ML20072J001
| ML20072J001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1982 |
| From: | Swanson E BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-06, TASK-07, TASK-6, TASK-7, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290861 | |
| Download: ML20072J001 (141) | |
Text
_ _
hd j
p UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT b
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, s
[g JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
\\
Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)
-against-THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT & CO.,
INC.,
t Defendants.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x Deposition of Defendant THE BABCOCK &
WILCOX COMPANY by ERIC SWANSON taken by Plaintiffs pursuant.to agreement, at the offices of Kaye Scholer Fierman Hayes &
Handler, Esqs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Wedn'esday, July 21, 1982 at 10:00'o' clock in the forenoon, before Nancy A. Rudolph, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
0306290861 820721 PDRADOCK05000$
DOYLE REPORTING. INC.
W CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 LaxtNGTON AvsNUs l
l WALTER SHAPIRO, CJ.R.
New Yonx. N.Y.
10017 CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.A.
TsLaPNoNa 212 - 867 8220 l
2 1
2 Appearanc e s:
3 Kaye, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
i Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, New York By:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQ.,
6 of Counsel 7
8 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
9 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 10 New York, New York 11 By:
ROBERT WISE, ESQ.
-and-12 PATRICIA VAUGHAN, ESQ.,
13 of Counsel
(}
14 15 Also Present:
16 DAVID TAYLOR 17 18 19 20 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and 21 between the attorneys for the respective parties e
22 hereto that the sealing, filing and certification 23 of the within deposition be, and the same hereby
[
24 are, waived; and the the transcript may be signed 25 before any Notary Public with the'same force and l
t
{
2A 1
O-2 effect as if signed before the court.
3 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that 4
all objections, except as to the form of the
~
5 question, are reserved to the time of trial.
g 6
7 h
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 9
22 23 24 25
1 3
(~)
(_/
2 E.R I C SWAN S ON, having 3
been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was 4
4 examined and testified as follows:
i 5
EXAMINATION BY MR. SELTZER:
ggg
)
6 Q
Please state your full name for the record.
7 A
Eric Swanson.
8 Q
What is your address?
9 A
Route 1,
Box 127A, Monroe, Virginia.
[
10 Q
Have you ever been deposed before with 11 respect to any aspect o* the Three Mile Island 12 accident?
4 O
13 A
I had an interview with an I&E inspector.
l
(,/
' 14 There was no court reporter present and the notes were 15 not taken down except as the I&E inspector took his f
16 own personal notes.
4 f
17 Q
Did you get a copy of his notes?
l 18 A
No, I don't believe he ever issued any notes.
I 19 Q
Did you ever read the IGE summary of the I
20 interview with you?
21-A No.
Like I said, I don't believe he ever O
22 issued one.
23 Q
This is what I was referring to, a report of 24 investigation of B&W into possible violations of Part 25 21 which has a section interview with Swanson.
1 Swanoen 4
)
2 Did you ever see that before?
l 3
A I don't believe I have, no.
4 Q
How long was that interview?
5 A
A couple of hours, on that order.
ggg 6
Q On two different days?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Is it correct that you found the experience 9
of having words that you had written subjected to 10 scrutiny extremely demotivating?
11 A
I don't know.
Did I say that in here?
12 MR. WISE:
This is a report by someone else.
13 This does not purport to be a direct transcript of 14 your words, Mr. Swanson, so the questions are now 15 being put by Mr. Seltzer and you should listen to 16 the questions that he is asking rather than worry 17 about what someone'from the NRC wrote in this 18 document which you haven't seen before.
19 BY MR. SELTZER:
20 Q
At the end of the fourth paragraph of the 21 last sentence, it states:
"As indicated above, Swanson O
22 expressed considerable dismay at having his remarks in 23 an internal B&W memorandum subjected to such intense and 24 scrutiny a year and a half after they were written, 25 characterized the effect upon him as being ' extremely
1 Swannon 5
2 demotivating.'"
3 Do you see that?
4 MR. WISE:
He is just asking you if you see 5
it.
g 6
A Yes, I see that.
7 Q
Do you recall indicating in words or substance 8
to an I&E investigator that you found being subjected 9
to intense scrutiny being extremely demotivating?
10 A
No, I don't remember that.
11 Q
In the course of work that you have done at 12 B&W, I take it that you are familiar with the --
()
13 MR. WISE:
Excuse me.
Just before you go on, 14 I think the record should indicate that we have 15 been reviewing GPU 532.
16 Q
Before the Three Mile Island accident, you 17 had done work in connection with analyses pursuant to.
4 18 10 CFR 50.46, hadn't you?
19 A
I don't recall what 10 CFR 50.46 is right 20 now.
21 Q
That is the acceptance criteria for i
k 22 emergency core cooling systems.
l I
23 MR. WISE:
Let the record reflect that the l
l 24 witness has been given a photocopy of a part of the s-25 Code of Federal Regulations covering 10 CFR 50.46, l-f l
. ~.
1 Swancon 6
l 2
and I don't think it has been marked as an exhibit.
3 MR. SELTZER:
I don't think so.
4 MR. WISE:
I am not saying it has to be.
5 I just wanted the record to reflect what he is ggg 6
looking at.
7 BY MR. SELTZER:
8 Q
Let me ask you, are you aware before the 9
accident that the NRC had articulated certain standards 10 for effective core cooling?
11 A
I am aware that the NRC has licensing 12 requirements for plants, and I am aware that they must
()
13 meet certain requirements for emergency core cooling, 3
14 yes.
15 Q
For example, you knew that there was a peak 16 clad temperature which could not be exceeded?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
You understood that that was 2200 degrees 19 Fahrenheit?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
You were aware before the accident, weren't G
22 you, that BsW, as part of its business, prepared 23 topical reports which it filed with the NRC7
~
24 A
B&W prepares topical reports in many areas.
y-wg U
25 Q
You knew that before the accident?
i I
1
~.
1 Swancon.
7 s
~
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Topice1 reports are filsd with the NRC, 4
right?
e g
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
I take it you were aware before the TMI 7
accident that B&W had prepared topical reporta 8
specifically for its 177 fuel assembly-plants?
9 A
B&W has prepared dany topica.1 repc:r t s, and 10 many of them are for 177 plants.
11 Q
You knew that some of those topical reports 12 analyzed how the a.nergency core cooling system would 13 operate to provide effective core ecoling under 14 transient conditions, isn't that a fair s ta.teme n t?
15 A
I am aware of topical reports for EccS; yes, 16 I am.
17 Q
Your profession has some words and phrases 18 that have special meaning within,your work.
19 I take it,)be f o r e the accident, you were 20 familiar with something called ^"a' worst case analysis,"
l 21 right?
O 22 A
Yes.-
l 23 Q-What did that mean in terms of transient 24 analyses?
LO 25 A
My understanding of it'is that a variety of l
l l'
t
,s-
1 Suoncon 8
( f) 2 conservative assumptions are made for the plant 3
configuration for the state of the burnup of the fuel 4
and for other things, and that an analysis is made to 5
demonstrate that with these worst case assumptions the ggg 6
plant systems and components meet the criteria set 7
forth by the NRC for licensing.
8 Q
In your last answer, you referred to these 9
worst case assumptions.
10 What are worst case assumptions, as you 11 used that phrase?
12 MR. WISE:
A're you asking him now for the
(
13 specific assumptions or for just a general 14 description of what kinds of assumptions those 15 are?
16 MR. SELTZER:
The intter.
17 MR. WISE:
In other words, he is asking 18 you not for the specific items, but if you can 19 generally describe what you mean by worst case 20 assumptions.
21 A
I thought I answered that before that it is O
22 a coabination of plant configuration for hardware 23 components, for assumptions for the burnup of the fuel l
24 and then other things which when combined would be a 0
25 worst combination of configurations for licensing.
1 Swanoon 9
a little bit 2
Q Let me try and approach it 3
differently so that we get something that is comprehensive 4
MR. WISE:
I object to the characterization 5
that Mr. Swanson's answers have not been i
ggg 6
comprehensible.
7 MR. SELTZER:
No, to me it is not 8
comprehensible.
It may be to everybody else in 9
the world.
10 BY'MR. SELTZER:
11 Q
You knew that one part of the transient 12 analyses that B&W performed for plants that had wanted 13 to get licensed were analyses that showed the ability
()
14 of emergency core cooling systems to provide effective 15 core cooling for the ent, ire spectrum of postulated loss 16 of coolant accidents?
17 MR. WISE:
Could I have that rced back, 18 please?
19 (guestion read) 20 A
B&W performs analyses for emergency core 21 cooling systems for a wide spectrum of breaks for 9
22 licensing.
23 Q
The spectrum, as you understood it, was to 24 cover different sizes, locations, and other properties O
25 sufficient to assure that the entire spectrum of
1 Swancon 10
,O
(_)
2 postulated loss of coolant accidents was covered, 3
isn't that right?
4 MR. WISE:
Under the licensing conditions.
5 A
Yes, within the confines of those required, ggg 6
the required spectrum that the NRC has.
7 Q
That is what I meant by " postulated loss of 8
coolant accidents."
9 For the loss of coolant accidents that 10 were within the spectrum that the NRC required vendors 11 like B&W to study, B&W had to do an analysis for the 12 worst case applicable to each such break size, isn't 13 that right?
14 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of the 15 question.
16 The witness may answer it if he understands 17 it.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Do you understand the question?
19 THE WITNESS:
I think I understand the 20 question.
21 A
Generally, the ECCS analysis is performed O
22 for worst case combinations of equipment, fuel burnup 23 and other criteria for a spectrum of large breaks and 24 for a spectrum of small breaks.
25 Q
You understood that that is what the NRC j
n
11 Swenoon 1
0 2
expected, right?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
What did you understand was the rationale, if you had any understanding of it, for doing worst 5
that were analyses for each of the break sizes 6
case 7
studied?
8 A
My understanding of the philosophy is that 9
it is not possible to define the plant response to 10 transients exactly.
Therefore, the NRC requires I
case assumptions.
11 applicants to file analyses using worst 12 The intent of those worst case assumptions is to be
(_
13 conservative.
14 Q
In other words --
15 MR. WISE:
Excuse me.
I don't think he has 16 finished his answer.
17' And by being conservative for the analyses 18 that have to be submitted, show a margin, if you will.
19 Q
A safety margin?
20 A
Not exactly a safety margin, just show a 21 margin of conservatism.
9 22 Q
In other words, if a vendor like B&W does 23 an analysis based on worst case assumptions, then B&W 24 customers and the NRC would be entitled to assume that q
25 under any less conservative assumptions there would be k
, - ~
Swanson 12 1
2 effective core cooling?
-(
MR. WISE:
I object to the form of the 3
4 4
question.
I don't know what you mean by who would be entitled to assume what.
5 g
6 If you are asking him for a legal opinion, a
7 I certainly object to that.
I don't see how this 8
witness can answer who is entitled to assume what 9
and I don't know what assumptions the customers 10 made or what assumptions the NRC made.
11 MR. SELTZER:
We don't need a speech.
I 12 will rephrase the question.
13 BY MR. SELTZER:
14 Q
B&W, and particularly Eric Swanson, understood
{
15 that if a conservative worst case analysis were done 16 for a particular break size and location, then you 17 understood that there would be effective core cooling 18 if any less consurvative assumptions were imposed for 5
19 a break at the same size and location, isn't that 20 right?
21 A
well, it is my understanding that the NRC 9
22 requires these analyses to be made for licensing and 23 that by interjecting conservatism into the analyses 24 they -- the NRC believes that there is a margin between O
25 the analyses submitted for licensing and the plant as 1
J l
1 Swan 00n 13 2
designed.
3 Q
ssW's analyses as submitted to the NRC 4
demonstrate that the plant is safe for the worst 5
case assumptions that are made, right?
l it means different 6
A Well, safe is not 7
things to different people.
8 Q
Let me withdraw that.
9 asW intended, as you understood it, that 10 there would be effective core cooling for the worst 11 case assumptions for the analyses submitted to the 12 NRC, isn't that right?
13 A
Well, the analyses that are submitted to 14 the NRC have to meet the NRC regulations for such 15 things as fuel clad temperature limits.
And if the 16 analyses, using worst case assumptions that are.
17 submitted for licensing, meet the NRC requirements, 18 then the plant can be licensed to operate.
19 Q
Did you understand that if the plant was 20 demonstrated to provide effective core cooling under 21 the NRC's criteria for the worst case assumptions O
22 that BsW believed there would be effective core 23 cooling for any credible conditions that were less 24 severe than the worst case assumptions?
25 MR. WISE:
You have asked that question i
1 Swanson 14 2
two or three times. I will permit it one more
(}
3 time, but I think the witness has described to you what he understood B&W's intention to be with 4
5 respect to the performance of analyses for 6
licensing purposes.
7 MR. SELTZER:
I think he has too.
I am 8
just trying to relate the worst case assumptions 9
to assumptions about operation that are less 10 severe than the worst case assumptions, And I 11 am asking whether if the plant can provide 12 effective core cooling for the worst case 13 assumptions, wasn't it implicit in the analysis 14 that there would be effective core cooling for 15 conditions less severe than the worst case 16 assumptions.
4 17 MR. WISE:
I know that you have asked him F
18 that question and several times he has attempted 19 to answer it with what he understood.
I will 20 permit him to go ahead and try and answer it 21 again, but I think you already obtained an answer.
G 22 A
Yes, the earlier answers are the answer to 23 this question.
24 MR. WISE:
What is implicit or not implicit C'i 25 may be something for someone else to judge at some
1 Swcncon 15 2
other time, but what you are doing is asking
(
3 this witness to make a conclusion or an opinion 4
as to something being implicit or not implicit and 5
he is apparently not prepared to do that.
ggg 6
BY MR. SELTZER:
7 Q
Are you unable to answer the question?
8 MR. WISE:
I don't think he has been unable 9
to answer the question.
He has answered it with 10 his understanding of what B&W's intention was 11 in performing the analyses that you asked about 12 and he has answered that several times.
13 MR. SELTZER:
Bob, I understand what you 14 are saying and your position is noted pretty well 15 on the record now.
16 Let me ask Mr. Swanson one last time.
17 BY MR. SELTZER:
18 Q
Was it your understanding before the Three 19 Mile Island accident that if B&W could demonstrate 20 that its 177 plants could provide effective core 21 cooling within the NRC criteria under worst case 9
22 conditions, then BsW believed that the 177 plants 23 could also provide effective core cooling for conditios 24 that were less severe than the worst case criteria?
V 25
-A Again, the words "less severe" are --
i E
l
1 Swenoon 16 l
l O(_/
2 mean different things to different people.
What B&W 3
has done is for its customers performed analyses in 4
accordance with the NRC requirements and submitted 5
those to the NRC on behalf of those customers for 4,
i 6
licensing purposes.
MR. SELTZER:
I move to strike that as not 7
8 responsive.
9 MR. WISE:
Well, you have your motion and 10 I am going to object to --
11 MR. SELTZER:
Don't interrupt, please.
I 12 am not finished talking, and you usually ask for
(
13 the same courtesy from me.
14 BY MR. SELTZER:
15 Q
I am asking about the relationship between 16 worst case assumptions, which you said are very 17 conservative assumptions, to other than worst case 18 assumptions.
19 Let me approach it a little bit differently.
20 Are you familiar with the phrase " bounding analyses"?
21 A
Yes.
O 22 Q
What does that phrase mean to you?
23 A
There are a few transients that are analyzed 24 in the SAR which, again, combine a worst case
(~
\\_-
25 combination of conditions.
These transients are
?
Swanson 17 1
2 expected to be the outer limits for many other transients that might occur.
Those other transients i
3 i
are not necessarily defined in the SAR.
4 5
Q What did you mean when you used the ggg 6
Phrase " outer limits"?
7 A
Each and every transient that is analyzed 8
in the SAR has some criteria for acceptance, and those critera for acceptance I would call that an outer 9
10 limit.
11 Q
Can you give me an example?
Can you give me 12 an example applicable to loss of coolant analyses?
13 A
I would rather not give you an example with
. (f 14 loss of coolant-accidents.
I am not certain, but I i
15 do not believe loss of coolant accidents are usually 16 used as bounding accidents.
I may be wrong.
It seems 17 to me one transient that we have looked at and 18 considered to be a bounding event is a steam line break trying to recall what the acceptance 19 transient.
I am t
20 criteria for that accident is.
21 I am not sure right now what the acceptance O
22 criteria is.
You said that B&W performs the transient i-23 Q
24 analyses for its customers.
..O 25 What is your understanding as to why it b
--,-m.
~
1 Swanoon 18
()
2 was B&W that performed the transient analyre ; rather 3
than the customer itself?
4 A
I am not certain.
I believe it was part 5
of the contract.
ggg 6
Q Bsw was the designer and the fabricator of 7
the nuclear steam supply system that it sold to its 8
customers, right?
9 A
Right.
10 g
You understood, didn't you,that when it 11 came to the understanding of the technology, B&W
[
12 generally had a greater expertise than the customers?
13 MR. WISE:
I object to the vagueness of the 14 question.
I don't know what is generally and 15 what is greater expertise.
16 MR. SELTZER:
I am talking about detailed 17 transient analyses of the type that go into topical 18 reports.
19 MR. WISE:
I don't know whether this witness 20 is able to answer that, because you haven't shown 21 what he knows of the technical staffs of the O
22 various utilities that were B&W customers.
Some 23 may have more technical staff than others and 24 some may have greater abilities.
25 MR. SELTZER:
I think that is a little bit i
1 Swanson 19 2
too weaving and coaching.
I think Eric Swanson 3
can give us an answer without your coaching him.
4 MR. WISE:
I don't think it is suggesting 5
anything.
I think your question is very ggg 6
objectionable and almost impossible for him to 7
answer unless you lay a proper foundation.
8 MR. SELTZER:
Well, let's see if it is so 9
impossible.
10 can you answer it, please?
