ML20072H813
| ML20072H813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1982 |
| From: | Zewe W GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-06, TASK-1, TASK-2, TASK-6, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290756 | |
| Download: ML20072H813 (20) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
('
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION,
,=
JERGEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVAHIK ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)
-against-k THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
E
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Continued deposition of GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION, by WILLIAM H.
ZEWE, taken by Defendants, pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esqs.,
One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York, on Thursday, May 27, 1982, at 9:20 o' clock in the forenoon, be' fore Harvey B.
Kramer, a Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
8306290756 820527 PDR ADOCK 05000289 T
pg (O.
(_,)
DO'YLE REPORTING. INC.
CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 lex NGTON AVENUE WALTER SH APIRO, C.S.R.
NEW Yon x. N.Y.
10o17 CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
TELEPHONE 212 - 867-8220
1 647 OU-2 Appe ara nc e s:
3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, New York
(
5 By:
DAVID KLINGSBERG, ESQ.,
6 of Counsel 7
8 9
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
Attorneys for Defendants 10 One Chase Manhattan Plaza t ew York, New York 11 By:
ROBERT B. FISKE, ESQ.
12 WILLIAM E.
WURTZ, ESQ.
-and-13 RODMAN W.
BENEDICT, ESQ.,
14 of Counsel 15 16 KILLIAN & GEPHART, ESQS.
Attorneys for the Witness 17 Box 886 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 18 By:
KEVIN WALSH, ESQ.,
19 of Counsel 20 i
21 I
~
22 Also Present:
23 JONATHAN QUINN, Law Assistant Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esqs.
25
1 648 2
- ZEWE, resumed, having 3
been previously duly sworn, was examined and 4
testified further as follows:
(
5 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
6 BY MR. FISKE:
7 Q
Mr. Zewe, continuing with this period of 8
time between the reactor trip and the time that you 9
left to go down to the turbine room, did any additional 10 personnel from Met Ed come into the con, trol room during 11 that period?
12 A
Yes.
f)
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13 Q
can you tell us who they were?
14 A
Ken Bryan came into the control room,.
15 Q
What was his position at Met Ed at that e
1,6 time?
t 17 A
Shift supervisor.
l l
18 Q
He held the same title you did?
19 A
Yes, he did.
l 20 Q
For Unit 27 21 A
Yes, he did.
k" 22 Q
Do you know.how it came about that 23 Mr. Bryan happened to come into the control room?
()
24 A
I had asked him to come over.
l Q
And at what point during this period did you 25
I 4
1 Zewe 649
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ask him to come over?
3 A
I don't recall exactly when, but it was 4
very early, within the first four or five minutes.
C>
5 Q
Why did you ask Mr. Bryan to come over?
6 A
He had recently been promoted to shift 7
supervisor.
And most of his experience as a control 8
room operator and as a shift foreman was in Unit 1,
9 and I felt that he could gain some valuable experience 10 in Unit 2 with the turbine and reactor (trip and the 11 recovery that I anticipated.
12 Q
You mean you were asking him to come over
(~3 s/
13 so that this could be a learning experience for him?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
Was any part of your reason for asking him 16 to come over the thought that he might be able to be 17 helpful to you and the others in handling.this 18 transient?
19 A
I guess I thought in the back $1f my mind 20 that having a knowledgeable individual certainly 21 wouldn't be a hindrance, but I thought more in terms 22 of him gaining experience, more so than him providing 23 me with help.
But I certainly don't remember ruling
[)T 24 out that possibility.
25 Q
Where was Mr. Bryan?
1 Zewe 650 0
2 A
In Unit 1.
3 Q
Was he on duty over there?
4 A
Yes, he was.
(
5 Q
Did you personally put the call in to him 6
to ask him to come over?
7 A
No.
I had asked for him to be contacted 8
and to come over.
9 Q
Now, did anyone else come into the control 10 room between the time of the reactor trip and the 11 time you left to go down to the turbine room?
12 d
Yes, there was.
1 i
/
13 Q
Who else?
14 A
There were two nuclear engineers, i
15 Q
What were their names?
16 A
At the time I did not know their names.
l 17 I had seen them around but I wasn't that familiar with 18 them.
I know now that one of them was Kevin Harkles.
l 19 Q
H-a-r --
20 A
-- k-1-e-s.
21 Q
All right.
What was the other one's name?
22 A
I can picture his face, but I can't think 23 of his name right now.
(
24 Q
And these were Met Ed people?
25 A
They were Met Ed people.
At the time I
1 Zewe 6.53
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2 was.not certain if they were Met Ed people or if they 3
w rked for B&W at the time.
4 Q
But you now know that they worked for
(
5 Met Ed?
6 A
That is my understanding now, that at that 7
time they did work for Met Ed.
8 Q
What were the circumstances under which 9
they came to the control room?
10 A
They arrived about the same time as 11 Mr. Bryan did.
I did not ask for them to come over.
12 In fact, I wasn't sure that they were even over in O
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13 Unit 1.
I can only assume that they came over to 14 observe the trip recovery.
15 Q
Did they come over with Mr. Bryan?
16 A
That I'm not sure of, if they came with 17 him or after him.
18 I do not recall them arriving before 19 Mr. Bryan.
As I remember, they came eithe'r with or 20 after.
21 Q
Was part of your idea in asking Mr. Bryan 22 to come over that he could sort of watch the way you i
23 as a shift supervisor handled this kind of a transient?
24 A
That was certainly part of it.
I felt 25 that he could gain something from the experience on i
1 Zewe 652 O
\\_J 2
watching how our particular shift and me particularly 3
handled the event; and if we had any observations or 4
questions, I could try to help him out.
(
5 Q
As part of your philosophy of running a 6
shift during a transient, did you feel that it was 7
important that the operators and the foreman and the 8
shift supervisor exchanged information as the 9
transient was progressing so that, to the maximum 10 extent possible, each person would know what the 11 others do?
12 A
I believe that's essential, yes.
' ')
13 Q
And in the course of making this a learning 14 experience for Mr. Bryan, did you try to include him 15 in that process on the morning of March 28, 19797 e
16 A
I certainly did, i
17 By the time Mr. Bryan had arrived, I had l
18 tried to relay to him the plant status and what I was i
19 going to do, what had happened, and everything related 20 to that morning.
21 Q
And when we left off on yesterday, we were 22 talking about the decision that was made to turn off 23 the sump pumps shortly before you went down to the 24 turbine room.
25 A
Yes, I remember that.
I I.
1 Zewe 653 2
Q Did you tell Mr. Bryan about that decision?
3 A
I d n't recall that part[cular point being 4
made, though I feel that he was aware of it.
More
(
5 so than me telling him directly, he was following 6
what,was going on, and I feel he should have made that 4
7 observation, if not directly.
8 Q
From discussions or observations or 9
whatever, was Mr. Bryan also aware of the fact that 10 the water in the sump had come from the drain tank?
11 MR. KLINGSBERG:
When you say was Bryan 12 aware, do you mean did the witness tell Bryan I
k 13 or did Bryan say something to him?
14 MR. FISKE:
Fine, that is fair enough.
15' Q
Did you or anyone else in your presence 16 discuss with Mr. Bryan the fact that the water in 17 the sump was coming from the drain tank?.
18 A
As I recall, he was involved in most, if 19 not all, of the conversations that were conducted 20 between myself and the operating shift, though I do 21 not recall that particular point being discussed.
.~
22 Q
Were the conditions that were' existing 23 in the drain tank inctrumentation panel -- that is,
()
24 the high temperature and low pressure.and low level 25 were they discussed with Mr. Bryan during this period?
1e 1
Zewe 654 1
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A My answer is the same, that ensrally I 2j li' believe that he was. aware of all the discussions that i
3 I
4 we had made.
But I don't recall individual points
([
5 about the drain tank being discussed by themselves 6
that stand out.
7 Q
Now, Mr. Zewe, during this period'of time 8
between the reactor trip and the tine ' that jou ven,t.
/
i-9 to go down to the turbine room,, you didLknow that<the -
10 PORV had lifted as part of the seqdence of events 11 leading to the reactor trip, did you nct?
"t had _
12 A
That is correct.
I felt that i
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13 lifted and had reseated.
. s
- ;.t 14 Q
You knew, I think as you castified i
3
/
3 16 j yesterday, that there1was a pipe that rar.;dirgetly
- ]
16 from the PORV to the drain tank; ccrrect?
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17 A
-Yes.
That pipe was joined'by,tha pipe's
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18
- from the code safety valves, and they all the.'
a 19 Proceeded to the dra'in, tank' its elf _ dir.e c tl'y.
20 Q
Now, whe'n you learned that the~
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sump was 31 full as a result of water which had come from the 22 drain tank, did you consider the possibility that the 23 PORV might have failed tc.,close?
(
24 A
No, because at that point.I had concluded I
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- that the PORV, from my indication, was closed.
I felt
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1 Zewe 655 x(
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that it had been open and p,ossibly that a code safety 3
valve had lifted, but that they were in fact at that 4
time closed.
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5 g
And what was the indication upon which
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6 you had based your conclusion that the PORV in fact E'
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7 closed?
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8
.A The items that I used in making my.
t 9
evaluation and determination that the PORV was closed
?,'
10 were that the indicating light for the';PORV indicated
'E 11 to me that the valve was closed.
Pressurizer level
't 12 indicated high.
And I would expect that if I were s
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13 losing inventory, that the pressurizer level would a
14 indicate a reduction in pressurizer level.
15 Pressure was though low, it was holding 16 fairly constant, and I felt that if there was a loss 17 of inventory occurring, that the pressure would 18 continue to go down.
19 Also, I had asked Mr. Bryan to find out 20 for me what the discharge temperatures were on the 21 relief lines downstream of the code safeties and the
' l. (.
22 PORV.
And the temperatures that he gave me, I
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23 evaluated that they were warm but that they were
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24 cooling off and that they were lower than what they 25 would be if the valve was still open.
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i l-656 1
Zewe (D
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Using all of these items, I concluded that 3
the valve was shut.
4 Q
Did you reach a conclusion at that time as
('
5 to where the water in the drain tank had come from 6
that had caused the tank to rupture?
7 A
We always maintained a desired high level 8
in the drain tank on a normal basis.
And I knew that 9
the PORV had lifted, and I suspected that maybe a 10 code safety valve had lifted.
And if that was the 11 case, that we could have caused a fault in the tank 12 due to them both lifting, and that the water that was O
13 in the tank originally plus the water that was in the 14 sump from other sources plus the inventory that was 15 lost when the valves did lift was the source of the 16 water, but that it had stopped and that it was just 17 stagnant in the sump after we secured the, sump pumps.
18 Q
I believe you have testified previous to 19 today, Mr. Zewe -- and I would be happy to 'show it to j
20 you if you would like to see it -- that at the time 21 you were going through this diagnostic process as to L
22 what had caused the water in the drain tank to go 23 into the sump, you felt that either the relief valve
()
24 had lifted in the drain tank, the rupture disk had 25 blown on the. drain tank, or there had been some other
e 1
ZeW8 657
(
2 hole opened in the tanks is that correct?
t 3
A As I remember, that is correct, yes.
4 Q
So you recognized that two of the
(
5 possibilities for the water leaving the drain tank 6
were that the relief valve had lifted or,that the 7
rupture disk had blown; correct?
8 A
Yes.
I g
Q Isn't it a fact that in the course of 10 your training at Met Ed, you had learned that it would 11 not be expected that the rupture disk on the drain 12 tank would blow from a normal opening and closing of 4
4 13 the PORV?
14 A
My understanding was, on a normal opening 15 that it would not rupture, that is correct.
16 Q
Wasn't it also your understanding that on 17 a normal opening and closing of the PORV,.that you-18 would not expect the pressure in the drain tank to go 19 up to the point where the relief valve lift'ed?
i 20 A
That is true, with just thq PORV lifting 21 in a normal opening and closing without a code safety l
22 valve lifting, I would not expect the relief valve j
23 to lift.
()
24 Q
Let me show you, Mr. Zewe, an exhibit that 25 has previously been marked as B&W 664, which consists
1 Zewe 658 2
of Pages from the FSAR filed by Met Ed with the t
3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Unit 2.
4 Was 'it part of your training at Met Ed
(
5 to review the FSAR which Met Ed had filed with the 6-NRC7 7
A Yes, it was.
~
8 Q
And did you make an effort in the course 9
of your years at Met Ed to review the FSAR?
10 A
Yes, I did.
t 11 Q
Were there any portions of it that you 12 didn't review?
O k/
13 A
The level of detail that I reviewed 14 various portions of the FSAR vary.
15 Q
But all of them received some review.
16 A
I did look at all of them, yes, 17 Q
Directing your attention to page 5 -
- well, 18 it is Section 5.5.11.3 captioned " Safety Evaluation,"
19 do you see that?
20 A
Yes, I do.
21 Q
That is part of the section, is it not, L'
22 captioned " Rad Waste Disposal Reactor Coolant Leakage 23 Recovery System"?
(
24 A
Yes, it is.
25 Q
Did you understand that this particular
o 1
Zewe 659 2
section we are looking at now, 5.5.11.3, contains 3
int rmation about.the reactor coolant drain tank?
4 A
Yes, it does contain that information.
(
5 Q
Did you know, Mr. Zewe, before the 6
accident, from reading the FSAR or from any training 7
that you received independent of actually reading the 8
FSAR, that you could add 3500 pounds to the drain 9
tank from the pressurizer safety and relief valves 10 before the drain tank reached the temperature of 11 193 degrees Fahrenheit at a pressure of 46 psig?
12 MR. KLINGSBERG:
What it says is,
\\,s 13 "Following the addition the tank will reach."
14, MR. FISKE:
Yes.
i 15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
A slight variation.
t n
16 A
I don't recall having that knowledge.
L 17 Q
Did you have any understanding of the 18 amount, of the number of pounds of discharge that it I
19 would take from the top of the pressurizerto raise I
l 20 the drain tank temperature to 193. degrees at a pressure
-21 of 46 psig?
f 22.
A I did not.
1,
)
23 -
Q The first sentence of this section of the 24 FSAR, Mr. Zewe, says, "The rad waste disposal reactor l
25 coolant leakage recovery system is slated to i
i
. _. _ _ _ _ _.. _.. ~.. - _. _. _ _ _
1 Zewe 660 2
accommodate 30 gallons per minute leakage from the 3
reactor coolant system and maintain the reactor 4
coolant drain tank at 126 degrees Fahrenheit."
(
5 Do you see that?
6 MR. KLINGSBERG:
That was " sized."
4 7
MR. FISKE:
" Sized."
Thank you.
4 i
8
'A Yes, I see that.
9 Q
Was it your understanding, before the 10 accident, that there was a leakage into,the drain 11 tank from the reactor coolant system in excess of 12 30 gallons per minute?
i 13 A
That was not my understanding.
14 Q
What was your understanding before the 15 accident as to the amount of leakage that would be 16 going into the drain tank from.the reactor coolant 1
17 system?
4 18 A
At that time I was aware of the numbers.
4 19 I am not at this point.
20 Q
It was supposed to be less than 10, wasn't 21 it?
22 A
As I recall, it should have been less than 23 10, yes.
i
' (
i 24 Q
Am I correct that if it was more than 10, 25 that you had.to go into some sort of a shutdown
.. ~...... _. _,.. _, _, - -. -. _ ~ _ - _.,., _ _ _,. _ _.,. ~... _
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6 1
Zewe 6.61 O'
2 procedure?
3 A
You had to evaluate the leak specs, make 4
a determination whether you were within the specs or
(
5 exceeding the specs, and then take appropriate action 6
accordingly.
7 Q
And you don't remember ever having gone 1
8 through that process in the week or so before the 9
accident?
10 A
I do remember going through the leakage 11 determination to make sure that we were within the 12 spec, yes.
~'s
(\\d 13 C
Right.
14 A
We do that as a rule every shift.
15 Q
I understand that.
But I think when we 16 covered this I believe earlier in the deposition, I i
17 believe you said earlier that if the leakage gets to l
l 18 a certain limit -- which I thought you said was 10 then you have to fol'1'ow certain 19 gallons per minute 20 steps in the procedure that may lead to a shutdown; i
31 correct?
22 A
That is correct.
23 Q
All I am saying is, in the week or so
[ )h 24 before the accident you didn't participate in any 25 of those steps in the procedure?
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Zewe ia 2
A That is true.
3 Q
Let me show you, Mr. Zewe, another section 4
of the FSAR which is 5.5.11.1, which is captioned
(
5
" Design Bases."
a I direct your attention to the sentence 7
near the bottom of the page that says, "The pilot-8 Operated relief valve discharges at 119,909 pounds per 9
hour."
10 1187 118,909 pounds per hour, which 11 according to our calculations is about 33 pounds per 12 second.
(~~'
13 were you aware, from reading the FSAR or 14 from any other training that you received at Met Ed, 15 that the pilot-operated relief valve discharges at 16 that rate?
17 A
I was aware that there was a design 18 discharge rate, though I did not commit that number 19 to memory.
20 Q
Was the understanding that you had of 21 the discharge rate, whether or not you had memorized 22 this specific number, in the general vicinity of that 23 number?
()
24 A
No, it wasn't.
