ML20072H885
| ML20072H885 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1982 |
| From: | Macmillan J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-10, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290795 | |
| Download: ML20072H885 (133) | |
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,w-UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK l
__ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _s _x 6 GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, :
th.
i JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and :
PENNSYLVANIA' ELECTRIC COMPANY, a
Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683
- (R.O.)
-against-
,) :
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC., s
/
/ Defendants. p :
l
/ .
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _x Deposition of JOHN HENRY MacMILLAN,
/V) taken by Plaintiff, pursuant to Notice, at
- the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, Esgs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, ,
New York, on June 9, 1982 at 9:53 o' clock a.m.,
before Charles shapiro, a certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
C'l-
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\ 8306290795 820609 PDR ADDCK 05000289 T PDR
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DOYLE REPORTING, INC.
CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 LEXINGTON AVENUr l WALTER SHAPIRO. C.S.R. New Yong. N.Y. 10017 CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
i TettpNoNr 212 - 867-822o
i
. 1 2
~
2 APPearan ce s :
3 NE , ,SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS &' HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4 425 Park Avenue New York, New York I ,,) BY: DAVID KLINGSBERG, ESQ.,
6 of Counsel 7
8 -
9 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
Attorneys for Defendants
, 10 One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York -
11 BY: ROBERT B. FISKE, JR., ESQ.,
12 -and-KATHRYN ANN MCDONALD, ESQ.,
.O-13 of Counsel 14 . .
' 15 16 Also Present:
17 DAVID TAYLOR 18 ig oOo -
20 21 22 23 i
O 24 25 .
1 l
1 3 gg -
( )
\~/ 2 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and 3 among ,the attorneys for the respective parties
! l 4 hereto that the sealing, filing and certification
! ( 5 6
of the within deposition be, and the same hereby are, waived; that the transcript may be j 7 signed before any Notary Public with the same
, 8 force and effect as if signed before the Court.
4 9 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that l
T
, 10 all objections, except as to the orm o f t te 11 question, are reserved to the time o f trial.
12 13 e i 14 ooo 15 1
^
16
, 17 JOHN KENRY MacMI LLAN, having
- 18 been first duly sworn by the Notary'Public 19 (Charles Shapiro), was examined and testified l
20 as follows:
21 (Copy of resume marked GPU-Exhibit 523 22 -for identification, as of this date.)
- 23 MR. KLINGSBERG
- We have just marked as I
/~h 24 GPU Exhibit 523, a copy of a resume-which you
-O 25 have supplied to us.
s
, . , . - - . y ,, , ~ . - , ~
3, 1
MacMillan 4 I
0 2 EXAMINATION BY '
I 3 MR. KLINGSBE.RG:
4 Q I will ask you, Mr. MacMillan, if this sets
{ 5 forth accurately information regarding your 6
background, education and employment history 7 (handing document to the witness)?
8 A s
Yes, I believe it does.
9 Q Prior to coming with Babcock & Wilcox, 10 what in your education and background related to 11 nuclear energy?
?
12 A Nuclear energy primarily in the training 13
. I received at the Oak Ridge School of' Reactor 14 Technology, 1952 to 1953, and then when I returned 15 to Boeing, I worked for some period of time on the 16 Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program adapt ng 17 nuclear power to airplanes in Seattle, Washington.
18 Q What sort of training did you'have at 19 Oak Ridge? -
20 A At Oak Ridge Reactor School is a one-21 year program in the fundamentals of reactor design 22 and nuclear technology intended to take a graduate, 23 ;
i an engineer with a degree from a' university and 24 give him additional specialized training in areas 25 involved in nuclear design and radiation. .
J-
1 MacMillan 5
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2 Q What was the nature of your 3 responsibili. ties in your first position with 4 Babcock & Wilcox in the Reactor Design Section
(,
5 6
from 1957 to 1960?
A During that period I was working 7 primarily on reactor safety, the prep'aration of 8 the safety guard reports for both the N.S. SAVANNAH 9 and the Indian Point 1 Nuclear Plant that Babcock &
10 Wilcox was in the design phase of at th,a t time.
11 Q Did you continue more or less working 12 in that same area through 19627
?
r~xi
(_)
~
13 A No. In 1961, February of '61, I went li to the New York Shipbuilding corporation on 15 assignment to serve as assistant manager of the 16 SAVANNAH Nuclear Power Program, and in thbt period 17 I was involved in the final construction testing 18 and initial operation of the nuclear ship' SAVANNAH.
19 Q In that connection, did you have any 20 of what I have heard called " hands-on experience" in 21 terms of operating any aspect of a nuclear steam 22 supply system?
l 23 A What would you define as " hands on"? 1 24 Q Well, actually participating in the k.,s e 25 operation of the unit.
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l 1 MacMillan 6 l
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2 A At no time was I involved as an operator Y 3 for the ship,N.S. SAVANNAH, but as part of the N , l s 4 '- total responsibility for the start-up program there
. 3 s -
5 the operation of the ship was p,rt a of that
, 6 department's responsibility.
7 , Q Did the SAVANNAH have a pressurized 8 water reactor? '
s
- . s_ '
g A Yes, it did.
10 Q Was there a simulator whiclg was used
' for training operators in the SAVANNAH reactor?
11
. ~
12 A Yes, there 'was. We hadasimulatob -
A V 13 in Lynchbu'ry, Virginia, which was used for that x
t .14 . purpose. s en 15 Q When you returned to Babcock in 1962 3
3 16 as chief of preliminary design, what were your 3
17 responsibilities? % s 18 A -In the period from 1962 to 1975, I was s
1.
- . g 19 involved primarily in advanced reactor design, sN . .
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% 20 looking , a,t breeder rearytors, steam pool bree ders, ('-
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C 21 advanced designs as contrasted with the pressurized
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.23 ,
Q Then-in 1965, did your responsibility
(~N. .ift when you became assistant : manager of A dvanced
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2t y 25 P roduct E ngineering, or,:when you became manager of the.
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%_/ 2 Reactor Engineering Department?
A When I became manager of the Reactor 3
4 Engineering Department, my responsibilities shifted, 5
and fr a that period forward I was working primarily 6 n the design of light water, reactors.
7 Q Until what period?
8 A That continued through into 1969 where g I supposedly gathered more and more engineering 10 responsibilities until finally was made manager of 11 Engineering in 1968.
12 In 1969 my responsibilities were 13 increased to include the contract management ors 14 Project management responsibilities for light 15 water reactor contracts Tne had at that time.
16 Q Can we go back for a moment t'o 1967 17 where you were manager of contract engineering?-
18 What is meant by Contract Engineering?
19 A Contract Engineering is the engineering 20 associated with those nuclear plants for which we 21 had a firm contract.
k- 22 Q Yes.
23 A As distinguished from' Design Engineering, l
24 which was really more advanced development and mj 25- basic standards work.
o q i 1 '
1 1 .
j-t 1; MacMillan 8 N' I see.
- 2. Q 1
3 .Then in 1971, you-became general manager 1
4 of the Reactor Department.
1
-, 5 Could you tell us briefly what that 6 entailed?
7 A As general manager of the Reactor Department, I had responsibilities for the design, i 8 9 development, engineering, contract management and 10 service of our NSS contracts.
. 11 Q Did your responsibilities change in 19737 ,
t 12 -A In 1973 my responsibilities broadened 13 to include the responsibility for the nuclear fuel 14 also.
15 Q And'from 1975 through April 1980, you
- 16 were vice president of-the entire Nuclear Power 17 Generation Division in Lynchburg; is that correct?
18 A That is correct. ~
19- Q - How did your responsibilities change in
. 20 . April 1980 when you became senior vice president -
21 of the Nuclear l Power Group?
22 A At that time in addition to the 23 responsibility for the Nuclear Power Generation 24 ' Division, . I also assumed responsibility for the L 25 Nuclear-Equipment Department in Barberton,~ Ohio,-
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. (_)y which manuf actures primarily equipmen t, large 2
3 pressure vessels, steam generators, pressurizers 4 for the nuclear Navy.
r- 5 Q The Nuclear Power Generation Division 6 in 1975 to 1980 was headquartered in Lynchburg, 7
Virginia; is that correct?
g A That is correct.
g Q Were you the highest B&W official in 10 Lynchburg, Virginia during that period?
t yg A I am not sure. That wasn't clear 12 because there also was a Navy Nuclear Fuel Division 13 in Lynchburg whose employment was somewhat larger 14 than the Nuclear Power Generation Division, so we t
i 15 had a situation where we had two senior representatives 16 there. '
17 Q Yes.
18 A I was the most senior representative 19 of the commercial nuclear business there, which 20 was the Nuclear Power Generation Division.
21 Q _And what was-the next level down from
(_ -
22 y u in terms of management responsibility?
23 A Those would be department managers within g the Nuclear Power Generation Division.
25 6H1. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark
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1 MacMillan 10 p
-(_/- 2 as GPU Exhibit 524, an organization chart 3
dated August 15th, 1978 of the~ Nuclear Power 4 Generation Division.
5 (organization chart dated August 15th, (J t 6 1978 of the Nuclear Power Generation Division 7 marked GPU Exhibit 524 for identification, as 8 of this date.)
9 Q Do you recognize this onhibit as an 10 organization chart of the Nuclear Powe Generation 11 Division of Babcock & Wilcox?
12 A -
Yes.
13 Q In 1978, after August of 1 9'7 8 , and 14 approximately up to the time of the Three' Mile 15 Island accident in March of 1979, were you aware 16 of any changes in the major management-17 spots on this chart? I am interested
~
18 in the technical ones more than the personnel 19 and things like that. -
20 A I really dont know when we might ,
21 have made organization' changes'after this.
'22 Q 7 *.1 right.
23 A And so I couldn't answer your_ question l
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24 specifically.
25 Q We will come'to'some particular
1 MacMillan 11 s-2 individuals and when we do, we can come back to the 3 chart. ,
4 A Okay.
( 5 6
Q In or about September 1977, you were the vice president of the Nuclear Power-7 Generation Division, were you not?
8 A Yes.
9 Q In that period of time, did you hear 10 anything about a transient or accident at Toledo 11 Edison's Davis-Besse plant?
12 A Yes.
13 Q When, approximately, did y$u first 14 hear anything about that accident?
15 A Well, that is difficult to pin down 16 specifically, but I know that in the fall of.1977 17 there were a number of questions raised about the 18 effects of that accident on the equipment'at 19 Davis-Besse, and I was involved in a review of 20 that assessment. I would believe that to be in 21 the time frame of October, November, 1977.
22 Q Who raised questions with you?
23- A I don't'know specifically who would
- [T 24 have raised those questions. They would have come (J-25 up-in conjunction with our Nuclear Service
. . ... .- .-. .. . . _. - = -. .--. - -
I 1 MacMillan 12 l t
' \' 2 Organization.
1
- 3. Q -Was that a department?
4 A Yes.
5 .Q Who was in charge of that department at 4
(o~
- 6. that time?
i 7 A Andy Olds was the manager of that 8 department.
4 9 Q Did you have any conversations with
' 10 Mr. Olds about the Davis-Besse accident in or 11 about the fall of 19777 s
12 A I don't remember who specifically 13 was involved in those discussions.
14 Q Did you receive anything in writing i
15 pertaining to the Davis-Besse accident?
16 A I really don't remember that I did.
I 17 Q What was the nature of the questions ,
~
18 that were raised?
19 A The discussions I remember bei'ng.a 1
3 20 participant in were related to the possible~ damage 21 to'equipmentIthat might have resulted.from this 22 . transient and-the evaluation of the transient'on 23 the major nuclear steam supply system equipment.
. . 24 . We also were-- I was also apprised ~of'the assessment' 25 of'the cause of the pilot operated relief valve 1
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I 1 MacMillan 13
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2 having failed to close and the steps that were taken 3 to determine whether or not that situation had i
4 been corrected and whether or not there was a need 5 to alert other utilities that had our nuclear 6 steam systems to the changes that were made in 7 the PORV at Davis-Besse.
8 Q What equipment in particular were 9 you advised of considerations relating to damage?
A I 10 Well, besides the pilot op9 rated ,
11 relief valve, which I ha.ve mentioned, we also were 12 looking at the reactor vessel to determine whether
'O
( ,) 13 the temperature transients had caused $ tress 14 levels there which would be of concern in the 15 continued operation of the nuclear plant.
16 Q Anything else?
17 A Those are the two that I remember 18 speci.fically being discussed at that time 19 Q How about the reactor coolant pumps?
20 A I don't remember any discussion with 21 respect to the reactor coolant pumps.
(" 22 Q Do you remember any discussion of any 23 damage to any equipment resulting from saturation? I
{
(~h 24 A I don't remember that being an issue. l L.) ]
-25 Q Do you know with whom you had discussions 1
l
43
'f.
n 1 MacMillan 14
- t. .
2 concerning the reactor vessel and whether temperature 4
s .
3 transients c,aused stress levels?
4 A I don't have a recollection of t
5 specifically who was involved in that discussion.
{ , ,
. 6 Q Do you have a recollection of how many l 7 people you discussed that problem with? Approximately?
8 A My memory is that we-had that meeting 9 in my office, which would have meant there would a
10 have been no more than four or five peqple involved.
L 11 I don't remember specifically who they were.
- i. 12 Q Were they all from the same depart' ment?
13 A I don't remember who they dere.
14 Q Was there more than one meeting in your
- 15 office concerning the Davis-Besse accident?
l 16 A The one I have mentioned is the only one r
i 17 that I recall at this time.
18 Q Do you recall whether you met ~with 19 representatives of other departments or se~ctions l 20 besides'the Nuclear Service Department?
v 21 A- I have stated I don't know who was at 22 that meeting, .but the.ch.aracter of the discussion 23 certainly would have involved the Engineering 24 Department'in the' assessment of the thermal I 25-l transient onlthe reactor vessel' and on the 5 3% .
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f 1 MacMillan 15 O 2 assessment of the pilot operated relie f valve 3 failure and what steps we had taken to rectify 4 that.
Who was the manager of Engineering at
[ 5 Q 6 that time?
7 A Don Roy.
8 Q Did you have any discussions with -- is 9 it Dr. Roy?
10 A Dr. Roy, yes. ,
11 Q --
concerning the Davis-Besse accident or 12 any of the other things that you told us about?
13 A I really don't remember who was at the 14 meeting,and.so I have difficulty responding to that 15 question.
16 Q Do you know a person named Deddens?
17 A Yes, sir.
18 Q Do you know what his position'was in or 19 about the fall of 19777 -
20 A I believe he was manager of project 21 management at that time.
22 Q Did you have any discussions with 23 Deddens concerning the Davis-Besse transien t?
( 24 A I don't remember with whom I discussed 25 that issue. I would not be surprised if Mr. Deddens had been a participant, but I simply don't know.
I t
1 MacMillan 16 ,
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' ') - 2 Q Do you know whether any of the participants 3 were below t.he manager level?
4 A I don't remember who was there.
5 Q Did you call the meeting in your office?
C.
6 A I don't remember whether I called the 7 meeting er whether the meeting was requested by 8 one of my staff.
9 Q Concerning the meeting, was it your 10 practice to do it orally or to send some kind of a 11 memorandum indicating the purpose of the meeting?
12 A There was no standard practice there.
13 Some times I would call the mee ti ng verbally, 14 sometimes in a more formal wny with a request for 15 the meeting in a structured agenda for the mee ting.
16 Q Do you know what practice you followed 17 in the case of the Davis-Besse meeting? ,
18 A I don't.
19 Q Do you know whether there was more than
'20 one meeting in your office?
21 A I only remember the one.
22 Q. Do you know if there were any meetings 23 _that you attended other than the one in your
(~)- 24 office?
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25 A I don't remember being at any other
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-f 1 MacMillan 17 2 meetings. ,
3 Q Apart from the meeting in your office, 4 were there any occasions when any individuals just 5 came to report to you either in person or by 6 telephone concerning the Davis-Besse accident or 7 its aftermath?
4 3- 8 . A. I simply don't remember. I don't know.
9 MR. KLINGSBERG: -Will you mark as 10 Exhibit 525, a chart of the Nuclear Power
, t 11 Energy Division, Engineering Department, 12 dated November 15th, 1977.
13 (Chart of the Nuclear-Power' Energy 14 Division, Engineering Department, dated i
15 November 15th, 1977 marked GPU Exhibit 525 16 for identification, as of this date'.)
l 17 A What is the date on this?
18 Q November 15th, 1977. -
f 19 Do you recognize Exhibit 525 as an 20 organization chart of a portion of the B&W NPGD 21 Engineering Department, dated November 15th,:19777
(- 22 A Yes. This-appears ~to be an organization 23 chart of the Plant Design Section of the engineering
!. , .5g Department.
i . ( --
25 Q That indicates that Dr. Roy was manager i..,v.--
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\" 2 of the Plant Design Section, does it not?
A That is correct. '
3 ,
4 MR. KLINGSBERG: I will ask to have marked 5 as Exhibit 526, another organization chart 6 dated November.15th, 1977 of the Nuclear Power 7 Generation Division.
8 (organization chart dated November 15th, 9 1977 of the Nuclear Power Generation Division 10 marked GPU Exhibit 526 for identi ication, 11 as of this date.)
