ML20072J016
| ML20072J016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1982 |
| From: | Swanson E BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-03, TASK-06, TASK-07, TASK-3, TASK-6, TASK-7, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290874 | |
| Download: ML20072J016 (162) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _
i bt UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 142 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- -x
{
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, a
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, l
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, a
Plaintiffs, s
-against-80 Civ. 1683 (R.O.)
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT & Co.,
INC.,
a Defendants.
--x Continued deposition of The Babcock &
Wilcox Company by ERIC SWANSON, taken by l
Plaintiffs pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler, Esqs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Thursday, July 22, 1982, at 9:45 o' clock in the forenoon, before Nancy A.
Rudolph, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
6 D
74 820722 7
K 050002g9 PDR OO DOYLE REPORTING, INC.
CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 LExlNGTON AVENur WALTER SHAPsRO. C.S.R.
New Yonx. N.Y.
10017 CHARLES SHAPIRO C.S.R.
TsLEPNoNr 212 - 867-822o
1 143 b(m 2
Appe a rance s:
3 4
KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs h
5 425 Park Avenue New York, New York 6
By:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQ.,
7 of Counsel 8
9 10 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
Attorneys for Defendants 11 One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 12
~
By:
ROBERT WISE, ESQ.
m
( )s 13
-and-PATRICIA VAUGHAN, ESQ.,
14 of Counsel 15 16 17 Also Present:
18 DAVID TAYLOR 19 20
,2 l
1 (3
24
%)
25
1 144
'gs
(,)
2 ERI C S W.A N S O N, resumed, having 3
been previously duly sworn by the Notary 4
Public, Nancy A.
Rudolph, was examined and lll 5
testified further as follows:
6 EXAMINATION (Continued) 7 BY MR. SELTZER:
8 Q
Was it you who told Joe Kelly that g
he was assigned to go out to Davis-Besse plant 10 immediately after the September 24, 1977 incident?
11 A
No.
12 Q
Who gave him those marching orders?
(
13 A
I don't know.
s 14 Q
You said you spoke to Joe after he got 15 back conerning what he had learnad about the 16 September 24 transient at Davis-Besse, right?
17 A
The way I recall it, I believe I spoke 18 to him after the meeting he held or it was held 19
'and discussed.the accident at Davis-Besse.
I do 20 have a vivid mental image of him coming into my 21 office and telling me about the evnet.
- 7. don't 22 have a particularly clear rememberance of the 23 details of the discussion.
3 24 Q
Did you review before coming in here 25 this morning your resporse to the questions that l
1 Swanson 145 2
you had gotten from B&W's counsel, and specifically 3
yesterday I showed you that Bob Wise had sworn to 4
us that you believed you were at the training h
5 room B briefing by Faist and Kelly even though 6
you had testified under oath that you didn't think 7
you had been at that briefing.
8 Did you look at the signed statement 9
that Mr. Wise relied upon?
10 A
Yes, he got that and showed it to me this 11 morning.
12 MR. WISE:
I would like also to state, 13 that you may be a little confused, Mr. Seltzer, 14 about the Federal Rules.
15 I bel'ieve they provide that an attorney 16 signs them with respect to the objections 17 and they are sworn to by an officer, 18 director of the client.
19 MR. SELTZER:
- Aell, I didn't see any-20 objections and it didn't say above your 21 signature that you were signing only as to
~
22 objections.
23 MR. WISER Well, I think youf.nr e familiar 1
l 24 p
with the Federal Rules as to who.[lgns l
(
/
25 j
interrogatories.
I don't think/we need to I
/e
/
1 Swanson 146
\\
2 debate it.
3 My impression is that lawyers do not 4
sign answers to interrogatories.
We can get llh 5
a copy of the Federal Rules.
6 MR. SELTZER:
I think the fact of 7
the matter is those answers were prepared 8
by Davis Polk & Wardwell, and I think at the I
g time you signed them as an attorney, we were 10 entitled to rely on Davis Polk & Wardwell for 11 having done a good faith job for gathering 12 information.
f~)\\
13 MR. WISE:
Well, I agree with the 14 general obligation of counsel to attempt to 15 gather the information and prepare the answers 4 16 for submission in the cases I have no objection 17 to that.
18 I do have an objection if you are going i
19 to say it's a sworn statemsnt, which it is
[
20 r.o t.
We did in good faith attempt to get l
21 the answers.
22 BY MR. SELTZER:
i 23 Q
Let me ask Mr. Swanson what the truth l~
l 24 in the matter is.
25-You looked at your written response,
-.e c
e
i s
E!.
5 1
Swanoon 147 s
s
(~N (x
( )
2 regarding whether you had attended the training 3
room B meeting, right?
4 A
Yes.
lll 5
Q What had you said in that written 6
response?
7 A
I put a question mark in the "No" slot.
8 Q
Did you make any other notation with 9
respect to whether you attended the training room
)
10 B session?-
11 A
No.
12 MR. WISE:
I will state for the record 13 that in order to be as complete as possible 14 in our answers, where the employees 15 indicated doubt as to whether or not they 16 could remember being at the meeting, we 17 included their names rather than exclude them, 18 and we preceded the answer with a preamble that 19 stated that the individuals listed below i
20 remembered that they may have been at the 21 meeting.
There were a number of people who 22 in 1982, almost five years after the event, 23 were unable to state with certainty as to 24 whether they had been there.
7,
(
)
~'
25 Where there was doubt, as Mr. Swanson 6
+
1 Swanson 148 (7
\\,)
2 indicated he noted on his response, we 3
included the names rather than excluded them.
4 MR. SELTZER:
Is there anybody else lll 5
who indiccted doubt as to whether he attended?
6 MR. WISE:
Yes.
7 MR. SELTZER:
Who?
8 MR. WISE:
I dun't know.
I don't have 9
all the questionnaires, but there were a 10 number of people who said they may have been 11 at the meeting and were not able today to 12 recall one way or the other.
I ).
13 In those instances, as I say, we included
%)
14 the names rather than excluded them.
15 Q
Did Joe Kelly ever tell you that as a 16 result of his trip to the Davis-Besse plant, he had 17 heard from Toledo Ediso'n Company personnel that 18 Toledo Edison Company wanted open and shut lights 19 to be placed on their electromatic relief valve or 20 pilot operated relief. valve?
21 A
I don't remember.
22 Q
You don't have any recollection of his 23 telling you that?
g3 24 A
No.
I don't remember.
~
25 Q
So in other words, you don't remember
i.
'l Swanson 149
()
2 Kelly coming-in and telling you that, is that what 3
you are saying?
4 A
I don't remember him telling me that llh 5
Toledo Edison had requested open and shut lights 6
on the PORV.
7 I also don't remember that from anywhere 8
Toledo Edison had requested open and shut lights 9
on the PORV.
10 MR. SELTZER:
Very good, thank you.
11 Q
Did Jae Kelly tell you that he had 12 '
learned directly from Toledo Edison personnel tha,t
(
13 Toledo Edison vanted a better indication of 14 the position of their pilot operated relief' 15 valvo than had been installed in their plant on 16 September 24?
17 A
I don't remember.
18.
Q You don't remember anybody telling you 19 that, do'you?
20 A
That's corrects :I do not remember.
21 Q
Did Joe. Kelly come back and tell you 22 that Toledo Edison personnel.had advised him 23 that Toledo Edison now wanted an automatic interlock 24 installed at their' plant that would shut the block
'us!
25 valve that's in series with the pilot operated-
1 Swanson 150 0
2 relief valve and they wanted the interlock to 3
shut-the block valve whenever the pilot operated i
4 relief valve was in an open position and lll 5
reactor coolant system pressure was less than 2100 6
psi?
i 7
A Now I have got some trouble with what 8
has happened recently versus what has happened at 9
that time, because I know now that we have 10 investigated automatic interlocks to close the 11 block valve, but I don't think I talked to Joe 12 Ke31y when he came back about automatic interlock,,s 13 on the PORV.
14 What I remember talking to Joe about 15 was that the operators arbitrarily turned off the 16 high pressure injection.
I do remember talking 17 about that singular thing.
18 Q
Was it during that conversation 19 with Joe Kelly that you formed the opinion that B&W 20 should warn other people aL&.t this issue of 21 incorrect termination of high pressure injection?
22 A
well, to the best of my recollection, 23 we felt that the operators had incorrectly turned a{~}-
24 off HPI and we believed that it would be useful to 25 send out some sort of information to-the sites
~.. _ _ _.,
1 Swanson 151 l
2 to remind the operators that they should not turn 3
off HPI for no reason.
It was inconceivable 4
to us that the operators who were trained in lh 5
LOCAC would just arbitrarily turn it off, so 6
we thought a reminder to the sites would be useful 7
and that's the time we discussed writing a note 8
to I believe field services saying " Don't you think 9
you ought to send a reminder to the sites?"
10 Q
You say you discussed writing a note 11 to field services.
12 Was such a note written?
(
13 A
Yes.
Joe wrote a memo.
This memo 14 right here.
}5 Q
GPU 76.
16 A
Joe wrote this memo, I will call it 17 a candidate for additional guidance or supplementary 18 informatio,n as a thought to send it to the sites 39 or as a thought to form an instruction possibly 20 to send it to the sites.
21 Q
You said that you reviewed this memo 22 with Kelly before it was finalized and sent, is 23 that right?
24 A
Yes.
-) _
%,)
25 Q
Do you see the third sentence of the 1
i L
I Swanson 152 2
first paragraph beginning with the words "The 3
operators stopped"?
4 A
Yes.
lll 5
Q That sentence reads, "The operators 6
stopped high pressure injection when pressurizer 7
level began to recover without regard to primary d
pressure."
9 A
I see that sentence.
10 Q
You understood from what Joe Kelly 11 had told you that the operators arrested high pressure 12 injection when they saw pressurizer water level
}
13 beginning to rise, isn't that right?
14 A
I read the sentence here in the memo, 15 but my recollection of about what we discussed is 16 hazy.
I just remember the topic and that 17 is that the operators turned off high pressure 18 injection arbitrarily.
19 Q
I know.
You used the word " arbitrarily."
20 This memo doesn't use the word " arbitrarily."
This 21 memo says they stopped HPI when the pressurizer 22 level began to recover without regard to primary 23 pressure.
24 A
I see what the memo is, but what I am
~
25 telling you is what I recall.
I don't recall the ry v
v-
---r p
=m e
1 Swanoon 153
[)
2 details.
V 3
Q Let me ask you When you use the 4
word " arbitrarily," do you mean something that llh 5
is inconsistent with the third sentence of Joe 6
Kelly's memo?
7 A
What I mean by " arbitrarily" is that 8
high pressure injection is initiated for a reason.
9 It's designed to automatically initiate on certain 10 Principles and that until the reason for the 11 automatic initiation is known and the operators 12 do do some work to investigate the reason for
(
13 the start of high pressure injection, that they 14 should rely on the automatic system and not 15 turn it off.
16 Turning it off without knowing the 17 reason or having some guidance for turning it off, 18 they should leave it running and for turning it 19 off for any time other than knowing what's going on j
20-or having a good reason for turning it off or having t
21 the best evidence for-knowing when to turn it off, 22 they should leave it on, otherwise it would be 23 arbitrarily cutting it off.
1 l
24 Q
Why didn't you tell Joe Kelly to 25-say in this memo, GPU 76, that the operators should i
i>-
m.
l 1
Swanson 154 f%Q.
2 not turn off high pressure injection unless 3
they know what caused it automatically to actuate?
4 A
Oh, I don't know.
h 5
Q He didn't say that in here, did he?
6 MR. WISE:
Well, the document speaks 7
for itself.
If you want to ask him --
8 MR. SELTZER:
Documents don't speak for 9
themselves.
I beg to differ with you.
I think 10 that's a stupid thing to say.
l 11 MR. WISE:
I think that's been something i
12 that's been part of our jurisprudence here in 13 this country for a long time.
The document 14 is the best evidence of what it says.
15 MR. SELTZER:
I think witnesses who 16 contribute to the authorship of documents are 17 better evidence of what a document says, 18 particularly documents on technical subjects 19 like this.
20 MR. WISE:
I disagree with you, but 21 it makes no difference.
l 22 What is the question?
23 -
(Question read back.)
24 A
He certainly didn't say the words I just n#
l 25 used in there.
l
1 Swenson 155
(
)
2 Q
Did you ever do anything, Mr. Swanson, v
3 to investigate why the operators shut off high 4
pressure injection at Davis-Besse in response to lll 5
rising pressurizer water level?
6 A
Well, like I said, the details of the 7
conversation I had with Joe Kelly are foggy.
I don't 8
remember the details.
9 Q
Do you recall doing anything to 10 investigate why the operators shut off high 11 pressure injection in response to rise in pressurizer 12 water level?
~
f')
13 A
I don't remember.
No, I don't remember.
v 14 Q
You never talked to anybody from 15 Davis-Besse about it, did you?
16 A
I don't recall.
17 Q
You don't recall doing that?
18 A
No, I don't.
19 Q
Did you ever sugg,est to Joe Kelly or 20 anybody else that they should go out to Davis-Besse 21 and speak to the operators there, speak to the O
22 operating staff and find out what was going through 23 their mind when they thought it was the right thing 24 to do to shut off high pressure injection in response 7.-
(
)
25 to rising pressurizer water level?
1 Swanson 156 2
A First, the channels we worked through l
3 are not to just pop up and send anybody out there, i
4 We worked through the field services organization, lll 5
and when Joe and I talked about this situation -- and 6
I remember that the operators cut off HPI, I suggested 7
to Joe that possibly some additional informatien 8
should be sent to the sites and would Joe go ahead 9
and formulate a letter giving some criteria for when 10 it was permissible to stop high pressure injection 11 with the end intent to have something sent to the 12 sites.
(
13 And in that respect we took what I 14 consider ethical and proper action on it.
15 Q
When you say you took ethical 16 action, you are referring to the November 1 memo?
17 A
This letter right here.
18 Q
To the best of your knowledge, 19 Bruce Karrasch never responded to this memo, did 20 he?
Let me clarify it.
21 As you s'it here today, you can't recall O
22 any response by Bruce Karrasch to GPU 76, can you?
23 A
I de not recall.
He may have responded to gg 24 Joe, since Joe was the author of-the letter.
\\v\\
i 25 Q
I am just asking you what you know.
1
-,n..
w-y 9
~
1 Swanson 157 2
I have already asked Joe Kelly.
He said he 3
didn't remember Bruce responding at all.
4 A
O.K.
lll 5
Q Ron Finnin to the best of your 6
knowledge never responded to this memo, did he?
7 A
I do not know.
8 Q
You are not aware of any Ron Finnin I
9 response to this memo, are you?
10 A
No.
11 Q
Danny LaBelle, to the best of your 12 knowledge, never responded to this memo, did he?,
()
13 A
I do not recall.
14 Q
You dor.'t recall any response from 15 LaBelle, do you?
16 A
I don't recall whether he did or did not.
17 I just don't remember.
18 Q
You don't have any memory of Norm 19 Elliott, the head of training, responding to this 20 memo, do you?
21 A
Again, I - don't remember whether he did i
22 or did not.
i 23 Q
Don Hallman made no personal response
)
s 24
.to this memo either in writing or orally that 25
.you can recall.as you sit here today, isn't that i.
-.._s
i 1
Swanson 158 2
right?
3 A
I don't remember that he responded or did 4
not respond.
llh 5
Q So as you sit here today, you can't 6
recall a Hallman response, isn't that right?
I 7
MR. WISE:
I*think he's answered the 8
question very clearly.. He said he doesn't 9
remember whether he did or did not.
There 10 is nothing more that he can say.
11 Q
Bert Dunn, did Bert respond orally or 12 in writing to GPU 76 to the best of your recollec, tion 13 today?
14 A
Now, my memory is clouded in this area.
15 I think I remember talking to Bert or Joe and 16 I remember talking to Bert at some time about
'17 this memo and the general gist of the way things 18 vent was Bert felt like this was a memo that should 19 be sent and that the -- this memo would stand I
20 for him writing a memo because I believe he was 21 concerned about this also and that is a vague 22 recollection.
It's not a-certain recollection.
23 Q
Bert certainly is one of,the people that 24 '
has indicated he was concerned about this. issue.
25 other than Bert Dunn, am I correct that 1
rw r--
-w
~
p ww,-
w=,
-e-e--en-e
---g weew-,
m----~~-
<m,
--..ee
.e
-s
1 Swanson 159 f%
(_)
2 it is your position today that you have no 3
recollection of any other person on the distribution 4
list of GPU 76 responding to the memo?
llh 5
A Well, with the exception of myself, 6
of course, and I had some discussions about it.
I 7
do not recall either whether they responded or just 8
did not respond.
I just don't remember.
9 Q
Let me show you GPU Exhibit 151, which 10 is a memo from Kelly to Lauer relating to the 11 Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 event.
12 Do you see where you "are marked for a 13 copy?
14
.A Yes.
15 Q
Do you believe that you received a 4
16 copy of GPU 151 on or about October 24, 1977 in the 17 regular course of business?
18 A
Let me look it over a minute, please.
19 I don't remember this memo.
20 Q
Since you are marked for a copy of thic 21 memo, let me ask you whether you were aware in 1977 22 that you were having a problem getting memoranda 23 for which you were marked as copies.
f-~
24 A
I didn't understand that question.
N-It's a Bob Fiske question that he asked 25 I
Q
1 Swanson 160
' (O) 2 Jack Herbein.
3 In the year 1977 when you are marked 4
for a copy of this memo, were you aware of any lll 5
problem with mail distribution or circulation of 6
memos within B&W Lynchburg such that there were 7
memos on which you were marked for copies but which i
8 were not coming to you?
9 A
I don't know.
10 Q
Today you don't recall that there was 11 such a problem?
12 A
I don't know whether there was a problem, i
}
13 or not a problem.
I haven't really thought about it.
14 Q
Well, think about it.
i 15 A
o.K.
I have no answer, I guess.
I just
}
16 don't know.
4 17 Q
Do you beli' eve it's likely that you 1
18 received GPU 1517 a
19 A
Most probably.
20 Q
You said that you thought a warning 21 should go out, you thought that additional 22 instructions should go out so that the type of 23 termination of high pressure injection that had i
i 24 occurred at Davis-Besse would not recur at other I
~h (G
\\
25 Bsw plants.
l r
,e-
,a
1 Swanson 161 O
2 After helping Joe Kelly prepare and 3
distribute GPU 76, what, if anything, else did 4
you do to try to get a warning out to the operators lll 5
at B&W plants?
6 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of 7
the question.
8 The witness may answer it.
9 A
First, I would like to say that this 10 memo is not something that we thought was 11 necessary to fill in the gap or any kind of training 12 or in procedures that they had, but it's more in,
O 13 the contents of a reminder to the operators with 14 regard to other actions I took relative to this 15 general subject of turning off HPI; I do have a 16 recollection, not a strong recollection, of 17 discussing the issue with Bert Dunn.
18 Q
Bert said he asked you to create a 19 forum within plant integration to review Dunn's 20 concerns about operator interruption of high pressure 21 injection.
22 Do you recall that he made such a request 23 to you?
24 A
No.
25 Q
Bert said that you told him that Joe
1 swanson 162
(
2 Kelly would create such a forum.
3 Do you recall telling Bert that?
4 4
A No.
hI 5
Q other than chatting with Dunn, what 6
if any af firmative steps did you take after sending 7
GPU 76 to get further instructions or warnings 3
to owners of B&W plants?
9 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of 10 -
the question.
I think your use of the word 11
" chatting" is a mischaracterization of what 12 Mr. Swanson said.
(
13 The witness may answer the question.
14 A
As I said a while ago, Joe and I 15 discussed the issue for what I would consider a 16 reasonable amount of time and came to the conclusion 17 that this kind of memo should be written.
18 Q
GPU 767.
19 A
Yes.
20 Then we may or may not have talked to 21 Bert Dunn at exactly the time the memo was 22 written, but I have a -- and I have a vivid 23 recollection of sitting in the office with Joe 24 sitting next to me and talking about it.
I remember 25 that for some reason.
1 Swanson 163
)
2 Then I have a less vivid recollection of 3-Joe and I sitting in Bert's office and talking 4
about this.
llh 5
Now, at what time and what kind of 6
framework relative to issuing this memo before or 7
af ter or considerably af ter, I just don't remember, 8
but it seems to me that that one reason we talked 9
to Bert was that we were not getting a response 10 from the field services people or something that 11
. happened to disturb Joe, so we went to talk to 12 Bert.
