D. Pijawka, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, forthcoming. 1 4. Bradley T. Cullen and James H. Johnson, Jr., " Energy Assistance for the Poor: An Evaluation and Alternative Allocation i Procedure," Energy, The International Journal, forthcoming. l
- 5. Meluin L. Oliver and James H. Johnson, Jr., Inter-ethnic Conflict i
in an Urban Ghetto: The Case of Blacks and Hispanics in Los Angeles, in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, edited by R. Radcliff, JAI Press, forthcoming.
- 6. Donald J. Zeigler, James H. Johnson,' Jr., and Stanley D. Brunn, Technology Hazards, Resource Publication in Geography, Washington, D.C.
- Association of American Geographers, forthe,oming.
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l~ l . . l l l l f i l l ATTACHMENT 3
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i* . Atade in UnitedStates ofAmerica ATTAC1IMENT 3 l Reprinted from GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW , Vol. 71. No. I. January 1981 Copyright @ 1981 by the American Geographical Society of hew York t EVACUATION FROM A NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL l DISASTER' DONALD J. ZEIGLER, STANLEY D. BRbNN, and JAMES H. JOHNSON JR. 1 unique peacetime technological disaster occurred in northeastern United ! States in the spring of 1979: an accident in a nudear-generating plant. j Because of the proliferation of nudear power plants throughout the world, the possibility of comparable disasters elsewhere increases. We chose to examine one aspect of the 1979 American disaster: evacuation of the affected population. The nudear accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) near Harrisburg, i Pennsylvania, on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, dramatically emphasized the I need to broaden the range of evacuation studies to indude technological dis-1 asters, particularly ones of nudear origin. The crisis at Three Mile Island pro-vided the first opportunity for an empirical examination of the evacuation pro-cess in the aftermath of an unexpected and unprecedented nudear disaster. We used it as a case study in order to seek a foundation for geographical research in the nascent field of evacuation behavior and planning in response to tech-
- nological disasters. Our objectives are to identify the spatial and temporal di-mensions of evacuation behavior among TMI residents, to offer a conceptual model of evacuation-decision making in response to a nudear disaster, and to
, suggest the role for geographers in evacuation planning. Because of the unique-ness of the case study, we offer generalizations and models to explain the decision-making process for nudear evacuation not as definitive condusions '{ but rather as hypotheses for future studies. Joseph Hans and Thomas Sell compiled a list of more than 500 natural and technological disasters that required evacuation during the period 1960 to 1973.8 "Iheir figures indicated that'an average of almost 90,000 persons per year were ! forced to evacuate their homes because of hurricanes, floods, train derailments l 1
- We thank Cyula Pauer, director of the Cartography I.aboratory, University of Kentucky, for con-
! structing the graphics. . j'
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' loseph M. Hans Jr. and Thomas C. Sell, Evacuation Risks-An Evaluation (Las Vegas, Nev.: U.S.
Environmental Protection A8ency,1974), pp.101-153. i e Da. Zuctra is an assistant professor of geography at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 23508. Da. Bauww is a professor of geography at the University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky 40506. Da. Jonwsow is an assistant professor of geog-raphy at the University of Califomia, Los Angeles, Califomia 90024. . Copyright C 1981 by the American Geographical Society of Neso York l , J $
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I 2 rnE cEOcRAPHICA1. REVIEW involving toxic chemicals, and other types of disaster. Evacuations from tech- - nological disasters accounted for only one-fourth of the incidents listed by Hans and Sell. In terms of affected area and pcpulation each technological ' l incident lacked the large-scale effect that characterized natural disasters.* Part-ly because of this limited scope of impact, study of evacuation from techno-bgical disaster has been neglected.* Such evacuation has traditionally been viewed as a mechanistic problem, merely a question of logistics. In this article we hope to advance understanding of individual behavioral patterns during evacuation from a technological accident. This understanding will aljow public officials and planners to base emergency-evacuation designs on documented behavioral responses rather than on assumptions derived from the experience of evacuations from natural disasters. The data for this study, hereafter referred to as the Michigan State Univer- i sity (MSU) study, were obtained from a survey questionnaire mailed to a strat- j ified random sample of 300 households in south central Pennsylvania approx-imately one month after the accident at TMI. The sample included 178 l households within fifteen miles of the plant and 122 households in Carlisle, Duncannon, and Lancaster, three communities beyon1 the fifteen-mile radius that we chose to include in the sample. Of the 267 quectionnaires that reached their destinations,150 were completed and returned, a response rate of 56 , percent. A detailed description of the survey design and a copy of the ques- , tionnaire appear in the final report on the TMI incident that we published ; elsewhere.