ML20072J037
| ML20072J037 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1982 |
| From: | Herbein J GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-03, TASK-04, TASK-06, TASK-1, TASK-10, TASK-2, TASK-3, TASK-4, TASK-6, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290887 | |
| Download: ML20072J037 (110) | |
Text
185 bt UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF UEW YORK
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-x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILIT1US CO R1'Olt AT I O ff,
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 7
i METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs,
-against-80 Civ. 1683 (R.O.)
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
x Continued deposition of General Public f';'
Utilities by JOHN G.
HERBEIN, taken by Defendants
'v pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Davis Polk & Wardwell, Esqs., one Chase Manhattan Plaza, hv York, New York, on Thursday, July 1,
1982, at 12:15 o' clock in the afternoon, before Nancy d. Rudolph, a Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
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9306290887 820701 PDRADOCK05000g T
m, DOYLE REPORTING, INC; j
CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERQ 369 LexlNGTON AVENUE WALTER SH APIRO. C.S.R.
New Yose<. N.Y.
10017 CHARLES SH APIRO, C.S.R.
Tet.spwows 212 - 067 8220 m
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186
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2 A p p e.a r a'n ce sa j
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3
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4 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, !!AYS t.
11 AN D LE R, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintif fs 5
425 Park Avenue i
New York, tiew York ti By:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQ.,
7
-and-AARON STIEFEL, ESQ.,
8 of Counsel 1
9 10 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL,sESQS.
Attorneys for Defendants f-11 One Chase Manhattan Plaza New York, New York 12' By:
ROBERT B.
FISKE, ESQ.
13
-and-4 KAREN WAGNER, ESQ.,
-14 of. Counsel 15 1
16 ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE, ESQS.
I ALtorneys Ivr che Witness 17 Three First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60602 18 By:
JAMES B.
BURNS, ESQ,
ID of Counsel 20 n
'g.
21 Also Present:
22
-ERIC ABRAHAMSON if
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.J.O H N G.
H E R B E I N,
resumed, having f'
3 been previously duly sworn by the Notary 4
Public, was examined and testified further 5
as follows:
6 EXAMINATION (Continued)
I BY MR. FISKE:
..8
'Q Mr. Herbein, you realize ~you continue D
today under oath?
10
~
A Yes, sir, I realize today I continue 11 under other.
I 12 Q
And throughout the rest-of this 13 deposition?
. (~)
U 11 A
Yes, sir, I realize that.
15 Q
Let me show you a document which has 16 been marked as 8&W Exhibit 802 and direct your 17 attention to what appears to be the fourth'page 18 in that collection of documents, the one numbered j
19 1528.
20
~
Then I wou1d like to ask'you'whether-h 21 you recognize that.page which has.got the number 1528 22 at the bottom as a copy of a one-page memorandum,-
23 il handwritten,-from you to Gary Miller.
'l 24 MR. SELTZER:
'Di,d you. read the entire
.h -
I,_)_
' document?
. 25 4,
'I 1
lie rbe in 188 n
-2 MR.'FJSKE:
Yes, if you want to read the
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rest of this exhibit, which I believe consists 3
of a mumorandum from Mr. Mi1Jirr back to you, 5
you are free to do that because we will be g;
getting to that in a minute.
7 A
O.K.,
I havu looked through the g
document.
9 Q
You have had a chance to read now 10 your memorandum to Mr. Miller and Mr. Miller's 11 memorandum back to you?
12 A
Yes, I have a little. difficulty recognizing
[3 the time sequence and flow of the document that I.am
('}.
b -
-11 looking at.
15 The cover page, 1524, Miller to Herbein, 4
10 is dated 3/9/75.
As you have-pointed out, thure is 17 a 1528 page,.Herbein to Miller, and I an.not quite 18 sure which came first.
Perhaps you.could clarify that 19 for me.
20 Q
Well, why don't youtlook at the first
)
21
. page of this exhibit, which is 1524.
You recognize 22 that as the first. page of a memorandum from-Mr. Miller j
23 i to you?
t i;
21
'MR. SELTZER;-.When'you say "You recognize
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/251 it,"'are'ycu asking-him does he recall getting
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if o rbo i n 189 2'
this from Mr. Miller?
In that w h.i t you ars 3-asking him?
4 MR. FISKE:
Yos, ail right.
5
.MR.
S ELT Zl:R a '
Do you recall getting i;
this from Gary Miller?
7 A
No, I do no t.
8 Q
Let's look at Exhibit 1528.
9 Is that in your handwriting?
10-A Yes, it is.
11 Q
And that is a memor'.ndum which you sent 12 to, Ga ry -Mille r, is it not?
13 A
It's indicated in my handwriting as-to
.14 Miller, and it's from lierbein.
15 Q
Now,-could you look at what is written 5
16 after the number 2 on Lhat p' age and read that for.us 17 into the record?
18 A
Item No. 3 circled?
19 Q
No, item No.
2.
s
'A 20 Item No. 2 circled, "New' subject -- Please-l I
Jg'.
21-keep mo constantly. advised on Unit
- 2. procedure _and-i
~22 where we
.i are on your schedule...
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23 I 4-
.Q could you read 1what'it:.says after the I
-24
- numbe r ;5 7..
c'T.
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25 r
A
. circle.4. says, on page 1528, " Don't l
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h t-v
I lie rbe in 190
'2 know if I said anything before, but you should plan
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3 on me approving procedures initially.
If you have l.
4~
' problems with this, see: me.
Naturally, I would expect i
5
.you to initial indicating you concur with the approval.
I' 6
Jack."
I l
l 7
Q Now, let's look at the document which i-l 8.
is Mr. Miller's memorandum to you, which is dated 9
March'9, 1975.
I would like to. direct your 10 attention to paragraph 4 on what in the second page 11 of this memo that rcads, "Last and most-important to me,.
~
12 I have no problem with assuring you initially.
13 approve my procedures.
I do-have some concern 14 an d I express it' directly" -- continuing over'to the
~
I 15 next page, and,then you see five separate paragraphs 16 on 1526 under tia e heading
" Procedure / Ground Rules t
I 17 GPM/JGH."
18 A
Yes, sir, I see that.
a.
19 Q
Then paragraph C says, "At what point s
j.
20 should weihand the procedure <to you--- if;it's last s-21
.and you provide a co mple t.e change o f di re ction ~, i t 'll 22 b
e hard on1 schedule."
J'.
23 L
-Paragraph D says,."If you:try::not to I
7
.24
- causeLrewrite,HI'11 give you final ~ typed
- procedure.-
3I I(d 25 '
Remembe r Unit. 2 :is" -, maybe - you' can read; that i for; me..
g 3,
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1
'te rbe in 391 2
What's the next word?
~~
3 A
" Remember Unit 2 is using magcard 4
system, et cetera."
5 Q
And then paragraph E says, "If you want,
6 I'll give you first draft and you can review hard.
7 But I'd like to" can you read the next word?
8 A
" Agree."
9 Q
" agree that if I resolve your 10 comments, no second review Yes, sign final 11 based on resolving. comments."
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
And then the final page in paragraph AV
- 14 G,
"I have a suggestion..
1, You and I review 15 Unit 2 procedure index -- we agree on x number of 16 procedures which mus t be iterbein reviewec.
II "2.
For those procedures You get-18 shot at first idraft so that'we get max bene fit from 4
19 your review.
20 "3,
.other procedure then flow" can yo'u.
h 21 read what it says?
i, 22
~
lt' think ~ it : says "via me" A
I
'i 23 4
Q.
"and Seelinger"?'-
24 MR.JSELTZER:
It doesn't.look like
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. 25 "Seelinger."
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That's " a:.
I signed."
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- Q "and we get the most from your s
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Q
'An d the last sen ten ce (o f 't he. memo says,
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7 "Let me know when'wa can sit doen, d
P.
Hiller
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8 3/9/75."-
s D
Now, did you talk to Mr. Miller after T
10
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,ypu received this memorandum?
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11-A First let me statg that I don't-s y
A 12
^
remember receiving this.particular memorandum, but i
>i 13 I would4say. that in the relationship Mr. Miller and i
1 i
m 13 I ha'd in March of 1975 which appears to be the general i.
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t, 15 time f ranM 't fia t this e'x c' an ge took place, Mr.. Miller h
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i n '. tlk 'p d c u s s of cuvoloping the Three Mile IG was 3
17 Islan d ' (Jn i t 2 procedures.
I'was the, manager of nuclear
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' operations in charge -.of Three' Mile I.sland' Units 1 I
dnd 2.{ ' 'Iam no t-'s u're if I-at this oint shifted ~
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I sensed ~that I may not'have.
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. superik;tendent -inI... charge : of Three ' Mile ~ Island, but 22
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unit,sfat Three Mile-' Island:-and Mr.-Mi11er was g -
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cha eqid' with the. oversight of the Three Mile;-Island 25
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-1 9 3 lie rbe in 9'
Unit 2 operation at that point.
Re<;ognize this
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3 was 1975.