That's generally the exteht of my memory
()
13 on it.
14 Q
You weren't getting a response from the 15 field services people who were the people 16 responsible for sending communications to the B&W 17 sites, right?
18 A
I vaguely recalled that Joe had a concern 19
.that his -- that this memo hadn't been responded to 20 or had been negatively responded to or in some fashion 21 he wanted more action, and I believe that we did 22 go to Bert at 5 bout that time, but I am not really 23 certain.
24 Q
In your answer, are you trying to distance w
25 yourself from' Kelly?
You are saying he was concerned.
1 Swanson 164
)
2 Are you meaning to imply that that was 3
Kelly's funny concern?
"I didn't share it"?
4 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of the lll 5
question.
6 The witness may respond.
7 A
No.
8 Q
Did you share Joe Kelly's concern?
9 MR. WISE:
Fxcuse me, Mr. Seltzer, 10 I don't think the witness has finished his 11 answer.
12 A
It wasn't that I wasn't concerned.
()
13 I am concerned about safety.
Joe is a very 14 experienced man.
He is a senior man.
He is a 15 knowledgeable man, and he is one of the kinds of guys 16 you like to have work for you.
He can handle the work 17 himself without a lot of instruction, and he has 18
'nitiative and he can take the initiative and i
19 it was my contention it was in good hands with Joe.
20 Q
You shared Joe's concern about the lack 21 of response from nuclear service, didn't you?
22 A
Yes.
I am concerned about safety..
23 Q
And you recognized that this was a safety 24 issue,~right?
\\_.)
25 A
Recognizing the turning off of high s
m_.
1 Swanson 165 2
pressure injection for no reason or for a limited 3
reason or for wrong reasons is a safety issue of some 4
dimension.
lll 5
Q Bruce Karrasch was your boss in the 6
fall of
'77, xight?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Was his office near yours?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
I take it as one of his managers, 11 you met with him fairly frequently like more than 12 once a week?
()-
13 A
I met with him on different subjects 14 frequently, yes.
15 Q
Did you ever take up with Bruce the 1
16 issues which you and Kelly had articulated in GPU 17 76 and say " Bruce, I would really like you to 18 give some attention to this," or words to that 19 effect?
20 A
2 don't really remember.
I 21 Q
At any of Bruce Karrasch's meetings O
22 of the plant integration section which Bruce said 23 were held from time to time, did you ever raise the 7y 24 concerns that you and Joe Kelly had about operator A1 m
25 termination of high pressure injection for the wrong
1 Swanson 166 2
reasons or at the wrong time?
3 A
I don't remember.
4 Q
Do you remember anybody else raising lll 5
those concerns at a Bruce Karrasch plant integration 6
unit meeting?
7 A
I don't remember.
8 Q
You used to hold bi-monthly 9
meetings of your group, right, according to Joe 10 Kelly?
11 A
I don't remember.
12 Q
Did you ever have get-togethers f( )
13 with the people who were in your group?
14 A
Certainly.
15 Q
Business get-togethers as opposed to 16 social get-togethers?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Do you have any recollection at any of 19 those business get-togethers of the people in your 20 group anyone, including you or Joe Kelly, raising 21 the concerns that you and he had about operator 22 termination of high pressure injection?
23 A
I don't remember.
It's not inconceivable s
24 though that it was raised because generally our C~J 25 get-togethers were usually for dissemination of
t 1
Swansen 167
()
2 what people were doing in the group and different 3
people would speak on their particular activities 4
at that time.
lll 5
Q But you have no recollection today 6
that it was ever di cussed?
7 A
!!o, I do not.
8 Q
You said you recognized that what you 9
were concerned about and Kelly was concerned about 10 and Dunn was concerned about was safety related.
11 Did it ever occur to you to file a 12 preliminary safety concern memtrandum with regard
(
13 to your concern over operator termination of high 14 pressure injection?
15 A
I really don't remember.
16 Q
The fact is that you never did file 17 such a PSC, right?
18 A
Apparently I did not.
19 Q
And you don't know of anybody else 20 filing a PSC with regard to the safety issues of 21 premature improper termination of HPI, do you?
22 A
No, I do know that Bert did write a 23 memo to Jin Taylor in licensing and Jim Taylor is 24 responsible for the management of PSCs and safety f--
N) 25 issues and so the licensing people have been informed l
1 Swanson 168 Os 2
by Bert's memo.
3 Q
You metin even if they didn't get it on 4
the PSC form, the licensing people who were in llh 5
charge of the preliminary safety concern procedures 6
were getting advised of the concern?
7 A
That's right.
Bert's memo to Jim 8
Taylor was evidence that he was concerned about 9
it and the licensing people were therefore informed.
10 Q
Before the Three Mile IsIand disaster, 11 had you ever filed a preliminary safety concern?
12 A
Personally, I had not, but people tha,t 13 worked for me had and I distinctly remember on one 14 occasion asking one of the people who did work f or 15 me to file a safety concern.
16 Q
So before the Three Mile Island 17 accident, PSCs were filed either on your recommendation 18 or with your concurrence?
19 A
That's correct.
l 20 Q
on what subject was the PSC filed that 21 you were just referring to?
92 A
The one I recall asking to be done was l
23 on failure of an auxiliary feedwater nozzle.
There O(~$
24 may have been_a couple of others, but that one I do l
25 remember.
i
y 1
Swanson 169
(~)
- (,j 2
Q Based on your understanding of the 3
preliminary safety concern procedures that were in 4
effect before the TMI accident, it's correct, lll 5
isn't it, that it would have been appropriate to file 6
the concern that you, Kelly and Dunn had about i
7 operator termination of high pressure injection as 8
- a preliminary safety concern?
9 MR. WISE:
I don't know that you have 10 laid a groundwork for what his understanding 11 was, but I will permit him to answer the l
12 question with that objection.
~()
13 A
I am not sure one way or the other at 14 this time.
15 Q
You couldn't say today that it would be 16 inappropriate to file it as a PSC, right?
17 A
It is probably not. inappropriate.
18 Q
You knew that Dunn was writing to Jim 19 Taylor in or about February 19, 1978 concerning 20 the safety probleEs cree.ted by operator termination 21 of high pressure injection, right?
22 A
We l'1, not exactly the way you phrase it.
23 Q
What did you know about it?
24 A
I vaguely recall that somehow or other
\\,3 25 Bert was not satisfied with the response Joe got 1
i y
_,w,,.
_y--
1 Swanson 170 2
and that he said he would take care of it or write 3
a memo or.take some action.
I don't recall him 4
particularly saying "I am going to write it to lll 5
Jim Taylor," or whatever.
6 Q
Did Bert show you his February 9, 1978 7
memo, GPU 78, before he went it to Jim Taylor?
8 A
Probably not, but I don't really recall.
9 Q
Bert thought that you might have been an 10 individual that he turned to for recommendations l
l 11 of to whom to send his February 9 memo.
12 Do you have any recollection of givin,g l
()
13 Bert some suggestions on who would be an 14 appropriate person to send the memo to?
15 A
Really, I do not.
16 Q
You are marked for receipt of a copy of 17 Bert's February 9 memo.
1 18 A
Yes.
19 Q
And you.are also marked for receipt of the 20 one week later addendum to that memo, which is GPU 21 79.
22 Again from the answers to interrogatories 23 signed by Bob Wise, you are. listed as somebody who 3
24 acknowledged receiving these memos at or about
\\.)
25 the time they were written.
l l
1 Swanson 171 2
Is that information in the interrogatory 3
answers correct, namely, that you did receive Bert's 4
February memoranda at or about the time they were lll 5
written?
6 A
Yes, I remember the memo.
7 Q
Both of them?
8 MR. WISE:
I would like to check that 9
answer.
I am not sure.
10 Is he marked for the February 16 one as 11 well?
12 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
()
13 A
I do remember the February 9 memo.
I am 14 less certain I remember this memo of the 16th and the IG reason for my memory being a little vague is because 16 since Three Mile Island and the highlight placed 17 on these memos, I am not certain whether I remember 18 them because of subsequent activities or because 19 I remember them at the time.
20 I am fairly certain I remember the 21 February 9 memo from the time.
l 22 MR. WISE:
Again let me state 23 that the preamble to the answers to 24 interrogatories stated that the people s
V
%)'
25 listed remembered.that they did or may have
4 1
Swanson 172
[ ')
(J 2
received it.
We tried to be as complete as 3
possible in giving you answers.
4 MR. SELTZEP:
Your answer wasn't as lll 5
wishy-washy as you are portraying it.
You 6
said to us, Bob, "The following individuals 7
principally recall having directly or indirectly 8
received, discussed, considered or been aware 9
of, p rio r to the accident, the documents listed."
10 MR. WISE:
hhat does the rest of it say?
11 Show it to me.
Perhaps I can --
12 MR. SELTZER:
I don't mean to make
("'J N
13
(
more of an issue out of it.
The document 14 speaks for itself, Mr. Wise.
15 MR. WISE:
Wall, since you read part of 16 it I am speaking about the part "All 17 responses are based upon present recollection, 18 and it is possible that others received, 19 discussed, considered or were aware of the I
l 20 documents but no longer recall doing so."
l 21 Particularly the first part that the responses 22 are based on present recollection.
23 MR. SELTZER:
Everything that people do i
I 24 when they testify is based on present
\\.))
-j 25 recollection.
/
t E
/
1 Swt/nson 173
/
/
O 4
2 MR. WISE:
!!ue only reason that I 3
pointed that out is you continually speak as 4
though we are making a misrepresentation that llh 5
in fact it happened and I wanted to make clear 6
that in all the answers we did the best we could 7
relying on the recollections of the 8
individuals.
You seem to make a big point 9
of this, saying that we swore that this 10 happened or that happened.
11 I don't think that's what the answers 12 purport to state.
(
13 MR. SELTZER:
Davis Polk did swear that 14 the answers are true.
15 MR. WISE:
And I think it is true that 4
16 these answers set forth they were based upon the 17 present recollection of the individual.
18 MR. SELTZER:
I don't know.
Swanson has 19 got a funny recollection if when Davis swore 20 that these answers were true he had a present 21 recollection of receiving both memos and today 22 when he is under oath in our offices he is not 23 able to recall getting the second memo.
Which 24 is it?
O("N 25 THE WITNESS:
I said vaguely recall.
1 Swancon 174
' O)
(
2 My memory is less certain.
g S
y u vaguely re all getting the 3
February 16 memo?
4 gg, x
res.
3 MR. WISE:
But he is not certain.
6 What do you want us to do in that circumstance, 7
Mr. Seltzer?
You are making such a big point g
of it.
g MR. SELTZER:
The Dunn memos are clearly 10 the most important piece of evidence in this gg 12
$ billi n lawsuit, and the way in which you
().
13 people make light of an interrogatory asking who got the memo is probably more a reflection on 14 15 y ur sensitivity to the importance of the Dunn mem than you would care to admit.
16 MR. WISE:
No.
1, I disagree that the g7 18 Dunn memos are the most important piece of evidence in the case.
I think what the 19 perators did during the accident will turn 20 ut during the trial to be of considerably 21 9
m re interest than the Dunn memos.
22 23 Secondly --
- 7' 24 MR. SELTZER:
They might have'done
-\\j' 25 something different i
,s. ;
4.
bk i v '/N.
.~
i 33 %
~
~
.s '
1 Swanson 175 s
s,
-D f
f MR. WISE:
I object to your attempting js to characterize our efforts in responding to your 41 k
interrogatory-answers as taking them lightly.
5 We made _a ma-Jor effort to contact every 6
professional e.mployee currently at B&W and to w.
~ ;
7 get the best of their recollection.
'6 We stated to you what the best of their 9
recollection vas, and you have been making a b
' big stink for=the last couple of hours, and 11 I have yet to see where you have shown where 12 Mr. Swanson's recollection is different than 13 what is stated in the interrogatories.
Z4-T We did the best we could with 15 '
recollections that are several years after the s
16 event.
I very.much take umbrage at.your i.
s 17 suggestion that-we are at fault fo,r not taking s
f
- 10 I
your interrogatories ceriously;' We did.
- -10 MR. SELTZER:
I* don't mean to call into
\\
20 question the efforts that you expended in i
21 e
trying to answer he interrogatory.
o w
<4.
l 22 Q
When you got Bert% Dunn's February 9, 1978 a.
i s..
memo, do you recalls ekding.1h?
23 b
24-A I just recall the memo.
I don't U
l' 25 E recall what I did with it.
f w
-4 k
J. %
y r
. si a M
s_
1 Swanson 176
)
2 g
would you take a moment to read it 3
now, please.
Unless it's something that you read 4
in preparation for the deposition and don't want to h
5 reread it.
6 A
I have not read it repeatedly in 7
preparation for the interrogation.
8 Q
After you got Bert's February 9,
1978 9
memo, did you have any conversations with Bert 10 about the contents of it?
11 A
I am not certain.
I know I discussed 12 the subject with Bert at one time or another, but,
.()
13 I am not sure whether it was before or after 14 his memo or in what context.
15 Q
You have indicated that you and Joe Kelly j
16 discussed the concerns that the two of you shared 17 with Dunn about operator termination of high 18 pressure injection.
j 19 Taking a look at the list of people 20 who were to receive Dunn's memo, do you recall 21 discussing the contents of Dunn's memo or the 22 concerns about operator termination of high pressure 23 injection with any of the people to whom Bert's I
(
f-w
~ 24 memo is addressed other than Joe Kelly?
l
-(
25 A
I do not recall.
l l
1 Swanson 177 2
Q I take it from what you have previously l
3 testified that when you received Dunn's memo, 4
GPU 78, there was nothing in it that was j.
h 5
inconsistent with your views on the question of 6
operator interruption of high pressure injection?
7 A
Well, I don't recall any that I O
critiqued his memo in any fashion.
I do remember 9
receiving it.
10 f
Q You don't remember taking issue with 11 anything that was in it, right?
12 A
I said I don't remember critiquing it.
~
in any way pro or con.
I4 Q
After Dunn's two memos came out in 15 February 1978, did you have any further i
16 involvement in the issue of operator interruption i
17 of high pressure injection at any time before 18 the Three Mile Island accident?
19 A
I don't recall that I did.
I 20 The only possibility is that Bert and 21 I may have discussed it at one time or-another.
As you asked me yesterday, we are good friends and 1
23 we see a lot of each other, and it's possible that 24 we may have-talked about it at one time or another.
25 Q
But you have no present recollection?
l i
1 Swanson 178 2
A No, no real recollection.
3 Q
You took no further action on the 4
concern you had about operator interruption l
5 of high pressure injection, did you, after February 6
1978?
7 A
Not that I can recall.
8 Q
Are you aware that in the summer of 9
1978, someone at B&W had voiced a concern that 10 Dunn's guidelines for the management of high pressure i
i 11 injection might lead to taking the reactor coolant 12 system solid and damaging relief valves and pipin.g?,
()
13 MR. WISE:
Are you asking him has he 14 learned that since the time of the accident?
15 MR.! SELTZER:
No, thank you.
16 Q
Did you ever know that such a concern 17 had been voiced before the Three Mile Island accident?
18 A
Well, certainly I know now that that 19 concern had been voiced, but I am not 20 Q
As your counsel interjected.
We are not 21 interested in that.
22 A
I am trying to remember the best I can.
23 I don't remember whether I heard it 24 since then or heard it at the time.
_)
25 Q
Did Bruce Karrasch ever ask you, that 1
i i
..-----,,_,-,,y
1 Swanson 179 (O
_)
2 you can recall, to study whether Dunn's 3
prescriptions for the management of high pressure 4
injection could result in damage to relief valves lll 5
and any other RCS componenets?
6 A
I don't think so.
I am not -- again, 1
7 I am not certain.
8 Q
Do you have any knowledge of Bruce 9
Karrasch asking anyone else to study whether 10 Dunn's prescriptions could cause damage to 11 any components of the nuclear steam supply system?
12 MR. WISE:
Again putting.aside a n y t h,i n g.,
()
13 he has learned in preparation for this 14 deposition from us.
15 I am certainly going to object if you 16 are asking him to reveal discussions with 17 counsel.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Don't reveal discussions 19 with counsel.
20 A
I don't reme mb e r.
21 Q
When is the last time you spoke with 22 Art McBride?
23 A
Earlier this year on the telephone.
24 Q
In connection with what?
25 A
I have a new job at B&W and his job at
1 Swanson 180 2
SAI is a similar job, and I was calling him to 3
discuss some aspects of my new job.
4 The discussion had nothing to do with lll 5
this whatsoever.
6 Q
What is the antecedent of this?
7 A
The antecedent of what?
8 MR. WISE:
He is asking you what it is 9
you mean when you say it had nothing to do with 10 this.
11 A
Oh, the Three Mile Island issue.
12 It was a completely different technical,
()
13 issue.
14 Q
You mean somewhere in the world there are 15 people that talk about things other than the Three 16 Mile Island case?
17 A
There are a lot of' things we talk about 18 other than the Three Mile Island.
19 Q
In Bert's memo of February 9, 1978 at 20 the end of the second paragraph, do you see the 21 sentence that begins, "Had this event occurred"?
22 A
Yes.
l 23 Q
Referring to the Davis-Besse event on l
l
.(-}
24 S ept e mbe r 24, 1977, Dunn says, "Had this event
\\_/
25 occurred in a reactor at full power with other
.. - -. ~ -,
1 Swanson 181 2
than insignificant burnup, it is quite possible, 3
perhaps probable, that core uncovery and possible 4
fuel damage would have resulted."
lll 5
Did you recognize in the fall of 1977 6
or early 1978 that a termination of high pressure 7
injection such as had occurred at Davis-Besse 8
could possibly or perhaps probably lead to 9
core uncovery and fuel damage?
~ 10 A
Well, like I said, I remember receiving 11 this memo.
I don't remember the decails of it.
12 Q
Let me clarify something.
I don't
()
13 mean to interrupt you, but I am not asking you so 14 much whether you gained that understanding that 15 I was inquiring about from Bert Dunn's memo, but 16 I am asking you whether you had formed a belief in 17 the f all of '77 or early '78 that such a termination 18 of high pressure injection could possibly perhaps 19 probably lead to core uncovery and fuel damage if a 20 plant were at full power.
21 A
Let me answer that by saying that j
22 I think nearly everybody in the industry knows that l
23 if high pressure inj ection is turned off and there 24 is still a small leak that at some time the inventory O
l 25 in the reactor coolant system is going to diminish l
l l
l l
- - -. - - - - - - - - - - --~~ --- - - -
1 Swanson 182 I
2 and begin to uncover the core.
I think that's 3
common sense.
4 Q
And if there is core uncovery, there lll 5
is'certainly the probability of fuel damage?
6 A
If the core uncovery is of a sufficient 7
depth and for a sufficiently extended period, it's 8
likely that fuel damage will occur.
9 Q
Now, you didn't mention and I 10 didn't directly ask you about the one response that 11 Joe Kelly did get to his November 1, 1977 memo.
12 Are you aware that there was one B&W
()
13 employee who did file a response?
14 A
Well, I am aware of it now.
I am not 15 certain that I remember it at that time.
16 Q
Let me show it to you and see if 17 it refreshes your recollection.
Joe Kelly has 18 given sworn testimony that you and he reviewed 19 Frank Walters' written response together.
I am 20 showing you GPU 132.
21 A
I don't believe I remember this letter 22 at the time of -- of this general period, December, 23 February' time frame.
i 24 Q
There is a statement in the first 25 paragraph of this memo which reads in part, "The
1 Swanson 183 2
operators at Toledo responded in the correct 3
manner considering how they had been trained and 4
the reasons behind this training."
llh 5
Were you aware in the fall of 1977 that 6
someone from customer service or nuclear service 7
had expressed the opinion that the Davis-Besse 8
operators had responded in the correct manner 9
considering how they had been trained and the 10 reasons behind their training?
11 A
Relative to this letter I think I told 12 you I don't recall seeing it.
Relative to your
()
13 question, the general subject, somebody from 4
14 field service having responded in this fashion, 15 I don't think I remember that.
16 Q
Your view was that they responded 17 incorrectly, right?
18 A
The reason that Joe and I talked about 19 writing his letter was that we felt like the 20 operators needed some supplemental guidance or 21 needed to be reminded of the reasons for turning 22 off HPI or having good reasons for turning off 23 HPI.
24 Q
Did you talk to anybody in B&W's 25 training department to find out whether the
1 Swanson 184
'(O_)
2 Davis-Besse operators had acted in a manner that consistent with their training when they shut 3
was 4
off HPI?
llh 5
A I don't think so.