I remembered that there 25 was a rate, but I did not think it was necessary to
=
i 1
Zewe 663 2
know that number or to be that close to the number 3
either.
I did not remember the number or close to it.
4 Q
Whether or not you were aware of the
(
5 exact numbers, did you know before the accident that 6
the amount of discharge that would go through the j
7 PORV in 15 seconds was less than 1/10 of the amount 8
which was necessary to raise the pressure in the drain g
tank up to 46 psi?
10 A
I did not, t
11 Q
Did you know that if the POR7 was open 4
4 12 for 10 seconds, that the amount of flow that would go 13 through was approximately 1/10 of the amount necessary l
to raise the pressure in the drain tank to 46 p si?
14 4
15 A
I did not.
I have already stated that 16 I didn't have a set value or even close to that 17 value, so to go on like this, I would say, no, that 18 I didn't know and I didn't have that knowiedge.
19 Q
You did k: w that the setpoint'for the 20 relief valve in the drain tank was 150 pounds per l
1 21 square inch, did you not?
A Yes, I did.
22 23 Q
There was a time, was there not, Mr. Zewe, 24 during the accident sequence, when the block valve 25 for the PORV.was closed?
1 Zewe 664
(~V) 2 A
Sometime that day?
3 Q
Yes.
4 A
Yes, it was.
(
5 Q
I think the chronology indicates that 6
occurred sometime around 6:17.
7 A
That was the first time that it was shut.
i 8
Q O.K.
9 A
And it was shut many times that day after 10 that.
t 11 Q
Let me a'sk you this.
At any time between 12 the reactor trip and the time the block valve was
~
13 closed at or about 6:17, did you make any effort to 14 determine what amount of flow would go through the 15 PORV in the course of a normal opening and closing?
16 A
As I recall, I felt that it was unnecessary 17 to try to do that calculation.
Therefore, I made no l
l 18 attempt'to do it.
f 19 Q
You said, Mr. Zewe, that at some time during i
20 '
this period between the reactor trip and the time you I
I 21 went to the turbine room you asked Mr. Bryan for the 22.
temperatures on the discharge lines?
t 23 A
As I recall, I did.
- [)
24 Q
Did you do that before or.after you l
%/
25 learned the information from the drain tank
1 Zewe 665 2
instrumentation?
4 A
I am n t sure.
3 4
Q Was part of your purpose in asking 5
Mr. Bryan for this information to determine whether 6
or not the code safeties or the PORV were open?
7 A
I don't recall thinking that I felt they 8
were open.
It was just one of the indications that 9
I thought that I would check on.
10 Q
I guess, putting it in its simplest terms, 11 why did you ask Mr. Bryan to get these temperature 12 readings?
s s-13 A
It was just part of the evaluation process 14 that I was undertaking during that time, and that 15 information I knew was available and I just wanted him 16 to look and to relate the numbers to me.
I I
17 Q
Are you telling us, Mr. Zewe, that it was I
i 18 not part of the reason for'asking Mr. Bryan to do that I
i 19 to determine whether or not the PORV might have failed 20 and stuck open?
MR. KLINGSBERG:
Objection to the question.
l 21 oo I think you asked the question and he answered i
23 it.
It is not a fair characterization to say T
what he is not telling.
24 MR. FISKE:
I think I will stick with the 25 i
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1 Zewe 666 2
-question.
3 Q
Do you want to hear it again?
4 A
No, I don't.
(
5 As I recall, I did not feel that it was 6
CPen, and I don't recall asking for it because I felt 7
that they were open.
I just requested the numbers 8
based on going through an eva'luation of' the primary 9
Plant.
Because the other indication did not indicate 10 that they were open or I would have certainly went to 11 that to verify that they were open if I thought that 12 they were open.
13 Q
You said that you did not eel that they 14 were opens, correct?
Is that what you just said?
15 A
It was my determination through my 16 evaluation that I had determined in my own mind that 17 the valves were not open.
18 Q
At the time that you asked Mr. Bryan for 19 these temperatures, did you have in your mind the 20 Possibility that the PORV might be open?
21 A
At that particular time, I don't recall 22 if I had that possibility or not, because as I remember, 23 I used all the indications that I talked about earlier 24 in reaching that conclusion, which included the 25
' tailpipe temperatures that I had at some point in
a L
f-2 1
Zewe 667
.m U
2 time.
3 Q
What method was there on the morning of 4
the accident for determining tailpipe temperatures?
i
( 'l 5
A Manually asking the computer to either 6
print it up on the utility typer or to use the 7
display window.
8 Q
We may or may not have covered this before.
9 Is the display window part of the computer?
10 A
Yes, it is, t
11 Q
What is the difference between the way 12
' the information is presented in the utility printer o
\\/
13 and in the display window?
14 A
On the display window, it is only capable 15
. of displaying one particular point.
And as that point 16 changes, it would just change the digital indicator 17 to reflect that change.
I 18 On the utility typer, it prints out 19 whatever points you ask for, and it only writes down j
20 that particular point valua at that time at which you 21 had asked for it.
22 Q
Each of
e methods for giving you 23 this information tve you the reading at the
)
24 particular point i that you had. asked for it?
25 A
Yes.
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1 Zewe 668 OV 2
You could also assign it to the CRT, where 3
you could assign more than one point.
There again, 4
it would update itself at any particular scan rate
(
5 that the computer was designed for.
6
.Q When you said "more than one point," what 7
did you mean by that?
8 A
I could ask for a series of points and 9
have them all displayed simultaneously.
10 Q
And you could also do that on the utility 11 printer?
12 A
The utility printer would only print up
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~
a 13 those particular points.that you had asked for.
14 It was possible to place them on what was 15 called scan mode.
You could ask for a time interval 16 of printing up any particular points or groups of 17 points.
18 Q
Did you understand that it was possible 19 on the morning of the accident to get the discharge 20 line temperatures on an analog trend recorder?
21 A
Yes.
The four analog trend recorders, 22 which are again part of the computer console which we 23 talked about the other day, it was also possible to put (O
_/
24 them on the trend recorders, too, yes.
25 Q
Did you consider, at any time between the
1 Zewe 669 3
d 2
reactor trip and the time when the block valve was 3
ci sed, placing the discharge line temperatures on 4
an analog trend recorder?
(
5 A
I did not.
6 Q
Do you know, Mr. Zewe, whether any 7
consideration was given to that by anyone else that 8
was in the control room during that period of time?
9 A
Not that I can recall.
10 Q
Do I understand correctly that the display 11 window method of showing the temperatures would 12 present them in a digital readout?
,,U 13 A
That is correct.
14 Q
So that you would see the temperature at 15 the moment you looked at it.
If you came back 10 16 minutes later and pressed it again, then you would get 17 the temperature 10 minutes later; right?
I 18 A
That is correct.
19 Q
And there would be no record of'what the 20 Previous temperature had been in that window?
i o1 A
That is true, s
22 Q
Now, am I correct that on the utility j
23 printer, that that types the information out on a piece
("h
( )
24 of paper?
25 A
Yes, it does.
1
=.
1 Zewe 670
(')T
~
2 Q
And so again, under the same situation that I was presenting a moment ago, if you asked for 3
4 the information from the utility printer, it would be
(
printed out; if you went back 10 minutes later and i
6 asked for the information again, the utility printer
~
7 would print out the second temperature.
Correct?
8 A
That is correct.
9 Q
But you would at that point have a written 10 record from the utility printer of what the temperature 11 had been 10 minutes previously?
12 A
Yes, you would.
13 Q
Was there any place in the control room 14 where the discharge line temperatures were dis, played 15 other than at the computer?
16 A
Yes, there was.
17 Q
Where was that?
18 A
If I recall, the multipoint recorder on 19 the panel underneath the reactor coolant p' ump 20 vibration.
21 Q
Maybe we had better look at the control 4
22 room diagram and you can show us where that is.
Do 23 you have that in front of you, Mr. Zewe?
24 A
Yes, I do.
25 Q
could you just tell us?
1 Zewe 673
/~%
(_) -
2 A
Right here.
Right in the left-hand portion 3
of the panel that has the arrow that says "RCP 4
vibration."
5 Q
Is there any place other than in the 6
computer where temperatures on the discharge lines 7
would be displayed in the control room?
8 A
Not that I am aware of.
9 Q
Is there any particular reason why it was 10 Mr. Bryan that you asked look at these temperatures for 11 you?
1 12 A
No parti,cular reason, o'ther than his
(
L 13 availability to accomplist : hat.
14 Q
'Do you remember, can you tell us where you f
15 were in the control room when you_ asked him to do 16 that?
17 A
I don't remember.
18 Q
Is there any reason that you didn't go 19 over and look at the information yourself LIn' stead of 20
.asking Mr. Bryan to,get it for you?
21 A
As I recall, I did not want to take the 22 time or d.4"ert my attention to do that.
23 Q
Mr. Bryan went over to the computer and 24 then gave you information concerning these temperatures?
25 A
As I recall, I assumed that he got it from t-e-
w
w e
->+ -
g n,
q-1
-e-v
P 1
Zewe 672 I
2 the computer because he came back within a short period of time and.he told me the numbers.
3 I did not watch him access the computer 4
k 5
or anything of that nature, but he.did relay the 6
numbers back to.me.
4 7
Q And what number did he give you for the g
discharge line for.the PORV?
A I don't recall the exact number for the 9
10 PORV.
t I remember the general range of all three 11 12 of them.
13 Q
Why don't we start with the PORV, if you 14 can give us that.
15 A
That's what I just said.
16 Q
Oh, I see.
4 17 A
I don't remember the PORV and.then RC-V3A 18 and 1B.
I remember a grouping that said dhey are 19 this, this and this, and I concluded that they are and th'ey were in the neighborhood, 20 all about the same 21 as I remember the first time that I had asked for them, 22 was in the neighborhood of 280 degrees.
23 Q
If I understand you correctly, Mr. Zewe, f
24 he gave you three numbers and they were all, you say, 25 in the vicinity of 2807
.. _... ~.
1 Zewe 673
(T
(./
- ~
2 A
As I remember, the readings were that 3
the first time that I had asked for them*.
4 Q
And these are the numbers that you
(
5 understood he was giving you at the time you received 6
them?
7 A
- Yes, I felt that they were current 8
numbers.
i 9
Q Was any one of the three numbers higher 10 than any of the others?
(
11 A
Yes.
The three numbers were not exactly 12 the same.
One had to be higher than another.
O 13 Q
Was the number of the PORV higher than 14 the numbers for the code safeties?
15 A
I don't recall.
t 16 Q
Well, on the basis of the training that 17 you had had and on the basis of your understanding'of 18 the system, would it have been important to you at 19 that time to know whether one temperature was higher I
20 than any of the other two?
l 21 A
As I recall, they were pretty closely
(-
22 grouped, and I wasn't aware of reaching any conclusion 23 that they were far enough apart to make any I
l
()
24 differentiation or distinction that would be meaningful.
lI felt that one or two valves had lifted, and I 25
1 zowe 674 2
expected the discharge lines to be above normal.
3 Q
Isn't it a fact, Mr. Zewe, that the i
4 temperature for the PORV was more than 20 degrees
(
5 higher than one code safety and approximately 10 f
6 degrees higher than the other c o,d e safety?
7 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Are you asking him for i
8 his recollection on the day of the accident 9.
MR. FISKE:
Yes.
10 MR. KLINGSBERG:
or some(post-accident 11 facts?
4 12 MR. FISKE:
I am asking what he was told I
(2) 13 on the day of the accident.
14 Q
Weren't you told that the temperature for 4
15 the PORV was more than 20 degrees higher than one 16 code safety and more than 10 degrees higher than the i
17 other?
18 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Your question is, does
^ '
19 he recollect being told.
20 A
I recall being told three separate i
21 numbers.
That particular day I &m sure that Mr. Bryan 22 told me the numbers and that I got three distinct 23 numbers.
()
24 And I felt, from the numbers he had given 25 me, I felt that it was high.
I expected it to be 4
n w
s.-s-
- ~
x,-e,.w-
..sw-wne---n,w.,-,-en-++-en- ~ ~ -
v-
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,,,,,,---m.-n-.,,.~eww~n' vwww-~mm-n'a-~r~<,v-=---w-e-
~*w w
o
1 1
Zewe 675 (D
V.
2 high, and I can only say that I could not reach any 3
e nelusion that the valves were open.
4 I would have suspected the relief valve l
5 line to be warmer than the code safeties if it had 6
opened first and had opened up longer, or if a code 7
valve had opened up it wouldn't have surprised mo 8
that the PORV was a little warmer than the other 9
lines.
10 And I don't remember getting any 11 significant conclusion drawn from that, saying that 12 there was a differenc6, but I believe that day I was 13 aware of a difference.
But I remember the grouping, 14 that they were pretty much all the same.
15 Q
You had a strip chart on the control 16 room panel which showed reactor coolant system 17 pressure; is that correct?
I 18 A
Yes, it is.
l 19 Q
And there was a wide range and a narrow l
20 range shown?
21 A
Yes.
l 22 MR. FISKE:
Let me mark as the next B&W 23 exhibit, which is 755, the strip chart which (T
l
- l. ()
24 reflects the narrow range pressure.
25 (strip chart reflecting narrow range
1 1
Zewe 676
/( >)
2 pressure marked B&W Exhibit No. 755 for 3
identification, as of this date.)
4 Q
Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Zewe?
(
5 A
Yes, I do.
6 Q
The s e tpoin t for the lifting of the 7
pilot operated relief valve is 2255.
8 A
At that time it was.
9 Q
And I take it that this strip chart shows 10 that the pressure reached,went above th,at se t point ?
11 A
Yes, it does.
12 Q
The strip chart indicates that the highest 13 point that the pressure reached was approximately 14 2350, does it not?
15 A
2363 or so.
16 Q
The setpoint for the code safeties is j
'17 25007 18 A
At that time, I believe that' what they 19 were.
I could be wrong on that, because we have 20 changed them, but I believe either 2450 or 2500 at 21 that point was correct.
22 Q
I think it has been established that they 23 were, that it was 2500.
(a) 24 A
All right.
25 Q
This strip chart would. indicate, would it I.
. =
2 1
Zewe 677-i r~3
^
bl 2
not, Mr. Zewe, that the pressure did not reach the 3
Point at which either code safety would lift?
4 A
As it shows here, it did not get that high
(
5 en ugh in the pressure.
6 Q
And,in fact, the code safety temperatures 7
which were given to you by Mr. Bryan which were below 8
the temperature for the PORV which had previously 9
lifted would be a further indication, would it not, 10 that the code safeties had not lifted?t 11 A
I do not believe I reached that conclusion.
12 The strip chart recorder here is a mechanical device D
13 and I felt that it was possible to actually have 14 pressure exceed the pressure that was inked on the 15 recorder and not display that on the recorder.
16 I had seen cases before where a particular 17 Parameter had changed rapidly enough to where the 18 recorder could skip inking and then start to ink again.
19 Q
Whether or not the narrow range pressure 20 chart was conclusive on the question of whether or not 21 the code safeties had lifted, certainly that L
22 instrumentation that was available to you on the day 23 of the accident indicated that they had not; isn't
<~
(
24 that correct?
25 A
Indicated that it did not, but it did not
1 Zew8 678 2
conclusively say that it had not or that the pressure 3
surge was so rapid that that in itself.may cause the 4
relief valves to actuate.
(
5 Q
And isn't it correct, Mr. Zewe, that the 6
fact that the temperatures at the discharge lines for 7
the code safeties were lower than the temperature at 8
the discharge line for the PORV would be a further 9
indication that the code safeties may not have lifted?
10 MR. KLINGSBERG:
First, yod,just asked 11 that question.
12 Second, I assume you are asking for his o
13 recollection, not
~
14 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
some abstract question.
15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
16 THE WITNESS:
Read that again, please.
i
=
(Record was read back.)
1 17 i
18 MR. KLINGSBERG:
You just asked that exact 19 question two questions ago.
20 MR. FISKE:
If he can give me the answer, l
21 we can move ahead.
22 A
I did not conclude from the temperatures
[
23 that I got that I was sure that the code safety valves 24 had not lifted.
25 Q
Again, I am not asking you in this question l
1 Zewe 679 fs 2
whether those temperature readings were conclusive.
3 I am simply asking you, weren't temperature r'adings which indicated a lower temperature 4
e
(
5 for the codes than the PORV an indication that the 6
code safeties may not have lifted?
7 A
It could be an indication, yes.
8 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Was the last question a 9
question of what was in his mind at the time of 10 the accident?
11 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
12 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Or an abstract question --
(*%
13 MR. FISKE:
No, all of these questions 14 are 15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I think it doesn't become 16 clear when you ask it in that fashion.
I am 17 not sure that that is the way that.the witne'ss 18 understood it.
19 MR. FISKE:
I was asking Mr. Zewe questions 20 based on his understanding of the system at the 21 time of the accident.
22 Q
Did you understand that?
23 A
I thought I did, but now I'm not so sure.
1 O)
(
24 Q
In its simplest terms, all the questions t
25 that I have been asking you related to the day of the i
1 zewe 680 fx U
2 accident.
I am not asking you for present 3
A True, and I tried to point out that I 4
received the numbers and that it did not lead me to
(
5 believe that one had leaked any more than the other, 6
though I expected them to be higher, because they 7
had lifted.