11 A
Generally, it is within the reactor vendor's 12 scope of supply to perform a large number of the
()
13 licensing analyses in the SAR, not only with B&W but l
14 with other reactor vendors as well; and, to my knowledge, 15 that is usually culled out as a portion of the reactor 16 vendor's scope of.s u p p l y in the contract.
17 Q
I understand from Bruce Karrasch's testimony 18 and from other people in plant integration what the 19 general interfacing role of plant integration was, and 20 I am not going to try and go into all that with you.
21 I take it from your years of working in the O
22 plant integration section, you came to realize that 23 B&W had considerable expertise within the Babcock &
24 Wilcox company for performing transient analyses on 25 the plants that it had designed, isn't that right?
E
1 Swanoon 20 1
()
2 A
B&W has considerable expertise for transient 3
analyses, yes.
4 Q
You knew it had that considerable expertise 5
before the Three Mile Island debacle, right?
6 MR. WISE:
I object to the use of the term 7
" debacle."
8 Q
Catastrophe.
You know what I mean, don't 9
you?
10 A
B&W has Ped that expertise for a long time.
11 Q
That expertise included a unit of people 12 whose principal responsibilies day in and day out were
/
13 to perform emergency core cooling system analyses, 14 right?
15 A
We have a unit in our organization that 16 specializes in ECCS analysis.
17 Q
You, I think, unintentionally are often 18 converting my questions into present tense when you 19 respond, and as your counsel knows, the focus of our 20 inquiry is before the Three Mile Island accident, so 21 when I asked you in the past tense I was looking for h
22 not whether you currently have a unit with that 23 expertise, but whether you had such a unit.
24 A
I apologize'.
I did not understand that 1($)
25 question.
1 Swenoon 21
()
2 We have had a unit that performs ECCS analyses both now and before Three Mile Island.
3 4
Q That was their principally ongoing, week in, 5
week out responsibility, right?
6 A
Yes.
j-7 Q
From your role within plant integration, 8
you were familiar with the fact that the customers 9
looked to B&W to supply the detailed transient analyses, 10 right?
11 MR. WISE:
I object.
12 The witness may answer it if he can.
13 A
They contracted with B&W to supply certain
()
14 analyses.
15 Q
Are you an expert on contractual relations 16 between B&W and its customers?
17 A
No.
18 Q
Have you seen the contract where there are 19 words that require B&W to supply transient analyses?
20 A
well, there's a large number of different 21 contracts between B&W and its customers.
I have not O
22 seen all of them.
I have seen a few.
23 Q
Have you seen the language that explicitly 24 obligates B&W to provide transient analyses as you have g-V.
25 just described that obligation to be an obligation l
1 Swanoon 22 2
pursuant to contract?
3 A
I expect I have.
I don't remember exactly 4
seeing the words, but I expect that I have seen it 5
one time or another.
ggg 6
Q As you sit here today, you can't recall 7
when or for what plant or where you saw such language?
8 Is that right?
9 A
To the best of my recollection, the plant 10 that I would have seen that on would be the Bellefonte 11 plant for the Tennessee Valley Authority.
12 Q
You say the plant you would have seen it on.
()
13 Are you saying if you saw it at all, that is 14 the plant on which you would have seen it?
15 MR. WISE:
I don't think that is what he 16 said.
I think he said that he expected that he 17 had seen it.
18 Q
Expected that "he" had seen it and would 19 have seen it don't imply to me a certainty that you did, t
20 in fact, see that particular language in the Bellefonte 21 contract.
O 22 I am asking you, do you have a specific 23 recollection that you did, in fact, see that language 24 in the Bellefonte contract between TVA and B&W7 l
25 A
Not a specific recollection, no.
l
l 23 1
Swanson 2
MR. WISE:
Had you finished your answered?
THE WITNESS:
I am through now, I think.
3 4
MR. SELTZER:
If I inadvertently cut you i
5 off, please hold your hand up and say you have 6
something more to say.
Sometimes you pause, and 7
1 assume that you are finished.
If you are not, 8
I want to hear everything that you have to say.
9 THE WITNESS:
I am trying to think.
10 BY MR. SELTZER:
11 Q
Well, aside from what might be in the 12 contract which you can't specifically recall seeing, 13 were you aware that customers of B&W tended to look
()
14 to BsW for the performance of transient analyses?
15 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of.that 16 question.
17 MR. SELTZER:
You may answer it.
18 A
Tended to look --
19 Q
Tended to rely upon.
20
'MR. WISE:
I object to that as well.
That 21 is ridiculous.
22 MR. SELTZER:
You can answer it.
23 MR. WISE:
Do you want him to state what his
~
24 understanding of the state of mind was of the t
25 various utility, customers of asW7 1
-,,~,
1 Swanoon 24 2
MR. SELTZER:
I will rephrase it.
3 BY MR. SELTZER:
I l
4 Q
Eric Swanson, you knew that customers 5
were coming to B&W to get transient analyses for the gg 6
plants they were buying from B&W, didn't you?
j 7
A Customers purchased certain analyses from 8
us, yes.
You know, however, that some customers do 9
some analyses themselves.
It is not a field limited 10 to B&W.
11 Q
The B&W topical reports were reports that 12 applied generically to a series of B&W plants, isn't 13 that right?
14 A
Usually a topical report -- or not usually, 15 but often a topical report will apply generically.
16 Some topical reports may be submitted on behalf of one 17 customer.
18 Q
For example, you know that there were topical 19 reports submitted that were applicable to all of the 20 B&W 177 lowered loop plants, right?
21 A
Yes.
O 22 Q
You testified earlier that B&W filed topical 23 reports with the NRC.
24 Were you familiar before the Three Mile O
25 Island accident with the fact that the NRC used to
1 swonnon 25 2
communicate directly with B&W for clarification and 3
support of topical reports that had been filed with the 4
NRC7 the 5
A I am not exactly certain how that
'6 official route of communication is always through the 7
licensee, but quite often for expediency the NRC will 8
discuss various matters directly with B&W.
9 Q
Did you understand that when Bsw submitted 10 topical reports to the NRC in support of the licensing 11 of its plants that those topical reports were to be 12 as accurate a's B&W could make them at the time they
(
13 were submitted?
14 A
I think that goes without saying.
15 Q
The topical reports were required to include 16 all of the appropriate worst case assumptions?
17 A
They were required to -- well, let me stop 18 here.
19 There's a large number of different topical 20 reports that are filed.
Some of them are not for 21 analyses.
They may be topical reports on codes and 22 the configuration of a computer code, so in the context 23 of worst case assumption those would only be for those 24 topical reports that deal with licensing.
. O 25 Q
Those are the ones I am talking about,
1 Swancon 26
-m (v) 2 specific analysec.
3 Those topical reports that deal with 4
licensing and with analysis of transients, B&W was J
5 expected to give the NRC the worst case analyses as 6
required by NRC criteria for each transient, isn't 7
that right?
4 8
A Yes.
9 MR. WISE:
I object.
Expected by whom?
10 MR. SELTZER:
Did you get his answer?
11 Q
You understood before the Three Mile Island 12 accident that B&W could not knowingly submit a topical 13 report for transient analysis which B& W knew failed 14 to consider the worst case for the transients under 15 examination, i,sn't that right?
16 A
I don't really know how to answer that.
17 It wouldn't be particularly useful to file a report 18 that was not in accordance with the NRC requirements 19 for the analysis, so it wouldn't make any sense to file
-l 20 one that didn't use the required NRC assumptions.
21 e
You knew that it would be improper for 9
22 B&W to submit a topical report and tell the NRC that the 23 worst case assumptions had been applied when, in fact, 24 B&W knew they had not been applied, isn't that right?
(
25 A
Quite frankly, I can't envision submitting
1 Swanson 27 2
a topical report for licensing purposes that did not 3
include the NRC requirements for licensing.
It would 4
not be approved by the NRC, so it wouldn't make any 5
sense to do that.
g 6
g Well, the NRC might not know what was the 7
particular worst case for each break, isn't that true, 8
if we are talking about breaks in the reactor coolant 9
system?
10 MR. WISE:
We have been over this at some 1
11 length earlier in this deposition as to what this 12 witness' understanding was of the term " worst case."
13 I think he has defined that for you as including
()
14 the NRC requirements.
I don't understand the 15 import of your question unless you are reasking 16 the questions that we went through earlier this 17 morning.
18 MR. SELTZER:
No, it is a different question.
19 would you read it, please?
20 (Question read) 21 MR. WI SE :
I think that is the question 9
22 you asked before and had answered.
I will pose 23 an objection and permit the witness to reanswer 24 it if he can.
V 25 A
whether or not the NRC knew, as you want to
1 Swanson 28 4
()
2 say it, what the worst case was is not for me to 3
answer.
I can't say what the NRC knows or does not 4
know, but what I do know is that they have stipulated 5
certain criteria for assumptions, and they have stated 6
certain acceptance criteria, and we submit analyses 7
in response to what the NRC stipulates.
8 Q
If B&W discovered an error in a topical 9
report which it submitted to the NRC in support of the 10 licensing of one or more B&W plants, did you understand 11 before the Three Mile Island accident B&W would have 12 an obligation to report that error to the NRC?
13 A
Generally, yes.
14 Q
Before the accident at Three Mile Island, 15 did you believe it was important for B&W to be honest 16 with its dealings with the NRC?
17 A
Absolutely.
18 Q
Did you believe that it was important for 19 B&W to be honest in its dealings with its customers?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Are you aware of any occasion on which B&W G
intentionally withheld information from the NRC 22 23 relating to the completeness of certain transient 24 analyses which B&W had previously submitted to the O
25 NRC?
29 Swanoon 1
4 2
A Withheld bothers me.
I 3
Q It bothers,me, too.
4 A
The use of the word " withheld" bothers me.
4 5
I would like to say that there are times when new 6
information becomes available and that new information 7
is not always well understood and that B&W will 8
investigate that new information to develop a better 9
understanding and then, at that time, will inform the 10 NRC of new findings of new information.
l-Is that the end of your answer?
11 Q
12 A
Yes, I think so.
13 Q
Isn't it a fact that B&W has learned that
()
14 it had submitted incomplete transient analyses to the 15 NRC but withheld that information from the NRC7 It 16 did not report it promptly to the NRC after discovering 17 that.it submitted incomplete information?
18 A
That's a pretty broad, general statement, and of all the activities that go on at i
19 I am not aware i
20 B&W.
I am not familiar with any time that things that L
l I had been involved in, a deliberate attempt not to 21 22 tell the NRC some information.
23' Q
What about the fact'that B&W had done an 24 incomplete transient analysis, isn't it a fact that t.
gg
\\/
25 B&W withheld that information from the NRC for a period j
l~
l'
1 Swancon 30 2
of time?
MR. WISE:
What transient analysis are you 3
4.
talking about?
You are now apparently focusing 5
on some specific incident.
I think in fairness 6
to the witness, you ought to call it to his attention what you are talking about.
You have 7
8 asked a general question and he has given you a 9
general answer.
If you have something specific 10 to bring to his attention, I think you should 11 do so.
12 BY MR. SELTZER:
13 Q
Aren't you aware that there was a point in 14 time before the Three Mile Island accident when B&W 15 had discovered that it had submitted an incomplete 16 transient analysis to the NRC and B&W elected to 17 withhold notice of that from the NRC?
18 A
Which analyses are you referring to?
19 Q
I am asking you if you know of any.
20 A
I think I answered before that there are 21 times when we have found new information, and sometimes 9
information isn't well understood at the time 22 that new 23 of discovery and that further work may often be done 24 to clarify that information.
If that new information, determined N-25 once it is clarified is determined to be i
i
1 Swancon 31
()
2 to be different from NRC requirements, B&W will 3
submit that new information to the NRC.
4 Q
Are you aware of any occasion on which (lg 5
B&W intentionally withheld information from any 6
customer relating to the incompleteness of certain 7
transient analyses which B&W had previously 8
submitted to that customer?
9 A
In the same kind of context as you use 10 the word " withheld" from the NRC,when B&W finds new 11 information, until they understand that new 12 information they will not rush out and tell the 13 customer necessarily.
They may,or they may decide to 14 do further investigations to be on firmer ground when 15 they talk to the customer or to the NRC to make sure 16 they understand the issue as well as they can.
17 Q
Before the Three Mile Island accident, 18 you believed that advising the NRC about an area of 19 deficiency in transient analyses previously submitted 20 by B&W to the NRC could result in a derating or 21 shutting down of B&W supplied nuclear plants, didn't 9
22 you?
23 A
There are several parts to your question.
~
First, it is hard to hypothesize what the NRC will 24 25 do, period.
- - - - - - -. + - - -
e
1 Swanson 32 0
j 2
Secondly, it is often better to review a 3
situation to come up with a more complete understanding 4
so that when B&W talks with its customers or talks with 5
the NRC, they can have a more complete story or be able llg G
to provide the best possible information to the NRC or 7
to its customers.
8 Your question was long and I am not sure if 9
that helps you out or not.
10 Q
I think that is constructive.
It doesn't 11 reach the point about your specifically anticipating 12 the possibility of the NRC derating or shutting down 13 B&W plants, however.
14 Isn't it a fact that you specifically had 15 that anticipation before the Three Mile Island 16 accident?
17 MR. WISE:
Anticipation with respect to 18 what?
Are you asking him whether he specifically 19 anticipated as to some particular events or are 1
20 you saying, in general, did he get up each morning 21 anticipating that for some unknown reason the NRC O
22 would derate B&W plants?
I don't understand the 23 import of the question.
24 MR. SELTZER:
I will restate the question.
25 BY MR.' SELTZER:
1 Swanson 33
[~/
h
\\_
2 Q
Isn't it correct that there was a point 3
prior to the Three Mile Island kccident when you believed 4
that if B&W were to advise the NRC that there had been 5
a deficiency in B&W's previously submitted transient lll 6
analyses that could result in the NRC derating or 7
shutting down the B&W 177 plants?
8 A
If you will give me a specific situation, I 9
may be able to help you out better, but if there is a 10 known deficiency in the plant, it is our obligation to 11 report it to the NRC.
12 Q
If there is a known deficiency in the
()
13 transient analyses that B&W has previously submitted, 14 did you also understand that there was an obligation to 15 report that to the NRC?
16 A
If there is a known deficiency in licensing 17 information, we have the obligation, we the engineers 18 at B&W, to report that to our licensing organization.
19 The licensing organization has a responsibility to 20 determine if that is reportable to the NRC.
21 Q
Now, lets see if you could answer the 22 specific point that I was asking you.
23 Do you have a recollection now that there
~
24 was a time before the Three Mile Island accident when 25 you were aware that there had been a deficiency in the v-
1 Swan' con 34 4'
( )
2 transient analyses previously submitted to the NRC, 3
.and you also feared that if that deficiency were 4
reported right then and there to the NRC that the i
5 NRC might turn around and darste or shut down all i
l ggg 6
of your 177 plants except, perhaps, one?
7 A
If you can be specific, I can tell you what 8
I was aware of.
9 Q
You mean right now --
10 MR. WISE:
He has told you that he can't 11 do that, and I am going to object to this badgering 12 of Mr. Swanson.
He is here to answer your 13 questions and he has tried very hard to do that.
(}
14 He has told pou he can't do it unless you give 15 him a specific example.
If you are not willing 16 to do it, let's go on to something else.
17 BY MR. SELTZER:
18 Q
Are you saying, without my telling you any i
19 more facts, you have no honest recollection of what I J
20 just described to you occurring?
Is that your sworn 21 testimony?
22 A
Your words " deficiency in transient analysis,"
23 I
do not believe I have ever knowingly withheld l
24 information where a deficiency in transient analysis O-25 for licensing of a plant has been an issue, where the
Swansor.
35 1
\\_)
2 plant deficiency is truly a design deficiency.
3 Q
Tou talked of a design deficiency.
I was 4
talking of a deficiency in transient analysis.
5 Do yott include w'ithin design deficiency a ll) 6 deficiency in tiansient analysis that was relied upon 7
by B&W in a topic 1 report submitted to the NRC to 8
get licensing for its plants?
9 MR. WISF,;.
What do you mean by a deficiency?
10 Typographical error 7 il MR. SELTZER:
No, substance.
12 An assumption,was made that something was a 13 worst case, and B&W found out that worst case 14 assumption was not well founded.
15 MR. WISE You mean they found out it wasn't 16 the worse case or they found out something alse.
17 I am not sure what you are asking him.
18 MR. GELTZER:
They found out that their 19 statement that this was the worst case was not 20 something they could hang their hat on anymore.
21 MR. WISE:
I cbject to the phrase " hang your O
22 hat on."
s 23 If you have a question for the witness,'go 24, ahead and put it to.htm, but I think you are being 25 awfully vague in what,.it is you are trying to get i
a b
% ' i
--i
1 Swanson 36 O
2 from him.
I don't know that he can answer the 3
question the way you are putting it.
4 (Question read) 5 MR. WlSE:
Please put an objection on my lll 6
behalf to the form of the question.
I will permit i
7 the witness to answer it to the extent he can 8
understand the question.
9 A
There's three things in there that I am not 10 sure of.
The three things are deficiency in transient I
11 analysis, design deficiency which I mean to be a hardware l
I do not 12 deficiency, and topical report.
I am not 13 think that I have knowingly withheld information that 14 deals with a design deficiency of the hardware, nor of 15 where I was cognizant of indirect transient analyses as 16 I explained before -- and I do not know whether either 17 of those relates to any specific topical report.
There 18 are so many licensing documents submitted, I am not 19 sure which one anything might apply to.
There are 20 times when we find new information out that we don't 21 clearly understand and those times we will often 22 investigate it further or ask for other people to 23 investigate it further to determine whether our doubts 24 are true or not ture.
25 Q
Have you ever discussed with anyone delaying
1 Swcnoon 37
(
2 informing the NRC about new information because 3
Premature disclosure of that information might lead to 4
dorating of Bsw plants or shutting down of B&W plants?