* In this article we make reference to two other surveys of TMI area 4 residents, although the final results of each survey are yet to be published. l* One survey was conducted by Mountain West Research for the Nuclear Reg-ulatory Commission (NRC), and the second was done by a group of geogra- .! phers at Rutgers University.* ! These three TMI studies provide the basis for examining the emergency-planning process in general and evacuation planning in particular. Methods of Harry Esti!! Moore and others, Before the Wind: A Study of the Response to Hurricane Carla, Disaster Study No.19 (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences / National Research Coun-c21,1%3): Thomas E. Drabek, Social Processes in Disaster:EFamily Evacuation, Social Problems, Vol. 16,1%9, pp. 336-349; E. M. Beck, Communication in Crisis: Explainin5 vacuation Symbolically, Communications Research, Vol. 2,1975, pp. 24-49; EarlJ. Baker, Predicting Response to Hurricane Warnings: A Reanalysis of Data from Four Studies, Mass Emergencies, Vol 4,1979, pp. 9-24; and Ronald W. Perry, Evacuation Decision. Making in Natural Disasters, Mass Emergencies, Vol 4,1979, , ( pp.25-38.8 Stanley D. Brunn, James H. Johnson Jr., ar.d Donald J. Zeigler, Final Report on a Social , Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents (East !.ansins, Mich.: Michigan State University, Department of Geography,1979). pp.19-25.
- Mountain West Research, Inc., Three Mile Island Telephone Survey: Preliminary Report on Pro-cedures and Findin5s by Cynthia B. Flynn, prepa-ed for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office,1979); Mountain West Research, Inc., with '
(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printin5 SocialImpact Research,Inc., The Social and Economic Effects of the Accident at Three Mile Island i by Cynthia B. Flynn and James A. Chalmers, prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Susan Cutter, and James Mitchell, Responses of impacted Populations , l to the T Nuclear Reactor Accident: An Initial Assessment, Discuulos Paper No.13 (New Brunswick, , N. J.: Riitgers University, Department of Geography,1979). The NRC study was conducted by telephone
.n July and August of 1979, and the Rutgers study was based on a questionnaire mailed in April
- of 1979. In general the results of the MSU, NRC, and Rutgers studies are mutually supportive; ;
najor differences are in the conceptualization and the spatial analysis of evacuation behavior and cecision making, topics that are most fully developed in the MSU report.
EVACUAT1oN FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 3 coping with the consequences of nuclear disasters are certain to attract consid-etably more interest than they have to date for several reasons. The TMI acci-dent demonstrated that " societies using nuclear power today must accept major accidents not only as a theoretical possibility of no practical consequence, but as a risk to include in actual planning."S The results of state and nationwide opinion polls conducted since the accident at TMI indicate that supporters of
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nuclear power, though now insisting on higher safety standards, still outnum-ber persons who oppose it.' Nuclear-generating facilities in the short run, at least, will probably continue to operate and to proliferate. Of the existing and planned reactors in the United States,85 percent are sited within sixty miles of a metropolitan core and thus cast a nuclear threat over a large proportion of the population in the country.' EVACUATION-DECIsloN MAXING Our study of the Three Mile Island evacuation was one of the first attempts to document the process of evacuation under the threat of a severe technological disaster. We designed the questionnaire to ascertain whether the respondent evacuated and to identify the factors that influenced the decision. The results of the survey indicate that 53 percent of the population within twelve miles of TMI evacuated, while only 9 percent beyond this limit left their homes. We propose a tentative model of the evacuation decision-making process and the spatial outcome of those decisions (Fig.1). The first question posed was whether even to consider evacuation; 21 percent of the sample never considered this question. The remainder considered evacuation, but only 31 percent of the sample d,ecided to evacuate. Several external constraints on the flow of deci-siens existed. Some potential evacuees were undoubtedly dissuaded from leav-ing by temporal (when), spatial (where), and operational (how) constraints.
'Ihe relationships in the diagram should thus be interpreted to present a system of interlocking decisions rather than a series of unrelated options. Further re-search on evacuations from nuclear and other technological disasters may sug-gest revision and refinement of the decision-making model and, perhaps even more importantly, may help to identify the critical factors that influence the decision-making process.
Two spatially distinct population groups were identified on the basis of l their reaction to the TMI incident. One group, composed of individuals who . l remained in their usual place of residence during the crisis, may be called the l l residual population; the other group, comprising the individuals who de-partcd, is the redistributed population or evacuees. The MSU study found no l statistically significant differences between these two groups in terms of oc-l cupation, income, age of household head, length of residence in south central Pennsylvania, and political ideology. Similarly the NRC study found that dif-ferences in income, education, and occupation had no significant bearing on an individual's decision to evacuate.'
