ML20072H883
| ML20072H883 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1982 |
| From: | Zechman R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-03, TASK-04, TASK-1, TASK-2, TASK-3, TASK-4, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290794 | |
| Download: ML20072H883 (146) | |
Text
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 377 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK U
_ _ _ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION,
(
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)
-against-THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
_x Continued deposition of RICHARD W.
- ZECHMAN, taken by Defendants, pursuant to a journment, at the offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esgs., One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York, on Wednesday, March 24, 1982 at 9:40 o' clock in the forenoon, before Catherine Cook, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
s (m
DOYLE REPORTING, IN C.
(,
CERTIFIED STENOTYP E REPORTERS 369 LExlN GTO N AVENUE WALTER SHAPIRO. C.S.R.
NEW Yo m K.
N.Y.
10o17 CHARLES SH APIRO, C.S.R.
TELEPHONE 212 - 867 8220 8306290794 820324 i
PDR ADOCK 05000289 T
1 378 2
Appearances :
3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, New York BY:
ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.,
6 of counsel 7
8 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
9 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 10
ROBERT B.
FISKE, ESQ.,
-and-12 KAREN E.
WAGNER, ESQ.,
of Counsel 13 14 15 Also Present:
16 SUSAN HANSON 17 18 19 oOo 20 21 IQ 22 23 i
l 24 25 1
379 1
O
(,/
2 RI CHARD W.
- ZECHMAN, having been previously duly sworn, resumsd and was 3
4 examined and testified further as follows:
5 MR. FISKE:
9:40.
lll 6
EXAMINATION (continued) 7 BY MR..FISKE:
8 Q
Mr. Zechman, you realize you continue under 9
oath in this deposition this morning?
10 A
I do.
11 Q
Were you aware before the accident on that were part of 12 March 28, 1979 that valves in the
/~
13 the nuclear reactor system could stick open?
\\,_)h 14 A
I certainly was aware that valves, there 15 were valves that could malfunction in that manner.
16 Q.
Had anybody told you that it was sort of an 17 inherent problem with valves in general, that they had 18 a tendency to stick open from time to time?
19 MR. MacDONALD:
You era talking about 20 valves specifically on the nuclear plant?
21 A
I don't know that that was ever reinforced S
22 or discussed with me as a matter of discussion.
23 Q
Were you aware before the accident in March 24 of 1979 of any specific situations in which valves on 25 either Unit 1 or Unit 2 had either stuck open or failed
-~. _..
[
l' 2echann 380 a
s
()'
2' open?
i A
Not to the bast of my. recollection.
3 4
Q Were you aware of a tr'ansient that occurred in Unit 2 in April of.3979 involving a cooldown?
ggg 5
6 A
No t that I recall, sir.
7 Q
I am referring specifically, Mr. Zechman, to a cooldown transient'that was caused or initiated by 8
9 the failure of certain. main steam safety valves on the 10 steam generator to raseat after they had opened.
MR. MacDONALD:
And the question is whether 11
'/
12 or not he was aware of that transient prior to l
13 the time of tha accident?
MR. FISKE:
Yes.
14 15 A
I just don't recall that,. sir.
16 Q.
Let me'show you a document that has been 17 previously marked as B&W Exhibit 80, which is a licensee event report prepared by Metropolitan Edison 18 19 with respect to the transient that I just referred to.
Do you have that document in front of you?
20 l
A How did you identify this document?
21 22 Q
A licensee event report prepared by
,+<
Metropolitan Edison with respect to the transient on 23 24 April 23, 1978 at Three Mile Island Unit 2, that I have been referring to in my last several questions.
25
~.... _ ~., _ _ _ _
1 Zochocn 381 p()
2 A
I have that in front of me.
3 Q
Did you see this report at any time before 4
the accideht in March of '797 5
A I don't personally recall seeing this lll 6
document.
7 0
Were you familiar with a transient that had 8
occurred at Three Mile Island Unit 2 in March of 1978 9
involving a stuck-open or failed-open pilot-operated 10 relief valve?
11 A
I don't recall personally being aware of N
12 that.
[^
13 Q
Were you aware prior to March 28, 1979 14 that one of the transients that was simulated in the B&W simulator training was a stuck-open or failed-open 15 16 pilot-operated relief valve?
I 17 A
Yes, I do.
s 18 Q
Were you aware before the Three Miles Island 19 accident in March 1979 that there was a specific 20 procedure in effect for TMI Unit 2 which dealt, among r
other things, with the diagnosis and treatment of a 21 e
22 etuck-open or failed-open PORV7 23 A
I recall a
procedure that deale 'with that, 24 yes, sir, 7_ )
i 25 Q
Were operators a.t Three Mile Island Unit 2
\\~'
i t
b
1 Zochman 382 i
s's()
2 trained on that procedure as part of the Met Ed training 3
Program?
,.'J 4
A To the best of my recollection, they were.
5 Q
Let me show you a document which has
+
6 previously been marked as B&W Exhibit 305, which is t
i 7
captioned "Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 8
Emergency Procedure 2202-1.5 Pressurizer System Failure."
9 Do you have that in front of you?
10 A
Yes, I do.
l 11 Q
Had you seen this document before the i
12 accident in 19797
- n
/~N 13 A
I don't recall seeing this document prior
~ \\_)
14 to the accident.
lb N
15 Q
Looking at the first page of that document,
^
s>
t 16 do you see the boxes at the bottom of the page with 17 some names in them?
sq 18 A
I see the boxes.
The names are a little 19 hard to make out.
20 Q
Looking at the right-hand side, there is one 4
21 that says " Unit 2 PORC recommends approval" and then O
22 there is a signature, and under that it says " Chairman of PORC."
23
~
r 24 A
Yes, I see that.
- b Q
25 Q
Can you recognize the name of the signature s,
\\
\\
2
383 1
Zach On
,m
(
)
2 there?
%J A
No, I do not.
3 4
Q Then underneath that there is another box 5
which says " Unit Superintendent, Unit 2 Superintendent ggg 6
Approval."
Do you see that?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
There is a signature under that.
9 A
I see that.
10 Q
Do you recognize that name?
11 A
Again, it's hard to read.
It looks like I don't know if that 12 Jim Seelinger.
It looks like J.
(~
13 that's an "L"
and then what looks like Seelinger.
O) 14 Q
Do you see section B of this document, 15 page 2.0, where it says at the top " Inoperative pilot 16 operated (electromatic relief valve)"?
17 A
I see that.
18 Q
It is correct, is it not, that that deals 19 with a' situation where the pilot-operated relief valve l
l 20 opens and then fails to close?
l MR. MacDONALD:
You are asking now for his 21 e
recollection of the procedure prior to the 22 i
23 accident?
MR. FISKE:
Yes, I will start with that.
24 Ok-25 A
I think I already mentioned that I did not l
i I
1 Zochacn 384
(~ i 2
recall seeing this procedure prior to the accident.
%)
3 Q
The first page of the document refers to 4
this as Unit No. 2 Emergency Procedure 2202-1.5.
5 Do you see that?
ggg 6
A I see that.
7 Q
Were you aware that there was an emergency 8
procedure dealing with a failed-open or stuck-open 9
PORV?
10 A
I was aware that there was such a procedure. l 11 Q
was it an emergency procedure?
12 A
Yes, sir.
~S 13 Q
Why did you understand that an open PORV (b
14 was an emergency?
15 A
I was aware that it was an emergency 16 procedute because it dealt with a problem with 17 decreasing pressure if it remained open.
t l
18 Q
Why was decreasing pressure an emergency i
l 19 situation?
l 20 A
Because it dealt with -- decreasing l
21 pressure, which means if you got down to a certain I
22 limit, you would have activated the high pressure j
23 injection system and that you wanted to maintain system 24 pressure in the RC system as a PWR operates at
\\/
25 elevated pressures.
1
I 1
Zachacn 385 1
l 1
T 2
Q Did you understand that a drop in pressure (O
3 in the reactor coolant system as a result of a stuck-4 open or failed-open PORV could cause boiling in the 5
reactor coolant system outside the pressurizer?
ggg 6
A I understood from a theoretical standpoint 7
that decreasing pressure could cause water to boil, 8
from a theoretical standpoint.
However, that was not 9
from the standpoint our training was put into.
10 MR. FISKE:
I will move to strike the last 11 sentence of that answer as being totally 12 nonresponsive and gratuitous.
(~
13 I would say to you, Mr. Zechman, if there k
14 is anything you want to say on any of the related 15 matters, directly or indirectly to any of the 16 subjects we are discussing in this deposition 17 that you feel have not been covered in the 18 questions that I ask, as I told you before, you 19 have a full opportunity to do that at the end of 20 this deposition when Mr. MacDonald asks you 21 whatever questions he wants to ask you.
In the O
22 meantime, we will get along a lot more quickly 23 if you just answer the questions that I ask.
24 Q
Going back to where we were, it is correct, Ok-)
25 I take it, that you realized that an open PORV could
1 Zachnan 386 2
cause a drop in pressure and that such a drop in 3
pressure could cause boiling in the reactor coolant 4
system outside the pressurizer?
ggg 5
A From the theoretical standpoint, I 6
understand that when pressure dropped to a certain 7
point, it could cause water to boil.
I also 8
understood that a stuck-open relief valve'would cause 9
a rise in temperature.
But there were other systems, I
10 too --
11 Q
Such as the high pressure injection system?
12 A
Yes, such as securing the open PORV.
13 Q
You did understand that if the open PORV 14 was not secured and if for some reason high pressure 15 injection either did not function properly in the 16 first place or was turned off after it had been i
17 actuated, that a continuing drop in pressure could cause 18 boiling?
19 A
I said from a theoretical standpoint I 20 understand that.
From a practical standpoint, it 21 wasn't discussed.
O 22 Q
I am not really concerned with whether it 23 was from a theoretical standpoint or whatever 24 standpoint.
I am trying to find out O
whether you 25 realized before the accident in 1979 that if a PORV
1 Zachran 387 f) 2 bpened and stayed open, and if as a result of that, J
3 pressure continued to drop, at some point that drop 4
in Pressure could cause boiling?
A I said from a theoretical standpoint lll 5
6 I understand that if the pressure dropped, boiling could occur.
That was 7
8 Q
O.
K.
- .l s o realize that a stuck-open 9
Did YOU
~
10 or failed-open PORV could result in a loss of coolant 11 from the system?
12 A
I certainly understood that a stuck-open
')
13 PORV could result in a loss of a small amount of l
u) l 14 coolant.
Certainly not to the extent, nor was it 15 ever discussed, to the extent that it occurred during 16 the day;of the accident.
That was never discussed in 17 any of our training at the simulator.
18 MR. FISKE:
I move to strike the last 19 sentence of that last answer.
20 Q
Let's talk about the training you did 21 in your department at Met Ed prior to the accident.
O 22 Did you train the operators that if a 23 pilot operated relief valve stuck open and remained 24 open for a period of time, that that would result in a
'/
25 loss of coolant?
1 Zachman 388
(,)s 2
MR. MacDONALD:
Are you speaking of the 3
courses he taught himself or training department 4
in general?
5 MR. FISKE:
I am asking him in his capacity lll 6
as head of the training department.
7 A
The training we did relative to the PORV 8
was in direct contrast to what we were taught at the 9
simulator, relative to the PORV at the simulator; they 10 did not discuss -- when you have steam released, you l
11 are losing a small amount of water.
It was never 12 discussed in any greater detail than that.
(
13 Q
You have told us now several times what 14 was said at the simulator at B&W.
l l
l 15 A
That's where we took l
16 Q-I am asking what did you train your people 17 on at Met Ed in your training department?
Did you 18 ever tell them that if the PORV remained open for a 19 period of time, that that could result in a loss of 20 coolant?
21 A
Not to any greater extent than the fact O
22 that when you have a PORV and you release steam 23 through a PORV, you lose coolant.
24 Q
You knew, did you not,.that if the PORV 25 stayed open and the block valve wasn't closed, that
i 1
Zochnen 389
/'")
2 that coolant would continue to escape through that LJ 3
PORV; isn't that a fair statement of your 4
understanding prior to the accident?
5 A
That was never discussed for long periods ggg 6
of time.
7 Q
I am not asking that at the moment.
8 Let's take it one step at a time.
9 You told us you did not discuss that in 10 your training program at Met Ed.
I am tryin~g to find 11 out now whether you understood that as a fact, 12 whether or not you put that into the training program,
(~
13 that if the PORV stayed open for a period of time,
V}
14 that could result in a continued loss of coolant?
15 A
All I can repeat back is -- because, 16 obviously, after the accident it was a major point of 17 discussion -- but pricr to the accident it wasn't l
18 a major part of discussion and I can't -- because it 19 wasn't something that we discussed at the simulator l
20 on the system, it wasn't discussed at B&W lectures we 21 had -- consequently, we, in teaching that, did not O
22 discuss that as a prime --
23 Q
As head of the training department at Met 24 Ed, did you ever try to form an independent judgment
,O k/
25 as to what was important for your operators to know l
1 Zachucn 390
()
2 beyond what they had been taught in the limited 3
training they had at B&W once every two years at 4
the simulator?
e g
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Did you form an independent judgment as to 7
whether the operators should be told why it was 8
important if the PORV stuck open or failed open, to 9
close the block valve?
10 A
would you repeat that question, please.
11 (Question read.)
12 A
Certainly in the training if it was
(^')
13 recognized -- if it was recognized that the PORV was
%/
I 14 open, if my recollection is correct, one of the 15 corresponding actions is to close the block valve, 1
16 if it is. realized it is stuck open.
17 Q
O.
K.
Did you tell the operators why it 18 was important to close the block valve if the PORV 19 was open?
continuously 20 A
Because we had decreasing l
21 decreasing pressure.
O 22 Q
And closing the block valve is one way to 23 get the pressure back up?
l 24 A
That's correct.
25 Q
Isn't it correct.that another reason to
1 Zochacn 391
[ )J 2
close the PORV or to close the block valve was to 3
prevent a continuing escape of coolant through the 4
open PORV7 5
A That concept was never emphasized at the ll) 6 simulator and, consequently, did not reflect in our 7
training program.
That was never a major discussion 8
or point of discussion, to the best of my recollection.
9 When we were on the simulator and had stuck-open 10 PORVs, that wasn't discussed.
11 Q
I think you said that several times, that i
12 in that part of the B&W training program that the
(~N 13 operators went to every other year during this period U
14 of time, that wasn't discussed.
I am asking you 15 independent of that, and you have said that you made an 16 effort to form an independent judgment as to what 17 should be taught in the Het Ed training program. Did 18 it ever occur to you that the operators ought to know 19 that one reason to close the block valve was that if l
20 you didn't do that, coolant would continue to escape 21 out of the top of the system?
l l
22
'A Reflecting back, my reflection of what 23 was important pretty much paralleled at that point, 24 in relationship to the PORV, what was taught at the
\\'
25 simulator.
That's the only way I can put it, sir.
l
1 Zochann 392 r~'
(s) 2 Q
YOu did understand from the simulator 3
training, did you not, as well as your understanding 4
of the system, that if the PORV remained open and the lll 5
block valve wasn't closed, you would have a 6
continuing drop in pressure?
7 A
I understood that.
I also understood that 8
the -- the next thing was to maintain pressure 9
through the recovery systems.
10 Q
The #.rst step, was it not, in curing the 11 drop in pressure would be to close the block valve?
12 A
Provided that you knew that the PORV was O
13 stuck open.
14 Q
Or might be stuck open?
15 A
Well, I am saying if you were sure and had 16 recognized that it was open and was not closing and 17 you could not get it closed, the next step was the 18 block valve.
19 Q
Put it this way, Mr. Zechman.
If you 20 saw a drop in pressure and you had reason to believe l
21 th at an open PORV might be the cause of that drop in O
22 pressure, weren't your operators then told to close the 23 block valve?
l 24 A
If they recognized and verified that it p_
l L>
25 was open.
l l
1 Zochnen 393 b
2 Q
Or might be open?
A I d n't quite understand "might be open."
3 4
I don't understand the difference between "open" and lll 5
"might be open."
6 Q
Let's take a situation where there wasn't 7
an absolute positive diagnosis that, 100 percent sure, 8
that the PORV was open.
On the other hand, there was 9
a set of circumstances from which the operators 10 could conclude that the drop in pressure might be due 11 to an open PORV but they were not sure.
Were they not 12 trained under those circumstances that in order to 1
()
13 eliminate any doubt as to whether the PORV was open,
\\_J l
14 they should close the block valve?
I 15 A
But your hypothetical situation is all-16 encompassing.
You have to know all the circumstances 17 at the time to make that kind of a determination.
l 18 Q
I am not going through 98 different 19 hypothetical factual situations that could reach 20 the point where the operators felt that the PORV 21 might be open.
My question is hypothesizing a situation O
l 22 where for whatever systems, for whatever reasons, the 23 operators concluded that we have a drop in pressure 4
24 and this drop in pressure may be attributable to an 25 open PORV, and were not they trained under those l
l
1 Zochacn 394 2
circumstances that they should close the block valve?