5 A
It is possible those kind of discussions can lll 6
occur.
7 Q
Do you have a specific recollection --
8 MR. WISE:
Excuse me.
I don't think he is 9
finished answering.
of such discussion occurring?
10 Q
11 MR. WISE:
Go ahead, Mr. Swanson and finish 12 the answer to the previous question.
Mr. Seltzer
()
13 apparently didn't want to hear the rest of it.
14 MR. SELTZER:
I want to hear it.
It is just 15 that a hypothetical discussion could have taken 16 place doesn't advance the ball anywhere.
17 MR. WISE:
You just go ahead and finish the 18 answer you were in the midst of when Mr. Seltzer 19 interrupted you.
20 MR. SELTZER:
And then answer my question.
i 21 MR. WISE:
Would you like it read back to 22 see where you were?
23 THE WITNESS:
I am trying to recollect.
24 A
It is possible for discussions to occur that 25-speculate on NRC actions.
It is possible that I have
1 1
Swencon 38 1
[h
(_)
2 participated in discussions related to possible NRC l
3 actions.
4 Q
Are you finished?
g 5
A Yes.
6 Q
Anything is possible or many things are I
7 possible.
8 What I am asking you is, do you have a 9
recollection of discussing with anyone before the 10 Three Mile Island disaster the fear that the NRC 11 would derate or shut down B&W's plants if you 12 prematurely disclosed certain information to the NRC?
()
13 A
well, again now, you have changed it a 14 little bit.
15 certain information is different from what 16 you used before, which you said a deficiency in 17 transient analysis.
18 Q
If we want to go back; I don't think I used 19 deficiency in transient analysis in the question.
20 MR. WISE:
Regardless of debating about 21 that, the witness understood you to be talking 22 about deficiencies.
Sometimes the witness doesn't 23 get subtle changes that you may be making in your 24 questions.
25 Q
Here is the question now.
You can clear
1 swannon 39 2
your mind of all prior questions.
3 Did you ever discuss with anybody before 4
the Three Mile Island disaster the possibility that 5
the NRC would derate or shut down B&W plants if you lll 6
prematurely disclosed some newly acquired information 7
to the NRC?
8 A
I have discussed the possibility that the 9
NRC might derate or shut down plants, but I would not 10 think that I would have discussed it in the context of 11 improper design or the design not meeting the 12 requirements or in the context of a wrong transient
()
13 analysis.
It is possible that I have discussed it 14 where incomplete information has been submitted to 15 the NRC and new information has come up and that we 16 needed to investigate the new information further 17 before submitting it to the NRC or to the customer.
t
'18 Q
You think that it did come up in that 19 context?
20 MR. WISE:
He is asking you whether you 21 have'a specific recollection of that happening.
22 A
I have a recollection of discussing the 23 effect of new information that was unknown before and 24 the possibility what the NRC might.do with that g-
-(.s' 25 information, but I do not believe that I would knowingly
1 Swancon 40 4
^w /
2.
Or that other people at B&W would knowingly withhold 3
information about design deficiencies or of incorrect, 4
as submitted, licensing information.
5 Q
You said in your last answer that you did ll%
6 discuss the possibility of what the NRC might do with 7
new information.
8 Did you discuss with anyone before the possibility of Three Mile Is1'and accident that one 9
~
10 what the NRC might do with new information was derate 1
11 or shut down B&W plants?
12 A
I just answered that, yes.
(~h I
(,)
13 Q
The answer is yes?
14 A
I have just answered that, yes, I discussed 8
15 what the NRC might possibly do upon receipt of new 16 information.
17 MR. SELTZER: -I think if your counsel agrees 18 with me, there is some ambiguity that-among the 1
19 possibilities you were discussing was the 20 possibility that the NRC might derate or shut down l
P ants.
21 22 MR. WISE:
You are talking about some 23 specific incidents?
24 MR. SELTZER:
No, I am not.
f [^
U l
25 Q
You have said you answered my question and i
+
c
1 Swanson 41 O-2 you said yes, so I think it is 90 percent certain 3
that you are saying yes you did discuss the possibility 4
that the NRC might derate or shut down B&W plants if it l
l 5
got certain new information.
llk 6
I am just trying to make the record 7
absolutely clear that that is what you intend to be 8
.saying.
9 MR. WISE:
No, I object.
I think you have 10 been switching back and forth from one question 11 to the other in a way that is very unfair to the 12 witness and is purposely confusing the record.
13 You have asked a number of questions at the l
14 beginning of this series concerning the witness' 15 general knowledge with respect to transient 16 analyses and deficiencies generally.
Then you 17 switched and asked a series of questions where 18 you were talking about his recollection of any 19 specific incidents where such and such may have 20 occurred.
Now, you have switched back again 21 and you are back into the general, and I think 22 it is very unfair to the witness to keep 23 switching from question to question like that 24 when he has been trying to answer your series of j}
25 qhestions'in context.
42 1
Swencon 2
You now appear to be asking a different 3
question than certainly I understood this line 4
of questions was about.
I understood you to be 5
asking of whether the witness was aware of some ll) 6 specific incident that occurred at some time and specitic recollection of certain 7
whether he had a 8
conversations.
Now it seems you have switched the 9
question back and you are asking whether that was 10 discussed as a general matter, and I am not sure 11 which question you are asking now or what it is 12 the witness is supposed to be answering, and it 4
13 has all been made very difficult by your
(
14 insistence of talking about some specific i
4 15 incidents and then talking in general.
16 You are obviously doing it purposely for 17 some reason.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Would you read the pending 19 question and then retype it at this point.
l 20 MR. WISE:
I don't care if you retype it 21 at any point, but I want to make sure that my 22 objection and comments relate to the question.
23 If au mean.by retyping it to skip over my 24 objection, then I will state my objection again O.
P 25 so that anybody reading this can see what my
1 Swencon 43
/^N 2
objection is.
( )
3 MR. SELTZER:
The court has your objection 4
in its full glory.
Don't worry.
5 (The requested portion of the transcript ggg 6
is as follows:
7
" Question:
You have said you answered my 8
question and you said yes, so I think it is 90 9
percent certain that you are saying yes you did 10 discuss the possibility that the NRC might derate II or shut down B&W plants if it got certain new 12 information.
'q)
13 "I am just trying to make the record 14 absolutely clear that that is what you intend to 15 be saying.")
16 MR. WISE:
Do you understand what the 17 question is?
IO THE WITNESS:
Good God, no.
I am all 19 confused.
20 MR. SELTZER:
Let's go back and reread the 21 prior question and answer, and then this question.
O 22 (The requested portion of the transcript is 23 as follows:
24
" Question:
tou said in your last answer
\\
/
25 that you did discuss the possibility of what the
' ~ '
1
1 Swanoon 44
()
2 NRC might do with new information.
Did you discuss with anyone before the 3
4 Three Mile Island accident that one possibility of what the NRC might do with new information eys (g) 5 6
derate or shut down Bsw plants?"
7 Answer:
I just answered that, yes."
8 Question:
The answer is yes?"
9 Answer:
I have just answered that., yes, I 10 discussed what the NRC might possibly do'upon 11 receipt of new information.")
12 (Record read) l (continued on next page)
(])
la 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 0
22 23 24 1
i e
n,
,-w
-e-..
1 Swanson 45 2
BY MR. SELTZER:
3 Q
Mr. Swanson, you just heard Nancy Rudolph 4
read back my question and your answers regarding 5
whether you discussed with other people the I
gg) 6 possibility that the NRC might derate or shut down B&W 7
plants if B&W were to turn over certain new information 8
to the NRC, and you heard in one answer you said, "Yes, 4
9 I think I already answered that question yes."
10 Am I correct?
And I don't want to put 11 words in your mouth that you were saying that yes, you 12 did discuss the possibility that the NRC might derate 13 or shut down B&W plants if it were given certain new
." f~}
v 14 information by B&W.
15 MR. WISE:
You are talking about some 16 specific incidents now?
17 MR. SELTZER:
Well, instances where he had
?
18 such a discussion.
That is what I am looking for.
i 19 A
Well, I am very confused.
I will say that.
20 MR. WISE:
Why don't you just state what as to what it is 21 the best of your recollection is O
22 you did discuss rather than trying to guess at 23 Mr. Seltzer's meaning and intent of his. questions.
24 MR. SELTZER:
I would like him to focus on
~
~V 25 the narrow question which ist i
\\
1 Swanoon 46 2
Q Did you discuss with others the possibility 3
that the NRC might derate or shut down B&W plants in 4
response to new information turned over by B&W7 5
A That is not a narrow question.
gg 6
MR. WISE:
Why don't you just state the 7
answer in your own words as best you recollect 8
what happened.
9 A
I do not believe I have discussed -- let me 10 start again, please.
I do not believe I would withhold 11 information from the NRC or would have discussed 12 withholding information from the NRC that deals with
()
13 incorrect or deficiency hardware design.
I do not 14 believe I would consider withholding information from 15 the NRC that deals with incorrect previously submitted 16 licensing analyses.
I have discussed withholding new 17 information from the NRC in the context that that new 18 information was not sufficiently mature.
We did not 19 understand enough about it to be able to talk with the 20 NRC intelligently, and unless we learned more by new 21 analyses or other evidence that it would not be useful O
22 or helpful to the NRC or to our customers or to us to 23 talk about any shallowly known information.
24 Q
Now, that is what I want to focus on.
You
\\)
25 said you have discussed withholding new information,
,. ~.. _ -
Swanson 47 1
2 and now I want to ask you in the context of discussing withholding new information from the NRC, did you f
3 discuss the possibility that the premature disclosure 4
5 of that new information to the NRC might result in the lll 6
NRC derating or shutting down B&W plants?
7 A
Isn't that what I just said?
Didn't I just 8
answer that question?
9 Q
Is the answer yes?
10 A
You have asked the question so many times, 11 Mr. Seltzer, that I am really confused.
12 Q
Well, don't be ccnfused.
h 13 Is the answer yes?
14 A
How can I not be confused?.
15 Q
The problem, Mr. Swanson is that you keep 16 telling me that you have discussed withholding new 17 information.
I just want to find out what is the 18 context in which you discussed withholding new 19 information that if you prematurely released it to the 20 NRC, the NRC might derate or shut down B&W plants.
21 MR. WISE:
What he is trying to do is ask 22 you whether or not you discussed the two things 23 simultaneously --
24 MR. SELTZER:
Or seriatim.
25 MR. WISE:
Or at the same time in connection
1 Swanson 48 2
with one another.
I think you have asked the 3
question a number of times, and the witness has 4
tried to give you the best of his understanding 5
as to what happened before the acccident, and I gg 6
also continue my objection with this sort of 7
general line of questioning that is not identified 8
to any particular incident.
9 MR. SELTZER:
We will get to specifics.
10 MR. WISE:
I think it is almost purposely 11
' misleading.
The question now is, did you discuss 12 the two things together on any particular incident.
()
13 A
In the same -- I don't --
14 MR. WISE:
Do you have a recollection of 15 doing that?
16 A
Not a direct recollection of a discussion.
17 g
Well, in writing or otherwise.
It doesn't 18 have to be an oral discussion.
19 A
When new information is found, it is often i
20 common to speculate on what the NRC might do with that 21 new information.
O 22 Q
Now, you say it is "often common" and I am 23 asking you in the often common situations where you 24 were speculating on what the NRC might do,-was one of O
25 the things that you considered that the NRC might do
1 Swanoon 49
()
2 was derate or shut down your plants?
3 A
That is likely to be a consideration in i
4 what the NRC might do with new information.
5 Q
You believe that that is something that (g) 6 you considered?
Is that right?
7 A
It could be.
8 Q
Do you believe you discussed that with 9
Lou Cartin?
10 A
Possibly.
11 Q
Is there anybody else that you believe you 12 might have discussed that with?
-(
13 A
I don't know.
I don't remember exactly.
14 You apparently have a specific situation in mind if 15 you asked me about Lou cartin.
16 Would you ask me about the specific 17 situation?
I may be able to help you out better.
18 Q
You are doing all right.
19 MR. WISE:
Well, if you have reached a 20 breaking point, we have been going for an hour 21 and 20 minutes, which is longer than you ever 9
22 permitted us to go with any of your witnesses, 23 so I would like to request a break at this point.
24 MR. SELTZER:
That's fine.
O 25 (Recess)
cc 1
Swancon 50 2
BY MR. SELTZER:
3 Q
You said you believed that you had i
4 discussions about the possibility of the NRC derating 5
or shutting down Bsw plants in response to receipt of gg) 6 new information.
And you said such discussions had 7
taken place before the Three Mile Island accident.
8 on what occasions do you recall having 9
such discussions or what was the occasion for such 10 discussions?
11 A
The one conversation that comes to mind is 12 a discussion probably involving Lou cartin, but I am 13 not sure of that, where we discussed new information on 14 pumps, reactor coolant pumps, continuing to run during 15 a LOCA.
16 Now, the NRC requires analyses in one of 17 the assumptions for a LOCA and one of the assumptions 18 for the LOCA analyses is that the RC pumps are tripped 19 or turned off at the start of the LOCA analysis.
20 At the time of the discussion, it was 21 thought that RC pumps on or running during the LOCA 22 analysis would be beneficial to core cooling and for I
23 that reason the NRC required the more conservative or L
24 worst case assumption to be that the RC pumps are 25 tripped, and we speculated that the situation with the i
l
1 Swancon 51
)
2 RC pumps on during the LOCA analysis had not been 3
analyzed, but we did not suspect that were they to run 4
during the LOCA that the plant would be less safe.
5 New information since Three Mile Island ggg 6
does indicate that the RC pumps, if they were to 7
continue to run, the plant may be less safe than if 8
they were stopped at the start of the accident, but at 9
the time we discussed it it was in the context that 10 we had not analyzed the situation.
There was no 11 consideration that there would be a safety problem.
12 g
Do you recall any other occasion on which 13 you discussed the possibility that the NRC might
()
14 derate or shut down B&W plants if new information 15 were given to the NRC7 16 A
Not specifically, no.
17 Q
In the conversation that you were just 18 describing concerning the absence of a pumps running 19 analysis, how did the possibility of the NRC derating 20 or shutting down B&W plants enter into the 21 conversation?
O 22 A
I don't exactly remember a specific 23 conversation.
I remember the conversation or the 24 issue more than I remember any specific conversation.
25 And I will try to explain it to you as best I can m
1 Swcncon 52 i
2 remember it at any rate.
3 The Toledo Edison Company has a raised l
4 loop plant.
That means that the steam generator is 5
at a higher elevation relative to the reactor vessel ggg 6
than our other plants, our other 177 plants, and this 7
feature has a beneficial aspect for natural 8
circulation.
That is the cold thermal center in the 9
steam generator can be at a much higher level than the 10 hot thermal center of the core, thus allowing a higher 11 rate of natural circulation within the reactor coolant 12 loops.
()
13 Toledo Edison requested us to -- let me 14 start all over again.
Because of the higher cold 15 thermal center in the steam generator, a greater rate 16 of heat transfer was possible with the configurations 17 and because of the greater rate of heat transfer, it 18 was possible to cool the reactor coolant greater in 19 that plant when auxiliary feedwater was turned on and 20 caused shrinkage of the reactor coolant which could 21 possibly, and I am not certain that it is entirely 9
22 possible, drain the pressurizer.
You have heard this 23 before?
^
24 Q
Yes.
25 A
Is there much sense for me to go through it
/
1 Swancon 53 2
then?
3 MR. WISE:
Go ahead and complete your 4
answer.
5 Q
What I am interested in is how you are going ggg 6
to get into the anticipation that the NRC might derate 7
or shut down all your 177 plants except for one of 8
them if you disclosed new information about not having 9
studied pumps running cases for small break LOCAS.
10 Are you building up to that, because that is 11 what the question was.
12 A
I am trying to get to the point where we
()
13 started to speculate about pumps running.
14 Q
And the NRC response?
15 A
No, just how we got to the point about 16 discussions on the pumps running during the LOCA 17 analysis.
18 Q
with your counsel's indulgence, let me 19 clarify.
The question is how in the course of your 25 discussions of not having previously done a pumps 21 running analysis did the possibility of the NRC O
22 derating or shutting down B&W plants come up?
23 A
It was a new condition that we had not 24 been required to analyze by the NRC in the past.
It 25 had been presumed by the NRC that the worst case
1 swanoon 54 2
condition for analysis would be with the pumps tripped i
3 for the LOCA analysis or for the small break LOCA 4
analysis, more specifically, since we are not required 5
by the NRC to analyze the case for the pumps running, ggg 6
we had not done an analysis of a LOCA with the pumps 7
on.
8 Now, what do you want'from me?
I am not i
9 sure where you are going.
10 Q
I think I understand where you have gotten 11 me so far, that previously the NRC had required that 12 you assume as one of the worst case assumptions that
()
13 the reactor coolant pumps were tripped for loss of 14 coolant accident analyses, right?
15 A
It was one of the criteria that the 16 analyses had to assume as input that the pumps were not 17 on.
18 Q
That is because that was a necessary 19 corollary of a loss of off-site power, right?
20 A
It is possible to have loss of reactor 21 coolant pumps for other reasons, but the most dominant O
22 thought is that the off-site power is lost.
f 23 Q
It is a fact, isn't it, that the NRC had 24 required, to your understanding, that for loss of L
25
' coolant accident analyses the vendors assume a loss of i-----__----,-----...._
..-s w
. ~,, ~ - -, _
---,-..,,=s.,
n.
1 Swcncon 55
)
2 off-site power, isn't that right?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
So part of the worst 5
A Yes.
g part of the worst case assumptions that 6
Q 7
you had to build into loss of coolant accident 8
analyses were a loss of off-site power and a loss of 9
any equipment that could only be run with off-site 10 power available, isn't that true?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Reactor coolant pumps can only be operated 13 in B&W design plants with off-site power available,
(
14 right?