The unit didn't go commercial until 4
Decembe r of 1978, so it seems entirely reasonable 5
to me that Mr. Miller and*I would have been 6
discussing p rocedures.
We would have been discussing 7
utilising the benefit of my previous experience on O'
' Unit 1 and my knowledge in reactor operations to 9
assist in the management and preparation, 10 review, comment, final approval on the TMI-2 11 procedures, so this documentation that I have 1~0 before me, while I don't particularly remember it, 13 seems to be in, keeping with the situation which Ti
(_/'
I4 I have just described as.it existed in March'of
'75.
15 Q_
And it is correct, is it not, that you.
If' expressed tha request to-Mr. Miller that he.should 7 II plan ~ on having you approve the procedures?
18 A
Again, I said that-I was not 19 specifically able to recall receiving this particular
-j 20 piece-of documentation, that we had. discussed the-lh; 21 issue ; and if you.will nindly show me this 22 specific statement that you _a re-- re fe rring to, it-23 may 24-Q Y e s',
the statement that I am re fe r ring
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to is in your meme to:him, Mr. lie rb ein, paragraph ~ '4,-
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!!c rbe i n 194 4
2 as I believe I road it into the record, "You uhould 3
plan on me approving procedures,".and you have 4
un de rlined the words "me approving procedures."
5 Do you see that?
6 A
Yes, I see that, and that is my 7
. handwriting, and I believe it reanonable to assume O
that-I not only wrote it but I underlined those 9
three words.
10 Q
And it is correct, is it not, that 11 after you told Mr. Miller that-he responded'to you 12 in substance that he was perfectly willing to have 13 you involved in reviewing and approving procedures-l3
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'I4' but that he wanted to work out a modus operandi 15 under which it would not slow up the schedule?
~
16 MR. SELTZuhs
.Now, that in contrary II to what he previously testified.
lie sa-id he 18 couldn't recall any specifics of the IO communication.: Are you asking him now, 20 notwithstanding that prior testimony, if this-gpI 21 refreshes his recollection?
l 22 MR. FISKE:
-Yes.
I i
23
[
A I think I may;be able to go and perhaps-
)
1 24 give an in te rpretation on some 'o f ' M111e r's language (3,
=>s>,
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- here because I. understand Gary and I can read the,
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4
.1.
I IIe rb ei n 195 2
r3 communication.
Q 3
Q I don't think Mr. Seltzer nor I.are 4
interested in having you interpret.a memorandum 5
if you don't recall having received it back at 6
the time.
7 I am simply asking you on a more general 8
basis if having reviewed your memo to Mr. Miller 9
and Mr. Miller's memo back to you that now retroshes w
10-your memory that you did have a discussion with 11-Mr.. Miller about working out between you a modus I2 operandi for your participation in the process of I3' 7
preparing. and reviewing procedures.
14 A
I believe the documentation indicates 15 that we discussed that.
16 I would also point out that these are
' II handwritten communications and as such are not 18 necessarily formal documented position.
This 19 is the example of day-to-day. communication, the 20 continuing. dialogue that one would have.with the.
(h) 21 immediate level of supervision underneath management 22 position, so I think you may be.trying to imply 23
.or elicit a more' formal interpretation of the 24
-handwritten notes than,the situation warranted at (3;
't i
t.e 25 the time..
mm.
m
2" 1
tierbein 196 l-2 j,-
I would point out, though, one thing I
)
hat does ring a bell is the concern that I 3
t 4
_ expressed on page 1528 where in i t e ra 3 1 do indicate 5
that there is a tendency with one of these large 6
projects to have a number of things bunch up'at 7
the tail end, and I had that concern in 1975 where 8
we were beginning to recognize that at the end 9
of the pipe procedures needed to be sent to the 10' NRC; SRO exams would be coming, there would be 11 hot functional testing, there would be preparation 12 for fuel load, so procedures was one aspec*. of the 13 kinds of concerns that a manager would naturally have 14 two to three years away from commercial operation.
15 Q
The question I asked you really didn't 16 call for a long dissertacion, and it did hut 17 involve, it did not ask you to - inte rpret or pass
~
18 judgment'on the~ question of whether there'is more 19 significance or less significance to a memorandum.
20 because'it is handwritten.as opposed to being llh 21 p re s en te d in some other form.
=22 My. question ~was whether, after this
)
23 exchange of memoranda had taken place, you worked 1
24 out with Mr. Miller some sort of modus operandi ~
- t. >
25' E
- between you which would es tablish Lth'e ' relationship -
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3 I
Ile rbe in ft97 or. the procedures under which you pa rticipated in 3
the preparation in ' review of the Un i t 2 procedures.
4 That's.all I asked you.
5 MR. SELTZER:
Mr. Fiske, I think that 6
it is improper for you to in any way criticize 3
or imply a criticism of Mr. lierbein for the
~0 explanation that you were given.
9 The reason I say that~is you had already 10 asked him once be fore after this exchange of 11 memoranda, did you and Mr. Miller discuss l
12 ho'w you were going to review procedures, 13 and you had already gotten the answer from 14
!!r. Herbein that "I don't recall any such 15 conversation but it seems logical that Gary 16 Miller and I would have been reviewing.
17 procedures'together.to work out some' method 18 for getting the benefitLof my experience from-
~
'19
-Unit.1."
'20-Now, I think'that since you already had
.h_.
21
.that-answer,to your' question, for you to put.the
]
22 same question again three minutes later had 23-to:make Mr. Herbein think that you wanted.to l
2I-l hear something;else.
m o
'In-the-attempt toJbe-helpful,. he~ was L
m
~
4-1 Herbein 198 l'
2 givin'g you some more background and context. -
,_t Y
's #
i 3
If you don't want it, don't ask the same
.I question two and three timeu.
5 Q
Mr. Herbein, in the in teres ts of moving I
6 along, let me read you some testimony that Mr. Miller j
7 gave just last week in this case.
'8 Reading from page 1028 o f Mr. Miller's 9
deposition, starting at line 24 and this is 10 referring to the same memos we have just been 11 discussing
" Question" In your. memo to him, your 12
.last point, No.
4, says, "Last and most important to 13 me."
(3 I1 "What'was that all about?
15
" Answer:
At that time, which-was within 16.
six to nine. months of me becoming the Unit 2 17 superintendent, Jack indicated a desire to reviewEevery 18 Unit-2 procedure, and I felt, as I state here, that 19 I wanted some of his guidance, but I-felt, as 20 I stated, that he could better' focus his efforts by ggl 21 agreeing to the procedures that~ he must review, 22 as opposed to all 2,000.of them.
- l I
l 23
" Question:
so. as I understand it, you 24 - { 1 aid out some procedure ground rules for your 1~ (~N i
/
95 l relationship with Mr.- Herbein'on this s
subject?
__._________mm. _ _ _ _ _.. _ -
n l
t,1
'1 ilo rbi* i4:
.199 2
" Answer:
Yes.
In addition.to all the 3
procedural approval circuits.
l 4
" Question:
Would you read your first 5
- item, A,
under the procedural ground. rules?"
6 MR. SELTZER:
It's already in the 7
transcript as part of the record.
This seems 8
to be taking up more time-than it's worth.
^
9 MR. FISKE:
No, I will re a d it.
10 Q
" Answer:
'I don't'think we need perfect 11 procedures.'"
12 MR. SELTZER:
You already read it into 13 the record once already from the letter.
'be.
14 MR. FISKE:
Please, Mr. Seltzer, let me 15
. proceed.
Ili Q
"'I feel if, 1,
we use Unit 1 procedure 17 as it is today, 2,
we do proper. technical homework, 18
- and, 3,
do a good one-time review,-that will have 19.
good enough procedures. As we run the plant,-
20 revisions will occur.'
g{
2 11
" Question:
What was your.second point?
(
22
" Answer: 'Many procedures can get.
j.
. 23 l reviewed to death, if'we~are not careful.'
l 9
1
- .24 l-
"Q u e s tio n ':
.On-the next page, your item.G,
)
25 you wrote,I have a suggestion.'
Would.you read the-T
.6-
-l IIe rbei n 200 2'
first.one?
As).
3 Answer:
'You and I review Unit 2 1
procedure index and we agree'on X number of 5
procedures, which must be Herbein reviewed.'
G Question: 'Did you ever agree with l
7 Mr. Herbein on' a certain number of procedures f
j 8
for.him to review?
f 9
" Answer:
I'think we did.
10
" Question:
Approximately how many 11 procedures did Mr. Herbein review?
12
" Answer:
In the early days, every one i
13 of them.
The only ones he-wouldn't have A
s
14 reviewed we re the ones like chemistry or HP which 15 might have just had a minor change.
All the operating 16 and eme rgency. "
17 The question, Mr. Herbein, is, having 18 listened to that testimony which Mr. Miller gave ID last week, does that re f resh your recollection that 20 you reached an agreement with Mr. Miller on the gg 21 relationship between you in your participation
' l 22 in,the review of TMI Unit 2 procedures?