3 MR. MacDONALD:
This is training at the 4
simulator?
5 MR. FISKE:
I am talking about in his ggg 6
training department.
7 MR. MacDONALD:
You were a minute ago 8
talking about the simulator.
You are jumping 9
back to the Met Ed training?
10 MR. FISKE:
I am talking about Met Ed 11 training.
12 A
I can only answer that question by telling 13 you that one has to evaluate the situation at the time g-(/
l 14 based on all the information they have at that time.
15 If it was recognized that the valve was open and it was 16 stuck open and they could not get it closed, if they 17 recognized that through the evaluation of all the 18 information they had at the time, certainly they would l
19 try to close the block valve.
i 20 Q
Try to close the block valve?
21 A
They would close the block valve.
They 9
22 would first try to close the PORV.
If that wouldn't 23 happen, they would close the block valve.
24 MR. FISKE:
Read the last answer.
25 (Record read.)
1 Zochucn 395 r8( ),
2 Q
It is correct, is it not, Mr. Zechman, 3
that after a scram, a reactor trip, after a reactor 4
trip, the PORV performs no essential function?
5 MR. MacDONALD:
You are talking about lll 6
now prior to the accident, his recollection?
7 Q
Your understanding prior to the accident.
8 MR. MacDONALD:
Objection.
I' don't know 9
what you mean by " essential function."
10 Q
I will rephrase it and maybe make it 11 clearer.
12 From your understanding of the system
}
13 prior to the accident, was there any reason not to 14 close the block valve if you suspected that there 15 might be an open PORV?
16 THE WITNESS:
Could you read that back.
17 (Record read.)
18 A
open or stuck open?
19 Q
Either one.
l 1
20 A
Normally --
l 21 Q
Stuck open or failed open.
l 22 A
Again, if all the circumstances were l
l 23 evaluated and the operators knew based on those 24 circumstances that it was stuck open.
Again it
\\m) l 25 depends on the situation.
You are giving me l
l
1 zochsen 396
()
2 a hypothetical, off-the-wall kind of thing.
It 3
d* pends where the system was -- where you are, what 4
all the conditions are.
If they knew it was stuck lll 5
open and had all those parameters and they had 6
evaluated that, they would close the block valve.
7 Q
Maybe you don't understand my question.
8 It doesn't involve an analysis of a lot of different 9
hypothetical situations.
It is a fundamental question 10 about the system.
In your training program, did you 11 ever tell the operators, "Whatever you do, don't 12 close the block valve unless you are positive that i
/~S 13 the PORV is stuck open or failed open"?
\\-)
l l
14 A
I don't recall, l
15 Q
Did you have an understanding before the 1
16 accident that that would be a bad thing to do, that is, 17 to close the block valve if you were not sure that the 18 PORV was stuck open or failed open?
19 MR. MacDONALD:
By " bad" meaning had 20 some detrimental effect on the system?
21 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
O 22 A
If the situation evaluated that it was 23 detrimental to the system --
24 Q
That is not my question.
l 25 MR. FISKE:
Read.the question back.
1 Zochnen 397 7(_)
2 I will put it again.
3 Q
Did you have an understanding that it 4
would be detrimental to the system to close the block 5
valve in a situation where the operators were not lll 6
sure whether the PORV was failed open or stuck open?
7 MR. MacDONALD:
Could I hear the question 8
again.
9 (Record read.)
10 MR. MacDONALD:
I am going to object 11 to the form.
It is hypothetical, as all the 12 other questions have been.
(^T 13 MR. FISKE:
These are not hypothetical V
14 questions. They are asking Mr. Zechman, the 15 head of the training department at Met Ed, 16 as to what his understanding was as to the way 17 the system worked.
I don't think that is I
18 hypothetical.
l 19 MR. MacDONALD:
I think it is a little 20 more than what his understanding was.
You are 21 giving him certain parameters that may or may O
22 not have operated in certain of other 23 parameters.
24 MR. FISKE:
You are building the same
/
t
(-)
25 erroneous predicate for an objection that
1 Zochacn 398
[G
\\
2 Mr. Zechman has given in his last few answers.
3 My question does not depend on any 4
particular set of circumstances.
It is just ggg 5
a fundamental question about the way the system 6
works.
7 MR. MacDONALD:
I object as stated.
8 THE WITNESS:
I don't think he gave me 9
enough information to make that kind of black 10 and white answer.
11 MR. FISKE:
Could you read the question 12 one more time, please.
T's 13 (Record read.)
C 14 A
I take it by your question that you are 15 saying that that was evaluated to be the case, failed 16 open or 4 tuck open, that was evaluated --
17 Q
No.
My question is directed at the l
18 situation where the operators are not tare whether l
l 19 it is stuck open or failed open and under those l
20 circumstances closed the block valve.
21 A
I am saying I cannot put it in a black 22 and white box without having a lot more qualifications, 23 and by that I mean a lot more circumstances, what 24 surrounds it, how they came to that conclusion, what Ab 25 was the condition of the system at the time, et cetera.
j
1 Z0chann 399 r~'s 2
Q Let me put it very simply, Mr. Zechman.
\\j 3
I don't think you have been responsive.
I will move 4
on to the next question anyway so maybe we can get 5
to the point even more directly.
ggg 6
Did you ever have an understanding that 7
it would be detrimental to the system to close the 8
block valve if in fact the PORV was closed?
9 A
There were procedures that covered that.
10 I don't recall the details and I would be speculating 11 at this time on all those conditions.
12 Q
Is it fair to say, Mr. Zechman, that you 13 don't recall any training that was ever given to any 7s 14 of the operators at Met Ed or at B&W that told them 15 they should be careful not to close the block valve 16 unless they were sure that the PORV was stuck open 17 or failed open?
18 A
I am saying to you that there were 19 procedures that covered these situations and that I 20 do not at this time recall all those circumstances.
21 There was training in regard to those procedures and O
22 conditions surrounding the PORV and the block valve.
23 I don't recall the details.
24 Q
Presumably, whatever the procedures were,
(- )
(_
25 were in writing; is that correct, those were written
1 Zochacn 400 2
procedures?
A I am referring to written procedures, yes.
3 4
Q Whatever those procedures said, we have 5
those procedures now and we have those documents and ggg 6
they will speak for themselves in terms of what 7
they say.
So I am not asking you now for the moment 8
to try and tell us from recollection what the 9
procedures said.
I am going beyond that and I simply 10 want to be sure that I correctly understand your 11 testimony.
If what I am about to say is wrong, you 12 tell me that it is wrong, but it is my understanding 13 that from everything you have said, that as you sit 3
d 14 here today, you do not recall that the operators were 15 trained either at B&W or at Met Ed to be careful not 16 to close the block valve unless they were sure that 17 the PORV was open?
18 A
I did not say that at all.
I said --
19 Q
Do you recall any such training?
20 A
I said there was training at both B&W 21 and at the site relative to the operation of the FORV O
22 and the block valve but I do not recall the specifics 23 of that, the details of that training.
24 Q
Let me ask you one more time directly.
(h
(._)
25 Do you recall as you sit here today, do you
I 1
Zochncn 401 2
recall any training that was given to the operators
(_j 3
either at B&W or at Het Ed that told them that they 4
should be careful not to close the block valve unless 5
they were sure that the PORV was open?
ll) 6 A
I repeat the last answer.
7 Q
That is your answer?
8 A
I don't recall.
9 MR. MacDONALD:
Could I hear the question 10 and answer.
11 (Record read.)
12 A
I don't recall either way.
13 (Recess taken.)
14 BY MR. FISKE:
15 Q
Mr. Zechman, I would like to read you 16 some testimony that Mr. Faust gave before the l
17 President's Commission at page 214, which also was 18 read to him in his deposition at page 376.
I would 19 like to read the questions and answers and then put 20 a follow-up question to you.
1 21 The question is:
" Question:
And were O
22 you taught in your training concerning that incident 23 any concerns with respect to the PORV failing open?
24
" ANSWER:
Not from that."
This is from s
j 25 page 214 of Mr. Faust's Kemeny Commission testimony.
l
1 Zachnen 402
( ~
2
" Question:
And were you taught in your b}
3 training concerning that incident any concerns with 4
respect to the PORV failing open?"
And I believe the 5
record indicates that "that incident" is an incident ggg 6
at TMI on March 29, 1978.
7
" ANSWER:
Not from that.
We were taught 8
in othe r words, if you take the -- our operater 9
relief valve as being open, your immediate reaction 10 would be to shut the isolated relief valve if you 11 were concerned about that.
That is our training in 12 EP.
13
" Question:
Did you have any concerns about
-m.
v 14 utilizing the isolation valve?
15
" Answer:
That day?
i 16
" Question:
No, prior to March 28th.
l 17
" Answer:
No.
l 18
" Question:
You never voiced a concern l
l 19 about using the isolation valve?
20
" Answer No, I never had any problem.
21 If I wanted to shut it, I would shut it."
l 22 Having read those questions and answers 23 from Mr. Faust's deposition, does that in any way 24 refresh your recollection that the operators were not
(")N
(
25 trained to be careful not to close the block valve
1 Z3checn 403 "3
2 unless they were sure that the PORV was stuck or f ailed
)
pen?
3 A
I don' t recollect either way.
4 5
Q You said, Mr. Zechman, that the re was training at the B&W on the diagnosis and tre atment of 6
a failed open or stuck open PORV; is that corre ct ?
7 we simulated 8
A That was one of the things from time to time.
9 10 Q
Did you learn that the B&W training 11 instructe d the operators that they should diagnose 12 whether or not the PORV had failed ope n by looking for 13 a drop in pressure, by looking at the te mpe ratu res at the
25
i Zachman 411 1
(v) 2 evaluate that.
3 g
what could cause all those three things 4
other than an open valve at the top of the sys tem that 5
is an incre ase in te mpe r ature in the re actor coolant ggg 6
drain tank --
7 A
Can we take them one at a time?
8 Q
I want to take all three in combinatio n,
9 and that's my question.
You can shake your head all you.
10 want.
Th at ' s my question, and I want you to answer the 11 question I am asking.
I am asking you what did you 12 understand be fore the accident could cause all th re e of 13 the following other than an open valve at the top of 14 the system, that is on top of the pressurizer.
N umbe r 15 one is an increase in the te mpe rature s on the dis ch a rge 16 line le ading f rom the PORV to the drain tank.
17 Secondly, a drop in pressure and, third, 18 an increase in pressure or temperature in,the reactor 19 coolant drain tank.
20 A
First of all, as discussed, tailpipe 21 temperatures, we had a le aking code safety as I understand O
22 that day that'would have elevated those temperatures. Are 23 you going to let me answer?
24 Q
Sure.
10J 25 A
The fact that the PORV had opened and closed
1 Z3chnen 4J2
[)
2 vould have elevated those temperatures under normal
\\m-3 ci r cums t an ce s.
There are a lot of other things that go 4
into the drain tank.
Other lines th at go into the 5
drain tank that could have caused the increase in ggg 6
pressure and temperature.
7 Q
I am asking again not about what could have 8
caused any one of the th re e ; I am asking prior to the 9
Three Mile Island accident.
I am not now asking you to 10 go back and sort of look back at the accident sequence 11 and give us your present thoughts o f what happened on 12 that day.
That's not my question.
My question is as 13 head of the Training Department at Met Ed, right up to
(~}
U 14 the day of the accident, did you have any unde rs tanding 15 as to any event that could cause all three of the that I re ferred to other than an open valve 16
- symptoms, 17 at the top of the pressurizer?
18 A
You can't put it in that mode, sir, because 19 th ere are other parameters, other factors that would that could effe ct those symptoms.
20 e f fe ct 21 Q
Would you tell me what those are that could 9
22 create all thr.ee of those things o the r th an an open 23 valve at the top of the system?
That is, other than an 24 open PORV.
Start with that.
I am asking you now for x/
25 your understanding before the accident.
Zachasn 413 1
2 MR. MacDONALD:
Just so I am clear, are O]
'w 3
y u asking prior to the accident, for his anything re collection of an event or a series 4
th at could cause those three things to happen 5
g 6
during a transient?
MR. FISKE:
Yes, in conjunction.
7 8
MR. MacDONALD:
At any point in time 9
during a transient.
Are you limiting it to a 10 Period of time close in sequence or just during 11 the transient to have those th re e happen?
12 MR. FISKE:
I am saying that when those 13 three things are occurring all at the same time.
g V
14 A
Would you read the question back, p le as e.
15 Q
I Will Put it again, s o the re is no question 16 about it.
The question is whe ther be fore the accident 17 you understood that there was any event that could ca me 18 all thre e of the things that I refe rred to previously 19 to occur at the same time other than an open PORV.
And 20 the three things th at I referred to are a drop in 21 Pressure in the reactor coolant system, an increase in G
22 te mpe rature s on the dis ch arge line running from the PORV 23 to the drain tank, and an increase in pressure and 24 temperature in the drain tank itself.
25 A
I don't recall eithe r way.
Zochoan 414 t
N-)
2 Q
Do you have the procedure in front of you,
/
J 3
the pressurizer system --
4 A
22021.57 5
Q Right.
ggg 6
A Yes.
7 Q
I am unclear as to what your prior testimony 8
w as with respect to this; so I would like to ask you one 9
more time:
We re you f amiliar with this procedure 10 before the accident?
11 A
I was familiar with the Unit 1 procedure 12 since prior to the accident that was the procedure that 13 I was working with.
They have similar procedure for N-14 Unit 1.
I don' t recall the Unit 2 one at this time.
15 Q
But did you have any unde rstanding that 16 the re was any important dif ferences between the pressur-17 izer system f ailure procedure for TMI-1 and that for 18 TMI-2?
19 A
I don't recall eithe r way.
l 20 Q
Is there anything that you now recall ab out 21 the pressurizer in Unit 1 as opposed to Unit 2 that 22 would call for a dif fe rent procedure?
23 A
I do n' t recall eithe r way.
24 Q
The Training Department of which you were I~
kN a supervisor conducted training for operators on TMI l
/
25 l
l
Zachmen 415 1
(~h 2
Unit 2, did it not?
N.j A
They did.
3 Q
In your own training program at Met Ed, I 4
take it, when you trained ope rators on Unit 2 on ggg 5
pressurizer system f ailure, you used a TMI-2 unit 6
p roce dure ?
7 A
My instructors did use the Unit 2 procedure, g
9 yes.
10 Q
was it important to you as supervisor of 11 the department which was training operators at both units 12 to know whether there was any important differences 13 between the p ro ce dures in one unit and the other?
(g
()
14 A
It was important to me to certainly know 15 that there were procedures that corresponded to each 16 plant that were PORC-approved procedures.
It was 17 important to me that my license people who taught the 18 operato rs use those procedures to train with.
19 Q
could you answer the question I asked?
l 20 If you want to here it again, I will have l
it re ad b ack.
21 O
A Yes, please.
22 l
l 23 (Question read.)
24 A
It was important to me to recognize that
(~
1 and there were procedure dif ferences between Unit
' _,/
25
(
[
Znchman 416 1
[J D
2 Unit 2.
I don' t pretend to know eve ry single di f fe rence w
3 between all the procedures in Unit t and Unit 2.
4 Q
But as you sit here today, you don' t recall 5
any dif ferences between the pressurize r system failure (l) 6 p roce dure for Unit 1 and that for Unit 27 7
A It's been too long a time -- almost three 8
years now since I last worked with the procedures.
I 9
just don't recall at this time.
10 Q
Look at the procedure that you have in front 11 of you which is Exhibit 305, B&W 305, which is the 12 pressurizer system f ailure proce cure for Unit 2.
I would
(~}
13 like to direct your attention to the first page,
G' 14 Section A, "Le aking pilot-operated electromatic relief 15 valve."
Do you see that?
16 A,
Yes.
17 Q
Firs t section, A-1,
- symptoms, 1.
relief 18 valve discharge line temperature exceeding the normal 19 1 30 degrees Fah re nheit, alarms set on computer at 200 20 de g re e s Fah renh ei t. "
Do you see that?
21 A
Yes, I do.
O 22 Q
Did you have any unde rstanding what the s
23 reason was for setting the alarm on the computer at
/~.
24 200 deg re es Fahrenheit?
Y 25 A
That was to alert the operators that
i Z3chman 417 1
2 certainly the temperatures have reached that point and
['N
'u j to alert them to dete rmine what the cause of those 3
4 temperatures was, 5
Q Do y u know that there was an alarm that 6
would go of f when temperatures reached 200 degrees?
MR. MacDONALD:
Unit 2?
7 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
g A
I just don't recall at this time.
9 10 Q
Do you know why the tempe rature of 200 11 w as selected for this procedure other th an -- rather 12 th an some othe r tempe rature?
13 A
I don't recall.
("}
'u j 14
-Q Is it fair to say, Mr. Zechman, that you did 15 unde rs tand th at an increase in the discharge line 16 tempe ratu re up to as much as 200 degrees Fahrenheit would 17 indicate that there was some form o f mass escaping 18 through the dis ch arge line f rom the pilot-ope rate d relie f 19 valve?
A It is my understanding that it may not have 20 21 just been from the PORV.