12 Q Do you recognize Exhibit 526 as another p(_j . 13 organization chart dated November 1977'of the
. 14 Nuclear Power Generation division?
15 A Yes.
16 Q Having looked at all of these", does that 17 refresh your recollection that at or abou -the time 18 of the Davis-Besse accident -and the discussions you
.19 had in the fall of 1977, that Deddens was-the 20 manager of Engineering and.Roy was a second 21
. manager below him?
(- 22 A From these charts, in August -- in
- 23 November of '77, it appears that Jim Deddens was rs ; 24 Engineering Department manager, that Don Roy was LJ
- 25 Plant. Design Sect' ion manager reporting to Jim Daddens, A
LE.
l 1 MacMillan 19
,~
-(' 2 and that between November of 1977 and August of 1978 3 there was an organization change in which Mr.
4 Deddens was moved from Engineering Department 5 manager to manager of Project Ma .agement, and Mr.
g 6 Roy was promoted to Engineering Department manager.
7 Q Yes.
8 A My earlier response to your question as 9 to who was Engineering Department manager, I was 10 relying on the organization chart dated August 15th, .
4 11 1978, and I was in error becauso we had made that 12 organization change between the fall of '77 and 13 the middle cf 1978.
14 Q Having looked at all of these charts, 15 does that refresh your recollection in any respect 16 as to the individuals or any of the indiv'idu als 17 that you discussed the Davis-Besse accident or its 18 aftermath with7
- 19 A No. I don' t have a clear recollection 20 of who was involved in those discussions.
21 These charts have not helped me with
(' 22 that.
23 Q You said that there was a discussion of the cause of the PORV having failed to close and
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. 24 25 steps ~taken to determine if it was corrected and the
~ _ . . _ -_
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1 MacMillan 20
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2' need to alert others.
3 -With whom did you have that discussion?
4 A That would have been the same group that 5 I had mentioned were in the meeting earlier I don't
{
1 -
6 remember the specific individuals.
)
4 7 Q Can you tell us any more about the 8 substance of the discussion at this meeting, what g you said and what other people said?
10 A I don't remember the details of what
. 11 was said, but the general --
the general trend of i
} 12 the discussion was to evaluate and determine 13 whmAher or not the transient that had occurred in l 14 September 1977 at Davis-Besse had caused any i
! 15 damage to the equipment that was within the B&W 4 16 scope of' supply of that unit. The determination was i
17 that there had been no damage and that the.
j
~
- 18 equipment-could continue to operate.
?
4
- 19 We als'o discussed the PORV and'what were 20 the causes for its failing in the open position, 21 what action was taken to correct those causes and '
22 whether or not the changes that were made there 23 would be applicable to other pilot operated relief l
f~T s ,/
24 valves in units that also had a nuclear steam 25 system-from Babcock & Wilcox.
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1 MacMillan 21
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2 The determination on that was that the 3 valve at Dav,is-Besse was manufactured by Crosby.
4 The primary cause of its failure was that the 1
5 electrical system controlling that valve had not l
(-
6 been built in accordance with the drawings. The 7 electrical system was corrected and since the valve 8 was manufactured by Crosby and none of our other 9 units had Crosby valves, we felt there was no 10 necessity to alert other utilities of ghe nature
=
11 of the failure at Davis-Besse.
i i 12 Did you nake that decision?
Q ,
Q(_/ 13 A That was a recommendation that was made '
14 to me and I concurred in it. ,'
- 15 Q Who made the reco mmendation?
16 A I don't remember that.
17 Q Was it made by more than one person?
18 A It was a consensus of the gro6p that 19 'was at the meeting. -
20 Q Whose responsibility was it at that 21 time to make analyses and recommendations as to a i
22 matter such as advising other utilities concerning 23 the causes of another transient at a sister plant
(g 24 or similar plant?
\_)
25 A -In general the -- what we called the l
cross-contract applicability, that was something l l
1 MacMillan 22
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N-) 2 that happens and one plant is app 1'i cable to another 3
plant. Norm, ally that determination is made in 4 the Nuclear Service Department, the engineering 5 support for the assessment of it, whatever problem
(
6 may develop,and its recommendation for remedies 7 would be made in the Engineering Department.
8 Q Do you know whether the assessment of 9 and/or the recommendation concerning the question 10 of whether others should be notified w s in writing?
11 A I don't remember.
I 12 Q At that meeting, did you see anything j3 in documented form,whether a memorandum or a 14 graph or anything of that , sort?
15 A I don't know what information we had, 16 what printed information we had at that m'eeting.
17 Q Did you take any notes?
18 A Not that I remember. ~
19 Q Did you dictate anything as a result 20_ of the meeting?
21 A I don't remember doing that.
22 Q Did you give any instructions as a 23 result-of the meeting? l r')
24 A I don't remember what instructions I NJ -
25 might have.given. . I recall the conclusions,and
.i
MacMillan 23 (Oj. -
clearly from those conclusions, I would have concurred in their recommendations and encouraged them to take 3
the actions that had been recommended.
4 Q Do you have any -- do you or your secretary have any diaries or other documents 6
from which it could be determined when that meeting 7
- 8 A well, I don't normally keep a diary.
My secretary does not keep a record of or a history o r diary of my meetings.
12 I haven't searched to see if there is
() g any other way of determining.
Q This meeting in your office which you l have been describing was not the first you had 15 heard of the Davis-Besse accident, was it>?
i
- A I don't remember when that was first l brought to my attention, but in a situahionof this sort where there was a que s tio n o f t h,e potential damage to equipment, I would expect that
- 'I'would have heard some report prior to that time.
( But I.have ho recollection of when that would have
! been.
23 Q Did you receive any written report
. /'N 24 prior to that time?
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r i MacMillan 24
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\% ).! 2 A I don't.know. I don't have any 3
recollection of that. s 4 Q Is there a room at B&W NPGD offices in !
5 Lynchburg known'as training room B?
6 A Yes.
7 Q Where is that_in relation to your 8 office?
9 A My office is in --
at that time?
4 Q Yes.
i 10 l i 11 A My office was in the front northern 12 quarter -- corncr of the-building on the main floor.
13 Training room B woul d have been in the ,t ack of that 14 same building in our training area. ,
3 15 Q What was training room B used for?
t 16 A Training room B would be used' both in i 17 conjunction with our training of utility ersonnel 18 and in this case, some cases it was used as a 19 . conference room when there was not a conference 20 room available anyplace else.
21 Q Were you ever present at a meeting
(- 22 attended by approximately 30 or 40 or 50 people 23 in training room B concerning the Davis-Besse
Y 24 accident?
- s) 25 A I d n't remember that I'was there.
. . _ . . = - --. .
I 1- MacMillan 25 2 Q Do you know that you were placed'there f
3 by various other people who were there?
4 A I --
1 5 Q I mean you have heard that?
-{
l 6 A I have been told by others that they 4 7 thought I was there, but I don't remember being 8 there.
9 ,
Q When was the first time that you found i:
t-10 l out that there was such a meeting? ,
11 A The first time that I~ remember knowing j i
j 12 of that' meeting was in the period after the Three 4 b 13 Mile Island accident in March of 1979.'
E' 14 Q Was it common for the Nuclear Power 15 Generation Division to have meetings attended
' by that many personnel?
16 17 MR. FISKE: What do you mean by "that 18 many personnel"?
- I MR. KLINGSBERG:
19 It has been' testified i
20 - there were.30, 40, 50 people there, and it has 21 also been testified by others-who.were-there
! 22' that they don't remember ever having such a 23 meeting with so many people in attendance.
F 24 MR. FISKE: Well~, in_other woIds,-the
'25 question is, was it common to have meetings at B&W attended by-as many as 30 or 40 people?
)
r i
1 MacMillan 26
.fs .
~- MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
2 l 3
A We have had meetings at B&W with as many 4 as 100 people.
5 g Did you have meetings with as many as g
j 6 30 or 40 or 50 personnel in regard to a transient 7 or accident at a nuclear plant as of the fall of 8 '777 g THE WITNESS: Could I have that question 10 read again, please? 3 l (Question read)
L 11 l
12 A We did have meetings at Nuclear Power
~
13 Generation Division following transients at nuclear 14 plants.
15 I could not testify to the numbers of 16 people that attended those meetings.
17 Q Did you attend those meetings?
18 A Not usually, no.
19 Q What was the highest level of persons who 20 usually attended such meeting?
21 A Normally I' would expect that the
' department managers would be the highest level 22 23 of attending.
^
( 24 Q Was there any procedure for reporting to U) 25 ! you on the results of such meetings?
J
1 MacMillan 27 4
(*)
t V 2 A Nothing specific other than the normal '
3 m nthly reports of the department managers.
4 Q The department managers submitted monthly 5 reports to you?
6 A Yes.
7 Q Did you receive any monthly reports 6 pertaining to the Davis-Besse accident?
g A I don't know. I don't remember, 19 l Q In regard to a meeting of p,ersonnel
, A -
11 li concerning an accident or transient at another 13 ptant in or about 1977, would there normally have '
13 been a notice circulated that such meetiing was
, 14 ' to occur?
15 A There were no specific requirements
~
16 for notification of meeting, but in this type of 17 thing I would expect there would have been some sort 18 of notice. -
19 Q Would you be a recipient of such notice?
20 A Not necessarily, no.
21 Q Do you retain in your files copies of 22 y ur monthly reports from department heads?
23 A. I retain them for some period of time.
24 Q Do you know for what period of time? -
i 25 A There is no specific period of time.
g MacMillan 28
(
b 2 Every once in a while you clean out your files and ,
frequently at that time I would discard old monthly 3
4 reports.
5 Q Were the monthly reports filed other 6 than in your personal or office files? .
A Do you mean did other people keep the 7
8 monthly reports?
g Q Or is there some central filing place ,
10 where they are preserved? j 13 A I don't believe that they are preserved 12 in any central filing facility.
, l n)
% 13 i I
G Y u have n rec llection whether you 14 received any monthly reports concerning or referring 15 to the Davis-Besse accident?
^
16 A 1 have no recollection of receiving ,
l 17 rep rts -- excuse me. I have no recollection of 18 having received a monthly report which reported !
19 on_the Davis-Besse incident. -
20 Q Have you reviewed testimony either 21 in this case or before the Kemeny Commission or 22 ther bodies by various persons in your organiza tion
- 23 e n erning this training room B meeting?
., 24 MR. FISKE: Mr. Klingsberg, we have had d ~
25 an understanding, I think, throughout these
1 MacMillan 29 l 2
depositions that questions would not be asked or Certainly would not be answered concerning 4
what went on in th( course of preparation for 5
the deposition and in the presence of. counsel.
6 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes, that is excluded.
7 MR. FISKE: If the question excludes 8 anything he did with lawyers, fine.
9 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
10 i MR. FISKE: Do you understand that, Mr.
> L.
11 MacMillan?
12 TH3 WITNESS: The question then is did 13 l I have any discussions or have I' reviewed any 14 testimony in the absence'of~ counsel?
15 MR. FISKE: The question is outside of 16 anything that happened in the presence of -
17 lawyers, have you reviewed the testinony that 18 other people gave either in this case or 19 anywhere else concerning the. training room B 20 meeting?
A I don't remember any situation where I 21
-h 22 was -- where I reviewed testimony in the ab sence of 23 e unsel. ,
24 Q Do you know a Mr. Kelly in your 25 #9"" **D' "
._ . . - _ . . . _ . _ ~ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . - . _
1 MacMillan 30
'tD '
- (") 2 A Is that Joe Kelly?
3 Q Yes. '
4 A Yes.
5 Q What was his position'in 19777 6 A I don't know, but I can check on the, 7 organization chart (indicating).
8 THE WITNESS: I can't read that.
9 MR. FISKE: All right, forget it.
10 A I dor.'t know.
11 Q I would like to show you a page from 12 ,
Mr. Kelly's-deposition in this case en May 5th, 1981 13 ) at page 258, starting at line 7, and gding down to 14 . line 14. l 15 I will ask you to look at that (handing 16 transcript to the witness).
17 Q You can look back at any part you like 18 to look at in context. -
19_ The question and answer to which I have i
20 referred you states, "You have testified previously 21 that John MacMillan attended part of the session.
22 How do you know he only attended part of it? " i 23 " Answer: During my sequence of events, (5 24 when I was giving the sequence of events at Davis-( ,[
95 Besse, I looked up and he was standing in the back
1 MacMillan 31
, , ) 2 f the room. By the time I finished, he wasn't in 3
the room anymore. That is what I meant by 4 ' Partially.'"
,5 Does that refresh your recollection in 6 any respect that you attended the training room B 7 meeting?
8 A No. I don't remember being at that ,
I
\
9 ""*Di"9*
f 10 Q Does it refresh your recollection that t
11 y a attended any meeting at which Mr. Kelly or i t
1 1g anybody els, provided the sequence of events at l
(3) 13 ,
Davis-Besse? -
l 14 A I don't remenber being at any such 15 meeting.
16 Q Do you think Mr. Kelly was in' error in 17 placing you at the meeting?
18 MR. FISKE: I will object to that, Mr.
19 Klingsberg. I don't know what you mean by 20 "1" *## #*" ~
21 Q Did you have an affirmative recollection
(- 22 that you were not at the meeting?
23 A I simply don't remember whether I was at 77 24 the meeting or not.
t i
m-25 Q You wouldn' t deny that you were at the
1 MacMillan 32
[T ~
(_) 2 meeting?
3 MR. FISKE: Well, he said --
4 A I simply don't remember.
5 Q Did you know a Mr. Bill Spangler in your 6 organization at NPGD in 19777 7 A Yes.
8 Q Did you know what his position or I
b responsibilities were at that time?
l 10 A I d n't know at that time.
! 11 Q Do you know how it would co e about that 12 he would have summoned people to the training room B 13 mee ting? '
g4 A Without knowing what his position was, 15 I e uldn't respond to that constructively.
16 Q Did you have any conversation's with Mr.
17 Spangler pertaining to Davis-Besse?
18 A I don't remember that I did. -
i 19 Q Now, the Davis-Besse accident to which 20 we have been referring was on September 24th, 1977. l 21 The testimony was that the training room I' 22 B meeting occurred on the 28th or 29th of September.
23 Is it your best rocollection that the meeting to r'\ 24 which you have referred that occurred in your office
% j)
\ l 25 was after September 28th or 29th? l l
.._m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ -J
t t MacMillan 33
\
(_/. 2 A I don't remember the exact date of the meeting that c urred in my ffi e, but knowing 3
4 the context of the meeting and the material that 5
was discussed, it would have required some engineering
{ evaluation before we could have had that meeting.
6 7
So my judgment is the meeting in my office would 8 have been after the September 29th time period.
g Q Were you aware of the fact that in 10 1977,that on October 23rd, 1977 thero was another t
gg transient at Davis-Besse?
12 A Is your question was I aware in 1977
-( 13 that there was another transient? -
14 Q Right. ,
15 A No.
16 Q Do you know whether the meeting that gp you attended or that occurred in your office was af ter 18 October 23rd, 1977?
gg A I don't know when that meeting.was 20 specifically.
21 Q At the meeting in your office, was
(- 22 there a discussion of one or two . Davis-Besse 23 transients?
/~~N n
~4-A My memory was that we were talking about N )-
25 the one September 1977' transient.
6 mm.
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+y % y -.r -
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+ .
I,
'M
) t * *
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_5- ' '
1 MacMillan '
34 T
7 ~~N s .
N-) h A Did anybody mention an October transient?
g.
0 3 A I d n't remember hearing about an
,s - ,
"' 0;tober trdnsient in 1977.
+4 1
\ ' "
5 (Q When was the first time that you did c:
4 ,
6 ' hear about an October transient at Davis-Besse?
f 7 - A That would have been brought to my 8 attention after the karch 1979 accident at Three g Mile Island. .
~ <
IO Q Did you get, aside from the monthly j _. .
it' 'I reports, any kind of regular information concerning x
121 accidents or transients at nuclear plants with B&W f)\
(_ 13 e qu'ipme n t? .
g,g A Not specifically in that form; 15 ,
Q How many B&W nuclear plants were either 16 n testing or; operational phase in 19777 17 A Well, I would have to numerate them.
e y ,There was Oconee Oconee 2, Oconee 3, 4
s y _ Ig --
1, Crystal T
.gg River, Arkansas Power and Light, ANO-1, Rancho s
s pg ' ,,Seco, Three Mile Island-1, Davis-Besse, and I am a 4 a
'7 little bit uncertain about the status at that time
+ 3 '2 f f ' ' 2- - (,. ,o about Three Mile Island-2.
w, s
.' sn- ,
, 23 Q Had you given your-department heads
/g
( ,) h] or any'of your subordinates any instructions as q'
25 to what they were supposed to do in the event of s -N'
- 6 4 I
b .
, ,_ i ' _,y..
. = . - - . _ _ -
1- MacMillan 35 p
(_ -
2 an accident or a transient at one of these eight 3 Pl ants in 19777 4 MR. FISKE: You mean in terms of 5
reporting it or in terms of dealing with a
. C-6 transient?