6 Q
You thought they had done something 7
that was arbitrary, but you didn't check with 8
training to see if what they did was absolutely 9
consistent with training, did you?
10 A
I think I had in my mind that the 11 operators had been trained in LOCAs and that 12 they had been trained in the procedures to handle,
()
13 LOCAs and that one of the things that they had 14 been trained to do is to use ECCS injection for 15 core cooling for LOCAs.
It was kind of unimaginable 16 to me that they had not been trained in that 17 in any fashion.
I,took it on faith, I guess.
18 Q
So the answer to my question is no, 19 you did no checking with anybody in training?
20 A
I didn't see a need to.
It's a basic 21 axiom, you use core injection for LOCAs.
22 Q
That's very interesting.
23 Were you aware by the fall of 1977 that 24 core injection as you call it automatically actuates 25 during overcooling events?
1 Swanson 185 2
A It is possible for an overcool'ing event 3
to reduce the primary system pressure to the setpoint 4
for initiation for ESFAS initiation.
lll 5
Q You referred in your testimony 6
yesterday to the criterion for pressurizer sizing 7
on the minimum inventory end of the sizing and 8
you said that the criterion was the amount of 9
contraction in primary system volume that occurs 10 following a turbine trip and reactor trip,right?
11 A
I believe I said that.
That's my 12 recollection of how the pressurizer water volume,is,
(
13 sized.
14 Q
I take it you were aware before the 15 Three Mile Island accident that the operators were 16 trained on procedures to follow during a reactor 17 trip?
18 A
I didn't follow the question.
19 Q
Before the Three Mile Island debacle 20 you knew that the operators had some training on 21 how to manage the plants during a reactor trip?
22 A
It's my knowledge that the reactor 23 trip is one of the procedures that'is taught to 24 the operators and training is involved in that, too.
O
. 25 Q
And you testified yesterday that you
I-1 Swanson 186 2
knew there is a shrinkage or contraction of the 3
reactor coolant system water following a reactor 4
trip, right?
lll 5
A That's correct.
6 Q
Are you aware that the operators received 7
training on how to manage the injection of water 8
following a reactor trip in order to counteract 9
the shrinkage of water in the reactor coolant system?
10 THE WITNESS:
Say that again?
11 (Question read back.)
12 A
I can't answer you in a time framework.
(
13 Q
The pressurizer has heaters in it, 14 right?
15 A
Correct.
16 Q
The heaters are a very important part 17 of the design and operation of the pressurizer, 18 right?
19 A
The pressurizer heaters are the singular 20 large pieces of equipment that allow the pressurized 21 water reactor to be a pressurized water reactor.
O
~
22 Q
Are you aware that during the operation 23 of pressurized water reactor, it's important that 24 the operators manage the pressurizer in order to keep b(~s 25 the heaters covered with water?
1 Swanson 187 2
A During normal power operation, the 3
pressurized heaters must be covered with water.
4 Q
What about during cooldown and llh 5
overcooling events, weren't you aware that in 6
order to maintain pressure control, the operators 7
were trained to keep the heaters covered with 8
water?
g A
I think your understanding of pressurized 10 water reactors is different than my understanding 11 of it.
12 Pressurized heaters are relatively
()
13 small.
Their heat input to the fluid in the 14 pressurizer is not sufficient to maintain 15 pressure during transients, so that pressure 16 control would not be from the heaters during a 17 transient.
18 Q
Are you aware.that the reactor trip 19 procedures drafted by B&W and on which B&W trained 20 operators told the operators that they should 21 initiate the injection of water into the reactor 22 coolant system "in order to keep the heaters covered?
23 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of the 24 question.
25 The witness may answer it.
i 1
Swanson 188 1
1 2
A As I had started to say a while ago, 3
there is a time framework that I am not sure 4
of at which I became aware that some of our lll 5
operating plants had instructed their operators 6
to turn on a second makeup pump to maintain level 7
in the pressurizer on trip.
8 Q
That's exactly what I was referring to.
9 A
And I was a little surprised at that 10 because it was my understanding that the water volume 11 of the pressurizer was sufficient to prevent draining 12 on a normal reactor trip.
()
13 Q
Did you learn of the procedures 14 that prescribed starting a second makeup pump 15 before the Three Mile Island accident?
16 A
Like I said, I am not sure of the time 17 framework when I learned that.
18 Q
Did you ever have any training at the 19 B&W simulator?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Were you aware that before the Three 22 Mile Island accident for all of the transients shown 23 on the simulator pressurizer level and reactor 24 coolant system pressure moved in the same direction?
f\\/
25 A
It's been a long time since I had that.
\\
l 4
c
,,,- ~
1 Swanson 189 2
simulator course.
so I really don't remember.
3 MR. WISE:
Are you getting to a spot 4
where you want to break?
We have been 5
going about an hour and a half.
6 Q
Before the Davis-Besse event was 7
reported to you, can you recall hearing about any 8
other transient at a B&W plant in which pressurizer
}
9 level moved in a direction that was different from 10 reactor coolant system pressure?
I 11 A
I don't think so.
12 Q
Did you know that Frank Walters or l ()
13 anybody at B&W had the view in 1977 that reactor 4
14 coolant pressure and pressurizer level will trend 15 in the same, direction under a loss of coolant 4
16 accident?
17 I was reading from Walters' November 10, 18 1977 memo, GPU 132.
19 A
. The way you asked the question bothers me 20 a little bit.
Pressurizer level and reactor coolant 21 system pressure will go in the same direction for 22 breaks outside the pressurizer steam space.
4 23 Q
Did you have any reason to believe 24 in the fall of 1977 that B&W had ever told any
\\_-
25 operator of any plant that for.a break within the
]
(-
.,... _... ~,. _. -. _....,. - -.. _..,.,..
3 1
Swanson 190 i-2 pressurizer steam space there would be some 3
difference in how pressurizer level responded as T
4 contrasted with how it responded during any other l
lll 5
break in the reactor coolant system?
6 A
I think you would probably better ask 7
somebody that dealt directly with the operators, 8
the-training department.
1 9
I really don't-deal and talk to the 10 operators or at that time I didn't.
11 Q
You didn't have any knowledge that 12 they got any different training on what would
()
13 happen for that' break than any other break, 14 is that right?
15 A
I really don't know.
16 Q
You told me in your answer just one 17 back that for the break'in the pressurizer steam space, t
18 pressurizer level and reactor coolant system 19 pressure responded in divergent directions.
i 1
J 20 MR. WISE:
I don't think that's what he 21 said.
22 My recollection of his answer was that l
i 23 they will respond in the same direction for s
24 a break other than in the steam space.
25 Q
All right, let me ask the question then.
. ~..
-... ~.
1 Swanson 191
()
2 For a break in the steam space, you 3
understood that pressurizer level and reactor 4
coolant system pressure responded divergently, h
5 ri ght?
6 MR. WISE:
Are you talking about any 7
time during the transient?
g MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
9 MR. WISE:
Because the answer may differ 10 depending on what you are talking about.
11 Q
When you said "except for a break 12 at a steam space at the top of the pressurizer,".
(
13 what did you mean?
14 A
It's hard for me to explain all the 15 phenomena associated with LOCAs.
16 Q
Let me try and refine the question.
17 Were you saying that you understood that 18 for a break in the steam space at the top of the 19 pressurizer, there was a different response of 20 pres'surizer level on pressure than there was to 21 breaks that occurred anywhere else in the system?
22 A
For some size breaks in the pressurizer 23 steam space, pressurizer level can increase while 24 at the same time reactor coolant system pressure O
25 can decrease.
1 Swanson 192 1
2 Q
Is that'something that you had i
crystalized in your cerebrum before the Three Mile 3
4 Island accident?
lll 5
A I knew of that.
I am sure other people 6
did, too.
7 Q
You are sure other people did, too?
8 A
I would think so.
Pardon me.
I am not 9
sure.
.I would think so.
I would think people 10 in the ECCS group would certainly know that.
11 Q
Bert certainly knew that because it's 12 in his February memoranda.
()
13 MR. WISE:
Presumably everybody at 14 Davis-Besse knew it.
15 MR. SELTZER:
Eric Swanson said he i
16 never talked to people at Davis-Besse, so i
17 he wouldn't know whether he knew it.
18 Q
Are you able to recall a specific 19 situation, any situation in which you had focused 20 on the fact that for a break in the steam space 21 of the pressurizer there could be a response 22 aof pressurizer level that would be different from 23 the response of pressurizer level to any other 24 break in the reactor coolant system?
. O, 25 A~
I really can't remember any specific j
i
_. _...._. _.._ __._..--_ -. __ _ _ _ __.-.. - -. ~., _. -... - -- -~ ~ -
1 Swanson 193 2
situation.
It seems to me that I do remember 3
something about loss of level or loss of level tap 4
would -- I don't remember.
lll 5
MR. WISE:
I think if you are going 6
to start with another document, we ought to 7
take our break at this time; unless it's one 8
or two questions.
9 Q
In Exhibit 82-A that we showed you 10 yesterday, do you remember in Table 2 for small 11 break LOCA, it said, " Loss of pressurizer level is 12 natural consequence of the accident"?
13 MR. WISE:
Did we ever establish who 14 wrote this?
15 MR. SELTZER:
It's Cartin's minutes of 16 the meeting.
17 MR. WISE:
I understand, but who 18 drew up the table that we are reading from?
19 MR. SELTZER:
I don't know.
20 Q
Was it you, Mr. Swanson?
21 A
No, that's not me.
22 MR. WISE:
So we are reading from a 23 table that we don't know who prepared?
l f
24 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
i 25 MR. WISE:
Go ahead, ask whatever l
l I
1 Swanson 194 A(_)
2 questions you want about it.
3 Q
You didn't comment to anybody when 4
you got GPU Exhibit 82-A with Table 2 in it that llh 5
th2y made a mistake in saying that there would be 6
a loss of pressurizer level whenever there was a 7
small break LOCA, did you?
8 A
I don't think so.
9 Q
Even though this is something that 10 you thought was something you certainly were aware 11 of at that time, right?
12 A
I think so.
()
13 Q
You are not certain that you were 1
14 aware of it at that time?
15 A
I don't really remember.
I don't really 16 remember commenting on this memo.
I just don't 17 remember.
18 MR. S5LTZER:
Let's take a break.
19 (Recess taken.)
20 BY MR. SELTZER:
21 Q
Did you ever hear of a chap who went by 22 the handle D.G.
Newton?
23 A
Yes.
24 Q
Did D.
G.
ever work for you?
)
\\
25 A
Yes.
+-
9 e.
, + -
,y,
-p..
ew e--
e-w.,.-,
,.---w-e-+-
r***-
W-*7
--9
,,y g--
1 Swanson 195 N
q 2
Q At the time of the accident, was he 3
somebody who was working for you?
4 A
I think so.
lh 5
Q What was his background before he came 6
to work for you?
7 A
He worked at Yankee Row in Massachusetts.
8 Q
Is he an engineer?
9 A
Yes.
i 10 Q
A college graduate?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Smart or not so smart?
()
13 A
I would say he is above average 14 intelligence.
15 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, 16 is he somebody whom you believe would know 17 that for a break in the steam space at the top of 18 the pressurizer of a certain size, pressurizer water 19 level would rise?
20 MR. WISE:
I object to that.
How could 21 it possibly be relevant to get this witness' 22 opinion concerning Mr. Newton's state of mind 23 before the accident?
24 It seems to me if you want to find 25 that out, you could have called Mr. Newton
1 Swanson 196 2
_and asked him about that.
3 MR. SELTZER:
Maybe we will have to.
4 MR. WISE:
Well, maybe you will, but l
5 I don't think we can decide that today.
All 6
we can do is proceed with questions that 7
Mr. Swanson can answer.
j 8
MR. SELTZER:
Eric Swanson said before 9
the break he thought there would be a lot of 10 people that would know a break in the steam 11 space in the pressurizer would cause pressurizer l
12 level to go up.
And I am asking him whethe,r
()
13 D.
G.
Newton was one of Mr. Swanson's lieutenants 14 and would have been expected to know that.
I 15 MR. WISE:
I object to the question.
16 Q
Here is the question:
Let's focus on 17 your understanding and expectations.
18 Did you expect before the Three Mile 19 Island accident that college graduate engineer 20 Newton reporting to you would know that if there 21
-is a break in the steam space at the top of the l
22 pressurizer, it could cause pressurizer level to M
go up?
i 24 A
I don't know.
I don't know that he i
25' ever thought about it.
I couldn't tell you.
l l
_ - ~ _... _ _. _ _,.. _...
1 Swanson 197 p
2 Q
After the Three Mile Island accident, 3
would you expect that he would know about it?
4 A
I think half the people in this country lll 5
know about it.
6 Q
What about D. G.i 7
A I would expect Dennis would know about it.
8 Q
Let me show you something that Dennis 9
Newton wrote on April 8, 1979 with a copy to you.
10 It's GPU Exhibit 496.
This is Newton's memo to 11 Womack with a copy to you written just a week or 12 two after the Three Mile Island accident.
13
Subject:
Operating Instructions for 14 Stuck Open PORV." The PORV sticking open creates 15 a break in the steam space at the top of the 16 pressurizer, right/
17 A
Where are you reading from?
18 Q
I am not reading.
I am speaking out 19 of my head.
20 A stuck open PORV creates a break in 21 the steam space at the top of the pressurizer, 22 right?
23 A
yes.
24 Q
Take a look at page 3 where Dennis 25 Newton, one of your boys, has listed symptoms of
1 Swanson 198 2
a stuck open PORV.
3 A
O.K.
4 Q
7t's a fact, isn't it, that as of
'llh 5
April 8, 1979, you understood that it was incorrect 6
to list-as the only symptom related to pressurizer 7
level for a stuck open PORV decreasing pressurizer 8
level?
9 MR. WISE:
Let me have that read back.
10 MR. SELTZER:
Let me break it down into 11 pieces.
I will withdraw that.
12 Q
Do you see that Dennis has referred
(
13 to pressurizer level in his description of 14 symptoms for a stuck open PORV7 15 A
I have seen what he has written here.
16 Q
And the only reference to pressurizer 17 level as a symptom of a stuck open PORV is that it 18 would be decreasing, righc?
19 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of 20 that question.
I think.you are trying to 21 recharacterize what is a simple sentence in 22 this memorandum, and trying to say something 23 about it that it doesn't say.
l 24 MR. SELTZER:
Well, instead of your
~
25 testifying to that, why don't we let a u.
.z.
1 Swanson 199 2
recipient of the memo give his understanding.
3 MR. WISE:
I am no t testifying.
4 I am raising a point of procedure.
I think lll 5
the memorandum states what it states as far 6
as pressurizer level goes, and I object to 7
your attempting to leave the implication 8
on the record that somehow we recast what is 9
written here and come out with a different 10 conclusion.
11 MR. SELTLER:
Bob, I think this is 12 really absurd that you would do this.
You
()
13 know that in an open court you would not be 14 doing what you are doing now.
A judge 15 would tell you, "Mr. Wise, that's not proper."
16 If you have an objection, state it.
17 We have got Mr. Swanson here who is a 18 recipient of the memo who can speak to 19 whether.this means what I am asking him 20 it means or not.
21 Do you have any problems with my asking
.O l
22 Mr. Swanson if he understands what this means?
l 23 MR. WISE:
I'have an objection to the t
24 question you posed.
I don't think it's f_~)g
~
25 proper in form and I do have an inturest in l
L
1 Swanson 200
('f T
s_
2 making sure that the record here is accurate.
3 MR. SELTZER:
I don't have any problem 4
with your stating objections to form.
I do lll 5
have a problem with your speech-making.
6 Could you reread the pending question, 7
please, and type it at this point?
8 (The question was read back as 9
follows:
" Question:
And the only reference 10 to pressurizer level as a symptom of a 11 stuck open PORV is that it would be decreasing, 12 right?")
I(-)
13 MR. WISE:
I object to your 14 characterization of this written statement.
15 I believe it is a mischaracterization of 16 what's stated here.
17 MR. SELTZER:
You already have that 18 objection on the record.
Why do you have 19 to restate the objection?
20 MR. WISE:
Just to make it clear since 21 you had the question reput on the record.
22 MR. SELTZER:
I will stipulate that 23 merely having the question read by the 24 reporter and typed doesn't void the objection.
)
%J 25 MR. WISE:
I don't understand why it a
w m-w.,
--,m e
w
,,,w-=
1 Swanson 201 O)
(_
2 upsets you so that I simply pointed out that 3
when you have attempted to put a quote on the 4
record as to what was being said, that is lll 5
not an accurate quotation, and it seems 6
to upset you greatly that I put that on the 1
7 record.
8 MR. SELTZER:
You upset me, not what you 9
are saying, and you are upsetting the flow 10 of the deposition.
11 Q
Answer the question.
4 12 A
Before I answer your direct question,,
(
13 let me give you some background information.
14 My father died on March 28 and so I was 15 out of work for a week after the accident solidly.
16 Then following that I got some sort of disease 17 and I had to go into the hospital, so I was out 18 a week for the first week after the accident and 19 thereafter only partly at work for the next couple 20 of three weeks.
21 During that time period a task force, 22 a recovery task force had been formed and Dennis 23 was put on that task force, and fundamentally during 24 that time period I was not there and because he was 55 on the task force, he didn't report to me.
.~
,F
/], -
.G l*
",'1
} )L y g
L t,
3 i
3 s
/
, b
, (, s Y
ho s
p-19
/
J',
}4 O
Svanson I
1-g' 202
\\; '
,\\.-
i
(%
\\
..I.
r, 52 Y.
r'/ I expect he copied me oit this memo i
q s,
,. /'
yi
,\\
3' j because'I whs his titular boss at the time, I guess.
s 1
'\\
s',
/
2 g>,
4.t i
4 So with regard to a flot' of the things
'\\,
s 5
tnat happened directly after Three Mile Island, 6
- 7. really didnt particip th in them.
7
'Q Did it eve r. *come to your attentiof i
8 that D,ennis Newton expected that pressurizer level
~
9
< would be decreasing as a symptom of a stuck open 7, )N s
l [,
10 l poRy?
\\
t 11).
A Just'right nb s, when I saw this.
12 MR. W I'S E :
I wdll S t.a t e for y y the way $ judge
' 'l j (.r,t l'
.J v.
13 the record, spthat knows, that t; e 14 that is not what thlis saysf.
c s-t 15 MR. SELTZER
,#,Tf e dNdMe'nt' speaks for i
/
l j
16
'itself.
,/
,'(i/,;
h,,
,r 17 Yes,'Any unf or urately syou s
f MR./ WISE :
)
\\
s t,
- j,
)
< x -
s 18 '
(.
havel:$o/
\\,
san not to read the d'o c umeis t into 4c i
19 1
the record.
Instead, you left the impression f
\\
/
20
. t v, tha/ it says something that it does not say.
t.
i t
Y,
/
s s
' a.' /
M'R. SELTZER:
We have mar'ked the document 21
/,
h, y
\\
!,22 I ', /,
as'an exhibit.
I think anybo'2y w'in takes the
,s,.
\\
s
'1
\\
4 i
e
,),
y- [(
t e f fort to read " Symptoms o f' a Stuck Open' PORV s
\\>bN s
t '
,~
/h'4 [
De'craasing RC pressurd o pr as rizer lev s
25 with no decrease in RC reaperatu nior increase y
k-v p'
p r
g I
)
s'.
\\
. '\\
w g
i jr j
+
4---
1 Swanson 203 A
k._,l 2
in letdown flow" can understand that j.
Dekhis Newton labored under the~
3 4
misapprehdnsion that a rise in pressurizer lll level was not something to be pointed out as 5
f one of the symptoms of a stuck open PORV.
6 Dennis was corrected later by somebody 7
8 else who took pains to point out more 9
accurateli that a rise in pressurizer level 10 should be noted explicitly as a symptom of 1*
11 a stuck open PORV.
12 MR. WISE:
Since you have taken upon
{)N yourself to give your explanation of this, 13 y_
14 I am now abligated to give mine.
MR. SELTZER:
We may not finish this 15 u
16 deposition today.
17 MR. WISE:
We are going to finish today.
18 MR. SELTdER:
I am not so sure.
19 ha. WISE:
I suppose you have the s
20 option of going to Judge Owen and explain 21 why you can't finish a deposition in two days 22 that you said would take one, and perhaps you 23 can explain to him why it is absolutely t'~;
24 essential that witnesses be brought back for (x_-)
25 additional days of deposition.
1 Swanson 204 O
2 MR. SELTZER:
Go ahead, keep going.