There were code s afe ties,' too.
O 22 Q
We are talking now about the section that 23 re fe rs to a le aking pilot-ope rate d e le ctromatic relie f 24 valve.
Do you see that?
A Yes.
25
I Zachman 418 i
[U) 2 Q
That's different than a code safety, isn't it A
I understand that.
3 4
Q Symptom No. 1 of a leaking pilot-operated electromatic relief valve is an increase in the relief lll 5
6 valve discharge line tempe rature from 130, above 130.
7 A
It says that one of the symptoms of the 8
relief valve.
It doesn't s ay other things that can 9
cause that.
10 Q
The reason that that is a symptom of a le aking pilot-ope rate d relie f valve is be cause mass 11 12 escaping from the pilot-ope rated relie f valve will he at
()
13 up temperatures at the dischargo line; isn'.t that LJ 14 cor re ct?
15 A
If a pilot-ope rated relief valve opened 16 and clos,ed, it could do that, too.
MR. FISKE:
Would you read the question 17 18 back, please.
(Re cord read. )
19 A
It's one of the causes.
20 21 Q
Let's go to Section B on the next page, 9
22 which talks ab_o ut an inope rative pilot-operated 23 ele ctromatic relie f valve.
Do you see that?
24 A
Yes.
,s I
1
~
25 Q
The first part is A-1, symptoms.
Z3chman 419 1
/"'N The fi rs t symptom is RC system pressure k.-)
2 4
3 RC system presure is above 2255 psig and the valve fails 4
to open."
Do you see that?
A res.
gg) 5 6
Q That is a symptom of a closed PORV; co rre ct?
7 A
one of the symptoms, yes.
8 Q
Let's look at Item No.
2.
RC system 9
pressure is below 2205 esig and the valve fails to 10 close."
Do you see that?
11 A
I see that.
12 MR. MacDONALD:
Is that supposed to be a 13 dire ct quote?
I don't know whether you are
(~))
L 14 reading it so it is a direct quote, or you are 15 paraphrasing.
MR. FISKE:
Le t' s start again.
16 17 Q
No. 2 is, "RC system pressure is below 18 2205 psig and RCR-2 fails to close."
That is a symptom 19 of an open PORV, is it not?
j l
20 A
That is one.of the symptoms.
l 21 Q
The next symptom listed is RC R-2 dis ch arge 22 line temperature is Mbove the 200 degree Fahrenheit r
23 alarm.
Do you see that?
24 A
It continues, " Compute r point"
(~\\
25 Q
" Computer point (40 2). "
That is a second
t Zachman 420 i
(
2 symptom of an open PORV; is that correct?
3 A
That is co r re ct.
4 Q
As you have just told us, the reason that 5
that is a symptom of an open PORV is because mass lll 6
escaping through an open PORV would heat up the 7
dis ch arge liner correct?
0 A
That's correct.
9 Q
Going back for a moment to Item No. 2 which 10 is the first symptom of an open PORV, I take it that 11 A
When you say go back to Item 2 --
12 Q
On the same section.
that RC system pressure is below 2205 psig 13 14 and RCR-2 fails to close.
I take it that a continuing 15-drop in pressure below 2205 would indicate that the 16 valve has not closed?
i 17 A
You are putting 2 and 3 togethe r.
Are you 18 combining those two?
l l
19 Q
Yes.
Start with No.
2.
The firs t symptom 20 of an open PORV, that the RC system pressure is below l
21 2205 psig and RCR-2 fails to close.
Do you see that?
Il>
22 A
I see that.
l 23 Q
It is correct, is it not, if the PORV stays 24 open and fails to close, pressure will continue to drop 25 below 2205 psig?
l l
l-
I 1
Zachman 420-A MR. MacDONALD:
His understanding prior to 2
the accident?
3 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
4 A
res.
(Continued on Page 421.)
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 e
22 23 24 O
25 l
i 1
Zachman 421 2
Q The third symptom listed in Section A01 3
for an open PORV is the RC drain tank pressure and 4
temperature above normal on the control room fad waste 5
disposal control panel 8-A.
lll 6
Do you see that?
7 A
Yes, Item 4, I see that.
8 Q
Is it correct that if mass is escaping 9
through an open PORV, that that mass will go directly 10 through the discharge line to the reactor coolant 11 drain tank?
12 A
Yes, sir.
[')
13 Q
And will cause an increase in pressure N/
14 and temperature?
15 A
That is one of the things that will --
16 one of the things that will cause that, yes.
17 Q
It is correct, is it not, that under 1
l 18 symptoms of an inoperative pilot operated relief valve 19 in this procedure there are no symptoms of an'open 20 PORV other than the three we just discussed?
21 A
As it relates to this procedure, right?
22 Q
Yes.
23 A
Yes, that's correct.
l 24 Q
And looking to the next section of this i
(h
\\)
25 procedure, which refers to immediate action, do you 1
422 I
Zachnan
[/)
2 see that?
s~
3 A
B.2.
4 Q
That's correct.
g 5
A Yes.
6 Q
That is divided into two sections, 7
automatic action and manual action?
8 A
Yes, sir.
9 Q
Looking at automatic action, that in turn 10 is divided into a failed-closed valve PORV and a 11 failed-open PORV, correct?
12 A
That's correct.
13 Q
It is correct, is it not, that one of the
(~))
14 automatic actions for a failed-open PORV is high 15 pressure injection is actuated at 1600 psig?
16 A.
You are down to Item 2?
l 17 Q
Right.
18 A
You are looking at 2-C, which is "High 19 pressure injection is actuated at 1600 psig"?
l 20 A
Yes.
l 21 A
Yes, sir.
h 22 Q
Continuing in the.next section, which 23 refers to manual, and part of that that deals with 24 manual action for a failed-open PORV, do you see that?
Nl 25 A
we are on page 3, now?
l
423 1
Zachern fm
's_)
2 Q
Right.
3 A
B.2, O.
K.
4 Q
What is the first item listed as the 5
manual action for a failed-open PORV?
gg) 6 A
Item 2-A says to close electromatic 7
relief isolation valve RCV-2.
8 Q
Is that what we have colloquially referred 9
to as the block valve?
10 A
Yes, sir.
11 Q
I would like to go back to the symptom, 12 the third symptom for an open PORV listed in this
()
13 procedure which says that the RC drain tank pressure 14 and temperature are above normal on a control room 15 rad waste disposal control room panel 8-A.
16 A.
Item 47 l
17 Q
Item 4 but it is the third symptom of f
18 an open PORV.
19 A
O.
K.
20 Q
Prior to the accident in March of 1979, 21 did you know where the rad waste disposal control 4
22 panel 8-A was in the control room?
23 A
On Unit 27 24 Q
Yes.
,_(s) 25 A
Yes, sir, I did.
1 Zachnen 424 (O')
2 Q
Where was that?
3 A
In the rad waste panel in the back; you 4
had to go around the back to see it.
5 Q
Did you think it was important that the ggg 6
operators have the information with respect to drain 7
tank pressure and temperature closer to them than 8
being on the back of a panel that they had to walk 9
around to find?
10 THE WITNESS:
Would you read that back 11 for me.
12 (Question read.)
~'}
13 A
You are referring prior to the accident?
s.)
14 Q
Yes.
15 A
I don't recall prior to the accident 16 thinking one way or the other about the location of 17 that particular panel as far as the control room 18 was designed.
l l
19 Q
Did you know where the instrumantation 20 for the reactor coolant drain tank pressure and 21 temperature was on Unit 17 9
22 A
Yes, sir, I did.
23 Q
Where were they on Unit 17 24 A
Rad waste panel.
\\'
25 Q
Where was the rad waste panel located?
1 Zachncn 425 p.
2 A
It was located -- see if I can put this (v) 3 in words.
Assuming the operators are facing the 4
reactor console, the rad waste panel was to their 5
back.
They would turn around from the console, they ggg 6
would see the rad waste panel to their left in 7
the control room in back of them.
8 Q
How far away was that from where they 9
would be standing when they were facing the reactor 10 console?
10 to 15 11 A
It was 10 to 15 -- a guess 12 paces.
13 Q
Let me show you a document which has been
{-
xs 14 marked previously as B&W Exhibit 263, which is a 15 diagram of the control room at TMI-2.
16 Do you see that?
17 A
Yes, sir.
l l
18 Q
can you tell us where the instrumentation f
i l
19 for the reactor coolant drain tank pressure and 20 temperature was in the Unit 2 control room?
I 21 A
To the best of my recollection, right 22 here, sir (indicating).
23 Q
You are indicating on what has been marked 24 as 8-A right at the bottom of the page.
25 MR. MacDONALD:
It looks like 8-A.
1 zochnen 426
('~N, 2
Q Why don't you put a circle around the N/
i s
location of the instrumentation for the reactor 3
4 coolant drain tank for Unit 2.
5 A
To the best of my recollection, right 9
6 here (indicating).
7 Q
Put a "2" next to that circle.
8 (Witness complies.)
9 Q
Could you take the same diagram and 10 indicate where the instrumentation for the reactor 11 coolant drain tank was for Unit 17 12 A
Unit 1 was over -- right about here 13 (indicating).
14 Q
Would you put a circle around that?
15 A
Realizing it is not the form.
16 Q.
I understand.
17 (Witness complies.)
t I
18 Q
Mark that with a "1."
19 (Witness complies.)
20 MR. FISKE:
Let's mark this as a l
21 separate exhibit, which is the next B&W 22 exhibit.
23 (Diagram of control room at TMI-2 was l
l 24 marked as B&W Exhibit 569 for identification,
{)s
(_,
25 as of this date.)
l l
427 I
Zochnan
[ )J 2
Q Mr. Zechman, did the training department 3
at Met Ed have any role in determining what the 4
best layout would be for the control room in 5
Unit 1 and Unit 27 ggg 6
A To the best of my recollection, we did 7
not.
8 Q
So it is fair to say that to the best of 9
your recollection, the people that were responsible 10 for designing the layout of the control room did not 11 consult the training department?
12 A
The only thing I can recollect is that
("'}
13 they did not, to the best of my recollection, discuss V
14 it with me.
I don't know if anybody discussed it 15 with anybody else in the training department, but 16 they certainly did not discuss it with me.
17 Q
At any time while you were acting 18 supervisor or supervisor of the training department, l
i 19 did you make an effort to find out whether the 20 training department was being consulted or had been 1
l l
21 consulted in connection with the layout of the control 9
22 rooms?
l 23 A
Could you repeat that please?
24 (Record read.)
(-
\\~'
25 A
To the best of my recollection, the periods l
1 Zochacn 428
()
2 that I was acting or supervisor of training, that 3
had already been accomplished, to my best recollection.
4 Q
Part of my question was whether you made 5
any effort to find out whether the training ggg 6
department had been consulted in connection with the 7
layout?
8 A
I don't personally recall making that 9
inquiry.
10 Q
Is it fair to say that it never came to g
11 your attention at any time prior to the accident in 12 1979 that the training department had been consulted?
j 13 THE WITNESS:
Would you repeat that.
14 (Question read.)
15 A
I don't recall from my recollection at i
16 any time the training department being consulted or 17 asked for their consultation on the layout of the 18 Unit 1 or 2.
19 Q
Did you know prior to the accident in 20 1979 that there had been leakage from one or more 21 valves at the top of the system for some period of O
22 time before March 28, 1979?
23 A
I don't personally recall that, sir.
24 Q
so I understand your testimony, you did 25 not know that before the accident?
j
429 1
Zochnen
(
2 A
To the best of my recollection, I don't 3
recall being aware of that prior to the accident.
to your attention after the 4
Q Did it come 5
accident that there had been that type of leakage ggg 6
before the accident?
7 THE WITNESS:
Can you go back to the 8
first question he had on the leakage, repeat 9
that for me?
10 (Record read.)
11 A
After the accident, I was aware that 12 there was leakage from one of the code safeties.
13 MR. MacDONALD:
We are speaking about
()
14 Unit 27 l
15 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
16 MR. MacDONALD:
It wasn't in your 17 question.
18 THE WITNESS:
I assumed that.
19 Q
Who told you that?
20 MR. MacDONALD:
How did he find out 21 is the question.
22 MR. FISKE:
Let's start with my question.
23 A
I don't recall.
It came in from i
24 different directions.
I don't recall how I first O
25 learned of it.
l
1 Zachurn 430
/
2 Q
What was the basis upon which it had been Nj)'
3 concluded that the leakage was from one of the code 4
safeties and not the PORV?
5 THE WITNESS:
Repeat that, please.
ggg 6
(Question read.)
7 MR. MacDONALD:
You are asking for the 8
basis of his conclusion or the basis of the --
9 or the information he heard of?
10 MR. FISKE:
He said in an answer to my 11 question that he learned after the accident I
12 that there had been leakage from one of the 13 code safeties.
My question is on what basis --
{~J}
14 let me back up to make it even simpler.
15 Q
Did you personally conduct an investigation 16 after the accident to determine whether the leakage 17 had been from the code safeties as opposed to the 18 PORV?
4 19 A
I did not.
20 Q
So the statement that you just made, that 21 you learned that there had been leakage from the code 9
22 safeties, was based on something you learned from 23 some other source; is that correct?
24 A
Yes, sir.
25 Q
My question is, whatever that source was,
431 1
Zachnnn 2
did you learn on what basis that source had concluded b) 3 that the code safety was leaking and not the PORV?
4 A
I guess not knowing -- having heard that 5
from several different sources, I can only say that ggg 6
it was one of the -- the fact that it was leaking was of the things that masked and confused the issue 7
one 8
with the tail pipe temperatures.
9 Q
You did learn after the accident that 10 for some period of time before the accident that 11 the temperatures at the relief valve discharge line l
12 had been above 130 degrees; is that correct?
~
13 A
I do not recall any of the details, (V}
l 14 for what period of time nor do I recall the exact 15 temperatures.
16 Q.
I didn't ask you at the moment to 17 specify the precise period of time or the precise 18 temperature.
All I am asking is, didn't you learn 19 that for some period of time before the accident, the 20 temperature at the relief valve discharge line had 21 been above the normal 130 degrees?
22 A
I am saying it was at some temperature, 1
23 I don't recall what the temperature was.
24 Q
The temperature was higher than 130 p
\\-.
25 degrees; isn't that correct?
1 l
l
i 432 1
Zachucn f' N V) 2 A
I don't recall that, sir.
e 3
Q You said that you learned that the tail 4
pipe temperature condition had in some way masked, 5
I think was the phrase you used, the situation of 6
the tail pipe temperatures during the accident; isn't 7
that correct?
8 A
Yes, in answer to your question of how 9
I learned about it and what was the basis, that is 10 how it was conveyed to me.
11 Q
Did you understand in what way it was 12 being claimed that the condition of the tail pipe
("%
13 temperatures before the accident had masked their
\\
)
14 significance during the. accident?
15 THE WITNESS:
Could you repeat that.
16 (Question read.)
l i
17 A
Only from the standpoint in the 18 discussions of the tail pipe temperatures and what 19 those temperatures were, that some of the confusing 20 issues were the leaking code safeties and the effoct 21 on the tail pipe temperatures and the effect of --
G 22 that the PORV had opened or closhd or, as we learned 23 later, had stayed open, had contributed to the 24 evaluation of those temperatures.
It was in that i
25 light.
1 Zachasn 433
(~N 2
Q That is what I am trying to find out.
(_
3 Did you understand that what was being claimed was, 4
because the temperatures at the tail pipe before the 5
accident had been higher than normal, that the 6
existence of higher than normal temperatures during 7
the accident lost some of its significance?
8 A
Again, I can only put it in the framework 9
in which I recall receiving that information, 10 that leaking code safety had elevated the temperatures 11 and that it contributed to the confusion over the 12 tail pipe temperatures.
13 Q
You did understand, then, that the leaking U
14 valve had elevated the temperatures before the i
15 accident?
16 A,
Yes, had elevated the temperatures.
17 That's as far as I can go.
18 (Recess taken.)
19 Q
I would like to go back to one question 20 that I don't think was answered before the recess, 21 which is whether you learned the basis upon which it l
22 had been concluded that it was a code safety that was 23 leaking rather than the PORV?
l 24 A
All I am saying is whatever the sources
((_,,
25 were, that was my recollection of when I learned --
i
434 1
Z3chman I'h 2
when I learned that there was a leaking valve, that V
3 it was the code safety that was leaking.
4 Q
I understand.
Did you learn the basis 5
upon which it had been determined that the valve 6
that was leaking was a code safety rather than the 7
PORV?
8 A
I don't recall.
9 Q
One other question going back to comething 10 just before the recess.
11 We marked as an exhibit the chart of the 12 control room at Unit 2, upon which you indicated the 13 difference in the location of the instrumentation 14 for the reactor coolant drain tank for Unit 2 as 15 opposed to Unit 1.
16 A,
Yes.
17 Q
Did you ever inquire of anybody while you 18 were in charge of the training department as to why 19 the instrumentation had been located in a dif ferent 20 location for Unit 2 than it had been in Unit 17 21 A
You said prior to the ac ci dent?