15 A
Correct.
16 Q
Now, you realized sometime before the Three 17 Mile Island accident that while the NRC had included 1
18 as a worst case assumption a loss of off-site power 19 and a nonoperation of the reactor coolant pumps, it 20 might produce an even worse situation if the reactor 21 coolant pumps remained on, isn't.that right?
And I O
22 use the words "might produce."
23 A
No, it wasn't that way.
It was that it had 24 not been analyzed and that we thought that it should be
\\.J 25 analyzed to be sure of that case, to be sure that it t
l
l 1
Swanson 56 2
was not worse.
And I must admit, I am having a little 3
trouble trying to remember what I knew then versus what 4
I know now, because now it has been analyzed and it is 5
known to be for some situations worse, but at that gg 6
time it was not.
As a matter of fact, it was thought 7
that it would be beneficial because of the forced 8
cooling with this thought to be better than natural 9
circulation cooling.
10 Q
I thought you told Bill Spangler in 11 Nov' ember 1978, which is before the Three Mile Island 12 accident that ECCS analysis, "Have not 13 investigated small breaks with RC pumps running if 14 such an analysis were to be made, the results would 15 probably be unfavorable."
16 MR. WISE:
I am going to object unless you 17 show the witness the document you are reading 18 from.
You have objected during the course of I
19 depositions.of plaintiffs' witnesses by us to our 20 reading from documents without showing the witness 21 a copy of the document that you are reading from.
9 22 Q
While David Taylor is getting it out, do 23 you recall that this issue of pumps running was something 24 that did surface sometime in or about the last half of 9
25 19787
1 Swanoon 57 (O
_)
2 A
It surfaced in connection with this Toledo
- P sode.
i 3
4 MR. SELTZER:
Let me mark for identification 5
as GPU Exhibit 592 a memo that Eric Swanson sent ggg 6
to Bill Spangler, subject " Auxiliary Feedwater 7
Setpoints," November 15, 1978.
8 (November 15, 1978 memo from Eric Swanson to
" Auxiliary Feedwater Setpoints" 9
Bill Spangler, re 10 was marked GPU Exhibit 592 for identification as 11 of this date.)
12 BY MR. SELTZER:
i( )
13 Q
Is GPU 592 a copy of a memorandum that you 14 sent to Bill Spangler in or about mid November 1978?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Those are your initial.s, "EW,"
scrawled on 17 the second page?
18 A
Clearly written.
Clearly written, please.
19 Q
Those are your initials clearly written?
20 A
Yes.
21-Q Do you see at the top of the second page O
22 where you say that "ECCS Analysis;...have not 23 investigated small breaks with RC pumps running"?
r-j 24 A
Yes.
t) 25_
Q You did say, didn't you, that it was your
1 Swancon 58 2
belief that "If such an analysis were to be made, the 1 )
results would probably be unfavorable," isn't that 3
4 right?
5 MR. WISE:
I object.
You are reading that g
6 out of context.
7 I think that the entire memorandum concerns 8
a possible change that was under consideration 9
and --
10 MR. SELTZER:
Do you have an objection to J
11 make?
12 MR. WISE:
Yes, I,do.
I object to your
(~
13 taking that out of context.
If you are asking V}
14 what the words are on the page, we will stipulate 15 that on page 2, one sentence reads as follows:
16 "If such an analysis were to be made, the 17 results would probably be unfavorable."
If that 18 is what you are attempting to establish that that 19 is on that page, I suppose you can do that.
If 20 you want to find out what the meaning of that 21 sentence was and what it relates to in this O
22 memorandum, I think you should ask the witness 23 that question.
24 BY MR. SELTZER:
25 Q
It is a fact, isn't it, Mr. Swanson, that at
\\'_/
.i
l~
1 Swanson 59 O(-)
2 the time you wrote this memo you apprehended that a
3 pumps running analysis would probably produce results 4
which were worse than pumps off?
5 A
Yes, but I have to read some information lll 6
on the first page to understand why I said that, and 7
if you look at the bottom of the page,and see,there is condition with off-site power available, which, as 8
is a 9
you know, would allow the reactor coolant pumps to in that sequence an 10
- continue operation, and that l
11 ESFAS signal could be received, which would only allow 12 a two-foot level in the steam generator.
And that O
13 is tied in with, as I remember it, the control systems
( )
14 which decide what level is to be used in the steam 15 generator, so that combination of off-site power which 16 allows the reactor coolant pumps to run in combination 17 with a two-foot main feedwater level is much below the 18 level that had been used by ECCS analysis, and I 19 thought at that time that the two-foot level in 20 combination with the pumps running would produce an 21 unacceptable ECCS analysis.
22 Shortly after I wrote this memo, I found 23 out that my assumption -- let me start again, please.
/~
24 I have a little trouble separating what I know now from
(_3) 25 what I knew then.
l 1
Swanson 60 N
-2 g
obviously, if you don't already know,what I am interested in is what you can recall knowing then, 3
4 not what you know only subsequent to the accident.
5 A ~
To the best of my recollection, then, the lll 6
situation dealt with a combination of the low feedwater 7
level and the pumps running, and shortly after I wrote 8
this' memo Bert Dunn told me that he thought that the 9
two-foot level would be all right with the pumps 10 running.
I believe it was Bert.
And the reasoning was 11 that-that was an adequate level with heat removal with 12 forced convection and that was his belief at that time, if you look at the top of 13 so I think in the context 14 page 2, the first condition may or may not be acceptable 15 to ECCS analysis. They have not investigated small 16 breaks with RC pumps running, meaning the combination 17 of the pumps running and the two-foot level, which is 18 that first condition.
19 So very shortly thereafter and in talking to 20 Bert about this, I think I found out that he thought 21 that that was not correct that the two-foot level would (Il l
22 be all right because the forced convection was better.
23 Q
Let me try and put some time dimensions to eN 24' your statement "very shortly thereafter."
I would like
\\~sl i
l 25 to show you GPU Exhibit 330, which is a memo from Bob l
1 Svanson 61 4
s--
2 Jones, Dunn's assistant, to you and others, dated 3
December 11, 1978.
4 MR. WISE:
It is actually addressed to Mr.
lll 5
cartin, but Mr. Swanson is listed as one of the 6
recipients of a carbon copy.
7 MR. SELTZER:
I think that is Eric Swanson's 8
handwriting on the second page.
9 BY MR. SELTZER:
10 Q
Is that your handwriting on the second page?
11 A
It looks like it.
12 Q
GPU 330 relates to the same pumps running 13 issue that you were discussing in your memo to Spangler, 14 GPU 592, isn't that true?
15 A
I didn't hear you.
Please say that again.
16 (Question read) 17 A
Let me read through this, please.
18 What was your question again?
19 (Question read) 20 A
Yes and no. As I look at these, they'are all 21 related to pumps running.
That's evident.
But I think, 22 and again I am not sure of how my memory was, that the t
23 concern I had here in GPU No. 592 was more related to
[~')
24 the Toledo situation with their special control system,
%d 25 and the two-foot level with the pumps running, whereas
_. _ ~ _
1 Swanoon 62
- )
(_/
2 it may have -- other discussions may have occurred i
3 between the time that memo was issued and this second 4
memo, GPU No. 330 that you hended me, because the way lll 5
I read this second memo that Bob Jones wrote, he was 6
interested in investigating it on a general basis.
7 Q
So he was focusing not just on Toledo, but 8
on all BEW plants, right?
9 A
Right.
That is what it looks like.
10 Q
I was correct, was I not, in describing 11 Jones as being an assistant in Bert Dunn's ECCS 12 analysis unit?
()
13 A
I am not sure if you are asking me for his 14 title.
I am not sure of what it was then.
He was a I'm not sure -- at the 15 supervisor or maybe wasn't 16 time.
17 MR. WISE:
He worked for Mr. Dunn?
18 THE WITNESS:
Oh, yes, he worked for Bert.
19 Q
And Bert is copied on this, do you see that?
20 A
on my memo?
21 Q
No, on GPU 330.
22 A
Yes.'
j i
23 Q
He is also copied on your memo, right?
24 A
Yes.
l 25 Q
Bob Jones told you in GPU 330 something
'l
~,
1 Swancon 63 s
2 about what he expected the RC pumps rune;ing case would 3
show.
4
- Ta).e a look at, first, the beginning of the 5
second paragraph.
Q ere Jone$ says:
"In making this g
6 recommondation, ECCS has performed a revieir'to determine 7
what previous analyses are available with the RC puops 8
powered and.nis'o has made an engineering assessment of s
9 what would happen under this situation.
No previous s.
10 analyses could be found."
l x,
11 I take it 1. hat his statement that no previous y
!s 12 analyses could,be found was consistent with the finding
+
s 13 that you had reported to SpAnngler about a raonth earlier s
14 that you didn
- L believi ECCS analysis.had investigated 1
3
\\
- x.
15 small breaks with RC' pumps running, right?'.,
16 A
I am trying to remember exactly how this-I' 17
'came about.
I think I probably said that ECCS had
'18 not investigated it vith the thought in my mind that N.
19 they had not been required toTby the NRC, so that's
~
\\
" D 20 probably my response,.the reason I said it this-way'{n 21 No. 592.
s O
22 Q
Whether they were required to do it by the
\\
23 NRC or not, your review had' determined that they'nad
\\,
cm,
.24 not investigated small breaks with RC pumps running,
~
O..
s
(
25 right?
\\
.t
\\
f s'
(
>. ~
. s3
,l
\\
g y
.e.
1 Swancon 64
('h.)
2 MR. WISE:
I don't think we have established i
3 that Mr. Swanson made a review.
You can ask him 4
that question but I don't think that he has said S
that he performed a review to make that gg) 6 determination.
7 Q
What did you base your statement to Bill 8
Spangler, the head of nuclear service, on when you said 9
they have not investigated small breaks with RC pumps 10 running, how did you know they hadn't?
11 A
Well, I suspected that because it had not 12 been required by licensing.
Whether I made a review or
()
13 not, I really don't remember.
I probably did not.
14 Q
You knew as of December 11th when you got 15 Bob Jnnes' memo coming from somebody in ECCS analysis 16 that he wasn't able to find any previous analysis of 17 cmall break accidents with reactor _ coolant pumps 18 running, isn't that right?
19 A
That's what he says.
I I
l 2b Q
Now, would you go down to-the first sentence 21 of the third paragraph.
l 22 Do you see where it begins, "Ars illustrated 23 above..."?
l s,
24 A
Yes.
25 Q
Jonen ?ron ECCS analysis writes, "Ae
_=___
1 Swanson 65 O
2 illustrated above, it is not obviously clear that 3
leaving the reactor coolant pumps running results in 4
an enhanced ECCS situation."
5 Did you understand that to mean that as of llh 6
December 11, 1978, Jones of ECCS analysis was not I
7 prepared to say that pumps running produced better 8
cooling results than pumps off?
9 A
Well, he says what he says.
10 Q
Did you understand that to mean that as of 11 December lith he did not believe that the statement 12 could be made that RC pumps running produced better 13 cooling than RC pumps off under loss of coolant 14 accident conditions?
15 A
That's what he says in his memo, yes.
You 16 can see it here.
17 Q
Now, Dunn is copied on this, as you noted 18 earlier.,
19 Is it your understanding that it must have 20 been sometime after December 11th when Dunn 21 communicated to you his conviction that pumps running 22 would be a better case than pumps off?
23 A
I don't know the time frame, so I really 24 can't answer that question.
L 25 Q
Dunn's advice to you about pumps running I
l l
i
1 Swanson 66 2
being a better case than pumps off is inconsistent with Bob Jones' statement at the beginning of the 3
4 third paragraph, isn't it?
5 MR. WISE:
Now, I object to that.
As to llk 6
whether it is or is not inconsistent, you have 7
asked Mr. Swanson for his understanding of what 8
Mr. Jones said in a memo that is written in the 9
English language and apparently you are not 10 happy with what Mr. Jones said --
11 MR. SELTZER:
I am thrilled with what he 12 said.
13 MR. WISE:
What Mr. Jones said is,
"...it 14 is not obviously clear that leaving the RC pumps 15 running results in an enhanced ECCS situation."
16 I cannot read from what Mr. Jones said 17 whether he thought one way or the other on it.
18 He said it is not obviously clear.
19 Now you have asked the witness what he 20 understood that to mean, and he said whatever he 21 said, but to now ask him whether or not something 22 is consistent with Mr. Jones' position when you 23 had Mr. Jones here for a deposition for several 24 days, I think is improper and I object to it.
x-25 BY MR. SELTZER:
1
1 Swencon 67 2
Q Did you understand that what Jones said to
]
3 you about being a better case then with pumps off is 4
inconsistent with what Jones said to you in the lll 5
beginning of the paragraph, GPU 330.
6 A
I don't really recall the time frame.
O.K.,
and I believe what Bert probably told me had to 7
so 8
do with this Toledo situation where pumps running with f
9 a two-foot level and, as I recall, that he told me that 10 that would be all right.
You asked a question, is his 11 statement then inconsistent with Bob's statement 12 MR. WISE:
No, that is not the question.
~
()
13 The question is whether you specifically thought 14 about it at the time and whether you today have 15 a recollect, ion of what you thought in December 16 1978 when you received Mr. Jones' memorandum and 17 any possible connection you made between that 18 memorandum and what Mr. Duna had told you orally 19 in connect $on with GPU 592.
Are you able today 20 to recall that?
21 A
Heavenly days, no.
I can't rememoer those 22 little details.-
23 Q
What did you say?
Heavenly days?
24 A
Heavenly days, no.
g-(>
25 Q
It wasn't until after the Three Alle Island
1 Swcncon 68 p,
(
2 accident that E&W had completelv analyzed the pumps u
3 running case, is that true?
4 A
I know that they did have extensive analysis 5
with pumps running after Three Mile Island.
I don't lll 6
remember if they had some partial analysis before.
I 7
don't remember.
8 Q
I didn't ask you whether they had a partial 9
analysis.
I said, isn't it a fact that it wasn't 10 until after the Three Mile Island accident that B&W 11 completed a pumps running analysis for small break 12 loss of coolant accidents?
I')
13 MR. WISE:
Are you in a position to testify N/
14 one way or the other?
Do you have knowledge of 15 that fact?
16 MR. SELTZER:
Let's not beat around the 17 bush.
18 Q
I think you said earlier that it wasn't 19 until after the accident that you discovered that 20 pumps running was a worse case than pumps off.
I 21 presume if you had done a complete analysis before the 22 Three Mile Island accident, you would have discovered 23 that before the Three Mile Island accident.
Therefore, 24 it must follow, as the night the day, that B&W hadn't 7-
)
\\,' _./
25 completed its pumps running analysis for small break l
1 Swanoon 69 2
accidents until after the Three Mile Island accident, 3
isn't that true?
4 MR. WISE:
I don't want to quibble with 5
you, Mr. Seltzer, but you have a witness here an.d ll) 6 for whatever reasons you have chosen to ask him l
7 questions this morning without ever asking him 8
what positions he held within the company and 9
what his duties and responsibilities were.
That 10 is your prerogative, but to assume that he is 11 somehow aware and responsible for something that 12 happened at B&W before and after the accident, I
(
13 think is unfair.
14 MR. SELTZER:
Don't be ridiculous.
I am 15 not assuming that he is knowledgeable about 16 everything in the B&W company.
17 MR. WISE:
He has told you that he became I
aware after the accident of the results of certain 18 19 analysis.
If you want to ask him whether he had as to when these analyses were 20 personal kno'wledge 21 performed and when the conclusions were reached 22 that is a perfectly fair question, but I don't 23 think it is fair to ask him whether B&W did or 24 did not complete something unless you have
~}
%_/
25 established whether he was the person within B&W
1 Swanson 70 l
.fs/
2 that was responsible for forming the analysis 3
until after the Three Mile Island accident?
The 4
question is, isn't it your understanding that I
5 B&W did not complete its analysis of the pumps 6
running case for small break accidents until 7
after the Three Mile Island accident?
8 A
Did not complete it?
9 Q
I will withdraw it.
Let me take it in much 10 smaller steps.
11 It is your testimony, isn't it, that it 12 wasn't until after the Three Mile Island accident that
(
13 B&W discovered the pumps running was a worse case 14 than pumps off?
15 MR. WISE Are you saying under all conditions 16 because I don't think that has been established.
17 Q
For certain conditions for small break loss 18 of coolant accidents, leaving the pumps on could produce a worse case than shutting them off at the start of the 19 20 transient.
21 A
Let me tell you the extent of my knowledge.
22 I am not in the ECCS group.
It is, to the best of my 23 knowledge, it was determined that pumps running after 24 the pumps running conditions for certain ranges of U(~S 25 small braaks could be more detrimental than the pumps
Swanocn 71 1
/m(,)
2 off.
I believe that that finding was made after Three Mile Island did occur, but I do not know how much 3
investigation the ECCS group put into it throughout 4
5 the period from about the time frame of these memos up lll 6
to Three Mile Island.
7 Q
Now, you previously testified that under 8
the ground rules that B&W was operating with the NRC 9
before the Three Mile Island accident, B&W was expected 10 to analyze loss of coolant accidents under worst case 11 assumption of reactor coolant pumps being off from the 12 start of the transient.
Isn't that correct?
13 A
That was the NRC requirement for licensing.
()
14 Q
Now, at some point before the Three Milt 15 Island accident, probably around November 1978, you.
16 learned that B&W had never investigated what would 17 happen to core cooling if the pumps were left on during 18 a loss of coolant accident, isn't that right?
19 A
Well, in the context of this memo that I, 20 wrote to Bill Spangler, I.was concerned with the two-21 foot level in combination with the pumps running and, 22 as you see here, Bob Jones has written another memo 23 for all plants on a slightly different aspect of it.