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s Bent Sorenson, Nuclear Power: The Answer That Became a Question, Ambio, Vol. 8,1979, p.17.
- Robert C. Mitchell, Public Opinion and Nuclear Power Before and After Three Mile Island, Resources, Resources for the Future, January-April,1980, pp. 5-7.
' Policy Research Associates, Socioeconomic Impacts: Nuclear Power Siting (State College, Pa.t Policy Research Associates for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1977), p. 43.
- Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 24. ,
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l 5 . l 4 THE GEOCRAPHICAL REVIEW EVACUATION DECISION MAKING Decisions to be Made SpatialOutcome of the l Decision-Making Process - i l Should We . I Consider (no) Evacuationi
< ves Remain at Home
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Should We Evacuate 7 ~ (Residual TT, - Poculation) v Should What Part _ Entire Famdy Evacuater (no)- of Family, Should Evacuatet t t t jAj Cf l When Should We Coi t a jji 6i
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When Should We Returnt Fic.1-Evacuation-decision making. Beginning with the study of the population affected by Hurricane Carla, studies of natural disasters have repeatedly confirmed the hypothesis that a family is the unit making the decision about evacuation.' Evacuees from sud- ' den natural catastrophes typically leave the hazard zone in family groups and remain together during the crisis. The results of our survey suggest that while the majority of evacuees left in complete family units, the proportion of partial l l ' Moore and others, footnote 2 above, p. 7. l 1 I w e l
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l-*-_ - EVACUATION FRoM NUCLEAR DISASTER 5 i i families fleeing the disaster was larger than would be expected from the con- . clusions of natural-hazard research. In charting the basic patterns of evacuation j behavior and in planning many phases of the evacuation process, the concept ] l
- of an evacuation unit, as opposed to the individual or the family, may best 4 serve as the fundamental analytical entity. We define an evacuation unit as a j single individual acting alone or a group of individuals acting in unison during j 1 the evacuation process. Because the members of a household may be unable to agree on a decision or on procedures, a single household may generate i several evacuation units. In the MSU survey, partial families composed one- d
; third of all evacuation units, but in the sample communities beyond fifteen f 4
miles from the plant, evacuation units were more likely to be partial families F 3 than complete families. Within six miles of the plant, complete families out-numbered partial families by more than three to one. The high percentage of f4 [ partial families evacuating the TMI area may be accounted for by the high j
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degree of uncertainty surrounding the accident itself and by the inability of Lt either individuals or public officials to giuge accurately the magnitude of the j
., malfunction at the plant. $
q In his study of the sudden and unexpected impact of the Denver flood of . 3 1965, Thomas E. Drabek demonstrated that evacuation is not always the result j g of a simple scenario in which families receive a warning, seek to confirm the ?
. danger, and decide to evacuate.2'Instead he proposed four separate evacuation y l
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- processes: evacuation by default, evacuation by invitation, evacuation by com-promise, and evacuation by decision. Although Drabek's classification scheme
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; was specific to forced evacuation in response to a natural disaster, we propose a similar but somewhat modified classification system specific to voluntary
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[ evacuation in response to a technological disaster. In terms of the response of 1 g i families in the Three Mile Island area, evacuation seemingly resulted from three 4 k 1 different processes: evacuation by division, in which some members of a family
- decided to leave while other members decided to remain; evacuation by con- ; sensus,in which the whole family decided that evacuation was the best course i f of protective action to follow, and evacuation by compromise, in which a dead- g j lock was resolved by a dominant family member in favor of evacuation. Dra- 7.}
bek's model of evacuation by default would be applicable only in the event of 3 a forced evacuation. ;i j The principal factor motivating TMI residents to evacuate was concern about A
; personal safety: 94 percent of the evacuees gave this reason (Table I). Conflict- %
ing reports from governmental and utility-company officials were another crit- d
') ical factor. One-fifth of the evacuees indicated that the news media played a T - role in their decision. The NRC study also cited the perception of danger and )
N the volume of confusirig information as the major reasons for evacuation." d
. The reasons given by members of the residual population for not evacuating ? ,
y were varied (Table II). The most frequently given explanation was that no order l j ' to evacuate was issued. The NRC study also found this response to be the most )
, frequent argument for staying."The existence of many conflicting reports was Ie n ?