Is that 22 correct?
23 Q
Yes.
24 A
Not to the best of my recollection.
(h
\\_)
25 Q
Right before the recess, I think your last u
435 I
Z3chsen
(~N 2
answer was that you did learn after the accident l
3 that for some period of time before the accident 4
y the temperatures on the relief valve discharge 5
line hnd been elevated.
'~'
h 6
A I believe-that the tail pipe temperatures 7
were elevated, yes.
8 Q
Did you make any effort to determine g
whether training had.been given to the operators on 10 what effect that elevated temperature would have 11 on the-implementation of the pressurizer system
~
12' failure procedure which had as one of the symptoms 13 of an open PORV, discharge line temperatures above g-V 14 200 degrees Fahrenheit alarm?
15 THE WITNESS:
Would you repeat that.
16 (Question read.)
l l
17 A
Just for clarification, you are saying 18 after the accident and after I learned of this, did l
10 I go back and determine if there was training prior 20 to the accident on those elevated temperatures and 21 the effects on that procedure?
22 Q
Yes.
l 23 A
I don't recall making that inquiry.
24 Q
Isn't it a fact, Mr. Zechman, that there
(/
25 was no instruction given to the operators on how they w
l l
1 20chocn 436 7-should adjust their approach to the open FORV N~)N 3'
Procedure in light of the fact that temperatures in 4
the discharge line were.above normal because of the 5
leakage?
6 THE WITNESS:
Would you repeat that.
7 (Question read.)
4 8
A I don't recall either way, if there was 9
trainit.g prior to the accident, from the training 10 department standpoint.
There are other ways they 11 could have been aware, such as during their shift j,,
).
12 tu rn o ve r.,
The operations department has a shift 13 turnover where they bring everyone on the shift up
\\s 14 to date on the situation of tea plant.
I don't know 15 whether during that period of time that could have 16 been discussed from that standpoint.
17 Q
You aro-just speculating whether it was
.- 18 or watn't, correct?
19.
A Yes.
20 Q
You don't know today that any such 21 instruction or training was done outside the training 22 department, do you?
23 A
I have no recollection, no, sir.
24 Q
You do know that no such training was done
['T
(_)
25 in the training department?
I lJ
1 Zachacn 437 f~')
2 A
I said I don't recall eithe r way.
v 3
Q Let me read you a question and answer from 4
the testimony that you gave before the Rogovin 5
commission.
I am going to read from page 77.
6 Question by Mr. Orenstein:
7
" Question:
I have one more question.
8 I had a question about the tail pipe from the PORV.
9 Now, it was known that prior to the March 28th 10 incident there was a thousand-gallon-per-shift leak 11 through the PORV or safety relief valve, whatever.
I 12 "The question that comes to mind is, in rx 13 view of the fact that it was known there was a leak
(_
14 and the effluent had to be removed at each shift and i.
l 15 there was a higher tail pipe temperature than you i
16 would normally have during that particular -- at that l
17 particular point than if there were no leak, did the 18 training program address this issue, that is, in your 1
19 requalification program, were you trying to tack b
more operating experience into it, was there a 21 situation where the operators were all alerted to the 22 fact that the tail pipe temperature would normally 23 be higher than originally prescribed and if there was 24 a transient taking place in which this lifted, l
(^T-)
25 they would have a different set of temperatures to l
H.
i
1 Zochnon 438 1
2 use as their base line?
(V 3
" Answer:
With respect to your direct 4
question, tail pipe temperatures versus the leakage 5
that went on, no, sir.
We have not directed that 6
particular situation in our training program in the 7
past."
8 Were you asked that question and did you 9
give that answer?
10 A
I was asked that question, I gave that 11 answer.
That was my recollection at that time.
12 Q
And when you gave that answer, you were 13 attempting to give the Rogovin Commission your best
-s,
\\
14 truthful recollection at that point, were you not?
15 A
certainly.
That was my recollection at 16 that time.
17 Q
Do you hav,e any different recollection 18 today?
19 MR. MacDONALD:
You are asking him 20 whether this refreshes his recollection as to 21 the answer he gave?
I 22 MR. FISKE:
No.
He said that the answer 23 he gave was his best recollection at that time, 24 which was in 1979 within a few months of the
/~T l
(,)
25 accident, and I am asking him whether today, l
i
1 23chacn 439 2
in 1982, he has any different recollection than O('~N 3
that which he expressed to the Rogovin 4
Commission.
5 A
I still don't recollect either way.
6 Q
Did you find out after the accident whether 7
anybody in the training department had been aware 8
before the accident that there had been elevated 9
temperatures on the discharge line from the PORV7 10 A
Today, I don't recollect either way.
11 Q
Did you make any effort after the accident 12 when you learned that there had been elevated 13 temperatures at the discharge line, to find out 14 whether or not that information had been known to 15 the training department?
16 A.
It is too long ago.
I don't recollect 17 either way.
18 Q
I take it is fair to say that as you sit 19 here today, you don't recall making such an effort?
l 20 A
I don't recall if I did or I didn't.
I 21 don't recall either way.
k 22 Q
What procedures did you have in the l
23 training department when you were in charge of it to 24 see to it that the training department would be
(_)
25 informed of changes in conditions at either one of L
1
1 Zachsen 440
()
2 the units that might affect operator response to a 3
4 THE WITNESS:
Please, repeat that.
5 (Question read.)
6 A
Well, our training department was on 7
controlled distribution for procedure changes, 8
procedures, procedure changes, TCR and TCN's.
When 9
our licensed instructors would go to the control room 10 for their period of on-the-job training, they would 11 review the logs and be brought up to date on the 12 condition of the plant at that time.
If they had
'3 13 a trainee that they were taking through training at
~
[G 14 the time in the control room, they would look at the 15 logs and make themselves aware of the updates that 16 were going on at this particular time.
I 17 Q
You just said, I believe, that operators 1
18 who would be participating in the training program, 19 and I assume by that you mean the requalification 20 program?
l 21 A
Or new -- well.
22 Q
Let's start again.
23 You said that operators who were 24 participating in any part of the training program (D
25 who went to the control room as part of that training I
i.
1 Zachnen 441 h) 2 program, when they got there would be made aware of wJ 3
what conditions were in the plant at the time; 4
correct?
5 A
You have got to separate trainee from 6
on-shift operations.
I am saying if one of our 7
instructors was taking a trainee to the control room 8
to give him an oral walk-through or something of that 9
sort, depending on the purpose he was there for, 10 they would review the logs to see what the status 11 of the plant was at the time to see what the changes 12 were and what was going on and what to be aware of.
13 If our instructors were going up there
( ')
V 14 for on-the-job training and being a part of a shift, 15 participating in the shift work, they would also 16 go through that review process.
17 Q
Is that the end of the answer?
18 A
And I think I just mentioned that we.are 19 on controlled distribution for procedures and changes.
20 Q
O.
K.
21 Is it fair to say, though, that if there 1
22 was a period o.f time during which instructors were not 23 in the control room either as part of their own 24 training or as part of the training of a trainee, (D
's t/
25 there were no procedures by which the training i
1 Zachnen 442
(~)
2 department would be aware of changes in conditions G/
in the plant which might affect operators' responses 3
4 to a transient?
THE WITNESS:
Would you repeat that 6
question.
7 (Question read.)
8 MR. MacDONALD:
I object to the form.
9 A
There were various documentations that 10 came down from the superintendent of system. changes, 11 things they felt were of importance for us to know 12 were distributed to us.
That is not to say -- what f-x 13 I am trying to say is that we were not blanked
\\
>Q 14 off from not getting any communications.
We were 15 certainly made aware of system changes.
We were made 16 aware of transients that occurred.
17 Q
who under the organizational structure 18 at Het Ed at the time would have been responsible 19 for communicating to the training department 20 information about elevated temperatures at the 21 discharge line?
h 22 A
There were several sources that that 23 information could come from.
It could have come from 24 the discussions with the foremen who were down in O
"\\s) 25 training at the time.
It could have come formally I
1 Zachann 443 rm
)
2 from the operations department in a letter to us.
(J they could have learned of that 3
It could have 4
while they were in the control room during training 5
exercises.
There are many ways that it could have 6
come to us.
7 Q
Did you ever have a discussion with 8
anybody in any other part of the Met Ed organization 9
in which you said in substance, "We would like to be 10 sure that we are advised every time.there is a change 11 in the conditions at either plant which might affect 12 operators' responses to a transient"?
(~)
13 A
As I said, there were modes in which Nj' 14 that was occurring, TDR's, trip reports we were 15 getting.
We were being fed that kind of information.
16 Q.
Is it your testimony that you believe 17 that there were procedures in effect prior to the 18 accident by which information about the elevated 19 temperatures on the discharge line should have been 20 communicated to the training department?
21 A
I think it is generally understood in the 22 operations department and by the superintendent 23 that the training department needed to be aware of 24 conditions that affected the plant operation and that 25 they would provide us with that information as they n
I
1 Zochnen 444
/']
2 deemed important, as they evaluated for us to know.
V 3
That is why we were on distribution for a lot of that 4
material.
5 Q
Can you answer the question I asked any 6
more directly?
7 THE WITNESS:
Repeat that.
8 (Question read.)
9 Q
I can testify that we were on distribution 10 for information and that relative to the tail pipe 11 temperatures that somebody had to make an evaluation 12 and determine whether that information should be sent 13 to the training department.
gyb 14 I don't know how else to answer that 15 question, sir.
16 g.
You learned of the fact after the accident 17 that the temperatures had been elevated prior to the 18 accident.
Did you believe then that that was the 19 kind of information that should have been communicated 20 to the training department?
21 A
I believe, as I testified earlier, that 22 I was not sure one way or the other whether that 23 information was relayed to us and whether we trained 24 l
on that.
After the accident, obviously, the
[~'t
()
25 circumstances surrounding the PORV and the tail pipe I
11
1 Z0chacn 445
,m
(
)
2 temperatures became the main focus of attention.
\\_/
3 There were a lot of lessons learned from that.
That 4
information would just be one point of interest that 5
certainly, in retrospect, if we didn't and I am 6
not sure that we di dn ' t have that information if 7
we di dn ' t, it would have been nice to have.
8 Q
I asked you before, Mr. Zechman, about a 9
transient which occurred at Unit 2 in March of 1978 10 involving a failed-open pilot operated relief valve 11 and I believe you testified that you were not aware I
12 of that transient prior to the accident in 1979; is 13 that correct?
Q(~N 14 A
That's correct.
15 Q
Let me show you a document which has 16 been marked as B&W 170, which is a letter from Mr.
17 Herbein of Met Ed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
18 dated June 27, 1978, tranmitting a special report 19 concerning the TMI-2 ECCS actuation of March 29, 1978 20 and a licensee event report for that same transient, 21 and I ask you whether or not you saw that document 22 or part of it prior to the 1979 accident.
23 A
I personally do not recall seeing this 24 document.
That is not to say that my department has not 1
/
l b'
25 seen it.
I
1 Zochacn 446
(~)
2 Q
You don't know one way or the other V
3 whether they did?
4 A
That's correct.
5 Q
If they did, nobody brought it to your 6
attention?
7 A
Prior to the accident?
8 Q
Yes.
9 A
I don't recall either way, sir.
10 Q
I think you testified that you were not 11 aware of the transient itself prior to the accident 12 in 1969.
13 A
That is true.
r s.,
\\_ I 14 Q
So is it correct that if this Exhibit 170 15 was sent to the training department, nobody brought 16 any of the information in it to your attention?
17 A
I can only say I don't recall personally 18 seeing that.
19 Q
Or knowing about the transient before 20 the accident?
21 A
or knowing about the transient prior, yes.
I 22 Q
In one of your earlier answers, you 23 referred to, I think what you said was a command 24 signal relating to the PORV7 O
V 25 A
Yes.
I Il
1 Zachmen 447
(~')
2 Q
Did you learn prior to the accident in U
3 1979 that instrumentation had been installed in the 4
control room relating to whether or not the PORV was 5
open or closed?
[
6 A
Prior to the accident, you are asking, 7
right?
8 Q
Yes.
9 A
Prior to the accident, the only recollection 10 I have is that the light was on when it was open, the 11 light was off when it was closed.
That was a light 12 indication.
13 g-)
Q The light was on if open, right?
'\\~J 14 A
Yes.
15 Q
off if closed?
16 A-Right.
That was the command signal to the 17 valve.
18 Q
When had that instrumentation been 19 installed?
20 A
I don't recall.
21 Q
When did you first find out about it?
I 22 A
I don't recall.
23 Q
What did you learn as to the reason for 24 that instrumentation?
(~/
\\
(,,
25 A
My recollection is that the reason was to il I
1 Zochacn 448 2
let the operators know as a visual indication whether
[ )'i
'w 3
the command to the valve showed that it was open 4
or closed.
5 Q
You do recall that there was a point in 6
time when that type of instrumentation was added to 7
the already existing instrumentation in the control 8
room; is that correct?
9 A
I recollect that there was a period of 10 time that it was added.
11 Q
At the time you learned that, whom did you 12 learn that from?
~~
13 A
I don't recall.
(U'3 14 Q
Did you ask whomever you learned it from 15 "Why are we adding this instrumentation to the control 16 room"?.
17 A
I don't recall.
l 18 Q
Did you learn at that time that there had l
19 been a particular event at Unit 2 which had l
desire to have this kind of additional 20 precipitated the l
21 instrumentation?
22 A
I don't recall knowing its being associated 1
1 1
23 with any event.
24 Q
Did you ask anybody "Why are we doing O]
'/
25 this"?
l I
I l
1 Zochscn 449 s
2 A
I don't recall.
3 Q
was the first time you learned about this 4
instrumentation after it had already been installed?
5 A
I don't recall.
6 Q
Is it your testimony that no one 7
consulted with you to get your advice as to whether 8
or not this kind of instrumentation would be useful 9
to the operators?
10 A
I don't recall anybody asking me my advice 11 on that.
12 Q
Did anyone ask the advice of anybody in the 13 training department before that instrumentation was 14 installed?
15 A
I persone11y don't recall if anybody in 16 my department was consulted on that issue.
17 Q
Do you know whether similar instrumentation 18 was installed at Unit 17 19 MR. MacDONALD:
You are talking about 20 the same time, prior to the accident?
21 MR. FISKE:
Any time before the accident.
lh 22 A
I am drawing blanks.
I don't recall.
23 Q
And were the operators at Unit 2 trained 24 as part of their requalification training program on 25 this light?
I
1 zochacn 450
/~'
2 A
It's been so long, sir.
I don't recall 3
either way.
4 Q
What did you understand this light showed?
5 A
My best recollection is that it showed the O
6 command signals being sent to the valve.
If the 7
light was on, the command signal was being sent 8
when the light was on, it was open, and if it was off, 9
it was closed.
10 Q
When a command signal was being sent, you 11 mean a flow of electricity?
f 12 A
That it would close if the light was off.
13 Q
Did you know that if the light was off 14 that showed only that a command signal had gone to the 15 solenoid which activates either the opening or the 16 closing.of the valve?
17 THE WITKESS:
Repeat the question.
18 (Question read. )
19 A
To the best of my recollection, that was 20 correct.
21 Q
That the light being on or off was not a llh 22 direct indication of actual position of the PORV?
i 23 A
May I have this put in a time frame?
24 Q
Before the accident.
25 A
I tell you, it is difficult for me to I
1 Zach=cn 451
(~'T 2
recall -- there is confusion in my mind, in all
\\_)
3 honesty, in what period of time I Isarned that.
Today 4
I recall it.
I don't recall the time frame I learned 5
it in.
There is confusion in my mind because of 6
circumstances after the accident.
7 Q
Let me show you a document which has been 8
marked as B&W Exhibit 262, which is a diagram of the 9
Dresser PORV, which is the type of valve which was on 10 Unit 2.
11 I would like to ask you, by reference to 12 that diagram, if you could tell us what your 13 understanding was as to how the PORV opened and closed s
_)
14 in response to the command signals that were sent 15 to the solenoid.
16 A-It's been too long ago, sir.
I don't 17 recall.
1 l
18 Q
Do it as of today, then.
19 A
I don't recall.
20 Q
You don't know today, in other words, 21 how the PORV actually functioned in terms of opening 22 and closing once a command signal had been sent to 23 the solenoid?
24 A
I know that there was,a solenoid 25 activated PORV.
I don't know the mechanical or
1 Zachsan 452 r~;
2 electrical interrelations today.
3 Q
Did you know that there were circumstances 4
under which after the PORV had opened, a command 5
signal could be sent to the solenoid causing the 6
light to go off and yet the PORV could stay open?
7 A
I am aware today that could happen.
8 Q
Were you aware of that before the accident?
9 A
I don't recall either way.
The time 10 frame, I just can't put that in my own mind in a 11 time-frame context as to what time I learned that.
12 Q
Let's go before the accident.
13 was it importart for you as head of the
\\
14 training department, to know when this new t
15 instrumentation was installed whether or not the 16 operators could rely on that instrumentation as an 17 accurate indicator of whether the PORV was open or l
18 closed?