23 A'
_ It tells me, sir, that Mr. Miller-in 24 the context in which we are. speaking, which was e
s.
i_) '
25 March
'75, was first of.all interested infobtaining
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lierbein
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2 my input to procedures.
He recognized that I felt
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I had a contribution to make in the early days 3
4' in the Unit 2 procedure preparation eftort, and that 5
he knew handwritten memorandums had communicated 6
those thoughts with me.
l 7
And I think he indicated that he believed 8
that I had had strong input'on the Three Mile Island 9
Unit 1 procedures.
10 MR. SELTZER:.
Jack, I think the question 11 is did you ever reach a formal agreement 12 with Miller about procedures 13 MR. FISKE:
I am not asking about any
., O l.
formal agreement.
.My question is simply:
15 Q
Having listened to Mr. Miller's testimony, 16 does that refresh your recollection that you worked 17 out an arrangement with Mr. Miller.under which you
~
18 would review certain procedures but not,as he put 19
,it, all 2,000 of them?
20 A
Not really.
ggp 21 It. reinforces my recollection that 22 I was interested in the Unit 2 procedures.
It didn't 1i 1
23 bring back an unde rs tanding of. a - formal agreement.-
24 Q
Well, I am not'asking youfahout a formal 4
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25
~ agreement..
.I am not trying to formalize it'in any-way; i
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I lierbein 202 2
A I don't mean to be difficult.
The words
.,_3 3
clearly indicate there that Miller-felt that the 4
communications that we have reviewed indicated 5
that he.and I had reached some p re limi n a ry M
unders tanding on what my role would be in the 1975 7
time frame on the Unit 2 procedurcs.
8 Q
And he says in his testimony that 9
you reviewed ali the operating and emergency 10 procedures?
11 MR. SELTZER:
Wait a second.
I think 12 he says in the early days'only.
13 MR. FIS KE :
That's right.
(~')
II A
And I indicated previously in the-15 testimony that I have given to you within the last M
five or ten minutes that I believed that this refers.
17 to my involvement with the'Three Mile Island Unit 1 procedures which was quite extensive, and, in fact, 19 did take place through the 1971,
'72,
'73 and '74 20 time frame, and, in fact, probably was still taking (g'g 21 place in the 3/75 time frame.
22 Q
'Is it your testimony, Mr..Herbein,.that l'
i 23
{.the - statements which.Mr. Miller-made which were 24 just read to you referred to a review o f Unit. 1
(
'n5' Ns procedures?
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I' e
9' l-Ite rbei n 203 4
2 MR. SELTZER:
'I am going to object.
(~)
V 3
This is not a proper way to proceed.
4 MR. FISKE:
It.cortainly is.
5 MR.. SELTZER:
You know, I particularly 6
object to your in terrupting me.
I don't 7
understand why you constantly feel that that d
is something that is necessary for you to do 9
in the confines of this room.
4
'10 MR. FISKE:
I don't know why you 11 constantly have to raise your voice.
12 MR. SELTZER:
Because I am very
.13" insulted that you don't.see fit to let me say
- b I4 what I want to say.
15 whenever I take an exception, you make 16 speechec.
Yo u n.uk e objections witon you want 17 -
to and I don' t presume to.tell you that you 18 shouldn't say what you.want to say or 19 interrupt you while you are in the middle of 20 saying it.
~gg N o w,' may-I have what I-just said road-
{
.21 ll 22
.back?
')3 l
(Record read back.)
24 MR. SELTZER:
You are reading him
. (,,..
25
.s'omebody else's testimony.
You have given
-m__,.__
i
~
204 0-I
. llerbein
.f 2
him an exce rpt from it, and you are asking
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3 him to comment on testimony that was given 4-out of his presence in a context that may not 5-be apparently from what you have chosen to 6i let him read.
I don't recall everything that 7
Gary Miller said about the work on procedures 8
and conversations with Mr. Herbeln, and I think 9
it's not proper to be asking Mr. IIerbe in -
10 to review Mr. Miller's testimony and give you 11 an interpretation of Mr. Miller's testimony.
l 12 BY MR. FISKE:
t 13 Q
Let me just put it to you this way, a.A L-).
I4 Mr. Herbein, and let me just read three questions 15 and' answers from the testimony we just reads it's III at page-1030.
4 17
" Question:
On the'next'page, your item 18 G,
you wrote,
'I have a suggestion.'
Would you' read 19 the first one?
20
" Answer:
'You and I review Unit 2.
-lll 21 procedure index and we agree on X numbe r of procedures, 22-which'must be Herbein reviewed.'
23 -
" Question:
Did you ever agree with 24 Mr..Herbein on a certain number = of p rocedures for
> y, 4
i ij.
25 him to review?
' j.
w r
r n,. - - - - - -
- 1 1
Ile rbe'.n 205
'" Answer:
I think we did.
2
" Question:
Approximately how many
()
3 procedures did Mr. Herbein review?
I 4
" Answer:
In the early days, every one 5
of:them.
The only ones he wouldn't have reviewed 1i were the'ones like chemistry or IIP, which might have 7
just had a minor change.
All the operating 8
. T d emergen cy. "
9 Now, is il your testimony, Mr. lie rbe in,
10 that you did not reach that kind of arrangement 11 with Mr. Miller on the review of proposed Unit 2 12 procedures?
13 MR. SELTZER:
Specifically what kind
- O 14 of arrangement?
15 MR. FISKE:
The one that Mr. Miller Ili described in hir restinony.
17 MR. SELTZER:
Namely, that Mr. Herbein 18 would review a ce rtain number of procedures? -
19 MR. FISKE:
Yes, and exactly as 20 Mr. Miller stated it, gg.
21 A
I would like to clarify one point, and it l-22 is the particular issue.that I'am1having a prob'lem i
l 23
,with.
I 24 I have stated previously that from the Q
4,_j..
25 documents here it appears that Mr. Miller and I. worked
2 I
Herbein 206
-l 2
out some kind of an agreement on obtaining my input 3
to Unit '2-procedures, and I don't have a problem 4
with that.
That seems to me con.p le L u l y in the 5
context with my memory regarding my position and the i
6 relationship I had with Mr. Miller in 1975.
The 7
The thing that is bothering me and which 4
8 I think is incorrect is the statement, "In the early days,.
9 every one of them. The only ones he wouldn't 10 have reviewed were the ones like chemistry or HP, 11 which might have just had a minor change.
All the 12 operating and emergency."
~
13 I do not believe that it's correct Il that I reviewed in the 197.5-74 time frame all of 15 the Unit 2 operating and emergency procedures.
IG I distinctly do not revull.
That's the problem I am 17 having.
That is not correct.
18 In my opinion, those words apply-to the 19 Unit 1 involvement that I had with operating and 20 emergency procedures.
l()
21 Q
So is it your testimon.y, Mr. II e r b e i n,
22 that you did not then review all of the procedures-l-
23
! for Unit 27 24 A'
.That is c,o rre c t, I did not. review all of
' r",
25 Ithe procedures for Three Mile Island Unit'2.
=()
n
.a.v-.
y
h 3
1 Herbein 207 2
Q And is it also fairL to say that you
/,
lj.
1 3
made the judgment as to which ones you would. review 4
and which ones you wouldn't review?
5 A
I don't specifica11y' remember making i;
that judgment.
It appu4rs from the documents 7
you have shown that that was discussed.
8 MR. SELTZER:
This will go faster if 9
you testify from.your' recollection; don't' 10 construe do c ume n ts today and come up with 11 in te rp re ta tio ns today unless it's refreshing 12 your recollection.
13 THE WITNESS:
Well, it isn't.
I have 14 tried to indicate that.
15 Q
And in the section, Mr. Herbein, of 16 the' procedures.that you decided that you wanted to 17 l have your own personal input into, did you:give l
18 con s'ide ra tion to the question of whether it might
)
19 be important for you to provide that kind of input' 20 for emergency procedures?
4 Jg't -
21 MR. SELTZER:
Could you read that again?
22 (Question read back.)
23 MR.
'S E LT Z E R :
What are you re ferring to 24 in connection with'Mr..Herbein's des' ire to have
(,s. ~
25 input.on7particular procedures.-
D
'E-
,y 9
y y
4'
.l~
Herbein.
. 08' 2
9
- e 2
MR. FISKE:
Well', I-am re fe rri ng first
\\ v 3-to:Mr. Herbein's1 written expressed desire for -
1 4
approval of all procedures 'aad._as modified by
- o 5-the arrangements aui he had described t
G p re vio usly that-he worked out with Mr. Miller z
7 under'which he would review certain procedures.
1 8-MR. SELTZER:
Where'does it say "all
-9 procedures"?..What are you re fe rring to?
10 MR..FISKE:
I am referring to.the sentence 11 that says, reading it' for the third time i
12 from page 1528 of Exhibit ~ 802,1"you should 13 plan on me app roving' p ro ce d u re s, " underlined.
~
114 MR. SELTZER:
All right,.it doesn't say 15
" approving all procedures," so I think you 16 misspoke.