7 MR. KLINGSBERG: Let's start with 8 reporting.
9 MR. FISKE: Do you understand the 10 question?
E 11 A The question is did I have any standing 12 instructions on how to report an incident?
~
13 Q Right. '
14 A I don't remember that we had any 15 standing orders as to how those would be reported.
16 Q Was an incident or accident o'f transient 17 at one of those plants something that you were 18 interested in in terms of your responsibilities?
19 A Well, I would be interested in- a 20 transient of that sort at one of our nuclear plants.
21 Q Did you take any action --
( 22 MR. FISKE: Can I hear the answer back, i
23 Please?
t's 24 (Record read) 25 MR. FISKE: It would be helpful if Mr.
b
. _ _ _ _ , _ . , , y__ _ , , , , . . . . . - ,
-e.. , , y
1 MacMillan 36
/
k-' 2 MacMillan explained what he meant by "that 3 sort.",
4 MR. KLINGSBERG: Sure.
5 Q when a nuclear plant with a Babcock &
6 Wilcox NSS went into service, we contined to follow 7
the operation of that plant.
8 Q Yes.
g A In order to support the utility and its 10 operations. And when something unusual happened 11 at the plant, I expected our Nuclear Service people 12 to discuss that with the utility and understand 13 what the nature of the problem was. Add we had a 14 sys' tem'of reporting through site problem reports 15 unusual events of this type.
16 When I say that I would have 'n a
17 interest in this kind of a transient, what I am is really saying is I was interested in making sure 19 that we had a system within the Nuclear Power 20 Generation Division for reporting these types of 21 transients and that we were responsive to the (J 22 utilities' needs and responding to whatever g assistance might be indicated by the utility.in I
rec vering fr m those incidents.
(~) 24 LJ 25 Q Who was in charge of Nuclear Service in l
4 i MacMillan 37
'" )
(/W 19777 2
A Acc rding to the organization chart, 3
4 GPU 526, was Andy Olds.
5 Q Had you had any conversations or written 6 communications with Mr. Olds asking him to --
7 directing him to report to you whenevar there was g an accident or a transient at one of your eight 9 nuclear plants? ,
10 A I don't remember that I hag any 11 standing orders for that type of report, but 12 generally my managers were sensitive to the need l
D3 for me to know of unusual or important' activities 14 of the division, and when something of that sort
- 15 was considered to be of sufficient in teres t for 16 them to report, they would do that as a matter of 17 course in the operation of the division.
18 Q What was the general responsib'ility 19 of Muclear service? -
20 A The Nuclear Service Department was 21 f rmed to support the utilities with B&W units
~ (- 22 ' during the final phases of start-up and testing, 23 and then forward into the operation of those units.
(~N 24 And they assisted the utility in whatever way the Q) .
25 utility requested in providing information or
- c t * - e . me-
- vw- +-y-- + + - - +
1 MacMillan 38
(%
U 2 services or engineering, as was indicated by the 3
utility. ,
4 Q Now --
< 5 A I guess I ought to add to that. They
- t 6 also had a responsibility in the tr'aining area for 7 fulfilling our contract obligations in the training 8 of utility personnel. '
9 Q Prior to the time of the TMI-2 accident, 4
10 were you aware of any occurrences at a abcock &
11 Wilcox-supplied nuclear steam supply system where
, 12 there was saturation in the reactor coolant system?
l 13 MR. FISKE: Was your,questi~on before 4
14 the Three Mile Island accident? ,
15 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
16 A I don't remember being aware 'of any 17 specific in li dents .
18 Q Had you been advised in the course of 19 the meeting that you have described in your office 20 or therwise that during the course of.this E 21 September 1977 Davis-Besse accidents: there was 22 saturation in the reactor coolant system?
23 AL_ 'I don't remember discussion of saturation 24 in the.reactob coolant system. The primary emphasis 25 f that meeting was to evaluate the impact of the
l 1 MacMillan 39 A_r- 2 incident on the equipment and the corrective measures 3
which we took to fix the pilot operated relief valve.
4 Q Prior to the Three Mile Island accident 1
5 in March of 1979, were you aware of any accurrences 6 at a B&W-supplied plant where a pressurizer level
- 7 increased substantially at the same time that 8 reactor coolant system pressure fell?
9 A I don't remember being informed of that.
10 Q Were you informed of that in connection 11 with the discussion of the Davis-Besse a,ccident at i
12 the meeting in your office or otherwise?
l
) 13 A I don't believe so.
~
] 14 Q Prior to the Three Mile Island accident 15 in 1979, were you aware of any occurrences at a
.16 B&W-supplied plant where the pilot operat' e d relief 17 valve at the top of the pressurizer stuck open 1 .
18 following a transient? -
19 A It is very difficult for me to-20 differentiate my memory and knowledge as to whether 21 .I knew that before Three Mile Island or whether I
(-- 22 knew that after Three Mile Island.
~
i 23 o re -
I .
A I know that there were occasions-before f',}.
- u. .
24 25 Three Mile Island whenTthat did occur.
~
,: .s . . . . _ _ .. .__ ---_u_
1 MacMillan 40 i s~ ~
2 Q You know that now?
A I know that now. I really don't know 3
4 whether I became aware of that before the Three Mile 5 Island accident or whether that was something that ,
6- happened after that. I can't sort that out in my 7
memory. .
8 Q Were you aware as a result of the l 9 meeting in your office that a pilot operated relief 10 valve had stuck open at Davis-Besse in September E
11 19777
, 12 A I knew that was a condition at Davis-
, 13 Besse, yes.
t .
14 Q Did.you inquire as to whetherl that had 15 ever happened before?
16 A I don't remember whether I did or not.
i-17 Q Did anybody tell you whether that had 18 ever happened before? -
19 A As I said, I have a hard time recalling 20 when I was told. There were other incidents of 21 this sort. I don't remember at that meeting whether 22- that was discussed or not.
23 Q At or about the time it occurred, were )
l
_r g - y u aware 24 .
f the transient or accident at the Duke i N ]. ._
' 95 P wer oconee 3 plant in' June 19757 ,
.i l
i MacMillan 41
/m k/
s 2 A Could you be more specific as to what?
3 What that situation was?
4 Q. Well, were you aware,for example, that 5 before the Three Mile Island accident, that at the 6 Duke incident at Oconee 3 on June 13, 1975, there l 7 was a stuck open pilot operated relief valve?
8 A I now know that there was a stuck open 9 pilot operated relief valve at Oconee 3, and I know 10 we made some modifications of that valv in order 11 to be responsive to that situation.
12 I don't remember whether I was aware of 13 that before Three Mile Island er whether that was 14 something that I was refreshed on after the Three 15 Mile Island accident.
16 Q I take it you don't remember whether 17 that was mentioned in the course of your discussion 18 of this stuck open PORV following the Davi's-Besse 19 accident? -
20 A I don't remember whether that was discussed 21 or not. !
22 Q Were you aware prior to the Three Mile-l 23 Island accident of.any occurrences at a Babcock &
/^N[ 24 Wilcox-supplied nuclear steam supply system where
'u/
25 the rupture disk on the reactor coolant drain tank I
1 MacMillan 42
/~T
' ' ' burst due either to a reactor coolant system fluid 2
3 discharge through the pilot operated relieve valve 4 or the code safety valves?
( 5 6
A No. I do remember that there was was an occasion at Oconee, and I don't remember there 7 which unit it was, in which that rupture disk 8 being broke,and the reason I remember it is it 9 damaged the insulation on the pressurizer and we 10 had to make some repairs on that insulation.
11 I don't remember the time frame of that 12 nor do I remember any discussions that we had with 13 respect to what was the cause of the ru'pture disk 14 breaking, but I do remember his having to fix the 15 pressurizer insulation.
~
16 Q During the course of your discussions 17 on Davis-Besse, did anybody tell you that the 18 rupture disk had blown? -
19 A I don't remember. -
20 g were you informed during your
~21, discussions immediately following the Davis-Besse (U . 22 accident that that involved ~a loss of coolant 23 accident?
(~) 24 _
A :Well,-I was informed that the pilot
\._/
25 - operated' relief valve had stuck open and that i
l
- i'
l 1 MacMillan 43 f^ .
k..)g - _certainly would be classified as a loss of coolant 2
3 accident. ,
4 Q Based on your understanding at that 5
time, what, if anything, was undesirable about a 6 loss of coolant accident at a Babcock & Wilcox 7
plant?
8 A Now, that is a very broad question.
9 can you be more specific?
10 Q Let me ask you this: Were you informed 11 in the course of your discussions of the Davis-Besse 12 accident, particularly the meeting in your office,
{%l ss- 13 that the operat' ors had turned off the h'igh pressure 14 injection? '
15 A I don't remember being told that.
16 Q When was the first time that you learned 17 that?
18 A 'My first knowledge of that, that I recall, j 19 was after the Three Mile Island accident when .I was 20 shown a copy of a letter written by Bert Dunn.
21 Q Was Mr. Olds still in your employ at that
.n.o .
time?
23 A At what time are you speaking of?
('N 24 Q After the.Three Mile Island accident.
L 25 A Yes. He is stilliin our employ.
w - ,,
t- 'w -
r - w wreT w-N --www'yV weee- 4 'r- ' -
- 7
1 MacMillan 44 1 O
V' 2 Q Did you ever call in Mr. Olds and say 3
s mething to the effect of, "Why didn't you tell me 4 at that meeting in our office that the operators 5
had turned off the high pressure injection during 6 this loss of coolant accident at Davis-Besse back 7
at that meeting we had?"
g A I don't remember talking about that with 9
Mr. Olds.
10 Q Aside from meetings at which counsel was present, did you ever have any conversation gi 12 with Mr. Olds in regard to his reporting o'r not 13 reporting to you concerning the Davis-Besse accident?
14 A I don't remember having discussions with f
15 Mr. Olds on that subject.
16 MR. FISKE: Whenever you~get 'to a 17 convenient point.
18 MR. KLINGSBERG: Okay, this is 19- convenient. .
20 (Recess taken) 21 BY MR. KLINGSBERG:
22 Q I w uld like to show you two documents 23 previously marked'as GPU Exhibits 93 and 94. And O 24 GPU Exhibit 93 is a document entitled " Babcock &
U.
25 Wile x company Administrative Manual Policies and
- .~ , _ . , _ _ . _
1 MacMillan 45 7-k I- 2 Procedures NPG 1707-01 Revision 6, Processing of 3 safety Concerns." 94 is revision 5.
1 4 94 was dated November 21, 1977 and 93 5 is dated 6/20/78 (handing documents to the witness).
1
(_ '
6 Are you familiar with Exhibits 93 and 947 7 A These appear to be our procedures for 8 processing preliminary safety concerns, yes.
9 Q Did you approve these documents before f
10 they were issued? ,
d 11 A I don't remember whether I approved these 12 specific documents, but I was certainly aware that 13 they existed and were, in fact, requirfd in order to 14 process safety concerns in response to NRC requirements.
W 15 Q And you say the purpose of these policies
~
16 and procedures was to comply with NRC requirements?
17 A Yes.
18 Q What requirements were thos e? -
19 A well, I think those are spelled out in -
20 paragraph 6A-1 and paragraph 6A-2 of the reference
, 21 documents.
22 Q In the next to the last'page of Exhibit 23 I 94, there is a' document called Exhibit'A, which is f'N 24 a flow chart.
.Q;)
25 Do you see that?
^
, - , --, - .1--- --- --
. 1 MacMillan 46 I l
(~
A Yes.
2 3 Q There is reference there to division 4- head.
5 A I can't read this copy.
. 6 Where is " division head"?
7 Q About there (indicating).
8 MR. FISKE: Where?
9 MR. KLINGSBERG: Do you have a magnifying 10 glass?
E 11 MR. FISKE: This is very hard to read.
12 A About halfway down the page?
() 13 Q Yes. '
14 A At the left margin, is tha " division 15 head"?
~
16 Q Yes.
17 A I see that.
18 Q That's you, right? ' -
19 A Yes. -
20 Q What was your understanding of your 21 responsibility in terms of the processing of safety k- 22 concerns?
23 A Where there was a substantial safety
~N 24 -hazard which required reporting under 10CRF 21, 25 then it was my. responsibility to assure that that
. - 4 -., - . , , ;_,_. - --
l f l 1 MacMillan 47-
. 2 was either reported directly to the NRC or to 3 satisfy myself that that safety concern had been 4 brought to the attention of the NRC by one of our 5
perators --
one of the u'tilities with our nuclear
{
6 Plant. ,
7 Q Prior to the time that there was a 8 10CRF 21, did you have similar responsibilities? "
g- MR. FISKE: I am not sure I understand 10 the question, g gg Q Prior to the time that there was a 12 10CRF 21, there was a procedure, was there not, 13 for dealing with safety concerns within'the NPGD 14 of B&W7 15 MR. FISKE: Just so I understand the
- 16. question, are you referring to some period of 17 time before 10CFR 21 became --
18 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
19 MR. FISKE: -
- effective? -
20 MR. KLINGSBERG: Right.
21 A I w uld have to do some research on that 22 to determine-exactly when we instituted the 23 Preliminary safety concern' procedure.
24 .Q Yes. !
' 25 A And the phasing of that with respect to
+
g --W t #,--
9-=mg e 4 .,g r. e- e v* -r--- -**'-'t4"-'*-
- W -- ~
1 MacMillan 48 rs -
2 the requirements of 10CFR 21.
d, 3 Q What did you do to assure that you were 4 fulfilling your responsibilities under the NRC 5 regulation and the B&W policy and procedure?
6 A well, I made sure that we had a policy 7 and procedure which was responsive to the 8 requirements of 10CFR 21 and that it was implemented g within the Nuclear Power Generation Division.
10 I assigned responsibility fr the 11 clerks and evaluation of preliminary safety concerns 12 to the manager of licensing and charged him with 13 the responsibility of bringing to my atiention 14 those safety concerns which, upon evaluation, 15 fell into the category of being substantial safety 16 hazards to be reported under 10CFR 21.
j 17 Q Was Taylor the manager of IAcensing at 18 the time of the Davis-Besse accident? -
gg A I really don't know. I would have to i
20 check that. -
21 He has been manager of Licensing for a
(~ 22 number of years, but I-would want to find out 23 specifically when he was.
(~)
X/
24 Q Is that indicated in these C.ocumen ts -
25 (indicating)?
- e " , e n -tw a, 7 + r
1 MacMillan 49
- n. -
l 2 A This doesn't show the Engineering 3 Department organization that he wou'Id be a part of.
4 MR. KLINGSBERG: Will you please mark 5 as this exhibit, next in order, an g
6 organization chart of the NPGD Engineering 1
7 Department, also dated November 15th, 1977.
8 (Organization chart of the NPGD i
9 Engineering Department dated November 15th,
> 10 1977 marked GPU Exhibit 527 for p 11 id en ti ficatio n', as of this date.)
12 Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 527 as an 13 organization chart of the Engineering D'epartment 14 of Babcock & Wilcox NPGD on November 15th', 19777 15 - A The exhibit appears to be a section 16 . of the Engineering Department organization.
17 Q Does that refresh your recollection 18 - that Taylor was manager of licensing at that time?
19 A Yes. This would indicate Taylor was 20 . manager of Licensing in November of 1977.
l --
21 Q. Was Taylor at the meeting in your office i * - concerning the Davis-Besse accident?
22 23 A. I don't remember who was in the meeting
~ 24 in my office.
25: Q What procedures, if any, did you.have.
s .
t*'i - < -y
- e ,-
1ew e---r, y e w % * - v- 's -,w> vv- i+w=--**+,e *----+-4 , - - -
--v*- w- **---' ,4+=- - =- w-e-
- i MacMillan 50
. (ss 2 for having the manager of Nuclear Services, who was 3 in charge of, finding out things about accidents at 4 particular plants, communicating with Mr. Taylor, 5 the manager of ILcensing? Who was in charge of
(
6 making sure that you notified utilities and the 7 NRC about safety cor.cerns?
8 A Well, the procedure for processing 9 safety concerns in paragraph 7 entitled 10 " Responsibilities for Reporting" calls (for all 11 NPGD personnel to report, originate form BWNP-20208 12 for potential safety concerns, suspected to fall
- 13 within the definition of this proceduri (indicating).
~
14 Q What were they' supposed to do with 15 those?
16 A There is a process by which that form 17 is handled in the organization as diagramed on 18' Exhibit A of the procedure for processing' safety 19 concerns. -
20 Q That paragraph-to which you have 21 referred requires all NPGD personnel to fill out 22 this form for' suspected potential safety concerns;
.g3 is that correct?'
i 24 - MR. FISKE: Well, are you asking him a
(~)%
% l 25 question?
a
, _ _ .~ . _ ...___ _ .-_ ._ _ .. _ !
{
\
1 MacMillan 51 l: .
2 MR. KLINGSBERG : Yes.
i 3 MR. FISKE: Could I hear it again, 4 please?
r 5 (Record read) 6 A No. The words that are in the paragraph 7 is it requires, it gives all NPGD personnel the 8 responsibilities of originating that form for 9 potential safety concerns suspected of falling within 10 the categories defined in Section 6 of the t
11 procedure (indicating).