3 MR. WISE:
I will say that I don't 4
think it's been established that a rise in lll 5
pressurizer level is always a symptom of a 6
stuck open PORV, and I think the implication 7
that you have put on the record that Mr. Newton 8
was confused or mistaken in stating that a 9
decrease in pressurizer level was a symptom 10 of a stuck open PORV.
11 I think the proof at trial will show 12 that on a normal event with a stuck open b) g_
13 PORV, pressurizer level will fall for several 14 minutes into the event and that to tell an 15 operator that a rising pressurizer level.
16 is the symptom he should look for in order 17 to diagnose an open PORV would be extremely 18 misleading if that's all the guidance that was 19 given, and this purports to be-a draft and 20 additional information was provided when the 21 final instructions or revised instructions, 22 or whatever it was, went out.
23 Why don't you continue with the V(~T 24 questioning.
25
.. ~.. -
1 Swanson 205 l
f~/)
(_
2 BY MR. SELTZER:
3 Q
When during the day of March 28 did you 4
learn about your Bad's demise?
lll 5
A Some time before lunch.
6 Q
Did you leave the Old Forest Road 7
building upon hearing of your dad's demise?
8 A
Yes, my wife came to pick me up.
9 Q
Had you heard about the Three Mile 10 Island transient before leaving Old Forest Road 11 that day?
12 A
Yes.
There was rumors floating all
()
13 through the building about an accident at Three 14 Mile Island.
15 Q
Had,anybody called you in and given you 16 any information that had been communicated from the 17 site?
18 A
There'was a -- I believe Allen Womack 19 called us for a meeting and we were just getting ready 4
20 to go into the conference room, or we had just 21 walked into the conference room when somebody came 9
22 and told me tha't my father died.
23 Q
Did you not go into the conference room gS 24 to get the report from Allen?
V 25 A
I may have just had walked in the door l
l
1 Swanson 206 2
or getting ready to walk in the door, but -- and then I left.
The meeting had not started.
3 4
Q Let me try and shortcut a lot of lll 5
today's examination.
And I will take your word for 6
it if this will shortcut it.
7 Are you saying that because of the 8
word that you got about the death of your father, 9
y u did not function on the information coming 10 from Three Mile Island that day?
11 A
No.
I left.
12 Q
No, you did not function on the information
()
13 coming from Three Mile Island that day?
14 A
Function on it?
15 All I heard was a bunch of rumors.
16 Did I do anything, take any actions or something 17 like that?
18 Q
Something like that, yes.
19 A
No.
I heard the rumors and --
20 Q
Did you confer with anybody about wNat 21 was happening at Three Mile Island that day?
22 A
Confer is not the right word. The 23 rumors were floating throughout the building and 24 everyone was talking about it.
We just talked with m) 25 no particular focus on the talks or anything.
There
1 Swanson 207
)
2 was a lot of sketchy trash floating around.
3 I couldn't characterize anything as being sound 4
information.
lll 5
I did know that there was an 6
accident, didn't know of what sort the accident 7
was or anything.
It's just that's the way it was.
8 Q
And as soon as you heard about the 9
information from home, you left the Womack meeting 10 and left the building?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
And then you were gone for how long?,
()
13 A
Well, directly for a week.
And then when 14 I did come back, shortly after I came back, 15 I contracted some sort of strange disease and had 16 to go into the hospital for a couple of weeks or 17 so.
After I did come back, I wasn't at the 18 office all the time.
19 Q
Here is a rare memo that you wrote 20 between coming back and going out for the disease.
21 It's GPU 296.
Subject, " Pressurizer Relief Valve."
22 Is that your neatly penned set of 23 initials?
l 24 A
That's my calligraphy.
~
l
\\J j
25 Q
Is GPU 296 a copy of a memo that you i
1 Swanson 208 O
2 wrote on or about April 5,
19797 3
A It looks like it.
t 4
Q Did you know at the time you wrote lll 5
this that B&W had already designed an automatic 6
interlock for closing the block valve for plants 7
which a B&W joint venture in Germany was going to 8
install?
9 A
I really don't know what I knew at the 10 time I wrote this memo.
I don't even really 11 remember writing this memo.
12 g
The second item --
()
13 A
Quite frankly, Mr. Seltzer, during this 14 period of time my mind was kind of -- I had a lot 15 of things on my mind other than work.
I was 16 really -- had a lot of problems at that time.
17 g
were these recommended procedures and 18 design changes developed by you in order to avert 19 another Three Mile Island accident?
20 A
well, first, like I said, I can't 21 really remember writing this memo and I guess the 22 best thing to presume is that what I wrote down here 23 is what I believed.
I can't testify to this
~N 24 memo.
That's the way it is.
(d 25 g
Does reading it refresh your recollection i.
1 Swanson 209 2
that you were drafting this in order to avert a 3
loss of coolant accident through a stuck open PORV 4
of the type that had occurred at Three Mile Island?
ll) 5 A
Well, the inference is certainly there, 6
but I can't tell you what was in my mind at the time.
7 MR. SELTZER:
Let me mark as GPU Exhibit 8
594 a memo from Stanek to Ed Kane dated 9
April 10, 1979, subject:
" Operating
- 10 Instructions for Stuck Open Power Operated 11 Relief Valve."
The memo includes as its first 12 attachment an Eric to Ed Kane memo dated 13 April 9,
1979.
14 (Memo dated April 10, 1979, subject:
15
" Operating Instructions for Stuck Open 16 Power Operated. Relief Valve" marked GPU 17 Exhibit No. 594 for identification as of this 18 date.)
19 Q
You wrote the April 9 memo to Ed Kane 20 which appears on the second page of GPU 594, right?
21 A
Yes, but I don't remember it.
22 Q
You are aware that B&W and Brown 23 Bovery Reaktorate combined as a joint venture to
.24 design the Mulheim Kaarlich plant in Germany?
l 25 A
Yes, I am aware that they had a joint
1 Swanson 210 s
2 venture.
3 Q
Was that plant ever built?
l 4
A I don't know its present status right now.
lll 5
I believe the containment is constructed.
I don't 6
know if the equipment is installed or not.
4 7
Q Have you ever come to know that an 8
automatic block valve closing mechanism was designed 9
for that plant?
r 10 A
No, I did not know that.
11 Q
So I am the first one who has ever 12 told you about it?
13 A
I seldom work on the German project.
14 Q
So the answer is yes, I was the first 15 one to tell you about that?
16 A
To the best of my memory.
17 Q
After the Three Mile Island accident, f
18 you did a comparison, didn't you, of the surge line 19 configuration?
20 A
I remember doing that, yes.
21 Q
What surge line were you analyzing?
^
22 A
I think, as I remember the subject, 23 somebody, and I don't recall who, asked me to gather 24
- up drawings of the BEW surge line configuration, 25 Westinghouse surge line configuration, and the
- - - + -
ww e
e-.
ee e
= = --n-a,e m.
e-+v-
-t=
m,w w
w
- w
-w-wme,-i
=e-*s,ww.,e w-*-e v
---e -e wwvw=-
- -t-w e w -* y -we- - - - -
-="------Wpg=w~=~~
- * * + +
1 Swanson 211 e
2 Combustion Engineering configuration.
[
3 Q
Now, my question was what surge line?
E 4
Surge lines can be anywhere; you can have them f
lll 5
attached to a toilet.
You can-have them attached 6
to a --
7 A
ch, pressurizer surge line.
8 Q
The B&W surge line attached to the i
9 pressurizer in the 177 plants has a dip in it that 10 is sometimes called a loop seal, right?
11 A
The surge'line configuration for B&W e
12 plants does not have a straight shot from the
)
i 13 outlet of the pressurizer to the hot leg whereas 14 Westinghouse, Combustion plants pretty much have r
15 a straight run.
I i
16 Q
Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering 17 plants have a surge line that drops straight down 18 from the pressurizer to the hot leg?
19 A
Well, in a horizontal plane they may.
20 We have some, but there is no -- they are at least 21 level if not decreasing level from the pressurizer 22 to where they enter the hot leg.
23 Q
Did you understand that that meant in 24 the Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering 25 plants the pressurizar water volume could drain j
i l
I Swanson 212
/
2 into the rest of the reactor coolant system 3
whereas in the Babcock design, the surge line 4
configuration prevented the pressurizar from llk 5
draining into the rest of the reactor coolant 6
system?
7 A
Well, when the plant is completely 8
depressurized, the surge line will not completely 9
drain in B&W plants.
10 For example, if they depressurize 11-completely for refueling, there will still have 12 been some water remaining in the surge line.
13 Q
Isn't it correct that you understood 14 that at the point at which the block valve was 15 closed --
16 A
The point?
17 Q-The point in time.
Let me start again.
i 18 Let's assume for purposes of this 19 question that the block valve was closed at 20 Three Mile Island at 135 minutes into the accident.
21 It is your understanding, isn't it, 22 that with the Westinghouse and Combustion l-'
23 Engineering surge line configurations, the
()
24 pressurizer water would-drain into the rest of 25 the reactor coolant system after the block valve i
-1 Swanson 213 2
was closed?
1 3
MR. WISE:
Are you asking him to form j
l 4
an opinion now or are you asking for his (l) 5 recollection of any work that he may have done 6
in the past?
7 MR. SELTZER:
Recollection of the work 8
he did and the conclusions that he drew.
9 A
well, the period of time after Three 10 Mile Island, like ' said, there was so many things I
11 going on in my personal life that detracted from 12 my "ork that I am not really certain that I did
()
13 much more than gather this information, and 14 if I drew some conclusions or worked with other 15 people to draw some conclusions at that time, like 16 you just asked me, I am not sure what they were.
17 Q
What is a loop seal?
18 A
The best example that everybody is 19 f amiliar with is the sink trap in your kitchen sink.
20 Q
That was what I was referring to when 21 I referred to surge line on the toilets a sin 1; 22 will do just as well.
23 The U-band in the drain pipe is the L
24 loop seal?
I
(
25 A
As long as it's filled with water, it l
l l
{
l Swanson 214
(_)
2 forms a loop seal.
3 Q
B&W's surge line connected to the 4
pressurizer has a loop seal, right?
lg) 5 A
It's not really the same as a toilet or 6
the same as a kitchen sink.
7 In a toilet or a kitchen sink, there 8
is atmospheric pressure on both sides of it.
9 In a pressurized water reactor, there 10 is a pressure differential between the loops of 11 the hot and cold legs and the pressurizer.
So it's 12 really not a true loop seal with a pressure f~x,)
13 differential.
It doesn't prevent the exchange t
14 of watcr.
15 Q
Here is a drawing that you attached 16 to an April 6 memo.
It's part of GPU Exhibit 295.
17 A
Drawing No,'8?
18 Q
Right.
19 Do you recognize that as a depiction of 20 the pressurizer and adj acent hot leg and the surge 21 line with its loop seal that connects the two 22 in a B&W 177 plant?
23 A
Generally, yes.
I should say that some gy 24 of our customers elected to have the pressurizer N.]
25 placed at different locations relative to the main
1 Swanson 215 2
parts of the loop and that the loop pipe -- the 3
surge line piping configuration may be different 4
from plant to plant than is shown here.
' Ilh 5
Q Now, the point that is labeled as 3"
6 is where the surge line enters the hot leg, right?
I 7
A Yes.
8 Q
Absent a
greater pressure in the 9
pressurizer than there was in the rest of the 10 reactor coolant system --
11 A
Absent?
12 Q
Without, I mean.
13 A
O.K.
14 Q
Without the pressurizer having more 15 pressure in it than is in the rest of the 16 reactor coolant system, the pressurizer could not 17 drain below the height of three, right?
18 A
I wouldn't answer it that way, becasue 19 that's not exactly right.
20 During normal power operation,.the 21 pressure, the static pressure throughout the 22 reactor coolant system is virtually the same.
The 23 only difference of static pressure.from one point 24 to another is due to elevation head which is 25 negligible compared to the operating pressure.
-a y
m-m---
.,-.._.,,-w y
.w, e.
w e.g
-m._,7,.p..-,w
,ee
1 Swanson 216 1
2 Q
You wrote the April 6 memo and sent 3
it together with its attachments to Danny LaBelle, 4
right?
I 5
A It says " Attachment No.
2" in handwriting 6
up above?
7 Q
Yes.
8 A
The question is did I write that memo?
9 Yes, I did write the memo.
10 Q
And you sent it together with its 11 attachments to Danny LaBelle?
12 A
correct.
()
13 Q
Did you ever find out why B&W put a 14 loop seal in its pressurizer where your domestic 15 PWR competitors had no loop seal?
16 A
Or why they didn't put one in and we 17 did?
I really don't know.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Let's go to lunch.
19 (Whereupon at 12:20 o' clock p.m.
a 20 luncheon recess was taken.)
22 23 25
1 217 U
2 AFTERNOON SESSION 3
(2:30 p.m.)
4 E RI C S WAN S O N, resumed.
llh 5
MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark as 6
GPU Exhibit 595 a document that purports 7
to be a resume of Eric Swanson.
8 (Resume of Eric Swanson marked GPU g
Exhibit No. 595 for identification as of 10 this date.)
11 MR. WISE:
Let me state for the record 12 before you begin questioning, we prepared 13 the resume and provided you with a copy of 14 it before the deposition.
I just want to 15 state now so that there will be no confusion 16 about it, that Mr. Swanson gave us the dates 17 for the various positions he held within B&W 18 as best he could recall them at the time.
19 He, however, was uncertain about some 20 of the exact dates and we make no representation 21 that any particular year is 100 percent III 22 accurate.
23 If it should make some difference to you
/'
24 which year or. month he held which title, N._N]
we l
25 will undertake to contact the personnel i
I 1
Swanson 218 l
)
l 2
office in Lynchburg and get the exact periods i
3 for you.
4 The general description of the titles llh 5
and the general description of the time 6
periods I believe are accurate, but there may 7
be some uncertainty in his mind about the 8
exact dates given for the various positions.
9 As I say, if it makes some difference 10 to you, we can contact the personnel office 11 in Lynchburg and attempt to get the exact 12 periods.
4 gg
\\s,)
13 EXAMINATION (Continued) 14 BY MR. SELTZER:
15 C
Is what your counsel says about the 16 accuracy of the dates in GPU 595 correct?
17 A
Yes, when I wrote those down the other 18 day for Mr. Wise, I couldn'c remember exactly the 19 dates.
20 Q
Is it during the 1972-1974 period when 21 you became familiar with the criterion for 22 pressurizer sizing?
23 A
Either there or when I was on the TVA Q
24 task force.
25 Q
Is GPU 595 accurate to the best of
_. _ - _ - _.,. ~ -
1 Swanson 219 2
your present recollection?
3 MR. WISE:
Subject to the 4
qualification that we gave.
lll 5
MR. SELTZER:
No.
6 Q
To the best of your present 7
recollection, do you think what is on here is 8
accurate?
9 A
with the possible exception of some 10 dates changed in here, it's accurate.
11 Q
You don't know of any date on here 12 that is inaccurate.
In other words, you were t ry,in g_
()
13 to be as accurate as you could be in coming up 14 with the dates that are presently on GPU 5957 15 A
When I wrote this up the other day, 16 I tried to be as accurate as I could be, that's 17 right.
18 Q
What I would ask is when the deposition 19 transcript is submitted to you for signing and 20 you are making corrections to any other part of 21 the transcript, I would like you to treat this O
22 exhibit as part of the transcript, and if you 23 discover that there are parts of this exhibit 24 that are inaccurate, I would like to request that g3 V
25 you correct them.
I Swans'on 220 2
You said you believed it was in the 3
1972 to 1974 period or perhaps during the preceding 4
two years that you had studied the sizing criterion llh 5
for pre'ssurizers.
6 Let me show you a document which you 7
received from Mr. Burris in or about 8
September 1974 on the subject of pressurizer level 9
measurement.
It's being marked by the reporter as 10 GPU Exhibit 596.
11 (Four-page document, first page a memo 12 dated 9/20/74 to R.
F.
Ryan and others from b)
(_
13 J.
R. Burris marked GPU Exhibit No. 596 fo,r 14 identification as of this date.)
15 Q
Does GPU 596 appear to be a copy 16 of a memorandum that you received in the regular 17 course of business in or about September 1974?
18 A
I don't remember it.
But it would 19 look like something I may have received.
And I am 20 on distribution.
21 Q
You testified that the criterion for 22 minimum size or water inventory for pressurizer 23 was calculated based on the contraction that was
(
24 expected when a reactor trip followed a turbine trip.
25 A
Yes, and I would like to make it a little
1 Swanson 221 1
2 clearer.
That is, as I remember the criterion, 3
the crit ** ion don't drain the pressurizer on a 4
reactor trip and looking over this memo, the ll) 5 concern that appears in this memo is that they will 6
lose indicated level which is a different which 7
is different from draining the pressurizer.
Loss of 8
level indication does not necessarily mean the g
pressurizer drains.
10 Q
The reason for that is that you can lose 11 level indication while there is still water in the 12 pressurizer?
13 A
That's right.
14 Q
In other words, the last tap in the 15 pressurizer for sensing level is somewhere above 16 the bottom of the pressurizer?
17 A
That's right.
18 Q
According to the chart on the second 19 page of Exhibit 596, several B&W plan.ts lose level 20 indication when there is a reactor trip following a 21
. turbine trip, right?
22 A
Well, the memo reports that from the 23 appearance of this table and the -- my background 24 and general knowledge on the topic, this looks 25 like these are calculations either from a code 4
s
.e
,--m-,,w a
-e.m.-..
y-m.,-
--~v
,-y,,,,,,y
,~-g-y,4 w--w-m
,,,y,..
n,u
1 Swanson 222 C\\
2 named SAVER or a code named DYSID.
3 And the analysis shows that it looks 4
to me like those plants, which have a normal lll 5
operating level of 180 inches with a 320-inch span 6
between taps are those that would lose indicated 7
level.
8 Q
The first conclusion / recommendation 9
on page 2 was that "The operator must have 10 pressurizer level indication following a reactor 11 trip."
12 What if anything was your understanding -
13 as to why B&W concluded and recommended that the 14 operator of its plants must have pressurizer 15 level indication following a reactor trip?
16 A
Pressurizer level measurement is one 17 of several indications that the operator uses 18 after a ' reactor trip to note whether the plant is 19 stabilized or not, purely and simply.
20 Q
How does watching pressurizer level 21 help the operator know whether the plant is 22 stabilized?
23 A
Well, pressurizer level, RC pressure, i
f~}
24 RC flow, reactor coolant system temperatures, T-hot v
25 and T-cold, T-Av, secondary plant pressure, u
l l
i
w
--,e
-n
, - - +, - - + + *
~ " " - ' * * ' ' "
1 Swanson 223 2
secondary or steam generator level, feedwater flow 3
are the principal parameters he looks at after a 4
reactor trip to see if the plant stabilized and lll 5
pressurizer level is one of those that he would 6
look at.
7 Q
Well, wouldn't it be sufficient for 8
the operator just to know that he lost pressurizer 9
indication, why does he always have to have an 10 indication?
11 MR. WISE:
Could you read that back?
I'2 (Question read back. )
13 A
Not recalling seeing this memo, again, 4
14 and in the context which I answered the-last question 15 where pressurizer level is one of the indications i
16 of several that he needs to look at for a trip, i
17 I would surmise, and I also have a vague recollection e
i 18 that pressurizer level was a parameter that was not 19 responding the way we wanted to respond, and I will i
20 draw a conclusion that the other parameters were i
21 adequate and that this was the one that was giving 22 some trouble and that 's why this review was made 23 and that is a conclusion that I am making right now, 24 not wholly from memory.
25 Q
What is your understanding as to why l
1 Swanson 224 N
2 the NRC was concerned about loss of pressurizer level 3
indication?
4 MR. WISE:
You are speaking now about llh 5
Mr. Creswell's concern at Toledo Edison?
6 MR. SELTZER:
I don't know that it was 7
Creswell.
Swanson's memo says the NRC's 8
concern.
9 MR. WISE:
I think we have already had 10 testimony on that.
But if that's the one 11 you are talking about, I think we have already 12 identified it.
That's my only reason for,
13 asking for clarification.
14 Q
What is your understanding as to why the 15 NRC was concerned about loss of pressurizer level 16 indication?
17 A
I am not really certain, but I believe 18 Mr. Creswell took it upon himself to think that 19 pressurizer level was one of the parameters called out 20 by general design criterion-13.
I believe that was 21 it.