19 A
It is important to me that my training 20 people, training operators on the systems of 21 procedures know the changes that have taken place on lh 22 those systems.
23 Q
In order to determine whether they knew it, l
24 did you try and find out whether the signal -- the
)
25 light on the control room panel was an accurate 1.
i n
1 Zachann 453
/"%
2 indicator of whether the PORV was open or closed?
3 THE WITNESS:
Please repeat the question.
4 (Question read.)
5 A
I simply don't recall what my recollection 6
was at that time.
7 Q
Did it ever come to your attention 8
that there were people within the Met Ed organization 9
who said that this instrumentation was not sufficient 10 because it did not provide a direct indication of 11 the position of the valve and that instrumentation i
12 should be installed which did provide such a direct 13 indication?
IV 14 A
You are asking me was I either part of i
15 or aware of the conversations relating to those 1
16 circumstances?
17 Q
Yes, as to the type of light that should 18 be installed.
19 A
I don't personally recall being a part of 20 any of those discussions.
21 Q
So is it your testimony that it never ll 22 came to your attention any time before the accident 23 that there was anyone within the Met Ed organization 24 who felt that this light was not a sufficient b
25 indicator of position of the PORV?
q_j 3
11
Zachsen 454 1
A I am saying that I personally was not part 2
f-of any discussion or was aware of discussions relative 3
4 to that.
5 Q
Were the operators who were being trained 9
6 in your training department during the period of time 7
before the accident after this light had been installed 8
instructed that the light was not a direct indicator 9
or the position of the PORV?
10 A
I don't recall either way at this time, 11 sir.
12 MR. FISKE:
Let's recess for lunch.
13 (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m.
a luncheon
(
\\
\\/
14 recess was taken.)
15 l
16 17 18 l
19 20 21 Y
23 24 25 N',-)t i
o
1 455 2
AFTERNOON SESSION Q
3 2:00 p.m.
4 RI CHARD W.
- ZECHMAN, resumed.
5 EXAMINATION (continued) 6 BY MR. FISKE:
7 Q
We talked some this morning, Mr. Zechman, O
about the reactor coolant drain tank.
9 A
Yes, sir.
10 Q
That particular component of the system 11 was not supplied by Babcock & Wilcox, was it?
12 A
I don't recall.
13
')
Q what did you understand the purpose of
[G 14 the reactor coolant drain tank to be?
15 A
It was a collection tank.
Not only did 16 the drainage from the tail pipes go there but there f
17 a series of other collection -- a series of other was 10 inputs that collected into that drain tank.
I just 19 don't recall what they all are anymore.
of fluid into the drain tank was 20 Q
One source 21 the piping that runs from the pilot operated relief 22 valve into the drain tanks is that correct?
23 3
y,,,
l 24 Q
why don't you tell us what the other
'hV 25 sources of fluid were for the reactor coolant drain l
l ll I
1 Zochacn 456
(~')
2 tank?
\\~)
3 A
I just remembered that there were other 4
vent headers that went in there.
I don't recall 5
at this time those sources.
6 Q
Do you know any of them.
7 A
I am just drawing blanks.
8 Q
Do you know how many there were?
9 A
Quite a few.
10 Q
How many?
11 A
I don't know.
I don't recall, I should 12 say.
13 Q
What is your position today, Mr. Zechman?
7-s N.)
14 A
My position today is supervisor of 15 technician training.
16 Q.
Does that involve training of operators?
17 A
No, it does not.
18 Q
Does your present responsibility include 19 training of auxiliary operators?
20 A
No, it does not.
21 Q
The position that you had prior to the lll 22 accident as supervisor of training, in that capacity 23 did you then have responsibility for training 24 technicians?
(~)\\
\\,
25 A
The responsibility of the training 1
Zachscn 457 1
,)
2 department at that time was, with respect to the (Y
technicians, was to provide administrative 3
4 capability for outside training, should that be 5
required.
For example, if the maintenance department 6
decided they wanted to send an instrument tech 7
to a Bailey training program, they might come to 8
us and give us all the details and have us 9
administrative 1y set that up and provide the input 10 to the school and so forth.
11 Q
But that was the only extent that you 12 had in training technicians?
l
(~^
13 A
That is not to say that they could not
(-
i 14 send any of their technicians to our training 15 program at any time.
16 Q.
We have been over this before.
I want to 17 ask that in reference to the next question.
That is, 18 the responsibilities that you have now for the 19 training of technicians are broader than the 20 responsibility you had before the accident for training 21 of technicians?
h 22 A
From my standpoint, they are broader, 23 certainly.
24 Q
Is it correct that you have no
\\-'
25 responsibility, then, for any training other than the 1;
I
1 Zochocn 458 2
training of technicians at the present time?
3 A
I believe in the first part of my 4
testimony, I listed all the areas of the responsibility 5
I had.
They include other things, such as general 6
employee training, radiation worker training, fire 7
brigade training.
8 Q
Chemistry?
9 A
chemistry tech training, tech training, 10 maintenance training.
11 Q
Security training?
12 A
Security training.
13 Q
In other words, every aspect of training
()
14 except operator training?
15 A
That's correct -- wait. I will take that 16 back.
There are other -- I don't train engineers.
I 17 don't provide supervisory training programs for 18 supervisors or supervisory management levels. You have 19 another section that does that.
20 Q
It is true that in your present position 21 you have no responsibility for training of control 22 room operators or auxiliary operators?
23 A
That's correct.
24 Q
For how long has that been the case?
O 25 A
It will be approximately -- it will be
~
- - - - ~ -
1 Zochncn 459
,r X 2
two years in August.
U 3
Q August 1980, in other words, is when you 4
first A
Yes, first took that position.
5 O
6 Q
Did the training program at Met Ed that 7
you were supervisor of include training with respect 8
to the reactor coolant drain tank?
9 A
Yes, it did.
10 Q
were the operators told what the size of 11 the tank was?
12 A
To the best of my recollection, they were.
13 Q
Were the operators also told what the es V
14 expected flow was from both the code safeties and 15 the pilot operated relief valve during any period 16 of time,during which it was open?
17 A
I don't recall either way.
18 Q
Did you understand that there was a relief 19 valve on the reactor coolant drain tank?
20 A
A rupture disk, are you referring to, sir?
21 Q
No, I will get to that in a minute.
I lh 22 am asking now about a relief valve.
23 A
I don't recall.
I am just drawing a blank.
24 Q
Your testimony is you don't 25 A
I don't recall either way.
I n
1 Zochsen 460 2
Q All right.
There was a rupture disk?
(
3 A
There was a rupture disk.
4 Q
What was the function of the rupture 5
disk?
9 6
A If the tank got to a certain pressure, 7
the disk ruptured and it was another source of relief.
8 Q
Were you aware before the accident that 9
there had been a transient at TMI-1 during which the 10 rupture disk on the drain tank had ruptured?
11 A
I recall that happened but I can't recall i
12 what specific point in time that I learned of that.
13 That is, I can't separate whether it was post or prior.
14 Q
Didn't you learn before the accident that 15 there had been an incident at Unit 1 where the 16 rupture. disk on the drain tank had ruptured and that 17 as a result of that, the drain tank at TMI-2 had been 18 built with a larger capacity than that of Unit 17 19 A
I don't recall either way.
20 Q
Were the operators at Unit 2 told that 21 the drain tank at Unit 2 had been built with a 22 capacity sufficient that it would not rupture as 23 easily as the Unit 1 drain tank rupture disk had 24 ruptured?
(,,
25 A
I don't recall at this time either way.
8
1 Zach00n 461
(~'N 2
Q Did you have an understanding as to how L
3 1 ng the pilot operated relief valve would stay open 4
in a normal transient where it had opened because of 5
increased pressure?
6 A
I believe your question is its opening 7
and closing time?
8 Q
Yes.
9 A
To the best of my recollection, at one 10 time I was aware of that transient time, but I don't 11 recall it today.
12 Q
You don't have any understanding today 13 as you sit here how long you would expect the PORV
~~
14 to remain open before closing in a normal transient?
15 MR. MacDONALD:
Your recollection prior 16 to the accident?
17 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
18 A
I knew at one time but I don't recall at 19 this instant of time.
20 Q
As head of training at Met Ed, did you 21 make an effort to determine as part of the training 22 that would be,given to the operators on open pilot 23 operated relief valves, whether they would expect 24 the rupture disk on the drain tank to rupture in the
/'s 25 event of a normal opening and closing of the PORV?
1 o
1 Zochrcn 462
(~}
2 A
As to my recollection, our training was
(_)
such that the operators would not expect the rupture 3
4 disk to rupture on the normal opening and closing 5
of the PORV.
6 Q
The FSAR for Unit 2 has a section on the 7
drain tank.
Reading to you now Section 5.5.11.1, 8
" Design Bases of the Rad Waste Disposal Reactor 9
Coolant Leakage Recovery System."
10 Do you see that?
11 A
I see that.
12 Q
Would you like to look a t -- read the full 13 particulars of that particular section, all of
,-)
- %/
14 5.5.11.1.
15 I would also like to have you read 16 5.5.11.3, " Safety Evaluation."
17 Those two sections deal with, among other 18 things, the capacity of the drain tank and the extant 19 flow from the PORV in the code safeties; isn't that 20 right?
21 A
That's correct.
22 Q
Using the information in the Me Ed FSAR, 23 did you ever attempt to calculate how long the PORV 24 would have to stay open before there was sufficient I
(';
j
(_)
25 flow through it to rupture the rupture disk in the l
8 l
u
1 Zachacn 463
(~}
2 drain tank?
\\J 3
A Did I personally ever attempt to 4
calculate that?
5 Q
Yes.
6 A
Not to the best of my recollection.
7 Q
Was that kind of calculation made in the
?
training department?
9 A
Not to the best of my recollection.
10 Q
Were the operators ever told how long 11 the PORV would have to stay open before flow through 12 the PORV would rupture the rupture disk on the drain 13 tank?
-m 14 A
I don't recall either way.
15 Q
I would like to show you a document which 16 has been. marked previously as B&W Exhibit 272, which i
17 is Unit 2 Emergency Procedure 202-1.3, " Loss of 18 Reactor Coolant / Reactor Coolant System Pressure."
i l
l 19 Do you have that in front of you?
l 20 A
Yes, I do.
21 Q
I take it you had seen that emergency h
22 procedure before the day of the Three Mile Island i
1 23 accident?
24 A
I recall seeing procedures prior to the
(~')s 1
(_
25 TMI-2 accident because I was. concentrating prior to 1
I l
l 4
i
1 Z3chacn 464
[))
2 the accident on Unit 1.
My attention was on Unit 1 3
Procedures.
I den't recall specifically seeing this
~
4 one at thit specific point in time.
t t
5 Q
What I have showa you is the LOCA 6
procedure that was in effect at Unit 2 as of October 6, 7
1978, with various pages in it indicating revisions 8
on various dates in June of
'77, May of 'V7, 9
December of
'77, March of
'78, September of
'78, May 1
10 of
'78, June of
'78, June of
'77, April of
'78, 11 October of
'78.
12 I would like to.ask you some questions 13 about that procedure.
,7~}
\\_/
14 On the cover of the first.page it says, 15 and again in the boxes at the bottom, " Unit 2 PORC l
16 Recommends Approval," signed " Chairman cf PORC."
17 Can you read that any better than you l
18 could on the last one?
l i
19 A
It looks like, though it is not clear, l
20 R.
P. Warren.
l 21 (Continued on the next page.)
22 l
23 24
[b N'
25
)
\\
l g
1 Za ch.9tn 465 g
I
(" S 2
Q Was there a person in the Met Ed organization,
(, )
3 in the GPU organization known by the name of R.
P.
t 4
Warren in 19787 5
A There was a Warren.
I don' t recall his 6
ini ti als.
7 Q
Was he the chairman of the PORC.
8 A
I don't recall either way at this time.
9 Q
Do you recall what the PORC was?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
What was it?
12 A
Plan Ope rating Review Committee.
13 Q
The next box s ays " Unit 2 superintendent 7_
()
14 app ro v al. "
And then there is a signature unde r that.
15 Do you re cognize that signature?
16 A.
Again, though it is not ve ry cle ar, it 17 appe ars to be J.
L.
See lin ge r.
18 Q
He was the superintendent o f Unit 2 in 19787 19 A
S upe rin te nde nt, Unit 2, to the best of my l
20 recollection, it was
'78.
21 Q
Turning your attention to the firs t page, llh 22 it says, " Leak or rupture within capability of system I
23 operation."
Do you see that?
24 A
Yes.
25 Q
There are a list of symptoms.
Do you see
(,
i I
t
Zochmmn 466 1
/~T 2
that?
N.J 3
A Yes.
4 Q
You unde rstand that the symptoms that were 5
being listed there were symptoms of a loss-o f-coolant 6
accident?
7 A
Yes, I did.
8 Q
You s aid that you were conce rned with Unit 1 9
during some period of the time that you were head of 10 the Training Department.
11 A
No, I was saying that prior to the accident 12 I was in training for Unit 1 license and was concentrat-13 ing at that time, that was three years ago.
r3Y]
14 Q
When you say you were concentrating on 15 Unit 1 procedures you were giving that answer in the 16 context.of what you were doing as a student rather 17 than as head of th e Training Department?
18 A
That's corre ct.
l l
19 Q
At any time in your time th at you were in 20 the Training Department.at Met Ed, did yo u e ve r s e e a
(
I 21 draft of a procedure for TMI-1 or TMI-2 which s aid in lh 22 substance that the ope rator should assume that the i
23 cause of the symptoms described in the LOCA procedure l
24 is a system rupture or leak unless another cause can be f}
(_)
25 immediately established?
I
1 Zachsen 467
(
2 A
Please repeat that.
3 (Question read. )
4 THE WITNESS:
May I ask you to read that 5
one more time, please.
6 MR. FISKE:
I will withdraw the question.
7 I will come back to it in a minute.
8 Q
Looking again at the procedure that you 9
h ave in front of you, which is E xhibit 272, there are 10 a list o f symptoms, are the re not, on that page, 11 symptoms of a LOCA?
12 A
There are.
f-s 13 Q
The first one is 1.1,
" Initial loss of 14 reactor coolant pressure and decrease in pressurize r 15 level becoming stable af te r short pe riod of time. "
16 Why did you understand that an initial loss o f re actor 17 coolant pressure and decrease in pressurizer level was 18 a symptom of a LOCA.
19 MR. MacDONALD:
You are speaking of his 20 recollection prior to the ac ci de nt, his 21 re colle ction of the procedure?
llh 22 MR FISKE:
Why this particular symptom 23 as described in Met Ed's emerge ncy LOCA procedure 24 was in fact a symptom of a LOCA.
[
\\
25 A
Ce rtainly the re was a break in the system, 1
Zochzan 468 1
2 loss of coolant in the system.
We we re losing
)
3 inve n to ry, and we were losing pressure, and be cause we 4
were losing inventory and pressure, the level will 5
certainly come down, and so will pressure.
6 Q
The next symptom is "Possible reactor 7
building high radiation and/or tempe rature alarm."
8 Why did you understand that that was a 9
symptom of a LOCA?
10 A
Because if the rupture was inside the 11 re actor building, and losing reactor coolant, which 12 is activated coolant, that that was a possibility for 13 ge tting radiation -- me asuring radiation in the building.
14 Q
The next symptom, "Possible reactor building 15 sump high-level alarm."
What did you unde rstand th at 16 was a symptom of a LOCA?
17 A
Going back to the other one.
Also talked 18 about tempe rature and coolants, so you,
so you 19 expect a temperature rise also, depending on the size.
20 Q
Why was possible reactor building sump 21 high-level alarm a symptom of a LOCA?
depending on the lh 22 A
Eecause the rupture 23 magnitude of the rupture that liquid would flow --
24 depending on location, could flow to the reactor 25 building sump.
~
Zachacn 469 1
(~}
2 Q
Next symptom is "Make-up tank level x_/
3 decreasing more than one inch in three minutes."
4 Why is that a symptom of a LOCA?
5 A
Again, because we are losing inventory from O
6 the system and that tank level is going to decrease also.
7 Q
Why would the mak e-up tank level decre ase 8
when you were losing inventory from the system?
9 A
If we were making up to the system at the 10 time.
11 Q
In other words, the flow would go to the 12 make-up tank to replace the coolant that was escaping 13 and that in turn would cause a de cre ase in the le ve l o f gS i
i G'
14 the make-up tank?
15 A
Yes, sir.
16 Q _
Next item, "Possible make-up line high flow 17 alarm."
What is the high-flow ala rm in the nake-up 18 line?
19 A
I don't recall at this instant in time.
20 Q
Next item is, " Reactor building fan drip 21 pan level alarm."
What were the f an drip pan level llh 22 alarms?
23 A
If you had a break in the system and 24 releasing high coolant or high-tempe rature coolant x_)
25 in the system and increasing the temperatures in the i
I
23chuan 470 1
2 building, you would get condensate f rom this coolant 3
that would collect and form in this pan.
4 Q
Were you aware prior to the accident that 5
there were other possible explanations for some of these O
6 symptoms othe.- than a loss-of-coolant accide nt?