II Q
What procedures did you have in mind 18
.when you wrote-that?
19-A I don't remember specifically,! but'I:can 20 give you what-I believe I meant to the:best of'imyL 21' recollection.
4 22 i Q.
.That's fine.
23 A
-I would have ' been ' concerned with the
. 24
- proceduresL that ; governed Jmajor evolutions, for b_)/
25 ins tance,- heat up, cooldown, initial ~ criticality, 3
- ak
.x e
4
'4
l 5-1 lie rbe in 2Q9 j
g-2 rise to power at power operations, these kinds of N-lq ~
3 things, and I believe that I would have indicated 4
. an interest in looking at certain emergency 5
procedures.
6 Q
And you had'that desire at the time i
7 you wrote the memo to Mr. Miller, right?
1 8
A I believe it's reasonable to assume that t
'i 9
I did.
I don't specifically remember, though.
10 Q
And af ter you had your discussions with 11 Mr. Miller and worked out the relationship, did you 12 feel at that time that the desire that you had had 13 when you wrote this memo had been. accomplished?
. /").
\\-)
14 MR. SELTZER: I think we are off into 15 the realm of specific --
'16 MR. FISKE:
I am simply.asking.
17 MR. SELTZER:
Why don't you let me e
18 -
finish?
19 He said that he thinks it's reasonable 20 tc assume that that is what he meant about ll) 21 wanting to approve' procedures, and he says 22
'h e doesn ' t ' have ' any spe cific recollection.
{
23 Then you -have asked him af ter you had a.
24 discussion with Mr. Miller, and all he said on
[)y L.
25 -
that~is, "It seems logical thac Mr. Miller 4
t g4-
.1 A
_m,_
m
i 6.'~
1 Herbein 210
,.,4 2
and I would havo had a discussion," but he 4
1 3 !
couldn't' remember-a specific discussion.
~
t 4
Now you are going.to pile speculation 5
on an assumption and try to get a conclusion.
'6 I think that is improper.
7 Q
Can you answer the question, Mr. Herbein?
4 d'
A
.You have to ask it again.
I have lost 9
whe re you are.
- 10 Q
I'm not surprised.
1 11 l
MR. FISKE:
Would you read it back?
12 (Question read back.)
13 A
Sir, being unable to specifically, p
14 recall this~ entire exchange, it's difficult-for me 15 to somehow-conjure up the state of mind that I may have 16 had after this exchange vf handwritten ucmcrandums 17 with Mr. Miller.
There is nothing t<>
indicate-
' I8
'inLmy recollection that I may have had some kind of 19 a problem with whatever: Gary and I finally, agreed on.
20 But I don't'specificallyfremember what that was, gg}
21 Q
.Let me show.you a document which has been 22
- marked previously as E
- :hibit 305 which'is the o-23 '. ! pressurizer system-failure-procedure for Unit 2.
j
' 24 l
Were you f amiliar with this procedure ~at e-
-f' N,;
, [any' times upito the. time.of 'the'Three Mile Island
' N,.)
25-w I
r n
n
Y
~
7-
.1 :'
IIe rbe in 211 L
.jg 2
acciden t ?-
)
3 A
I was familiar that.a procedure having 1
'4 to'do with pressurizer uystem failure existed on 5
1Three Mile Island Unit 1 in the '73-74 time frame.
6 It's reasonable to assume that I was aware that we 7
had a. procedure like this on Three Mile Island 4
8 Unit 2.
9' I would point out that this procedure 10
.is dated 9/29/78, so I would have some basic 11 familiarity with the procedure, although I would 12 not be.very familiar with the details in the '78-79 1
13 time frame.
'~
14 Q
The pressurizer system failure procedure 15 is an emergency procedure, is it not?
Ili A
That's truc.
17 Q
And it was also at Unit 17 18
.A-To the best of.my knowledge, it was.
19 Q
And as you recall the general arrangement.
20-that you worked out with..Mr.. Miller, would the.
jlg 21 pressurizer system failure emergency procedures be
'22 included in the group l o f 'proce dure s that you would-l 23 l review?
j 24 ~
MR. SELTZER: : Objection.
.. fy~
'L/ -
25' Q
. Was it?-
t
~,('.
e e ' l
.k
V-212 6
'I lierbein m
2 MR. SELTZER:
Do you understand he is
..,m.,
.3 1
3 asking you do you now have a recollection --
4 A
The implication that you made is 5
disturbing to me.
We sat down and looked at' a (i '
group of' handwritten taumos that wuro p repared in s
{
'7 March 1975.
n 8
Now you show me another-procedure-
~9 that is dated 9/29/78, three years af te r those 10 handwritten memorandums were exchanged.
11 I told you in the context of those 12 handwritten memorandums, I could not spe ci fically 13 remember the de tails of any kind of an agreement f'
~ %s)-
14 that Miller and I may have worked out.
15 I told you specifically that it was l(i reasonable.to assume that Miller and I would have 17 talked about that in the context of the plant 18 superintendent and the Unit 2 superintendent working 19 out the details for the preparation of the initial.
1:
90 operating and. emergency procedures on Three Mile
]lh 21 Island Unit 2,-and the years subsequent to that 22 3/75 memorandum, a numbe r of' things took place.
I
.23' I' changed my position in the organization I
24 several. times and in'no way'in September'of 1978.was
, X_j; 25 re viewing the. de tails of Three Mile Island. Unit 2 s
t 6
y 9
g
~. -
.,w g
--m
.-g n
,-+s--w---
y
-y-
E 9
1 Herbein 2
emergency procedures, and I think that it's 7
'g s.
'v' 3
unconscienable to have made that implication in the 4.
manner in which you just did.
~
5 Q
First of all, it was a question.
6 All you had to do was answer it.
7 Secondly, the portion of the procedures 8
that I was going to be questioning you about are 9
Revision 1,
which bear a date o f June 22, 1977.
10 Presumably there was a Revision'0 before that, and 11 presumably there was a draft some time before that 12 that led to the revision.
13 I am simply'asking you whether you
(
14 participated at any time in the process of preparing 15 the procedure which eventually became Revision 1 on 16 June 22, 1977, including whatever you may have done 17 in working-on or reviewing drafts of this particular 18 procedure back.in 1975, under whatever arrangements 19 you may have made with Mr. Miller.
20 A
Through lengthy discussion we have-just
]lh 21 established that I was involved in procedures in 22 March of 1975.
23 I do not recall the specific details of 24 the arrangement.that Miller and I worked out.
I am
~ (^)T n.
25 almost positive that I was not involved in' procedure "e
C.
1 Horbein 214 2
. review.after 1976 O'[
3 You must recall from having restewed 1
my resume.that in the.'75-76 time t r.ame, my 5
position changed a number of times, and in this 6
time period,- 1977-78, I was back_in the corporate 7
office in Reading and was' designated as vice president 8
in June of 1977.
-9 Q
This is a question very. simply which 10 is, did you participate at any time in reviewing 11 any draft of a pressurizer system failure procedure 12 for Unit 27 13 A
I don't specifically remember, but I may 14 '
have.
15 (Recess taken.)
16 BY MR. FISKE:
17 Q
You we re ' aware, were you-not, before 18
.the Three Mile Island accident, Mr. lie rbe in,
-19 that there was leakage from the top of the pressurizer 7 2d JL I am not sure if I was or-not..
jg 21 Q
Let me just read you-from page 815
. 22 of the -testimony of Gary Miller. j ust last week.
i 1
23
- TheEquestion:is line 9.
"You mentioned;before lunch-1 Ilthat you had conversations" 24' O MR. SELTZER:
I don't think it was last (j
j m.
_m.
o 1-1 215-Ite rbe in
(
week.
3 MR. FISKE:
Well, June 10.
Correction, L
4 that Mr. Miller gave was June 10, 1981.
[-
5 Q
Question by Mr. Weiss.
"You mentioned 6
before lunch that you had conversations with 7
Mr. Logan and Mr. Herbein concerning the increased 8
amo un t of leakage at TMI-2 before the March 1979 I !
accident.
We have discussed the conversations you l
to had with Mr. Logan.
I would like to cican up this 11 a re a by asking what con ve rsations you had with 12 Mr. Herbein on th'at subject.
13
" Answer:
That status that I discussed 14 that I obtained both-verbally and -- verbally if I was on 15 theLIsland and also the status sheets for the units 16 went to Mr. Herbein and nr. Lawyer.
I am sure that we 17 discussed that item.
I can't remember specific 18 conversations but I am sure Jack was aware we 19 suspected some leakage.
It was common fo r us ' to 20 go.through.that sheet in'the morning, both'with g
21 IIerbein and with Lawyer."
22 Does that question an'd answer'from
.23 iMr.-Miller's testimony in any way-refresh your l
24 recollection, Mr. Herbein, as to whether you were-l O) k 20 aware before the Three Mile Island acciden t -: that' i
i h
j 2-l' lie rb o i n
.216.
i
. m-2 there was leakage?