J h Drabek, footnote 2 above, pp. 345-346. I
" Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote d above, p.18. I d " Mountain West Resench, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 21. Q ,
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1 4 6 THE cEoCRAPalCAL REVIEW TABLE I-reasons FoA EVACUADNC FEACEN T ACE OF EVACUAT1oM
- mEasoNs UNrrs Concerned about safety , 91 Conflicting reports from government and utility-company officials 48 ,
Conflicting reports from utility-company officials 26 Conflictin reports from government ofSeials 24 News me 20 Everyone was evacuating 7 Ordered to evacuate 4 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3. TABLE II-REASONS Fon Not EVACUAUNC FERCENTACE OF azAsoNs NoNEVACUEEs No order to evacuate was issued 62 Too many conflicting reports 42 No apparent reason to evacuate 38 Home was a safe distance from plant 31 Fear of looting 24 No children involved 23 l Could not leave job er business 21 No one else in area evacuated 16 Needed to take care of farm livestock 6 No place to go 5 Too old to evacuate 3
; Handicapped 2 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3.
l l the second-most frequently cited reason for not evacuating. Paradoxically this was also the second-most widely cited reason among the persons who chose to evacuate. Conflicting information was thus used by some residents to justify a decision to leave and by others to justify a decision to stay. THE CEoCRAPHY oF EvACUAT1oN FRoM TMI On the basis of the redistribution of population in the immediate aftermath of the Three Mile Island disaster, we were able to delineate two distinct but overlapping regions: the zone of evacuation and the evacuation field. The first zone comprises the areas left by the eva.cuees, and the.second was the area to which the evacuees fled. i ! ZONE oF EVACUAT!oN ,
, The pattern of voluntary evacuation from Three Mile Island clearly reveals a distance-decay relationship that illustrates both the effect of governmental directives and the evacuation-shadow phenomenon. The distance-decay func-
- tion shows a sharp discontinuity approximately twelve miles from the plant (Table III). Within a twelve-mile radius of tl.e disabled reactor,53 percent of the sample reported that at least part of the household evacuated. Beyond -
l twelve miles, only 9 percent of the sample reported evacuation. The sharp 0 c , -
EVACUAT!oN FRoM NUCI. EAR DISASTER 7 TABLE III-DISTANCE AND EVACUAnoN REsFoNs1 FERCENTAGE OF RESFoNDING , DISTANCE ZONE HOUSEHOLDS FRoM WHICH
- F*oM TMt soME MEMBEks EVACUATED 1 to 3 miles 55 4 to 6 miles 56 7 to'9 miles 53 10 to 12 miles 47 13 to 15 miles 13 More than 15 miles 9 Total sample 31 Source: MSU Survey, text footnote 3. ,
discontinuity in the vicinity of twelve miles reveals the impact of two directives issued by the office c,f the governor of Pennsylvania on Friday, March 30. In the first, everyone within a ten-mile radius was advised to remain indoors, an action known as sheltering. In the secon<i, all pregnant women and preschool children within a five-mile radius of the plant were advised to evacuate. The first directive seemed to establish the critical evacuation boundary in the minds of area residents. Beyond the ten-mile limit the proportion of respondents who evacuated declined sharply. The evacuation-shadow phenomenon is the term used to describe the ten-dency of an official evacuation advisory to cause departure from a much larger area than was originally intended. The evacuation shadow cast by the public announcement of a very limited evacuation order extended well beyond the
} zone to which the order applied. If only the persons advised to evacuate had left the area, the number of evacuees would have been limited to approximately g 2,500 preschool children and pregnant women. Instead an estimated 144,000 persons, or 39 percent of the population, evacuated their homes in the area as far as fifteen miles from the plant.'8 Although the evacuation-shadow phenom-enon may be a minor consideration in evacuation planning for natural hazards, the impact of the phenomenon needs to be emphasized in planning for future nuclear accidents precisely because delineation of the geographical scope of an invisible danger such as ionizing radiation is difficult for public officials and private citizens to determine. In planning for an evacuation from a nuclear disaster, it can therefore be projected that any order to evacuate will cause the departure of residents not only from a designated zone but also from its periph-eries. The planning process should accommodate responses from the two areas.
EVACUAT!oN FIELD l In order to analyze.the spatial patterns of evacuation behavior, we asked i each evacuation unit to indicate its destination. Taken together, these desti- , nations constitute the evacuation field of the survey respondents (Fig. 2). The spatial pattern, as inferred from the locations of these sites, suggests a calm and orderly movement rather than a hysterical flight. Evacuees fled a median distance of eighty-five miles from Three Mile Island. In the NRC study the median distance was found to be one hundred miles from the plant."In com-( '8 Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social !mpact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 22.