12 Q Did anything that you were told at the b
q ,j 13 meeting concerning Davis-Besse in your' office lead 14 you to suspect or believe that anybody else 15 suspected that there was a potential safety concern?
16 THE WITNESS: Could I hear that question 17 again, please?
18 (Question read) .-
19 A I don't remember having suspicions of 20 that at the time,no.
21 Q Did you ask anybody if they were C- 22 investigating whether or not you had any 23 responsibilities under your policies and procedures
- <'N 24 1:o write any memoranda or forms concerning i i
.N,s .
25 suspicion of potential safety concerns as a result
.s
.,=-9 rw -
p ,. ,,,.-rw .yw y ,.-i -gy-y-, y up.-,g- w"
o 1 MacMillan 52
/~N
~ (,l , 2 of the Davis-Besse accident in September of 19777 3
I am sorry, could I hear
[HEWITNESS:
4 that question again, please?
5 (Question read) 6 A I don't remember whether or not I asked 7 anybody at that meeting.
8 Q Did anybody assure you that there were 9 n Potential safety concerns?
10 A I don't remember.
t 11 Q Was the subject of safety concerns 12 discussed in any way, shape or form at this
() 13 meeting, or mentioned at this geeting to which 14 you have referred on Davis-Besse or at any other 15 time that you considered the Davis-Besse accident 16 Prior to March 19797 '
17 A I don't remember if it was.
18 Q Would it have been your practice at such 19 a meeting to make inquiry concerning whether or 20 n t there were safety concerns? ,
21 MR. FISKE: Well, I object to that
(- 22 question.
23 I don't think there has been any t'T 24 testimony that there was a regular practice .
Q,) i 25 of having meetings like-this.
1 MacMillan 53 0
2 MR. KLINGSBERG: Are you directing him 3 nt to answer? ,
4 MR. FISKE: 'Jo , no.
5 You may answer.
(-
6 A Well, there was a procedure in place 7 for handling potential safety concerns, and that 8 was the method of addressing issues or concerns i
9 which any of the employees might have had for 10 Potential safety hazards.
11 Q As of the time of the meeting you had i
12 on Davis-Besse in your office, had there been 13 Previous occasions when B&W reported sifety 14 concerns to utilities and the Nuclear Regdlatory 15 Commission?
16 A I would have to do some homework on 17 that, some research on that.
18 We have reported items under t0CFR.21 19 to our utilities,and the exact timing of that I would 20 have to go back and review.
21 Q Do you remember any occasions prior to
--k- 22 .the Three- Mile Island accident when you were 23 dissatisfied with the way in which safety concerns
/~N 24 had been handled on the part of the NPGD?
1 f
25 MR. FISKE: When you talk about the
'4
1 MacMillan 54 O. - 2 safety concerns, Mr. Klingsberg, are you using 3 that a,s a term of art in reference to the 4 definition that is given to that in this 5 procedure, or are you using the term " safety 6 . concern" in a much broader sense?
7 MR. KLINGSBERG: I am talking about 8 these policies and procedures.
9 A I don't recall an occasion where prior 10 to the Three Mile Island accident when would have 11 been dissatisfied with the procedure for handling 12 preliminary safety concerns.
13 Q I want to show you an exhi6it previously 14 marked as GPU 334, which is an administra'tive .
15 procedure, Babcock & Wilcox, the subject of site
~
16 problem report, this one dated March 21, 1975.
17 (Handing document to the witness.)
18 -I would also like to show you' Exhibit 19 345, which is a similar do'cument dated March 5th,
- 20 1979, but.all of the subsequent pages are dated 21 August 1, 1977.
22 This is called " Revision 5." 334 is
. z3 " Revision 3." And we don't seem'to have' " Revision d'."
Do you recognize Exhibits 334 and 335 24 Q 25- as containing B&W's; policy and procedure concerning
a- - - - - - - -
1 MacMillan 55
(~)
\') 2 site problem reports?
A Yes.
3 4 Q Did you approve these documents before 5 they were issued?
g 6 A Again, I don't know whether I approved 7 these specific documents or not.
8 I know that they were in existence.
9 Q Will you look at Exhibit 334, appendix 1, 10 item numbered G. It talks about top ge eric 11 problems.
- 12 Do you see that?
~
, 13 A Yes.
~
14 Q It says, "A designation given to 15 certain Site Problems that are of a serious' nature 16 and that have a high potential for reoccurrence,"
17 and provides that they - are assigned a unique 18 identifying number and given wide distribution 19 so there can be an expeditious resolution of 20 problem.'
21 Do you see that?
( .
L 22 A- Yes.
I 23 -Q Was there any consideration in your
- /'N 24 discussion at the meeting in your office of.the l
\, ,/
25 Davis-Besse event, or otherwise, of whether or not
/
l
1 MacMillan 56
~
(2) 2 any of the problems coming out of that Davis-Besse 3 event should,be designated " top generic problems"?
4 A I don't recall that there was any 5 discussion on that subject.
(
6 Q Do you know the reason why in Exhibit 345, 7 the reference to the top generic problem designation 8 seems to have been eliminated?
9 A I do not know why.
10 Q At the time of your discuss on of the 11 Davis-Besse event, did you have in hand the site 12 problem report dealing with that event?
13 A I don't remember that we d[d .
14 Q Who draft'ed or who was in charge of 15 drafting these policies and procedures, Exhibits 16 334, 335, 94, 937 17 A I don't know the specific answer to 18 your question, but I know general policies' and 19 procedures were handled by a unit within the General 20 Services Department. These procedures were drafted 21 and then circulated for review and comment and 22 subsequent approval throughout the organization.
23 Q tre re they circulated to you?
24 A In general, they would not be circulated 25 to me. I don't know specifically with respect to I
1 MacMillan 57 2 these whether they were or not.
3 Q Were they ir ulated to Engineering and 4 Nuclear Service Departments?
5 A They would generally be circulated to 6 any department that had a responsibility under the
- procedure.
g MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to now g mark, or I guess it has been marked, the 10 Babcock & Wilcox site problem report concerning a
4 %
11 the Davis-Besse accident.
12 Q That was previously marked as Exhibit 152,
(: 13 and I will show you that.
You can look* at whatever
~
14 parts you want to-to refresh your recollection, 15 but I am only going to ask about certain 16 specific parts,and I will give you an opp 6rtunity 17 to make further review after I have asked.the-i .
~18 questions ~about those-specific parts. (Handing 19 document to the witness. ) And perhaps we can-save
- 20; some time.
21 MR.-FISKE: Will you_just give us the
( 22 pages that you are going to ask questions 23 about?
MR. KLINGSBERG: I am not sure exactly, y'%j 24
' Q.'
+-
25- but Probably.18847;through 51, and;18868
- m. 4,. - - - . - -
- --+r w -r y *e +
9 - -we w = = *e * * + - - -
l l
1 MacMillan 58 4 . l
. 2 through some subsequent pages. It depends 3
n how much he knows about it. He may never ,
, 4 have even seen it before.
5-A Okay, what was your question? .
. 6 Q To ask a preliminary question, prior to l 7 the Three Mile Island accident, had you ever seen
-8 this document?
g A I don't remember seeing this document at 10 any time.
v
. 11 Q You had never seen it before, ever?
12 A I don't recall seeing it.
13 Q Do you know whether this document had 14 been completed as of the. time of the meeting that
=
15 was held in your office?
4 16 A I don't know. '
4
-17 Q Could you turn to page 18852, which is 18- dated November 1, 1977, which is!a letter to
't 19 Davis-Besse from the project manager? .
- 20 Do you know whether-the meeting in 21 y ur ffice~ concerning the Davis-Besse event
$( '22 ccurred'after-November.1, 1977_when this document L
3 was apparently sent?
,s :24 A' I am n t~certain of the date at which'the
- I k. meeting-was held in myJoffice, and I can't tell from 25 -
. l ,
l
[;_ , '
1 MacMillan 59 3 -
2 this. letter whether it would have been before or 3 after. '
4 Q Will'you turn to page 18854, which is 5 headed " Sequence of Events."
6 Have you ever seen that document before?
7 A I don't remember seeing that. I don't 8 remember seeing that.
9 Q Will you turn to page 18868, which is 10- en title d " Attachment C1RC Pumps."
11 Did you ever see that before?
12 A I don't remember seeing this before.
13 Q Was the subject of this pag'e reviewed 14 with you either at the meeting in your office or 15 otherwise?
16 A I don't remember the subject of pumps 17 being discussed in the meeting in my office.
18 I do remember the assessment o-f the 19 -impact on primary system components, pressure 20 components being discussed,' and the pilot operated 21 relief valve.
22 Q Would you' turn to page 18846, which is 23 a lctter dated November 7, 1977 to Toledo Edison.
("N 24 Do you know whether any of the people
. (_/
25 who'were marked for copies of that document were
i 1 MacMillan 60 2 at the meeting that was held in your office?
3 A Well, I have said I don i t remember who 4 was at that meeting and I can' t answer that question.
5 Q D y u see on the next page, it says 6 " Attachment B , " and the first paragraph says, 7 "B&W has completed their evaluation of the 8 September 24 incident at Davis-Besse and found no g harmful effects were incurred in the reactor 10 vessel steam generator pressurizer and primary i
- 11 piping pressure boundary."
12 That was a subject of discussion at 13 your meeting, was it not? '
14 A I : recall that being a subject: of 15 discussion at the meeting, yes.
16 Q .Do you know whether the meeti'ng.was 17 held after B&W.had com'leted.its.
p evaluation?
18 A Well, I don't know that specifically, 19 but the purpose of the meeting;was-to review the 20 impact of that transient on the equipment in order 21 to be responsive to the. customer's request for
. (- . 22 inf rmation on the evaluation. So I would presums !
l L 23 :ttat the ovaluation had boen completed, but I am g N- 24 uncertain as toithe specific date of the meeting. -
i (j
25 Q Will y u turn the-page and look at I.
\' j c . , . . . , ,
1 MacMillan 63
(' ~
\_/ 2 item No. 3, which talks about the effect of the 3 change in water level on the pressurizer? j 4 Was there any discussion of that at r 5 your meeting?
6 A I don't remember that specific subject 7 being discussed.
8 Q Out of items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 on those 9 two pages,can you tell us.which, if any, of those
{
10 was discussed at your meeting? ,
11 MR. FISKE: You mean in whole or in 12 part?
13 MR. KLINGSBERG: In whole dr in part.
14 A Well, item 1 is the subject of the 15 effect of.the transient on the thermal transient.
16 oon the pressure boundary components. That subject 17 I recall was discussed.
18 Subject 2 has to do with the fatigue
. 19 . life.of the reactor coolant components. I recall 20 that subject being discussed.
21 Subject --
item 3,'I don't recall.being k 22 discussed.
23 MR. FISKE: Could I hear the beginning 24 - of that answer again?~
c{"}-
7j 25 MR .7 KLINGSBERG: Why don ' t' we get1 the a* Ar- y e , 1 , , -
.w. . , - - r ,,n.. -
,f
- ~ -- ^
- s s
't MacMillan 62
_,1 s 7
(
2
\
wh$le answer? ,
N, s
'~
MR. FISKE: All right,
[
3 ,
t Well, I would like ,to hear what he said 4
5 so far. Could yed read it back, please,
- , x -
6 * . charles?
7, ,
(Record read) g Q You may continue.
9 ,
A On item 4, I didn't recall whether or 10 not that was discussed at tho' meeting.
L
' s 11 -
And I don't recall whether or'not item 5
, 3 12 t was' discussed. ,
13 Q In connection Vith the' disc ~ussion of i =
14 item 2, was there any nention of the fact;which is s .
1 l 15 ,
referred to .ih ' paragraph 2 .that the HPI system was th actuated twice during the event?
A 't . I don't remember discussions of the
, 17
~ -
m 18 adtiIation
.s cf thesHPI system at that meeting.
4 1
, 19 MR. FISKE: You would say, Mr..Klingsberg, 4
20 m.
I didri' t obj ect to the que stion, but you referred
- ( g . g ~ m.
3{ to discussion of the' item, . meaning item 2, and h ' 22 I think what Mr. MacMillan had previously 23 said'was the gubject matter-of the first
'3 , .
s .
.t X) o4a i 4 sentence'of
-, t.he dtem M rsdiscussed. 3' i/ 7, \d ,.
25 - MR. KLINGSBERG: Right..
$ 's f
,s.- g
^
- _ 'b. , - . ,
1 MacMillan 63
~2 Q My question is in connection with that 3 subject matter, was there any mention of HPI having 4 been actuated?
5 A I simply don't remember the details of 6 that discussion.
7 I do remember there was a concern at 8 that time about the fatigue life of the components 9 and whether or not that had been impacted by the 10 sequence of events that took place. And the 11 conclusion was it had not, but what detailed 12 information was discussed in conjunction with the 13 report of that conclusion I simply dont remember.
, Q Do you remember whether in the discussion 15 f the sequence of events which might have affected 16 the fatigue life, there was any mention of 17 - actuation of HPI?
18 A 'I simply don't recall. I don'~t know.-
-19 -Q You knew that there was a failed open 20 pilot' operated relief valve?
1 A Correct.
f 31 k- 22 Q And you knew, .
did'you not,: that
~
23- that-caused the pressure to drop?
24 A Yes.
s._e 2f Q You knew that,that caused the high.
. l 4
)
l 1 MacMillan 64
}"% ~
(_)- 2 pressure injection to actuate?
3 A Now, that is the part where I get a 4 little bit hazy as to just what we did discuss. I 5 can't remember specifically that we talked about 6 that, about that issue.
7 Q Do you know whether you were aware in 8 1977 of the fact that HPI had actuated during the 9 Davis-Besse accident?
10 A In 1977, I don't -- I don't know whether i
11 I was aware of that or not. I have no recollection.
12 Q Turning back a page, page 18847, and
() 13 look.'g at the second paragraph, were y~u o aware or 14 was there any mention at the me.eting in your
.15 office that this was a rapid depressurization
^
16 event?
17 A Well, since the subject of that meeting 18 had to do with the stresses and the pressure.
19 boundary and the potential for impact on fatigue 20 -life, the pressure and temperature history was 21 probably discussed. But I don't have a specific
(- 22 recollection of that, details of that.
23 9 -Did you have an understanding at the
/~N 24 time that if pressure dropped below some certain
'\ .__)
25 - setpoint following a loss of' coolant accident l
1 MacMillan 65 2 such as a stuck open pilot operated relief valve, 3
.that high pressure injection would automatically 4 actuate?
r 5 A I was familiar with the design of the 6 emergency core cooling system and the fact that 7 when pressure dropped below a certain set pressure, 8 the high pressure injection equipment would come 9 on, into operation automatically.
10 Q Now, would you turn to the next page L
11 and look at the last paragraph?
12 was there any mention at the meeting of r
() e ~ 13 the burst rupture disk of the pressurizer quench 14 tank?
15 A I don't recall that subject being 16 discussed. I don't know whether it was o'r was not.
17 Q Was there discussion, skipping down a 18 couple of sentences, of the effect of the -rapid 19 temperature change in the local region of the 20 vessel shell?.
21 A I simply don't recall whether this was
( 22 or was not discussed.
N l 23 Q During the discussion of the Davis-Besse '
24 event in your office, was there any mention of the i (f-w) us .
< l.
25 insulation removal'from the~ steam generator at l
~
l w ,r
1 MacMillan 66 7_ _
(_/ 2 Oconee which you testified about earlier?
3 A No. I don't believe I said the 4 removal of the insulation of the steam generator.
r 5 I said there had been damage to the insulation on 6 the pressurizer at Oconee, and I recall having to 7 do some work to fix that insulation on the 8 pressurizer at Oconee.
9 Now, is your question, did that 10 subject come up at this meeting?
(
11 Q Yes.
f 12 A I don't know.
13 Q Will you turn to the next p' age, which 14 is a letter of October 5th, 1977 from the, project 15 manager of B&W to the Toledo Edison Company?
16 Do you know whether your meet'ing
, 17 in your office followed this October 5th date of 18 this letter? -
19 MR. FISKE: You mean does he know 20 whether it was af ter October 5th?
- 21 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
- (- 22 A Well, again, I am sorry. I don't recall 23 what thefdate of that. meeting was. I could.not --
. g S- 24 I cannot determine.whether it was before or after k_,]
25 this letter.
- w w w - , --
- I 1 MacMillan 67 x- -
2 Q Please look at the second sentence in 3 the first paragraph and tell me if that refreshes 4 your recollection as to whether there was any
. 5 mention at the meeting in your office concerning ,
6 the Davis-Besse event or whether you learned 7 o the rwise that there was steam formation in the 8 reactor coolant system during that event?
g A I am sorry, are you referring to the 10 second paragraph? g 11 MR. FISKE: The second sentence.
4 12 THE WITNESS: Oh, the second sentence.
13 Okay, I read the sentence.
N =
4 14 . Can I have the question repeated, please?
15 MR. KLINGSBERG: Sure.
16 (Question read)
J 17 A This sentence doesn't refresh my 18 memory. I don't recall that subject being discussed.
19 .
.Q I would like to show you now a-document 20 Previously marked as GPU Exhibit 63, which is a 21 memorandum from Mr. Kelly of Plant In tegra tion 22 dated November 1, 1977. (Handing document to the 23 witness.)