7 A
I was.
8 Q
Does the procedure indicate a way in which 9
the operator can distinguish between a LOCA and an 10 OTSG tube rupture and a ste am line break?
11 A
The procedure: addresses just that unde r 12 the note.
13 Q
I take it that an OTSG tube rupture or a 14 ste am line break could be possible explanations for some 15 of the symptoms described in the procedure?
16 A.
That's correct.
17 Q
Is it correct in this section of the 18 procedure the re are no other explanations for the 19 symptoms liste d other than a loss of coolant, a tube 20 rupture and a steam line break?
21 MR. MacDONALD:
His understanding or what I
llh 22 is written here?
23 M R.
FISKE:
I tm asking for what the 24 procedure is.
It is a preliminary question.
O
\\_/
25 MR. MacDONALD:
You are not asking him to I
1
1 Zachnen 471 2
inte rp re t it.
Q,!
3 Q
I am asking whethe r there is any other 4
explanation in this procedure for the symptoms listed 5
under 1.0 other than a LOCA, a tube rupture or a O
6 steam line break.
7 MR. MacDONALD:
I am going to object if 8
you are asking him to go through the procedure 9
as he views it today and give you that 10 understanding.
Rather, I think we are 11 dealing with his recollection of what he understood 12 prior to the accident, what his understanding 13 was.
We can all -- I think we can all draw whatever inference f rom the words that we want to.
14 15 Q
(continuing)
I am talking about the section 16 of this, document, Page 1, which talks about symptoms for 17 a LOCA.
We have been through six dif ferent symptoms, 18 and there is then a reference in the note to possible 19 events which could cause one or more of those symptoms 20 and I am simply asking you, isn't it co rre ct as you 21 understood the procedure prior to the accident that the lll 22 three events which were referred to as possible 23 explanation for those symptoms, we re a LOCA, a tube 24 rupture and a s te am line break.
()
25 A
All I can testify to is from section A of
Zschman 472 1
2 this p ro ce dure down -- Se ction A including 1.0 down to
- 7..()
but not including 2.0.
That's all this procedure 3
4 addresses itself to.
5 Q
The note tells you, does it not, how the O
6 operator may distinguish between those three possible events; is that correct?
7 8
A It lists three.
9 Q
The first one is, " Loss o f coolant inside 10 RX building."
I take it that's the reactor building?
A That's correct.
11 12 Q
It says, " Particulate io din e and gas monitor 13 alarm on HPR-227 reactor building air s ample. "
Do you see that in the procedure?
'/
14 A
I see that.
15 16 9,
What was your understanding as to why that 17 particular alarm would indicate that the symptoms re f e r re d l
18 to in the procedure were the result of a LOCA?
A obviously inside the reactor building this I
19 device was me asuring the particulate and iodine and 20 21 gas sampling, particulate, iodine and gas ai r s ample.
What the procedure is pointing out is that if h
22 a coolant should be lost within the reacto r building, 23 this would be one of the monitors that would pick that 24
! h) 25 up, that sample.
w, I
8
,1
Zochacn 473 1
2 Q
It would pick it up be cause radiation was
/-s\\
\\]
3 being rele ased into the are a inside the building?
4 A
I was looking at particulate as well, 5
but particulate, iodine and gas.
O 6
Q But does the particulate reflect anything 7
other than an increase in radiation?
8 A
As far as activity is concerned, no.
9 Q
Does iodine reflect anything othe r than 10 increase in radiatio n?
11 A
No.
12 Q
Does gas?
13 A
No.
Om/
14 Q
So the function of that ala rm, as you 15 understand it, was to indicate by reference to those 16 th re e particular items whether or not the re was an f
17 incre ase in radiation within the reactor building?
18 A
To the best o f my re colle ction.
19 Q
Your understanding of the procedure was 20 that if you saw that typ e o f -- i f you s aw an incre ase 21 in radiation within the reactor building reflected on 22 that alarm, that would be a symptom which is unique to lll i
23 a loss-of-coolant accident; co rre ct?
24 A
Would you repeat that question?
(])
25 (Record read. )
I lI
Zochman 474 1
2 A
That could be one of the symptoms of loss 3
of coolant.
4 Q
It would be a symptom of a loss-of-coolant 5
accident, but it would also be a symptom which is O
6 unique to a loss-of-coolant accident, not explainable 7
by either a tube rupture or a steam line break; isn't 8
that your understanding?
9 A
To the best o f my recollection, that monitor taking a building air sample and 10 was looking at any condition that would release 11 anything that 12 to the reactor building could be monitore d -- anything 13 radioactive that gould be released in the O)
\\m 14 b uilding could possibly be dete cted by that monitor.
15 Q
Let's go at this a little more directly.
16 There are six symptoms listed in this p roce dure ; correct?
17 A
Yes, sir.
18 Q
That are symptoms of a possible 19 loss-of-coolant accident; right?
20 A
Yes, sir.
21 Q
Wasn' t it part o f your training p rogram 22 to the operators th at they we re trained that they didn't lll 23 need to see all six in orde r to determine th at there 24 was a LOCA?
You could have a LOCA even though only 25 certain of these symptoms, but not all of them, were
Za chman 475 1
/^
2 p re s e nt?
D) 3 A
That's correct.
4 Q
You also testified that some of those 5
symptoms could be explainable by events othe r than a O
6 LOCA; corre ct?
7 A
That's correct.
8 Q
And that two of those events, indeed, the 9
only two describe d in this proce dure, are a steam 10 generato r tube rupture and a steam line break; isn't that 11 correct?
12 A
That's what's mentioned here.
r-13 Q
Didn' t you unde rstand that the purpose of NJ 14 this procedure was to enable the operators when they 15 saw some or all of the symptoms listed in 1.0 t o t ry to 16 de termine whether those symptoms were resulting from a 17 LOCA as opposed to a tube rupture or a ste am line break?
18 A
certainly this procedure is addressing 19 itself to the opeator such that these were some of the some of the things to look for to try to distinguish 20 21 between those e vents.
lll 22 Q
A tube rupture involve d -- an OTSG tube 23 rupture involves what?
24 A
What you are talking about there is a 25 p rima ry, secondary le ak.
l 1
Zachman 476 g
/~N 2
Q In other words, a tube breaks and coolant 3
leaks from the tube into the secondary system?
4 A
That's correct.
5 Q
So whatever radiation might be in the water O
6 th at is escaping is going, not into the re actor building,
7
- but into the se condary system?
8 A
That's correct.
)
9 Q
A ste am line break involves, does it not, 10 a b re ak in one of the lines in the steam generator?
11 A
That's corre ct.
12 Q
So again, whatever fluid is escaping is 13 escaping into the secondary-system and not into the 14 reactor building?
i 15 A
Wait a minute.
Would you repeat that 16 question?
17 (Question read.)
l 18 A
(Continuing)
You have got a steam line 19 rupture inside the reactor building.
20 Q
Which would involve a release of radiation 21 into the building?
lll 22 A
certainly.
23 Q
Which --
24 A
You are talking about steam line break with 25 the tube rupture.
l 1
l
Zachman 476-A 1
O; 2
Q No, I am talking about two separate events.
(
3 A
0.K.
Back up a little, then.
4 (Continued on Page 477.)
5 O
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 O
14 l
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 h
22 23 24 25 I
I
1 Zachmtn 477 2
Q We talked about the tube rupture where
("]
N_/
3 there is a release of coolant from the primary system 4
into the secondary system.
5 A
Understood.
6 Q
I believe you testified that that kind 7
of transient would not result in an increase in 8
radiation levels in the reactor building.
9 A
That's correct.
10 Q
Now I am talking about a second event which steam line break in the secondary system.
11 is a 12 A
O.
K.,
assuming we don't have a tube 13 rupture, now?
7s t
t V
14 Q
That's right.
That event would not lead 15 to an increase in radiation in the reactor building; j
1 16 is that. correct?
17 A
That's correct.
18 Q
Didn't you understand that Item No. 1 19 under the note was telling the operators that if you 20 saw an increase in radiation in the reactor building 21 as reflected on this particular alarm, then you knew lll 22 that that was a symptom which was unique to a loss 23 of coolant inside the reactor building?
l 24 A
That isn't the only condition that that n
25 could occur though.
You have to be careful.
Ix_)
1 Zach=tn 478
/~N 2
There could be multiple casualties that could-- for N.-
3 example, a steam line break and a tube rupture 4
inside the reactor building.
5 Q
You understood that before the accident?
O 6
Did you understand what you just said before the 7
accident?
8 Just so it is clear, you said that a tube 9
rupture coupled with a steam line break could produce 10 an increase 11 A
Steam line break in the reactor building.
12 Q
O.
K.
I will withdraw it.
13 You just said that a tube rupture coupled 14 with a steam line break within the reactor building
~
15 could cause an increase in radiation within the 16 reactor _ building.
17 A
That's correct.
18 Q
You understood that before the accident?
19 A
To the best of my recollection, I did.
20 Q
Did you ever tell anyone at Met Ed, inside 21 or'outside the training department, that a correction lll 22 should be made,to the LOCA procedure which said that 23 a loss of coolant inside the reactor building was an the 24 event -- withdrawn-- that the radiation
)
25 activation of the radiation alarm referred to in Note 1 3
1
1 Zochann 479 2
could be activated by events other than a loss of 3
coolant?
4 THE WITNESS:
Repeat that whole thing.
5 (Question read.)
9 6
MR. FISKE:
I withdraw that question.
7 Q
Was it your understanding, Mr. Zechman, 8
before the accident that Note No. 1 on this 9
procedure, loss of coolant inside reactor building, 10 included a transient in which there was both a tube 11 rupture and a steam line break?
12 A
If you are asking me is it my understanding that this note referred to 13 whether this 14 simultaneous occurrences, the best of my recollection 15 is that it did not.
It talked about single occurrences.
16 Q.
At least as far as the training was 17 concerned, the operators were trained by Met Ed under 18 this emergency procedure that if they saw an increase 19 in the reactor building, radiation increase, as 20 reflected on this alarm, they should consider that 21 they had a loss-of-coolant accident in progress?
llh 22 A
They were to consider that this is one 23 of the symptoms of a loss of coolant.
24 Q
And a symptom that is unique to a loss
()
25 of coolant inside the reactor building; is that t
Zochnen 480
/
2 correct?
t}
3 A
I don't recall either way at this point.
4 Q
You don't disagree that that is what the 5
procedure says, do you, as you understood it at the 6
time of the accident, prior to the accident?
7 A
As I understood this note at the time of 8
the accident, it talked about a particular system, 9
this being one of the possible symptoms for a reactor 10 coolant -- loss of reactor coolant.
11 Q
Didn't you understand that this particular 12 symptom was designed to enable the operator to 13 distinguish a loss of reactor coolant inside the
(^N
%.]
14 reactor building from a tube rupture and steam line 15 break?
16 A.
Yes.
17 Q
Didn't the procedure tell them that an 18 increase in radiation levels within the reactor 19 building was a symptom unique to a loss of coolant l
1 20 inside the reactor coolant building?
21 A
I realize the procedure says -- the note 22 says
-- break by the following symptoms, which 23 are unique to the aforementioned accidents."
I 24 re alize as an operator you have got to have -- you've r"3
(
1 you've got to think of all
'x.J 25 got to think, you can't I
l
481 1
ZOchrcn
/
'N 2
different kinds of conditions.
You have to evaluate
~
O 3
the condition of the plant at the time, the symptoms 4
you have coming from different directions.
5 This says unique to the situation I think one has 6
to have his thinking cap on of other possible 7
situations that could occur.
This is one symptom 8
that they are mentioning.
9 Q
Is it correct to say that one of the 10 philosophies of the training department was what 11 you just expressed, that the operators should have, 12 as you put it, their thinking caps on and analyze a analyze a 13 transient by sort of a basic component l
g-
\\s 14 transient based on their understanding of how the l
15 system was supposed to work and what possible causes 16 there could be for the symptoms they were seeing?
17 Q
They were, taught to follow the procedures 18 and use the procedures and look at the symptoms that 19 are here.
That does not mean that they are blind to 20 everything else that is going on around them.
They 21 have to be aware of other things, other parameters.
I 22 Q
Did you ever tell them in the training 23 program that the loss of coolant inside the reactor 24 building was not -- withdrawn -- that an increase in O)
\\-
25 radiation levels in the reactor building was not li
l 482 1
Z0chsinn l
)
2 unique to a loss of coolant inside the reactor 3
building?
4 A
I don't recall either way at this time.
5 May we take a break or do you want to ask one 6
more question?
7 MR. FISKE:
I will stop here.
8 (Recess taken.)
9 (Continued on the following page.)
10 11 12
/
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
'v' 25 11
1 3
Zachuan 483 rN 2
Q Going back to this procedure, Mr. Zechman.
~
k.
No. 2 under the note says that a gas monitor alarm on 3
4 VA-R748 is a symptom unique to an OTSG tubes do you see 5
that?
6 A
I see that.
7 Q
why did you understand that the gas monitor 8
alarm on VVA-R748 was unique to an OTSG tube rupture?
9 A
It's been too long ago.
I don't recall th a t 10 alarm associated with this procedure at this time.
11 Q
Item 3 says that a low condensate storage 12 tank level alarm and/or low hot well level alarm is 13 a symptom unique to a stemline break; do you see th a t?
14 A
I see that.
~#
15 Q
Why did you understand that a low condensate 16 storage, tank level alarm was unique to a steamline i
)
l 17 break?
18 A
Because this is one means of feeding the 19 leak, steamline leak when you are losing inventory.
20 Q
So essentially you understood that if you 21 saw that symptom you would know that you had a steamline I
22 break and not a loss of coolant inside the reactor 23 building?
24 A
This is one of the symptoms associated with f3
(_)
25 that, yes.
1
4 Zachnan 484 g
Q Not only associated with it but unique to 2
\\_/
it' * ""***?
3 A
Well, this is to separate the fact that 4
there are other things that can cause low condensate 5
O 6
storage tank levels.
Recognizing that,right?
Q I don't know.
That's my question.
7 A
There could be a leak in the storage tank g
that could cause storage tank level alarms to go off.
9 10 Q
Didn't you understand this procedure to be
~
telling the operators that if they saw a low condensate 11 12 storage tank level alarm go off they would know that 13 they did not have a -- in the presence of one or more (Qf
\\#
of the symptoms listed at the top of the page, they 14 would know they did not have a loss of coolant accident 15 16 inside,the reactor building?
A This is one of the symptoms that they would 17 look for in combination with some of the other ones.
18 19 Yes, it would help them separate the de termination of what kind of a rupture you had.
20 Q
I think this is probably more simple th'an 21 you are making it, Mr. Zechman.
Didn' t you understand lh 22 that the top part of this procedure under " Symptoms" 23 referred to a number of different symptoms, six in 24 25 particular?
You are nodding your head "yes."
1
485 i
5 20chran A
I understand.
/~'
2 k_
Q And it was understood that one or more of 3
those symptoms could be caused by either a loss of 4
coolant inside the containment, tube rupture or a 5
steamline break?
6 A
I understood that.
7 8
Q Didn't you understand that the three points under the note in the middle of the page on this 9
10 procedure were designed to tell the operators when they saw one or more of the symptoms at the top of the page 11 12 what to look for to determine whether those symptoms were being caused by a LOCA as opposed to a tube 13
\\"'l 14 rupture or a steamline break?
A I understood that this procedure 3v giving 15 in determining 16 them th,ree means by which they can assist 17 that.
18 Q
Isn' t it clear on the procedure that item 19 No. 1, identifies something that is unique to a LOCA, 20 No. 2, identifies something that is unique to a tube 21 rupture, and No.
3, identifies something that is lll 22 unique to a steamline break?
23 A
I think I have already mentioned to you 24 that I did not teach these procedures and the term
(~h
" unique" is used in this procedure.
I don't believe s._)'
25
(
l 1
1 6
Zochman 486
/"N 2
tha t that is the only means by which the operators, in b,
their thinking process, looking at all the parameters, 3
4 I said they have to look at everything that is a clue as to what is happening in the plant.
You are asking 5
me whether these are unique to that.
The procedure 6
7 says what it says.
And it lists three of these items 8
and I grant you that.
9 Q
Very simply, did you understand that a
10 loss of coolant inside the reactor building could cause 11 a low condensate storage tank level alarm to go off?
i A
No.
12
-w 13 Q
Did you understand that a tube rupture 14 could cause a low condensate storage tank level alarm tj 15 to go off?
l 16 A.
I missed that.
I 17 (Question read) l l
18 A
No.
19 Q
Just following through on the other two 20 symptoms referred to in item 3 unde r the note, did you understand that either a LOCA or a tube rupture could 21 lh 22 cause a low hot well level alarm to go off?
23 A
Not to the best of my recollection.
r 24 Q
Finally, did you understand that either a
(~)\\
(_
25 LOCA or a tube rupture could cause FW latch system
1 7
23chman 487 2
actuation?
A That I don't recall.