" Mountain West Research Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17. ,
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[I i parison with the list of evacuations compiled by Hans and Sell, the median fm. flight of evacuation from Three Mile Island is the longest on record. The longest - F: median distance given in that study was eighty miles in response to Hurricane b Carla in 1961. 5 a L Half of the evacuation units in the MSU survey chose destinations between [
- g. forty-five and ninety miles from the plant. We define the area in these limits ji W as the zone of perceived safety far from the nuclear site. The inner boundary sj of this zone, shown on Fig. 2 by a dashed line, suggests that the evacuees 0 l {:s sought destinations far enough from the' plant to put a territorial buffer between E themselves and the source of possible danger. The outer limit of the zone seems
'{; to imply a reluctance on the part of most evacuees to ventu e any farther than I
5F necessary from home. The zone of perceived safety represents the spatial out-47 come of the tension between centrifugal forces generated by the perception of ,)
,f danger and centripetal forces generated by the attachment to home.
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L - EVACUAT!oN FROM NUCLEAR D!sAsTER 9 i evacuation field. Although only one of every ten evacuation units chose des- : tinations in the quadrant southeast of TMI, almost half chose destinations in i the quadrant northwest of the crippled reactor. The directional bias was the , l - consequence of severalinterrelated factors The most important considerations . 2 seem to have been a preference for a site upwind from the plant, a psychological attraction to the mountains in time of danger, and a reluctance to select a , destination in the more densely populated metropolitan areas to the east. These i factors, and possibly others, require further investigation before behavioral } models of the evacuation site. selection process can be constructed. j In addition to sketching the configuration of the actual evacuation field, we attempted to delineate a potential evacuation field for all respondents. Everyone j; 2 was asked to supply a choice of destination, if a presidential order had required a full evacuation of the area. The map of potential sites displays a galaxy of l destinations to the north and the west of Three Mile Island and an evacuation 4 hollow, an area shunned by evacuees, a,rpund the reactor (Fig. 3). The maps j
; of actual and potential fields are similar in many respects, although the map 3 of potential destinations has a less clearly defined zone of perceived safety. The '.' ; potential destinations were also more widely dispersed, and some were not (* ; shown on the map because they were as far away as California, Arizona, and :
Florida. f l I-2 SVACUATION QUARTERS ; I l The homes of relatives and friends proved to be the preferred evacuation Li l quarters among both the actual and the potential evacuees. The MSU survey j m fcund that 81 percent of the evacuees st yed with relatives and friends. The g
- comparable figures were 78 percent in the NRC study and 74 percent in the Rutgers study.'" These proportions exceed those characteristic of evacuations 7{ .
i from natural disasters." Despite the ubiquity of hotels and motels in the evac- } uation field, their use by evacuees from Three Mile Island was limited, in all j i likelihood, by the financial strain that such accommodations would have im- i { posed on family budgets. The use of the designated evacuation shelter in Her- l
- shey, ten miles from the plant, might have been limited by the perceived social ;
stress of life in mass quarters and by the perceived locational stress that evac- t uees would have experienced in a site so close to the threatening reactor. No l
- respondent in either the MSU or the Rutgers survey reported utilization of the }
.E public shelter in Hersney, and only one of the 1,500 households surveyed in j i the NRC study used the evacuation shelter.8'The maximum number of persons j y who used the shelter in one day was estimated at only 180, a situation that s seems to confirm the fi.nding that " shelter centers are used only if nothing else )
g[ is available or if one cannot financially care for himself.'"' A reasonable con- }
. clusion is that the low utilization of the shelter at Hershey was partially the 8 a
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" Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17; and ,
d , Barnes and others, footnote 4 above, p.17. y " Moore and others, footnote 2 above, p. 93; and Thomas E. Drabek and Keith S. Boggs, Families
.j in Disaster: Reactions and Relatives, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 30,1%8, pp. 443- 851. t p " Barnes and others, footnote 4 above, p.17; and Mountain West Research,Inc., with Social !mpact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 25. . .Js a Hans and Sell, footnote 1 above, p. 52; and Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact ,) Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p. 25. ,
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,6 result of its location in the ten-mile zone from the reactor. Within ten to twelve *
% miles of TMI,47 percent of the survey respondents evacuated. i
.$ The pattern of evacuation was influenced by both spatial and temporal f M processes (Fig. 4). In this diagram each prism of the cube represents the average ;
behavior of evacuees originating in each of the six distance zones used in this 3 analysis. The dis,tance of the home from Three Mile Island was found to be y g directly related to the destination chosen by an evacuee. In general, persons } Q living farther from the plant fled to more distant locations than did iridividuals )y "a living close to the plant. The same tendency was observed in the NRC study.2' 1
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$ This finding adds a new dimension to evacuation behavior that has not been previously observed or predicted, and several explanations may tentatively be - f
$ offered. First, persons living closest to the plant were likely to be the most }
concerr ed about the safety of their homes and property. They were therefore i y% inclined to remain as close as possible to home. Second, only in the closest ' j g distance zones were residents with high personal evacuation thresholds suf- 7 g ficiently motivated to abandon their homes. If these evacuees lived a few miles p if 3 . k te
" Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social Impact Research, Inc., footnote 4 above, p.17.