./N 24 Have you seen that before?
L)*
25 . When was the first time that you ever
!, 'saw that memorandum?
1 l
I l
1 MacMillan 68 j"))
'\ A I saw that memorandum sometime after 2
3 the Three Mile Island-2 accident for the first 4 time.
I How long after the Three Mile Island-2
( 5 6
Q accident?
j l
7 A I believe this letter was shown to me 8 on the weekend after the accident, which would 9
have been in the time frame of April 1, 1979.
10 Q Was there anybody from Plant t
11 Integration at the meating in your office 12 ~ concerning the Davis-Besse accident?
() 13 A. I don't remember who was at"the 14 meeting in my office, so I can't respond to your 15 question.
16 Q Does this' memorandum refresh,your 17 recollection looking at the distribution ist of 18 any of the people who were at the meeting in your 19 office? -
. 90 A No, it doesn't.
21 Q Do you know if particularly Mr. K arrasch k- 22 was at the meeting in your office?
I
- 23. A I don ' t know whether he was or not. )
i
~ 1 Q I would like to show you a document '
(~v 24 25 marked GPU Exhibit.78, which is a memo from Bert M.
Dunn, manager of ECCS Analysis, to Jim Taylor, ,
1 I
1 MacMillan 69
/
\/ ) ,
2 manager of Iic ensing , dated February 9, 1979.
3 (Handing document to the witness.)
4 When was the first time that you saw 5 this memorandum?
(9 6 A I saw this memorandum for the first time 7 shortly after the Three Mile Island accident, 8 probably that weekend in the April 1, 1979 time 9 frame.
10 Q At about the same time that you saw 11 the Kelly memo?
12 A I believe both of these memos were ys -'
'I s_) 13 brought to my attention at the same t i m'e .
14 Q Looking at the fact that this memo from 15 Dunn to Taylor with copies to various persons,
~
16 does that refresh your recollection as to whether 17 any of those people were at the meeting in your 18 office or whether you had discussed the Da'vis-Besse 19 event in any way, shape or form with any of those 20 people in or about 1977 or 19787 21 ~A No. These letters don't refresh my
- 22 memory.on that subject.
23 -Q I would like to show you the ~ Kelly I
24 deposition taken in this case, page 242 through 7')
N_/
25 244..(Handing transcript to the witness.) l I
1 l' MacMillan 70 1s- -
2 You have testified that there was 3- discussion at the meeting in your office, and 4 indeed, the principal point of the discussion was 5 effects of the Davis-Besse event on equipment;
(/
6 is that correct?
7 A That is correct.
~
8 Q 'Does this refresh your recollection that I.
a 9 ne of the' items of effect on equipment had to do 10 with whether there was any deleterious effect on t
11 the reactor coolant pumps?
12 A No. I don't recall even with this 13 information the discussion of that.
l 14 Q Do you recall'any discussion bf the 15 net positive suction head limits?
16 A I don't recall any discussion ^ relative 1
17 to reactor coolant pumps.
18 Q Does this refresh your recollection that 19 boiling or saturation in the' reactor coolant.
-20 system was considered as a significant event in 21 the disucssions you had concerning Davis-Besse?-
22 A At the meeting that was, held in my 23- office?- -
(~'t 24 Q Yes, or otherwise, at any time prior to
) %) '
^
March of '79.
25
i- 1 MacMillan 71
_q;
~
A /' 2 A I don't recall having any discussions 3 relative to the formation of steam in the reactor 4 coolant system on the September 1977 incident at 5 Davis-Besse prior to March 1979.
{
6 Q having looked at all the things that 7 we have shown you so far this morning, do you have 8 any recollection of any conversation in person, by
(
, 9: telephone or otherwise, with anybody concerning the 10 Davis-Besse event or events in the fall of 1977 11 prior to the Three Mile Island accident other than 12 . the one meeting in your office?
. 13 A My memory is restric'ted to 'that -- having a
14 that one meeting in my office. I don't recall having 15 any other discussions prior to March 1979.
16 Q And aside from the one_ meeting in your 17 office, do you' recall any document or piece of 18 paper which passed your desk which had any reference 19 to the Davis-Besse accident prior to ' March- 1979?
20 A I don't remember any.
l 21 Q Have-you ever gone back and looked 22 through your file of monthly reports to see if 23 -
there'is any reference to the Davis-Besse accident?
- .A 24 A - I have not.
.t_J 25 Q Do you-have a file of monthly. reports?
I
t 1L MacMillan 72
~
2 A I maintain a file of monthly reports, but 3
as I indicated earlier, we periodically clean the 4
4 files out and I don't know whether they go back to
( 3 is77.
Q I douhe ie.
Do you know if those monthly reports 7 were looked at in connection with the request for 8 production of documents in this case?
I A I don't know.
1 9
10 Q Did you make any search of(fi1~es of
?
- 31 documents in connection with any requests for 12 documents in this c,ase?
A 7
- ! 13 Yes. I looked through my ersonal files 14 to determine if there were any documents related to 15 the Three Mile Island accident.
16 Q Was that all you looked for ib your 17 personal files, documents relating to the;Three 18 Mile Island accident?
19 A I think that was the primary-s'ource of i
20- 1"t'r*8t> 7**-
21 Q Was there any.other source of: interest
~
22' that you recall?
23 MR. .FISKE: I am sorry,- I: didn't hear 24 that question.
25 _Q -Was there any other source of, interest- .
.s, . _ = 3- g --c,.-
--9gw-- g# y.,re,y, -,9e,g, p. ay .,.,,,my y. ,w-.,,_p g..-.. ,, g. - ,
1 MacMillan 73 !
2 that you recall? ,
A . Well, after the Three Mile Island accident, 3
4 we did get a request to search our files for information a
5 that dealt with the Three Mile Island accident, and 6 I looked through my own personal files..
7 Q Right.
g A And I instructed my secretary to look 9 through my office files for that type of information.
10 And it was identified and made available.
t 11 Q After this lawsuit was filed, which 12 was about a year after the accident, were you asked 13 to make a further search of your person'al files? e i-14 A I don't remember whether I was or not.
15 Q What do your personal files, insofar 4
16 as they relate to your Babcock & Wilcox b'siness, u
17 obviously, consist of?
18 A I have a file of the salary of the 19 people that work for me. I have a file of-the 20 personal history of the people that work for me.
21 I keep files of financial and technical information
' 22' that is current, energy information, energy supply 23 and demand, what I' call a personal file, which are
24 letters'to me. personally, certificates that Ilmight
. %.,1 25 have been awarded, things of that sort.
-- ~. .. . - _. -- -
i l
. l 1 MacMillan 74 1
2 Q Is there anything in your personal files 3
relating to safety matters? s 4 A I don't think -- I don't have a specific 5 Personal file that says " Safety" on it.
6 Q Would there be anything in your 7 Personal files pertaining to accidents or incidents 8 at B&W plants?
9 A No, I have nothing of that sort.
10 Q You say there are some technical
(
11 documents in your personal files.
j 12 Do they go back at all before the
( 13 accident?
14 A I would have to look and see.,' I don't 15 know. I do know I looked through those at the time 16 that the request came to identify Three Mlle Island l 17 documentation.
i
- 18 Q Do you have any documents pertaining l !
l 19 to sales or marketing matters? .-
l l
20 A Yes.
l i
l 21 Q Did those documents refer in any
(- 22 respect to features of your nuclear steam supply 23- system such as the once-through generator system?
- r' 24 A I would have to look specifically.
%/-
25 In general, the files on sales and i
1 MacMillan 75 2 marketing are more related to energy forecasts and 3 the requirements for additional new capacity and 4 cost information rather than the technical features
~5 f ur product. l l
I 6 Q Do you have any docu,ments pertaining l
}
f to any criticisms or complaints about the once-8 through generator steam supply system?
i g A I don't recall that I do.
i 10 MR. KLINGSBERG: Would this be a l t i 11 convenient time to break for lunch?
4 t
12 MR. FISKE: Sure.
13 MR. KLIdGSBERG: Two o' clock?
- 14 MR. FISKE
- Fine.
4 15 (Luncheon recess taken at 12:35 p.m.)
16 17 18 -
19 -
20 4
21 22 23 24 25 i
1 76 (O/ 2 Afternoon Session 2:20 o' clock p.m.
3 4
5 JOHN HENRY MacM ILLA N, resumed:
r _
6 BY MR. KLINGSBERG:
7 Q I would like to show you Exhibit 254 8 previously marked, GPU Exhibit 254, which is a 9 memorandum from J.H. Taylor, manager of Licen sing ,
10 to J.H. MacMillan, vice president of Nuclear Power t
~
11 Generation Division, dated February 10, 1978.
12 (Handing document to the witness.)
.; 13 A Yes. -
14 Q Can you identify Exhibit 254,;GPU Exhibit 15 254 as a memorandum that you received from Mr.
16 Taylor in the regular course of business on or 17 about February 10th, 1978?
18 A The letter certainly appears to be when
, 19 'it was sent to me, and I have to assume'th,at I saw 20 it.
L ,
21 I. don't recall-specifically having read
(
22 the letter.
23 Q Did y u at some point in time request
~3 g4 an explanation as to why the safety concern dealing
( )
25 with the oncesthrough steam generator water level 5- .__ _ _ , .. . - - ...
1 MacMillan 77
- y) ' 2 operating procedures, which was discovered on the ,
3 Toledo Edison plant, was not passed on to TMI-1 more 4 promptly?
5 A I would judge from the first sentence 6 of Mr. Taylor's letter that I made an inquiry to 7 that effect, yes.
8 Q Did you make that inquiry personally, g by telephone, written request, or what?
10 A I don't know.
(
11 Q Do you have any recollection at all of 12 the entire event or affair, or whatever you want to 13 -call it? -
14 A I don't have any recollection;of this 15 particular event.
16 Q Let me show you GPU Exhibit 259,~which 17 is.a memorandum from Taylor to you, dated February 2nd, 18 1978. (Handing document to the witness.).
19 MR. FISKE: Is'there a question?
20 Q Are you finished?
21 A I am finished, yes.
k 22 Q Do you recognize this document, GPU 23 Exhibit 259, as a memorandum which you. received in
.n4 thel regular course of your duties at Babcock & Wilcox i-
~~
- 25 in r about February _1978?_
1 MacMillan 78
(~) ~
(-) 2 A The letter from Mr. Taylor is addressed 3
to me and addresses a substantial safety hazards 4 report, and I am sure it was brought to my 5 atten tion .
<E 6 Q Was it part of the procedures in this 7 period of time for substantial safety hazards 8 reports to be sent to you?
9 A Yes.
10 Q And --
t 11 A I would like to qualify that by saying 12 it is part of the procedure that when the 13 evaluation of a potential safety concern reached 14 the point of a decision that it was a substantial 15 safety hazard, then it would come to me.
16 0 Yes.
17 A And I had 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> in which to either la satisfy myself that the thing, the concern had been 19 reported to the NRC or reported it myself..
I 20 Q And what did you do in this case?
21 A I d n't remember specifically what I did
\. 22 in this case.
23 Q Do you recall what the origin was of this l
24 safety concern?
(/ A Well, after reading these two memos, 25 ar-,w e = ~ = . ---
c - -w. r m- = 9 T
-1 MacMillan 79
' O
(_). 2 GPU No. 259 and GPU 234, I vaguely recall that we 3
did have a problem in which one assumption had been 1~
4 made, but relative to water level in a generator 5 during 1 ss or steamline break, and the procedures 6 called for a different level to be maintained to 7 keep the nozzle submerged.
g Now that I have read these two memos, 9 I also remember wondering at the time when this
~
10 was originally reported in June of 1977 by Davis-t gg Besse,and it was not reported to me as a 12 significant or substantial safety hazard on
) 13 TMI until February 1978,asking where ha's this 14 been, why has it taken so long to resolve.
15 I don't remember whether that was a
~
16 verbal request or not, but Taylor's letter of 17 February 10 th', GPU Exhibit 254, clearly was a 18 response to that inquiry on my part. -
49 Q Now, you say there was.one assumption
- 20 during steamline break.-
21 Do you mean by that that there was one
(- 22 assumption in the safety analyses which Babcock &
- n. Wilcox had done in regard to its '77 line of once-
.gN 24 through steam generators?
-d 25 T"" "IT""888 L** "* "*k* ""r* I
s.
e 1 MacMillan 80 2- understood that.
3 Will y u read that back, please?
4 (Question read) 5 A The assumption was a part of the safety 6 analysis for a steamline break accident as 7 applicable to our 177 fuel assembly plants, some g of our 177 fuel assembly plants.
9 Q What was the nature of that assumption?
, 10 A Without knowing the details, basically it it assumed we had a fairly low water level in the 12- secondary side of the steam generator during low 13 power operation. '
' 14 12 What was the inconsiste nt proyision 15 .in the ~ Toledo Edison-procedures?
16 A Depending heavily upon the in' formation 17 contained in GPU-Exhibit 259, the procedures called
. 18 for a flooding of the feedwater nozzles which t-19 would mean a high water level under conditions j 20' of power less than-five percent.
21 12 What was the reason that Babcock &
(i . 22. LWilcox thought it was necessary to pursue this 23 - as a substantial safety hazard problem?
3 r- A .The requirements of the-start-up and 24
. v 25 shutdown procedures at Davis-Besse prior .to: June 3rd, i
e
% 4 - s- e , .e:e: ,. - - e-nvw.>- 4 ~.,s,,w,-wn .an.-e.-,-,.,m,.m,, , , - - . ,,,y v e s , e, ,ae y, 7ge m,,,,g-. -
1 MacMillan 81 2 1977 were not consistent with the assumptions 3 which had bee'n made in the safety analysis of the 4 steamline break accident.
5 Q Which was correct, the analysis, safety 6 analysis,or the procedures?
7 A I don't believe it is a matter of which 8 was correct. It was the fact that there was an 9 inconsistency between the two.
10 Q Well, isn't it a fact that he high 11 water level at five percent power, which was in 12 the procedures, was considered to be a safety 13 hazard? '
14 A It was considered to be a safety 15 hazard in the context that that high' level was 16 inconsistent with the assumptions that had been 17 made in the safety analyses, and it was the 18 inconsistency that was of concern here. -
19 Q Did you decide to change the safety 20 analysis or to-change the procedure?
21 MR. FISKE: Just so we can maybe' move 22 this along, I am not sure whether Mr.
23 MacMillan has a recollection of any'of this 24 or whether he is just,.you know, reading off.
25 the documents.
s' u
1 MacMillan 82 2 I think this has already been established 3
in ther depositions as to what happened, 4 but, I mean, I have no objection to your asking 5 him. But if all he is doing is reading from 6 the document and reading something off the 7 document --
8 MR. KLINGSBERG: He said he had a vague g recollection of the event and was involved 10 in it. There is always a hard line between t
11 what is refreshing recollection and what 12 comes into your mind when you read a document.
() 13 A The answer to your specific' question is 14 I don't remember whether we changed the analysds 15 or we changed the procedure. The resolution of 16 this would have been to make the two cons' istent, 17 and I don't remember which way we went.
18 Q If you continued operating under a 19 Procedure which was inconsistent with the safety 20 analysis,that would mean in effect that B&W and the 21 utility wouldn't know the consequences of,a k 22 steamline break operating under those procedures; 23 is that correct?
24 THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that, 25 Please?
l 1 MacMillan 83
.p
-(,). 2 (Question. read) ,
A Sin e the analysis was not made at a 3
4 water level consistent with the operating r 5 procedures, then until the analysis was performed, 6 it would only be a judgment as to what the effect 7 would be.
g Q Were you aware of the effect as 1
g indicated in the attachment to GPU Exhibit 259, 10 which is the memorandum to you dated February 2nd, t.
11 1978, the attachment being the preliminary report 4
12 of safety concern dated June 3rd, 1977, that as 13 it states in the.last line of the second paragraph, 14 "This condition has not been analyzed. TMI has 15 perated since the initial start-up with the
~
16 nozzle flooded up to five percent power"?
. 17 A I have not seen the -- previously see'n 18 the preliminary report of safety concerns.-
- .19 Q When you asked Mr. Taylor for an 20 -explanation in' February 1978 as to why the safety 21 concern had not been passed on to TMI-1 more (J 22 promptly, had you been aware of the fact that TMI 23 was operating for several years with the nozzles g- 24 fl ded inconsistently with your safety analysis?
Q.,1 :
25 A' I don't remember what I understood at Tr M *ww- g s'ew'a ws.y. 7 w-up gem -
yr- -.y,.
l I
i I
l 1 MacMillan 84 j I
- p. -
1
d 2 that time.
My inquiry to Taylor was related to the 3
4 fact that the preliminary safety concern for TMI 5
was reported to me in February 1978. ,
6 Q Yes.
7 A On a problem that was initially identified 8 in June of 1977.
9 I was really asking him why has this 10 taken so long to resolve?
L gg Q In Taylor's. memo, he reporth to you, 12 does he not, that on June 3rd, 1977, a preliminary w
revised operating procedure was sent to Toledo
. V) I3 14 Edison? Do you see that?