And I definitely thought about the 8
possibility that a code valve had lifted along with 9
the.PORV.
And at that point I didn't differentiate 10 between one being a few degrees higher,than another, t
11 because that isn't what I remember, 12 But if you would look at only that case.
O 13 where I would say here is one temperature and here 14 is another temperature.-- all right -- you could use 15 that in your determination if you felt that one had 16 lifted and the other one had not; you could use that 17 supportively.
18 I did not that morning, because I did 19 not think it was significant enough to differentiate 20 between the two.
Therefore, I didn't reach the 21 conclusion that this one was 10 degrees higher than 22 one and 20 degrees higher than the other one, that 23 that indicated that the PORV was open.
I knew that
()
24 it had lifted, and it was not conclusive saying that 25 because of that the code safety valve had not lifted.
s
i 1
Zewe 683
-)
V 2
Q You understood, did you not, from your 3
knowledge of the system, that in the event that the 4
PORV lifted, that would cause an increase in the l
5 temperature at the discharge line for the PORV7 6
A Yes.
7 Q
O.K.
And did you understand that in the 8
event that that happened and water flowed through 9
the discharge line down into the drain tank, that 10 the action of that water flowing throu{h the discharge 11 line would have some effect in raising temperatures 12 for the code safeties?
Cs 13 A
As I stated yesterday, I always felt 14 that the fluid that was leaving the pressurizer 15 through the PORV would be steam, not water.
16 Q
Well, I will ask the same question again, i
17 And if I.used " water" in the last question, I will-18 just change it to " steam."
19 Did you understand that the steam going 20 from the pilot-operated relief valve down the discharge 21 line into the drain ~ta'nk would have an effect in 22 raising temperatures for the two code safeties?
l l
23 A
Yes.
I believed that that discharge from (m
24 the PORV would raise the temperature of the indicating l
25 thermocouples on the lines for the code safeties as
\\
..(
^
. r,_-)
.1 zewe 682 -
l' ig 2 l$
well.
3 Q
Right.
O.K.
)
I 4
And did you undsrstand,ibased on your t
()
5 knowledge of'the system before: the accident and any 8
6 training that you me.y have had at Met Ed on that system, 7
that ir.'; t he event that the'PbR'V lifte't and the codu 0
4 s
s.Tr.t'ies did not, that the tenneratura for the:PORy 9
would be higher than the temp $ratures for the dode i
10 safeties?
That is, that even though all of them. woald
, i j
11
~go up, the temperature dor the.PORV, the one that had i
j.
g 12 \\
lifte4, would go up higher / than khe other
~
two.
U b>' t
,3 A-I believe l't was my undetstanding that the s) i
/
14/j PdW t[riporature ',soItid I
be the highest of the three j
J r 10
- under those con d iticin s.
r.
\\
/
16 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Is this'a' good time fr 1M a break?
')
j 8
r
-z
)
18 I
(Rocess taken;)
i j
n
';t iT Li if
." * ' 419 2
?
i
,\\
"(Continued on the following page.)
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/
'20
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e 21 22 L
23
(
24 25-
~
j "il I.
r:
- lh.] '
- r, c
'. 'hd1
~
l Zewe 683 e..
(
\\
1
's 2
(Mr. Benedict entered the deposition s
3 room.)
4 BY MR. FISKE:
p:
5 Q
Mr. Zewe, was there some. kind of an
\\}
6 instrument range that indicated the height of the 7
drain tank?
.}
8 A
Yes, there was.
9 Q
What is that?
10 A
I don't recall the exact Sange.
The 11 lower end was in the 90-inch range, and the upper 12 g-)
range was over a hundred. inches.
NJ{~
13 Q
Did you say the lower was 90 and the I4
[
upper was -- I just didn't hear you.
3.5 A
As I remember, the lower end of the 16 j
range was in the 90-inch range and the upper range
{_
~
17 was somewhere over a hundred inches.
I don't recall.
18 j
Q Was there a level that the operators
'19 tried to maintain in the drain tank under normal
'n 20 conditions?
21 A
Yes, there was.
22 Q
Was that around 75 inches or so?
23 A
I don't remember the range.
Maybe the b
(/
24 lower range was lower than 90.
And the 75 inches i
25 sounds familiar, though I don't remember.
-c e
a p
-env-yg y
.--pc-
- =w r----yy-r=-
2 1
Zewe 684
)
2 We did maintain a certain band that 3
insured that the tank had a certain level of water in 4
it.
(
5 Q
How was it determined that that particular 6
band was the right level to keep the water at?
Who 7
made that determination?
8 A
I think that that was made during the 9
design of the system, in figuring out the amount of 10 energy that was put into the system and what cooling 11 capacity you had, and the amount of water that was 12 needed to absorb the energy, and so forth.
O 13 Q
In other words, the band.that you tried 14 to keep the level within was the basic design band 15 for the drain tank?
16 A
Certainly.
l 17 Q
Is it correct that in the days preceding l
18 the accident, the operators had been pumping water 19 out of the tank to keep the level within that desired 20 band?
21 A
As I recall, yes, we did.
22 Q
As of the time when this reactor trip 23 occurred at 4:00 a.m.
on March 28, 1979, is it fair I
(')%
s 24 to say that you had no reason to think that at that 25 point the level in the tank was not within the band?
i l
=-
4 3
1 Zewe 685 2
A I believed that the band was within the s
3 normal operating range at that time.
i 4
Q I think you previously said, Mr. Zewe, (l
5 that from your training and experience you would not 6-expect a normal operning and closing of the PORV to 7
produce a sufficient discharge to raise the pressure 8
in the drain tank to the point of either lifting the 9
relief valve or rupturing the disk; correct?
10 A
That is correct.
11 Q
You did recognize this, you testified 12 earlier, that the water in the sump tank could have
\\_/
13 gotten there by reason of the relief v.alve lifting t
14 or the rupture disk blowing, to the drain tank?
15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Could we have that read 16 back?
17 MR. FISKE:
I will rephrase it, if you 18 would rather.
19 Q
You testified earlier that in considering 20 how the water got into the sump, you tho'ught that the 21 relief valve might have lifted, the rupture disk might 22 have blown in the drain tank, or some hole might have 23 been put in the drain tank.
24 A
That is correct.
25 Q
Did you reach any conclusion, Mr. Zewe, 4
4
--~s a-e-,,y~
-ve-wg-
,,-e.-,
n, 4
-g-,
e.
, w
4 1
ZeWe 686 (3
u.)
2 before you went down to the turbine room, as to where s
3' the water could have come from in sufficient quantity 4
to raise the pressure in the drain' tank to the point
(
5 where the relief valve would lift or the rupture 6
disk had blown?
7 A
As I remember thinking about it, I 8
thought that, well, there was possibly a hole in the 9
tank because there was an off-scale level.
And I 10 would think that if I had discharged i'nventory in the 11 tank, that I would have an increased level.
So I 12 thought that the more likely case would be to have 13 some hole in the tank which then would drain the tank 1
14 and indicate with the level off-scale low.
15 Q
And this hole in the tank would have been 16 produced by some event that occurred after the 17 reactor trip?
~
18 A
Yes, I still felt that the cause of 19 whatever happened at the tank was still c sed by 20 one or more of the relief valves on the pressurizing, 21 lifting and putting the energy into the tank.
22 Q
You knew then, did you not, that the 23 uormal lifting of the PORV and closing itself would V
24 not be enough to do that; right?
25 A
Normally, I would say that is correct,
,,,,,m.--
_,._._.-m
,,4._
e v
5 1
zewe 687 O
~
Q/.
2 that it should not do that.
3 Q
So that this would have had to have been 4
caused either by the PORV staying open or by one of
(
5 the code safeties lifting; right?
One or more of the 6
code safeties lifting.
7 A
That is not the conclusion that I 8
reached.
I did not know why.
I did not know for 9
sure what the failure was.
And I felt it may have 10 been that the PORV may have lifted and, reseated and 11 that a code safety valve had lifted and reseated.
12 Not that the PORV was open.
(')
13 Q
No, I understand that.
That wasn't the 14 point of my last question.
15 Isn't it correct, Mr. Zewe, that the 16 cause of this -- again, we are only talking about 17 your thought process during the period of time between 18 the reactor trip and your turbine room trip.
19 Isn't it correct that the sources of the 20 water in the drain tank from the top of the system 21 sufficient to put a hole in it had to be either from 22 one of the code safeties lifting -- one or more of 23 the code safeties lifting -- or from the fact that 24 the PORV had stayed open, or from some combination of 25 these things?
I 6
Zewe 688 OU 2
A As I remember, my thought was that the s
3 rapid pressure excursion that we had had at the time 4
I looked at the drain tank, I knew that we had had a
(
5 total loss of feed for some time and that's what 6
started the event that caused the high pressure to 7
rapidly increase.
And I just felt that during the 8
course during that transient, that the PORV lifted 9
and a code safety lifted, that the sudden release of 10 that energy at that particular time caused some 11 particular failure in the tank.
thie presence of water in the 12 Q
Other than
- O-13 tank itself, did you have any evidence. from any 14 iris trumen tation that,in fact, a code safety had 15 lifted?
16 Let me withdraw that and put the 17 question again.
18 Did you have any indication from any 19 instrumentation in the control room that a code 20 safety, in fact, had lifted?
j l
21 A
You are asking me for what conclusions 22 I reached, based on my instrumentation, my training, 23 experience, knowledge, and what I observed --
24 A
No, no.
25 g
-- and it was my estimation that it was
.~
. -. _, _ ~. _
. ~.. -.
7 1
Zewe 689 2
Possible fpr it.
3 Q
I understand the answers you have given 4
up to now.
The question I just put to you was, was l
5 there any instrumentation in the control room that 6
indicated that a code safety had lifted?
7 A
I felt that the indication that I 8
observed on the RC drain tank supported that there 9
was a strong possibility that a code valve had 10 lifted.
(
11 Q
That being the increase in temperature 12 and the drop in pressure and level?
That is what you i
13 just referred to?
e 14 A
The drain tank indication that there was 15 some failure that I felt occurred in the tank, and 16 that was the reason for the low level, and we had 17 an elevated temperature, and we had zero, pressure, 18 which further indicated that there was a hole in the 19 tank.
And I felt that under normal conditions, the 20 tank would not fail in such a manner and that I felt 21 that there had to be another cause.
And I reached 22 the conclusion that it was due to a code safety valve.
23 Q
All right.
I think you have explained
)
I 24 that conclusion before.
25 You did know, did you not, Mr. Zewe, on
8 1
~
Zewe 690 (o
2 the day of the accident, that it was possible for an continui'g discharge into the 3
open FORV to produce a n
4 drain tank thtt would be sufficient to cause the l
5 problems with the drain tank that you were seeing?
6 A
As I recall, no.
7 I felt that if the PORV was continually 8
discharging, that I would have a high level in the 9
drain tank from all of the fluid going into the 10 tank, raising the level of the tank.
hnd also I 11 could not void myself from my other indication.
12 I used it collectively, not individually, in reaching
~~'
13 my determination, and that's how I tho.ught that 14
~ morning.
15 Q
I understand'that, Mr. Zewe, but I would i
16 like to address each one of these things individually.
l 17 I can't deal with them all collectively in every 18 answer.
You have 19 A
But that is how I dealt with it that 20 morning, and you are asking for my understanding, 21 evaluation and what I was thinking that morning.
And
(
22 I did not view separate, isolated facts, just as well 1
23 as I did not view the drain tank as one isolated 24 thing and other items such as level and pressure as 25 one isolated thing.
9 1
Z8W8 691
(
~
2 There were a lot of other things happening 3
that I paid particular attention to and action was 4
taken on.
(i -
5 so I-can't void myself for one particular-6 item because that is not how I viewed it.
That is 7
not what I based my decisions on.
8 I used all the indicators and used them 9
all collectively in making my conclusions and my E
10 course of action.
11' Q
Did you feel, Mr. Zewe, that a high level 12 in the drain tank was inconsistent with an open PORV 13 but was consistent with a code safety.having lifted?
14 THE WITNESS:
Read that back, please.
15 (Question read) 16 A
You are asking what I thought that day or i
17 up to that time if I had thought about that?
l-18 Q
You said in your answer a minute ago l
19 that if the PORV had stayed open, you would have l
20 expected to see a high level in the drain tank and 21 that you concluded that the PORV had not stuck open l
22 in part because there was a low level in the drain 23 tank.
I 24 My question is, what kind of a level in 25 the drain tank did you expect to see if a code safety i
(
( -.
.------,n--
,-n,-
-,.---,,-,,.--nn-------,
--,,.n-
,-->-n
..ee-.
.,,-,c-.+.--,,---w-~a-,
rw.,,,.-,v,-,,
--,----n,-,r,n-n-,,,
10 1
Zewe 692 V(-.
2 had been the cause of the water going into the drain s
3 tank?-
4 A
I would expect to see the same indication.
(
5 Q
The same indication as what?
6 A
I would expect, no matter.what the source 7
was, whether it be one or both of the code safeties 8
or the PORV, I would expect to have a higher level 9
because I am adding inventory to the tank.
The relief 10 valve and the rupture disk are on the t,op of the tank.
I 11 So even if they were open, I would expect to have a 12 higher level.-
O s
/
13 Q
So the-level in the tank itself doesn't 14 help you determine whether the water is coming from the 15 PORV or from one of the code safeties; right?
16 A
That is true.
That is why I remember I 17 leaned more toward another hole in the tank that would l
18 cause the tank to drain below the level of indication.
t 19 Q
Let me go back to the basic question 20 that I have for you, Mr. Zewe.
And let me make it as 21 clear as I can, and if~you don't understand it, let 22 me know and I will try to make it clearer.
23 You are dealing with a volume of water l(Oj 24 that has gone into the drain tank, to.the point where 25 either the rupture disk has blown, the relief valve
l' 11 1
Zewe 693 b)
\\J.
2 has lifted or a hole has ~been put into the tan) by 3
that water.
J 4
The question is where does that water l
5 come from.
It is not coming from a normal opening 6
and closing of the PORV.
And, as I understand it, 7-the water from the top of the pressurizer sufficient 8
to produce a lifting of the relief valve, a blowing 9
of the rupture disk or a hole in the drain tank 10 could come from either a ecde safety h'aving lifted 11 or l't could come from the PORV staying open, or it 12 could be some combination of those two.
13 Now, I am trying to get y.our thought 14 process as to how you concluded that that water had, 15
-in fact, come only from a code safety lifting and 16 not in any way from the PORV having stayed open, and 17 that is what I am trying to find out.
And it is in 18 pursuit of that question that I am going to ask you 19 a couple of specific questions.
20 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I assume, following your 21 usual practice after I object to the summation, 22 you will-just indicate that is for in formational 23 purposes?
24 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
25 MR. KLINGSBERG:
And the question will
--.m
12 1
Zewe 694
(i Q '.
2 be the question.
3 MR. FISKE:
Yes, this is designed to 4
make it clearer to Mr. Zewe exactly what I am
(
5 asking him so he will understand my question.
6 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I don't necessarily 7
agree with your summation, but that is beside 8
the point.
J 9
MR. FISKE:
Yes.
10 THE WITNESS:
Could you r'eread that 11 question, first?
12 MR. KLINGSBERG:
There is no question
%..,/
13 yet, but you can hear that if you want.
14 MR. FISKE:
He can hear it again.
There 15 is no question yet, but --
16 THE WITNESS:
That's all right.
I would 17 like to hear the question you will ask.
18 BY MR. FISKE:
19 Q
The symptoms you were seeing on the 20 drain tank itself, the temperature and the pressure 21 and the level, were all reflections of the fact that 22 there was a significant volume of water in the drain 23 tank; correct?
(O
_j 24 A
The pressure and temperature and level 25 that I observed was indication that a significant
13 1
Zewe 695 2
amount of water was in the tank?
3 Q
Had been in the tank.
4 A
Quite the opposite
(.!
5 Q
Had been in the tank?
6 A
I knew that the normal level was a 7
relatively high level.
I knew that there was a 8
considerable volume initially, because that is what 9
we maintained in the tank.
10 Q
Putting it another way, t'be high 11 temperature, low pressure and low level in the drain i
12 tank did not, even of themselves, indicate or tell 13 you one way or the other whether those conditions 14 had been created by a lifting of the code safety or 15 by a stuck open PORV; isn't that correct?
16 A
As I recall, that was not my thought 17 process.
18 As I recall, I thought that a lifting 19 before I observed the indications that I had had 20 caused it, but not that it was an ongoing thing.
If 21 I thought it was still an ongoing thing, I felt that 22 I would have seen other indications to support an 23 ongoing thing.
O(_)
24 I used them in relationship to my other 25 indicators.
-e-r--
w-
- - - + + - - - - -.. -
14 1
Zewe 696 l
v 2
Q I know you have said that before.
3 A
Well, I felt that is the answer.
4 Q
We will have to deal w'ith the other
(
5 indicators when we.get to them.