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l further from TMI, they probably would not have evacuated at all. Third, resi-dents who live far from the disabled reactor would be expected to shun evac- : j uation sites in the closest zones because they would offer little or no improve- { ment over the conditions of the home site. It can be hypothesized that evacuees ( originating at great distances from Three Mile Island would include the seg-j ment of the population with low personal evacuation thresholds that would consequently be likely to seek more distant destinations. Fourth, because evac- -
'3 q uation units residing more than fifteen miles away were predominantly women -
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! 12 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW N kN The temporal dimension of evacuation is along the third axis of the evac-h[.h uation cube and represents the date and the duration of evacuation (Fig. 4).
The length of the hinges on which the prisms hang denotes the average du- 3
@M #fr' ration of evacuation, while the position of the hinges denotes the average date
- t of departure and return. The length of stay away from home among respon- ?;
fj$ dents ranged from one to sixteen days, but 54 percent of all evacuation units
? .c returned home two to four days after departure. In the three-mile zone closest * {,
M to the reactor,58 percent (none of whom had preschool children) stayed away 5 h three to six days, and 42 percent (all of whom had preschool children) were {y absent nine to thirteen days. As distance between home and plant increased
$g, ^ .% up to the fifteen-mile radius, the duration of stay away from home decreased. b g An increase in the duration of evacuation was observed in respondents from f
W6 the three sample communities that were outside the fifteen-mile limit. f.@ The majority of evacuation units (54 percent) left on Friday, March 30, two h:= f days after the accident and the beginning of what was termed the crisis-re- g Q@- sponse period.28 An identical percentage was cited by the Rutgers study, and g the NRC study reported 55 percent.22 The departure of so many persons that i de Y day can probably be attributed to a combination of factors. First, the governor's y y ! sheltering and evacuation directives were issued ~on Friday when serious con- 1 x q sideration of a full evacuation first became public. Second, two major con-y straints on evacuation were lifted because Friday is the end of both the work- k
%T@ week and the school week. Evacuees living close to the plant were likely to r.
@Q Ieave earlier than those living in the outlying communities. Whereas 77 percent
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N. of the evacuation units living within'six miles of the plant left on or before ( Friday, only one-third of the evacuation units living ten or more miles away 3 h evacuated on Friday. All of the evacuees who reported leaving on Monday lived ten or more miles from the plant, k@ @ [g A CONCEPTUAL MooEr. or SrxEss-InouCEo EVACUAT!oN ~ g C The decision to evacuate from the Three Mile Island area may be concep-tualized as a behavioral adjustment to the stressful environmental conditions h caused by the sudden nuclear accident. Evacuation in anticipation of disaster p J QF therefore becomes a stress-management technique whereby an evacuee moves 4 g from one location to another in an effort to reduce the strain imposed by the [ Q perception of danger.22 The stress-inducing factors during the TMI crisis were i the knowledge that radioactivity had leaked into the environment and, more importantly, the fear of an even larger catastrophe, that is, a core meltdown, l $ U .. i " Russell R. Dynes and others, Report of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Task Force, ' 3 . Staff Report to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Washington, P. j ' .. D C.: U.S. Covernment Printing Office,1979), p. 45. Dynes divided the time after the accident in
'% the emergency-response period from Wednesday, March 28 to Friday moming, March 30, and the 7>
crisis-response period, beginning on Friday morning, March 30. h I
,"My
" Bames and others, footnote 4 a bove, p.17; and Mountain West Research, Inc., with Social !mpact
.mMq 3 Research, Inc., foctnote 4 above, p. 24. T
$5d, Stanley D. Brunn, Spatial Causes and Consequences of Psychosocial Stress, in The Geography s
of Health and Disease (edited byIchn M. Hunter; Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina,
$N Department of Geography,1974), pp.138-153; W. A. V. Clark and Martin Cadwallader, l.o-i *y ' cational Stress and Residential Mobility, Environment and Behavior, Vol. 5,1973, pp. 29-41; Harold j
4 D. Foster, The Geography of Stress, Area, Vol. II,1979, pp.107-108; and lulian Wolpert, Migration 3 7.i@i as an Adjustment to Environmental Stress, fournal of SocialIssues Vol. 22,1966, pp. 92-102.