15 MR. FISKE: (Indicating).
16 A That is what the memo says, yes.
g7 Q Did you regard it as part of your gg obligations in dealing with substantial safety
.gg hazards or preliminary safety concerns to prepar,e
-20 and send to the utility revised operating procedures 21 where that was warranted?
( 22 A As a part of the preliminary safety 23 e neern procedure, there is a step which requires y cross-contract applicability to be established and u
(_
25 the appropriate actions taken on other plants that
. .-. -- =. . . - . __ .
1- MacMillan 85 2 -would.be affected by the same concern.
I 3 Q Did you ever establish to your i
4 ' satisfaction any reason why Three Mile Island
? -
5 perators were not either given the revised 6 procedures or advised of the safety concern which 7 had been known since at least June 19777 J-8 THE WITNESS: Can I hear that question 9 89ain, please?
10 (Question read) E l
4 ,
i '
l 11 A I have no recollection of having '
12 resolved that issue beyond what I am reminded j 13 is reported in this memo from Taylor to~me, 5
14 dated February 19, 1978 (indicating). ,
i
! 15 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark 16 as-GPU exhibit next in order, a fl e t'ter from 17 -James Taylor,: manager of Licensing, . to Karl i '-
i 'S eyf rit, chief of the Reactor Technical 18 19 Assistance Branch of.the NRC, together with-f
. 20 an attached report on start-up and. shutdown' 21 procedures-for steam generators with seal
) (' 22 welded'feedwater nozzles, bearing the date of
-23 February 7,.1978.
24 (Letter' fr m James Taylor to' Karl Seyfrit, 25 with attached report on start-up and shutdown eg - % .r .m y yw,- - + y- ,-w. *y+, _%+ -
9 . -,%-w e.+v-g
1 MacMillan 86
\ ,
2 Procedures for steam generators with seal 3
"*1d*d feedwater nozzles, bearing date of 4 February 7, 1978 marked GPU Exhibit 528 for 5 identification, as of this date.)
6 (Handing document to the witness.)
7 Q Do you recognize Exhibit 528 as a copy 8 of the report which was made to the Nuclear g Regulatory Commission concerning the safety concern 10 that we have been discussing relating to the level t
11 in the steam generator?
12 A Well, I have read this letter and it is 13 a letter to thga NRC, and it is advising- the NRC 14 that Metropolitan Edison had reported on February 2nd --
15 Q Right.
16 A -- the existence of this significant 17 safety hazard. And beyond that, B&W had evaluated 18 this safety concern as applicable to other units with 19 seal welded steam gererator feedwater nozzles, and 20 had determined that no reportable safety concern 21 existed on those other plants.
( 22 Q Does this refresh your recollection 23 that after receiving Mr. Taylor's report, you did
,7 24 make a determination that.this was, indeed, a I i s ~'/ '
25 sub s tan tial safety hazard which had to be reported e# ._ y y. ,e-. -.
1 1 MacMillan 87 s, - l
' (~).
~
%/. 2 to the NRC under 10CFR 217 1 3-A Yes. s
(
4 Q And also that this was a substantial 5 safety hazard as defined in your own procedures 6 which we have reviewed this morning?
7 A Yes.
8 Q Did you see or approve of or pass on g Exhibit 528 before it went to the NRC?
10- A Exhibit 528 was not the letter which 1
11 was responsive to the substantial safety concern 12 'which was identified in GPU Exhibit 259.
Q Yes. -
13 Q 14 A The resolution,or the reporting rather, 15 of that significant safety hazard was accomplished 16 ,by Metropolitan Edison.
17 Q Right.
18 A After we had brought this condition 19 to their attention. .
20 Q And --
21 A And that apparently was reported again
(; 22 judging f rom Taylor's letter --
23 Q Yes.
24 A --
to-the NRC. It was apparently 25' reported on' February 2nd.
- , , - - v-w,,- , , , - m -c,y,- , - - ,- ,,-e ,- . - , - -- , -
l l
1 l
1 MacMillan 88 l r%g *
- k- 2 Excuse me.
3 .Yes, on February 2nd, by' Metropolitan 4 Edison.
( .
5 6
Q Do you know why Taylor or Babcock &
Wilcox did not advise the NRC that this matter 7 had been known to B&W as early as June 19777 8 A I don't know what information B&W g submitted to the NRC.
10 The letter which Mr. Taylor gwrote 11 identified the fact that this concern was first i'
12 discovered in June, on June 3rd, 1977.
.-(_f") - 13 Q Were you satisfied with Tap'lo r ' s report 14 in GPU Exhibit 254, or did you feel that further 15 . explanation was required?
+.
16 A I don't recall what my response or 17- reaction was to that, whether I felt satisfied 18 or not. -
19 Q Did you feel it was important to 20 determine who in the company was guilty of the 21 omission which led to the failure to advise the (J 22 - TMI operators earlier?
23 A I don't remember what my reaction was f's 24 - at that point.
ve 25 Q What, if any steps, did you require be a
v 'T' -r- = m v-m.v en*&* 'er---y * *gr
- w T *F' 1ep 7e-
- wW- e
1 MacMillan 89
/]
(-- 2 implemented in order to avoid this kind of delay in 3
reporting of safety hazards to utilities from 4 occurring again?
5 MR. FISKE: You mean in addition to the 6 things that Mr. Taylor referred to in this 7 memo? -
8 MR. KLINGSBERG: No.
9 In addition to or including.
10 A I have no recollection of..t king any 11 steps beyond raising the question with Taylor and i
12 having his, response that he was going to implement O)
( 13 steps to assure quicker action in the' future. I 14 don't remember anything that I did beyond: making 15 that inquiry.
16 Q Were you aware that the safety hazard 1
17 which could result from operating under the old
.8 procedures was that during a steamline break, there 19 is= overcooling of the reactor coolant system which 20 can cause ,the reactor power to increase unless it r
21 is tripped, and that if you have a high water level 22 at five percent power in the case of a steamline 23 break, you could get a power excursion to a degree
(~h 24 that is unknown?
O 25 MR. FISKE: Do you.want to hear that
, p.--.,. . - -- ,__ -, , , , - - ,- r- n , ,-
S- l
, g/
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1 MacMillan '
'90 4 s ,
l
.~ ' 4-
, i s s ,s f( )N. 2- question again? ,
s, .
- x 3
e
,Ti{E WIT, NESS : Yes. ,
s -
What\ was , t'hv f ' ront 'eSd of that question?
A s 4
- a N. ,; '
.c .
)i A 5 '\ (Question-read) s
, 9 '
, I6' ' A Well, I was aware bksed on my years i
\\\
T h\ of engineering experience in the nuclear business
,. s ,s.'. )
, ',T g ] shat if'yoh had a high water' level in the secondary p ', i'.s
,\ . .
_y i g
\
s.
t 4 19'- siide ' cf hkd steam 'g'ener3 tor and' a subsequest steamline s
s.
'N .., (s sf I ,,'., ' 10 break, bhat 'you could -- you would evaporate more s n s - t
. ' "s \ g s .
- i
, N % i ~~
11
- water, and therefore cool the reactor,bo'olant to *s N
't 12 a higher degree than yduEnduld if you had a low i
s' ,
s
\ T2O 13 water level, and the net e'f f e c t o f' that~ would be '.
w
'- to increase reactor power.
14 .So in generalsI i
%g -
, s
, N 5 ,, ' 15 understood-those were the ramifications of this 16 inconsistency between the operating procedure and L 3 h 17' the safety analysis. ( . ,
- 18 ' Q And what did yo,u understand could be
.t 5
i< >
3
.J hg ' the results of this inc rcs'a s e in reactor power? ,
,, s i .( .
4 .
- , 20 A I -had n basis for making that js- s
, s c.s , ,,
)
, 3
, .jp , (\ evaluation. ,-
y w r h7, 22 ' Q\ 9'? y u have an-understanding that it- a
? - 's n
' could be potentially seerious?
'23 ,
,, .y a
s - .s r s . , l '.,p- ,
'3 A It is h'ird for'me to discriminate
{q; .,
-.p- 24-a %
N m s b'etween~what I might.have thought at that' time and
- ' 25
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1 MacMillan 91
'\ / 2 what I know today, but I think in general this is 3
something that I would have considered to be alarming.
4 , The difficulty was that we had a 5 disconnect or an inconsistency between what we had 6 in our safety analysis and what we had in our 7 operating procedures,and we needed to resolve that 8 disconnect.
9 I don't think, and I wouldn't today 10 consider this to be something that was approaching t
11 a major safety issue.
12 Q Did you get excited or upset about the 13 fact that TMI had been allowed to operate for some 14 substantial period of time with procedures that 15 were inconsistent with the safety analysis?
g MR. FISKE: I am going to object to I the form of the question.
17 18 I don't know that there is any evidence 19 to support the predicate. .
20 A My primary concern, as I recall it, 21 was that it took us from June of '77 to February
(- 22 of 78 to resolve this safety concern as it 23 applied to TMI-1, and that was the question e- '
24 which I raised with Taylor and asked him to look
\_J- .
into that, and apparently asked him-to look into 25
, ,..,e v --m+- m-e* y v'" =
1 MacMillan 92 2 that and reassure me that we were going to take 3
steps to avoid that in the future. -
4 Q Did you' follow up to see whether the 5 steps Taplor said he was going to take were 6 actually taken? ,
7 A I don't recall what follow-up action I 8 took.
9 Q Did you inquire of Taylor or take any 10 steps to be sure that in regard to any preexisting t
11 safety hazards or safety concerns that the 12 Licensing Department was taking appropriate action
() 13 to notify other utilities that might be'affected?
14 A I don ' t recall what kind of follow-up 15 action or line of questioning I had with Mr. Taylor.
I don't know.
- 16 17 Q Did you have any --
18 A I don't recall. .-
19 Q Did you have any concern that if this 20 had happened, this omission occurred and a delay 21 ccurred in regard to this one incident, that there
- (- 22 might be otherfthings lurking in the" company which 23 were being similarly delayed?
I A No, I don't recall specifically what p/
i 24 25 my concerns were at this time. I think having asked t ,
O 4
1 -MacMillan 93 s -
9 that what had taken s6 long in this particular case 3 demonstrates a concern about whether we were in a 4 ' timely way, we were e volving some of these or :
5 completing the evaluation of some of these i 6 preliminary safety concerns.
7 Q In connection with your discussions 8 with Taylor of this matter relating to Davis-Besse, 9 did you have any discussion with him or was there 10 any mention of whether there were any s fety 4 11 , concerns which should be reported growing out of 12 the fall 1977 Davis-Besse events?
13 A I don't recall having any d'iscussion with 14 Mr. Taylor on that. l 15 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to have a
16 marked as GPU Exhibit 529, a letter'from 17 James H. Taylor to the Nuclear Regulatory 18 Commission dated April 14, 1978, indicating a
19 a blind copy to J.H. MacMillan. -
20 (Letter from James H. Taylor to the
- 21. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated April 14,
- k. 22 1978, indicating blind copy to J.H. MacMillan 23 marked GPU Exhibit 529 for identification,
' ('T 24 as of this date.)
'%l (Handing document to the witness.)
25
~
1 MacMillan 94 2 MR. FISKE: Is this the complete ,
3 document?
4 Cff the record.
5 ~(Dig..ussion off the record)
~
6 BY MR. KLINGSBERG:
7 Q I invite you, also in connection with 8 this, to look at GPU Exhibit 90, which is a memo o from Taylor dated April 12, 1978, and contains the 10 preliminary report of safety concerns.
11 (Handing document to the witness.)
12 A I have read it.
13 Q In regard to Exhibit 529, ihich we 14 have just marked, did you receive a copy in the 15 regular course of your duties from Mr. Taylor in 16~ or about April 1978 of his letter to the NRC 17 pertaining to this safety concern?
18 A I am marked for a blind copy of that 19 letter, and therefore I presume that I was --
20 received a copy. However, I dornot recall 21 specifically receiving it.
32 Q' As part of your duties, it was, or was
. 23 . it not, under.the policies and procedures to review q 24 these' reports and to indicate time-and date of 25 your receipt and sign a cover memo?
O h -
a _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___._i____--_--------
l 1 MacMillan 95 e
N- -
2 A That is correct.
3 Q Did y u d that in the case of this 4 report?
5 A I d n't know.
6 Q Looking at Exhibit 259, which I showed 7 you earlier, and we have that here, if you look at 8 the second page, there is a place for time, date 9 and signature of yourself as vice president of 10 NPGD; is that correct?
g 11 A Yes.
12 Q Was there some place where the copies
.3 that you received, looked at and signed'and dated 14 were retained by the company? ,'
15 A I don't know the specifics of that.
16 I would expect to find them in our licensing files.
17 Q Did you ever have occasion to call for 18 a prior 10TFR 21 report which you had signed and 19 initialed -- signed And dated? -
20 A Sometime after I had initially signed i
21 them?
22 Q Yes.
23 A I don't recall tha t .I had.
~
24 Q When did you first become aware of this v
25 safety concern that is described in Exhibit 529
1 MacMillan 96 2 and Exhibit 90?
A I d n't remember specifically.
3 4 I do recall that I was aware that we had 5 this potential safety concern, but I could not 6 identify specifically when I became aware of that 7 for the first time.
g Q Was it prior to the time that you g received the 10CFR 21 report for your date, time i
10 and signature that you had been informed about 9 .
11 it in any respect?
12 A I have a very difficult time recalling
( 13 specifically when I was first made aware of this A
14 problem versus when I may have signed a significant 15 safety hazard report. I know that I was aware of 16 the problem. *-
17 Q Did it ever come to your attention that 18 Mr. Dunn had or his group had a reasonable indication 19 of this problem as early as April 1977, a year 20 bef re,the report to the NRC resulting from their 37 work on 205 plants?
(. 22 A I don't believe I was aware of that. .
23 Q Do you know a Mr. Cobb?
3 A W.A. Cobb?
24 Q Yes, 25 f
. 1 MacMillan 97 s
ll-)
(,,/ . 2 A Yes.
- 3 Q. A1.Cobb?
4 A Al Cobb.
5 Q What was his position or responsibility 6_ at this time?
7 A I would want to check that, but he has 8 been in the project management organization for 9 some number of years, and I would expect at this l 1
l
, 10 time he was part of the Project' Management t
11 Department.
12 Q This concern affected operating plants,
( 13 did it not? -
l 14 A The concern reported by Tay' lor in his ,
I 15 letter of April 14th specifically affected the 16 177 fuel assembly plants with the lowe re d'- loop 17 design.
18 Q And -- .
19 A These are numerated in his-att_achment.
20 .Q Can you state what your. understanding 21 was, briefly, of the basis of the concern?
- ( 22 -A The primary or the principal concern 23 - here wasithe assumed location of the small~ break
- in.the reactor coolant' system on.the basis of
. 24:
m_, .
25- -earlier calculations.'It appeared that the.most s
- r--d.+ .-. ma he w w.g-e.- *'4 'g-w re ' 4 - - g- .e py g 77- - - . ,gWWd *D" e'-'CT' N"' F *'-
- '/T jy y- t' -**--r'yy'+'CT-T --'-
F' 'Wr-* e4e*'
l 1 MacMillan 98 l
,s ,/. 2 sensitive location would be between the steam 3
generator and the pump suction. -
4 Q Yes.
5 A In subsequent calculations, it was 6 determined that for those cases where.' low pressure 7 injection and core flood tanks were not activated, 8 where the pressure did not drop to the point 9 where they became effective, that the critical 10 location was not the reactor coolant but between
- t 11 the point at which high pressure injection enters 12 the pipe and the reactor vessel.
) 13 Q Was that called the pump di'scharge?
14 A That is in the pump discharge:line, yes.
15 Q Could you indicate on the chart 4
16 attached to Exhibit 529 where those two areas are 17 or --
18 A They are shown schematically on figure 1, 19 _ one identified as suction break (indicating).
20 Q Yes.
A That is the location that we felt 21
(- 22 originally based on our earlier calculations and 23 sensitive analysis would be the most critical 1 cation.
(~h 24
\)
' 25 ' Q Right.
" + E* --y- m-T + - w+ n+d v + ten-
- em w e w y a ee- '
-- *,w*%- gP'D
1 MacMillan 99 2 A The one labeled "Disebarge break" is the 3 1 cation that we subsequently determined to be a 4 more sensitive location as reported in this 5 submittal to the NRC.
6 Q What was the effect, potential effect 7 from a safety point of view of operating on the 8 premises that the most serious break would be at the 9 pump suction rather than the pumping discharge?
10 A The safety analyses that were made
(
11 based on the break occurring at the suction 12 confirmed that loss of coolant accident. We were 13 able to meet the'NRC requirements of a taximum 14 cladding temperature in the reactor-core not 15 to exceed -- I don't remember whether it was 22 16 or 2,300 degrees Fahrenheit.
17 What we found was that for a small 18 break in which the loss of coolant was not sufficient 19 to lower the pressure to the point where you got 20- low pressure injection and core flood tank, that the 21 discharge break was more critical and that in that
(- 22 circumstance we could not demonstrate that we would 23 conform to the maximum cladding temperature of 24 2,200 or 2,300 degrees Fahrenheit required by NRC 25 requiremen ts --
regulations.