3 4
Q Finally going back to item 1 under the 5
note, loss of coolant inside reactor building which 9
is described as a symptom unique to a loss of coolant 6
7 inside containment.
Do you see that?
8 A
Where are you at?
9-Q Item 1 under the note describes the particula te 10 iodine and gas monitor alarm on the HPR227 reactor 11 building air sample as a symptom unique to a loss 12 of coolant inside the reactor buildings is that correct?
13 A
That's what the procedure says.
O 14 Q
Did you understand from that an alarm which reflected radiation in the air within the reactor 15 16 buildin,g was a symptom of a loss of coolant inside i
17 the reactor building?
18 A
I raccgnize that that was one of the 19 symptoms, possible symptoms.
20 Q
Would it be f air to say that radiation 21 inside the reactor building would be a symptom of 22 a LOCA no matter how it was determined that that lll 23 radiation existed?
24 A
Read that just one more time.
25 (Question read) r Il i
8 Zachman 488 1-()
A Best of my recollection, that would be one
\\J 2
of the symptoms of a loss of reactor coolant in the 3
reactor building -- one of the possible ones in the 4
reactor building.
I think I answered that.
Q I am not sure, but let me put a question 6
again.
I will make it as simple as I can.
7 Did you understand that radiation in the 8
reactor building was a symptom of a loss of coolant 9
accident?
10 A
I understood that, sir.
11 Q
Did you understand that it was a s ymp to m 12 of a loss of coolant accident no matter how or by what j3
(
)
13 x_.-
means it was determined that that radiation existed?
14 A
I believe so.
15 Q
Were the operators ever told in their 16 training that the only possible course of information 17 with respect to radiation in the reactor building was 18 the HPR227 alarm?
19 A
Read that.
20 (Question read)
A I believe you asked me were there any other 22 radiation alarms 23 Q
No, that isn't my question.
Let me put it 24
,f S
(_ >
to you this was, going back to the answer you gave 25
9 Zachman 489 1
d,x thinking cap on earlier.
If an operator with his
~
2 looking at all of the conditions as he saw them at the 3
time determined, from whatever source,that there was 4
radiation in the reactor building, wouldn't that indicate that there was a LOCA?
6 A
There are other conditions that could cause 7
activity other than from the reactor coolant system 8
to be present in th e reactor building.
For example, 9
there are other systems feeding the drain tank and 10 should the drain tank rupture for any reason and that 11 source of radiation coming from another system gets 12 into the reactor building, it could be detected.
[)
13 Q
Would you expect to see a drop in pressure 14 in the reactor coolant system from the situation you 15 just described?
16 A
No.
17 Q
I am talking about a situation, Mr. Zechman, 18 where we have one or more of the symptoms that are 19 listed in this procedure and the operator is trying 20 to determine what might be the cause of those symptoms.
$h It is in that context that I have asked --
22 A
I can't recall any at this moment, any 23 o the rs,
24 fs
(
MR. FISKE:
Could you now read the last 25
10 Zachann 490 I
1
(~}
question I asked Mr. Zechman and type it in L.J 2
when you get to it?
3 Q
Answer the question that I asked before in 4
light of the understanding that you now have that I am asking that question in the context of a situation where 6
the operators see one or more of the symptoms. listed 7
in this LOCA procedure.
8 If an operator with his thinking cap on 9
looking at all of the conditions as he saw them at the 10 time determined, from whatever source, that there was 11 radiation in the reactor building, wouldn't that indicate 12 that there was a LOCA?
73(,)
13 A
Best of my recollection at this time, I 14 believe that's true.
15 Q
Before the break, we had been discussing 16 the pressurizer system failure procedure.
17 A
I recall that.
18 j
Q Particularly with reference to the part 19 l
of it that described increases in the tailpipe 20 temperatures as a symptom of an open pilot operated h
relief valve; do you remember the questions we had 22 about that?
23 A
I recall the questioning.
(~)
24
(_)
Q Under the organization and structure at 25
\\
1 11 Zochean 491.
(~')
2 at Met Ed as you understood it before the accident, V
who would hava'been. responsible.fer implementing a 3
4 change in that portion of the pressurizer system failure 5
procedure to deal with the fact that because of a O
6 leak from one of the valves, the temperatures at the 7
discharge line during norhal operacions vere higher 8
than the level referred to'in the procedure?
A Would you repeat that, p'a e as e?
9 10 (Question read) 11 A
I think I already testified that I didn't 12 recall what those levels were, bu t --
13 Q
I understand that.
r3U 14 A
That certainly would have been initiated i
15 by the operations Department.
And who within tha Operadions Department?
16 Q,
17 A
It would fall under i.no rasponsibility of 18 supervisor of operations.
19 Q
Who was that in the month or two before the.
I t
20 accident?
I 21 A
Unit 27 h
22 Q
Y<s t.
23 A
J;.m Floyd.
24 Q
Coing back to the subject of the LOCA O
(,)
25 procedure aut the manner in which oparators were I
.l t
1 12 Zachcon 492
/~N 2
instructed to diagnose what the possible causes were of the various symptoms listed in the LOCA procedure, 3
r j
4 did you see a procedure either at THI-1 or TMI-2 which 5
told the operators that if they saw the symptoms, any 6
of the symptoms listed in the LOCA procedure th at they 7
should assume the cause of the symptoms is a system 8
rupture or leak unless another cause can be immediately 9
established?
10 A
Repeat the question.
11 Q
Very simply, did you ever see a procedure 12 at either Unit 1 or Unit 2 th at told the operators 13 that if they sau any of the symptoms listed in the es 14 LOCA procedure they should assume that the cause of 15 the systems was a LOCA unless another cause could be 16 immedia,tely established?
'^
17 A
You are asking me if there was a specific 18 procedure?
19 Q
Did you ever see J
' age to th at e f f e ct 20 in any procedure?
21 A
Related directly to this procedure?
- lh 22 Q
Yes, related to the LOCA procedure.
23 A
I don't recall.
24 Q
Did you ever see a draft of procedure
(,)
prepared by Babcock & Wilcox which contained language
(
25 b
n i
1 13 Z2choon 493 r~N 2
to that effect?
'/I
\\
3 A
I don't recall seeing a procedure of that 4
sort.
5 Q
Let me show you a document which has been 6
marked as B&W Exhibit 418 which is a document dated 7
June 1970 transmitted to Metropolitan Edison Company 8
From Babcock & Wilcox, and ask you whether you have 9
ever seen that document?
10 A
I don't recall seeing this document.
11 Q
When you were at the simulator at B&W,
12 did you receive any training using the B&W simulator 13 procedure?
\\_)
14 MR. MacDONALD:
Any B&W simulator procedure?
l 15 MR. FISKE:
Yes, for the moment.
16 A.
Yes, there were times when we used B&W 17 simulator procedures.
l 18 Q
I am going to show you a document, Mr.
19 zechman, which has been marked as GPU Exhibit 58 which 20 is the B&W simulator procedure for loss of reactor 21 coolant / reactor coolant system pressure.
h 22 I ask you whether looking at that document 23 you can tell us whether on any of the occasions when 24 you were at the B&W simulator you received training k,m, r
/
25 using that procedure?
Il i
494 Zoch2nn 1
14 t'N 2
A I simply don't recall using that procedure.
U, I would like to go back to the Exhibit 272 3
Q 4
which is the TMI LOCA procedure we have been discussing 5
earlier.
I direct your attention to page 2,
paragarph 3.1 or heading 3.0 which refers to follow-up.
6 7
A I see that.
8 Q
Did you understand that is describing follow-up in a situation where there has been a leak 9
10 or rupture within the capability of the system operation?
MR. MacDONALD:
What he understood prior to 11 12 the accident?
MR. FISKE:
Yes.
13 l
73 l
(_)
14 A
As I said, I am not familiar with this i
15 Procedure at this time.
16 Q
You are saying you weren't before the l
l 17 cecident?
18 A
I am saying that I was aware that procedure 19 existed.
I just don't have the detail memorization 20 at this point in time.
the I
21 Q
What was your understanding as to circumstances under which the operacors should terminate 22 it had come on in the course 23 high pressure injection once 24 of a transient?
25 A
My understanding was that they operated
()
N I
495 1
15 Zochcan
(~')
2 the high pressure injection system to maintain -- by V
observing the level in the pressur!.zer and to continue a 3
cooldown in a safa manner.
4 3
Q What was the purpose of keeping high 6
Pressure injection on?
To fill up the pressurizer?
A No.
To maintain level in the RC system.
7 8
Q Well --
A And, of course, cooldown.
9 10 Q
Was one purpose of keeping high pressure injection on to get pressure back up above the point 11 at which it had been acuated?
12 A
To maintain pressure, one of the reasons,
('T 13 LJ sure.
14 (Continued on next page) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 0
25 i
jb/1 1
16 ZOchcan 496 (G~')
2 Q
In fact, the event that actuated high 3
pressure injection automatically was a drop in 4
pressure below 1600 pounds per square inch, is that 5
right?
6 A
To the best of my recollection, that's 7
correct.
8 Q
The level in the pressurizer had nothing 9
to do --
10 MR. FISKE:
Wi th drawn.
11 Q
The actuation of HPI did not depend on 12 the level in the pressurizer, did it?
13 A
HPI was based upon pressure -- activation
~x 14 of the HPI was based on pressure.
15 Q
In other words, it was a drop in pressure 16 that ca.used it to come on in the first place, 17 correct?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Were the operators told in the course of 20 the training that the reason to leave it on was to 21 get pressure back up above the point at which it ha'd h
22 been originally actuated?
23 A
They were taught the purpose of it was to maintain level in the pressurizer and to maintain 24
(_)
25 and to assist in maintaining the pressure.
I I.
1 17 zachoon 497
(~S 2
Q Was maintaining level in the pressurizer
\\_]
3 an and in and of itself?
4 A
That was one of the -- at our training 5
simulator, maintaining level with HPI was a means --
6 we were told we would maintain reactor coolant in the 7
RC system.
8 Q
Isn't it a fact that procedures told the 9
operators they should leave HPI on until pressure and 10 pressurizer level had been restored up to certain 11 limits?
12 A
All our training at the simnlator --
13 MR. FISKE:
Wi th drawn.
That's not my 7-NY 14 question.
15 A
It was to maintain level and pressure.
16 9
Both.
17 A
That was one of the purposes of the high 18 pressure injection system, to maintain level and 19 pressure in the pressurizer.
20 Q
Didn't you understand that if the pressure 21 was not maintained in the system, that that could k
22 lead to boiling in the --
23 A
All the training that we had, pressure 24 and level stayed the same.
We never observed a A()
25 decreasing level and increasing pressure in any of n
I
498 Zochuan I
18
[~)
2 our training.
L/
3 Q
You are telling us that you never were 4
familiar with the situation before the accident in which 5
Pressurizer level went up while pressure was going down?
6 Are you telling us that, Mr. Zechman?
7 A
I am telling you all the training that we had 8
at the simulator and any training that we have had, that 9
I don't recall seeing a situation or discussing a
10 situation where we have observed level going down and pressure going up.
11 There has been a problem in earlier 12 Q
<~N 13 depositions when witnesses from GPU have not understood 14 the difference between a question which asks for their 15 undertanding and a question which is directed at their 16 trainin.g.
Do you understand that those are two 17 different concepts?
l b
18 A
I understand they are two different concepts.
l 19 I also understand they go together sometimes.
20 Q
I am sure they do.
Training could be one 21 way at which you arrive at an understanding.
I am i
22 sure we all agree on that.
f 23 My question to you was not limited to what l
l 24 you may have been trained on, although we will get to Os k-)
25 that later; my question is are you telling us by an i
19 1
zochmnn 499
/"'
2 earlier answer that you gave that as of the time of
(_s}/
3 the accident in 1979 you were not aware of from any any situation at any B&W plant where pressurizer 4
source 5
level had gone up during a transient at the same time 6
that pressure was going down?
7 A
During operation?
8 Q
Any point.
9 A
You fill the system initially, when you 10 fire the system up for the first time and there is a 11 bubble and pressure is increasing and level is 12 decreasing.
I don't recall any period of time in 13 which f rom any o ther plant prior to the accident.
V 14 Q
Yes.
15 A
Where I observed, to the best of my 16 recollection, level increasing and pressure decreasing.
17 Q
Just so we can make sure, is it your 18 testimony that at no time before the accident did you 19 have an understanding that there could be a set of l
1 20 circumstances which pressurizer level would go up i
21 while pressure was going down?
h 22 A
well, I guess I have to clarify, in the if we 23 operation of the high pressure injection system, 24 see the level going up -- wait.
It's my understanding,
(-
(_,/
25 sir.
I don't recall any other situation.
I
500 1
Zochoon 2
Q I will come back to that in a minute, but I want to go back to where we were before you made that 3
4 statement that led to the last two or three questions.
Didn't you understand that the purpose of 5
9 6
HPI coming on was to increase pressure back up above 7
the point at which it had been automatically actuated?
I 8
A That was one of the purposes.
9 Q
Didn't you understand that once HPI 10 came on, because of a drop in pressure below its 11 actuation point, if HPI was turned off and pressure 12 continued to decrease, that that could. lead to boiling 13 in the reactor coolant system?
O 14 A
That was never discussed in any of our 15 training programs.
16 Q,
Whether it was discussed in your training 17 program or not, didn't you understand that as a matter 18 of common sense?
19 A
Whst I understand is what I expect the l
20 manufacturer to tell me.
I 21 Q
That is totally unresponsive.
It's a h
22 gratuitous answer.
I am asking as a matter of common as head of the training department at Met Ed, l
23
- sense, 24 didn't you understand that if pressure continued to 25 go down in the course of a transient, that that could I
- l
501 1
.21 Zochasn
,e x 2
produce boiling in the reactor cooltnt system?
N-3 A
I understood it from a theoretical 4
standpoint that decreasing pressure could cause 5
boiling.
6 Q
Didn't you understand from a practical 7
standpoint as well as a theoretical standpoint that 8
if you had a transient in which pressure started 9
going down, HPI comes on automatically, one of its 10 purposes being to get pressure back up above 1640 11 and instead of allowing the HPI to continue to do 12 that, HPI is turned off so it cannot perform the 13 fanction of stopping that decrease in pressure, that fm 14 the decrease in pressure could continue to the point 15 where boiling occurred?
16 A,
I would have to relate that answer to what 17 we have done and practiced on the simulator and what 18 we were told on the simulator.
19 Q
I am not limiting it to what you were l
20 taught or told on the simulator.
I am asking from 21 whatever source, including all the training you received 22 at Met Ed and all the training you had supposedly llh 23 supervsied at Med Ed,didn' t you understand that basic 24 concept?
25 A
I understand what I was.to do in the O()
il I
1 22 zcchnen 502 2
operation of the HPI system.
I learned that g-V) understanding from operating the simulator.
3 4
Q You never discussed that at Met Ed in the 5
training program, what the purpose of HPI is?
O 6
A Certainly we did.
7 Q
Didn't you understand that the purpose of 8
HPI was to try to get pressure back above 1640?
9 A
In all situations in which we practiced --
10 Q
Just answer that yes or no.
pressure and level -- pressure followed 11 A
12 the level.
13 Q
That isn't my question, and you know it
(\\_)'
14 isn't my question.
15 My question is didn't you understand that 16 an important purpose of HPI coming on was to get 17 pressure back up above the point at which for safety 1
18 reasons it had been automatically actuated?
l 19 A
I understand that was one of the purposes.
l 20 Q
Isn't it a matter of common sense and 21 wasn't it to you at that time that if the HPI was not l
llh 22 allowed to perform that function that pressure could l
continue to decrease to the point where boiling 23 24 occurred?
()
25 MR. MacDONALD:
He is asking whether you l
I
8 1
23 Zachsen 503 2
had that understanding basically.
~
3 A
I understand from a theoretical 4
standpoint, I understand when pressure gets down the 5
possibility of boiling can occur.
O 6
Q You also understood if HPI was turned off before pressure started to recover that pressure 7
8 could continue to ducrease to that theoretical point 9
where boiling occurred?
10 A
That's where you and I separate, because 11 I have got to relate it to the training I received 12 and what we were asked to focus on in that training.
13 That's what I tried to explain to you, sir.
\\~
14 (Continued on following page.)
15 16 17 18 l
19 20 21 lll 22 23 24 (J
25 ll
24 Zochacn 504 Ik 1 1
'T 2
Q In all of your years at Met Ed it never
[d
\\
occurred to you that if the safety HPI system didn't 3
4 function for some reason, never came on at all, that you 5
could have a transient where you had boiling in the core?
6 A
Again, I have got to relate to the training 7
we received, sir.
8 Q
I am talking about the training you gave, 9
Mr. Zechman, as head of the training department at Met 10 Ed.
Did you tell the people that were in your training.
11 program why it was important to have a safety system 12 called "high-pressure injection"?
13 A
Certainly I explained -- we explained why g~
N,))
14 it was important to have high-pressure injection in our 15 system and we related that training and that feedback 16 directly to what we were taught.
1 1
17 Q
I have asked this question once before.
18 You didn't sit there like an automaton, l
19 regurgitating when you went to the simulator once 20 cvery three years, did you?