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EVACUAT!oN FRoM NUCLEAR D!sAsTER 13 y GENERALIZEJ PERSON AL STRESS CURVES g e oiseqwdsbrium i
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Fic. S-Generalized personal stress curves. -l s 5 ?
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l G at the plant. Only permanent relocation is a more radical adjustment to per- j 3 ceived risk than evacuation. Less radical adaptations surfaced among TMI area f y1 residents, for example, modifications of the daily personal routine such as p , d remaining indoors and constant tuning to local and regional news. N r) % EVACUAT!oN-RESPONSE THRESHOLDS 4 e 1 At any given distance from Three Mile Island, the propensity of a household j [y to evacuate depends on the evacuation-response thresholds of individual fam-ily members and on the availability and the desirability of evacuation quarters j j l at varying distances from the source of danger. The evacur. tion-response 2 h;. threshold is that point along an individual's personal-stress continuum when I El the decision to evacuate is made. Individuals with low thresholds will tend to 3
& evacuate even if they live far from the source of danger, while persons with h
high thresholds will evacuate only if they live very near that source. As distance j 4 from the plant increases, the proportion of the evacuating population decreases, e
@c and the evacuating population includes an increased number of individuals j
? with low evacuation-response thresholds. The tendency of persons with low j
. thresholds to move farther from the stricken plant than persons with high j Q;; -
thresholds helps to explain the pattern of evacuation-site selection with respect !! C to the two distance variables presented in the evacuation cube (Fig. 4). :I d
.0 Generalized postaccident personal stress curves offer another temporal mea .
j sure of responses to the disaster (Fig. 5). The increased perception of stress on v Friday is apparent on both stiess curves, but only the curve for the evacuees - 1 *
$ rises above the evacuation-response threshold. The precipitous drop in the j evacuees' level of perceived stress on Saturday was the result of departing for -
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M j,; 14 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
$j SELECTION OF EVACUATION QUARTERS m
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n h Maes from TMI l {}n o is to as so n eo tes 120 135 150 250 500 ___ Qw c Seccad Home 2 ; W~f. d I Family
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C'*4 4 h Nonlocational . '"'~ Potentional Evacuation Quarters " C. Stress conteauum h Fic. 6--Selection of evacuation quarters. h 5
? a destination that was considered a safe distance from the plant. Consequently b
i equilibrium was reestablished. j4 Evacuation may also be motivated by reasons other than the need to alle-W via;e stress. Some evacuees' stress curves may peak below individual evacua- } M tion-response thresholds, an indication that the persons may have acquiesced i h in the decision by their family to evacuate, even though individually they j would not have taken the action. Forced evacuation by governmental author- a f ities and previously arranged plans to be absent would be other examples of l
% i such a phenomenon. The stress curve of an individual may also rise above the *k evacuation-response threshold, but evacuation is not an automatic result. For } .$ example, some individuals may have had no place to go, may have been con- j $ fined to an institution, or may have had constraint' s imposed on their mobility l
2
% by a job or other commitment.
f,k The possible evacuation sites that a hypothetical evacuee might consider
$ can be entered in a matrix of the search for evacuation quarters, which iden- k % tifies available options (Fig. 6). Personalized stress curves may be projected
- f h
g along each axis of the matrix. On the basis of the map of actual evacuation destinations, the most desirable locations were between forty-five and ninety E l q miles from the disabled reactor. The locational stress curve therefore ap- ( (g.. pears to dip in this range and to demarcate a zone of perceived safety. A '
@ personal or nonlocational stress curve, representing the total social and finan-irre. :- .
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? EVACUAT!oN FRoM NUCLEAR D!sAsTER 15 9 cial strain perceived to be associated with various types of evacuation quarters, ,
YO.'. was drawn to conform to the preferences expressed by survey respondents. - y{_ , The curve peaks at public shelters and diminishes through motels, friends, and
- relatives. Although the use of second homes and campgrounds would be lim- -
E. ited by personal circumstances, they are included as potential destinations. - r g
- EVACUATION SPACE-SEARCH MATRIX A M In the space-search matrix the most desirable evacuation sites can be iden-
,i
"- tified by projecting the " lowest" segment of each stress curve into the matrix.