-?
):
'3' A
That doesn't improve my re co lle ct io'n 4
ability, sir, but I would assume that it's 5-
~ reasonable to postulate.that I probably knew 6
there was leakage.from code safety valves on 7
the pressurizer of TMI Unit 2.
8 Q
Well, isLit your testimony that you 9
don't recall now whether'you knew anything about i
'10 leakage?
11
'A I-t'old you previously. that I didn't 12 remember whether I at that time knew'that the 13 valves on the top of-the TMI-2' pressurizer were leaking.
O Q,
11 We have looked at'Mr. Miller's testimony.
.He has' 15 told us that it was a matter of course ~ that he 16 discussed operations witn Lawyer and llerbein.
17 I have indicated that based on that, it seems 18 reasonable to assume that I probably knew that' 19 we-had-leaking valves..on the.TMI-2 pressurizer prior.
20 to the March '79'a'ccident.
,ggp 21-Q Is it. correct ~ that you: don't' remember-22
'now whether.you-learned which-valve the leakage 23.,
i! was coming ~from?
e 24 MR. SELTZER: :You mean as between' code A( )
1251 safeties and pilot operated relief valves?
P
'S
^
s
13-
'l Herbein 217 2
MR. FISKE:
Well, there are throu
'f%
3 valves, correct, which one of the three.
4 MR. S ELTZ Mit :
I think he previously 5
testified he was probably awa re there-was 6
some code safety valve leakage.
7 MR. FISKE:
No, he said he didn't 0
recall.
He was postulating.
)
9 MR. SELTZER:
He.Jaid he was probably 10 aware there was code safety valve leakage.
11 MR. FISKE:
You wrote down "probably" 12 instead of " postulating."
13 A
Sir, I was probably aware there was e
14 some code safety valve leakage.
15 Q
I am not interested, Mr. Herbein, 16
~ in what you think you mignt-have known now or 17 probably known or postulate you know.
18 As you sit here today, can you'tell us:
10-whether you recall learning prior to the accident 20' which of the three valves _was_ leaking.
{lg 21 A'
I think I have answered that. question.-
22 Q
What-is your recollection?
I' l 23 a.
Lege s just restate the question to get i
24
- things s't r aigh t.
,k
' s.y 25-Q Sure.
r
[i 2
.4 1
ite rbe in.
218 2
As you sit here now, thinking back
('1).
3 before the accident, do you have a recollection 41
~ of having learned before.the accident which one of the k
5 the three valves was leaking?.
i ti A
I don't recall that.
7 Q
Now, there is a procedure, it is part 8
of the emergency procedure for the pressurizer system 1
9 failure to take certain actions in the event that f
L 10 either the pilot operated relief valve or the 11 code safeties were leaking, isn't that correct?
12 A-Are you saying that-this procedure has 13 dif fe rent. parts depending on what is leaking?
n 14-Q
'Yes.
15 A
That's correct.
Iti Q
Did you undarstand beforc'the accident 17 that in the event there wasLa leaking pilot operated 18 relief valve, the procedure called for the -block I
19 Lvalve to be closed.and'that if;the' code safeties
{
1 20 were leaking, the procedure' called for the code ggg 21'
. safeties'to be.placed on anfanalogue-
- t rend re co rde r, -
f
=22'
.that is i called Efor the-code, relief discha rge line
-: j t
23
. temperatures to be placed on_an analogue trend
.24 recorder?
-f i
~ ~
T_)
25 A
I would like a, chance to'quickly look' 6
_ _L_ _z_._ L-L_-. _-
5 I
Itu rbu in 219 2
g-]
Litrough the procedure to see if I ag ree with that t
\\/
.. interpretation.
j t
3
-l Q
Sure, you are welcome to look through 5
it,
'I Let me just make it clear.
We are not I
asking you to interpret it today.
It is simply a J
8 question that before the accident, you were aware 9
that those things we re in the procodure, but you are 10 l certainly'welcome to look through it in order to 11
- answer that question.
12 MR. SELTZER:
Why don't we take it in 13 parts so that it's not an unfair compound 14 question.
15 With respect to a leaking pilot Iti operated relief valve, what wuro you asking?
17 Q
Did you know before the accident the 18 manual action prescribed by the procedure for a 19 leaking pilot operated electromatic relief valve was 20 to close the block valve?
llh 2I A-I don't know that I did know thatoor l-22
.that I_ agree.with that interpretation of the 23
{ procedure or would have agreed with that interpretation
~
24 of the procedure in the '77-78-79 time frame.
' p
, d 25
~
leaking"electromatic relief
.We ran with a
,,.=
s-N-
i' 1\\
s
,w 6
I
~g,%
IIe rbe in 220 s
r
~
}
f-2 (val ve on T'hree Mile Island Unit 1.
To run'with (3)
"A
~, s 3
a' leaking, electromatic relief valve was acceptable s
i_t
\\
3 w N
4 o n TMI-2.'"
There was no technical upucificat. ion
-. s.
m 3
',5
(
5 re qui reme n't dealing with the electromatic relief
'~
t s
s 6
valve a n d "wh'e t h e r it' leaked or not.
'id' 4
s s
s'
)
s s.
The only' requirement we were bound to s
x 1
b h
e 8
was the.J ess than one gallbn a minute Gnidentified 9
leakaga" requirement with the greater than ten GPM 3
s
b 10 identified leakage requirement, so to state that
.)
11 I unde rs tood that the electromatic relief isolation D
12 y lve had to be closed when the electromatic n
7,
[
13 leaked, it seems to me is not correct. T' '
y s
14 Q
Did you understand that the block valve
.,l 15 didn't 'have to be closed unless the leakage' exceeded 9 l'
'N
,one. gallon per minute of identified o r ' ten gallons u
II
,- i e
per minute.of unidentified?
\\
N 18 '
MR. SELTZEdt; -'I think you have got it
.v 19 y
backwards,~ Bob.
I think it's one-gallon-
.N 7
20 A
unidentifie.d and ten iden$1fie'd.
~g 21-Q
~ id you understand that phe block valve D
x 1
f.
22 di.d not have.to be closed unless. thM identified 3 1 J
i L
23 -, lea'kE2e excleede'd' ten gallons pe b minute.'o'r the J
l.3 1
. ),g 2
...3, x
s
% 24 unidentified 1pakige ' exceeded' one gallon;per minute?
g '"
w q.
C6 25 A'
Nall,;evan in those jarticular' cases, j
=5 3 ; y-i
) l 't s
. );
N, s.
x y
..m
'?: y.,
3:
s
',g r
u x a.s.
s n,-
221 7
1
!!a rbo in 2
there was no specific requiremen t just for a 3
one gallon a minute unidentified or ten GPM identified 4
leakage to go close the block valvo.
5 It was in the context of overall leakage, i
G though, that the block valve could be used as a 7
diagnostic tool to determine where the leakage was 8
coming from since the pilot operated relief valve 9
discharges into the reactor coolant drain tank, one 10 could use the block valve to assist in reducing leakage 11 from the PORV to the drain tank.
'12 Q
I am not sure I understand that answer.
13
. Closing the block valve had the 14 function of s topping whatever' leakage might be 15 occurring through the' pilot operated relief valve, 16' correct?
17 A
That's correct.
18 Q'
Did youEunderstand that-the block 19 valve did not have to be closed to perform that 20 function until the leak rate exceeded the g,
. 21 limitations we had been discussing ea rlier?
I
' 22
'A The point I was trying.to make was
- j.
I 23 that it doesn't have'to be closed even then. - ' The'
. 24 '
action required by the t e chn ica l' spe ci fic atio n s n
i.on the greater than' ten gallons la minute or1 greater
~
(y) 25
.'e
^ ' '
m-a m.
~
b.
I IIe rbe i n 222 2
than one gallon a minute was that the plant had g.
('#)
3 l to be shut down within a specific time period if the i
4 leakages were'not reduced below that tun gallon 5
a minute and one gallon a minute value.
6 Q
Did you understand also that the 7
procedure required that if there wau a leaking 8
code relief valve or code relief valves, the code 9
relief discharge line temperatures should be placed 10
.on an analogue trend recorder?
11 A
I didn't really have that knowledge 12 or understanding.
13 Q
Did :/ou ever make any inquiry *before
(~)#
\\"
14 the Three Mile Island accident as to whe ther or not 15 the code relief' discharge line temperatures had been IG put on an analogue t rc..d recorder?
17 A
I don't believe that I would have 18 asked that precise a question based on'my pos~ition 19 and unde rstanding of events at the time.
20 Q
Let'me'show you a document which has lh) 21 not been previously marked which we.will mark-as 22 Exhibit.880, and ask you if you recognize this as 23 the copy of the-pressurizer system ~ failure procedure 24
.for-Unit 1 as of June 2, '1975.-
. p)..