Did7't you form an g
21 independent judgment as to what you thought what the 22 operators ought to know, how to keep the plant from 23 having a major t-nt?
24 A
A9e 11 repeat that if there were 25 situations that
.ght of at a time, we certainly
25 2
1 zochacn 505 i
i 2
relayed that to the simulator people and asked them to i
l simulate that in that simulator.
3 This particular situation, we were doing what 4
we were told -- what our training at the simulator has 5
6 told us.
7 Q
Let's get serious for a moment.
i 8
In your requalification training program at i
g Met Ed for the operators, that occurred over a period 10 of an entire year, did it not, during which the operators were continually exposed to Met Ed training?
11 12 A
Yes.
13 Q
once every two years they went to Babcock &
s 1
Wilcox for one week of simulator training, is that 14 15 correct?
16 A.
That's correct.
Let's talk about what you did in this 17 Q
18 requalification training program that extended over a 19 year, and I am asking you, in the part of that program 20 that dealt with emergency procedures and the part of 4
did you eve'r 21 the program that dealt with the system, address the question of what would happen if for some 22 23 reason the HPI did not work, did not come on when it was 24 supposed to in the course of a transient that was (O_)
25 producing a drop in pressure?
Did it ever occur to you i
1 ZachmEn 506 I
2 in the training program what would happen in that 3
situation?
4 A
Sir, I asked that question when I was at 5
the simulator and do you want to know what the reply was?
6 The reply was, first of all, that won't happen.
You 7
have other redundant pumps that will come on that will 8
take care of that situation, and on we.went.
9 Q
The other redundant pumps were what?
10 A
HPI pumps.
11 I asked at the simulator one time, I recall 12 specifically asking an instructor, what would happen if 7-13 the HPI system would fail, and they were sloughed off.
N.)3 14 I never got an answer.
15 Q
So it was important for you to know what 16 might happen if the HPI system failed?
17 A
They said that situation wouldn't occur.
18 They gave me the feeling that that situation wouldn't 19 occur because of the redundancy of the system, and off 20 we went.
21 Q
It was important enough for you to ask the 22 question?
23 A
I thought, if the people who manufactured 24 it couldn't tell me that.
\\-')
25 Q
Answer my question.
It was important enough 11
27 1
Zochnen 507 4
2 for you to ask that question, what would happen if the
[')]
u 3
HPI system didn't function correctly, right?
4 A
Yes, they assured me that that wouldn't 5
happer..
6 Q
That the HPI system would work as they 7
designed it to work and come on automatically, and if it 8
failed for some equipment reason, then there was a 9
backup system available, correct?
That's what they 10 told you?
11 A
That's correct.
12 Q
Did it ever occur to you to ask them what 13 if the operators at Met Ed terminated HPI which had come 14 on the way it was supposed to under the B&W design, 15 but the operators turned it off, producing the same 16 result as if it had never worked in the first place:
17 did you ever ask him that question?
18 A
I don't recall those particular situations 19 being discussed.
20 Q
so you didn't ask them that question?
21 A
Not that I remember.
They left me with what 22 was a feeling of no problem.
23 Q
No problem in terms of the system doing 24 what they had designed it to do, correct?
Ok-25 A
In what they have designed and trained us to I
508 I
1 Zochscn r ~x
)
2 do.
%)
3 Q
Did it ever occur to you that the same result 4
might flow from operators at Met' Ed terminating this 5
system improperly as would result if for some equipment 6
reason it never functioned in the first place?
7 A
Repeat that question.
8 (Question read) 9 A
Again we have to put it in light of the 10 training that was going on at the time.
11 Q
No, Mr. Zechman.
You can answer that from 12 any source whatsoever.
Simply whether that occurred to 13 you.
^
( )N, L
14 A
I don't recollect that occurring to me in 15 that time frame.
16 Q-Did you understand that part of the training 17 and part of the procedures in the training program at 18 Met Ed was devoted to telling the operators under what 19 circumstances they should terminate HPI during the course 20 of a transient?
21 A
Again, I don't recall -- I don't have the 22 procedures memorized, but I recall we operate the 23 high-pressure injection system until we get the system 24 cooled down --
A.
25 Q
I am not asking you to restate the I;
29 Zochmen 509 6
1 2
procedures.
I am asking you, did you simply understand that one part of the procedures, the emergency 3
4 procedures, and one part of the training that your training department was conducting at Met Ed was to 5
6 tell the operators under what circumstances they should terminate HPI once it had come on as a result of a 7
8 transient?
A And as I repeated, that kind of training 9
10 and that kind of operation philosophy came when we 11 operated at the simulator.
12 Q
In other words, you are saying that that 13 subject was never covered once in any part of the O
14 training that was done at Met Ed?
15 A
I am not saying that.
I am saying that the 16 training covered at Met Ed was the feedback of what we 17 were told by the vendor.
18 Q
In other words, you never told them in your 19
. training program anything different than what you had 20 learned the one time you went down there 21 A
Not what I learned.
What the trainees, the trained and -- we told them and trained 22 feopl^ who were them on the information we received from the vendor in 23 the operation of the vendor system.
24 25 Q
You are telling me that you never considered I
i zochann 510 30
(-]
2 telling them anything in your training program beyond v
3 what they had already learned?
4 A
No, there are times where we did expand 5
upon that.
6 Q
In fact, you already testified that the 7
operators were only going down there once every two 8
years, is that correct, during '78 and '79?
9 A
They were also there for initial training, 10 don't forget.
11 Q
Let me go back to my basic question, which 12 I don't think has been answered yet.
~s
~
You did understand that it was part of the 13
{V b
14 training that went on at Met Ed to tell the operators 15 under what circumstances they should terminate HPI 16 once it-had come on automatically?
17 A
We trained them on what the procedure said, 18 along with how we practiced that at the simulator and l
19 what we were told at the simulator.
20 Q
Didn't you understand that it was important 21 that the operators understand when and under what 22 conditions they would terminate HPI?
l 23 A
Yes, sir, it is important.
24 C
Isn't it a fact that you believe that it was
[ }
\\_/
25 important that they be told.under what circumstances l
l 1
511 I
1 31 zochaon
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2 they should terminate HPI because if they did it
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wrongly, that could cause problems?
3 4
A They were trained that if they did it wrongly -- did it wrongly within the context of which 5
6 they were trained, what was defined as wrongly, you 7
didn't want to go out the top of the pressurizer or the 8
bottom.
9 Q
I am not asking what the specific 10 instructions were.
I am asking for the basic concept.
11 You understood that training was given to the operators 12 on what circumstances they should terminate HPI once 13 it had come on automatically, is that correct?
m 14 A
They were trained, yes.
15 Q
You understood that that training was given 16 to them.because it was important that they not make i
17 a mistake in terminating HPI when in fact it should 18 have stayed on, is that correct?
19 A
In the context of their training of the 20 operation of the high-pressure injection system.
l 21 Q
The basic point that it was important t$o you l
22 that they not terminate HPI when in fact it should have 1
23 been left on, is that correct?
24 A
It was important to have high-pressure I
O in the l
(J 25 injection on to maintain level and pressure l
I i
512 32 Zachacn 9
1
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2 pressurizer.
That's the basis with which the training
%.s' occurred.
3 4
Q Mr. Zechman, I am going to move to strike 5
that answer as not responsive.
I want a responsive g
answer to my question.
6 Simply, wasn't it important to you that the 7
8 operators be trained so that they would not turn HPI off when in fact they should have left it on?
Wasn't g
10 that basic point important?
11 A
It was important that they operate the the injection system in accordance with 12 high-pressure 13 procedures in the mode instructed at the simulator.
g--
14 Q
Wasn't it important that they do that
's_/
15 because if they didn't do that and terminated HPI when 16 it should have stayed on, that they could produce a condition in which pressure would continue to go down
(
17 reactor to the point where boiling could occur in the 18 19 system?
In their training they never observed a A
20 condition where the pressure was going down and 21 W
22 leveling up, because their training centered on g
i injection based on level and 23 maintaining high-pressure 24 pressure.
p, that's a totally nonresponsive 25 Q
Mr. Zechman, 1
1 33 Ecch=cn 513
(
2 answer.
MR. FISKE:
Would you read the question 3
I 4
4 back, please.
We are going to stay here this afternoon 5
l j
6 until we get an answer to this.
l (Question read) 7 8
MR. MacDONALD:
You are asking him whether or not he understood that it was important to him 9
10 that if pressure went down, regardless of what 11 else happened, that you would get that condition i
12 practically in a reactor coolant system?
1 13 MR. FISKE:
No.
Mr. Zechman has already 14 told us that he realized if pressure went down to 15 a certain point, that we could have boiling in the i
He already told us that.
He has also told us that iu was important 17 18 to him that the operators not terminate HPI when in fact they should have left it on.
19 I am simply asking him --
20 21 BY MR. FISKE:
22 Q
Isn't it a very simple fact that the r
23 reason -- a reason you thought that was important was 24 because if they terminated HPI when in fact it should 25 have stayed on, that they could produce a condition where l
ll
1 34 Zachacn 514 pressure, instead of recovering as it would by 2
e(s) continued HPI operation, in fact continued to decrease, 3
and that that decrease in pressure could produce boiling?
4 A
You see, in the training they never separated 5
lll the two.
Pressure and level always was the same.
They never observed the difference.
7 Q
That is not a responsive answer.
That's 8
the same one you gave the last time.
I am not asking 9
whether in training something was said about 10 pressurizer level.
I am simply saying -- asking you 11 whether you understood that a reason for HPI, a safety 12 reason was to prevent a continuing drop in pressure.
13 I~^
Did you understand that?
k 14 A
From a safety reason --
15 Q
Did you understand that?
l 16 A
That one of the purposes of the high-17 pressure injection was to maintain system pressure, I 18 understand that.
I 19 l
Q A safety measure?
20 A
I understand that.
l 21 Q
You also understood that if HPI turned off, it ceases at that point to perform any function in 23 increasing pressure, is that correct?
24 A
I understand that.
/D 25 V
3
$15 1
35 zochoon 2
Q Didn't you understand that it was important O
1 (3
that operators not terminate HPI prematurely in a 4
situation where that termination would produce a 5
continued or would allow a continued drop in pressure?
6 A
But sure.
7 Q
can you answer that yes or no?
8 A
You can't separate that from level, because 9
level also meant that the coolant system was full.
That 10 was their prime focus.
Our training did not separate 11 those two.
You can't separate one from the other.
12 Q
So is it your testimony, Mr. Zechman, that 13 you didn't care whether or under what circumstances 14 the operators terminated HPI?
15 A
Certainly I cared.
16 Q.
What did you think could happen if the 17 operators terminated HPI when in fact it should have 18 stayed on, what did you think could have happened to 19 pressure?
20 A
It depends on what's happening in the rest 21 of the system.
It depends whether the leak was 22 terminated.
It depends on the capability of the -- the ll 23 size of the leak.
It depends on the capability of the 24 heaters.
25 Q
All of those are factors which would lead you
()
u
1 36 Zochann 516
(~N 2
to determine one way or the other whether it was Na'i 3
proper to terminate HPI, correct, and under situations 4
where the leak had been corrected, then obviously it 5
might be corrected to HPI.
I am not asking about that.
6 I am assuming a situation where the HPI 7
should have been left on and, in fact, it was turned 8
off and didn't you understand that if that happened, 9
if HPI was terminated when in fact it shouldn't be, 10 that one consequence of that could be a continuing drop 11 in pressure which could cause boiling in the core?
12 MR. MacDONALD:
You are asking him basically 13 if he ever thought of that prior to the accident gg t
.)
%_J 14 and had an understanding that that could happen?
15 MR. FISKE:
It's a fundamental, simple 16 question, going to why you think it was important 17 that the operators know when and when not to 18 terminate HPI.
Why did that make any difference?
l 19 (Continued on next page) 20 l
21 h
22 l
l 23 24 p
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25 l
l l
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37 Zochaon 517 2
MR. MacDONALD:
I think you are confusing 3
again.
4 MR. FISKE:
That's just a statement which is 5
intended to be helpful in getting an answer 6
to what is one of the most simple questions 7
that I think has been asked in this entire 8
deposition.
9 could you go back and read it again, 10 please.
11 (Question read.)
12 A
I repeat to you that it should be left 13 on based upon what we had been trained to do with O
14 HPI.
15 Q
Mr. Zechman, will you please.
16 MR. FISKE:
Maybe you can tell him to 17 answer the question.
18 MR. MacDONALD:
I am trying to help both 19 parties get to a resolution of this.
You may 20 think it's easy.
It may not be that easy.
21 Q
Let me explain, Mr. Zechman, I am not I
22 asking you for an evaluation of the criteria for 23 leaving HPI on or turning it off.
I am simply 24 presenting you with a situation applying whatever 25 the criteria may have been as the operators understood
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2 1
38 Zochcon 518
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2 it, they terminated HPI when in fact they shouldn't N )}
3 have, whether they misread this or whether they 4
misread that.
Or they didn' t follow the procedure, 5
whatever.
They in fact did not do what they were O
G supposed to do and terminated HPI when it should have 7
been on and I am simply asking you as head of training 8
didn't you have a concern that if the operators by 9
mistake, by error or for whatever reason terminated 10 HPI when it should have stayed on that a consequence 11 of doing that would be to allow a continuing drop in 12 pressure?
13 A
Sir, when that was never discussed in
.s 14 training, and it couldn't be done on a simulator, 15 I have to answer it in light o f what traising.
16 MR. MacDONALD:
If you want to go on, it's 17 20 minutes past where we were.
To answer your 18 question--I am not going to answer it.
10 MR. FISKE:
I can't do any more than 20 ask the same question five times and I keep 21 setting the same totally non-responsive answer.
l 22 MR. MacDONALD:
I think he is having 23 trouble understanding the question in the 24 context in which it is done.
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25 MR. FISKE:
Read, it back one more time.
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1:
519
'l 39 Zochann 2
If you think he understanda the question and he g/
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deesn't, I will be willing to stop and explain 4
t.o 'him, while we are sitting here.
5 MR. MacDONALD:
I don't went'to explain i
i 6
it in the middle of the question.'
He has 7
answered _c2 well as he thinks he understands it i
,q 8
'in context of the question.
I don't went to 9
talk to him in the middle of a question, and, 10 : ),
therefore, if you want to break for two minutes
~11 and come back.
p 12 MR. FISKE:
Let me see if I can explain 13 the quescion so we can;take it step by step so
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are talking e. bout.
I think f l
14 you know wiat wo
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15 did this just a minute ago.
(Continued on following pags.)
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IT 18 19
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21 1,
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Z chmen 520
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l 40
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2 Q
I am not asking you to tell us what training 3
was given, in fact, at B&W or at Met Ed as to what, in 4
fact, the criteria were for terminating HPI.
Do you 5
understand that?
6 A
I understand.
1 My question is did it occur to you before i
7 Q
8 the accident that if the operators had been given training and instruction on when it is proper to
'e 9
10 terminate HPI, either didn't understand those or failed to follow them or made a
11 instructions terminated HPI when, 12 mistake or for whatever reason
("5 13 in fact, the HPI should have stayed on, that one N-14 consequence of their doing that, that is improperly terminating HPI,would be to allow a contining drop 15 16 in pres _sure?
Did that ever occur to you?
MR. MacDONALD:
17 r
l-18 A
Yes.
if 19 Q'
That a continuing drop in pressure 4
far enough could cause boiling?
I '[ '
(/[
20 it went 21 A
And this is where I think we have our JN a theoretical point, I understand that b
22 differences.
At i
23 that will occur.
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(Continued on next page) y 24 (gr%
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4
Zachnen 521 1-A 1
40-A MR. FISKE:
That is as much as we can do 2
%.J' today.
3 (Time noted: 4:22 p.m.)
4 000 5
6 Richard W.
Zechman 7
8 subscribed e.nd avorn to 9
before me this 10 day of 1982.
11 12 13 (s
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
)
23 24 25
522
'Cl l
t, i
CERTIFICATE
/
b l
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
3 ll
- ss.:
l COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 I
{
I, CATHERINE Cook
, a Notary i
i Public of the State of New York, do hereby 6
i e
i certify that the continued deposition of i
l 7
RICHARD W.
ZECHMAN was taken before 8
l me on Wednesday, March 24, 1982 consisting 9
of pages 377 through 523 10 f
I further certify that the witness had i
j been previously sworn and that the within s.
I transcript is a true record of said testimony; in (j
That I am not connected by blood or 14 s
i marriage with any of the said parties nor la_
l interested directly or indirectly in the matter I
t i.
16 l
in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any 1
g
(
t of the counsel.
I i
18 8
l IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my l
19 hand this d$
day of
/A A r A i
~
, 1982.
20
}
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i f
21
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- n~)mna 0x$
22 23 l
Catherine Cook i
24 25 l
l
523
.C2 O
IN DEX WITNESS PAGE s.
Richard W. Zechman (resumed) 379 EXHI B I TS B&W FOR IDENTIFICATION 569 Diagram of control room at TMI-2 426 O
e e.
._