22 Now, why he decided pressurizer level 23 was one of the parameters to be called out by GDC 13, 24 I don't know.
25 Q
Did you ever look at GDC 13 to see if v
w
-er m
o e v
s e4~-,n+-
- -, ~
,r-s-
1 Swanson 225 2
you could ts11 if it requires maintaining 3
pressurizer level indication?
4 A
I have looked at all the GDCs at some llh 5
time or another.
Right now I don't remember what 6
the GDC 13s say in particular, and I don't 7
recall having looked at GDC 13 with direct need to 8
look at it for pressurizer level.
9 Q
So as you sit here today, you can't 10 testify one way or another as to whether GDC 13 11 requires maintaining pressurizer level indication, 12 can you?
13 A
I can't testify, but it's easy to get 14 a copy of GDC 13 and see what it does say.
15 Q
You said it would be a simple matter 16 to look at criterion 13.
17 Do you have it in front of you?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
It talks about providing instrumentation 20 to monitor variables for anticipated operational 21 occurrences and accident conditions, right?
9 22 A
- Yes, s
)
23 Q
Including variables that affect the l
24 reactor coolant pressure boundary, appropriate 25 controls shall be provided to maintain these l'
1 Swanson 226
'O
(_)
2 variables and systems within prescribed operating i
3 ranges.
4 A
O.K.
lll 5
Q Do you understand that that requires 6
maintaining pressurizer level instrumentation 7
such that during anticipated operational occurrences 8
it will maintain level indication within operating 9
range?
10 A
Well, choice of variables from all the 11 variables in the plant to comply with this is -- the 12 choice of variables that one person might choose,
O
(_/
13 may be different from something another person 14 might choose.
15 Q
I am just asking you what you-would choose.
16 A
O.K.,
containment pressure for example.
17 MR. WISE:
I am going to object if you 18 are asking him to speculate at this point.
19 MR. SELTZER:
He said it's a very easy 20 thing to read criterion 13.
21 MR. WISE:
It-is.
We can all read it.
22 MR. SELTZER:
He said for somebody l
23 technically qualified he could read it.
l(~}
24 MR. WISE:
2%d
. He's also testified that 25 "I didn't know why Mr. creswell had selected I
L l
1 Swanson 227 out the particular parameters he had for 2
n ern." Reading criterion 13, it doesn't 3
menti n anything about pressurizer level 4
gg, indication.
zt s a rather gener.1 statement 3
which we can all read.
6 MR. SELTZER:
You must be very afraid 7
8 of what he is going to say on this for 9
yut be blocking my inquiry on it.
10 You have communicated your concern gg to the witness now.
Do you want to say 12 anything else?
~
()
13 MR. WISE:
No, but I really do take ffense at your-continually suggesting that 14 15 any time I have anything to say in this case, 16 I am trying to do something improper.
i 37 During the course of the depositions 18 of your people, Mr. Glassman, Mr. Klingsberg 19 and you have made repeated objections and
-20 they have.been speaking objections including comments that are considerably more 21 O
22 inappropriate or that I consider to be
- 13 extremely inappropriate given the questioning l
ges that was going on, and I think your comments 9
s 25 are out of place.
r I.
I Swanson 228 2
In any event, I do have an objection 3
at this point to your asking this witness 4
to sit down with a part of the code of h
5 Federal Regulations this afternoon and attempt i
6 to answer questions about what Mr. Creswell 7
was concerned about in 1978.
8 BY MR. SELTZER:
9 Q
Is it your view, Mr. Swanson, that 10 criterion 13 does not apply to pressurizer level 11 indication and that that was your view before the i
12 Three Mile Island accident?
0 13 MR. WISE:
You have got two questions 14 there.
Maybe you want to take them one at a 15 time.
16 MR. SELTZER:
I only want the second 17 one.
18 A
It was my view before the Three Mile 19 Island accident that pressurizer level was a 20 parameter to be included in a list to comply with 21 GDC 13, is that the kind of answer --
22 MR. WISE:
Would you read his question 23 back?
l r
24 (Question read back.)
25 Q
That's the kind of answer I was looking
1 Swanson 229 2
for.
3 MR. WISE:
I think that was a question, 4
not an answer.
lll 5
MR. SELTZER:
He said "It was my view before 6
the Three Mile Island accident pressurizer level."
J 7
MR. WISE:
Is that what you said, that it 8
was your view?
9 TiiZ WITNE S's:
I said is that the answer 10 you want?
11 Q
Yes.
12 A
I do not know before the Thiee Mile 13 Island accident whether I would have included 14 pressurizer level as a parameter.
I don't remember 15 where I have to put the list together.
Pressurizer 16 level is not an unimportant variable in the plant.
17 It is not the only variable, and I gave a list of 18 other variables that are also of roughly equal I
19 importance.
20 Q
In reading criterion 13 today, is it 21 your understanding that pressurizer level 22 indication is included?
23 MR. WISE:
I object to that.
24 Unless you lay a foundation showing 25 that he's sufficiently familiar with the I
l
h('
.)
\\
j uj 1
i 230 N
Swanson
, 3 2
licensing requirer.e,nts of the general i
3 design criterion' tp be.able to answer that
.)
4-)
kind' of question of f the' ciaf f. sitting here t,
s i
h 5
this af te;rnoon without any study of its if I
i 6
i you want to establish him'as an expert in 7
this and qualified to give off-the-cuff 8
opinions, that's one thing.
9 MR. SELTZER:
Well, he's already, 10 sel'f-described, B&W's spokesman at a meeting 11 at which one of the principal subjects y
12 was pressurizer level and one of the matters 13 raised in the notes about pressurizer sizing 14 was the NRC's position on GDC 13, so I will 15 press the question'.
16 MR. WISE:
He's testified that he 17 doesn't remember what his position was on that 18 before the accident.
You are now asking 19 him to sit here this afternoon and draw a 20 conclusion.
That's what my objection is to.
21
, MR. SELT3ER:
Your(l objection is noted.
22 MR. WISE I,4m going to direct him not 1
23 to answer that one,. consistent with the 24 understandings and the colloquy that has been 25 repeated in a number cf depositions on both i
1 I
L s
i f[
s
\\
t J'
A.-
- \\..
1 Swanson 231
["%
\\
/
2 sides.
3 MR. SELTZER:
Not on both sides, almost 4
exclusively on your side.
)
l llk 5
I think your side is the side that has 6
been concealing things and directing witnesses 7
not to answer.
8 Q
Are you going to follow your 9
counsel's instruction not to answer the question?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Did you understand that in 1978 the NRC 12 felt the pressurizer level was an important
/~h
(,,!
13 indication of reactor coolant system inventory?
14 A
I really don't remembers not in 1978.
15 Q
Did you ever have an understanding that 16 the NRC viewed pressurizer level as an important 17 indication of reactor coolant system water volume?
18 A
Pressurizer -- well, I do know that 19 pressurizer level is a good indication of reactor 20 coolant system volume when the reactor coolant 21 is in a subcooled thermodynamic state.
G 22 Q
Did you understand that that was one 23 of the reasons that the NRC felt it was important
(^]
24 to maintain pressurizer level indication?
\\_J 25 ME. WISE:
You are asking this witness l
l' Swanson 232 O)
\\_
2 as to his understanding of the state of mind 3
of the nuclear Regulatory Commission, whatever 4
that may be.
llh 5
MR. SELTZER:
Phooey on the state of 6
mind of somebody else.
7 I am asking for his state of mind 8
and you know it.
That has been consistently 9
my position when I deposed your witnesses.
10 MR. WI3E:
I am just trying to figure 11 out what it is about his state of mind you 12 are asking.
You are asking for his
-()
13 understanding of the NRC's understanding?
14 MR. SELTZER:
That's exactly what I said, 15 his understanding of the NRC's position.
16 A
Relative to the Toledo incident, I do 17 remember in some fashion that Mr. Creswell was 18 concerned with loss of indicated pressurizer level 19 and he related that to general design criterion No.
20 13, but why Mr. Creswell chose to relate pressurizer 21 level to general design criterion 13, I don' t know.
22 Q
You recognized that B&W and Toledo 23 Edison were under some pressure from the NRC to
(']
24 justify the size of the ' Davis-Besse pressurizer,
'ul 25 right?
1 Swanson 233 O
2 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of 3
the question.
4 The witness may answer it if he can lll 5
understand it.
6 A
The way you asked the question is not 7
exactly as I understand the concern.
8 It's not the size of the pressurizer.
9 The pressurizer is, as far as I know, properly 10 sized at Toledo and on a normal reactor trip, it 11 meets the criterion that the pressurizer doesn't drain.
12 The concern that Mr. Creswell brought,up, b) g_
13 was loss of the indicated level.
14 So with respect to Toledo, the concern 15 became one of loss of indicated level, not of 16 pressurizer draining, which is more related to the 17 size.
The loss of indicated level is more related 18 to the placement of the taps and the span of the taps 19 and other things such as how much the plant cools 20 down on trip and what the power level was prior to 21 trip and a whole raft of other heat transfer 22 the rmodynamic phenomena.
23 Q
If the pressurizer held more water, it V(~)
24 would take a greater contraction of the reactor 25 coolant system to hold pressurizer level below its
1 Swanson 234 O
2 indicated range, wouldn't it?
3 A
That's correct.
4 Q
Once the pressurizer is below its I
5 indicated range, is there any way that the operator 6
can tell that he's drained the pressurizer?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
How?
9 A
He can view the reactor coolant system 10 pressure, relate it to reactor coolant system 11 temperature, especially hot leg temperature, and 12 see how close to saturation the plant is.
13 secondly, when the pressurizer drains, 14 it will be a fairly rapid drop in system pressure.
15 Q
Why?
16 A
Well, the pressurizer is maintained at 17 a temperature of --
18 Q
70 degrees?
. 19 A
Well, it's 70, 50, I was going to say l
l 20 roughly 50 degrees grater than the reactor loop 21 temperature or the hot leg temperature and the G
22 pressurizer is saturated, so when you lose that the 23 way the pressurizer operates is that on an outsurge,
(~}
24 the water in the pressurizer turns to steam to
%./
25 try to maintain the pressure.
When all the water
1 swanson 235
)
2 outsurges from the pressurizer, the -- there is 3
nothing left in there to maintain system pressure 4
and the pressure will drop to about or in the llh 5
direction of the secondary system.
6 The secondary system begins to maintain 7
reactor coolant temperature and therefore pressure.
8 Did that confuse you?
It was a little 9
confusing discussion.
10 Q
Did you know in 1978 that pressurizer 11 level indication could be lost on both the low end 12 of the indicating scale and on the high end of th,,e
()
13 indicating scale?
14 A
It's possible to do that because the 15 taps do not cover the entire pressurizer volume.
16 The top tap is below the head of the vessel and the 17 bottom tap is above the bottom head of the vessel.
18 Q
In 1978, the NRC's concern was focused 19 on the loss of level indication at the low end 20 of the pressurizer, right?
21 A
Mr. Creswell's concern, as I understand 22 it, yes.
23 Q
How did you know it was Creswell who r
rs 24 was concerned?
(
)
us 25 A
I believe when Toledo called us on the l
1 Swanson 236 2
telephone to discuss this with us, they mentioned 3
Mr. Creswell's name.
4 Q
You know, the notes of your meeting llI 5
where you were the spokesman under " criterion for 6
Pressurizer Sizing," the second paragraph. talks 7
about "Something would probably satisfy the 8
regional reviewer.
However, they are not so 9
optimistic about DOR acceptance."
10 A
What are you reading from?
11 Q
The meeting minutes that you got, 12 page 3.
()
13 MR. WISE:
That's GPU Exhibit 82-A.
14 Mr. Seltzer is reading from something on 15 page 3.
4 16 Q
What did you understand " DOR" referred 17 to?
18 A
I think DOR stands for division of 19 regulation.
20 Q
Is that a part of the NRC7 21 A
Yes, but they have changed their 9
22 names of their groups so often.
23 Q
Apparently from~this, DOR was taking 24 a harder line position than the regional reviewer l
25 of the NRC, right?
l
i' 1
Swanson 237 2
MR. WISE:
I object to that.
I don't 3
think you can draw that conclusion from what 4
this says.
llh 5
MR. SELTZER:
Bob, if I were asking 6
you the questions, that would be a fabulous 7
answer for you to give, if you wanted to 8
give it, but you are not the witness.
I am 9
asking this man who attended the meeting and 10 was a recipient of the minutes.
I think it's 11 far more appropriate for him to tell me what 12 that means than for you gratuitously to j u s.t 13 speak an answer on the record.
14 I think it's a bloody outrage and it's 15 unlawyerlike.
16 MR. WISE:
I think it's a bloody 17 outrage the way you are conducting this 18 and attempting' to take words out of a memo
?
19 and put them to a witness in a very unfair and 20 misleading format.
21 I think anybody looking at what you 22 are doing here where you take a statement 23 in a memorandum that was written and say, 1
24 "Apparently z'eading this, the DOR was taking 25 a position" when that isn't what that says
._..-._w..
1 Swanson 238
(
\\-)
2 at all is very misleading, and to put a 3
misleading question to the witness in the 4
hopes that perhaps you can trick him or llh 5
somehow confuse him into saying that something 6
is written in this memo that is not written 7
is what is unlawyerly and what is very 8
unfair, and I think borders on questions 9
of -- well --
10 MR. SELTZER:
Go ahead, say it.
What?
11 MR. WISE:
I think it is an extremely 12 '
unfair way to conduct an examination and
)
13 I think that's entirely within the proper scope 14 of counsel for the witness to point out that 15 kind of unfairness when you take statements 16 out of context from a written memorandum and 17 characterize them in a way that is exactly 18 the contrary of what the statement says in the 19 text or if not the contrary, at least you are 20 reading an awful lot into it and to purport 21 to be making the statement that that's in 22 there when it is not in there, I think is 23 what is misleading and unfair.
That's not l
l 24 the way to conduct an examination if you are
{~}
x_/
25 looking to get the truth, which it's obvious
1 Swanson 239
. ~N s,)
2 that you are not.
3 You seem to be far more interested in 4
putting trick questions to the witness to llh 5
see if you can fool him into saying that 6
something is in there that is not in there.
7 MR. SELTZER: Are you finished?
8 MR. WISE:
Yes.
9 MR. SELTZER:
Can you reread and retype 10 the question, please.
11 (The question was read as follows:
12
" Question:
Apparently from this,
)
13 DOR was taking a harder line position than 14 the regional reviewer of the NRC,'right?")
15 MR. WISE:
Can you tell me where you a
16 see that?
Since you made the characterization 17 of what I am doing is so unprofessional 18 and unlawyerlike, I would like you to point 19 out to me where in this memorandum, as you say, 20 from this memo, where you see in here that 21 the DOR was in fact taking a harder line l
22 position.
23 Could you just state in the record where 24 you read that out of this memo and why you 25 put it to the witness in that form?
~
t
~-
~.
1 Swanson 240 l
2 MR. SELTZER:
"T Co indicated that 3
the position indicated in Table 2 would 4
probably satisfy the regional reviewer.
- lll 5
However, they were not so optimistic about 6
DOR acceptance. "
7 MR. WISE:
That says nothing about 8
what the DOR's position was.
It says 9
something about what Toledo Edison's position 10 was.
4 1
11 MR. SELTZER:
And I think your witness 12 has said that all he knows about the NRC
()
13 position comes from what Toledo Edison was I
14 telling him including everything he knows 15 about Creswell whom you say Creswell is the 16 one,it's not the NRC.
Well, here it's Teco 17 saying they think they can push something 18 by the regional reviewer who is probably 4
l 19 Creswell, but they are not so optimistic f
~
20 about DOR, so my question is:
21 g
Wasn't it your understanding that it 22 wasn't just the. regional reviewer Creswell that was 23 a problem on pressurizer sizing, but that there was 24
- a further problem with the DOR branch of the NRC?
! ' \\.
~25 MR. WISE:
Do you-understand what the 1
e. -,,-
m,
~,.
,..--,r-y
,-.-,.-..-,-e
,_.-,.,,..-.--r,--...~v, cy.m-
T
+
t 1
Swanson 241 2
question is?
Do you understand what the 3
question is, Mr. Swanson?
4 THE WITNESS:
Let me have the question h
5 again, please.
6 (Question read back.)
7 A
My recollection is that the way I 8
learned about Mr. Creswell was through Toledo, and 9
I do remember his name.
I right at the moment 10 don't remember any other NRC concera about ir from 11 the main branch or from the people he may have 12 reported to or anything.
1 13 Q
What about DOR 7 14 A
Well, incitiding DOR.
t-15 Q
Are you saying that you think these notes 1
i 16 are wrong in their reference to DOR 7 17 A
No, all I am saying is I don't remember l
18 anything other than a concern of Mr. Creswell as 19 relayed to B&W, myself, maybe other people of l
l 20 Mr. Creswell',s.
That's my memory.
21 Q
In'1978 the concern from the NRC or 22 any representative of the NRC was focused on loss 23 of level indication on the low and of the pressurizer, I
24 right?
s 25 A
At Toledo that was the concern, yes.
f' 1
Swanson 242 2
Q In 1978 did you believe that the NRC 3
or any representative of the NRC would also 4
be conce rned about a loss of pressurizer level j
llh 5
indication on the high side of the pressurizer?
6 A
I don't remember any.
7 What I do remember is what I have told b
8 you.
9 Q
For the November 27, 1978 meeting for 10 which you were the spokesman, you didn't have 11 anything on the agenda regarding loss of level 12.
indication near the top of the pressurizer, did you?,
13 A
Let me take a look at the agenda.
14 As I read the agenda, it's not clear.
15 There is an item on the first page that says, " Loss 16 of pressurizer level indication," and on the 17 second page s6me words that say, "Need to maintain 18 indicated level for several different events."
19 Q
Those are events that would cause it 20 to_go low, right?
21 A
So as far as the agenda being specific, 22 it's not specific for high or low but in the context 23 of what I remember about the issue, it was all 24 dealing with low or loss of it at the low end.
25 Q
At the meeting itself which took
1 Swanson 243 (h
T,/
2 place on November 27, you didn't have any 3
discussion about loss of level indication near 4
the top of the pressurizer, did you?
lll 5
A I don't recall any.
6 Q
It's a fact, isn't it, that at 7
least part of the reason you didn't want to raise 8
the problem of loss of level indication near the 9
top of the pressurizer was because B&W was already 10 having enough trouble defending itself cgainst 11 other NRC concerns about the prescurizer?
12 MR. WISE:
I object to the form of
()
13 the question.
14 A
The way you asked the question was 15 more of an accusation which I don't think is 16 correct.
17 We went to a meeting in good faith 18 to work with our customer, to deal'with loss of 19 pressurizer level indication at the low end, and 20 I honestly don't recall having loss of pressurizer 21 level indiation at the high end come up as a part 22 of the meeting'or in the general surrounding time 23 frame in which this was being considered.
24 Q
You knew, didn't you, that there had
(_
25 been a loss of pressurizer level indication high I
1 Swanson 244 D
2 during the Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 event?
3 A
I may have been aware of it.
I don't 4
recall.
lhh 5
Q You didn't say anything to any of the 6
Davis-Besse representatives at this September 27 7
meeting about the incorrect operator action taken 8
with regard to high pressure injection during the i
9 September 24, 1977 event, did you?
10 A
I honestly don't remember.
11 Q
Bert Dunn didn't say anything to them 12 about it either, did he?
()
13 A
I honestly don't remember.
14 Q
Nobody said anything to them about it, 15 did they?
16 A
I don't remember.
17 Q
You had no information prior to this 18 meeting that anybody had ever discussed with Toledo 19 Edison the Kelly or Dunn prescriptions for better 20 management of high pressure injection, isn't that 21 right?
G 22 A
I don't reme mbe r.
23 Q
Did it ever occur to you to raise with 24 your B&W colleagues prior to this meeting whether k
25 Bsw should use this meeting as a good opportunity i
1 Swanson 245
-\\_/
2 to ciscuss better management of high pressure 3
inj ection?
4 A
From my recollection, I don't remember, lll 5
but I notice on the agenda there is a topic on page 6
2 that calls out basis for operator intervention, 7
and that may have been a forum for a discussion, 8
but.I can't recall out of my own memory.
9 Q
That's under the heading " Discussion 10 of Recent site Instructions."
11 You don't have any reason to believe, 12 do you, that B&W had already sent site instructio,ns,
()
13 to Davis-Besse that included the Dunn guidelines, 14 do you?
15 A
I don't know.
16 Q
In fact, to the best of your knowledge --
17 A
I don't think so.