6 But my question, Mr. Zewe and I think 7
it is really very simple is, these indications on 8-the drain tank instrumentation panel themselves, all 9
by themselves, without relation to anything else, 10 did not indicate one way or the other,!,did they, 11 whether those conditions had been created by a lifting 12 of the code safety or by an open PORV?
b 13 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I think,. Bob, that you 14 are entitled to ask,if you want to, abstract 15 questions, which you do from time to time, of 16 his understanding based on training, experience, 17 how the plant operated, et ceteraf and whether 18 2 and 2 is 4 and 4 and 4 is 8,
and you have 19 asked those kinds of questions and I have not 20 objected.
f 21 On the other hand, when you ask the I
22 witness for his recollection at the time and 23 he says he didn't consider things in isolation i
O 24 and he considered all these different things
(,s t
25 together with other indications, I don't think i
15 1
zewe 697 2
it is fair for you to say to him that he can't 3
answer the question by referring to all the 4
indications that he, in fact, considered.
l 5
Therefore, I think that the question is 6
objectionable.
7 MR. FISKE:
Well, I disagree.
If you 8
want to debate it, I will debate it.
9 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I don't want to debate 10 it.
I just 11 MR. FISKE:
I think we are entitled to 12 take each one of the indications separately O
13 and pursue it.
14 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I think you are, as a 15 matter of abstract theory, and based on his 16 understanding of how the plant worked.
But l
i i
17 when you ask him for what was in his head, I l
18 think he has got to tell you honestly what was 19 in his head.
And if a particular indication 20 wasn't jn his head by itself, I think he is 21 entitled to say, without being berated, that
(_
22 it wasn't in his head all by itself.
l 23 MR. FIsKE:
Well, there is no effort or 24 intention to berate anybody.
25 BY MR. FISKE:
~.-
I
^
Zewe 16 r
i
\\
2 Q
You understood, did you not, Mr. Zewe, m
3 from the pressurizer system failure procedure, that 4
increased temperatures, pressures at the drain tank
(
5 were the symptom of an open PORV?
6 A
They were possible symptoms, and I 7
used those in conjunction with other indicators and 0
operations to determine if, in fact, it was, but 9
there are other reasons that cause the very same 10 thing.
And it is always tying things in relationship 11 to whatever else you have is always the key.
12 Q
Apart from the temperature, pressure, 13 level readings on the drain tank which we have 14 already discussed, was there any instrumentation in 15 the control room which indicated that a code safety 16 had lifted?
17 A
Other than the drain tank indication, 18 no.
19 Q
You testified yesterday, Mr. Zewe, 20 about an increase in reactor building pressure; do 21 you remember that?
22 A
Yes, I do.
23 Q
You have said that you understood that
.'\\
24 that was coming from the drain tank.
25 A
At some point, I recall reaching the
_ - ~ _. - - _
17 1
Zewe 699
~h
[J.
\\.
2 conclusion that at least part of the pressure increase 3
in the reactor building may be attributed to the 4
drain tank.
('
5 Q
Well, didn't you testify yesterday, Mr.
6 Zewe, that during this period of time between the 7
reactor trip and the trip to the turbine room, you 8
knew that the pressure in the reactor building had 9
gone up to 2 pounds per square inch and that you 10 attributed that increase to the water 'in the drain 11 tank?
12 A
As I recall, I did know the pressure
($)
tpat 13 was above normal, greater than 1 pound.
I do not 14 recall 2 pounds.
But I did a tribute that to the 15 RC drain tank at that particular time, yes.
16 Q
Now let me show you the reactor building 17 pressure strip chart, which we marked some time ago 10 as B&W Exhibit 616.
r 19 Do you have that in front.of ou?
20 A
Yes, I do.
21 Q
That, as we established yesterday, was 22 right there on the front panel of the control room?
l 23 A
Yes, it is.
\\
q,)
24 Q
This indicates, does it not, Mr. Zewe, 25 an increase to approximately 1 pound per square inch
{
18 1
Zewe 700 g
2 pressure in the first 15 minutes, and then'a 3
continuing increase in pressure over the next half 4
hour of close to the 2 pounds per square inch level?
(
5 A
Yes, it does.
6 Q
On the day of the accident, did you 7
understand that that movement of reactor building 8
pressure, increasing 1 pound per square inch during 9
the period of 15 minutes to 45 minutes into the 10 accident, demonstrated that a code safety had lifted 11 and rescated in the first few seconds of the 12 accident?
13 THE WITNESS:
Read that back, please.
.14 (Question read) 15 A
No.
e 16 Q
Did you look at that movement of i
17 reactor building pressure during this period of time i
18 to try to determine whether that movement of reactor j
i 19 building pressure was more consistent with a 20 continuing flow of water into the drain tank than 21 with a brief opening and closing of the code safety?
22 A
I did not, because I did not reach those 23 conclusions that I felt it was open.
O)
(,,
24 Q
Now, did you feel, Mr. Zewe, during the 25 accident, that it would be helpful, in determining
-7.03 19 1
gew.
%)
2 whether the water that went into the drain tank came s
3 from a brief opening and reseating of the code 4
safety as opposed to a stuck open valve, to find out
(
5 as best as you could how much water had gone into the 6
drain tank?
7 MR. KLINGSBERG:
You left out the 8
witness' testimony that in addition to the 9
opening and closing of the code safety, he 10 also testified about opening an'4 closing of 11 the PORV, but you keep leaving that out of 12 the question.
I assume that is intentional.
O 13 MR. FISKE:
We will add those 10 gallons 14 to the question.
15 Let me put the question.again.
I didn't 16 mean to leave the opening, the normal opening 17 and closing of the PORV out of the question.
18 BY MR. FISKE:
19 Q
I think it has already been established 20 that you knew that the volume of water sufficient to 21 cause whatever the problem was in the drain tank was 22 not attributable to a normal opening and closing of 23 the PORV; right?
24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
By itself.
(,j 25 MR. FISKE:
By itself.
20 1
Zewe 702 2
A That is true.
3-Q Did you feel that it would be helpful in 4
determining where the water had come from, beyond
(
5 whatever came out.during the normal opening and 6
closing of the PORV, to determine how much water had 7
gone into the drain tank and then into the sump?
8 A
As I~ recall, I believed that I knew what 9
the source of the water was.
The source of water was originally what was in the drain t'ank and what 10 11 was put into the drain tank from either PORV or 12 relief valve lifting.
I did not feel it was an O
13 ongoing thing, nor did I think it was.necessary to 14 try and calculate what that volume of water was.
15 Q
Did you have an understanding, Mr.
16 Zewe, as to what the volume of flow would be through 17 a code safety that lifted and then reseated pursuant 18 to its normal operation?
19 A
I have already stated that I did not 20 remember what the volume was and' e act relief 21 capability of the valves when they opened or when 22 they were open for any particular time.
I did not 23 have that information, as I remember.
p)
(
24 Q
You didn't know on the day of the 25 accident that if both code safeties open and stay
21 1
Zewe
.703 s
2 CPen for ten seconds and then reseat, that the volume f the discharge is not even sufficient to raise the 3
4
' Pressure in the tank to the 46 psi?
l 5
A I have already stated I don't remember 6
knowing that information on any particular time 7
period, its flow rate or based on 10 seconds or 15 8
seconds or 20 seconds or what have you.
9 I don't remember having that information.
10 Q
Did you make any effort ih this time 11 period we are talking about to get that information?
12 A
As I have stated earlier, I did not.
I
[
~
13 did not feel that it was necessary to seek out that 14 information, based on my observations and my 15 conclusions.
I didn't feel that it was ongoing.
I 16 knew that there had been a problem with the drain 17 tank, and I did not pursue the fact of how much was 18 transferred in order to do that because I didn't 19 know the mechanism of the failure.
It may not take 20 very much at all to cause a ' failure.
It depends.
21 Because I didn't know what the hole was,so I didn't 22 know how much it would take in order to do that.
23 (Discussion off the record.)
i 24 BY MR. FISKE:
25 Q
Did you have any information, Mr. Zewe,
i 22 1
Zewe 704 (v~',
2 during this_ period of time between the reactor, trip 3
and your trip to the turbine room, on temperatures 4
at the discharge lines for the three valves other
(
5 than the readings that you said Mr. Bryan gave you 6
on that one occasion?
7 THE WITNESS:
Would you read the first 8
part of that back, please?
9 (Question read) 10 A
As I recall, only the rea' dings that Mr.
11 Bryan gave to me.
12 Q
So you did not know what the temperatures U
13 on the three discharge lines had been.right after 14 the reactor trip and you did not know what they were 15 at the time you left to go to the turbine room; 16 correct?
17 A
The only temperatures I knew is what' 18 Mr. Bryan told me at that particular time that he 19 told me.
20 Q
Now I guess we can look at this 21 pressurizer system failure procedure.
22 I will ask one more question before we 23 do that.
(")T 24 g,,
Did you have any understanding, Mr.
25 Zewe, at all, with respect to the relative movement
23 1
zewe 705
\\
s' -
2 of the temperatures on the three valves during this s
3 period of time from.the time the reacter tripped 4
until the time that you went to the turbine room?
l 5
A Not as I remember.
6 I had asked for the readings during 7
that time, and then I had asked for them at another 8
time.
But between that two-time period, no, only 9'
that one reading.
10 Q
So that you had no b a s i s,', f r o m the 11 temperature readings that you had, for concluding 12 during this period of time one way or the other as to 7s
(
)
13 whether, over this 45-minute period, temperatures at 14 these valves were going up, were going down, or were 15 staying relatively the same?
16 A
Not correct.
17 As I remember, for either a*PORV lifting 18 or for a code safety valve lifting, I had expected 19 considerably higher discharge thermocouple readings.
20 And when I had received the numbers from Mr. Bryan 21 which I received during this time period, after which 22 I felt that the valve, before it had lifted and then 23 reseated, the temperatures that I received I thought
()
24 were in line with what I would expect.
25 Even though I didn't have a fixed number
~
24 1
Zewe 706
24 Q
Yes, or at any time before that.
25 A
I don't remember anything about is it
26 1
~
Zewe 708 b)I-2 insulated in relationship to the position of the 4
3 thermocouple.
4 Q'
. Was there any other basis for your j(
5 thought that the temperatures would go to 350 orl 6
whatever, other than what you.have just given us?
7 A
No, except I knew that it had been 8
around 190 degrees with very minor leakage going 9
through it, and I felt that after the valve in 10 fact does lift, that the ran.Je would he much higher 11 than another 70 or 80 degrees.
I just felt that 12 that range would be something much greater than 13 that.
But again, no qualifier an saying it should 14 be this or it should be particularly that, just that 15 it should be much higher.
1G Q
Now I think we are ready to go to the 17 pressurizer system failure procedure.
18 Directing your attention to page 2, Mr.
19
'Zewe
-- that is, Section B -- that is captioned 20
" Inoperative Pilot operated (electromatic) Relief 21 Valve."
22 A
Yes, it is.
23 Q
I believe you testified previously this 24 was the emergency procedure for pressurizer system l
l 25 -
failure that was in effect on the day of the accident.
l
~
27 1
Zewe
.709
/~N l
\\. J -
2 A
No, I don't believe I did say that.
3 Q
well, if you didn't before, let me give 4
you a chance to.
(
5 A
If you are stating in retrospect that 6
it was or was not, I couldn't I don't feel that
-x,
7 is,what you are asking.
You are asking -- right 8
that on the day of the accident was I into this 9
procedure?
10 A
(
No.
E 11 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I.think he has asked 12 you to identify the piece of paper.
\\-)
I3 Q
I think all'I am asking y.ou to do --
14 sort of a preliminary question'- 'is to confirm 15 that on the day of the accident, the document that 16 you have in front of you, Exhibit 305, was Met Ed's I
17 emergency procedure for pressurizer system failure.
18 w A I misunderstood.
s.
Yes, it was.
19 l
]
20 Q
O.K.
And you testified earlier
- and, I
l 21 indeed, some of the other operators have also that I
l 22 as part of your training, you were taught that you 23 should memorize the symptoms in the different i
O 24 em rgency procedures.
Correct?
(j l
25 A
That is correct.
s e
~., - -. -. -.
c a(-'
.l a.
t
,i- <
- 28,
1 Zewe-
.720
,w.
e, i jt 2
Q Is it-fair to say that no exception' I
- t f r
{,,
3 was made to that principle for the symptoms in the t
4 pressurizer system failure procedure?
c
,(
5 "A
That 19 trus.
6 Q
Referring to symptom number 3'i-paragraph f
i 7
nunber 3,
under symptoms, "RC-R2 discharge line l
f,(
8 etemperature'is.abcVe the 200 degree tahrenheit 9
alarm.
Computer Poi t ' (40 2)," it is correct, is it
.y 10 not, that.at the time you left to go t'p the turbine.'
11 room, that diacharge line, temperature *Nas above the' 12 200 degrees' Fahrenheit r. ark?~
~
)
13 A
Yes, it wa.a.
j.
L 14 Q
The next sympuom is, "The RC drain tank 15 pressure and temperature are above normal on the
~
16 control room radwaster disposal control panel 8A."
i 17 Now, it is correct, is it not, that at 18 the time that you went to the turbine room, the RC j
19 drain tank temperature was above normal on that 4
20 panel?
I 21 A
The temperature was.
The pressure was 22 low.
23 Q
The temperature was in alarm, was it l
24 not?
t 25 A
Yes, it was.
r T
29 1
Zewe
.7.1-1 j~s i
i
\\_)
2 Q
You understood that at sometime after
.??
3 the reactor trip, the pressure in the drain tank had i
4 been sufficient to either lift the relief valve,
(
5 rupture the disk, or put some, kind of hole in the 6
tanks right?
7 A
That was my understanding at the time, 8
yes.
p 9
Q Now, proceeding down the page, under i_,
10 "Immediate Action," there is a paragra'ph with respect 11 to automatic actions which occur for a failed open 12 pilot-operated relief valve.
13 Do you see that?
t 14 A
Yes, I do.
15 Q
The first automatic action that occurs r
j 16 at a failed open relief valve is "All pressurizer 17 heater banks on full below 2105 psig."
18 I take it that that is something that 19 is supposed to happen when pressure falls below 2105 20 psig?
21 A
That is correct.
(.
22 Q
Did that, in fact, happen on the morning l
l 23 of the accident?
24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Did what happen?
l L
25 Q
Did pressurizer heater banks go on full
30 1
zewe
.7.12 0
2 when the pressure fell below 2105?
3 A
As I recall, it did, yes.
4 Q
The next automatic action that occurs
(
5 when you have a failed open PORV is " Reactor trips at 6
1900 psig or variable pressure temperature."
7 Did you have a reactor trip that 8
morning?
9 A
Yes, we did.
The reactor tripped on 10 high pressure.
11 Q
It is correct, is it not, that at 12 sometime after the PORV opened, pressure fell below O'
13 1900 psig?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
The third item is "High Pressure 16 Injection is actuated at 1600 psig."
17 Had high pressure injection been 18 actuated'at 1600 psig?
19 A
By that point, it had been actuated.
(
20 Q
Is there any symptom of an open PORV 1
21 listed in this procedure that you had not seen on the i
22 morning of March 28, 19797 i
23 A
There is not, except that all of these
.- ()
24 symptoms are also symptoms for other problems, which 25 is not necessarily restricted to a failed open PORV.
/1 1
Zews 713 2
Q Is there any condition in the plant, 3
Mr. zewe, that you knew of on the morning of 4
March 28, 1979, at the top of the system, which could
(
5 Produce an RC-R2 disciarge line temperature above the 6
200 degree Fahrenheit alarm, an increase in drain 7
tank pressure and temperature above normal, and the 8
automatic actuation of high pressure injection at 9
1600 psig?
10 A
Yes.
t 11 Q
What?
12 A
The normal lifting of the valve or of a O-
'd n
13 code safety valve and other circumstances like the 14 initiation of a cooldown as supported by emergency 15 feedwater actuation.
So that I indeed would have the l
16 high temperature alarm, I would have an increased i
17 pressure and temperature in the drain tank, and I'
18 would -- due to the cooldown, if that were the case 19 get down to high pressure injection actuation.
20 So there are other circumstances used in 21 conjunction with these symptoms which would have the 22 very same symptoms.
23 Q
In other words, there were other
(
24 combinations of -occurrences which could produce 25 those three symptoms; is that right?
1 Zewe
.734 2
A That is correct.
3 Q
Would you have understood on the day of 4
the accident that you would get high-pressure injection
(
5 from an opening and reseating of the code safety?
6 A
Normally I would not expect that to be the 7
case.
O Q
Now, this procedure, Mr. Zewe, says under 9
" Manual Action," "For a failed open RC-R2, close 10 electromatic relief isolation valve."
11 Do you see that?
That is the so-called 12 block valve?
13 A
RC-V2 block valve, yes.
14 Q
Was that block valve closed during this 15 period of time between the reactor trip a,nd your trip 16 to the turbine room?
17 A
It was not.
10 Q
Did you give consideration during that 19 period of time to closing the block valve?
20 A
It was my conclusion, based on my 21 evaluation of my control room indicators, that the
- 2 proper course of action was not to close the PORV
'3 block valve.
2I Q
In other words, just so I' understand your 25 testimony, you did think about it and then you did
Zewe
.735 O
reach a conscious decision that you should not close 3
the block valve?
4 A
I think that it would be more accurate
(
5 to say tha.t I did not reach the conclusion that the 0
block valve should be shut, based on my indication.