(, -
25
.(Multipage document / entitled "Three Mile
?
f-m
.9 1
lierbein 223 2
Island Nuclear.itation Unit #1 Emergency f^'\\
V 3
Procedure 1202-29 Pressurizer System 4
Failure" dated 06/02/75, Revision 2,
marked I
5 B&W Exhibit No. 880 for iden ti fica tion as (i
of this date.)
7 A
Yes, sir, I have the proce. dure.
l 8
Q And I guess the question is do you 9
recognize that as a copy of the procedure for Unit 1 10 as of that point in time?
11 A
It's signed by Joe Coiltz and dated i
12 6/2/75.
I believe it's re asonable - to assume this is 13 a 1975 version of the pressurizer system failure
' ~#
14 procedure on Unit 1.
15 Q
There was a portion of the pressurizer
~
Ili system failure procedure for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 17 that dealt with an inoperative. pilot cperated 18 electromatic relief valve, isn't that correct?
19 A
You asked if that particular section-20 having to do with an inoperative pilot operated jgg 21 relief valve existed in both the 1975 version of the 22-Unit 1 procedure and.the 9/29/78 version of-the Unit 23
'2-procedure, is that a correct understanding of your 24 question?
3
(.)
25 g
yes.
r e
_l__J_
'a
+
0 t'
Ila rbe in 224 9
A Making the comparison for you that you just requested, sir, I find that on the exhibit page 3
.g 11136 of the 1975 Unit 1 p rocedure, the words in 5
Section B,
" Inoperative Pilot operated Relief Valve."
{
6 I also find on the Unit 2 version of the pressurizer 7
system failure procedure dated 6/22/77 the words 8
"Section B,
Inoperative Pilot operated (electromatic) 9 Relief Valve, RC-RV2."
to Q
Now, it is correct, isn't it, Mr. Herbein, 11 that you participated in the preparation or review 12 of the Unit 1 p ro ce du re which has been marked Exhibit g3 880?
y A
I believe we have established that I was 15 involved in the Unit 1 procedure review preparation 16 process.
Yes, sir, we have established that.-
17 I don't specifically remember that I was
~
18 involved with this particular procedure that was 19 approved in June of '75 by Joe Colitz.
20 Q
Looking at the section that's marked 21 29.B.1,
" Symptoms," you unde rs tood,. didn ' t yo u. --
g 22 lMR. SELTZER:
In which procedure?
23 MR. FISKE:
=In Exhibit 880, which is the 24 Unit.1 procedure.
r,
(_)
25
-Q You understood,Edidn't you,'that i
those
e 1
I IIe rbe in 225 2
we re L stated to be symptoms of an inoperative
-s
-i 3
pilot operated relief valve?
4 A
I believe it's reasonable to assume that 5
I understood that, yes.
G Q
Now, No. 2 says, " Reactor coolant 7
system pressure is below 2205 psig and valve fails l
0 to Close."
9 Do you see that?
10 A
Yes, I see that.
11 g.
It is correct, isn't it, that the 2205 12
'psig was the setpoint at which the valve was supposed 13 to close once it had opened and pressure had fallen f'N
- N) 14 back below that point?
15 A
That's reasonable.
16 Q
tiow, para 9Aaph 3 says, "RC-Rv2 discharge
'II line temperature is above the 200 degree Fahrenheit IS alarm."
t 10 Do you see that sentence?
-20 A
Yes.
. lg)-
Q There.was a monitoring device, was 21 22 there not, for the pilot-operated; relief valve on 23 Unit 1 which gave you the temperatures on the discharge' 24 Lline from theLvalve?
r ~;
(_/
25 A
We measured-tailpipe' temperature on I
-l 1
I-
a
- s-
--.u-,.--a
a-.
a a
- r.;
2 11 ilorbein 226 l
W 2
Three ' Mile -Island Unit 1 electromatic dischargo,
~
l i
^
'3 yes, sir.
4 Q
Did you understand that temperature 5
above the 200 degree Fahrenheit alarm on that (i
discharge line was a symptom that the pilot operated 7
relief valve had opened and failed to close?
8 A
That is not necessarily the case.
9 It could cortainly be that the code safetics or i
10 perhaps a reactor coolant pump seal could leak 11 into the drain tank, cause the-tank temperature to
-12 rise andifeed back up that tailpipe and in turn l
13 cause that temperature indication to reach alarm.
t Ii 14 It was also ve ry possible that the electromatic 15 relief valve would open andl properly close on a Ifi turbine t' rip and that'ir. so doing,. provide that 17 indication of tailpipe temperature in the vicinity of b
18
' 200 degrees.
19 -
So it is not conclusive that tailpipe 20' temperature indication of 200 degrees meant specifically ggg 21 thac'there was an inoperative pilot operated' relief
?
~
i.
22-valve.
.That's not correct.-
i
- 23 We relied on Unit 1 as we did on i.
T I
I i
247 I Unit.2 on the light. wired'to the solenoid valve to 325 '
<tell4 us
~
the position'of the pilot operated relief-a i _.
,, ~, -.....
s.....,...
~
3 I
lie rbe i n 227 2
valve.
The indication of temperature was n'o t esU 3
.something that we relied on in a great degree of detail, 4
as I have just described.
5 Q
We will get to the light in a few 6
minutes, Mr. Herbein, and my. question wasn't whether 7
a tempe rature at the discharge line above 200 degrees 8-was a conclusive indication that the pilot operated 9
relief valve was open.
10 I simply asked you whether, as you 11 understood this procedure, the fact that if a 12 temperature was above 200 degrees Fahrenheit was 13 a symptom that the pilot operated relief valve might
's 14 be open.
15 A
It's listed here on the procedure as a 16 symptom.that might indicatc the valve is open.
II
'Q Now, the next sentence says, "The reactor IO coolant drain tank t e mp e rat u re/p re s's u re is above 19 ambient as indicated on the control room radioactive 20 waste panel."
' jg) 21 Do you see that?
22 A
Yes, I do.
23 D
Did you understand when you reviewed this 24 procedure that.an increase inTdrain tank temperature A,y
/
- 25_~
and/or pressure above ambient was a symptom of an O
4 1
lie rbe in 228 2
open pilot operated relief valve.
3 A
.I have just indicated previously that 4
the high drain tank temperature /presuure could be 5
indicative of a number of leakage items into g
6 that tank, not just a discharge of a code safety 7
valve or an electromatic relief valve, but I will 8
state that it's listed here as 29.B.1.3 in the 1975 9
version of the Unit 1 procedure.
10 Q
Now, going down the page, there is a 11 section that re fe rs to "Immediate Action."
12 Do you see that?
13 A
Yes, sir.
14 Q
And then there'is an " Automatic Action,"
15 right?
16 A
Yes, sir.
17 Q
I take it that was intended to refer 18 to things that happened automatically?
19 A
Yes, sir.
20 Q
Can you see under 2 that if there is a ll) 21 failed open~ pilot operated relief valve, under "a,"
l 22
.all; pressurizer-heater banks will go on full below j
23 2105 psig, the reactor will. trip atf1800 psig,:and 24 high pressure injection will be actuated at 1500 psig?
b,)
- 25' y,
Do you see that?'
1 g ;..
.i,.,g
.. i.
s
_m
5, 1
!!crbein 229 2
A Yes, sir, I see that.
,s A).
3 Q
Did you understand in your review and 4
use of that procedure, that those automatic actions 5
themselves we re symptoms that there might be G
a pilot operated relief valve?
7 A
They are listed as symptoms 0
MR. SELTZER:
No, they are not listed 9 -
as symptoms.
10 A
I'm sorry.
They are listed as automatic 11 actions, but I would also state that these automatic 12 actions occur on a number of plant transients, not 13 just an electromatic relief valve problem, so having 14 these particular symptoms is not necessarily 15 correction.
Having these particular automatic 16 actions occur is certainly not conclusive evidence II that there is a failed open RC-Rv2, and I think it's 18 taken out of context to imply that it might be.
19 Q
Well, Mr. Herbein, maybe we'are 20 having a little problem with the use of the word gg} -
21
" symptom" as it'is used in my questions, as I. assume 22 it is used in the procedures, and'certainly as it has 23
,been used in earlier depositions.
24 The word " symptom" is not intended to r>
'q j -
25 me that the occurrence'of the particular symptom is.
e 1
u 1
lierbein 230 2
conclusive,-that a particular event has occurred.
- (~h
'w')
3 It is used in the context that that e ve n t is a symptom of, although it might aluo be a symptom of other l
5-events.
(3 MR. SELTZER:
That is not a question.
7 Q
So none of my questions have implied 8
that in the use of the word " symptom" that the 9
particular event is conclusive.
10 MR. SELTZER:
What is,this, a seminar 11 or do you have a question?
12 MR. FISKE: W e l'1, I think we will save 13 a lot of time because Mr. Herbein keeps p
k-11 coming back to that in response to e ve ry 15 question.
1(;
THE WITNESC:
Sir, I can read the 4
17.
procedure to you.