18 Q
In fact, to the best of your knowledge, 19 B&W did not communicate the Dunn guidelines 20 for operator action following high pressure 21 injection initiation until after the Three Mile 22 Island accident, isn't that right?
23 A
I think that's correct from my knowledge.
i 24 Q
Do you know whether the reactor trip
- ~
v L
25 procedure at Davis-Besse authorized the operator
.~ -. _. _ _., _ _.. __
i 1
Swanson 246 O) 2 to throttle high pressure injection in response 3
to rising pressurizer water level?
4 A
I am not sure I saw the reactor trip llh 5
procedure for Davis-Besse.
I have not been in the 6
area I have worked in in the past. I have seldom 7
reviewed procedures or had occasion to look at them.
8 Q
When you say you thought the operator's 9
action was arbitrary in shutting off high pressure 10 injection when they did at Davis-Besse, you didn't 11 know whether what they did was consistent or 12 inconsistent with their reactoF trip proced72re, 13 did you?
14 A
Partly that's true because I probably 15 had not reviewed a procedure to make that comment, 16 but it was within my -- I take it as an article 17 of faith that the operators had been trained in, 18 in LOCAs and how to management LOCAs and that 19 turning off the high pressure injection was not 20 something that I would have expected them to do 21 and I also would not have expected it to be in 22 a procedure or a procedure to have stated it or 23 given criterion the way they did turn it off.
A 24 Q
But you are just speaking cut of (w)'
25 ignorance.
You never looked at their procedures
1 Swanson 247
\\
2 to see whether or not those procedures prescribed 3
termination of high pressure injection in the way 4
they did?
_ lll 5
MR. WISE:
I object to the 6
characterization "out of ignorance."
7 Q
You never looked at their procedures, 8
have you?
9 MR. WISES You asked him that and 10 he has nnswered that.
11 A
I may have not have looked at the 12 procedures.
I probably did not look at the
(
13 procedures.
14 I took it as an article of faith that 15 they had been trained in LOCA management and 16 that the way they turned off the high. pressure 17 injection was against general and basic knowledge 18 of reactor operation.
19 Q
But you also testified earlier that 20 you never even checked with the B&W training 21 department to see how they were trained on managing 22 high pressure injection,.isn't that right?
23 A
That's probably righter -- as I said, rT 24 as far as looking at procedures, I probably did not.
>1
\\_/
25 I may have.
I would have been less-likely to have I
W 1
Swanson 248
= 0)
(, -
2 talked to the training department.
3 But, again, I don't recall the whole 4
episode that well.
llh 5
Q
' Did you file monthly reports with 6
Bruce Karrasch when you reported to hin in plant 7
integration?
8 A
I filed monthly progress reports or 9
I had sesebody that worked for me do it.
10 C
If You wanted to go Lack and review your 11 monthly reports,.is there some placo ycu would be 12 able to go to and look for them?
()
13 A
I do maintain a chren. file and I would g
14 l
expect most-of my pregress reports to be in the 15 chron. file.
16 Q
Do you know whether your chron. file 17 was produced either for my firm or to your counsel 18 in this litigation?
19 A
I had a request to fairly recently 20 produce prngress reports over some time period.
l 21 I don't remember what the time period was, and 22 I asked my secretary to go through the chron. file 23 and pull out the progress reports.
i 24 Q
Is that the first time your chron.
l 25
-file was searched, to your knowledge, in this r
1 Swanson 249 O
2 litigation?
3 A
There has been an awful lot of requests 4
for documents and since I keep most of my llh 5
correspondence or I keep all of my correspondence 6
in a chron. file, I would expect that it had stuff 7
pulled out of it before.
j 8
Q But you don't know for sure?
9 A
I kind of think I have taken stuff out
+
i 10 and given it to the people at B&W who are collecting 11 this.
12 Q
Has anybody other than yourself ever,
13 I gone through the chron, file to pull out 14 everything that they think is responsive to 15 request for production?
16 A
I may have done it or I may have had my 17 secretary do it.
18 Q
I am going to show you Don Hallman's
'I9 August 3, 1978 memo and ask you when is the first I
20 time you think you saw his memo to Bruce.
21.
A I don't remember seeing this.
1 22 Q
Ever?
23 A
Well, "ever" is a bad question, because
(}_
24 I think Mr. wise showed me this memo the other day 25 and asked me --
=
{
1 Swanson 250 2
Q Don't tell me about what he asked you.
3 Are you saying you don't believe you 4
ever saw it before Bob Wise was kind enough to lh 5
show it to you?
6 A
.Right.
7 Q
And is it correct that you don't recall 8
Bruce Karrasch ever asking you to do anything in 9
connection with responding to that memo?
16 A
I don't think Bruce did.
11 Q
And you don't think anybody else did, 12 asked you to do?
13 A
Right, I don't think anybody else asked 14 me to do anything on this memo.
15 Q
one final question.
16 Do you see your note up-in the 17 upper right-hand corner of GPU 5937 18 A
Yes.
19 Q
What does it say?
4 20 A
It says, " Lou - Keep.
Place in a safe
.21 place under lock and key. Give me a copy.
Eric."
22 Q
Is " Lou" Lou cartin?
i 23 A
Yes.
24 Q
Why did you write that note?
25 A
I don't know.
1 Swanson 251 p)
(..
2 Q
Is that some code that you had between 3
you where you put " Keep" in quotation marks?
4 A
It's probably more in the context of a lll 5
quipper.
I don't think there is anything 6
serious meant by that. We don't have codes or 7
anything like that where I work.
8 Q
Do you have some place where documents 9
are kept under lock and key?
10 A
B&W does perform some siudies for the 11 redsral government, military and whatnot, and they 12 have a vault at B&W for maintaining classified 13 documents in the con ext of nilitary classification.
14 Q
Is that where you were asking Lou Cartin 15 to place this?
16 A
Oh, of course not.
17 Q
Why did you ask him to place this 18 under lock and key?
19 A
I have no idea.
20 MR. WISE:
Have you reviewed the memo I
21 to see what it is you are talking about?
22 THE WITNESS:
No, I was looking at this.
l 23 MR. WISE:
The witness hasn't had an N
24 opportunity to see what it is the note is
(~Y
'u.
25 written about, so why don't we take a second
I Swanson 252
/~h 2
and see what the memo is that he wrote the note 3
about and perhaps that would help him with j
4 why it is he wrote the note to Mr. Cartin.
h 5
Q This is, Mr. Swanson, a top secret 6
document and has been stamped " Confidential Counsel 7
Only," if that helps.
8 MR. WISE:
I think that was put on 9
during litigation.
10 There is nothing top secret about i t.,
11 You have a copy of it, Mr. Seltzer.
12 MR. SELTZER:
But only counsel have 13 been permitted to see it.
14 Mn. WISE:
It's been produced during 15 litigation.
I will note that this is a document 16 that concerns the Toledo Edison plant and that 17 in general in producing documents in 18 response to your various requests where 19 documents were taken from files that related
~
20 to other utilities besides the one whom you 21 represent, we, as a matter of courre, did make 22 them confidential on the theory that documents 23 concerning Toledo Edison's plant do not belong l
24 in the files of Metropolitan Edison.
25 I don't know specifically whether that's i
1 Swanson 253 Oi 2
why that stamp was put in there at the time, 3
but we did follow the general instructions 4
to our paralegals in producing documents lhk 5
to you that where they took these from other 6
customers' files, that those documents were 7
to be restricted for use in this litigation 8
and were not to generally go out to your 9
client.
10l Q
I take it you don't have any present 11 recollection why you told Lou Cartin to put 12 this under lock and key?
)
13 A
No, but the inference that I gather from 14 all this conversation is that there is sone insidious 15 reason for me doing this.
I don't think there was.
16 I think it was just a quip.
17 g
A joke?
18 A
Yes.
19 MR. SELTZER:
I don't have any more 20 questions.
21 MR. WISE:
Let's take a short break.
22 I think I will have a few questions.
23 I will try to get them over with as quickly
-In 24 as possible.
25 (Recess taken.)
l
1 Swanson 254 1
fs/
2 BY MR. WISE:
3 Q
Mr. Swanson, the last couple of questions 4
that Mr. Seltzer asked you were about a handwritten lll 5
note at the top of GPU Exhibit 593.
6 During the break, you and I discussed 7
this note.
8 As a result of our discussion, did you 9
have any further recollection concerning the note?
10 A
- Yes, t
11 Q
What is the best of your recollection 12 as to what the meaning of this note, which reads,
[)
13
" Lou - Keep.
Place in a safe place under lock i
~-
14 and key.
Give me a copy.
Eric"?
15 A
The way I remember it now is that this 16 is a -- let me start again.
17 If you remember the original ECCS steam 18 generator level for the 177 plants was 32 feet and 19 this is a note that we needed.
20 Q
Ignore that kind.of undertone; just 21 continue.
22 A
This is a note that we needed to be 23 able to justify Toledo changing to a ten-foot
- ,3 24 point.
It was an important memo to us and I wanted O
25 to make sure that Lou kept a copy in his files on
1 Swanson 255
(
- s J 2
the Toledo business.
3 Q
Was that note meant in any way to restrict 4
the circolation of the memo?
ll) 5 A
No.
It was just to make sure we had a 6
copy.
7 Q
What was it that helped refresh your 8
recollection concerning that note?
9 A
I don't know.
I just remembered it when 10 I want to the head a minute ago.
I 11 Q
Let me show you another exhibit that 12 Mr. Seltzsr asked you some questions about, GPU 13 Exhibit 596, which is a September 1974 memorsndum I
14 from Mr. 3urris to Mr. Ryan which you are listed 15 as a recipient of a. copy of.
The memorandum 16 concerned pressurizer level measurement.
17 Mr. Seltzer asked you a number of 18 questions about the concerns discussed in the memo 19 and the question of loss of pressurizer icvel
- 20 indication at certain plants.
In particular there J
21
.is a chart on page 2 which Mr. Seltzer directed i
22 your attention to.
That chart lists a number of n
~ different plants under the heading "NSS" which I 24 believe stands for nuclear steam supply system
- 25 as we have established at other depositions.
-+
c r,-
- -, - +
---,e w-
.,wr.
-,,e,n.
~,,-- -...,,-- --
,,---,--+,.,..~,--n.
-,-,------..-e--...---,,-,,
-v,,
1 Swanson 256
'AU 2
Are you generally familiar with the 3
numbering system for the NSS plants around the 4
country?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Do you know what NSS 5 and 6 are?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Could you tell us?
9 A
TMI-1 and 2.
10 MR. SELTZER:
I thir.k it's, written right 11 in on the document.
12 This isn't much of a memcry test.
13 r
Q According to this chart, are you able 14 to draw any conclusions as to whether the problem 15 that was under discussion, namely, loss of indicated
(
16 pressurizer level, applied at the TMI plants?
1 17 A
The discussion says that -- well, the 18 discussion omits NSS 5 and 6 from the group of 19 plants that would have pressurizer -- indicated i
20 pressurizer level loss on trip, and I think the 1
21 1
reason for it is that both TMI-1 and TMI-2 22 operate at 220 inches in the pressurizer and have 23 a 400-inch span.
24 Q
Then the problem that's discussed in 25 this memo would not apply at TMI-1-and TMI-27
I l
1 i
1 Swanson 257 2
A That's correct.
3 Q
Earlier t day Mr. Seltzer asked 4
you some questions concerning the memorandum lll 5
prepared by Mr. Kelly and the subsequent memo 6
prepared by Mr. Dunn which concerned operator 7
interruption of high pressure injection.
8 I believe it was established that 9
those memos were written following the 10 Septe mbe r 1977 event at Davis-Besse, Mr. Seltzer l
asked yoe in particular whether it was your 11,
12 understanding that it was appropriate to file a
- (
13 preliminary safety concern about the concern that 14 you, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Dunn had discussed in 15 connection with those memos.
16 I believe your answer as I took it 17 down was "It is probably not inappropriate."
f 18 Could you explain for us what you 19 meant by "not inappropriate"?
20 A
-Well, anybody can file a PSC any time l
21 he wants to on any subject at any time, so the i
22 word " inappropriate" as I used it is there are no 23 rules at B&W that say there are only appropriate g-24 times for filing a PSC.
Any time is appropriate.
~
C' 25 Q
Did.you mean to indicate in any way a
'\\
z I(
l Swanson 258 O.
O~
2 conclusion as to whether a PSC was required or 3
necessary with respect to the concernsthat[you, 4
Mr. Dunn and Mr. Kelly had?
5 A
SEy that again?
6 Q
D d you mean by your answer to 7
indicate that fou believed it was required or 8
necessary that a PSC be filed with respect to the
/
i.
)
9 conceras that you, Mr. Dunnfand'Mr. Kelly had in
-i I,i s.
o
<
- 10 late 1977 or early 19787 s
)
z' 11 MR. SELTZER.
I think he said that since 4
i 22.l Dunn wrote his memo to Taylor who is in ch a,rg e, kt s
V 13 cf PSCs anyway,, that $2e didn't think it\\was
'- \\
.i 14 necessary.
L
+
p i
/ 15 A
Thank you.
f ;
16 g
Is that your understanding?
i t
1 17 A
Since Bert wrote his memo to Jim Taylor,
.i
)
18 I would consider that to be enough.
19 9
Let me shift to another topic now.
c 8
~
20 Before I go on t.the next topic, I think 21 that you may not have unde stood the import of my N'
22 question and Mr. Seltzer's comment may have thrown 23 you off.
[
24,
I am only asking you whether you drew 4y 25 the conclusion in the fall'of 1977 or the early w3 x
4 g.,
l' l_,
~
.~
- - ~ -, - ~
- - ~ ~
1 Swanson 259 O
2
, part of 1978 that a preliminary safety concern g
needed to be filed or was required to be filed with 4
r espect to the concerns that you, Mr. Dunn and Mr.
h 5
Kelly' were discussing at that time.
6 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
There is no 7
foundation that Mr. Swanson even thought about 8
it.
l 9
Q Are you having trouble with my question?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Let me try and rephrase it if you 12 are having difficulty understanding what I am 13 talking about.
14-You do remember that you, Mr. Dunn and 15 Mr. Kelly discussed the concerns that Joe Kelly had 16 originally brought to you and which Mr. Dunn later 17 wrote a memo about in late 1977 or early 19787 18 Do you know what I am talking about?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
And you do remember that you 21 participated in those discussions?
22 A
Yes.
j 23 Q
And I believe Mr. Seltzer asked you 1.
24 whether you filed a preliminary safety concern with 25 -
respect to the issue that had been raised?
l
l l
1 Swanson 260 2
A Right.
[
?
3 Q
And you said that you had not.
4 My question now, Mr. Swanson, is only G
5 whether at the time you formed any conclusion one 6
way or the other as to whether it was required l
7 as you understood the procedures at the time that 8
a preliminary safety concern be instituted with 9
respect to that particular issue?
10 A
well, I don't remember exactly how 11 the conversations went, but I would judge uhat 12 our attitude at the time based on my conversations 13 with Joe when he came over to me was that the 14 operators probably had the right procedures to begin 15 with and weren't using them and that our memos, 16 that the memo that Joe wrote, was intended to 17 remind the operators to use them, so I would suppose 18 that there was no absence of or there was not a 19 gap in the operator's training and, therefore, 20 the reminders -- the memo was issued in the context 21 g
of a reminder or additional instructions that the 22 operators might use, so I would guess that a 23 preliminary safety concern wasn't needed if I had
(~]
24 thought at all about it, which I am not sure that
%.)
25 I remember.
. ~. -
1 Swanson 261 2
g Well, that last part is really the 3
answer to my question, so let me move on to another 4
topic.
I 5
Mr. seltzer yesterday asked you throughout 6
most of the day questions concerning consideration 7
that was given by you and others at B&W during 8
the late part of 1978 to a request that had come in 9
from Toledo Edison to change certain setpoints 10 regarding the steam generator levels at the 11 Davis-Besse plant.
In particular you were shown 12 GPU Exhibit 82-A and 122 among others.
Exhibit
()
13 82-A is a copy of Mr. Cartin's notes of a November 14 27, 1978 meeting at B&W with the Toledo Edison 15 representatives and has attached to it as 16 a proposed agenda which I believe you 17 testified you participated in the preparation of 18 or was prepared under your direction.
Exhibit 122 19 is a December 19, 1978 memo by Mr. Cartin which has 20 various attachments to it including a letter from 21 Toledo Edison dated December 4, 1978.
22 I w'ill let you take a look at those.
23 You recall generally the discussions
.rS 24 that we had yesterday concerning those documents b
25 and the concerns that they covered, do you not?
1 Swanson 262
/'
(_)T 2
A Yes.
3 Q
Now, let me ask you this:
4 How did you first become aware of the llh 5
issue that was under discussion in these memoranda 6
and the related conversations that you testified i
7 about yesterday?
8 MR. SELTZER:
What specific issue are 9
you talking about?
There were quite a few
- =
i 10 issues.
11 MR. WISE:
You asked him yesterday, 12 these particular documents, and I believe
(
13 you concentrated on certain aspects of them, 14 particularly the pumps, the RC pump status 15 consideration, that it was given by Toledo 16 Edison and Babcock & Wilcox and also the 1
17 question of the dual setpoint control logic 18 for the steam generators.
19 Q
How did all this come about as best 20 you recall it?
21 A
Well, I have tried to remember some of 22 these things and reading some of these memos I think 23 I remember the general thrust or the gist of the
^
24 concern.
25 Toledo in their letter, which is attached
1 Swanson 263
[\\
2 to GPU 122, asked us to evaluate whether or not 3
reactor coolant pump running status should be 4
included in the dual setpoint control logic.
llh 5
g Mr. Swanson --
6 MR. SELTZER:
Don't interrupt the 7
witness.
I object to this.
He is in the 8
middle of answering and you are interrupting 9
him.
10 Do you have more to say, Mr. Swanson?
11 MR. WISE:
I will let him finish his 12 answer.
I just wanted to make it clear tha;t
(
13 he is now going on about a letter which is 14 December 4 and my question was directed to 15 how this arose, going back into the time before 16 the meeting with IeCo which was late November.
17 THE WITNESS:
I misunderstood your 18 question.
19 MR. WISE:
We'will come to the December 20 4 letter.
21
'MR.
SELTZER:
Actually I don't really 22 care.
I was just showing you that it can c
l l
23 be very innocuous to interrupt an answer or l.
24 when you redirect a witness who has gone 25 astray.
I really think what you did was
1 Swanson 264
[/
~
'k
\\-
2 all right, and sometimes when I tried to tell 3
Mr. Swanson that he was way off course, that 4
he was talking about something that wasn't in Ih 5
my question, I was showing you how that 6
easily can happen.
7 Q
I want to direct your attention to the 8
initiation of this issue how did it come up as best 9
you recall.
10 A
Toledo Edison --
11 MR. SELTZER:
Can I just object before 12 he starts answering?
He gave us this te s timony
(~%
(_)
13 yesterday that there are overcooling events 14 that caused the pressurizer to drain with the 15 setpoint high and so Toledo Edison wanted to 16 find out if they could have a dual setpoint 17 so that for non-loss of coolant accident 18 transients, the primary system would not be 19 subjected to overcooling and contraction.
20 MR. WISE:
If I thought it was as clear 21 on the record as you have just stated it, I 22 would perhaps not be doing it.
23 It was my impression that through the 24 method of examination, which you chose to
()'
(
25 pursue, which is your right, it was left rather i
I Swanson 265 i
l 2
unclear as to the chronology and how the l
3 issue arose in the context of these memos.
4 I thin \\ it's now my prerogative to h
5 proceed to examine him in the order that I l
6 would like to have it put on the record so that 7
these memos can be clarified and put in 8
context, and I can ask any additional questions 9
that I have about them.
-10 Q
You may proceed to answer as to how 11 this issue arose and what your recollection is as 12 to how it all got started.
t l
13 A
Toledo Edison contacted us.
As I recall, 14 the initial contact was on the telephone.
15 They told us that they were having 16 trouble maintaining indicated pressurizer level 17 when auxiliary feedwater started up at their plant.
18 There are several factors involved in why they i
19 were having trouble and the other plants may not 20 have been having trouble.
21 One of the reasons is that the plant is 22 a raised loop; another reason is that the auxiliary 23 feedwater capacity at their plant is fairly large
}
24 relative to the other plants and they wanted to 25 know if there were some changes that could be made
,,--,a
--a w--,-
e
~
-,n
~_.-,-.-----.me,
- - - -, ~ - - -
1-Swanson 266 O
. (_/
2 to reduce the chances for loss of indicated 3
pressurizer level.