I I did not thinks Close the valve, and then say for these reasons I did not close it.
9 It is more the fact that my evaluation 10
(
process drew me to the conclusion that it was not proper and it was not the right thing to do to close' 12 the block valve.
g Q
Had you excluded the possibility that the 14 PORV might be open at the time'that you went down 15 to the turbine room?
I-16 A
I don't recall excluding any particular 17 possibility.
I was just using the indica tio r s and observation that I had made for the transient that 1
l the plant was undergoing and the action th we were i
20 taking.
And I used these factors in determining what 21 course of action I was taking.
2 I do not remember purposely or otherwise 03
~
l excluding any particular items for whatever reason.
O n4
,Q Well, you knew, did you no't, at that time, 05 based on your training and understanding of the system, l
1 Zewe
.736 i
I 2
that if the PORV was open, _ that that could produce a 3
loss of inventory from the system?
4 A
Most certainly.
And that would certainly
(
5 be reflected in the loss of inventory as indicated 6
by pressurizer level.
7 Q
You have previously referred to a situation 8
in which the PORV remained open as a LOCA; correct?
9 A
Yes, that is correct.
10 Q
And it is fair to say, is 1,t not, that 11' a LOCA was something to be avoided?
12 A
Yes, it was.
(~,
13 Q
And you knew, didn't you, that you could I4 avoid any possibility of a LOCA through the PORV 15 simply by closing the block valve?
A l
16 THE WITNESS:
Would you read that back, 17 please.
18 (Question read) 19 A
Yes, if I had reached the conclusion that 20 the system inventory was being lost through the PORV 21 and the block valve is between the pressurizer and 22 the PORV, that in fact should isolate it, yes.
23 Q
Didn't you consider it, Mr. Zewe, a l
w
[G
\\
24 prudent thing to do to close the block valve if there 25 was a possibility that there might be a loss of 1 -...
1 Zewe
.737 2
coolant going on through the open PORV?
3 THE WITNESS:
Read that back, please.
4 (Record was read back.)
([
5 A
I based my actions solely on my training 6
and experience and evaluation of the particular plant 7
upset that's going on and use whatever information I 8
have available in. reaching a course of action.
9 And in this particular instance I did not 10 think that a loss of inventory was occurring through 11 the PORV.
So I did not close the block valve.
And 12 I had reached that based on my observations of the O.
~
13 indications.
14 Q
Had you been trained not to close the 15 block valve until it has been positively determined 16 that there was a loss of coolant accident due to an 17 open PORV7 18 A
I had been trained to take action based 19 on my indicators and my understanding in handling all 20 events.
It was never in my training that anyone would 21 state that you will not do this, isolate the valve, L
22 or that you would isolate the valve.
It is based 23 solely on my training, understanding and evaluating
(
24 ny process indicators.
25 That is reinforced at the island and
1 Zewe
.7 1 8
/~~N V-2 certainly in my transient response,the major training 3
that I received on plant' upsets in a hands-on fashion 4
at B&W.
1
(
5 Q
Wasn't the training on an open PORV at 6
B&W that as soon as you saw drain tank pressure and 7
temperature increasing, you should close the block 8
valve?
9 A
No, you still needed to evaluate other 10 parameters, such as pressurizer level,1,hich indicates w
11 inventory, the indicator for the PORV itself, along 12 with the drain tank alarm indicators.
13 Q
In your last answer, you were referring 14 to training that you received at B&W?
15 A
Yes, it was.
Any transient training 16 response that I received in relationship to the PORV 17 was solely at B&W.
And from any action that I took 18 at B&W, I do not remember one instance where the 1
19 action was not deemed acceptable by the training l
20 instructors.
21 MR. FISKE:
I guess we reserve until 22 later motions to strike as well as objections 23 to questions.
()
24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
You will-have all of 25 this at the trial anyway.
1 Zewe
.719 2
Q In going through your thought process 3
before you went down to the turbine room, was there 4
any reason not to close the block valve other than l
5 t' hat you didn't think that you had an open PORV?
6 A
As I, recall, I did not conclude that I 7
should shut it.
Therefore, there was no reason for 8
me to go ahead and shut it.
9 I was aware of instances where closing 10 that valve had resulted in the valve f4,iling shut, 11 but it was based more on not reaching the conclusion 12 that it should be shut.
13 MR. FISKE:
Can I hear that answer, 14 please.
15 (Record was read back.)
16 Q
Is it your testimony, Mr. Zewe, that there i
17 had been previous instances in which that. block valve 18 at Unit 2 had been closed and failed shut?
19 A
As I have stated previously during this 1
20 deposition, that I do recall instances where block 21 valves on the pres.ori=er have failed shut between 22 Unit 1 and Unit 2,
and I consider any experier.ce that 23 I gained on Unit 1 certainly applies to Unit 2 and
(
24 vice versa.
So more in those terme.
25 As I pointed out, I don't think that was
gewe
,720 1
rm
~
$,)
2 the overbearing thing why I didn't shut it.
3 Q
But just to answer my question specifically, 4
there were no situations, were there, in which the
(
5 block valve at Unit 2 for the PORV had been closed 6
and had failed to open?
7 A
Again,'I believe there were but I am not 8
absolutely certain whether it was Unit 1 or Unit 2.
9 Q
And we are talking now about the block 10 valve for the PORV?
(
11 A
RC-V2.
12
'Q What was your understanding, as of the N-)'
13 day of the-accident, Mr. Zewe, as to percentages of 14 time in which when the block valve was shut you 15 wouldn't be able to get it open?
16 A
I never thought about percentages.
17 Q
Well, I am not holding you to.the last 18 decimal point, but was it something that happened i
19 every other time?
Was it one out of four?
Was it 20 one out of ten?
Was ~it frequent or was it infrequent?
21 I am looking for some perspective on how big a problem 22 that really was.
23 A
Unusual.
(
24 (Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken 25 at 12:04 p.m.)
t
. 7.21 Ai'4
,n, 2
(AFTERNOON SESSION) 3 (Mr. Benedict not present) 4 (Time noted:
1:05 p.m.)
([
Z EWE, resumed, having 6
been previously duly sworn, was examined and 7
testified further as follows:
8 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
9 BY MR. FISKE:
10 Q
Mr. Zewe, before the a c c i d h,n t, had you i
11 obtained any understanding through training or 12 otherwise as to what material the drain tank was
(~
13 made out of?
14 A
As I recall, I remember that the drain 15 tank was made out of stainless steel.
16 Q
We talked previously in this deposition i
17 about a relief valve and a rupture disk; right?
i 18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Did you understand that the relief valve I
20 was designed to try to avoid an overpressuri=ation 21 of the drain tank?
l 22 A
It was designed to limit the overpressure i
23 condition before the pressure got high enough to Iv) 24 challenge the rupture disk.
25 Q
Right.
And did you understand also that
3 1
Zewe 722 N
2 the rupture disk was designed to give way in the 3
event of an overpressurization to prevent other 4
parts of the tank from giving way?
(
5 A
Yes, I knew that it was designed to 6
protect the vessel itself, the tank.
7 Q
So did you understand that in order for 8
some hole to be put in the tank as a result of 9
overpressurization, at least under normal circumstances, l
10 there would have had to have been some, failure in the 11 operation of the relief valve or the rupture. disk?
12 A
No.
13 Q
How did you understand that a hole could 14 open in the tank as a result'of overpressurization 15 without the pressure reaching the point where the 16 relief valve was supposed to lift?
17 A
There could be various ways, various 18 level taps and valves which are located on or on lines 19 that are going to the tank could have a failure.
They 20 could h' ave bad diaphragms, bad gaskets,and various leaks 21 on them, have an instrument line fitting open up on 22 it.
23 It is just like the analogy is that since
()
24 I have code relief valves on the RCS,-I would never 25 have any leaks unless I pressurized above the relief
1 zewe 723
(^%
~
\\_]
2 valve set point of the RCS, which is not true.
I 3
e uld have packing leaks on the pump, suction valves 4
could leak through its packing, instrument lines.
(
'5 There is a whole realm of things that could happen at 6
a much lower pressure than what would be required tg 7
rupture the disk or even blow the relief valve.
8 Q
And did you, on the morning of the 9
accident during this first 45 minutes after the reactor 10 trip, try to think of which of those various situations 11 could produce a flow of water in the quantity that 3
12 was going into the sump?
(~N 13 A
I did not.
I had other things that I 14 was thinking about and considering, and I didn't feel 15 at that time that it was necessary to try to further 16 make any determination.
17 Q
Did you think it was important to your 18 diagnosis to determine whether the water that was
~
19 going into the sump had left the drain tank because of 20 a lifting of the relief valve or a rupturing of the 21 rupture disk as opposed to a hole developing in the 22 drain tank as a result of a situation in which pressure 23 had not reached the setpoint of the relief valve?
fs()
24 MR. FISKE:
Off the record.
25 (Discussion off the record.1 l
I
1 ZeWe 724 2
A I did not think that it was worth the time 3
and effort to make the determination differentiating 4
between any of the three cases.
(,
5 Any of the three cases would have to be 6
found at some later time and permanently repaired.
7 And at this point I didn't feel that it was worth the 8
effort to make that determination.
I had other things
'g that I was looking at and trying to take action on,
~
10 and that is where I spent my time.
t 11 Q
Why was it that you left the control room 12 at or about 4:407
(~'/)
N-13 A
As I recall, I left the control room for 14 a number of reasons, one being to see if I could 15 re-establish condensate flow and reject the high hot 16 well level, to try and open up COV-12 manually, to 17 assist the operator in isolating a leak a.t the i
18 condensate booster pump 2A, trying to insure that we 19 do not suck water into the main vacuum pump's.
20 Q
That is the end of your answer?
~
21 A
Yes, it is.
22 Q
When you left the control room, I take 23 it Mr. Scheimann, Mr. Frederick, Mr. Faust and g
()
24 Mr. Bryan were still there?
25 A
Yes, they were.
1 Zewe 725 2
Q Did you place somebody else in charge 3
when you left?
4 A
Place somebody else in charge?
Could you l
5 clarify what you are saying, " place in charge"?
6 Q
Sure..
During the period you had been 7
there from the reactor trip on, you had been, as 8
you put it, responsible for the operation of the 9
plant.
10 A
Yes, I was.
(
11 Q
And you were the one'during that period 12 of time, I take it, who would make the final decisions 13 as to what actions should be taken, if,there was any 14 disagreement.
15 A
Absolutely right.
16 Q
O.K.
l 17 A
And even though I was out of the control l,
18 room, I was still in charge.
l l
19 Q
When you left the control room, what did l
20 you understand was going to happen in the event some i
21 decision had to be made in the control room while 22 you were down in the turbine room?
Who was going to 23 be ultimately responsible for that decision?
()
24 A
Any action --
25 MR. FISKE:
Withdrawn.
( - - -
1 Zewe 726 f~
2 Q
Who was going to have the responsibility 3
for making thac decision?
4 A
As always, the responsibility lies in each
(
5 of the individuals that are on shift.
6 If they feel that it is necessary to take 7
a particular course of action, based on their training 8
and evaluation, based on that conclusion, they will 9
make them, whether it be the control room operators I
10 or the shift foreman.
1 11' The senior person in the control room on 12 shift was Mr. Scheimann.
13 Q
Let me put it this way.
While you were 14 in the control room during the first 40 minutes, you 15 were the leader, weren't you?
16 A
Yes, I was.
I was the leader for the 17 entire plant.
18 Q
Who was the leader for actions to be 19 taken in the control room while you were down in the 20 turbine room?
21 A
I just stated that the shift foreman was 22 the senior watch stander in the control room that had 23 the duty.
()
24 Q
What had Mr. Scheimann been doing during 25 the first 40 minutes of this transient?
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1 Zewe 727 O
~#~
2 A
After he had arrived back,in the control 3
room, I had assigned him and Mr. Frederick to primary 4
plant control, mainly pressurizer level, makeup pump
(
5 control, and anything that dealt with the operation of 6
the primary plant.
7 Q
Before you left to go down to the turbine I
8 room, did you have a discussion with Mr. Scheimann?
9 A
During the course of the event up to that 10 time, we had numerous discussions on eVerything that 11 was happening.
12 Q
When you left the control room, were you t'
13 satisfied that Mr. Scheimann was aware of everything 14 that you thought he needed to be aware of in your 15 absence?
16 A
I certainly was.
And I was only a short l
l 17 time period away if he needed any help, and he knew 18 that.
19 And he also had Mr. Bryan there to assist 20 him as Mr. Scheimann would require.
l 21 Q
on what basis.were you satisfied that
(-
22 Mr. Scheimann knew everything that you felt that he 23 needed to know?
To put it another way, was that as a
(
24 result of conversations that you had had with him i
l 25 directly?
5 1
Zewe 728 p,
\\_)
2 A
As I stated, he was in my judgment fully 3
aware of what had happened to the plant as I knew, and 4
the actions that we had.taken as I knew, and that
(
5 he would certainly take what I thought would be 6
appropriate actions.
If he had any point to where he 7
would be undecided, he would certainly confer with 8
the control room operators, with Mr. Bryan and also 9
contact myself and I would be free to come back to 10 the control room.
(
11 Q
Was Mr. Scheimann aware that the water 12 in the sump was at its highest level?
(
13 MR. KLINGSBERG:
When you say "was he 14 aware," do you mean did he either indicate to 15 Mr. Zewe or Mr. Zewe indicate to him?
16 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
17 Q
Or did you see him looking at the computer 18 when the readings would appear?
In other words, did 19 you believe when you left the control room that 20 Mr. Scheimann was aware of the fact that the water in 21 the sump was at its highest level?
22 A
Yes, I believe that I thought he was aware 23 of that, yes.
(
24 Q
What did you base that belief on?
25 A
His presence'in the control room and his
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1 zewe
.729
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2 involvement in all of the discussions that I had had 3
with the control room operators and with Mr. Scheimann 4
himself.
(
5 Q
And did these discussions that you had had 6
with Mr. Scheimann include discussions about where the 7
water in the sump had come from?
8 A
It involved discussions of every nature 9
of what'had happened.
As I recall, it must have 10 included those, also.
t 11 Q
Did you give Mr. Scheimann the benefit of 12 your analysis with respect to how that water had gotten P
13 into the sump?
14 A'
During the course of our discussions, I 15 believe I did, yes.
16 Q
In any of your discussions with 17 Mr. Scheimann, did you discuss with him whether or not 18 the water in the drain tank had come from a stuck open 19 PORV7 20 A
I never at any time discussed with 21 Mr. Scheimann that I felt there was a stuck open PORV, 22 at any time.
23 Q
That wasn't --
[~V) 24 A
That is what I believe you. asked.
25 Q
No.
I said, did you discuss with Y-e-
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1 Zewe 730 r~N i
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Mr. Scheimann whether or not the water in the drain 3
tank had come from a stuck open PORV?
4 A
You are saying the same thing.
(
5 Q
I don't believe 6
A I don't differentiate the two.
7 Q
Maybe we misunderstand each other.
Let i.
8 me rephrase it then.
9 Did you discuss with Mr. Scheimann 10 whether or not there was a stuck open P,ORV7 11 A
I just told you that never at any time
~
12 did I discuss with him that the PORV was stuck open, u
N-13 in any form, and that's it.
e 14 Q
Did you discuss with Mr. Scheimann whether 15 the water in the drain tank had come from the lifting e
16 and reseating of the code safety valve?
l 17 A
As I remember, that was included in our l
18 discussions.
19 Q
Did you discuss with Mr. Scheimann the 20 temperature readings that you had received from 21 Mr. Bryan?
22 A
A~ gain, I can only believe that it was in 23 the course of our discussions and in his own
()
24 observations and knowing where the plant was and what 25 had happened to that point, that I understood.
I do l
l
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1 zewe 7JJ
= " >
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2 not recall an exact instance to refer to that but 3
I believe that he was aware.
4 Q
You believe he was aware of the same l[
5 readings that Mr. Bryan had given you?
6 A
YeE-7 Q
And can you tell us whether he got the 8
information about those readings from you?
9 A
I don't remember.
10 Q
Just so I understand, I woh,1d like to ask 11 you the same questions first with Mr. Frederick and 12 then with Mr. Faust.
I don't think I can lump them f'
I s
\\
13 together in one question.
14 Did you discuss the subject of a possible 15 open PORV with Mr. Frederick?
16 A
I did not discuss the possibility of a 17 stuck open PORV with anyone, Mr. Frederick, 18 Mr. Scheimann, Mr. Bryan, with anybody.
19 Q
Did you discuss the possibility of the 20 water in the drain tank coming from a code safety 21 lifting with Mr. Frederick?
L 22 A
During the course of our discussions 23 Q
This is during the time period of the
[)h 24 first 45 minutes.
25 A
I was answering the question.
L
1 Zewe 732 During the course of our various 2
3 discussions, I believe I did, t
4
\\
Q Within that time period?
l(
5 A
It included that time period.
6 Q
Did you discuss the temperature readings 7
that you had received from Mr. Bryan with Mr. Frederick 8
during that time period?
9 A
I don't remember, though I thought that he 10 was aware of it, t
I 11 Q
What was your basis for thinking.that he 12 was aware of it?