24 Q
He says there are no previous analyses
'd 1
25 of pumps running with small breaks, right?
r
1 Swenocn 72
~}
2 MR. WISE:
We have already read into the s/
3 record what he says.
4 A
Yes, he says that.
5 Q
My question is:
What was it specifically ggg i
6 now that caused'you to believe that the NRC might 7
derate or shut down B&W plants if you disclosed to 8
them at the end of 1978 that you had not done a pumps 9
running analysis for small break loss of coolant 10 accidents?
4 11 THE WITNESS:
Say that again, please.
12 (Question read)
+
13 MR. WISE:
I don't think he has testified 4
14 to that.
I will let the witness answer in his i
15 own words as to what he was talking about.
16 A
I am not sure I can remember enough to draw 17 a connection between this statement at the top of page i
18 2 of my memo to Bill Spangler and what you just asked 19 me right at the moment.
20 Q
You stated earlier this morning l
l 21 A
I am not really certain how these conversationo k
22 transpired.
They took place a long time ago, and I 23 don't remember the exact conversation.
24 Q
Let me try to refresh your recollection.
C)
(_
25 You testified earlier this morning that it was in the
1 Swancon 73 2
context of this pumps running concern that you believe 3
you had a conversation with Lou cartin about the 4
possibility that if you disclosed the issue of pumps g
5 running analysis to the NRC as new information without 6
the analysis being completed that it might result in 7
the NRC derating or shutting down B&W plants.
And l
8 refreshing your recollection about that prior testimony, 9
I am now asking what was it about disclosing this new 10 information to the NRC that made you believe that they 11 might derate or shut down B&W plants?
12 A
I am not sure I really recall how this all 13 came about.
I can state that people do try to figure 14 out what the NRC will do under some circumstances.
15 In this circumstance, it could be that it was an 16 unanalyzed situation. I think, at about the time I i
17 wrote this memo to Bill Spangler, that I thought the 18 analyses of pumps running with a two-foot level would 19 be unfavor'able.
I say that f-here.
Shortly after 20 that, Bert told me that pumps running would provide' 21 better heat transfer, so I don't think there was a 6
22 safety problem involved.
23 If I had thought that a safety problem would 24 have been involved, I would have probably gone through 25 the right channels to announce a safety problem.
I
I swanoon 74
(~'
2 think this is new in the context of new information 3
and it is evidently new because it hasn't been analyzed, 4
but the information I had at about this time was that lll 5
it probably was not a safety problem, at least as I 6
recall it or roughly recall it.
7 Q
It is a fact, isn't it, that B&W could not 8
prove that there was no safety problem without doing 9
a full pumps running analysis, isn't that right?
10 A
Well, it seems to me the way I remember it 11 was that the general thought was that pumps running 12 would be a better condition because of the forced 13 convection and the better heat transfer to the steam 14 generators for heat removal, and I believe the NRC 15 probably felt that too; otherwise, they would have had 16 this as a part of our analyses.
17 Q
Did you ever have any conversations with 18 the NRC about that?
19 A
No, I am really only guessing.
20 Q
You don't know what 21 MR. WISE:
Go ahead and finish your answer.
22 A
I am really only guessing because the NRC 23
.had always required these analyses to be done with the
)
24 pumps off.
Therefore, I can kind of conclude that n
(\\
25 they also thought that the pumps off would be a more
1 Swanson 75 4
2 challenging condition.
3 Q
Let me pick up on that.
4 In other words, before 1979, the NRC lll 5
required small break analyses to include the assumption 6
that the reactor coolant pumps we're off throughout the 7
loss of coolant accident, right?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
You understood that that had been built into 10 the NRC requirements because they assumed that that was 11 a worst case assumption, right?
12 A
- Well, I. don't know exactly what
'1e NRC did' 13 assume.
I just drew that as a conclusion.
14 Q
Now, by November 15, 1978, you had some 4
15 reason to question whether pumps off was really a worst 16 case, didn't you?
17 A
Maybe you are not understanding what I am 18 trying to tell you.
19 MR. SELTZER:
All right, I withdraw the 20 question.
l 21 Q
You knew, didn't you, that until B&W did a 22 full-scale pumps running analysis, there would not be 23 conclusive assurance that pumps runniug was a better 24 case than pumps off, isn't that true?
I 25 MR. WISE:
At what' time are you asking for
1 Swanoon 76 2
now.
You say you knew in the past?
3 MR. SELTZER:
Before the TMI debacle.
4 Q
You knew that B&W could not state conclusively lg) 5 to the NRC that pumps running was a better case than 6
pumps off until it had done a full-scale transient 7
analysis?
8 A
I do have a hard time trying to put this 9
pumps running issue in a time perspective, because, as 10 you know, we have done some analyses more recently than' 11 these memos that show that the pumps running condition 12 for some breaks could be a worst condition, f-s 13 At this time, I thought, especially after i
14 Bert talked to me about this Toledo memo, was 15 that the pumps running condition would transfer heat 16 better and, therefore, may be a better condition than 17 the pumps off, but it was unanalyzed.
Purely and 18 simply unanalyzed.
19 Q
Now, isn't it true that because it was 20 unanalyzed, if you told the NRC about it before it 21 was fully analyzed, the NRC might not be placated by 22 Bert Dunn's oral assurance that pumps running was a 23 better case than pumps off and that that might lead 24 to the possible derating and shutting down of B&W l
25 plants?
1 Swanson 77 f
2 A
Well, you got a whole lot of statements in
(
3 that last question.
4 Q
Do you want me to break it up into pieces?
lll 5
A Let me try and figure it out.
6 MR. WISE:
Off the record.
7 (Discussion off the record.)
8 (Question read) 9 A
I think you have got the thoughts I have 10 tried to tell you all kind of twisted around.
Whether 1
11 the NRC is placated by Bert Dunn or not is irrelevant l
l 12 and I really don't know what the NRC would do, O.K.
1 13 In the time framework around this memo, the concern 14 I had was the two-foot level in combination with 15 pumps running.
16 Now, as it has evolved and matriculated with 17 tim &,
even past Three Mile Island, we found that pumps 18 running in some cases can be worse than pumps off, and 19 at this time we prc bably had the suspicion that the 20 Pumps running was actually better, but we hadn't 21 analyzed it so we really didn't know for certain.
9 22 That's all I can say.
I r t sure whether I answered 23 the question you asked It was a long question.
24 MR. SELTZER:
hat is your pleasure?
25 I have got maybe ten more minutes to try and
1 Swanson 78 2
pull this together.
If you want to take a lunch 3
break, we can do it.
4 MR. WISE:
If you really have got only ten ll) 5 minutes, let's finish it.
If you think it is ten 6
minutes and, perhaps, 30, then I prefer to go ahead l
7 and take our lunch break.
8 MR. SELTZER:
It is just five or ten minutes.
9 BY MR. SELTZER:
10 Q
As of December 1978, B&W was not in a 11 position to state conclusively that pumps off was the 12 worst possible case, was it?
13 A
That's hard for me to answer, and it would 14 probably be better to ask an ECCS specialist such as 15 Bob Jones what he thought at about that time.
16 Q
Well, I am referring to what you signed on 17 December 19, 1978, GPU Exhibit 122, page 2.
18 A
What I signed.
This is a memo from Lou 19 Cartin.
20 Q
Do you see EWS for LRC on the third page?
21 A
Yes, I do.
9 22 Q
You did sign it, right?
23 A
Yes.
24 Q
Look at item 6 on page 2, please, and i*
b)
(,
25 you take a moment just to read that paragraph I would 3
+c w
-v
- - - - - " - ' ~ -
1 Swanson 79 6
(
2 appreciate it.
3 A
O.K.
4 Q
Let me read the first three sentences into 5
the record:
"BsW's position to Toledo Edison Company (g)
G is that the status of the reactor coolant pumps should 7
not be included in the dual setpoint control logic at 8
this time.
If questioned by the NRC, however, B&W 9
must be in a position to state that the small break 10 topicals have considered the worst possible 11 conditions (i.e.,
loss of off-site power).
Our 12 inability to respond conclusively to such an inquiry 13 could result in the NRC derating or shutting down all O
14 of B&W's 177 fuel assembly operating plants (except 15 SMUD) until the issue is resolved."
16 Does that refresh your recollection, Mr.
17 Swanson,that as of December 19, 1978 you believed that 18 B&W was not in a position to respond conclusively that 19 pumps off or loss of off-site power was the worst 20
-possible condition for small break accidents?
21 A
well, it refreshes my recollection,that's O
22 for certain.
And Lou states what he says here, which 23 you have read into the record.
24 Q
When you say it refreshes your recollection
.. f~)
'\\/
25 for certain, do you mean this does remind you that as
1 Swanson 80 i
l
(
2 of December 19, 1978 you understood that B&W was not 3
in a position to state conclusively that pumps off was 4
a worse case for small break loss of coolant ll>
5 accidents?
6 A
Yes, the part of my memory that is 7
stimulated is this RC pump status signal and inclusion 8
in the dual setpoint control logic.
9 MR. WISE:
What do you recall about that?
10 Don't just leave us hanging.
11 Q
If you could respond to my question; if you 12 want to also answer Bob Wise if it is any different, 13 you can do that too, but I am trying to find out does 14 this refresh your recollection that as of December 19, 15 1978 it was your understanding that B&W was not in a 16 position to state conclusively that loss of off-site 17 power and reactor coolant pumps off was a worse case 18 for small break accidents.
19 A
Well, with respect to what I remember, is 20 that it was an unanalyzed situation.
21 Q
If it is unanalyzed, you can't state what 22 is the worst case, can you?
23 A
The belief,I believe, in the company at 24 that time, though, in general, was that the pumps O
2b running case would transfer more heat.
Again, I W.
1 Swanoen 81
()
these times are so close together, I can't 2
can't i
3 say how the thing was evolving.
4 Q
I know that that was the belief in some 5
quarters, but the question that I'am putting to you, lll 6
and then maybe we should just go to lunch if you can't 7
focus on it, is you have used this phrase or Cartin 8
used it, and you signed it, about the ability to 9
respond conclusively or the inability to respond 10 conclusively.
11 Do you see that phrase?
12 A
Yes.
13
-Q so I am not talking about some feelings 14 about unanalyzed cases.
I am using this phrase here 15 about B&W's, quote, inability to respond conclusively, 16 close quote, and I am asking you, isn't it a fact that 17 as of mid-December 1978 B&W was unable to respond 18 conclusively as to what was the worst case with respect 19 to pumps on or pumps off during a small break loss of 20 cool' ant accident.
Isn't that precisely what this means 21 and what you signed?
22 A
It means what it says right here to you.
23 Q
Thank you.
You mean T have correctly 24 construed it?
(~)/.
25 A
I didn't say that.
I said it means what it i
1 Swencon 82 2
means to you.
What it means to me is that it is an 3
unanalyzed situation.
4 Q
Until you analyze it, you can't state 5
conclusively to the NRC which is the worst case, can gg) 6 you?
7 MR. WISE:
Well, I think you are now 8
quibbling with him.
He has told you he believed 9
he knew what the worst case is.
He told you 10 that he hadn't analyzed it.
11 MR. SELTZER:
I am trying to find out what 12 "our inability to respond conclusively" means, 13 and I am asking him doesn't that mean that until 14 you had analyzed completely the small break loss 15 of coolant accident with pumps running, B&W was 16 unable to respond conclusively that pumps off 17 was the worse condition?
18 A
No, it is not exactly the way you said it, 19 at least the way I remember it, O.K.,
and my memory is 20 limited.
It was that it was an unanalyzed situation, 21 O.K.,
period.
9 22 Now if you go and start thinking about the 23 things that have occurred since then, we found out that 24 it is a worst case..
(x3) 25 g
What is a worst case?
I swanoon 83 r
2 A
That for some -- we do now know because we 3
have analyzed it that the pumps running cases were for I don't remember 4
some small breaks, but it is not 5
exactly this situation.
I think it was only that it 6
t 4 unanalyzed.
7 MR. SELTZER:
Let's go have some lunch.
4 8
(Time noted 12:45 p.m.)
4 9
i 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 s --
24 25 4
~-
i 1
84 2
AFTERNOON SESS I ON 3
(Time noted:
2:00 p.m.)
4 E R'I C
- SWANSON, resumed.
lll 5
EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) 6 BY MR. SELTZER:
l 7
g I would like to start this afternoon by 8
.having the reporter read to you a question and an 9
answer from this morning's session, and I would like 10 to ask that the question and answer be repeated in the 11 transcript at this point.
t 12 (The record was read by the reporter as 13 follows:
14
" Question:
With your counsel's indulgence, 15 1et me clarify.
The question is how in the course 16 of your discussions of not having previously done 17 a pumps running analysis did the possibility of 18 the NRC derating or shutting down B&W plants come 19 up?"
20
" Answer:
It was a new condition that we 21 had not been required to analyze by the NRC in 22 the past.
It had been presumed by the NRC that 23 the worst case condition for analysis would be 24 with the pumps tripped for the LOCA analysis or 25 for the small break LOCA analysis, more i
h 1
Swanoon 85
(
2 specifically.
Since we are not required by the 3
NRC to analyze the case for the pumps running, 4
we had not done an analysis of a LOCA with the lll 5
pumps on.
l 6
Now, what do you want from me?
I am not 7
sure where you are going.")
8 BY MR. SELTZER:
9 Q
You heard the reporter reread the question 10 and answer from this morning?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
You explained in your answer that before 13 the Three Mile Island accident the NRC had not 14 required B&W to analyze small break loss of coolant 15 accidents with tha reactor coolant pumps running.
16 In what way did you believe that disclosing 17 to the NRC the fact that a pumps running analysis 18 not being done could lead to derating or shutting down 19 of BsW plants?
20 A
Well, as best I can recall the situation, it 21 wasn't one of safety that was a concern, but as I 22 explained in that answer it was a concern about having 23 an unanalyzed condition that would be new for the 24 MRC.
25 Now it is speculative now and even then as
1 Swenson 86 l
(
2 to what the NRC might -- how the NRC might respond if 3
presented with an unanalyzed condition, but the concern 4
did not arise from safety or not safety, just that it lll 5
was a gap in the analysis.
6 Q
Now the gap was along these lines, the NRC 7
had been requiring that you analyze small break loss 8
of coolant accidents with the reactor coolant pumps 9
off.
They had not been requiring that you analyze 10 those breaks with the reactor coolant pumps on, is 11 that right?
12 A
Well, in effect, that is what the NRC
~
13 required.
What they, I believe, and I will paraphrase 14 what the regulations might say, it would be with loss 15 of off-site power which, as you know, has the effect 16 of losing the reactor coolant pumps.
I don't know for 17 certain that they said specifically without reactor 18 coolant pumps.
19 Q
I think we covered this morning that the 20 loss of'off-site power mandates loss of reactor 21 coolant pumps.
22 A
Right.
23 Q
I understand what you are saying about not 24 being concerned that this related to safety.
You are 25 saying the focus was that it related to an area where
1 Swenoon 87
(
2 the NRC had previously not required analysis, and you 3
might be alerting them to an area where they might 4
require analysis, is that right?
lll 5
A well, again, that is somewhat speculative.
6 One of the things they could require is analyses.
7 Q
And that is.this speculation that was going 8
through your mind when you signed GPU 122, right, which 9
talks about not telling the NRC about new information, 10 right?
11 A
When I signed GPU 122, I think I probably 12 signed it because Lou was not there,more than anything
(
13 else.
That is not an approval signature.
14 MR. WISE:
Well, Mr. Swanson, if you wrote 15 or approved of what is written in GPU 122, then 16 Mr. Seltzer's question is an appropriate one, and 17 you can answer it.
If all you did was initial 18 something for Mr. Cartin when he was not there 19 and did not form an opinion as to the facts of 20 Exhibit 122 at the time you initialed it for Mr.
21 Cartin, then you cannot ar.swer Mr. Seltzer's 22 questions, since you obviously would not have 23 thought about what was being written at the time.
24 Do you understand that?
25 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
1 Swencon 88 2
MR. WISE:
Do you remember whether you 3
specifically looked at this and had some thoughts 4
about it at the time or whether you simply lll 5
initialed it for Mr. Cartin?
6 MR. SELTZER:
I think you are being unduly l
7 obtrusive.
I think Judge Owen is going to look 8
at this and think that you are horseshedding him 9
on the record.
I don't think that is a right way 10 to proceed at a deposition.
11 MR. WISE:
We can get at the truth and you 12 are p'erfectly free to ask questions of Mr. Swanson 13 for whatever reason you have chosen purposely not 14 to ask him what his participation was in the 15 preparation of this exhibit.. You put it under his i
16 nose and asked him a number of questions about it, 17 and I have not made-the objection for lack of 18 foundation until now, but I do think that it is 19 unclear on the record as to just exactly what this 20 witness' participation in the preparation of this 21 exhibit was.
O 22 We have established that his initials appear 23 on the last page, but you have purposely avoided 24 asking him whether he actually participated in 25 the drafting of this memo or whether he actually
1 Swanoon 89
~
2 read it before he initialed it on Mr. Cartin's 3
behalf.
I must say, I don't know the answer to 1
4 that question, but to ask him now whether ll) 5 something was going through his mind at the 6
time -- whether something written in this 7
particular memo was equivalent that was going 8
through his mind at the time that he initialed 9
this document without establishing that he even 10 read it at the time, I think is a question 11 totally without foundation.
I'm sorry if you 12 think that is horseshedding the witness, but I 13 happen to think it is clarifying the record and
\\
14 pointing out $ hat you have failed to lay any 15 foundation for the question you have asked.
I 16 don't know what the answer will be if you do 17 ask the proper foundation questions.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Could you please retype the 19 question at this point?
20 THE WITNESS:
Could you tell me what the 21 question is?
22 (The record was reproduced as follows:
23
" Question:
And that is this speculation l
l 24 that was going through your mind when you signed r
25 GPU 122, right, which talks about not telling the
1 Swancon 90 2
NRC about new information, right?")