1 MacMillan 100 7S .
~(_) 2 Q When you mentioned those breaks that 3
d n't activate low pressure injection or core 4 flood tanks, you mean breaks that depend only on 5 the high pressure injection system?
6 A That is correct.
7 Q And was there a potential as a result 8 of the error in the analysis for core uncovery, in l
9 fact, to below four feet?
10 A I don't know what the --
I don't know
(
11 what the --
whether there would be core uncovery 12 or not.
b
(_j Q, Was it your practice in connection with
~
14 your work on these 10 CFR 21 reports to 1ook at 15 the preliminary report of safety concerns as well 16 as the report to the NRC to get a complete 17 picture of what it was about?
18 A Are you asking did I look at the 19 preliminary safety concern report?
20 Q Yes.
21 A As a matter of practice?
( 22 Q Yes.
23 A I d n't think it was a standard 24 practice. I would look at the report that was
'% ,)-
~
25 submitted to me, notifying me of the significant
1 MacMillan 101
/~%
(_) 2 safety concern and the one which you have previously 3 said I needed to sign and date and time.
4 Q Would you look here at Exhibit 90, in
! 5 the third page which is the preliminary report 6 of safety concern from R.C. Jones, Jr., particularly 7 the part that says, "For small breaks at the pump 8 discharge on the 177-FA Lowered Loop Plants 9 (identified acove), the HPI pumps are inadequate 10 to control the accident to the criteria of L.
11 CFR 50.46. The, analysis performed for a 0.04-ft2 12 break at the pump discharge shows core uncovery
) 13 starting at 1700 seconds."
, 14 Did you have an understanding of that 15 at the time you were functioning on the report
^
16 to the NRC?
17 A I don't know whether I had a knowledge
-18 of that or not. I do know I_had a knowledge that 19 in this set of conservative assumptions for the 20 loss of coolant accident, that we could not 21 conform to the requirements of 10CFR 50.46.
. 22 Q What were the requirements or what was 23 the nature of the requirements of 10CFR 50.467
/
24 A That is the one that says you must, in NJ 25 a loss of coolant accident, maintain maximum
1 RacMillan 102 V 2 cladding temperatures below 22 or 2,300 degrees.
3 Judging from the information her'e, it'is 2,200.
4 Q What happens or what can happen if 5 you don't maintain that temperature?
6 A You are out of conformation with the NRC regulation.
o Q What happens from a practical matter?
9 A That depends on how far over the 2,200 10 degree Fahrenheit level you rise. g 11 Q What are the possibilities?
12 A You can have rapid oxidation of the 13 cladding, ultimately leading to a failuie of the 14 cladding and formation of hydrogen in the' process 15 of deoxidation.
16 Q That is quite serious, is it dot?
17 A Well, that is a very general comment,
~
r 18 "very serious." It is certainly something~you 19 would want to avoid in the normal operation of 20 ~ the unit, yes.
21 Q What was it that led you to conclude
. 22 that this situation was reportable under 10CFR-21?
23 A The original safety _ analyses that were 24 ;done for the plants identified --
25 Q' Yes.
= .i r
1 MacMillan 103
. 2 A --had been done on the basis of a loss 3 of coolant accident small break at the suc tion side.
4 Q Yes.
5 A some additional analyses were made, which 6 indicated that that was not the wors t case, that 7 you could, in fact, have higher cladding temperatures 8 if you had the break on the discharge side of the 9 pump. And that the knowledge of those results 10 was a basis on which we had to report t at we did 11 not have the most conservative conditions reported 12 - in the safety analysis report and therefore we 13 were not in conformance with 10C3R 5 0 . 4 '6 , and that 14 was a reportable safety concern.
15 Q What did you have to do to come into
^
16 conformance?
17 A Well, we looked at a number of things, 18 and if my memory serves me correctly, the'first thing 19 we did was to modify some operating procedures to 20 instruct the operators to open cross-connect
- 21 valves between the two high pressure injection 22 _ lines in order to be sure of getting enough high 23 pressure injection flow into the reactor.
24 -Q Yes.
25 A subsequent to'that, again if my memory.
J 1 MacMillan 104 p~h .
(-) 2 serves me correctly, we did, in fact, make some 3
m difications in the high pressure injection system 4 which would accomplish that objective without the r 5 necessity of operator action. We looked at a 6 number of other alternatives. But to my rec 611ection, 7 that is what we did.
8 -Q You are aware of the fact, are you not, g that 50.46 requires that B&W make analyses for 10 different sizes, locations and other properties t
11 sufficient to provide assurance that the entire -
12 spectrum of postulated loss of coolant accidents ;
13 is covered?
14 MR. FISKE: Is that a quote? '
15 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
16 MR. FISKE: Can we hear it again, 17 Charlie, please?
18 (Record read) -
19 A I know that the licensee on a nuclear L 20 plant is required to make those_ calculations and 21 report those results. The licensee is the utility
(-
~
-22 and normally the utility in that particular loss 23 of coolant accident analysis would depend upon the
-/ ' 'N 24 supplier of the. nuclear steam system to perform e i
! k 25 those analyses.
r - - -
1 MacMillan 105 2 Q And if the supplier determines, as you 3
did here, that the prior analyses did not cover 4 an adequate spectrum of break sizes and locations, 5 then that would be reportable under 10CRF 21;.is 6 that correct?
7 A That is my understanding, yes.
8 Q Were you ever made aware of the fact g that Cobb in his capacity in project management 10 had in 1977 refused to provide funds for the t
11 analysis which Dunn had indicated he thought should 12 be done, should be made?
13 MR. FISKE: I think I will' object to
~
14 the form of the question. , ,
15 You can answer it.
~
16 A I was not aware of that.
17 Q That never was brought to you attention?
18 A No. .-
19 Q Not to this day? -
20 A That is the first time.I had heard that, 21 as I recall'.
h 22 Q I would like to show you pages 698 and 23 699 of Dunn's testimony (handing transcript to the witness).
Q.
\.J 24
~
25 Line 15 -- I will start'with the question,
' r:
1 MacMillan 106 1 1
,~ -
s/ 2 line 12. " Question: All I can do is work with 3 you and what you understood. All I can ask for is 4
4 your recollection, your impressions."
f 5 That is referring back to the question, 6 "What resistance had you experienced within B&W 7 to raising safety issues prior to the Three Mile 8 Island accident?"
9 Then at line 18, he says, "The relative 10 nature of this, in the case of the pump discharge 11 break, obtaining the funds necessary to examine 12- the situation was somewhat difficult."
13 And then on page 699, "From'whom had 14 you had difficulty getting the funds for the pump 15 discharge work?"
16 " Answer: In that particular case , we 1 17 secured funds from the generic project team.
l 18 " Question: From whom had you trouble 19 getting funds? -
20 "The individual was Mr. Al Cobb.
21 "What was Cobb's position?
22 "What position did he take in resisting 23 giving y u the funds?
i(-i 24 " Answer: That we_had an HRC reviewed
- 25 license 'for these plants."
, w
1 MacMillan 107
./\ Gl N/ 2 Was that situation ever brought to your 3 attention before today?
4 A I don't recall it ever being brought to 5 my attention.
6 Q Was it ever brought to your attention 7 that there was.any undue delay in the communication 8 of this safety concern or hazard to the NRC?
9 A That was not broughE .to Wy attention, 10 to my recollection. t 11 MR. KLINGSBERG: I am going to turn to 12 another subject. I think we have two choices, ,
(^^ ~
13 one is to move to another conference room which 14 people want us to do, which would take us about i
15 ten minutes during a break, and then we can I
16 go to about 4:30, a quarter to five$orwe can 17 go straight through-until they throw us out.
18 I guess we better take a short' break.
19 MR. FISKE: Yes.
~
20 (Recess taken) 21 MR. FISKE: I would just like to have
-22 the' record note that we believe that there 23 were other portions of Mr. Dunn's testimony
./~T 24 concerning'the funding request to Mr. Cobb L,1 -
25 .and-Mr.-Cobb's action with respect to those
, . , , . . *m-P
1 MacMillan 108 es 2 requests that need to be read in order to 3 Present that picture accurately. And Mr.
4 Klingsberg did not read them in his questions he 5 put to Mr. MacMillan. Since Mr. MacMillan said he 6 was unaware of the entire situation,I don't see any 7 reason to read them at this point, but we would 8 insist that if this question and that. line 9 of questions and answers is going to be used 10 in the trial of this case, that t(he full Dunn 11 testimony on this subject be inserted.at that 12 time.
13 MR. KLINGSBERG: As I unde [ stand it, you 14 are not suggesting that there is any problem 15 with the question and the answer so long as 16 the rest of the testimony is insertsd?
17 MR. FISKE: Yes. ,
18 Your question -- -
- 19. MR. KLINGSBERG: You are not insisting 20 that I do that.now?
21 MR. FISKE: No. Your question to Mr.
22 MacMillan was was he aware that Mr. Cobb 23 refused.to make funds available,'and he said O 24 "No," and I objected to the form of the
' '\.,)
25 question, and you read certain portions of Mr.
1 MacMillan 109
-Ct , 2 Dunn's testimony which are in the record.
l 3 My point is simply that there were other 4 portions of Mr. Dunn's testimony at or about 5 the same pages that you read from that make 6 it clear that Mr. Cobb, in fact, did,not 7 refuse to make the funds available. He simply 8 asked Mr. Dunn for more information, and once 9 the information was provided, Mr. Cobb made 10 the funds available. But since Mr. MacMillan t
11 had no knowledge of that whole subject anyway, 12 I don't see any point in actually reading all
() 13 that testimony into the record at"this point.
14 BY MR. KLINGSBERG:
15 Q I would like to show you a document 16 previously marked as Exhibit 398, GPU Exhibit 398, 17 which is a preliminary safety concern report from
'18 Mr. Taylor to Mr. ' MacMillan dated _ December 13, 1979.
19 (Handing. document to the witness.) .
20 Is that your signature on the second 21 page of the preliminary safety concern r epor t?
. 22 A Yes, sir.
23 g At what point in time did you start as
('T 24 a matter of procedure in initialing or signing
\,_)
25 preliminary safety concern reports?
l 1 MacMillan 110 x
2 A Well, this report is the evaluation of a 3 Preliminary safety concern.
4 Q Yes.
5 A With the conclusion that it is a concern 6 which is reportable under 10CFR 21.
7 Our policies and procedures require 8 that in that circumstance the concern be brought g to my attention and that I have to sign and 10 indicate the time of the acknowledgemen of the 11 receipt of that concern, and that triggers or starts 12 the clock which gives us 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> to assure O)
(_ 13 ourselves that the NRC has been notifiid of this
.14 concern. ,'
15 MR. FISKE: I am sorry, could I hear 16 the beginning of that answer, pleas'? e 17 (Record read) 18 Q Do you know whose handwriting'is up in 19 the right-hand corner where it says "H. Somebody"?
~
20 A H. Honig.
21 Q Yes.
(" 22 Who is that?
23_ A H. Honig is an engineer in the Plant
(')
-n/
24 _
Equipment Unit.
25 I don't know whose handwriting that is.
i, I
I 1 MacMillan 111 l
l -
2 Q Do you know what is the reference to 3 MacMillan? It seems to be stamped in the right-4 hand corner.
5 A That appears to be my date stamp which
{
6 my secretary would .usually impress on , correspondence 7 that comes to me.
8 Q What was the nature of the safety 9 concern in this situation?
10 A well, without going into a ot of detail, 11 the concern here was that we found in the 12 examination of core flooding system isolation valve 13 and some decay heat. system isolation va'lve that we 14 had linear defects which were beyond those 15 permitted by the ASME code, and since these valves
^
16 - were either required for emergency' core cooling 17 or as a part of the reactor cooling system pressure
.6 boundary, these unacceptable indications were felt 19 to be reportable under 10CFR 21. -
20 Q And this was found to be a significant 21 defect in the valves?
22 A Yes.
23 Q What was the function of these valves?
A Well, there are two. sets of valves 34 Xs' inv lved, ne is the core flooding system' isolation 25
1 MacMillan 112 s/ 2 valve, that is a valve that is in the line between 3 the core flooding tank and the reactor coolant system.
4 In the event of a loss of coolant accident in which 5 the reactor coolant system pressure drops below -
6 approximately 600 pounds per square inch, water from
'7 the core flood tank is forced into the reactor 8 coolant system by gas pressure in these tanks.
9 Q Yes. And it is important to keep 10 the core covered? ,
11 A In a large loss of coolant accident, 12 yes.
13 Q And the other valves?
14 A The other valves are isolat ion valves 15 in the decay heat removal system, and under normal 16 operation these valves are exposed to reactor coolant 17 system pressure, and therefore they are part of 18 the reactor coolant system boundary. -
19 Q Yes. -
A
~
20- And if these defects were of such 21 magnitude that the. valves either leaked or . then
-on you would lose reactor coolant system and you would 1
23 have eventually a loss of coolant accident of some
.A o4 magnitude.
lQ) ~
25 Q When did t'he problem with these valves
1 MacMillan 113
)
(_/ 2 first come to your attention?
3 A Again, I cann t identify specifically 4 when that was brought to my attention.
i 5 I was aware that we were having some 6 Problems with the WKM valves supplied to the 7 Washington Public Power Supply System, but I can't 8 identify the specific time when it first. came to 9 my attention.
10 Q Did you reach any conclusions as to E
11 whether there had been any omissions or errors 12 by your subordinates in terms of the timeliness
() - 13 with which this matter was resolved or-brought to
_14 the attention of the NRC? ,
15 A I don't recall having concerns of that 16 sort.
17 Q I would like to show you a document 18 Previously marked as. Exhibit 141, GPU Exhi-bit .141, 19 - which is a memo from you to Mr. Vannoy dated 1
20 Oc tobe r 27, 1978 concerning the availability.
- 21. of B&W plants. (Handing document to the witness.)
22 JL Yes.
23 Q_ Can-you identify Exhibit 141 as a l
I 24.
document you sent to Mr. Vannoy on or about I
- Q(~)
25 October :27, 19787
- , ,o q y w- y- - , ,- , .- y ,w - -.
I 1 MacMillan 134
,-m -
\/ 2 A Yes.
3 Q Where was Mr. Vannoy stationed at the 4 time?
5 A .I am not sure. Mr. Vannoy moved from
.( ,
6 Barberton, Ohio to New York City to New Orleans, 7 and I am not sure where he was at that particular 8 time. I just don't know.
9 Q He was your superior in company 10 headquarters? g 11 .
A He was Mr. Fav r e t ' s superior, and Mr.
12 Favret was my boss.
13 .Q There is a reference in thi paragraph 14 numbered 3 to "a concert ed effort to shape up the 15 WKM valves which are being put into new plants e
16 without sound engineering basis."
17 From where did you get that information?
18 A That information would have co'me from ~
19 . Don Roy. ~
20 Q What was the nature of the absence of 21_ sound engineering basis for these valves?
k- 22 A I-am not sure I can give you an answer 23 on that. I don't recall.
24 We were having difficulty with WKM in the
(~V}
- 2;5 quality control on the valves they were supplying.
b r ,- -
,,7- ~ n , -- > > - . my- - ,
1 MacMillan 115 2 Don Roy personally got involved and went to the 3' WKM plant and worked with their people to try to 4 upgrade their performance, but I could not be 5 specific as to what the items were. ,
C- l 6 Q I would like to now show you GPU 7 Exhibit previously marked 142, which is a 8 memorandum from you to Mr. Favret dated October 30, g 1978, again regarding availability of B&W plants.
10 (Handing document to the witnessJ 11 Can you identify GPU Exhibit 142 as a 12 - . memorandum you sent in the regular course of 13 - business to Mr. Favret dated October 3 0', 19787 14 A I have got to admit an element of 15 confusion at this point because this appears to 16 he very similar to the earlier GPU Exhibi^t 141.
17 I have signed the October 30th document.
18 'Q Yes.- -
19 A No. 142, so I feel confident that that 20 was sent in the regular course of business.
21 Q Yes.
(- 22 A There is no signature on document GPU 23 . Exhibit.141, and it.is very unlikely that I would 24 have sent both:of these memos out, one to Mr.
25 Favret.and one to Mr. Vannoy. So as I say, I am J
1 MacMillan 116 2 confused at this point.
3 Q It is your -- '
4 A The first document, GPU Exhibit 141, 5 could have been a draft.
6 Q Yes.
7 A Which upon subsequent review and 8 supplementary information, which you see in the 9 enclosures may have been decided in discussions 10 with Favret. I had to send it to him r ther 11 than Vannoy.
12 Q It is your best judgment,then, GPU A
( ,) e 13 Exhibit 142 is the document that was sint?
14 A I can attest by my signature that 142 15 was signed by me and sent.
16 Q Referring to the paragraph numbered 3,
'17 what was the nature of the significant engineering 18 concerns which you had in regard to the WKM valves 19 which were currently being shipped to utilities?
20 A That refers to the same item I mentioned 21 earlier where we wer'e having 'some dif ficult , at) WC M 22 with the quality control on the valves and some 23 - design problems.