13 A
His presence in the contro room and 14 involvement in the discussions and the plant operations 15 that were occurring at that time.
4 16 Q
How would his presence in the control room 17 and his involvement in the operations that were going 18 on at that time make him aware of the temperature 19 readings that Mr. Bryan obtained?
20 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Objection.
21 Q
How did you understand that would happen?
(_
22 A
By those reasons.
23 Q
Yes.
(
24 A
"By those reasons."
That is my answer.
4 25 Q
I guess I don't quite understand.
4
1 Zewe 733 2
You said one of the reasons was that he 3
was in the control room.
I am trying to find out how 4
you thought that simply being in the control room
(;
5 would make Mr. Frederick aware of the temperature 6
readings that Mr. Bryan had obtained.
7 A
His presence in the control room and his 8
involvement with the discussions between all of the 9
operating crew in the control room:
I believe he was 10 aware of the readings.
t 11 Q
Is it your best recollection that the 12 readings w'ere included in the general discussions that O-13 went on among the people in the control room?
s 14 A
That's as I remember.
15 Q
Did you discuss the question of whether l
16 the water in the drain tank had come from the code i
17 safety lifting with Mr. Faust?
18 A
Again, in the course of discussions between 19 the personnel in the control room, of which'Mr. Faust 20 was a member, I felt that he was made aware of that.
{
21 Q
Did you discuss the conditions in the k.
22 drain tank with Mr. Faust?
23 A
Not that I could remember that particular I~h 24 point, but, again, the previous answer applies.
I d
l 25 feel that general discussions about that:
He, in my i
l i
\\
1 Zewe 734 p
opinion, was aware of that condition.
3 Q
Was it also your understanding that from 4
the general discussions, Mr. Faust was aware of the k
5 fact that the water in the sump had come from the 6
drain tank 7 7
A That was my understanding.
8 Q
How long were you gone from the control 9
room, Mr. Zewe?
10 A
I don't know.
11 Q
The GPU chronology that was involved with 12 the NRC reflects that the first set of reactor coolant O
13 pumps was turned off at 5:15.
e 14 A
As I remember, that is correct.
15 Q
Had you returned to the control room 16 before that occurred?
l 17 A
Yes, I had.
18 Q
Can you tell us, to the best of your 19 recollection, how long you had been back in the l
20 control room before the first set of pumps was turned i
21 off?
l 22 A
I don't remember.
23 Q
You said that one of the things you did
'(
24 when you left the control room was go and look at i
25 the high hot well. level in the condenser.
l 8
1 Zewe 735 j
2 A
That is true.
3 Q
How had it come to your attention that 4
the level in the hot well was high?
(.
5 A
From the indicator in the control room.
6 Q
Do you remember when that first came to 7
your attention?
i 8
A Before I left the control room.
9 Q
How long before?
10 A
I don't remember.
11 Q
Why was a high hot well level a matter l
12 of concern?
13 A
Because it was abnormal and it may result l
I 14 in losing vacuum by sucking water into the main 15 vacuum pumps, and also it would continue to fill up 16 the hot well up underneath the main turbine.
17 Q
It is correct, Mr. Zewe, that a high hot 18 well level is inconsistent with a steam line break?
19 A
Under normal conditions, that is true.
20 Q
And am I correct that at this point in 21 time in the transient that is, the first 40 minutes i
22 of the transient that you, Mr. Zewe, did not 23 conclude that at that point you had had a steam line
()
24 break?
25 A
As I remember, that is true.
It was after
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-1 Zew' 736 I
~
2 that time period.
I 3
Q And did y u discuss that conclusion with
(
i 4
the other operators that were on the shift?
m m
{
A That we did not have a steam line break?
6 Q.
Yes, at that point.
7 A
I would not and I did not.
i i
I 8
Q
.Was there any discussion at all among the 9
operators that were on duty in the first 40 minutes 10 as to whether or not you had a steam line break at i
l 11 that time?
\\
' ss 12 A
There may have been, though I do not 13 recall.
C 14 Q
Am I correct that your-testimony today is s
15 that you don't remember anyone discussing with you 16 during that period the possibility that you might have ss 'q 17 a steam leak at that time?
18 A
I don't recall any discussion to that l
19 effect at that particular time, though there was s
20 considerable conversation to that effect which, as I i
21 remember, happened later.
But I very well could be 22 confused.
But that is not how I remember it.
4 9
23 Q
In other words, the way you remember it, e
25 40 minutes?
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A Not that I recall.
3 Q
what did you do about the high hot well 4
level when you got dcwn Shere?
(
.5 A
I verified that it indeed was high, and q
6 then I wanted to reject the water to the condensate l
7 storage tank by running a condensate pump and opening w
8 up the polisher bypass, because I had noticed that t
9,;
the polisher' valves were all shut.
And in order to N
% 9(
10' reject that watea, I had to make the ndcessary lineup
~
3t 11 in' order to red'uce the hot well level, and that also i
12 was blowing down some lime trap.s going to the vacuum O
13 pumps so that they did not become logged with water.
v Q
Was it in connection with trying to get 14 15 the water out of the hot well level that you opened i
3+
16
~ manually that valve COV-12 that we talked about s
i.
17 eariter?
18 A
Yes, as I remember.
19,
3Q Now, you said you also did something with go(p[ the condensate booster pump?
s 21, A
I helped to isolate the suction in or 22 discharge valve of the pump because of a leak.
s 23 Q
What was the problem that you felt that
'()
.24 could be caused by 'that leak?
25 A
The transient that the feedwater system had s
"u
6 1
Zewe 738
(~%.
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2 undergone, the complete loss of feed, resulted in a 3
pressure transient that caused the leakage to occur.
4 Q
so this is something that had resulted
(
5 from the trip; is that correct?
6 A
That was my assumption.
7 Q
And then the last thing that you had 8
mentioned was something having to do with the main 9
vacuum pumps.
Could you tell us what you did in 10 connection with that?
(
11 A
I mentioned already that I blev down 12 trapped drain lines to preclude the vacuum pumps 13 sucking in water and becoming waterlogged, which would 14 impair their operation.
15 Q
Have you now told us everything that you 16 did during the period of time you were out of the 17 control room?
18 A
I gave some other directions to the 19 auxiliary operators in the turbine building', and I 20 made a few phone calls to the control room and also 21 to Unit 1 while I was outside the control room.
22 Q
With whom did you have discussions in the 23 control room by phone?
(~)
24 A
I remember calling the Unit 1 shift u) 25 foreman and asking him to contact I believe at that
1 Zewe 739
\\'
2 point Mr. Miller and Mr. Ross.
3 Q
Who was the Unit 1 shift foreman?
4 A
Mr. Pilsitz.
(
5 Q
P-i-1 --
s-i-t-z.
6 A
7 Q
Is he still with Met Ed?
8 A
He is.not.
9 Q
What did you tell him to tell Mr. Miller 10 and Mr. Ross?
t 11 A
I don't recall any exact words, but in 12 effect it was in letting them know the problem that I f
\\_-
13 had had and that I would need assistance.
14 Q
How did you describe the problem to 15 Mr. Pilsitz?
16 A
I don't recall the level of detail that I 17 told Mr. Pilsitz, except that we had had a turbine 18 trip and a reactor trip which was initiated by a loss 19 of feed when the polishers went shut.
Pres'sure was 20 low but stable around 1100 pounds and the pressurizer 21 level was very high and I didn't know why.
Other 22 plant parameters were quite normal.
23 Q
Was it your understanding that Mr. Pilsitz f~}/
24 was supposed to communicate those basic facts to x_
25 Mr. Miller and to Mr. Ross?
1 Zewe 740
,2 A
I would expect him to do so, yes.
3 Q
what type of aesistance did you expect to 4
receive as a result of this phone call?
(
5 A
Any assistance th'at two knowledgeable and 6
capable individuals could provide me.
7 Q
In other words, your understanding was that 8
Mr. Miller and Mr. Ross would provide you with whatever 9
assistance they thought would be helpful in light of 10' the problem as it was described to them?
11 A
I don't believe that I took time to 12 analyze what I thought they would be telling me or how
("h
\\2 13 they would view it, other than I felt that I could 14 use more assistance from experienced people to provide i
15 assistance.
That's about as general as I could say.
A 16 Q
You understood they would make the decision 17 as to what kind of assistance they were going to provide 18 based on the information that was communicated to them l
19 by Mr. Pilsitz; is that right?
i 20 MR. KLINGS B ff.G :
It sounds to me like he 21 has answered the question.
22 A
Just to put it very basically, I expected l-23 to get some needed help from these two individuals.
24 Q
Why did you feel that help.was needed?
25 A
For the reasons that I stated to
a 1
Zewe 7.4 J S
%s 2
Mr. Pilsitz to relay on to Mr. Miller and to Mr. Ross.
3 That pressurizer level was abnormally high, pressure 4
was abnormally low but steady, and I didn't know why.
()
5 Q
Did you make any other phone calls from 6
the turbine room?
7 A
Yes, I did.
8 Q
Could you tell us whether you made any 9
phone calls to the control room of Unit 27 10 A
Yes, I did.
11 Q
Do you remember how many?
12 A
No, I don't.
/~N 13 Q
Who did you talk to in.the control room?
14 A
Operating room personnel.
I don't 15 remember.
I believe that at one time or another during 16 that time outside the control room I believe I talked 17 with all of the operating staff in the control room.
18 Q
So you obviously made more than one. phone 19 call.
20 A
Yes, there was.
I had asked things 'like, 21 "How are the amps on the vacuum pumps?
k 22 "Try to go ahead and jog open the COV-12 23 valve.
After it starts, open it up all the way.
I) 24 "I
found the polisher valve shut.
We are 25 isolating the leak on COP-2A.
Pull the lock to make we--
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i i
1 Zewe
-742 2
sure it doesn't start.
3 "D
y u have any other information since 4
I left?"
(
5 You know, "How are things looking?"
6 General-type things.
7 And then I remember paging an operator.
8 I couldn't get hold of him so I called the control 9
room and I asked, " Hey, is George on another job?
If 10 so, I need him now."
And they said, no, they didn't 11 know at that particular time that he was on another 12 job, so I paged him again.
13 so general-type communications.
14 Q
Did you receive any phone calls from the 15 control room while you were down there?
16 A
Yes, I did.
17 Q
Did any of those phone calls ask y'our 18 advice about problems that they were dealing with in 19 the control room?
i 20 A
I believe that there were, yes.
21 Q
Can you tell us now what problems were k
22 discussed with you while you were in the turbine room?
23 A
As I recall, the only interface of problems 24 here was really dealing with what I was doing.
They 25 were wondering how soon I was going to have the valve I
31 1
Zewe
'743
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~
V 2
opened, and asking me once I had cracked it off its s
3 seat, did I want to go fully open on it or just jog 4
it open.
Again, just general back and forth.
(!
5 And I believe at some point there before 6
I went back to the control room, they had called me 7
and they had said that Mr. Kunder had arrived in the 8
control room.
9 Q
Apart from discussions that you may have 10 had with them on the phone related to t'hin g s that you 11 were doing down at the turbine room, were there any 12 discussions between you and the control room people O,O 13 about problems that they were seeing back in the 14 control room?
15 A
Yes.
The same general things, that they 16 said that they were still trying to reduce pressurizer 17 level and it was staying pretty much the same, and' 18 pressure was holding about where it was when I left, 19 and that the status was pretty much the same.
That 20 they were still trying to combat the problem.
Nothing 21 other than those types of information exchange.
22 Q
Was any new problem brought to your 23 attention while you were down there?
O.
24 A
Not that I recall.
a 25 Q
I think I neglected to ask you, while we
i 1
Zewe 744 2
were talking about the water,in the sump, was there 3
any method available to you for determining, after 4
the sump pump had been turned off, whether water
(
5 continued to flow into the sump?
6 A
To my knowledge, there was not.
7 Q
Would it have been possible did you 8
understand that it would have been possible -- to make 9
that determination if you had left the sump pumps 10 running?
(
11 A
I didn't think about that that day.
12 Q
What was the reason that you had turned r
(
N-13 off the sump pumps?
14 A
My reason was that I did not want to 15 overflow the tank in the auxiliary building where the e
16 sump pumps were pumping into.
I knew that there was 17 not a lot of freeboard available before that tank 18 would overflow, and I didn't want to overflow it to 19 the floor.
I just wanted to keep it in the reactor 20 building sump.
21 Q
Had that tank ever overflowed before?
22 A
Yes, it had.
23 Q
Was that something that had happened on
[/)
24 more than one occasion?
s_
25 A
Yes, it had.
____-- _ _~ - -
_ _ -. ~ _ -, _ _ _, _
1 Zewe 745 3
Q What adverse consequences resulted from 3
having that tank overflow?
4 A
It depends on how much it overflows.
l 5
Q All right.
What are_the consequences 6
if there is a relatively small amount of water that 7
overflows?
8 A
It would overflow to the aux building 9
sump itself.
And when that was full, it would then 10 start to back up through the floor drai,ns in the 11
. basement of the auxiliary building.
12 Q
Where does it go from there?
13 A
It just starts to back up until the 14 building itself would flood.
15 Q
Is that at the other end of the spectrum 16 of Possible bad consequences?
I mean, that the 17 building would fill up itself?
18 A
The other end of the spectrum?
I am not 19 sure what you are asking.
20 Q
I'm sorry.
21 You said that the consequences would vary k
22 depending on how much water overflowed.
You said if 23 it was a minor amount, it would flow into the
()
24 auxiliary building sump.
Then you said if the flow 25 was greater than that, it might go into the drains,
1 Zewe 746 O
2 and then eventually fill up the building.
3 I guess my question is, is filling up the 4
building the worst consequence that would follow from
('
5 overflowing that tank?
6 A
Yes.
Because the building contains many 7
needed pieces of equipment, that if the building would 8
flood any appreciable amount, they would render them 9
10 Q
Did you know on the morning of the 11 accident how much water you could pump out of the 12 sump into the tank before the auxiliary building sump 13 would fill up?
14 A
That morning I was aware of how much 15 freeboard we had in the aux building sump tank, the 16 aux building sump, and the miscellaneous waste holdup 17 tank and the RC bleed tanks.
I was aware of where our 18 water situation was and capacities.
I am no longer, 19 about how much was left.
But I do remembed-the 20 concerns that I did not have a lot of freeboard 21 available to allow the pumps to pump.
22 Q
When you say " freeboard," do you include 23 in that term the remaining amount of capacity in the hJ 24 tank itself?
25 A
Yes.
747 1
g,y,
)
~#
2 MR. KLINGSBERG:
What tank is that?
3 Q
Is that the tank that you pump water into 4
from the reactor building sump?
(
5 A
It has two places to go to.
Either the 6
miscellaneous waste holdup tank or the auxiliary 7
building sump tank, both of which, when I mean 8
freeboard, I mean volume left before overflow.
9 Q
What determined whether water from the sump 10 would go to the miscellaneous waste hoi, dup tank or 11 the auxiliary building sump tank?
12 A
As I recall, we had a criteria based on f
~
A/
13 I believe it was the activity of the water.
14 Q
What do you mean by " activity"?
15 A
If the water was radioactive over a 16 certain limit, we would route it to the miscellaneous j
17 waste holdup tank.
If it was of a lesser activity',
18 we would route it to the auxiliary building sump tank.
(
19 Q
And on the day of the accident, it was 20 i being routed to the miscellaneous waste holdup tank l
l 21 or-the auxiliary building sump tank?
Which one?
k 22 A
One or the other, and I don't recall 23 exactly.
I knew then, but I don't know now.
24 I would think it would be. lined up to the 25 tank based on low activity which I believe, if I
5 1
Zewe 748
\\~
2 remember it right -- and I have.not reviewed this for 3
years now -- that I believe that the low activity tank 4
was the auxiliary building sump tank, which I believe
(
5 is where it was lined up to.
6 Q
Just so I understand your answer, your 7
best recollection is that it was lined up with 8
whichever of the two tanks was the low activity tank?
9 A
As I recall, yes.
10 Q
Was the determination as t6,which tank the 11 water went into determined manually by the operators?
12 A
Yes, it is.
. (
x-13 Q
There wasn't any sort of automatic valve 14 that shifted the flow of water when radioactivity 15 got to a certain level?
16 A
Strictly manual process.
17 Q
When you referred to the amount of 18 freeboard, in your earlier answers, were you referring 19 to the capacity that remained in whichever tank it 20 was that the water was then being pumped into?
21 A
Any reference that I have made to 22
" freeboard" that I can remember making was made in
~
to the amount that was left before overflow 23 reference I~')
24 at the particular tank.
'%.)
25 Q
Did you understand on the morning of the 4
,n-
.,m.
749 Zewe 1
i
.(5 U
2 accident that it would have been possible to continue pumping water into that tank until it reached its
,a 3
i 4
capacity and then switch the flow into the other tank g
Il and continue pumping water into that other tank?
k 5
6 A
I knew that morning that I could pump water wherever I deemed I wanted it pumped, for 7
8 whatever reason I choose.
9 Q
Did you have an understanding as to how 10 much freeboard there was in the other tank?
That is, 11 the one that'the water was not being. pumped into.
THE WITNESS:
Say that again, please.
12 I
(Record was read back.)