4 One of the -- one of the fixes that llh 5
could be made to the plant to help that out would be 6
to reduce the ECCS level from 32 feet to ten feet.
7 To allow Toledo Edison to make that reduction, 8
we would have to be able to support safety analysis, 9
particularly LOCA analysis with a ten-foot level 10 in the generator and the topical report had been 11 submitted at 32 feet.
~
12 What we did to make that change was
()
.13 ask the ECCS people to supply us with some 14 information about ECCS at ten feet which they did do.
15 In addi. tion to that, Toledo Edison had 16 been running some natural circulation tests and 17 had determined that their plant had exceptionally 18 good natural ciruelation at about a three-foot level.
19 And the reason for.that is because of the configuration 20 in their loop.
Their steam generator is raised at i
4 21 a high level compared to the level of the core which 22 allows them a high thermal center.
23 So the thrust then was to come up with 24 two setpoints, one at three feet, roughly, and one
..Og 25 at ten feet for ECCS.
Their tests indicated good
1 Swanson 267 2
natural circulation at three feet and that 3
gave evidence that the three-foot level was 4
acceptable,and the ECCS information gave indication lll 5
that the ten-foot level was acceptable.
6 Therefore, we concluded that we could 7
change to a design or control system design or 8
an operating method that would allow the dual 9
setpoint, one for the ten foot for ESFAS conditions 10 or when HPI is turned on, and the lower setpoint 11 for other conditions.
12 Q
Let me just pick up on a few things q_)
13 that you said since not every reader of your 14 testimony will be as familiar with the terms as t
15 you are.
16 First of all, let me ask you what was 17 your understanding at the time as to the relationship 18 of auxiliary feedwater at Davis-Besse to this 19 entire issue?
20 A
The capacity of the auxiliary feedwater 21 pumps was considerably greater than that of most 22 of the other p1' ants.
I believe it was on the order 23 of 1200 gpm.
I may be wrong, as compared to 24 somewhere in the neighborhood of six or seven hundred 25 gpm at other plants.
i 1
Swanson 268
/'N t
t
(/
2 Q
Did you understand that the concern 3
ab ut loss of pressurizer level indication 4
applied when main feedwater was available and h
5 applicable?
6 A
Well, there is no trouble with main 7
feedwater for two reasons:
One, it is hotter 8
than auxiliary feedwater, so it does not have g
the cooling effects secondly, it comes in at the 10 bottom of the generator and builds level from 11 the bottom up, whereas auxiliary feedwater comes in 12 at the top of the generator and tends to cool not,
(_)
13 only as it builds a level but at the point of 14 injection as well.
15 Q
Was the question that Toledo Edison was 16 raising with you directed at situations where 17 auxiliary feedwater was involved?
18 A
The concern was with auxiliary 19 feedwater, not with main feedwater.
20 Q
Now, you' described thE. auxiliary 21 feedwater system at Davis-Besse and how it differs G
22 from the other plants.
l 23 How does the level of feedwater
/~^
24 entering into the steam generator affect the NJ 25 conditions on the primary side?
1 Swanson 269 2
MR. SELTZER:
Could I hear that.again?
4 3
(Question ~ read back.)
4 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
This is asked 5
and answered.
Eric Swanson already told 6
you that because auxiliary feedwater enters 7
higher, it cools not only at the top but also 8
at the bottom, and what it's cooling is 9
primary side inventory.
10 MR. WISE:
I am now asking about the 11 different level,that is, I am trying to 12 establish from the witness what relationship 13 there is between the level in the generator 14 and the conditions that will be seen on the 15 primary side.
16 A
Well, relative to level, it's the higher 17 the level, the greater the tube surface area is 18 exposed, and tube surface area is a factor in the 19 heat transfer capability.
The larger the area, 20 the more heat that can be transferred, so as you 21 raise level, you increase the area, you can 22 increase the cooling rate.
23 Q
So that a higher level on the steam 24 generator will remove more heat?
Is that right?
25 A
A higher level in the steam generator
1 Swanson 270 1
1
\\_/
2 can remove more heat, that's correct.
k 3
Q Now, you mentioned that Davis-Besse 4
had proposed to change the, I believe you called l
Ihh 5
it, the ECCS level from 32 feet to some lower level.
6 Coult you explain what you meant by 7
the ECCS level?
8 A
Well --
9 MR. SELTZER:
We will stipulate to all 10 this.
There is really no dispute about this.
11 MR. WISE:
I would just like it on the 12 record so that we have it.
13 A
The ECCS, small break analysis, relies 14-on steam generator heat transfer to remove heat 15 from the primary coolant.
Their analysis that 16 had been performed was done' pretty much generically 17 for 177 plants.
And because of the lowered loop 18 configuration, a high level in the generator was 19 required to get it above the point in the 20 reactor vessel where the cold legs entered.
21 That is the high level in the generator allowed 22 steam or primary coolant when it flashes steam 23 to condense in the steam generator to form a pool
(')
24 at the bottom of the steam generator and run back kJ 25 into the cold leg.
1 Swanson 271 0
2 Because the lowered loops have such 3
a greater difference in elevation between the 4
point at which the cold leg enters the vessel and h
5 the bottom of the steam generator, a high level was 6
needed to build the pool to allow it to run back in.
7 That was not necessary at Davis-Besse because 8
the loop was raised.
9 Q
You mentioned that Davis-Besse was 10 proposing two different setpoints for the ECCS level.
11 Could you explain why two setpoints 12 were being proposed by Davis-Besse?
13 A
Well, the ten-foot level was a higher 14 level, gave more steam generator condensation 15 surface for small break.LOCA and we also had some 16 analysis to support the ten-foot level, whereas 17 had they proposed a single level, let's say at 10 three feet or some intermediate point, we did not have 19 an analysis at three feet.
We would have to perform 20 an analysis so it was convenient to use the ten-foot 21 level for ECCS.
22 Q
And the three-foot level would be for 23 conditions other than ECCS analysis?
24 A
That is correct.
Three-foot level for 25 natural circulation was supported by tests that W
&-p-w'--T--wv--e ewp--e--
-,wwor.-*vy-r, we+-w-
-t-'-m-y--e-w---
,-c---
ww-r 3,-,-
---y gy y-v.sy^-g-'
l 1
Swanson 272 2
Davis-Besse then had performed and indicated 3
they had a high flow rate on natural circulation.
4 Q
What was your understanding for the 5
criterion for going to the ten-foot level 6-versus the criterion for going to the three-foot 7
level?
8 A
Well, what we had to do was to devise some 9
signal to differentiate between the need for the 10 ten-foot level and the three-foot level, and as 11 indicated in GPU 122 and 82-A, our choise of signals 12 to make that differentiation could have been 13 selected from a variety of'possible signals.
14 I believe the way we ended up was to use 15 the ESFAS signal to indicate a need to go to the 16 ten-foot level and in the absence of an ESFAS signal, 17 we chose to go to the three-foot level.
18 gow, there is an interim time period 19 before those two signals could be designed and 20 installed at the plant.
The way we had the procedure 21 or to handle it was that if an ESFAS signal were l
22 to occur,-then the Toledo Edison design ESFAS system 23 would raise the level to ten feet automatically.
24 In the absence of an ESFAS signal, the l
25 operator was to halt the increaser level and he was l
1 Swanson 273 2
to manually step in and to manipulate the auxiliary.
3 feedwater level controls at the three-foot point.
4 Q
Before Toledo Edison proposed this 4
lll 5
change, that is, lowering the setpoints for 6
the steam generator level during auxiliary 7
feedwater events, had the 32-foot level been 8
analyzed for ECCS purposes?
9 A
To my knowledge, the 32-foot level 10 was submitted as part of the analysis for small 11 break LOCA in a topical report that was generic to 12 the 177 plants or to many of the 177 plants.
()
13 Q
And before they made this proposal --
4 l
14 MR. SELTZER:
Wait a second.
I don't i
~
15 want him to say something wrong.
I think the 16 32-foot level was just for the raised loop 17 plant and Davis-Lesse'is the only raised loop 18 plant.
19 MR. WISE:
Mr. Seltzer apparently knows 20 more about it than you do, Mr. Swanson.
21 THE WITNESS:
You may be right.
My 22 memory is' not.that strong because there has
' 23 been talk of a 40-foot level, but at any rate, 24 the level-for the 177 plants was a high level, 25 very high in the steam generator.
And it
~
1 Swanson 274 O
2 may have been 32 feet and it may have been 3
some other relatively high number.
I apologize 4
if I don't remember exactly.
lll 5
Q Had the level that Toledo Edison 6
was proposing, that is, the ten-foot level and the 7
three-foot level, depending upon whether or not there 8
was an ESFAS, had those levels been analyzed 9
before they made their proposal, to your knowledge?
10 A
well, as I recall it, there was some 11 brief, not a full analysis at the ten-foot level 12 that the ECCS people Had done and had on file,
()
13 is the way I remember it.
14
.Q Do you remember whether there was a 15 question after they made the proposal as to 16 whether B&W would provide an analysis to support the 17 ten-foot level?
18 A
The way I remember it happening is i
19 that we had two analyses at ten feet.
They were not 20 complete, and that the ECCS people considered that 21 to be ample evidence that the ten-foot level was 22 satisfactory and the way I remember it is that 23 if the NRC were to request a complete analysis, l
24 then we would discuss that with Toledo Edison or do 25 the analysis as needed.
1 l
.m-
1 Swancon 275
()'>
2
(
Q Mr. Seltzer showed you GPU Exhibit 593, 3
which is a memorandum dated November 22, 1978 from 4
Mr. Dunn to you with some attachments, including lll 5
a site instruction -- I'm sorry.
I think there 6
may be a problem with the exhibit the way it was 7
put together.
The exhibit as we have it includes 8
a memorandum dated November 22, 1978 and attached 9
to it is a memorandum dated November 28, 1978 which 10 references the earlier memorandum.
That would 11 indicate that the sheet that's on the top of this 12 exhibit was actually an attachment or at least a, 13 reference to the memorandum which makes up the last 14 two pages of the exhibit.
I don't know the reason 15 why these were stapled together in the order they are.
16 It may be that they were in.the file this way 17 or it may be that they were put together during the 18 copying process this way, but it appears from the 19 dates at least that Mr. Dunn's memo to you predated 20 Mr. Cartin's memo to Mr. Spangler of November 28 21 which discussed the site instruction and attached 22 the site instruction.
23 I guess my question at this point is, 24 looking at GPU 593 and particularly the top page,
,_s
')
'~-
25 does this reflect the information that you received
i 1
Swanson 276 2
from B&W's ECCS unit concerning the ability or 3
tne acceptability of a change to the ten-foot 4
level for Davis-Besse's steam generator during lll 5
a'n auxiliary feed event?
j 6
A It seems to me I have seen a memo 7
from Nehru Shah that also substantiates that, 8
but this would also state -- it's pretty 9
straightforward -- the high level at ten feet is 10
. required only when the reactor coolant pumps are 11 not operative during the small break transient; i
12 meaning, we have to design for ten feet.
13 Q
Now, during the course of the questioning, 14 Mr. Seltzer, in connection with this, asked you a 15 number of questions about the status of the reactor 16 coolant pumps and the so-called pumps running issue.
17 Let me first direct your attention to 18 GPU Exhibit 122 and particularly the attachment to 19 that exhibit which is a copy of Toledo Edison's 20
The beginning of the i
21 letter references the meeting on November 27, 1978 22 which is the subject of Mr. Cartin's memo which 23 Mr. Seltzer has marked as Exhibit 82-A,and proceeds
(
24 to' read as follows:
"At the meeting on this 25' subject in your office on November 27, 1978, it was
1 Swanson 277 2
decided that-further analysis is required to 3
support the safety evaluation of the proposed dual 4
level control setpoints on the steam generators."
lll 5
I take it the proposed dual level control 6
setpoints are the ten-foot and three-foot level 7
setpoints we have been discussing in your last couple 8
of answers?
I 9
A Evidently.
10 Q
Now, turning over to the second page l
11 of the letter, there is an item 6 among the various 12 items listed by the Toledo Edison people.
That
()
13 item reads, "Your evaluation as to whether or not 14 reactor coolant pump running stat'us should be 15 included in the dual setpoint control logic."
16 Do you recall what the relationship of 17 the reactor coolant pump status was to the question 18 that had been raised by Toledo Edison concerning 19 changing the setpoints for the steam generator 20 level?
21 A
Af ter reading some of these memos 22 during this interrogation, I'think I understand how 23 the reactor coolant pump running status fits into
(.
24 this.
To the best of my memory, there was a
(
25
[uestion from Toledo whether we could have a l'
I Swanson 278 2
three-foot level approximately with RC pumps 3
running and use it as a single level rather than 4
a dual level.
This is kind of the way I remember 5
it going.
6 The reason they asked us is because 7
with the reactor coolant pumps running, there is 8
a greater heat transfer rate with forced convection 9
on the steam generator than there is with a natural 10 circulation flow rate.
11 And with the RC pumps running, there 12 would be greater overcooling than there would
()
13 be if the reactor coolant pumps were off.
14 So what they wanted to try, as best 15 as I can recall, was to use some signal from 16 the reactor coolant pumps to establish a level.
17 If the reactor coolant pumps were running, then 18 I believe the way I recall it, Toledo wanted to use 19 the three-fcot level and they wanted to use that 20 for ECCS as well as for other conditions.
21 Now, what we decided to do was to not 22 use a signal for reactor coolant pumps and the 23 signal could be, for example, a pump current monitor 24 or some other kind of indication that the pumps were g3O 25 on or some combination of the four reactor coolant
1 Swanson 279
~
x 2
pumps were on.
3 And we decided to not use a reactor 4
coolant pump signal of some nature and we decided lll 5
not to do the ECCS at three feet because we did 6
-not have any ECCS analysis at three feet, and also, 7
it may have been that the signals from the reactor 8
coolant pumps are not as easy to come by as signals, say, from the ESFAS system which has a very easy 10 signal to pick up, and it's one or it's two rather 11 than four or some permutation and combination of 12 signals from reactor coolant pumps, so for those 13 two reasons, one, the signal wasn't that available, 14 and we did not have an analysis with reactor coolant 15 pumps running at three feet, we elected not to 16 use a reactor coolant pump input as a signal setpoint 17 or a control system initiator.
18 Q
Mr. Seltzer asked you some questions 19 from Mr. Cartin's December 19, 1978 memo which 20 refers to the Toledo Edison letter you just have 21 been discussing and in particular he asked you O
22 some questions'about Mr. Cartin's response for 23 item 6 in the Toledo Edison letter.
That response 24 of Mr. Cartin is contained on page 2 of his memo.
25 Reading from the top in that paragraph,
i:
1 Swanson 280 2
it says, "B&W's position to Toledo Edison is that
~
3 the status of reactor coolant pumps should not be 4
included in the cool setpoint control logic at lll 5
this time."
6 I take it that's consistent with your 7
recollection of the reasons which you have just 8
given for_why the reactor coolant pump signal was 9
not included in the dual setpoint control logic?
10 MR. SELTZER:
Objection; leading.
11 MR. WISE:
I will withdraw it.
12 Q
The sentence that I read by Mr. Carti,,n
(}
13 refers to the let me put it this way:
14 Was it your understanding that Mr. Cartin's 15 description there of the B&W position was based on 16 the reasons which you have just given us?
17 MR. SELTZER:
I have the same I
18 objection.
19 MR. WISE:
I will stand on this one.
'20 A
My recollection as reading these memos 21 and trying to understand this and trying to reinforce 22 my memory and the information that gave me this or 23 pro $pted my memory was that in GPU No. 82-A, which 24
~in Table 1,
Item No.
4, is a statement that says,
, p 25 "Small LOCAs have not been analyzed assuming main 4
i
1 Swanson 281 O'
2 feedwater controlled at a two-foot level by 3
the ICS and RC pumps operative."
4 That in combination with knowing h
5 that we had some analysis at the ten-foot level 6
and also some limited recollection that the RC 7
pump signals would be more difficult to obtain 8
leads me to believe that the reason we did not 9
recommend inputs from the RC pumps was what I just 10 said.
11 (Continued on next page.)
12 O
~
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 l
20 i
21
.O l
'22 23' 24 i
25 l
1 Swanson 282 em 2
BY MR. WISE:
3 Q
The remainder of the paragraph 4
concerning item 6, Mr. Cartin prepared, speaks lll 5
of possibility of performing an additional ECCS 6
analysis or study.
And concludes by saying, 7
"If this work effort is completed and results are 8
acceptable, B&W may then be in a better position 9
to support Toledo Edison's request to include the 10 status of the RC pumps into the dual setpoint logic."
11 Do you recall whether at the time this 12 was under discussion there was consideration on
(
13 performing additional analyses in order to determine 14 whether B&W could support the type of proposal 15 that Toledo Edison had made?
16 A
Well, the way I recall it, and it's not 17 a strong memory, if that's correct, we had not an 18 analysis for the request by Toledo to use RC pumps 19 signal to establish a level at the two-foot point 20 with the pumps on.
21 We did not have a LOCA analysis which 22 supported heat removal at the two-foot point.
23 We did have one at the ten-foot point.
- (~s 24 As a part of that we did discuss or in
\\_
25 some manner tried to find out if the ECCS analysis
1 Swanson 283 k_)
2 would be O.K.
at the two-foot level with the 3
pumps running, and I think Bert's memo, GPU No.
4 593, says ECCS finds a two-foot level adequate lll 5
when being fed by the main feedwater.
This response 6
is valid for two and three pump operation.
7 But nevertheless, we did not have 8
an analysis and we also elected during this period 9
of time not to use the pump status, but we started 10 thinking about ECCS analysis with pumps running, 11 and I believe we had some Lou may have 12 had some discussions with Bob Jones.
I don't rec,all,
,-fy 13 that I had discussions with Bob Jones to further 14 investigate ECCS analysis with RC pumps on.
15 Q
Mr. Seltzer, when he was questioning 16 you about this particular paragraph in this particular 17 memo read from the middle of the paragraph.
Let me 18 read the sentence immediately before it.
"If 19 questioned by the NRC, however, B&W must be in a l
20 position to state that the small break topicals 21 have considered the worst possible conditions 22 (i.e.,
loss of off-site power).
Our inability to l
23 respond conclusively to such an inquiry could result l
rx 24 in the NRC derating or shutting down all of B&W's
- }
v 25 177 fuel assembly operating plants (except SMUD)
l 1
Swanson 284 n
t
\\
(s/
2 until the issue is resolved."
3 Do you recall that what Mr. Cartin was 4
talking about and the general discussions that lll 5
you testified to in response to Mr. Seltzer's 6
questions yesterday concerning possibly derating or 7
shutting down of B&W plants related to this proposed 1
8 change that was being discussed in item 6 that 9
Toledo Edison wanted to make?
10 A
Sobe of this is extremely vague.
11 I don't understand Lou's statement "If questioned 12 by the NRC, however, B&W must be in a position O(_)
13 to state that the small break topicals have 14 considered the worst possible conditions (i.e.,
loss 15 of of f-site power). "
16 I don't really understand that because 17 the topicals were submitted with that as an 18 analysis assumption.
So it puzzles me some.
19 Q
Was it your understanding that you did 20 have discussions with Mr.' Cartin about the need 21 to have in place a completed ECCS analysis for the 22 change that Toledo Edison was proposing to make 23 in item 6 before it was made so that B&W could have
(~
24 a response for the NRC in the event questions were Y_J
\\
25 asked?
1 Swanson 285 2
A Well, I have a vague recollection that i
3 we did want an ECCS analysis with pumps running at 4
the two-foot steam generator level for Toledo.
4 lll 5
Q Now, there has been a good deal of 6
discussion during yesterday's questioning about 7
the so-called pumps running issue.
8 Could you tell us in your own words i
9 what you understood was the concern in late 10 1978 about pumps running?
11 A
Well, I think --
12 MR. SELTZER:
Wait a second.
This has
(
13 beer, asked and answered yesterday and today, 14 and he explained just a few minutes ago today 15 that there is increased heat transfer when the
+
16 pumps are running compared to natural 17 circulation, so the issue is that with the 18 pumps on, there is more cooling down and more 19 contraction of the primary inventory.
20
- Why do we have to hear this a third time?
21 MR. WISE:
I think I am entitled to put O
22 my examination in the order and format that 23 I desire.
I don't think your objection is 24 well founded and why don't we just wrap it up.
l (s.
(-
l 25 We are close to the end.