/~h 24 I don't know what the specific nature b
25 was. I had' asked Don.Roy, my engineering manager,
. - 2 . . , . . _ - . --
1 MacMillan 117
. (, .
5- 2 to personally get involved in the review o f these, 3 and he did make a trip to the WKM plant to work with 4 their engineering people to try to improve the 1 5 quality of those valves.
- - g 6 Q How were these concerns brought to your 7 attention in the first instance?
8 A I don't know how they first came to my 9 attention.
10 Q Were such engineering concerns expressed 11 in any documents?
12 A I don't know.
13 Q When between October 1978 a'nd' December 14 1979 did it come about that the significant. engineering 15 concern developed into a recogniti6n of significant 16 defects that had to be reported to the NRC?
l 17 MR. FISKE: Is there any evidence, Mr.
18 Klingsberg, th < . 1 .ey were talking About the 19 same valvet ?
20 MR. KLINGSBERG: It is WKM valves.
21 MR. FISKE: I am not sure --
22' MR. KLINGSBERG: Let me reframe the 23 question.
['T ' 24 - MR. FISKE: Because I am not sure they
~C/
, 25 .are talking about the same thing.
~
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s g i ! L MacMillan !118 i . gI 5
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2 r. MacMillan, when you got the Q7 f t -
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3 preliminary safety concern report in December of g.
4 1979.reiating to significant defects in WKM s %. ,
5 vt1ves, did you say to yourself or make any inquiries
)
6, aq j to whether or not these were.the same WKM v$1ves
_t> u sg_ .- t
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!y , 7 about which meste than a year previously you had
- 5
. , , , { t_
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s significant engineering ~ concerns?
\V 'F s 8
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9 ,,
MR. s FISKE: Well, Mr. Klingsberg, you
~
10 put that question in the plural,and(as I read n, -
11 this memorandum it is referring to a 12 i ,, particular valve.
.( 13 \ ) ,MR.,KLINGSBERG: I will s t(nd by the s
7 7 g , ,
questi,on.
., g4 4 I think it is clear' from' the report t s 4 .
> s ,
' _15 - 3 i that therie are a number df valves involved.
u, -
')- There are a number of valves-lhvolved i 16 - A, .J y I ' \
w
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17 i r.* ? th e s,a .fety. concern report and they were,in N s
i s
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two classes, one was th.e_ core flooding system a '
t .
\. 19 isolation valves, and the other were the decay heat 4
f -
1 ;
20 - isolation valves. t p "
~: e' h,
,3 s 'gg I don *t know whether those are the same
.. F -p 3 ; ,
g (j- 'l[ 29 valves that were referred lto in my l'etter to Mr.
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93
~ fa#su vrbt \ dateds Oc tober 30 th'/ 1978'. 'Neither fo I
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( 1
,Y . remember,to answer your question, what I. felt or 24 25 thouhht--at the time thatl this safety concern .was c + 4
- dt . '
h-asf , 31 -
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1 1 MacMillan 119
[)s
'\- 2 brought to my attention, whether I even thought 3 about the earlier memo or not. I simply don't 4 know.
5 0- Did you make any inquiry at or about C.
6 the time you got the preliminary safety concern or 7 any time as to whether or not the safety concern 8 relating to;the significant defects in the WKM g valves was brought to your attention in a timely 10 fashion?
t 11 A I don't recall making any inquiries.
, 12 i don't remember.
13 Q Did you make any inquiry to' ascertain 14 whether or not the WKM valve refdrred to in the 15 preliminary safety concern report was, indeed, 16 the same valve about which significant en'gineering 17 concerns were expressed more than a year before?
18 A I don't remember making any inquiry.
19 Q If you were to make such inquiry, how
, 20 w uld you go about it?
21 A At the time of 19797 22 Q No, right now. If we wanted to find 23 out if there is a leak, how would we do it?
r"% - 24 A . Well, I w uld have to confer with Mr.
25 Taylor and Dr.-Roy and try to: track between the
1 MacMillan 120 2 two memos whether there is a correspondence between 3
the earlier availability valve, valves mentioned 4 in the availability letter, and the ones that 5 are mentioned in the preliminary safety concerns.
6 .Q Do you think there should be a paper 7 trail in regard to the significant engineering 8 concerns relating to the'.WKM valves in 19787 g MR. FISKE: You mean does he think there 10 is?
t 11 A I don't understand the question.
12 Q Do you think that it is documented?
( ) 13 A I don't know. -
14 Q Should it be in the way that the NPGD does 15 business?
16 A The nature of the defects whi'hc are 17 identified in the preliminary safety concern are 18 those which would normally be detected in ,-a quality 19 - control inspection, and I would expect that there 20 w uld be some record o* that inspection and probably 1
21.
some correspondence on the issue.
k- 22 Q Do you know whether the utility customers 23 were notified of the significant engineering
~
24 ' concerns about the valves that were being delivered
(/
25 to meet contract commitments?
1 MacMillan 121 2 A I don't know.
3 Q Did you make any effort to make sure 4 that the customers were so informed?
5 MR. FISKE: Are you talking about 205 6 customers?
7 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
8 Customers with the WKM valves, whoever 9 they were.
-10 MR. FISKE: When they were eing put 11 in new plants?
12 A Well, without knowing the specifics of 13 the engineering concerns, it would be hard -- it 14 is hard for me to answer your question oflwhether 15 or not they were brought to the attention of the 16 customer.
17 Q Exhibit 142 also says in the second 18 paragraph that the problem of availability "has 19 been identified as a key issue of our-Division which 20 could impact severely our-competitive position in 21 the marketplace."
k- 22 Who identified availability as a key 23 issue in your decision?
(N. 24 A .Well, in our division, Operations, I
. Q.j -
25 involved the people reporting to me periodically in
1 MacMillan 122 O -
A(_) -2 assessments of the division's future plans, and 3 typically in one of those sessions we would try 4 to identify what were the key issues facing the 5 division as we looked to the future, and 6 ,
availability of our units would have been a 7 problem which would have been identified in 8 conjunction with that planning operation.
g .Q Well --
10 A We have worked aggressively through t.
11 the years to improve the availability of our 12 NSS or the nuclear plants that have our NSS. There O)
~
t 13 is only so much that we can do as it applies to 14 the equipment which we supply. And in here I 15 mention examples of things that we have done 16 to improve the availability by upgrading the 17 fuel-handling equipment, improving the pump seals 18 on the Bingham pumps, other things over which we I
t 19 have direct control. -
I 20 In about-this time frame as we are 21 evaluating the sources of forced outages, we
(- 22 reduced the availability, it became quite clear 23 to us that many of-the outage days were in.the rest g-w 24 of the plant which was not our scope of supply
(.
25 and/or in the-operation and maintenance of the
4 1 MacMillan 123
,,~ -
3 2 equipment which was a utility responsibility.
3 And so we were in the process in this 4 time frame of going to our utilities and trying 5 to get them to work with us to set availability 6 goals and then work to achieve them. And I must 7 say we had some difficulty in getting the utilities 8 to participate in that program in a joint effort 9 to set a goal and try to work toward it. And I 10 believe I indicate in item 2 on page 2 that we t
11 have made an effort to accomplish that objective 12 and that we hadn't been entirely suc'cessful.
() 13 Q Who attended these_ meetings' at which 14 key issues were identified in terms of yo,ur 15 competitive position?
16 A Typically they would involve 'the 17 pe ple reporting directly to me,. department 18 managers, and usually in a session of that -sort i
19 we also would have the individaul in the division 20 responsible for planning attend.
21 Q At any of these meetings in 1977 or 22 1978 or early 1979 before the accident,-did.
23 anyb dy ever express.NRC regulatory matters, 24 safety concerns as a contributing factor to lack-25 f availability?
,y , e r -
- i l
1 MacMillan 124 O
s 2 THE WITNE,SS: Let me hear that question 3 again, please. '
4 (Record read) 5 A Well, even before the Three Mile Island-2 6 accident, there were some outage days which 7 . detracted from availability, which we are required 8 to make modifications required by changes in the 9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. It was 10 not as significant a factor in the tima frame l
11- 1978 as it has been since the Three Mile Island 12 accident.
13 Q Did anyone at these meetin[s ever 14 mention as a potential problem in terms of your 15 availability or availability record or in terms
^
16 of competitive position, the consequences of 17 reporting safety matters to the NRC in consequent
.d retrofits, changes in procedures, shutdown of 19 plants, cutback in power, or anything of that sort?
20 A I don't recall that being a f actor in 21 the assessment of our competitive position.
22 Q What about in connection with 23 potential availability problem?
-24 MR. FISKE: What was your question?
25 A What was.your; question again?
1 MacMillan 125
(~S '
(,,) 2 Q Whether anybody expressed concern that 3 -y ur position regarding availability would be 4 adversely or could be adversely impacted by the 5 results of reporting of safety hazards to the NRC 6 on B&W plants?
7 A I don't recall anybody expressing L
8 concern that reporting safety concerns would 9 adversely impact availability.
- 10 Q Now, the valves were just an example 1
(
11 given in the memorandum of defects in B&W equipment 1
12 which might impact on availability.
i
() 13 Were there any other illustrations taken 14 up at any of these meetings, apart from the valves, 1 J
15 the WKM valves?
16 A Is your question were there other
-17 examples of pieces of equipment that were degrading 18 availability? -
19 -Q That's right. .
20 A Yes, we kept a very good record of the 21 forced outage days that were assigned to each piece
(- 22 of equipment in our scope of supply.- We also 23 kept track of outage days that were assignable .
o to equipment outside of our scope o f supply and 24 L/
25 - outage days that were assignable to inappropriate
s 1 MacMillan 126 f- s - . -
~
, A- ,
2 maintenance or operations on the part of the utility j I3- so that we could get an understanding of what were 4
- 4. some of the major factors that contributed to the i 5 lack of availabilit'y. We kept those records in
.6 quite substantial detail. ,
7 Q How would you describe those records?
8 A' Well, the way it came to me, it was 9 a tabulation of the major pieces of equipment and 10 how effective outage days were allocate against 11 that equipment for problems with it.
12 Q Was there-any, discussion regarding the
( 13 effect of the pilot-operated relief val've 14 reliability on outage days? ,'
15 A I don't recall discussions of that, 16 but it is very possible that relief valve's was one --
17 would be one of the items on which we would keep 18 track of outage' days. -
19 Q What other key issues were mentioned 20 at the meetings.which impacted your competitive 21' position in the~ marketplace?
22 A That is a very broad -- a very bread 23 question.. It involved our product, the services jr]" 24 we provided, the satisf action of .the utility with U
R./ ' '
25 those services.
1 MacMillan 127 2 I don't know -- could you be more ,
3 specific? -
4 Q Was there any key issue that was 5 considered in terms of your competitive position 6 - relating to the nature of your nuclear steam 7 supply system or any aspects of it?
8 A We considered that our nuclear steam
-g supply system had some substantial competitive 10 advantages. Our once-through steam generator t
11 gave us higher availability -- higher efficiencies 12 than any of the other nnelear plants in the ,
13 industry. We felt we had excellent fuel design and an 14 excellent record of fuel performance. We:had so~me 15 unique fuel cycle features which we. felt were 16 advantageous in terms of our competitive position.
17 Q Were there any; aspects of your nuclear 18 steam supply equipment which you felt a negative 19 impact on your competitive position? -
20 MR. FISKE: You mean in th'e sense ,
21_ that the utilities regarded that particular 22 item of equipment as less. desirable than 23 - what they could get from another supplier?
' 24 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes.
d[~T.-
25 Q' I realize that it is a tough- question
l 1 MacMillan 128
/~)5
(~ 2 for the head of the division. .
3 A I am trying to reconstruct what feature 4 of our plant we might have considered to be a 5 detriment in the marketplace, and I am having C.
6 trouble bringing one to mind.
7 Q What about a feature --
8 MR. FISKE: That is a very honest answer.
I 9 Q What about the feature that your actual L
10 or potential customers considered a de.triment i (
11 even though you might not have agreed with them?
12 A For many years our customers considered 13 that our insistence on high quality water' going into 14 our steam generators was an economic penalty.
15 because they had to put water purification-in i'
16 the feedwater system in order to meet those 17 requirements. We were very particular about that 18 and we lost . some competitive bids becaus e of our 19- ' insistence on that. -
~
- 20 Q Is there any other feature that you can --
-21 A In time that proved to be a very wise 22 thing to do, and now all of the other manuf acturers
! 23 have come to that same conclusion, but that was j'i -24 considered-at one time.by some of our utilities
, A f 25 as a disadvantage.-
y ~. it. ,, e-*- y ,vv. --y-9+* g. ,yaa ,g--y .
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1 MacMillan 129
_ 23 -
j '2 Q Well --
3 A Inappropriately, I believe.
4 Q Just to sum up for the day, is it
- 5 your testimony that you can't think of any negative 6 feature of the B&W nuclear steam supply system 7 which was considered in this period before the 8 accident?
9 MR. FIFKE: You mean considered by 10 them or by --
(
, 11 MR. KLINGSBERG: Considered by this 12 group who was identifying key issues for 13 competitive position. -
14 A I don't recall any right off-hand.'
15- As I said, we considered the unique 16 feature of our system was the once-through steam 17 generator. We considered that to be an advantage, 18 a competitive advantage. e 19 The balance -- and we thought our fuel 20 was a competitive advantage. The balance of the 21 equipment- was not a significant difference from what
(- 22 the other manufacturers of pressurized water equipment 23 were supplying.
( 2j Q Did the added efficiencies of the once-ks!
25 through steam generator create anything, any situation
7.,
l i
! 1 MacMillan 130 2 which anybody expressed as a safety disadvantage?
3 A I d n't recall pe P l e expressing a concern 4 about the once-through steam generator from a safety 5 standpoint.
l 6 Q Did anybody express the view that it 7 was the once-through steam generator that was more 8 difficult to operate in the event of a trip or g loss of feedwater?
10 A Are you addressing now the eriod 11 1978 or the post-Three Mile Island?
12 Q Mo s pre-Three Mile Island.
13 A I don't recall any customer' raising that 14 concern before Three Mile Island.
15 Q Was that ever raised internally at 16 B&W2 17 - A There was a recognition within B&W 18 that our once-through steam generator was'more 19 responsive than the steam generators provided 20 Int the other pressurized water reactor manufacturers.
21 Q What do you mean?
22 A That it was capable of accepting changes 23 in electrical load, changes in output more 24 rapidly than you could with a recirculating steam 25 generator. Recognizing that, we provided as a iia i a qi i - i
.t. . . .___._m.._m -. - - - - - - _
1 MacMillan 131
- ' ~
2 standard item in our scope an integrated control 3 system which controlled the entire nuclear plant, 4 the turbine generator, the feedwater system, and 5 the reactor in such a way that it allowed the plant 6 to be, to accommodate more rapid changes in load 7 than our competition. And one of the features that 8 we offered was the ability to take a turbine trip.
9 Your turbine generator tripped off the line, shut 10 down without having a shutdown of the reactor.
t
. 11 Q Right.
12 A And that was considered as an operating fk 13 advantage because it allowed the utilit'y to get 14 back into power operation to start generating 15 electricity more rapidly than they would with ' the 16 other competitor *.s units. '
17 MR. KLINGSBERG: I think we will pick.
18 up tomorrow.- -
19 9:307 -
20 MR. FISKE: Sure.
21 (Time noted: 4:10 p.m.)
22' 000 John Henry MacMillan 23 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 24 _
, 1982.
25
I
' 132 2
gggggglqAgg 3 STATE OF NEW YORK
)
- ss.:
4 COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
- 5 6
I, charles Shapiro ,a 7
Notary Public within and for the State of New York, 8
do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition 9 of John Henry MacMillan was paken before 10 me on June 9, 1982 -
11 That the said witness was duly sworn 12 before the con:mencement of his __
testkmony and 13 that the within transcript is a true reco*rd of said 14 testimony; 15 That I am not connected by blood or '
16 marriage with.any of the parties herein por 17 interested directly or indirectly in the matter in 18 ~
controversy, nor am I in the.emplcy of any of the 19 counsel.
10 IN WIT:'ESS WHEREOF, . I have hereunto set (k,: ' 21 my hand this kkday of 'd d -
l 22
- O; 24 pk_
Charles S'hapiro,4C.S.R..
25 a
I 133 O I ND EX i Witness Page
John Henry MacMillan 4
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GPU For Ident.
523 Copy of resume 3 H
524 Organization chart dated August"15th,
, 1978 of the Nuclear Power Generation Division 10 525 Chart of.the Nuclear Power Energy..
Division, Engineering Department, dated November 15th, 1977 ,
17 a .
526 Organization chart dated November 15th, 1977 of the Nuclear Power Generation e Division 18 527 Organization chart of tht NPGD ,
Engineering Department dated ,
November 15th, 1977 49 528 Letter from James Taylor to Karl S eyf rit, with attached report on start-up and shutdown procedures for steam generators with seal welded feedwater
( nozzles, bearing date of February 7, 1978 86 529 Letter from James H. Taylor to ,
the Nuclear Regulatory-
.- ( ') _
Commission, dated April 14, 1978, indicating blind copy to J.H. MacMillan 93
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