\\~'
13 14 A
As,I have stated earlier, thatl day I was
~
aware of how much freeboard I had in both of those 15 16 tanks, and most, if not all, of the other' tanks in 17 Unit 2.
18 Q
What kind of documents would there be which.would re'flect the level in those two-tanks in 19 20 the containment building on the morning of the
\\_
91 accident?
22 A
We used to keep track of it a couple of 23 different ways.
But about the only one that is 24 recorded and kept is the aux operator'.s log sheets
()
25 where he records during the course of the shift what
i i
'3 1
zewe
-750
~'
2 it is from shift to shift.
We also would maintain a 3
running status by the control room people as to what 4
the tanks were at any particular time, but I don't k.
5 believe they are recoverable.
6 Q
To put the question in a form that seems 7
to be the favorite of our adversaries in this case, 8
if you wanted to find out today what the level in 9
those two tanks was on the morning of the accident, 10 what document's would you go look at?
(
11 A
Auxiliary operator's log.
12 (Recess taken.)
i N-13 BY MR. FISKE:
14 Q
Mr. zewe, you said that you learned while 15 you were down in the turbine room that Mr. Kunder 16 had arrived in the control room?
l L
17 A
I believe that's when I learned, yes.
18 Q
And he was there when you got back?
19 A
Yes, he was.
20 Q
Did you find out the circumstances under 21 which Mr. Kunder had come to the control room?'
22 A
He was telephoned at home and he got out 23 and came in.
()
24 Q
Who telephoned him?
25 A
I believe it was one of the two engineers I
7.51 hd 1
g,y,
(-
G 2
that came over from Unit 1 with or after Mr. Bryan 3
came over.
4 Q
Do you know whose idea it was to l
5 telephone Mr. Kunder?
6
-A Yes, it was mine.
7 Q
When did you suggest that that be done?
8 A
I don't know the time, but it was sometime 2
9 early into the event, before I left the control room.
10 Q
While you were in the tu'rbine room, did 11 you make any phone calls other than the ones that we 12 covered just before the break?
t 13 A
Only the general-type calls, and not 14 very many individual-type calls other than the ones 15 to Unit 1,
and I believe I covered them to my best 16 recollection.
17 Q
At some point after you came back into 18 the control room, were you present during a discussion 19 which occurred on the subject of whether ycu had a j
20 steam line break or whether you had a LOCA?
21 A
I don't recall discussions about whether l
22 we had a LOCA or a steam line break.
I do recall l
23 discussions to the effect that we may have a steam 24 leak in the B. steam generator, i
j 25 Q
Within a few minutes of those discussions, I
i l
1 2
1 Zewe 752
13 Q
Do I understand you correctly that up 14 to the time that the block valve was closed at or 15 about 6:15, you did not see either a yellow light or e
16 a red light for any of the radiation alarms on that 17 panel other than the intermediate closed. cooling 1
18 system alarms?
19 A
Intermediate letdown monitors.
20 Q
o.K.
- 21 A
They are separate monitors.
I just l
l 22 wanted to point that out.
23 That is correct, that those were the l
(s.
24 only ones that were in alert or alarm 25 Q
Specifically, you did not see either a
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8 1
Zewe 758
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V~
2 yellow alarm or a red alarm for the R-227 monitor 3
that is referenced in the LOCA procedure?
4 A
"All" did include that 227.
l 5
Q Did you understand that in addition to 6
these lights, there were meters that monitored 7
radiation in the building atmosphere?
8 A
only the monitors that were either in 9
the building or monitored a building, yes.
10 Q
Was there a specific meter associated 11-with the 227 alarm?
12 A
Yes, there is.
13 Q
Did you look at that meter at any time 14 before the block valve was closed to determine if 15 that reflected any increase in radiation?
16 A
I remember looking over all of the RMS 17 from time to time as just the normal course of events, 18 and I don't remember seeing any change that I noted.
19 Q
Can you tell us what time during the 20 transient you first looked at the meter associated 21 with the 227 alarm?
22 A
No, I can't.
I routinely scan the 23 panels in the control room which includes the RMS
(
24 panels, and I cannot pin it down to any particular 25 time, other than after the time of closing the block
9 1
Zewe 759 i
O 2
valve when they all went off and then I,certainly did 3
note that change.
4 Q
I asked you a question before about
(
5 building temperature.
Let me refer you to the 6
interview that you had with Mr. Madden and Mr. Rogers 7
of the NRC on April 3,
1979, which has been previously 8
marked as Exhibit 271.
9 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Do you have it?
I 10 THE WITNESS:
Yes, I do.
j 11 Q
Let me direct your attention, Mr. Zewe, 12 to page 33, the top of 34 and the bottom of 33.
's-)
13 Have you had a chance to, read that answer?
14 A
I have read it.
15 Q
The first part of this answer reads, e
16 "Also, and I'm not sure when, whenever we noticed that 17 we did have a pressure in the reactor building, we 18 did put on emergency river water cooling through the 19 reactor building coolers, at that time to try to 20 reduce the temperature and pressure that was in the 21 reactor building that had been on up until now, I 22 think probably an hour at this point or, well, no, 23 if it's only 5:25 or so for the steam generator, then
(
24 it was on for at least a half hour at.least.
We had 25 on the emergency river water cooling to the reactor
10 1
zewe 760 2
building for some time."
3 Do you see that statement that appears 4
on the bottom of page 33 and the top of 347 l
5 A
Yes, I do.
6 Q
Did you make that statement to the 7
gentlemen of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission back on 8
April 3, 19797 9
A I don't remember the words exactly, but 10 I have no reason to believe this is no't accurate.
11 Q
Does reading that statement and having 12 it read to you refresh your recollection that you
\\-.
13 did put on emergency river water cooli.ng in an effort 14 to try and reduce building temperature?
15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I object to the form of l
16 the question.
There is no indication that the 17 witness needed to have his recollection 18 refreshed.
19 MR. FISKE:
All right, then I will 20 rephrase it.
21 Q
Did you, in fact, Mr. Zewe, put on 22 emergency river water cooling to the reactor building 23 coolers?
)
24 A
Yes, we did.
25 g
was the reason for doing that to try to y-
,y-3
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y,
,u m.~%
e_,g
.g,,
11 1
Zewe 7.61
('S V
2 reduce pressure and temperature that was in the s
3 reactor building?
4 A
As I recall, it was.
l 5
Q Did you take that action at some point 6
before the B steam generator was isolated?
7 A
That, I don't remember.
8 Q
Does reading this statement that you 9
gave to the NRC and having it read refresh your i
10 recollection that, in fact, you did do.that at some 11 time before the steam generator B was isolated?
12 A
I don't recall.
I don't remember if it 13 was before or after it was isolated.
1 4
14 I see what the words say here, but from 15 today, putting myself back on March 28th, I don't
??
16 remember.
l 17 MR. FISKE:
As the next B&W exhibit,'let 18 me mark a figure from the LER filed by GPU l
j 19 with the NRC, captioned " Figure 13, Reactor 20 Coolant System Pressure."
That will be B&W 21 756.
I 22 (Documen t from the LER filed by GPU with 23 the NRC, captioned " Figure 13, Reactor Coolant
()
24 System Pressure," was marked B&W Exhibit 756 25 for identification as of this date.)
12 1
Zewe 762 2
Q Do you have that in front of you?
3 A
Yes.
4
-Q This shows that for the period of time k
5 beginning, an hour into the accident, continuing on 6
for the next 20 minutes or so, the pressure of the 7
reactor coolant system was somewhere around 1100 psig; 8
is that correct?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
And that that pressure wa's lower than the 11 pressure had been 15 minutes into the transient?
12 A
Not a great deal of change.
f%
k/
13 Q
It does show, doesn't it,.Mr.
Zewe, that 14 from 15 minutes into the accident right through 75 15 minutes into the accident, there had been no increase 16 in pressure, that the pressure had stayed --
17 MR. KLINGSBERG:
That is not true.
18 Q
No overall increase in pressure.
19 A
True, it stayed relatively constant.
20 Q
I think you s' aid yesterday that by at i
21 least an hour or so into the transient, you had 22 assumed that there wasn't any problem with the heaters I
l 23 in the pressurizer; correct?
[ ')
24 A
I don't believe that is what I said, no.
\\s 25 Q
Whether or not it is what you said
13-1 Zewe 763 O
2 before, is it correct?
3 A
_It is not.
4 Q
What?
l 5
A I said that we checked to make sure that 6
all the heaters were on and that all the breakers 7
were closed, and that whatever heater capacity we had 8
available to us we were using.
But I still did feel 9
that we did not have full design heater capacity.
10 It was reduced, but everything that w e!,had available
-11 we were using.
12 Q
Did you have any understanding of what
(
13 was reducing the heater capacity?
w 14 A
I felt that it was because of the 15 atmosphere in the area of the pressurizer heaters 16 themselves, being in close proximity to the main i
17 steam relief valves, due to moisture and' conditions 18 in that area would cause problems with the heater 19 capacities.
20 Q
Did you understand that these were 21 problems that had only developed since the reactor 22 trip?
23 A
I felt that they were problems that
()
24 existed when the main' steam relief valves had lifted 25 after the reactor trip and turbine trip.
~.
14 1
gewe 764
(
2 Q
Looking back to the April 23rd transient, 3
that was a case of where the cteam relief valves 4
lifted?
(
5 A
April 23rd?
6 Q
'78.
7 A
Yes, it was.
8
, Following that event, you had an Q
9 overcoo' ling in which pressurizer level went down to 10 zero; correct?
11 A
Yes, correct.
12 Q
It was true, was it not, that in that t
13 case, with pressurizer level at zero,.the pressurizer 14 heaters were able to restore RCS pressure within a few 15 minutes after the trip?
16 A
No, that is not correct.
17 Q
Do you know how long it took to restore 18 RCS pressure after the trip?
19 A
It'was just your phrasing of the question.
20 You said, did I know that the pressurizer l
21 heaters restored pressure soon after the trip while it 22 was at zero level.
At least, that's what I got.out 23 of it.
.(
24 Q
Maybe there were too many facts in the 25 question.
l
15 1
zewe 765
(
2 It is a fact that in that transient the 3
steam relief valves lifted; right?
4 A
That is correct.
(
5 I
Q, It is also a fact that in that transient 6
pressurizer level went down to zero?
7 A
That's correct.
8 Q
It is also a fact that in that transient 9
pressure in the reactor coolant system recovered 10 within five to ten minutes?
11 A
After pressurizer level was restored, 12 yes.
i 13 Q
In this case, the March 28, '79 transient, 14 you had had a full pressurizer right from the 15 beginning; is that correct?
16 A
Would you define full pressurizer?
17 Q
Well, at its normal level or higher.
18 A
I believe it was at its normal level at 19 the start of the event.
20 Q
and in this transient, March 1979, after 21 a very brief drop in pressurizer level, level was 22 at its normal height or above from that point on; 23 isn't that correct?
(
24 A
Initially, it dropped down to around 150 25 inches from a normal 220, and then after that At
l 66 16 1
Zewe
(
2, started to continually rise.
3 Q
Beginning within a minute or two after 4
the trip; isn't that correct?
([
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
You knew that despite the fact that 7
pressurizer level had reacted the way you just 8
described, the heaters were not able to bring 9
reactor coolant system pressure above 1100 pounds 10 per squ are inch during this period o( time to an 11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> and a quarter into the accident; right?
12 A
That is true.
I felt that with the 13 reduced pressurizer heater capacity *which we talked 14 about earlier, along with the very high level of water 15 in the pressurizer, I thought that it would take a 16 considerable amount of time to heat up that water 17 with the pressurizer heaters.
18 Q
Is there any instrumentation, Mr.
19 zewe, that measures pressurizer heater capacity?
20 A
You could measure the amount of power 21 consumed by the heaters as an indication of heater L
22 capacity.
23 Q
Did you, in fact, do that on the morning
(
24 of the accident?
25 A
I did not.
I 17 1
Zewe 767
(
2 Q
So apart from the fact that the pressure 3
was not coming back up, on what did you base your 4
conclusion that there was reduced pressurizer heater
(
5 capacity?
6 A
Based on the location of the pressurizer 7
heater control cabinets and past experience with 8
reduced pressurizer heater capacity and also the 9
fact that we had a very high level of water that 10 had to be heated up by the heaters.
11 Q
When you say your past experience with 12 pressurizer heater capacity, had you had a prior 13 situation in which the pressurizer heaters were 14 unable to restore a loss in pressure because of a 15 lack of capacity?
16 A
My experience was one of which the 17 breakers at the pressurizer heater control cabinet 18 had tripped, rendering heaters out of service on a 19 couple of different occasions.
20 Q
But you did not have that problem; you 21 know you did not have that problem on the morning 22 of March 28, 1979; isn't that correct?
23 A
I had asked the operator to go down and
{
24 check it, and I don't recall him calling back.
I 25 would have expected him to have reset any breakers
18 1
Zewe 768
(
2 that he found open and reclosed them.
And after that, i
3 I don't recall asking him if he did have to reset any 4
breakers or having him go back down and reverify that
(
'S there were any breakers that had tripped at a later 6
time.
7 Q
Would it be helpful, in determining 8
whether the pressurizer heaters were able to heat up 9
the large volume of water in the pressurizer to a 10 point sufficient to raise the pressure ( to find out 11 what the temperature was in the pressurizer?
12 THE WITNESS:
I am afraid I am going to 13 have to hear that one again.
I don't 14 understand.
15 Q
Sure.
I will rephrase it.
16 In the course of trying to determine 17 whether the pressurizer heaters were able to heat up 18 the large volume of water in the pressurizer, did 19 you look to see what the temperatures were in the 20 pressurizer?
21 A
I don't remember looking at the 22 pressurizer temperature.
I just assumed that we 23 had -- all of the heaters that we had available were
~(
24 in operation, a.'. d that they were doing their best to 25 try and restore pressurizer temperature and pressure.
19 1
zewe 769
(
2 Q
Was it your view that the time would 3
come when the heaters were able to get the water up 4
high enough to restore the pressure?
(
5 A
I felt that they would recover pressure, 6
yes.
7 Q
Do you understand that it would have 8
been helpful in determining how long that was going 9
to take to find out what the temperature in the 10 pressurizer was at various periods of ' time?
11 A
I think I have already answered that.
12 That I said that I did not look at the pressurizer t
13 temperature and that I had all the heater capacity 14 available on, and that eventually it would recover.
15 Q
At some time after you came back from 16 the turbine room, did you learn there was some kind 17 of a problem going on with the reactor coolant pumps?
18 A
Yes, I did.
19 Q
Did you learn that there was a reduced 20 flow through the pumps?
21 A
Yes, I did.
22 Q
How was that flow measured?
23 A
Gentile flow tube.
(
24 Q
How does the measurement appear on the 25 control room panels?
20 1
Zewe 770
(
2 A
It is displayed twq different ways:
in 3
percent flow and also in pounds mass.
4 Q
Is there a sepa nte figure for each one
((
5 of the flow pumps?
6 A
There is a total flow and then there is-7 an A and aB loop flow.
8 Q
For each of those there is both a 9
percentage and a pound-mass figure?
4 10 A
Percentage of flow is j u s"t percentage of 11 total flow.
And then I have pounds mass for the 12 individual loops.
13 Q
When this problem came to your attention, 14 what were the instruments showing in terms of-total 15 flow percentggs?
16 A
It indicated lower than what it should 17 be for the pump combination we had.
18 Q
Wasn't the percentage down as low as 19 40 percent?
20 A
Not at that point.
As I remember, the 21 flow when I became aware of it with four reactor L
22 coolant pumps running was in the neighborhood of 60 23 or 65 percent total flow.
{
24 Q
Between that time and the time the 25 pumps were turned off, did that pe rcentage go down?
21 1
Zewe 73 1
(
2 A
When you turn off the pumps, the 3
percentage does go down, yes.
It did go down further' 4
than what the normal flow would be for a two-pump
(
5 operation.
6 Q
It was 60 to 65 percent when you first 7
looked at its right?
8 A
As I remember, when I returned to the 9
control room, yes.
10 Q
Between that time and the', time when you 11 turned off the first set of pumps, did that percentage 12 go down?
13 A
As I remember, the flow p,ercentage was 14 decreasing.
15 Q
Then you turned off one set of pumps at 16 or about 5:15.
17 A
I believe that's around the time, yes.
18 Q
Did I understand your prior answer to 19 be that'when you did that, you would expect total flow 20 to go down further?
21 A
If you are running four coolant pumps, 22 I would expect flow to be 100 percent flow.
And if 23 I secured two of the pumps, I would expect total
(
24 flow to be approximately 50 percent.
25 When I secured those two pumps, the total
22 1
zewe 7.72
(
g flow was less than 50 percent for the two pumps that were still running.
3 4
Q What kind of readings were you getting
(
5 on the instruments that showed pounds mass?
6 A
The same relative readings.
7 Q
What did you understand the percent flow 8
meter actually measured?
f'om zero to 100 9
A Percent of total flow r
10 Percent.
11 Q
And by " flow," you mean flow of water; 12 right?
13 A
Flow of reactor coolant system water, as 14 Provided by the head of the pumps.
15 Q
So that a reading that showed that there 16 was only 60 percent flow going through all four pumps 17 would be an indication that only 60 percent as much 18 water was going through as would normally go through?