The area, delineated in Fig. 6 by a shaded border, has three potential sites that , would be open to this particular evacuation unit. The final choice under such 1['. circumstances would be made on the basis of nonlocational factors that enter Mf.: the selection process. While locational factors would prevail to discourage the M selection of evacuation sites either very near or very far from the nuclear plant,
$. nonlocational factors would influe6ce the selection of a specific site in the is-geographical zone of perceived safety. Each individual would perceive the
{, stress associated with location and types of evacuation quarters differently. This personalized decision-making schema is only a first attempt to analyze ' p& the thinking and the planning by which individuals and families search in the surrounding tetritory for an acceptable evacuation destination. f.-
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Tus GEocRAPHER's Ro!.E IN EMERcENCY-REsroNsE PI.ANNINc j
- k. Until the accident at Three Mile Island, emergency-response and evacuation E planning received surprisingly little attention from either the Nuclear Regu- ];
latory Commission or government officials. Prior to the TMI accident, NRC had
.h*2 required nuclear plant operators to develop emergency plans only for the fa- .
R cility itself and the surrounding low-population zone. The zone around TMI ; extended only 2.2 miles from the facility. At the time of the accident, no evac-3 uation plans exieted for the local jurisdictions in the area. Although the three ; closest counties had five mile emergency-response plans on file, only one plan ; incorporated a fully developed course of action. Two emergency plans were developed for the state at the time of the accident, but neither one had been j approved by NRC." . [i,j After noting the low priority that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had mi i accorded emergency-response planning, the President's Commission on the
$. Accident at Three Mile Island recommended that emergency plans, including J
p g evacuation, be designed for existing and proposed nuclear power plants on the i gr basis of alternative disaster scenarios for any given plant. Scenarios would 4 d'p, specify appropriate responses from state and utility-company officials on the ; bases of both the magnitude of the disaster and the distance of residents from
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the generating station. The commission considered a single evacuation plan based on a fixed set of distances and a fixed set of responses to be inadequate.85 F '* A thorough critique of the plans in effect on March 28,1979, and of the ed hoc plannin8 docu-ments that evolved in response to the nuclear emergency is in Dynes and others, footnote 21 above, pp.101-169. . 8* Le President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island he Need r ange: The fo Ch i 1.egacy of ut! (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Covernment Printing Office,1979), pp. 76-77, ' e
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*^ 16 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REv!EW In view of the minimal attention to emergency-response olanning and the
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ME recommendation of the presidential commission to identify appropriate re-
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% sponses for a range of conditions, there seems to be ample opportunity for geographers to contribute to the design and the implementation of emergency-
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'f5 4 response plans for nuclear emergencies. The role of the geographer in emer- , Q j'
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gency preparedness is considered most essential in the design of plans for evacuation and for delivery of emergency services. Expertise in spatial and
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h,. locational matters is especially critical in response to nuclear accidents and other technological disasters. Specific contributions of the geographer include %
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%pd6 the identification of the areas to be evacuated on the bases of distance and !!!
i@ direction from the disaster site, the description of the population and settle-ment geographies of the potentially affected areas as a basis for intelligent EE i$ t
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higiin decision making, the determination of the transportation routes that would be most suitable for an evacuation, and the establishment of the locations for !@* g~ evacuation shelters. Additional important contributions that geographers may make are the prediction of the movement patterns of evacuees in order to
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(4 q 0 regulate the mass evacuation of an area and to plan for the delivery of emer- N a j gency services and supplies in the evacuation field, the creation of the networks for the communication of disaster information and for the delivery of emer-g}~ i
- T-gency services in the zone of evacuation, and the identification of the locations l.i that would be most difficult to evacuate because of physical constraints, per- s.. 0 g
.M sonal immobility, or attitudinal resistances. M}-y' h * * '
- In addition to the magnitude of the accident, other factors may require the formulation of contingcncy plans to cope with the invisible danger and de- Q, struction associated with a nuclear emergency. Evacuation, particularly if it begins as a. voluntary process, will vary according to the season of the year, '
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% the day of the week, the specific weather conditions, and the availability of gasoline supplies. Factors unique to the affected area will also need to be con-i .7 sidered in anticipating the public reaponse to an e acuation order, particularly $$
i[('I 59t rural-urban population mix, automobile ownership, ownership of campers, & h'l
%$i vans, and second homes, available public transportation, proportion of the population confined to institutions, location of friends and relatives, obstruc-M@E b1 tions in the transportation network, and extent of cooperation among local M p.i . governments. A clear understanding of responsibilities and prior planning of appropriate emergency responses will help to facilitate evacuation from nuclear h
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