9
+
y
. -=-
r i---w+
-*w=
-w,
+ - - -
--,-,-----+-------+w-t
-e
-c-e
\\
l
~
l Swanson 286 g(,)
2 MR. SELTZER:
I am going to have 3
redirect now.
4 THE WITNESS:. What was the question?
lll 5
(guestion read back.)
6 A
At least for Toledo there was no 7
analysis to support a move to a low setpoint with 8
the pumps running.
9 Also, I vaguely recall that as a result 10 of knowing that there was no analysis for Toledo, 11' we also begin to realize that there was an absence
\\
12 of analysis with the pumps running.
)
t(9
)
13 In general, I don't recall -- I say t
14 "we" in the context of B&W or several people 15 at B&W -- I don't recall that I had a particular
'16 worry about not having an analysis with RC pumps 17 running.
18
.I do know that it's unanalyzed and
\\
~
i 19 I believe at that time I had thought that with the i
i
\\
20 RC pumps running, the plant would be better than i
21 if the RC pumps were off as the way most ECCS analysea 22 had been performed in th'e past or all ECCS analyses 23 had been performed in the past.
24 Q
Back in the fall of 1978 when you were em I
L/
25 considering the need to prepare an analysis for ECCS 1
I T
i L
i
(
r 1
1 Swanson 287
.mk,)
2 purposes with the pumps running, did you at that 3
time consider the case of the pumps running for a 4
portion of the time that the LOCA was in progress llh 5
and then being shut off in the midst of it?
6 A
Not as I recall.
7 It seems to me that a concern that grew 8
out of this Toledo was that we just did not have 9
an analysis for the pumps running without 10 interruption.
11 Q
Had the pumps off been analyzed for 12 ECCS purposesh I
()
13 A
The normal way of performing an ECCS 14 analysis is for loss of off-site power which 15 includes the RC pumps turned off.
16 Q
Are you aware of any analysis that has 17 been performed through today that shows chat for 18 ECCS purposes, the pumps running throughout the 19 accident, that is, without being shut off at any 20 point during the accident, is a worse case than the 21 pumps being off from the beginning of the accident?
22
.MR.
SELTZER:
I don't think there is l
23 any foundation that Eric Swanson has reviewed 24 all the pumps running analyses.
g S-V l
25 MR. WISE:
I just asked him whether he l
. c l
l
t 1
Swanson 2e9 O
\\/
2 personally is aware of any such analysis.
MR. SELTZER:
All right.
3 4
A Right off the top of my head I can't lll r ecall ne unless it was included in the blue book 5
6 analyses that were made after Three Mile Island, and if it was included in that, I have read the 7
8 entire blue book.
9 It's my impression, though, that if the 10 pumps continue to run that the plant is as safe as 11 if the pumps are off or maybe even safer.
4 12 Q
Now, you did hear about the TMI accident
()
13 af ter it happened, I think everybody's heard about it.
14 MR. SELTZER:
As opposed to before it 15 happened,7 16 A
I heard of the Three Mile Island accident.
17 Q
Did you become aware of what the 18 operators did wi~th the reactor coolant pumps during 19 the course of the accident?
20 A
Yes, I am abundantly aware of what 21 happened.
L 22 Q
I take it you are aware they turned off 23 the reactor coolant pumps while the loss of coolant
~
24 accident was still in progress?
l'
(.-
25 A
That's' correct.
l' i
,m...
1 Swanson 289 O)
(,
2 Q
Are you aware that after the accident 3
an analysis was performed to determine for ECCS 4
purposes what happens during a LOCA if the pumps lll 5
are run for some period of time and then shut off?
6 A
I am aware of that analysis.
7 Q
Are you aware of anybody who thought 8
of doing that type of analysis at B&W before the 9
Three Mile Island accident?
10 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
There is no 11 foundation that this witness was staying in 12 touch with the ECCS analysis people to find,
()
13 out what they were contemplating or weren't 14 contemplating about how to study the pumps 15 running case.
16 Q
You may answer the question.
17 A
To my knowledge, no.
18 Q
Do you have any knowledge as to what 19 the analyses after the Three Mile Island accident l
l 20 showed concerning the case where the reactor 21 coolant pumps were run for some portion of the 9.-
22 loss of coolant' accident and then shut off in the 23 midst?
24 A
Yes, I am.
What happens is as long as
. V( ^ g 25 the reactor coolant pumps continue to run, they tend
,e
-+
--r-+,,,,mc-e-<
, - - + -,---4,,
e-
1 Swanson 290 2
to circulate a relatively homogenous two-phase 3
mixture from through the core and to the 4
steam generators where heat can be removed and llh 5
when the reactor coolant pumps stop, the water 6
separates from the steam, from the steam water 7
mixture, and settles in the low points of the vessel 8
and of the loops and steam rises to the top portions 9
of the loop.
10 In the case of Three Mile Island, there 11 was not a sufficient amount of water remaining 12 after the reactor coolant pumps were stopped to O)
(_
13 cover the water.
14 Q
Putting aside Three Mile Island, 15 with respect to the analyses that were performed i
16 after the Three Mile Island accident, are you aware 17 of what they showed concerning the range of break 18 sizes that would result in the worst case for a 19 situation in which the pumps were run for some 20 portion of the accident and then shut off in the 21 mids t of it?
22 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
I don't think 23 that presenting to the court through this t
{~/}
24 witness is going to be a very effective way s
25 of presenting what these post-accident running l
1 Swanson 291
,a
(_,)
2 analyses showed.
3 We haven't got them in f r-o n t of him.
4 He didn't author them.
He is testifying based ll) 5 on vague recollection of what they showed.
6 The documents are going to be the best 7
evidence of it.
His testimony is second best, 8
at best.
9 What's the point?
It's 5:00 o' clock.
10 MR. WISE:
I am just about through.
11 MR. SELTZER:
I am not going to be able 12 to redirect today if you keep on with this,,
(O 13 and it's not going to be very persuasive in gv 14 court.
15 I can't believe that this is how you are 16 going to show the judge what the pumps running 17 analyses showed.
18 MR. WISE:
If you don't think it is 19 important, you will have very little on 20 redirect.
21 Q
Did you learn anything about the range 22 of break sizes that were reviewed in this type 23 of analysis?
24 fw MR. SELTZER:
I object.
This testimony Nj 25 is not the best evidence of the pumps running Y
1 292 Swanson 2
analysis?
3 A
I did review the analyses.
I did 4
read them and there is a spectrum of break sizes lll 5
that if the reactor coolant pumps are turned off 6
even though HPI injection continues, that the 7
liquid level in the core will be lower than the 8
top of the core.
And the level in the core will vary 9
depending on the break size itself.
10 Q
Is the size of the pilot operated relief 11 valve or the break that an open pilot operated 12 -
relief valve represents within the range of break,
()
13 sizes that causes the problem that you have just 14 described?
15 A
As best I can recall, it's smaller 16 than the smallest b.reak size in that spectrum.
17 Q
After the accident, did you come to 18 learn whether any of the other pressurized water 19 reactor vendors had performed analyses for the 20 pumps running, pumps off, pumps running and then off 21 situations?
22 A
I do recall that the NRC asked Westinghouse i
23 and Combustion Engineering to submit analyses for 24 the case where pumps were running and then turned l l% ~
25 off for their plants, l
f
l 1
Swanson O
2 Q
Do you know'whether B&W's analysis 3
was submitted before the analyses for Westinghouse 4
and Combustion Engineering?
lh 5
A As I recall it, B&W was the first 6
vendor to become aware of this loss of pumps at 7
some intermediate time and the concerns about the 8
core liquid level.
9 Q
And that was after the accident?
10 A
Yes, this was after Three Mile Island.
11 MR. HISE:
That's all I have.
12 BY MR. SELTZER-()
13 Q
Don't you know that before the Three 14 Mile Island accident, Westinghouse was s1 ready 15 requiring its operators to trip the reactor coolant 16 pumps at the start of a transient?
17 A
I am not aware of that.
I would be 18 surprised if they were requiring it for.any transient.
19 Q
Would it surprise you that they were
- 20 requiring it before the Three Mile Island accident, 21 for the same transients,that B&W only began to require 22 it after the Three Mile Island accident?
23 A
Yes, it would surprise me.
{J')
24 Q
You testified that you don't think 25 B&W even considered doing an analysis of delayed
1 Swanson 294 eg 2
loss of off-site power after the start of a transient 3
until after the Three Mile Island accident, is that 4
right?
h 5
A I don't recall that.
Some other people 6
in B&W that I was not necessarily in contact 7
with may have considered it.
l 8
Q Well, here is a memo to you, May 16, 9
1977, that indicates the NRC was asking for such an 10 analysis in 1977.
It's Jones to Speight of licensing 11 copied to Mr. Swanson, subject:
"NUREG Issue #4,"
12 May 16, 1977.
13 (Two-page handwritten memorandum to 14 W.
R.
Speight from R.
C.
Jones dated 5/16/77, 15 subject:
"NUREG Issue #4," marked GPU 16 Exhibit No. 597 for identification as of 17 this date.)
18 Q
All I am going to ask you, does GPU 19 597 refresh your recollection that B&W was 20 giving consideration in 1977 to the issue of delayed 21 loss of off-site power following a LOCA?
22 A
Do you also have a copy of this letter 23 Denny Ross to Ken Suhrke?
N'~)g 24 Q
I don't think we have that.
25 A
Well, I don't remember this letter, but
295 1
Swanson
,/m.
(
)
2 it does jog my memory and I would -- it may help me 3
to see this letter from Denny Ross to Ken Suhrke.
4 I may have been wrong in what I said a minute ago.
llh 5
I may have been aware of it.
6 Q
You may have been aware that B&W was 7
considering delayed loss of of f-site power following 8
a loss of coolant accident?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
And you may have been aware of it in 11 19777 12 A
Yes.
The recollection I was going th, rough O()
13 was trying to come out of these Toledo memos and 14 it does not jog my memory.
15 Q
This adds something that wasn't in the 16 Toledo memo?
17 A
Yes, it adds a time so 18 Q
Now, you were writing to Spangler in i
l 19 Nove mbe r '78 saying that you thought pumps running i
l 20 might come out as a worse case than pumps off, and you l
l g
21 got something from Jones to that same effect in early W
22 December.
I 23 At some point in time after those two l
(~')
24 memos, you said your very good friend Bert Dunn
\\_,)
25 told you that he thought pumps running might be a
1 Swanson 296 2
better case than pumps off.
l 3
Are you ready for the question?
4 MR. WISE:
I think he may be objecting lh 5
to your restatement of what was said and 6
what the testimony was.
7 Why don't you just put your question?
8 MR. SELTZER:
That's not part of the i',
9 question.
That's just R.
Seltzer talking.
10 A
Break'your question down in littler 11 pieces.
12 Q
This is the question:
i 13 At the time that your very good friend 14 -
Bert Dunn told you that although it hadn't been 15 analyzed, he thought that pumps running was 16 a better case than pumps not running following a 17 LOCA.
18 Had you ever seen any study of the 19 ability of those massive reactor coolant pumps 20 to continuously run during a loss of coolant 21 accident?
22 A
I do have some background in pumps, pump 23 design, myself.
24 I think that I would not have I have 25 not seen anything.
I probably would not have seen
i I
1 Swanson 297 O-2 a study.
More likely, the best evidence 3
would-have been a pump test, and I do not recall 4
a pump test'.
f h
5 Q
When Bert Dunn told you that he 6
thought, although it hadn't been analyzed, that 7
pumps running was a better situation than pumps 8
not running, did you ask him whether he had done any 9
pump tests or asked anybody to verify that the 4
10 pumps could keep running with the increasingly 11 high void fractions that would develop during a loss 12 of coolant accident?
13 MR. WISE:
I guess I will object to 14 the form of the question in that I am not 15 sure what you mean by "high void' fractions i
I 16 that would develop during the course of a 17 LOCA."
18 You are assuming that saturation --
i 19 MR. SELTZER:
I mean increasing steam 20 quantity as more liquid is emptied from the 21 reactor coolant system.
22 MR. WISE:
I wouldn't debate with l
23 you.
I will just state that's.not my I
24
- understanding of what happened.
25 A
I don't remember.
- =,,
w c
4-rr-,r W
r a
<**,---<r-
-+-.,r
..r%++
%<ai-.
,-e,
,..---e
- --=cv ew-.-wr--,,
e.-&-r-,--,-me-
i Swanson 298 (m) 2 Q
Now, you said, and this is my final 3
area of questioning, that you encouraged Kelly to 4
write his November 1,
1977 memo in order to remind lll 5
the operators that they should follow their 6
procedures rather than taking the action that the 7
Davis-Besse operators had taken.
8 I would like you to look at GPU 76, 9
which is Kelly's memo, and tell me where in there 4.
10 is there anything that reminds the operators to 11 follow their existing procedures.
12 A
There is no words exactly like that.,
f~)
13 Q
Are there words which you think in G
I4 substance tell the operators " Follow your existing 15 procedures" as opposed to follow some new 16 guidelines that you and Kelly have come up with?
17 A
There are n'o words in there that relate 18 "to existing procedures.
19 MR. SELTZER:
I have no further questions.
20 BY MR. WISE:
21 Q
Was it your understanding that the 22 guidelines included in Mr. Kelly's memo were l
l 23 consistent with the existing procedure as best you 24 unde rstood them?
p-i
\\.,/
'^
25 MR. SELTZER:
Object; it's leading and w
4 1
Swanson ggg 4
.()
2 there is no foundation that this witness 3
even looked at'the existing procedures or 4
asked anybody else to look at the existing l
lll 5
procedures to answer a question like that.
6 Q
You may answer the question.
7 A
I think I had stated earlier today that 8
I probably had not looked at Toledo procedures, 9
but had thought, I had no doubt that the procedures 10 covered LOCA and that HPI should be turned on 11 for LOCAs, and the reason I asked or Joe and I 12 talked about issuing this memo was based on I thi.nk,
(
13 a word I used earlier was the faith that they had 14 been trained to use HPI for LOCAs.
15 MR. WISE:
I have no further questions.
16 BY MR. SELTZER:
17 Q
You worked on the ATOG program in some I'
18 respects, right?
4 19 A
Yes.
20 Q
There is nothing in Joe Kelly's 21-prescriptions that would require the operators 22 to recognize that they had a LOCA in order to apply 23 his GPU Exhibit 76 prescriptions, is there?
j 24 A
Not specifically.
These' deal with 25 stabilization, plant stabilization based on l
l'
. ~ ~.
1 Swanson 300 O)
(_
2 symptoms in the reactor coolant system.
3 Q
So unlike the procedures that you took 4
on faith as being in effect in 1977, Joe Kelly in llh 5
your prescription in GPU 76 does not require the 6
operators to recognize the existence of a LOCA in 7
order to know how to handle high pressure injection, 8
isn't that right?
9 MR. WISE:
Objection to the form.
10 The witness may answer it.
11 A
What it says is once high pressure 12 injection is on, understand the operators -- the.
()
13 operators should understand the symptoms of plant 14 stability and only then, once he has achieved a 15 stable plant, is he allowed to terminate high 16 pressure injection.
17 Q
The operator did not have to recognize
.18 that he had a LOCA in order to apply the Kelly 19 guidelines for operation of high pressure injection, 20 right?
21 A
Well, high pressure injection is turned 22 on for LOCAs, for small break LOCAs, so the point 23 here is once it's turned on for any reason, LOCA, r-24 or it could be overcooling, or it could be some Y
25 other reason, do not turn it off until you have a 1
,.e..
n
1 Swanson 301 2
symptom that allows you to turn it off or evidence 3
that it can be turned off.
4 4
Q In other words, the operator did not ggg 5
have to recognize what events had caused HPI to go 6
on in order to apply Kelly's rules correctly for 7
the operation of high pressure injection, isn't 8
that true?
9 A
It's not explicit in this memo.
10 Q
What is not explicit in this memo, what 11 I just said?
12 A
Yes.
()
13 Q
It's implicit, isn't it?
14 The operator following these 15 guidelines does not have to determine what i
16 has caused the high pressure injection to go on 17 in order to know what the rules should be for the 18 termination of high pressure injection, isn't that 19 a fact?
20 MR. WISE:
Do you understand the question 21 at this point?
22 THE WITNESS:
I think so.
I 23 A
And it's not explicit in this memo.
24 This memo is not cause and effect.
It's mostly 25 for termination.
It doesn't go through the whole
1 Swanson 2
business of LOCAs and other things.
It does not.
3 Q
It doesn't direct the operator to 4
determine whether a LOCA, an overcooling event hl 5
or any other kind of specific event has caused the 6
automatic actuation of high pressure injection, 7
does it?
8 A
It's not explicit in here as to the 9
cause of why high pressure injection came on.
10 Q
In that sense it's consistent with the 11 format of the ATOG procedures, right?
12 A
Well, the ATOG procedures are much mare,
4
()
13 extensive than this, O.K.?
So this would -- well, 14 the ATOG procedures have evolved considerably 15 since this, but this would only be a small part 16 and as a part of the ATOG procedures, we do have l
17 guidance for recognizing a LOCA and differentiating IO a LOCA from other possible events.
19 Q
It's a fact, isn't it, that you don't 20 have to diagnose the upset condition as a LOCA in 21 order to know what is the correct rule for leaving 22 high pressure injection on and for terminating 23 high pressure injection under the post-TMI accident l
(^3 24 guidelines issued by B&W7
(_).
25 (Question read back.)
1 Swanson 303 n
i
(_.)
2 A
We have some very specific rules in there for -- and one is called the HPI cooling rule 3
4 for starting HPI, and we have some guidance in llk 5
there for throttling and terminating HPI.
6 Q
And those rules or guidelines for when 7-to throttle HPI are not dependent on the operator 8
identifying the event that has initiated the transient, 9
isn't that right?
10 A
Well, I think you can't quote or refer 11 to specific sections of the ATOG piece by piece.
12 The ATOG is written as an integral pi,ece_of r's
( )
13 information and part 2 especially is a training 14 chapter that covers the entire aspect of core 15 cooling and heat removal from the steam generator.
16 And included in the ATOG is an HPI cooling rule.
17 There are rules for HPI throttling. There is also 18 information that is included in there to allow the 19 operator to diagnose or differentiate a LOCA 20 from other events, so taken in its entirety, 21 there is information in there on how to recognize 1
22 a LOCA and other things, too.
23 MR. WISE:
Mr. Seltzer, I have allowed f'N 24 this to go on, but I think this was an area I
LJ 25 that was not at all touched upon in my
l 1
Swanson 304 2
cross-examination.
3 I don't want to cut you off, but this 4
really does seem to be getting into some new h
5 area.
6 MR. SELTZER:
I was going to cut 7
the witness off if you didn't jump in.
I 4
8 think we have gone through ATOG fairly 9
well with Joe Kelly who is sometimes thought 10 of as the father of ATOG, although he was 11 generous in acknowledging your role in the 12 creation.
13 I don't think we need to keep Mr. Swanson.
14 Thank you, Eric.
15 (Time noted:
5:20 p.m.).
16
'ERIC SWANSON 17 i
18 Subscribed and sworn to 13 before me this day 20 of 1982.
21 e
1 22 24
- O 2,
.-..--..---.--.---.----..-.------.--..-----.-------------J
1 305
()
CERTIFICATE
(_ /
2 STATE OF NEW YORK
)
3
- ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 ig I,
NANCY A.
Rtin0PrJr
, a Notary Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the continued deposition of 7
ERIC SWANS 0?!
was taken before me on JULY 22. 1982 consisting 9
of pages 142 through 306 I further certify that the witness had been'previously sworn and that the within,
(~/')
transcript is a true record of said testimony; x_
13 That I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the counsel.
18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 17th day of AUGUST
,1982.
21 22
& ($ / 0 w /
Ab 23 V
NANCY A.OttUDOLPH j
,7 ss 25
s.
306 e
O
_I._N.D E I-
?
WITNESS EXAMINATION BY PAGE ERIC SWANSON RICHARD C.
SELTZER 144 EXHI B I TS DEFENDANTS' PAGE 594 Memo dated Ap.ril 10,1979, subject: " Operating.
Instructions for Struck Open j
Power Operated Relief valve" 209 595 Resume of Eric Swanson 217 596 Four-page document, first page a memo dated 9/20/74 to R.F.
Ryan and others from J.R.
Burris 220 597 Two-page handwritten memoran-i dum to W.R.
Speight from R.C.
j Jones dated 5/16/77, subject:
"NUREG Issue 94 294 f
+
I f
1 1
t I
L l
I I.. '
k m,
1
~.
,l il'-
~
_1
'..u:
, ws.M1-ia h -
'~
^
.