19 A
That's what was indicated, yes.
i l
20 Q
What did you understand the pound-mass i
l 21 instrumentation was designed to reflect?
l C.
I 22 A
RCS coolant flow rate.
23 Q
How did the pound-mass measurement
[
24 reflect that?
25 A
You read the meter.
And the indicator
?
773 23 1
Zewe
('
2 would point to the flow rate.
)
\\
3 Q
What reading would you expect to see if 4
the normal flow was going through?
(
5 A
Approximately 140,000.
6 Q
What readings were you seeing during 7
this period of time when you came back from the 8
turbine room and when you turned off the first two 9
pumps?
10 A
I don't recall what the numbers were.
11 Q
Did you consider that a reduced flow of 12 water through the reactor coolant pumps was 13 inconsistent with a reactor coolant system that was 14 full of water?
15 A
You are asking if I though that on the 16 morning of the accident?
17 Q
Yes, sir.
18 A
I don't remember thinking in ~ terms of 19 low flow being inconsistent with RCS indicating full.
20 Q
Did you have discussions with other 21 people in the control room at the time about what 22 significance should be attached to a reduction in the 23 flow to the pumps?
b l
l (
24 A
I remember discussions that we had -- "we i
25 being all the people present in the control room at l
l l
a/l 1
gewe 774
-I 2
that point in time -- discussions that were, why did 3
we have reduced flow?
And we were trying to put our 4
heads together and trying to come up with why we
(
5 thought there was a reduced flow indication.
6 Q
Did anyone suggest that a possible reason 7
for reduced flow was that the pumps might be pumping 8
a mixture of water and steam?
9 A
I do not remember such a discussion.
10 Q
Did you understand on the d,ay of the 11 accident that pumping a mixture of water and steam
~
12 through the pumps would reduce the flow?
k 13 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Do you mean was that in 14 his mind?
15 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
16 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Or was that a fact of 17 which he was theoretically aware?
18 MR. FIS KE :
Yes.
i 19 MR. KLINGSBERG:
"Yes," what?
Both?
20 MR. FISKE:
I will take them in reverse 21 order.
k i
22 Q
You may have answered the first part.
23 A
I may have answered the first one already?
I l
! (
24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Let's get the question.
25 Q
Were you aware on the day of the accident,
I 775 1
Zewe
('
2 from your training or from any understanding -- training 3
r from anything that you had learned anywhere, that 4
in a situation where the pumps pump water and steam,
(
5 there would be a reduced flow?
6 A
From any training?
7 Q
Or any understanding --
8 A
Any pump or just the reactor coolant 9
pumps?
10 Q
Any pump.
5 11 A
I believe I had an understanding that if 12 a pump that was designed to pump water and it was now 13 pumping steam and water, that the flow would be 14 reduced, yes, the indicated flow.
15 Q
I forgot to ask you, Mr. Zewe, between the 16 time that you came back to the control room and the 17 time that the second set of reactor coolant pumps were 18 turned off -- which I think the chronology reflects into' 'the control 19 is about 5:40 did anyone else come 20 room?
21 A
I don't recall e xactly when other people 22 began to arrive.
So I am not sure.
I don't know if 23 Mr. Ross was there by that time or Mr. Logan was there 24 by that time or Mr. Mehler arrived -
.I am not sure.
[
25 Q
Did you, at or about the same time that
'A+
l 1
Zewe 776
(
2 you noticed a reduced flow to the pumps, notice a 3
reduction in the amps that were going to the pumps?
4 A
Yes, I did.
({
5 Q
And that also was reflected on some 6
instrumentation in the control room?
4 7
A Yes, it is.
Right above the control 8
switches for the reactor coolant pumps.
9 Q
And did you have discussions with other 10 people in the control room about what might be causing 11 the reduction in the amps?
12 A
The same discussions that we had on the
?
13 flow.
14 Q
And did you understand on the morning of 15 the accident, based on training or anything that you 16 had learned anywhere outside of training, that it would 17 take less amps to run a pump that was pumping partially 18 steam than to run the same pump pumping entirely 19 water?
20 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Now, again I think it is 21 ambiguous.
When you say "Did you understand 22 on the day of the accident," that implies to me 23 "Was that in your mind on the day of the 24 accident," as a period of time.
If that is your l
25 question --
(
1 Z8W*
777 i
l f
2 MR. FISKE:
The quest' ion is the same one 3
I asked with respect to the flow.
4 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Of course, that was
(
5 ambiguous, also.
6 MR. FISKE:
Well, I thought we had 7
straightened it out.
8 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I am not sure.
9 Q
Do you understand what I am asking you?
10 MR. KLINGSBERG:
You never' asked him the 11 other question.
12 THE WITNESS:
Would you repeat it?
13 (Record was read back.)
14 A
I believe that was my understanding, yes.
15 Q
Did you observe anything else with respect 16 to the pumps during this period of time between the 17 time you came back from the turbine room and the time 18 that the first two pumps were turned off?
19 A
RCP pump vibration.
20 Q
And were all four pumps vibratin_g?
21 A
Their monitoring instruments ware al3 22 in alarm for all four pumps.
23 Q
And did you conclude that that vibration
(
24 was resulting from cavitation?
25 A
I didn't know why they were in alarm at
5 1
ZeWe 778 2
the time.
3 Q
Did you consider at that time that one 4
reason they might be vibrating was because of
(
5 cavitation?
6 A
I don't remember if I did or not.
7 Q
Is it a fact that during this period of 8
time you got out or had out some of the curves that 9
we discussed earlier in your deposition?
10 A
Yes.
t 11 Q
The fuel pin compression curve and the 12 net positive suction head curve?
13 A
We had out the heatup and cooldown curve 14 which includes those other two curves.
15 Q
Would you tell us which particular 16 Procedure you had out that included that heatup/cooldown 17 curve?
18 A
I don't remember now.
i 19 Q
Did you discuss these curves with 20 Mr. Kunder?
21 A
Yes, I did.
22 Q
Did you look at the pressure / temperature 23 relationships that were existing in the reactor coolant 24 system at the cime you were looking at the curves?
25 A
Yes, we did.
1 Zewe 779
(
2 Q
And didn't you conclude that those j
3 Pressure / temperature relationships were right on the 4
line of the net positive suction head curve?
(
5 A
Yes, we did.
6 Q
Having reached that conclusion, didn't 7
that indicate to you that there was a likelihood that 8
the vibration in the pumps was being caused by 9
cavitation?
10 A
I don't remember thinking 6,avitation.
11 Q
Do you remember being interviewed, Mr. Zewe, 12 by the so-called Keaten task force after the accident?
e 13 A
Yes, I do.
14 Q
And there was a fairly lengthy interview, 15 was there not, in September 1979 in which you 16 Participated?
17 A
I recall the interview, but I don't 18 recall the date.
19 MR. FISKE:
Oh, the date is Aug'ust.
20 MR. KLINGSBERG:
0.K.
i 21 Q
Let me show you a document which has been
[
22 Previously marked Exhibit 346, which is a draft i
23 transcript of that interview.
f
[
24 Do you have that in front.of you, Mr. Zewe?
25 A
Yes, I do.
1 Zewe 780 2
Q If you will ook at the cover, it says, 3
Subject:
Operator Interviews, From:
R.
W.
- Keaten, 4
To:
Mr. Bryan, Mr. Frederick, Mr. Faust, and others."
(
5 Do you see that?
6 A
Yes, I do.
7 Q
Did you receive a copy of this transcript?
8 A
Yes, I believe I did.
9 Q
And did you review it and make whatever 10 corrections you felt were necessary to'.make it 11 accurate?
12 A
I don't remember.
(
13 Q
Do you still have a copy of this in your 14 files?
15 A
I don't know.
I probably do, but I don't 16 know.
Since I haven't looked at them, I don't know.
17 Q
There was a tape recorder which recorded 18 this interview, wasn't there?
19 A
I believe there was for this pa'rticular 20 one, because I don't remember any stenographer present 21 for this particular interview.
So it almost had to 22 be by a tape recorder.
23 Q
Did you ever listen to the tape of that 24 interview?
25 A
I don't remember going over this particular
l' Zewe 7.81 s
2 interview, no.
I may have, but I don't remember that I 3
did.
4 Q
Do you recognize any of the handwriting on C
5 this exhibit?
6 A
While you have been talking., I have been 7
glancing through it.
I don't recognize any of my 8
handwriting or whoever the other handwriting may be I 9
am not sure.
I know it is not my handwriting.
10 Q
Let me direct your attention, Mr. Zewe, 11 to what I believe is page 77 of this transcript.
12 A
I have it.
I 13 Q
It starts at the top with a question by 14 Mr. Walsh.
15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
How do you tell the pages?
16 MR. FISKE:
The only way you can tell is 17 by the next one, which is 78.
It is 0011 I
18 0010, number in the corner.
19 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I have it.
20 Q
Have you had a chance to read the question
.21 by Mr. Walsh and the answer?
22 A
No, I haven't.
23 Q
Do you want to do that?
l
[
24 A
Yes.
l 25 I have read it.
L
1 Zewe 782
('
2 Q
Now, the answer reads, "When I got back 3
to the control room and I am not sure if it was 4
sometime 5 o' clock or later all right is the
(
5 first time that I had noticed that we were having any 6
flow oscillations with the pump.
That wasn't long 7
before we had secured the first two pumps itself. There 8
again once George Kunder had pulled out the curves 9
for the net positive suction (blank) for the coolant 10 pump and we were right at or below the', net positive 11 suction (blank) into the pumps and I figured that was
)
12 why'they were cavitating -- all right -- but I didn't I
13 know why we were that low in pressure and at the time 14 I didn't know yet, you know, the solvent reason why 15 the pressure was low."
16 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I just think we should 17 point out that a number of these things are 18 written in in handwriting and it is not his 19 handwriting.
To some extent it may not even i
20 make sense.
Like " solvent reason."
21 MR. FISKE:
I think that the questions I 22 am going to ask Mr. Zewe don't turn on those i
23 particular notations.
24 Q
Isn't it a fact, Mr. Zewe that the r
l 25~
temperature / pressure relationships that existed in 1
1 Zewe 783
(
2 the reactor coolant system during this period of 3
time between when you came back from the turbine room 4
and when you turned off the first two sets of pumps
(
5 was below the net positive suction head curve?
That 6
is, they were on the wrong side of it?
7 A
As I recall, they were in very close 8
proximity to the line.
It may have been below or 9
on the line, as I remember.
10 Q
one sentence from what I just read to 11 you reads, "There again once George Kunder had pulled 12 out the curves for the net positive suction / coolant 13 pump and we were right at on below the net positive 14 suction (blank) into the pumps and I figured that 15 was why they were cavitating."
d 16 Did you tell Mr. Walsh that you were right 17 at or below the net positive suction head. curve?
18 A
I don't recall the exact words, but I 19 don't have any reason to believe that this 'isn't 20 accurate.
21 Q
Did you tell Mr. Walsh that you figured
('
22 that that was why the pumps were cavitating?
23 A
Again, I don't have any reason to believe
{
24 that this is inaccurate.
I just don't remember now 25 thinking back then on March 28th about cavitation.
1 Zewe 784
(
2 I may have, but I just don't recollect 3
that right now.
4 Q
Well, you understood from your training,
(
5 didn't you, Mr. Zewe, that if the pressure / temperature 6
relationship deteriorated to the point where you were 7
on the wrong side of the net positive suction head 8
curve, that created a situation which could cause 9
cavitation?
10 A
It was my understanding tha,t if you were 11 on the wrong side of the net positive suction head 12 curve, that you could have cavitation, yes.
13 Q
And I think you testified earlier that 14 cavitation is a process which includes as part of it 15 the formation of steam at the eye of the impeller of 16 the pump.
17 A
That is part of it, yes.
~
18 Q
And I think you testified earlier that 19 you understood that th'e~ deterioration in thIe pressure /
20 temperature relationship below the net positive 21 suction head curve could produce the formation of C
22 steam at the eye of the impeller of the pump which 23 is part of the process which causes cavitation.
Isn't
(
24 that right?
25 MR. XLINGSBERG:
Can we have that read l
2 1
Zewe 785
(
2 back, please.
3 (Record was read back.)
4 MR. KLINGSBERG:
You have several questions I
(
5 in there.
You can take them one at a time or 3
all at once, depending on what the answer is --
7 MR. FISKE:
I think Mr. Zewe can answer 8
all at once.
If he doesn't think so, he can g
tell me.
10 A
I am asking, are you asking me if at the 11 morning of the accident I considered all of those 12 things?
13 Q
No.
My first question is, you did learn 14 that in your training; that is all I am asking at 15 this point.
16 A
I did learn from a theoretical standpoint 17 that if you do exceed the net positive suction head 18 on the wrong side of the curve for that particular 19 pump, that you could flash the steam in the-eye of l
20 the impeller and have cavitation, yes.
i 21 Q
Didn't you understand that the reason for L
22 having the net positive suction head curve in the 23 procedures was to prevent cavitation of the pumps?
l 24 A
My understanding is that the curves were
(
l l
25 there so that you could use as a guide to make sure i
i
I ~
I
~
Zewe 786 k
2 that you remained on the right side for the proper 3
operation of the pump.
Some of those reasons may have 4
included cavitation, but it was for the proper design
(
5 operation of that particular pump.
6 Q
What adverse consequences did you understand 7
from your training would result from going on the 8
wrong side of the cu rv e, other than cavitation?
9 A
I can't think of any others right now.
10 Q
Did you have an understanding before the 11 accident that you could not have the formation of 12 steam at the eye of the impeller with a full k
13 pressurizer?
14 A
As I recall, I don't remember considering 15 having cavitation at the pump in a full pressurizer.
16 Q
You testified yesterday, I think, that it 17 was your understanding on the day of the accident 18 that you could not have the formation of steam in 19 the reactor coolant' system if you had a full 20 pressurizer; do you remember giving that testimony?
21 A
I do.
And in relationship to the day of L
22 the accident, I was referring to the full pressurizer 23 and being at 1100 or 1200 pounds.
As I remember, i
24
(
I do not remember thinking that I could have cavitation 25 or the formation of steam at the eye of the impeller
1 Zewe 787
(
2 at those conditions.
3 Q
Just so I understand you, is it your 4
testimony that after looking at the pressure / temperature
([
5 relationship that actually existed and comparing them 6
with the net positive suction head curve, you 7
concluded that you could not have steam at the eye of 8
the impeller because the pressurizer was full?
9 A
That isn't what I said.
10 Q
That is what I am trying to, find out.
11 A
I said the fact that I had a full 12 pressurizer and I had 1200 pounds in the reactor --
t 13 1100 or 1200 pounds in the RCS I did not think i 14 was possible to have cavitation in the eye of the 15 pump.
16 Q
Well, did you think it was possible with 17 a full pressurizer to have cavitation at the eye of 18 the pump at the pressure that you saw in the system
~
19 at the time you were trying to determine which side i
20 of the net positive suction head curve you were on?
21 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Can we have that read?
22 (Record was read back.)
23 A
At that particular time, I was looking 24 at temperature and pressure.
The other reference was 25 a full pressurizer in relationship to the existing
i 1
Zewe 788
~
(
2 pressure.
Q What I am talking about now is 3
4 A
Right.
(
the time you are looking at the net 5
g 6
positive suction head curve and you are looking at 7
the pressure / temperature relationships and you see a 8
particular pressure, which I think the chart would g
indicate is somewhere around 1100 pounds.
I am asking 10 you, at that point in time were you of the opinion 11 that with a full pressurizer you could not have 12 cavitation at the eye of the impeller at that k
13 pressure / temperature relationship?
14 A
As I have stated before, I don't remember 15 thinking about cavitation.
16 I knew that we were at or would be on 17 the curve for the pump, but I do not remember thinking 18 of cavitation, so I did not think of it in reference 19 to it not happening because of a full pres'surizer, i
20 MR. FISKE:
I think that is about as much 21 as we can do today.
L 22 (Time noted:
4:13 p.m.)
l 23
('
24 William H.
Zewe k
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of 1982.
e r-
16 y
789 CERTIFICATE 2 i
!i STATE OF NEW YORK
)
l 3
- ss.-
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 i
e i
a I,
HARVEY B.
KRAMER, RPR, CSR
, a Notary I
Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the continued deposition of WILLIAM H.
ZEWE 8
was taken beford me on Thursday, May 27, 1982 consisting of pages 645 through 78a I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within i'
o transcript is a true record of said testimony; 13 That I am not connectedbybb.codor marriage with any of the said parties nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the counsel.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my l
19 hand'this_f.)didayof June
,1982.
20
(
21 i
i
~
M [p /(_,w n u l
p y
23l
(' '
HARVEY B.
KRAMER, RPR, CSR I
24 ;
?
-25
i 790 I.
INDEX WITNESS PAGE William H. Zewe (resumed) 648 EXHIB IT S B&W NUMBER 3
FOR IDENT.
99 755 Strip chart reflecting narrow range pressure 675 756 Document from the LER filed
(
by GPU with the NRC captioned
" Figure 13, Reactor Coolant System Pressure" 761 757 (Exhibit number skipped)
O e
i l
(
I e
e P
y
- - ~,.
-