It says "29.a.1, Immediate V
18 Action."
19 Q
All I am trying to say, M.r. Herbein,
'20 is-that you did understand-at the time you were 31 working with these, procedures. tha t. tailpipe
, 22 temperatures above 200 degrees for the pilot operated 1 23.. relief valve, an increase in drain tank tempe rature 24 or pressure and a drop in pressure to the point
)
25
. where-HPIfbecame' automatically. actuated were all
_M.
7 1-lie rbe in 231 i
2 symptoms of an open PORV?
I,,
\\
-s
/
s 3
A I have stated previously that the symptoms 4
and automatic actions you have'just deucribed were 5
indicators o f a number of events.
6 Q
Yes, one of which for each one was an 7
open pilot operated relief valve, isn't that correct?
8 A
I have given you my answer, sir.
9 Q
And j ust so we understand it, there isn't 10 any question, is there, that each one of those 11 three things was an indication of an open pilot 12 operated relief valve?
13 MR. SELTZER:
[)
You are saying HPI actuation
\\~
14 is an indication of an open pilot operated 15 relief valve?
l6 MR. FISKE-Yes, it comes ~ on automatically 17 when there is an open pilot operated relief
~
18 valve.
19 MR. SELTZER:
It's not' listed as~a 20 symptom.
jgg 21 MR. FISKE:
You don't have to tell him-22 what to say.
23 MR. SELTZER:
I know I dont.
He has 24
.given you the answer five times.already.
i
/T
'()
25 MR. FISKE:. Well, you seem to'be trying_
s
,8-1 Herbein 232 2
very hard to do that.
Mr. lie rbe i n seama
- p...
~'
3 perfectly capabic of answering questions.
4 MR. SELTZl:lt If you would just move 5
on after you get an answeri just because you G
don't like an answer, I don't think that's 7
groun d for coming back five times and 8
asking the same question.
)
9 MR. FISKE:
I am trying to get him to 10 confirm what I believe his own procedure says.
11 MR. SELTZER:
Well, I object.
There is 12 no foundation that high pressure injection
.13 actuation is a symptom for this or that his
/~%
~
14 procedure says it as you have just represented.
15 Q
Didn't you understand, Mr. Herbein, that 16 if.one automatic action t %, t rollows from an 17.
open pilot operated relief valve is the automatic 18 actuation of HPI at 1500 psig that in that sense, 19.
.the actuation of HPI at that pressure level is 20 a symptom as we have previously de fined the term gggg 21.
of an open pilot operated. relief valve?
22 A
I think we areshaving-a problem with
.23 terminology here.
l 24 There are immediate actions.and they have
.G x.)
25.-
as a subheader automatic actions in this 1975 o
_1
9
.1 Ito rbe i n 233 2
procedure,'and reading specifically 29.B.2.A.2, "For f)
\\/
3 a failed open RC-RV-2:
All pressurizer heater 4
banks on full below 2105 psig, reactor trips at 1800 5
psig, high pressure in]ection is actuated at 1500 l
6 psig," they are listed'as automatic actions in the 7
1975 Three Mile Island Unit 1 procedure.
8 I have stated previously that is what the 9-procedure says, that I have tried'to put it in the 10 proper context, the symptoms listed here, the automatic 11 actions,- the things we have just been talking-about, 12 are symptoms of a number of transients that could take 13 place on Babcock & Wilcox reactors, and as such are s
(_)
14 not conclusive, all knowing indicators of a particular 15 event.
16 These particular symptoms and automatic.
17 actions could be indicative of a number of things.
~
18 Q
When was the light installed at Unit 17 19 A
We installed that light following a.
20 transient that we had March the 29th, 1978.
gg 21 MR. SELTZER:
He said Ur. it 1.
I think f
22 you are focusing on Unit 2.
23 Q
Yes, the question was Unit 1.
24 A
I'm sorry.
The. light on Unit 1,
to the n( )
25 best of my knowledge,.was provided as part of the 9
-O' I
lierbein 234 2
basic NSS.
It.came.with the plant.
3 Q
How did that light work?
l 4
A It was hooked up to the solenoid on the 5
electromatic relief vaive.,
When the light was on, 6
the valve was open correction.
When the light 7
was off, the valve was closed.
8 Q
Was that light a direct indication 9
of position of the valve?
10 A
We certainly utilized it that way.
We 11 believed that when the light was on, the valve was 12 open, and when the light was off, the valve was 13 shut.
14 Q
That isn't my question.
15 My question is, was it?
16 MR. SELTZER.
You are asking him for<
II his understanding of ---
18 MR. FISKE:
Sure.
19 MR. SELTZER:
Yo u.' are really impatlent 20 today.
jgg 21 Are ~ you asking him for his understanding 22 before the Three Mile Island accident?
23
~FISKE:
I am asking him for his MR.
24
. understanding now.
<m()
25 MR. SELTZER:
Well, I object..
That is 1
i r
.~
j b
I 11e rb e in 235 2
(3 not relevant. Wita t he understands today qf.
3 in light of the Three Mile Island 4
accident and studies since then is not 5
probative.
6 MR. FISKE:
I am simply asking Mr.
7 Herbein to tell us as a fact 0
MR. SELTZER:
And you frequently J
'D objected to my asking your witnesses for their 10 post-accident analyses and understandings of 11 things.
12 I think that it is far more probative 13
- g~g to ask Mr. Herbein when he was responsible for V
I4 Unit 1 and was aware that they had a PORV 15 indicator light, did he understand then that 16 it was a direct indicator for valve position.
17 MR. FISKE:
I will certainly ask him 18 what his understanding was then.
If it's 19 any different from what-it is now, I would like 20 to know as a simple fact whenever Mr. Herbein lhk 21 learned'it,-what kind of a light they in fact 22 had at Unit 1,
and I ce rtain ly think that i
i 23 is a pretty basic question-and that
'is 24 -
what I am.asking you now, Mr. Herbein.
[')
xs 25
- Q I will ask you-in a few minutes in i
__.ma___-._m.__.
_ ~ -
u
l 236 2
1 11e rbein 2
connection with some other questions what your
' s/
3 understanding was before the accident, but I am simply 4
now trying to find out as a matter of discovery what i
5 kind of light did you in fact have at Unit 1.
{
G MR. SELTZL:R:
What do you mean, "what 7
kind of light"?
8 Q
Is it the same light there now that 9
was there from the beginning?
10 A
To the best of my knowledge, it is,-sir, 11 and to the best of my knowledge, it is.a light that 12 is wired to the solenoid, and when the light is on, 13 the valve is open and when the light is off, the 14
~ valve is closed.
15 I must add,. relative to what is there 16 right now, we now know that the light is not the 17 best indicator of valve position, and, in fact, have 18 installed elbow tap DP cells on the tailpipes of the 19 PORv'and code safety valves.
That is the' conclusive 20 way to measure valve position, i.e.,- the measurement
. jgg 21 of specific downstream flow tells us whether the 22 valve is open or closed.
23 Q
'Is.the mechanism that activates the l
24 l J11ght at TMI-1 exactly the same as the mechanism that
/\\ -).
25 activates the--light that was installed at.TMI-2 after-i
. i m
- m. m. a
3 I
lie rbe i n 2
the March-29, 1978 accident?
'l s) v 3
A I really can't answer that.
l.
I can state that Th ro u Mile Island Unit 1 5
today does rely on those elbow tap DP cells.
6 Q
I am not asking you about that.
7 A
I can't answer the question.
8 My understanding is that prior to the 9
accident, Unit 1 had a light that was wired to the 10 solenoids.
11 Q
So that means, just so we unders~ tand 12 each other, that when power goes to the solenoid --
13 A
the light goes on.
,/'\\
14 Q
the light is on, and when power stops 15 flowing to the solenoid, the light is off?
16 A
And the valve is shut.
17 Q
Well,.wheth.er or not
- t. h n v.il va in uhut 18 A
Let me qualify my response.
19 To the best of my knowledge, I am fairly 20 certain that I understood in the TMI Unit 1 time jll-21 frame and by that I mean
'74,
'75 -- that 22 we had'a light that indicated PORV position', and l
23 that that light was wired to the solenoid and as such, 24 when it was on, indicated the. valve'was open, and (3._
(./ -
25 when it was closed, the light was off.
I.
.m
I 4
i
!!s rba in l
2 There may be ~ one other feature on the rs
(
).
N/
3 Unit 1 light that I may have neglected to mention.
4 I believe the Unit 1 light had a r e."! /g reen indicating
~5 feature along with it, so in trying to remember what t;.
my recollection was, I may not have accurately 7
described the way that Unit 1 light f un c tion ed ;
M thinking back on it as you have asked the question, 9
it may not have worked quite the way I have described 10 it.
11 I am fairly certain that the Unit 1 light 12 was not a direct system position indication of the valve, 13 but, in fact, had to do with power application to O)'
s 14 the valve.
I am not sure about the red / green 15 indication.
I seem to remember that that was present.
Iti Q
Well, let just make clear what I am ma 17 asking you.