3 BY MR. SELTZER:
4 Q
I think Mr. Wise interrupted you in the lll 5
middle of your answer.
You have referred to the pumps 6
running case as being the only situation that you could 7
recall where you discussed with somebody the 8
possibility that the NRC might derate or shut down 9
asw plants.
10 Do you recall that testimony from this 11 morning?
Do you recall that you gave such testimony 12 this morning?
(
13 A
I remember a lot of questions in that 14 general area.
There are all kinds of the same sort of 15 questions, different tone and that sort of thing.
16 Q
I am referring to that same pumps running 17 question and the same discussion about the possibility 18 that the NRC would derate or shut down B&W plants.
19 Am I correct that the issue arose ard the 20 discussion occurred before the Three Mile Island 21 accident?
22 A
well, obvicusly the memo is dated before 23 the Three Mile Island accident.
24 Q
That is GPU 122 that you signed on or about 7_s 25 December 19, 19787 l
\\
~
1 Swanson 91 l
2 A
This is the place where that kind of
~
3 information does appearJin print, and it is before
,3
' IQ' 4
Three Mile Island,[so I think the memo stands and the s
i (g
5 date stands.
s 6
iQ You have a,1 ready explained thaU the NRC
/
7 was requiring analysis of-small break loss cf coolant s'
s
= '
i 8
accidents with a 16ss of off-site powe'r and a consequent 9
loss of the react k ecolant pumps, and y'ou have
~
- - r 10 explained that the NRC was not requiring that small 11 break loss of coolant accidents be analyzed for a -
12 situation where the reactor coolant pumps remained in
- d
'f 13 operation after the start of a transient.
s e
s N,
, ~
4 14 Is it correct that in or about December i
15 1978 when you signed,GFU 122, it occurred to you',that
~
16 if you alerted Yhe NRC to an area of analysis that i'
17 they had not previously been requiring with respect 1
18 to smal'1 break loss of coolant accidents that the t
19 NRC might derate os, shut down B&W plants?
20 A
Well, Lou's speculation in'this letter is 21 his speculation.
The NRC can respond in genera,1 to 22 unanalyzed situations in a lot of ways, one of the,n A
u 23 would be to require a reanalytis.
One of them'possibly 4
i g
s a
24 could be to shut plants down - s
\\
O M
sQ
'You were a
1.
\\"
A
1 Swancon 92
(~}
2 A
or derate, or they could do a lot of V
3 different things.
4 Q
You were aware of those possibilities ll) 5 before the Three Mile Island accident, right?
6 A
l'think every' body in the industry is aware 7
of what the NRC can do.
8 G
'At the time that you stere thinking about 9
the relationship between the pumps running analysis, O
10 which had not yet been done, and the possibility of the i
11 NRC derating or shutting down B&W plants, am I correct 12 that it was y6ur thought that,'one possibility'was that 13 the NRC would require such a derating or such a shutting V
14 down until it received from B&W an analysis of the 15 pumps running case for small break loss of coolant
.\\
16 accidents?
17 A
Weil s. m, memory is not as exact as the way 18 you ask your 7ues tion, but one of the things they could 19 l do, among a da(riety of things they could do, is to 20
' require the plants,to be shut down until an analysis 1,
k' 21 is performe4 or' require a derating until an analysis is j
if 22 performed.
Thhae,sre possibilities the NRC has the e
h 23 power to take.
3, 24 Q
Lou Cartin worked-for you in December 1978,s
(~3) t 25 right?
4 l.
U
/
-)
I, '.
% 's
,i
\\I
\\\\
1 -,
. _ =. -
1 Swanoon 93 2
A I think so.
I am fairly certain he did at 3
that time, yes.
4 Q
Is it your recollection that uou Cartin g
5 had drafted GPU 122, and specifically the first three 6
pages of it?
7 A
He did draft it.
His initials are on it or 8
his name is on it.
9-Q You signed it on his behalf, is that right?
10 A
Yes.
My initials are on it.
That would j
[
11 indicate -- yes.
tL e
j ( p{.
L 12 Q
You signed it before it was sent out to Mr.
.13 L'uken and all of the other people who are la.sted to 14
~rcesive copies, right?
15 A'
Yes.
16 Q
You signed it rather :than sending it out as n
- 17 an unsigned 4 memo from Lou Cartin, right.?
('
~
' ' '~
'u A
Apparently.
18 i'
19.
Q Ad I corract that you read ~it before you s
20-
. signed,it?T,
.?.,
21 A
I; don't really remember, g,
//,
/
3 52' Q-Was it your practice to sign things that you
. )*
4 r
N.
4'
'y(j 23 hadn't re ad ?.
q q
}
1 a.-
24 A-Not generally, because at least I went 3(d' Nrouga's.com.tos..;2f A)
+
^N 25 th erie were any typos.
In this ss a
y t
9{s t i
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1 Swanoon 94 i
l 2
particular case, I am not certain whether I read it or 3
not.
I don't remember.
4 Q
But it was your general practice to read lll '
5 things word by word before you signed them or initialed 6
them?
7 A
Usually.
8 Q
You know, don't you, that in 1978 B&W 9
decided to withhold from customers the fact that B&W 10 had failed to analyze the pumps running case for small 11 break loss of coolant accidents?
12 MR. WISE:
I object to the form.
The witness 13 can answer it.
14 A
Say it again, exactly, please?
15
'(Question read) 16 A
Well, that is in the note in Lou's memo.
17 Now, whether that actual'ly was withheld from the 18 customers or not, I couldn't tell you.
19 I don't remember, and I would expect in this 20 case it would be
- Tolede, because it says, quote, the 1
21 customer.
22.
Q You don't have a specific recollection that 23.
any customer was told in 1978 that a pumps running 24
. analysis had not been performed, do you?
25 A
I don't know one way or the other.
I don't
l l
l l
\\
1.
Swanoon 95 I
(
2 recall.
But you see this item 6 has to do with a 3
setpoint, a signal derived from the reactor coolant 4
pumps.
It is not a -- you know, it was a signal that lll 5
we were exploring at that time in response to a customer 6
request later on in this memo on page 2.
7 It is on page 2 of attachment 1.
We were 8'
reaponding to a request for a should we or should we 9
not put a setpoint in based on the reactor coolant pump 10 status.
11 Q
That is item 6, right?
12 A
Yes.
And that is what this is responding to.
/'h 13 Now, in response to that, it would appear that Lou 14 or the group ran into the issue of ECCS analysis for 15 pumps running at least for Toledo, so until we explored 16 the ability to provide a setpoint, which included 17 investigation of the pumps running case, we couldn't 18 logically deal with a setpoint, I would think.
19 Q
Isn't it a fact, Mr. Swanson, that B&W did 20 recommend and approve a dual setpoint for the steam 21 generator secondary side water level before completing 22 an analysis of the pumps running case?
23 A
As I recall, and I am not really sure, it 24 seems to me that there were some ECCS analyses that 25 showed Toledo would be acceptable with a ten-foot level
1 Swan 00n 96 2
in the generator, the Toledo plant would be safe with 3
a ten-foot level in the generator, but I am not certain 4
that -- and, again, I don't recall that the pump signal lll 5
was a part of the dual setpoint signal at this time.
6 You can get a signal to go to a dual setpoint from 7
other places than from a pump signal.
8 Q
Didn't you recommend to Toledo Edison that 9
they have one setpoint for loss of coolant accident and 10 another setpoint for loos of main feedwater without 11 concurrent loss of coolant?
12 A
In my memo number GPU 592, there.ls a 13 suggested scheme for a dual setpoint that you can look 14 in the back and see the schematic for it.
Now, I don.'t 15 remember if this was the final version of it or not, 16 and it does not include a pump running signal.
17 Q
Let me show you something that you signed 18 on November 28, 1978, which is Toledo Edison Company 19 operating Instructions, and I will ask you whether 20 these operating instructions recommend a dual setpoint.
il 21 MR. SELTZER:
I will mark this as GPU Exhibit 22 593.
23 (Three-page document, the cover page being 24 a November 22, 1978 memo to Eric Swanson from 25 Bert M.
Dunn, re "small Break Analysis for Toledo
1 Swancon 97
(
2 14," was marked GPU Exhibit 593 for identification 3
as of this date.)
4 MR. SELTZER:
For the record, let me lll 5
identify GPU 593 as a cover memo from Dunn to 6
Swanson, subject "Small Break Analysis for Toledo 7
14."
I assume that means NSS contract 14.
8 The second page is a memo, cartin to 9
Spangler, reviewed by Eric Swanson, November 28, 10 1978, subject " Toledo Edison Company Operating 11 Instructions", and the third and final page is 12 the " Site Instructions."
13 MR. WISE:
Is there a pending question?
14 BY MR. SELTZER:
15 Q
Do you recognize the attachment to GPU 16 Exhibit 593 as a copy of operating instructions for 17 Toledo Edison which you reviewed at the end of 18 November 19787 19 A
I see it in front of me.
I am not sure I 20 remember it, though.
21 Q
That is your signature above the line that 22 says " Reviewed by"?
23 A
Yes.
24 Q
It is dated Novecher 28, 19787 O
~/
25 A
Yes.
1
,1
1 Swcncon 98
(
2 Q
Does that tend to indicate to you that you 4
3 reviewed it on or about November 28th?
4 A
Yes.
I don't remember it right now.
lll 5
Q Do you recognize the attachment as 6
prescribing a dual level setpoint for the steam i
7 generators for the Davis-Besse plant of Toledo Edison?
8 A
I don't recall the paper itself, but I 9
recall the issue and I recall that we were able to 10 permit Toledo to manually control auxiliary feedwater 11 to two points -- well, to control auxiliary feedwater 12 to the high setpoint.
The low setpoint would be taken 13 car.e of by itself.
I don't really recall what this 14 auto essential mode of SFRCS was.
15 Q
The attachment indicates that the steam 16 generator level would be set at 35 inches if there was 17 no actuation of emergency. safety features, is that 18 right?
19 A
That's right.
20 Q
The attachment indicates that the steam 21 generator level would be set at-the higher level of lI 22 96 inches indicated if there were actuation of emergency L
23 safety features. turning on high pressure injection?
i l
24 MR. WISE:
I don't see that.
Where are you 25 reading from?
I don't see anything about l
1 Swanoon 99
[~h 2
setpoints.
I see something about monitoring d
3 steam generator level.
l
}
4 Do you mean by the word " monitor" to be t
lll 5
setpoints?
6 MR. SELTZER:
It says
"...to ensure 7
automatic control at..."
8 BY MR. SELTZER:
9 Q
Am I correct that this procedure prescribes 10 setting the steam generator level to be 96 inches 11 indicated for situations where there was auto actuation 12 of high pressure injection?
13 A
well, the part I don't recall about it, I 14 don't remember the two setpoints, the three foot and 15.
the ten foot, roughly.
What I don't remember at this 16 time, this more or less interim time, whether this 17 was-completely manually controlled or partly manually 18 controlled.
19 Q
I am not focusing on whether it is manually 20 controlled or automatically controlled, but there are 4
21 two setpoints for steam generator level, right?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
That is something that was prepared for i
24 Toledo Edison at the end of November 1978,'right?
l Os 25 A
Yes.
.._.,m.,
1 Swancon 100
(
2 Q
Now, in December 1978, you read and signed 3
Lou Cartin's memo, GPU Exhibit 122, which says, " Note, 4
the customer should not be informed of the ECCS
{lg 5
Analysis efforts to examine the pumps running case."
6 Do you see what I just read?
7 A
Yes, but hold up a minute, please.
I have 8
forgotten your question.
9 Q
Do you see what I just read about what you 10 signed, saying
"...the customer should not be informed 11 of the ECCS Analysis effort to examine the pumps 12 running case"?
13 A
I see that in the middle of the page, yes.
14 Q
It is part of the memo that you signed, 15 right?
16 MR. WISE:
He signed it for Mr. Cartin.
You 17 keep saying that he signed it and we have 18 established he signed it for Mr. Cartin.
19 MR. SELTZER:
He said he believed it was 20 his practice at that time to read word for word 21 the things that he signed.
O 22 THE WITNESS:
My general practice signing i
l 23 for Lou was not an approval signature; it was, 24 I think, a formality more than anything else.
O 25 MR. WISE:
Mr. Seltzer seems to be confused l
1 Swanson 101 J
2 by what you mean by that.
Perhaps you can explain.
3 MR. SELTZER:
He can explain on your 4
examination.
lll 5
MR. WISE:
Then I will object to questions 6
that you use with this signing preface.
If you 7
don't want to find out what it means, that's fine.
8 MR. SELTZER:
I think I found out what it I
9 means, and if you want to muddle the record you l'
10 can do that at your own time.
11 MR. WISE:
I will object to the form 12 throughout, and you can take your chances.
13 BY MR. SELTZER:
14 Q
What conceivable justification was there in 15 1978 for B&W withholding from customers the information 16 that B&W had not examined the pumps running case for 17 small break loss of coolant accidents?
18 MR. WISE:
You.are asking him now to think 19, up an answer to that or are you asking him what 20 his understanding was as to why Mr. Cartin wrote 21 what is written in GPU Exhibit 122 back on 19787
~
22 Q
Back in 1978, can you recall any conceivable 1
23 justification for B&W's withholding from any customer 24'
'the information that B&W had omitted to analyze the 25 pumps running case for small break loss of coolant
1 Swanson 102
()
2 accidents?
3 A
.I don't really recall,not the way you asked 4
that question.
lll 5
Q Do you recall any variation on that?
I 6
don't want you to take it excessively literally.
7 A
I am not sure I recall at all right now.
8 I am getting a little confused about things, but I 9
would make the judgment that it was not necessary to 10 inform the customer if we had discovered a new 11 situation that upon detailed review would not mean 12 anything or would not really be important to him.
13 That's a speculation.
14 Q
Do you see in attachment 1 to the memo that 15 you signed, item 6 on page 2 of Toledo Edison's letter 16 to B&W7 17 MR. WISE:
I think he pointed it out to 18 you a few moments ago.
19 MR. SELTZER:
Right, and now I am pointing 20 it out to him and I want to use that as the 21 predicate for my next question.
22 Are you looking at it?
23 THE WITNESS:
I see it.
24 BY MR. SELTZER:
25 Q
when you referred me to it a moment ago,
1 Swancon 103
]
)
2 you were showing me, were you not, that Toledo Edison 3
Company had specifically asked B&W for its evaluation 4
"to whether or not reactor coolant pump running lll 5
status should be included in the dual setpoint control 6
logic", isn't that right?
7 A
That is what it says.
8 Q
Are you saying that even when a customer 9
specifically asks B&W a question about reactor coolant 10 pumps running status that nevertheless B&W could decide 11 that it is better for the customer not to know that 12 B&W has failed to do an analysis of pumps running?
13 A
The response to that request by the customer 14 in this letter on page 2,
not of the attachment, is 15 that B&W's position to TECo was that "The status of our 16 C
pumps should not be included in the dual setpoint 17 control logic at this time."
18 Q
B&W's response to TECo's question 6 was that 19 "The status.of the reactor coolant pumps should not 20 be included in the dual setpoint logic at this time,"
21 right?
22 A
That's what it says right'here, yes.
23 Q
The reason B&W took that position was that 24
-B&W had not yet done an analysis of the pumps running 25 status for small break loss of coolant accidents, isn't b
..u w
,r....
-.Swancon 104 2
that right?
I think it gets back to "our inability to 3
respond conclusively" language, the part in the third 4
sentence.
ll 5
MR. WISE:
I object if you are going to ado t
6 to the question your own theories as to what gets 7
to what in the memo.
4 8
Could you just state now just exactly what 9
your question is without the comment at the end 10 as to your views?
11 Q
Cartin wrote in the memo that you signed, 12 B&W was, at the present time, unable to respond 1
13 conclusively to an inquiry about whether it had 14 already evaluated the worst possible conditions for 15 small break accidents, isn't that right?
16 A
Cartin did that?
Wasn't that in Bob Jones' 17 letter?
18 Q
No.
Take a look at the third sentence of i
19 item 6 on page 2 of GPU 122..
20 A
O.K.
e 4
21 MR. WISE:
What is the question at this O
22 point?
23 (Question read) 24 MR. WISE:
I don't think that is what this y
25 meno says.
If you want to ask him to try and
=
1 2
1 Swanson 105
(
2 construe what Mr. Cartin wrote 3
MR. SELTZER:
Instead of your putting a 4
statement on the record why don't you just object lll 5
properly instead of telling the witness, coaching 6-him.
You had probably a week of horseshedding him 7
back at your office, and I think you knew that 8
we were going to ask about this memo.
I think if 9
you are very afraid that he is not going to be 10 able to handle the questions, why don't we adjourn 11 and go back to your office and horseshedding some 12 more.
I am entitled to ask my questions.
He i
13 said he signed this memo.
He said it was his 14 general practice at the time to read things word 15 for word before he signed them.
I am entitled to 16 the inference that he read this before he signed 17 it, and I am asking him now what his understanding 18 was when he read it.
19 MR. WISE:
I take offense to your continually 20 suggesting that if I make any comments in the 21
- record, that I am horseshedding the witness in 22 some improper way.
I think given the behavior of 23 plaintiffs' counsel during the testimony of your 24 witnesses that it is a particolarly uncalled for O
25 remark.
R
__-___m.______-__m____.__.____.Aa_._
-1 Swanoon 106 2
Last week, I took a deposition where when 3
I asked a question, one of the lawyers in your 4
firm refused to allow the answer to be given by 5
the witness until he had taken him out of the ll) 6' room for a conference, then they came back in 7
the room and gave the answer that apparently had 8
been discussed with counsel, and I haven't done 9
anything like that, and I think to continually 10 put on the record complaints and comments that I 11 am horseshedding the witness is totally uncalled 12 for.
13 MR. SELTZER:
The record will speak for O
14 itself.
15 MR. WISE Particularly in light of what 16 your firm has done with witnesses of the utility, 17 getting to the specific point.
We have been over 18 this memo that Mr. Cartin wrote and that Mr.
19 Swanson initialed in Mr. Cartin's absence.
Mr.
20 swanson has told you that he doesn't remember 21 whether he read it at the time or not.
He has k
22 told you he has a general practice of reading 23 things before he initialed them, but he can't l
24 remember this particular one.
('T kl 25 You have persisted in asking him a lot of u
l l
1 Swancon 107 2
detailed questions and, in any event, about the 3
specific statemeats in item 6 of this memo.
And 4
my objection, really, Mr. Seltzer, is to the ll 5
misconstruction of the memo.
You and I can sit 6
here and debate all afternoon on what this memo 7
says, and I suppose we can get Mr. Swanson drawn 8
into the debate and let him try and read it.
9 MR. SELTZER:
That's exactly what I was I
10 trying to do, and that's why I think it is improper 11 to make it a colloquy between counsel.
I should 12 be asking him the questions, and he should be 13 answering based on his understanding as he has 14 been doing previously.
15 MR. WISE:
To the extent that Mr. Swanson 16 remembers this memorandum and is able to testify i
17-as to why it was written the way it was or what 18 he thought it meant at the time, or what he 19 remembers of it today based on what he saw at the 20 time, I have no objection to'your questioning 21 him.
But you are continuing to question him after 22 he has told you on several occasions that he 23
'doesn't even remember reading this.
He said he 24 didn't write it and he doesn't remember reading I
\\_]
25 it, and yet you insist on asking him to construe l
l l
i:
1 :.
l
1 1
Swanson 108 2
what is written here.
I don't know if what you have 3
said is right or wrong, but you are confusing this 4
witness who is not a lawyer and may not understand lll 5
the fine points of whether he should be testifying 6
based upon reading it today and whatever conclusions 7
he may draw today, or whether he should be 8
testifying based upon his recollection of what 9
he remembered at the time.
10 I think you have established several times 11 that he doesn't remember either writing this or 12 reading it at the time.
Now, it says what it 13 says there, and I can certainly debate with you 14 as to whether or not your construction of it 15 is proper or not.
By the way, I have not done 16 that on the record because I don't want to prompt 17 the witness.
I simply stated that I don't 18 think your construction of it is correct.
19 If you want to ask him questions about 20 what he knows and what he remembers, I think we 21 can proceed much more quickly, and the information 22 you would get would be much more relevant to the 23 case.
24 MR. SELTZER:
The world would be a lot O
25 more boring place to live if everybody did
i l
1 Swancon 109 i
i
(
2 everything the same way.
I am certainly not i
3 going to conduct this deposition the way you are 4
suggesting to conduct it.
lll 5
BY MR. SELTZER:
6 Q
Did'you ever tell Mr. Cartin, in words or 7
substance, that you disagreed with his instructions 1
8 that, "the customer should not be informed of the 4
4 9
ECCS Analysis efforts to examine the pumps running 10 case"?
l 11 A
I don't remember.
j 12 Q
You don't remember doing that?
13 A
No, I don't remember discussing this memo 14 with Lou.
I do not remember discussing any particular 15 sentence or whatever in this memo with Lou.
16 Q
You and Lou sent copies of this memo to l
17 Messrs. Luken, Cartin, Womack, Jones, Dunn, Shah, i
18 '
Winks and Vosburgh.
L 19 Did they ever discuss with you or you with 20 them the advisability of not informing a customer j
21 about the ECCS analysis efforts to examine the pumps 22 runnt.ng case?
E 23 A
I reall'y don't remember.
24 Q
Did you ever discuss with any of those 25 gentlemen the notion that the NRC should not be l
1 Swancon 110
[V) 2 informed about the fact that B&W had not analyzed the l
3 pumps running case?
4 A
I am not sure.
Possibly with Bert, but I lll 5
am not certain.
6 Q
Do you have any recollection of what, if 7
anything, you and Bert Dunn discussed about not 8
reporting to the NRC the absence of a pumps running 9
analysis?
10 A
With reference to this list of names, the 11 only reason I said "possibly with Bert," is because I 12 do know that I had asked him about the change of the
('}
13 setpoint and needed some information from him on whether U
s 14 ECCS analysis would be acceptable at ten feet, in that 15 line of reasoning.
16 Now whether or not the subject of analysis 17 for pumps running or not running specifically in the 18 context that you have been placing it came up, I really 19 don't in the context that you have been placing it, 20 that is, do not tell the NRC about it, I don't remember 21 whether that came up or did not come up.
22 Q
In 1978, you and Bert Dunn were very good 23 friends, right?
24 A
Yes.
I)
Y
25 Q
Have you continued to be very good friends?
l
1 Swcncon 111 2
A Yes.
3 Q
He is somebody with whom you were able to 4
converse professionall1y on a very easy basis?
llk 5
A
- Sure, or any other basis.
6 g
Did you ever play bridge with Bert?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Did you play bridge with him in the lunchroom 9
on the day of the Three Mile Island accident?
10 A
No, I don't play bridge at work.
11 Q
Is there a group that did do that in 1978 12 and 19797 13 A
oh, I don't know.
There are a lot of people
()
14 that play bridge during work or at lunchtime.
15 Q
Was Cal Goslow one of them?
16 A
I don't know.
I don't really know Cal 17 Goslow very well.
18 Q
This morning you were beginning to describe 19 how the pumps running concern first came into focus, 20 and you explained it had something to do with water 21 level in the steam generator causing excessive 22 shrinkagc of the reactor coolant system inventory.
23 The event that you were describing is 24 sometimes called an overcooling event, right?
O 25 A
Yes.
1
1 Swancon 112
(
2 Q
What happens during such an overcooling 3
event is that the secondary side cooling water lowers 4
the temperature of the primary side such that there is lll 5
a contracting of the volume of water in the reactor 6
coolant system, right?
7 A
Right.
Close.
I t '~s not just a secondary 8
side water, but it's heat removal through evaporation i
9 and making steam, but 10 Q
Prior to the fall,of 1978, Toledo Edi' son 11 Company had had a problem with such overcooling events 12 leading to loss of level indication in its pressurizer, 13 right?
14 A
I believe that's right.
15, Q
When you said to Bill Spangler in your 16 November 15th memo, third paragraph, " Toledo's needs 17 to lower the setpoint are genuine..." you were referring 18 to their problem with loss of pressurizer level 19 indication if the setpoint was left at a high setpoint, 20 isn't that right?
21 A
Yes, I believe that's right.
22 Q
You knew in 1978 that the NRC was concerned 23 about the loss of pressurizer level indication on B&W j
l 24 plants, didn't you?
Lo 25 A
As I recall it,.it was a loss of pressurizer l-i l
l 1
swanoon 113
()
2 level indication at Toledo that the NRC was concerned 3
about.
I do not recall that they were concerned 4
about any other planta at that time.
lll 5
Q What is your understanding about why the 6
NRC had a concern about loss of pressurizer level 7
indication?
8 A
I don't really remember.
The man at the 9
NRC that was the I&E inspector for Toledo was a man 10 named Mr. Creswell.
I think he told Toledo what the 11 concern was, but I frankly -- I don't remember his 12 exact -- his specific, worry.
13 Q
Let me show you a memo that E.
W.
Swanson 14 wrotc on November 22, 1978.
It is GPU Exhibit 81, 15 subject, " Toledo Edison Company Pressurizer Level 16 Meeting."
17 Is this a copy of a memorandum which you 18 prepared and circulated on or about November 22, 1978?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
would you like to take a moment to review 21 the memo before I ask you questions on it?
22 A
Yes, let me look through it.
23 What was your question about?
i 24 Q
It was whether you wanted to have time to t
25 read it.
1-Swancon 114
(
2 A
If you ask questions about specific parts 3
of it, I will see what I can do.
4 Q
Do you recall that there came a time in lll 5
November 1978 when a meeting was convened between B&W 6
and Toledo Edison to discuss the issue of loss of 4
7 pressurizer level indication for which you were the 8
B&W spokesman?
9 A
In general, I remember the meeting, yes.
10 Q
You were the B&W spokesman at the meeting, 11 right?
12 A
I believe so.
13 Q
Did you work up the agenda that you 14 attached to your November 22nd memo, GPU 81?
15 A
I am not sure.
Sometimes these memos for 16 B&W customer meetings are worked up over the telephone 17 with the customer, and sometimes B&W will work them up 18 and send them to the customer and ask them if that 19 suits him, and sometimes we will just work one up, so 20 I don't know exactly how this one came about.
I do 21 recall having phone calls with Toledo people prior to 22 the meeting, but I don't know what went on in those 1
23 phone calls or I don't remember.
24 Q
Am I correct that after preparing a proposed 25 agenda there was a meeting held on or about November 4
1 Swcncon 115
)
2 27th at which some or all of the items on the agenda I
3 were discussed between B&W and Toledo Edison?
4 A
I don't remember going to a meeting.
I 1
lll 5
expect it was held on November 27th.
Whether or not 6
we completed the entire agenda or followed the agenda 7
during the meeting, I don't remember.
8 Q
Let me show you GPU 82-A which are Lou 9
Cartin's notes of the November 27, 1978 meeting between 10 TECo and B&W personnel with a copy indicated to you.
11 Is GPU Exhibit 82-A a copy of notes which 12 you received of the November 2, 1978 meeting which you 13 attended between Toledo Edison and B&W personnel?
14 A
It looks like it.
I don't recall these 15 notes, though.
16 Q
As you read it through, did you recall the 17 meeting taking place and some of the things you were 18 reading being things that you recalled were discussed?
19 A
I remember the meeting taking place, yes.
20 I remember the general subjects that were being talked 21 about, but I don't remember the specifics especially.
9 22 Q
Do yo'u see the attendance sheet which is 23 the fourth page from the back?
24 A
Yes.
25 g
Do you recall that Bert Dunn was at the
l 2
meeting?
3 A
No, I don't remember thr.t.
4 Q
Do you remember that Lou Cartin was there?
h 5
A I could better tell you who I remember was 6
there, than answer certain questions.
7 Q
Let me ask it in obverse fashion.
8 You don't have any reason to doubt the 9
validity of this attendance sheet, do you?
10 A
No.
11 Q
As you had set up the responsibilities for 12
- the B&W people who attended the meeting on behalf of BEW, 13 you had listed Bert Dunn as somebody who would attend 14 on behalf of ECCS, isn't that right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Section 3 of your discussion with Toledo 17 Edison was headed, in your agenda and in the meeting 18 notes, as
" Criteria for Pressurizer Sizing."
19 Do you see that?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
What does the phrase " pressurizer sizing" mean1 22 A
When you size a pressurizer, you size it with 23 a specific volume for the steam space and for the 24 water space.
The designer sizes i't for a specific 25 volume for the steam space and for the water space
l l
1 Swenson 117 2
for normal power operation.
3 Q
Now, you are using the word " size" in your 4
definition.
That was the word that I really wanted lll 5
you to help me with.
6 What is pressurizer sizing?
7 A
It is how largw the volume of the steam 8
space and the water space should be.
9 Q
If you add the two of them together, you 10 get the size of the total pressurizer, right?
11 A
Right.
12 Q
What, if anything, qualified you to be the
(~}
13 B&W spokesman for the meeting with Toledo Edison to V
14 discuss small LOCA pressurizer level and AFW operation?
15 MR. WISE:
Do you want him to start with 16 his high school education and carry it forward 17 with all of his jobs?
I 18 MR. SELTZER:
If he thinks there was 19 something he learned in high school that was 20 pertinent, fine.
I think you are being facetious 21 and I don't think that is necessary.
22 MR. WISE:
I object to the question as 23 being facetious.
You have got a man here who l
24 obviously held a responsible position in the
)
- -/
25 company.
If you have some specific questions as
1 Swanoon 118 (e~,)
2 to why he was designated rather than someone 3
else in the company to handle this meeting, I 4
have no objection to that.
But to ask him why lll 5
what, if anything, qualified him to conduct a 6
meeting concerning the subjects here seems to 7
be facetious.
8 We have given you a resume and it shows 9
he graduated from college with an engineering 10 degree and had many years' experience within 11 the nuclear business.
I think your question is 12 faceticus.
{V}
13 MR. SELTZER:
There are a lot of people 14 at B&W who graduated from college and had years 15 of engineering experience.
Eric Swanson was 16 selected by somebody to be the spokesperson 17 for B&W at a particular meeting to discuss a 18 problem with pressurizer level, and I am asking 19 him very seriously what, if anything, qualified 20 you to be the B&W spokesper'on on that subject.
s 21 A
On the subjectaof pressurizer sizing or for 22 this meeting?
23 Q
on the subject or requirements of maintaining 24 pressurzer level including criteria for pressurizer
\\
/
25 sizing.
/
's 3 1
Swanson 119
()
2 A
Well, there are two separate questions.
I, 3
am not an expert in any specifit discipline.
I have 4
a broad baq(oround.
People who know about such lll.
5 things as pressurizer sizing usually do not know much 6
about, let't say, ECCS analysis.
And those people..
\\
7 that know a great deal of ECCS analysis are specialists
{
8 in one area. 'But I have a general background.
I have 4
9 a wide breadth of knowledge and not especially-a great s,
it 10' depth of knowledge in any single area.
And that's why 11 I was,in this Antedration group, because the integration
'I'2 group needs people with a broad scope.
i
{
13 Q
Before you were put onto the particular 14 problem of loss of pressurizer level with Toledo 1
i 15 Edison's plant, had you ever done any specific work on 1,6 problems with maintaining pressurizer watersle, vel?
\\
17 MR. WISE:
Excuse, me, when did'we establish
\\
L 13 that he was put on pressurizer level?
s
.x.
19 MR. SELTZER:
He is the spokesperson for
~
q s
20
~the whole meeting.
.t V
s 21 MR.' WISE:
Well, that to me is -- does not
-m s s 22
- follow that he specifically was on pressurizer o
s 2h
'"flevel.
As a matter of fact you stopped him when
}
e s
24 he was in the midst of an answer, and I didn't 0
25 e
object then.
I suppose I should have.
I don't
,s l,
,3.
- ?
I 1
Swcncon 120 s
I
)
2 thir.k he completed his answer as to why he was LJ 3
the spokesperson and what the~different 4
responsibilities were for the specific'arcas.
lll 5
I object to the form of your question 6
insofar 'as it assumes that he had been assigned 7
to handle pressuriser sizing or this specific 8
section.
I agree that he was the spokesporson 9
for the overall meeting.
10 MR. SELTZER:
That is all I was referring 11 to.
12 MR. WISE:
Well, I don't think the two
(~}
13 are the same thing at all, v
14 BY MR. SELTZER:
15 Q
Before you became the spokesperson for 16 the overall meeting which dealt at considerable length 17 with pressurizer level and pressurizer sizing, had you 18 h=4 3ny pecific earlier experience dealing with issues 19 of maintaining presaurizer water level or pressurizer 20 sizing?
21 A
Well, of course, my background included 22 knowledge about the pressurizer size and pressurizer 23 operation and that sort of thing.
Specifically, I 21 really don't recall in the way you asked the question.
25 Q
Take a look at page 3 of GPU Exhibit 82,
e 4
4 x
l' Swanocn 121
(
gif l\\
4, 3:
2 pleaso.
11
,H r i, 7
3 b*
MR. w1SE:
82 or G2-A?
4 MR. SELTZER:
They are the same thing.
k' 5
Q' g
would you take a moment to read the first 6
full paragraph under the heading Section 3,
" Criteria 7
for Pressurizer Sizing"?
r l;'t l
l 8
A Including the table?
9 Q
If you want to.
-10 A
o.K.,
I generally reviewed it.
x 11 Q
The notes of the meeting say that, "The 13 need to maintain pressurizer level during normal 13 accident conditions was discussed at length."
14 Does the phrase "during normal accident 15 conditions" refer to the four condit, ions that are listed 16 across the top of Table 27 17 A
Those two words " normal accident" conditions 18 don't make any sense to me.
There is nothing normal 19 about an accident, so it must be a typographical l
20 error in there.
l l
21 Q
Take a look at your proposed agenda, l
22 Section 3.
23 j
x n,x, 24 Q
You have an entry there, sub (a), "Need to
-O 25 maintain indicated level for normal reactor trip
1 Swanson 122
()
2 events."
3 Do you see that?
4 A
Yes.
lll 5
Q Then, under that, " Upset condition," and 6
under that, " Design basis events."
~
7 The design basis events included a steam 8
line break and a loss of coolant accident and et 9
cetera, right?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Are those three types of events the 12 conditions that are listed across the too of Table 27
~
13 A
O.K.,
I don't know whether you are familiar 14 with the categorization of accidents by the AN5, but 15 there is a great --there is a large number of ways e
16 of categorizing accidents, mostly for convenience.
17 These categories are one way of breaking them down.
18 whether these things right here are exactly the same 19 as these, they look about the same.
20 Q
The two things you were comparing were the 21 list of items on page 3 of the agenda and the list of 22 items across the top of Table 2 in the notes of the 23 meeting?
24 A
I have got page 2 cf the agend'a.
O 25 Q
Fine, page 2 of the agenda, which was page I
1 Swancor 123 4
()
2 3 of GPU Exhibit 81, is what you were comparing on the 3
one hand with the items across the top of Table 2 of 4
Exhibit 82, right?
lll 5
A Yes.
6 Q
Did you understand before the Three Mile 7
Island accident that it was a criterion for designing 8
the correct size of a pressurizer that a pressurizer 9
be able to maintain indicated water level for various 10 upset conditions that would occur in a nuclear plant?
11 A
What I recall is the normal operating 12 level in the pressurizer is chosen -- well, let's 13 see, the steam space size and the water volume size 14 are selected by two events, and as best I can recall 15 the one event that sets the downside, that is the 16 overcooling event which sets the size of the water 17 volume, was a normal reactor trip or turbine trip 18 followed by a normal reactor trip.
That is the best 19 I can remember.
20 The upside, that is where the primary 21 coolant would swell and surge into the pressurizer 9
22 increasing the water level, I believe that was set by 23 loss of feedwater followed closely with initiation of 24 auxiliary feedwater, but I am not certain.
25 Q
Loss of main feed followed by initiation
I swancon 124
()
2 of auxiliary feed, as I have understood it, causes 3
contraction not expansion.
4 A
Well, it does.
And that's why I say I lll 5
am not sure I remember it exactly.
The loss of 6
feodwater with the reactor trip,for a short time'the 7
primary coolant will contract when the rods go in, but 1
8 if auxiliary feedwater is not started within some time 9
frame, tha reactor coolant system will swell because 10 there is no heat removal, and I am not certain that 11 was the identified event for sizing the steam space.
12 I don't think it is pertinent, particularly.
(
13 Q
Now, you said that the downside for 14 pressurizer sizing was set based on the contraction 15 that would occur when a reactor trip followed a turbine 16 trip.
17 A
As far as I can remember, that's right.
18 Q
The cooldown and contraction that follows a 19 turbine trip and reactor trip is generally less 20 pronounced than the cooldown th'at follows a loss of 21 main feedwater, isn't that right?
22 A
with auxiliary feedwater started up?
23 Q
Yes.'
24 A
Yes.
l 25 Q
so there would be more contraction of the j.
t
1 Swancon 125 l
()
2 reactor coolant system water for a loss of main feud 3
followed by an initiation of auxiliary feed than there 4
would be for a turbine trip followed by a reactor lll 5
trip, right?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Yet, it is your recollection that they 8
sized the pressurizer based on the turbine trip 9
followed by a reactor trip rather than a loss of main 10 fee'dwater followed by initiation of auxiliary 11 feedwater?
12 A
That's right.
That is my recollection.
(}
13 Q
Now, Davis-Besse, which is the reactor 14 owned by Toledo Edison, was having problems where 15 they were losing pressurizer level indication on loss 16 of main feedwater followed by initiation of auxiliary 17 feedwater, right?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
You knew that the NRC was voicing concern 20 about that, right?
21 A
Toledo told us that a Mr. Creswell, who is 22 an I&E inspector, was upset about it, but I don't 23 remember the extent of his worry.
24 Q
Did it worry B&W that the NRC was worried?
25 MR. WISE:
You keep referring to the NRC.
1 i
1 Swancon 126
( )
2 The witness has twice told you that this is a 3
concern of Mr. Creswell who was an ISE 4
inspector for Toledo Edison.
You keep equating him lll 5
to the N'RC.
6 MR. SELTZER:
I am using the same 7
phraseology that Mr. Swanson used in his agenda, 8
page 1, where he has got item (b) "B&W perception 9
of the problem (1) loss of pressurizer indication l
10 (NRC concern)."
11 MR. WISE:
Where are you reading from again, 12 page 1 of the agenda?
l
('N 13 MR. SELTZER:
I am talking about B&W's
\\
l 14 perception, and I am talking about B&W perceiving
}
15 the NRC's concern, and if you want to argue to 16 the court that Mr. Creswell doesn't speak for the 17 NRC on this or that B&W micperceived the NRC's 18 concern, good luck.
l l
19 BY MR. SELTZER:
20 Q
When B&W learned in connection with this 21 Davis-Besse issue that the NRC was concerned about the 22 loss of pressurizer level indication during an 23 overcooling event, did that cause concern at B&W?
24 A
well, concern means a lot of things, I O
LJ
\\
25 suppose.
It was for Toledo.
It was a concern by Mr.
i
1 Swcncon 127 (a) 2 Creswell, who was an I&E inspector, and, at that time, 3
I believe it was Mr. Creswell's concern for Toledo and 4
not for any other plants, and obviously the fact that lhk 5
we held a meeting with a customer and tried to figure 6
out ways of rectifying the situation or correcting it 7
or making improvements or otherwise handling it, I 8
would say that represented some evidence of concern; 9
we held a meeting.
10 (Recess) 11 BY MR. SELTZER:
12 Q
When did you first learn that saturation V)
/
13 in the reactor coolant system outside the pressurizer 14 could cause pressurizer water level to rise?
15 A
Saturation in the reactor coolant system 16 outside the pressurizer can cause'-- it can cause 17 pressurizer water level to rise.
It also does not have 18 to cause pressurizer water level to rise.
19 Q
Now, my question is, when did yoa first 20 learn that it could cause pressurizer water level to 21 rise?
22 A
A long time ago.
23 Q
Before the Davis-Besse event on September 24 24, 1977, had you ever heard of an event at a B&W
,,(')
25 plant which caused saturation in the reactor coolant
1 Swanoon 128
(
2 system outside the pressurizer?
3 A
I don't believe so, but I don't know that I 4
remember it completely.
lh 5
Q Before the Davis-Besse events, had you 6
ever heard of any event at any PWR manufactured by 7
another company which had led to saturation occurring 8
in the reactor coolant system outside the pressurizer?
9 A
I want to tell you yes, but I can't 10 remember exactly where it would be.
I have an 11 extremely vague memory of discussing some event at some 12 plant with a fellow from TVA at an ANS meeting, and 13 that was a long time ago, but I can't remember any of 14 the details.
I really don't remember.
15 Q
Before the Davis-Besse events, had you 16 ever heard of pressurizer water level rising during a 17 loss of coolant accident?
18 A
It's awfully difficult to say -- separate 19 what I know inherently and has been driven into my 20 brain so profoundly now from what I knew then, so I 21 just don't recall.
22 Q
It has been driven profoundly into your l
23 head since the Three Mile Island accident that l
1 24 pressurizer water level --
[)
I
~/
25 A
oh, absolutely.
1 Sw0 noon 129 2
Q Let me finish the question.
(O 3
It has been driven into your head since the 4
TMI accident that pressurizer water level can rise lll 5
during a loss of coolant accident?
6 A
Oh, yes, most certainly.
Now, whether I 7
knew it before or not, I suspect I did, because I 8
knew about voids forming in the primary system and 9
changing the water level in the pressurizer.
It is 10 not'an unknown sort of thing.
11 Q
Do you recall specifically learning that 12 during the Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 event
(~
13 pressurizer water level rose while there was a loss of V]
14 coolant accident in progress?
15 A
Hot specifically.
I don't remember it 16 specifically.
17 Q
Take a look at Table 2 of Exhibit 82 or 18 82-A.
19 In the last column under " Loss of Coolant i
20 Accident" under the heading "Small Break," what does 21 it say in the box righ* aelow that?
22 A
" Criteria for pressurizer level"?
23 Q
Right.
4 24 A
" Loss of pressurizer level is natural
[
's
(
N' 25 consequence of the accident."
l 1
swenoon 130 2
Q When you got Table 2 did you point out to 3
anyone that loss of pressurizer level is not always 4
going to be an event that occurs with a small break lll 5
loss of coolant accident?
6 A
I don't remember.
I doubt it.
I don't 7
remember.
8 Q
Did anybody point out to you that 9
particularly in a table prepared in connection with 10 the Davis-Besse pressurizer, this is a rather ironic 11 comment?
Namely, that there will be a loss of 12 pressurizer level as a natural consequence of a small 13 break loss of coolant accident.
14 A
I don't remember.
15 Q
Before the Davis-Besse event of september 16 24, 1977, had you ever heard of an event at a B&W 17 plant where true pressurizer level failed to be a 16 reliable indication of the volume of water in the 19 reactor coolant system?
20 A
That would relate to the previous question 21 you asked about P&W plants on the pressurizer level l
22 business.
And I don't think so, i
.M Q
In 1977 and 1978, it is your impression, 24 isn't it, that Bert Dunn was B&W's leading expert on 25 emergency core cooling system analysis, isn't that i
.._______,,~.I
1 Swanoon 131 2
right?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Is Joe Kelly the name of someone who was lll 5
in your group in 19777 6
A Yes.
7 Q
Joe Kelly was sent out to the Davis-Besse 8
plant to conduct an investigation into their September 9
24, 1977 transient shortly after it occurred, isn't 10 that right?
11 A
I believe that's right.
12 Q
Kelly came back from Davis-Besse and
()
13 together with Fred Faist, the B&W site representative U
14 at Davis-Besse, gave a presentation in training room 15 B at which the two of them described some of the key 16 features of the September 24th transient, right?
17 A
I don't believe I was in that meeting.
I 18 do remember that Joe went to a meeting on the Toledo 19 event.
20 Q
Let me show you a sworn answer that Bob 21 Wise signed and a manager at B&W signed that assured 22 us that E.
W.
Swanson v J at a meeting headed by Kelly 23 and Faist to discuss the Davis-Besse event.
24 MR. WISE:
Let me read the preamble of what x.)
25 it said.
It said, "The following persons believe
I l
1 Swcncon 132 2
they may have attended a briefing in Lynchburg 3
given by Mr. Joseph L.
Kelly and Fred R.
Faint 4
in September 1977."
These answers were prepared lll 5
on a questionnaire that was sent cat to all B&W 6
employees including Mr. Swanson, and a review of 7
the responses that those employees sent back to 8
the lawyers in New York.
9 The question which was asked of the 10 employees was whether they recollected being there 11 or not.
Some of them said that they may have been 12 there.
So that I don't believe Mr. Swanson has 13 ever seen this list, and showing it to him may 14 not be very helpful.
You can certainly ask him 15 whether he received a questionnaire in connection 16 with these interrogatories and whether he remembers 17 filling it out and what he said.
18 BY MR. SELTZER:
19 Q
Do you remember receiving a questionnaire 20 from B&W management or B&W counsel asking you some 21 questions about whether you got this memo, whether 22 you attended certain meetings?
23 A
I received several requests from our 24 contracts legal department, mostly to supply information 25 or memos, and I don't remember any specific one about M
w
1 Swencon 133
}
2 signing a questionnaire.
I may have.
/
3 g
Well, we sure feel bamboozled if we are 4
getting sworn answers to interrogatories that are at lll 5
odds with witnesses' sworn testimony that we get from 6
a deposition.
7 MR. WISE:
I can't speak to whether ycu 8
have been bamboozled or not.
The question that 9
you had asked in the interrogatory was a 10 difficult one to answer.
We did the best we 11 could, which was to submit a written 12 questionnaire to the B&W employees who might
(~g 13 have knowledge or information.
Apparently, Mr.
U 14 Swanson filled out the questionnaire.
15 MR. SELTZER:
What do you mean?
He just 16 swore he doesn't remember filling it out.-
How 17 can you say he did?
18 MR. WISE:
I think we have a copy of it in 19 the office.
20 MR. SELTZER:
Maybe we should produce it 21 tomorrow and see what he said.
22 Do you mind doing that?
23 MR. WISE:
I would object to producing work 24 papers of counsel d'uring the course of this 25 deposition.
However, we will undertake to get a
1 Swanoon 134 O) 2 copy of it and show it to Mr. Swanson and see
(,
3 if that helps to refresh his recollection as to 4
whether he received it and signed it and returned lh 5
it, and also why he answered the way he did; but 6
I would object to producing it to you.
7 However, as Mr. Swanson says, as a result 8
of this litigation I think the B&W employees have 9
received a number of questionnaires and a number 10 of document requests, and he may be confused as 11 to just which one is involved in the preparation 12 of this particular set of interrogatories.
We 13 have sent a number of them as a result of the 14 various requests that your firm has posed over 15 the last two years, so I can understand his 16 confusion.
It does not surprise me in the 17 least.
18 MR. SELTZER:
That certainly calls into 19 question the reliability of the purported answers 20 throughout this response to interrogatories.
21 BY MR. SELTZER:
22 Q
Before we start tomorrow, I will ask you to 23 look at what Bob Wise said you signed and see if that 24 refreshes your recollection that Wise was telling the C
25 truth when he said he believed you had been at a
4 1
swanoon 135 1
()
~
2 meeting where Kelly and Faist gave you a briefing on 3
the Davis-Besse event.
4 A
Didn't it say "No" opposite my name?
lll 5
Q The "No" is for whether you took notes at 6
the meeting.
i 7
A Oh, O.K.
8 Q
Do you recall receiving information from Joe 9
Kelly about the Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 event?
10 A
Yes, I do.
11 Q
He spoke to you about it?
12 A
Yes.
O 13 Q
Did he explain that it had been an event V
14 in which the pilot operated relief valve had failed 1
15 to close, among other things?
16 A
I recall a discussion with Joe in my office 17 on the subject, in general.
Specifically, I don't 18 remember all the details of the conversation.
19 Q
If you don't mind, I am just asking you 20 that the PORV had faile'd open.
21 A
I don't remember the specific details of 22 the situation.
But what I do recall about it in that
[
23 the operators turned off HPI.
i i
l 24 Q
Prematurely?.
25 A
I would say arbitrarily would be the better i
r
.. _, = _ -. _
. ~
1 Swcncon 136
(
(
)
2 word.
3 Q
They turned it off when it shouldn't have 4
been turned off, right?
lll 5
A Right.
6 Q
Any time HPI comes on, an operator has to 7
turn it off, right?
It doesn't go off automatically?
8 A
That is right.
9 Q
So the issue that came to your attention 10 following the Davis-Besse event is that the operators 11 had shut it off at the wrong time?
12 A
They shut it off arbitrarily.
(
13 Q
They were supposed to shut it off, but they 14 shut it off at a time that you believed was 15 inappropriate, isn't that right?
16 A
Well, my words for it is that they shut it 17 off arbitrarily.
~
18 Q
They shut it off in response to a rise in 19 pressurizer water level?
20 MR. WISE:
Are you asking him now what he 21 heard?
22 A
As I recall, they shut it off without knowing 23 the reason for it coming on, and that's arbitrarily.
24 Q
Who told you they shut it off without knowing N) 25 that it came on?
4
1 Swanoon 137
[)
2 A
That's what my memory is of the discussion v
3 Joe and I had.
4 Q
You also discussed the implications of that lg 5
termination of high pressure injection with Bert Dunn, 6
right?
7 A
I have a vivid memory of Joe and I sitting 8
together.
He sat opposite me.
I have less of a 9
recollection of talking about it with Bert, but I feel 10 that I probably did.
11 Q
I could show you the place in Bert's 12 testimony, if you are int'arested, where Bert Dunn 13 testified that he spoke with you shortly after the 14 Davis-Besse event, and then spoke to you another two 15 or three times about his concern of operator 16 interruption of high pressure injection prior to his 17 writing his February 1978 memoranda.
18 A
That may well be.
I have no reason to 19 argue with what he said, and I suspect what he said is 20 close to the truth.
My memory is not -- I feel like 21 I did talk to Bert, but I don't remember a setting or 9
22 anything.
23 Q
To the best of your knowledge and 24 recollection, isn't it correct that it was Bert Dunn 25 who was the first to recognize the dangerous
)
1 Swcncen 138 2
implications of the operators' termination of high 3
pressure injection at the time they did?
4 MR. WISE:
How can he answer that when he ll 5
can't even remember talking to Mr. Dunn about it?
6 He said he feels he may have talked about it, but 7
can't remember any of the details.
8 MR. SELTZER:
Does my question refresh your 9
recollection?
10 THE WITNESS:
Not especially.
11 Q
Did there come a point in time when you 12 appreciated that there was some dangerous implications
/~'
13 to the Davis-Bessc operators' termination of high 14 pressure injection at the time that they did?
15 A
When Joe and I, talked, we talked about 16 our discussion centered around the fact that the 17 operators turned it off without good reason, I expect.
18 And should we warn somebody of this issue or should 19 we send a reminder to the site to our field service 20 group that the operators shouldn't turn off HPI 21 arbitrarily.
22 Q
You mean one of the things that you and 23 Joe Kelly discussed was whether B&W should warn the 24 owners and operators of B&W plants about the issue of J
25 premature interruption of high pressure injection?
1 Swancon 139
,ry
(
2 A
Yes, we discussed whether we should make s
3 that warning.
As a result.of that, Joe went and wrote 4
a memo that gave some criteria that he warned should lll 5
be used to supplement operator training or to remind 6
the operators of their training.
7 Q
Had you suggested to Joe Kelly that he write 8
that memo?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Did you review the memo with him before it 11 was sent?
)
i 12 A
Yes.
[3 13 Q
Let me show you GPU Exhibit 76 and ask you V
14 if this is a copy of the Kelly memo that you instigated.
15 A
Yes.
16 (Time noted:
4:30 p.m.)
17 18 ERIC SWANSON 19 Subscribed and sworn to 20 before me this day 21 of 1982.
22 23 24 f-('l 25
1 140 gEgggpggggg 2
oU 3
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
- ss.:
4 COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
C%
6 I,
NANCY A.
RUDOLPH a
7 Notary Public within and for the State of New York, 8
do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition 9
of rnic swANSON was taken Defore 10 me on wednesday, July 21, 1982 11 That the said witness was duly sworn 12 before the comencement of his testimony and 13 that the within transcript is a true record of said 14 testimony; 15 That I am not connected by blood or 16 marriage with any of the parties herein nor 17 interested directly or indirectly in the matter in 18 controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the 19 counsel.
20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this //
day of d' <:.. :.. alt 21 1982.
22 23
~/:.......
rL i b,/..:,, l.'
^
q 24 V
33, y 3, gunotpg /
25
July 21, 1982 141 IND EX WITNESS PAGE 4
Eric Swanson 3
EXHIBITS GPU FOR IDENT.
592 November 15, 1978 memo from Eric Swanson to Bill Spangler, re " Auxiliary Feedwater Setpoints."
57 593 Three-page document, the cover page being a November 22, 1978 memo to Eric'Swanson from Bert M.
Dunn, re "Small Break Analysis for Toledo 14."
96 P
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