I am really not asking you what kind of 18 a light they had, whether it was one light that went-19 on or off or whether it was a green Light or red 20 light.
ggy 21 I am also not asking you what conclusions 22 you drew before the accident from.the fact that the 23 light was on or off or red or green ~ or whateve r.
24 I am simply asking you,Jis it correct r~) ~
25 that the mechanism which activated the' light at M
l k
5 1
Ilarbain 239 2
TMI-1 was power flowing to the solenoid or not pd 3
flowing to the solenoid?
4 A
Sir, I think that's gene ra lly correct, j
5 but I am not positive.
It's my belief, to the 6
best of my knowledge and understanding.
7 Q
Were you aware of the consideration that 8
was given at Unit 2 to the installation of a light 9
af te r the March 29, 1978 accident?
10 A
I knew we felt we needed a position 11 indicator and we went to Babcock & Wilcox and asked 12 them for their input regarding the kin'd of position i
13 indication we should have, and thef came back
( 3)
(-
11 conclusively and put in this type of an indicator 15 light and11t was from them that we obtained the 16 specific recommendation on the kind of light 17 to install on Three Mile Island Unit 2.
18 MR. SELTZER:
May we avoid going into 10 this?
I can't believe you are' going to finish 20 this subject in one minute.
'gg 21 MR. FISKE:
We are not, out let me just I
~22 ask a couple of questions in light of 23' Mr. Herbein's last answer.
24 Q
Did -you have.any conve rsations direct n(f 25 with anybody'from B&W on the subject of that light?
u.
a
1
~ ~
I 6
. ite rbe i n -
240 2
A No, I didn't, but I feel fairly certain 3
that my people did.
4 Q
So the 'answe r that you just gave is 5
not based on any discussions that you pe rsonally had 6
- .with anybody'at Babcock & Wilcox?
I MR. SELTZER:
he just answered that.
.Why do you have to ask it again?-
9 MR. FISKEr I will with$1 raw the last 10 question.
I agree, it's unnecessary.
11 (Whereupon, at 1:45 o' clock. p.m.
a lunch 19 recess was taken.)
13 14 15 Ili
'17
-18 19
.20 I.
h, 21 22
.t
~23.
s 24,
^
m
. 25 (j
A 4
~
5-3 w
- v -
e
~
=
~
e.
w, wr r-
241 7-I 2
AFTERNOON SESSION s
\\J 3
(2:30 p.m.)
l J OHN G.
H E R B E I N,
resumed.
5 EXAMINATION (Continued) k li BY MR. FISKE:
7 Q
M r.
Herbeln, you just indicated off 8
the record that during the luncheon break you had checked 9
with Three Mile Island and you were in a position to 10 give us some more information about the light at 11 Unit 1.
12 A
Yes, sir, I did check and Unit l's PORV 4
13 indicating light does come off the~ power application O
' G.
ll to the solenoid.
It does have a red / green indication, 15 red indicating the valve is open and green indicating l(i the valve is off, but for all practical purposes, 17 it is very similar to th e indicator that we-had on 18 Unit 2, i.e.,
the light is an indication of.
19 power application to the valve.
20 Q
Power application to the-solenoid?
lg 21 A
Power application to the solenoid which 22 in turn operates the PORV.
23-Q Now, it is correct, is it n o t, - M r.' He rb,ein,
~24 that at the~ time the TMI-2 pressurizer system
(~m
(_)
25
. failure procedure was.being prepared, there'was no 6
4
~
242 8
I
!!c rbo in '
2 light at all on Unit 2?
' \\_$
~
)
3 A
To the best of my knowledge, that's 4
correct, yes, sir.
.5 Q.
Did you understand that one of the 6
p urpose s of the pressurizer system failure procedure I
at Unit 2 was to enable the operatora to be able to O
diagnose the existence of a stuck open or failed
.9 open pilot operated relief valve?
10 A
No, I did not understand that.
11 Q
It is correct, is it not, that at 10 Unit 1 t he re had been more than'one incident in which a
~
4
'I3 pilot operated relief valve had opened and the rupture
(\\_).
14 disk on the drain tank had blown?'
15 (Question read back.)
I"'
A That's correct, we had'on~ occasion 17 lif ted the PORV and blown the RCDT rupture disk on
- 18 TMI Unit 1.
19 Q
And were.those-situations in which'the 20 pilot operated relief yalve had opened and_ closed as l
S 21 -
it was supposed to?
22
~
A I -believe that was the case.
I am-not.
23 sure.we had!a situation where the PORV3may have-24
. stayed open when'it should have been closed.
/
aF'
'.k/
25 I-am not' aware =specifically thatithat was-a cause.
4 3
4, p
mv f-'
l 9
I lie rbe in 243 2
' (^l Q
Following those i n~c i de n t s, were there
' v '.
3 changes made in the drain tank at Unit 17 4
A I am not uure what you mean by " changes."
5 We replaced the torn rupture disk.
G Q
Were there changes made in the design 7
of the tank so that the system would be able to 8
survive a normal opening and closing of the PORV 9
without having the rupture disk blow?
10 A.
I don't recall that we made changes 11 '
in the drain tank on Unit 1.
12 Q
Is it your undersatnding that as of 13 the time of the Three Mile Island accident, the 14 condition of the drain tank or the design of the 15 drain tank at Unit 1 was such that every time there 16 was a normal opening and closing of the POhV, the II
_ rupture disk would blow?
18 A
That's not my understanding.
19 Q
Had there been situations before the 20 Three Mile Island accident where at Unit 1 the PORV h) 21 had' opened and closed the way it was supposed to where I-22 the rupture. disk had not blown?
10-I A
'I don't specifically' recall, but I assume 24 there were times that the'PORV opened and closed and
('N
\\I 25 the rupture disk did not blow-on TMI Unit 1's drain I
j 0
1 Horboin 244-l 2
tank.
6'~\\
V t
3 Q
What kind of a problem does it cause 4
for the company if the rupture dink blows on the 5
drpin tank?
6 A
Additional downtime while maintenance 7
personnal install a new rupture disk on the drain 8
tank.
9 Q
Did you have any idea in 1974 through 1979 10 as to what it cost Metropolitan Edison if TMI Unit 1 11 was shut down for a day?
12 A
I believe we have to di f fe ren tia te 13 between cost to our customers and the operating
' o
'u 11 and maintenance costs experienced by the company 15 for particular repairs.
16 Q
O.K.
17 MR. SELTZER:
Which were-you asking him 18 about?
19 MR. FISKE:
I'will now ask him about both.
20 bGt. SELTZER:
Which do you want him to ggg 21 start _with?
i f
22 MR. FISKE:
Either onc.
i 23 A
Replacement power-costs for a-nuclear apply' principally 24 unit to the dif fe rence in~ energy
(_);
_ 25 -
generated by. fossil-fuel as opposed to1 nuclear fuel v
)
1 I
Ite rbe in 245 2
.and could run on the order of -- in the
'74,
'75
[s v
3 time frame, a half million dollars a day.
4 The other kinds of costa that I mentioned 5
were operating and maintenance expenses which, when 6
applied specifically to the reactor coolant drain r
4 7
tank rupture disk, might have involved a singic day's 8
effort by five or six men to replace a rupture disk.
9 Q
Did you keep a space rupture disk around 10 for Unit 17 11 A
I don't remember.
12 Q
The~ reactor coolant drain tank for Unit 2 13 was designed by Burns & Roe, was it not?
O I4 A
That's correct.
15 Q
And isn't it a fact that the drain tank 16 for Unit 2 wac designed uo that the rupturo disk 17 would not blow in the even t - of a no rmal opening 18 and closing of the PORV?
19 A
I would say.that the drain tank'on' Unit.2-20 could withstand a higher temperature / pressure lll 21 relationship than the drain tank on-Unit 1.
That's not 22 to indicate that there wouldn't be a' blowing of the 23 rupture disk when the.PORV opened.
24 Q
Did f you ~ eve r review the FSAR fo r Unit.?".
J) 25 which describes the capacity o f the. drain tank' and
=
J
2-1 florbain 246 2
also the amount of flow that would be expected
.A-3 through the PORV while it was open?
-t A
I don't recall that I did.
5 Q
Before the Three Mile Island accident, ti you were aware, were you not, of incidents at other 7
plants in which the PORV had failed or stuck open and 8
the rupture disk had blown?
9 A
I don't know whethe r or not I was aware 10 of the rupture disk blowing at other B&W facilities.
11 Q
Let me show you this document which 12 has been marked B&W Exhibit 212, which is the l3 minutes of the meeting of the users-group of l-14 November 15, 1977.
15 I direct your attention to. the third Ni page.
17 Does that indicate you as one of the-18 persons who was on the~ distribution list?
19
'A Yes, it indicates that I am ~1isted on
~
20 the distribution.
21 Q
Directing'your attention to'-page 0947, 22 which is~page-11.--
23 1
A-Yes, sir,'0947.
24.
Q
. Turning back;one/page, do you-see~the h~
f
-25 L:refarence to Davis-Besse 1-Toledo Edison. Company?
t t
a
\\
4
-3 I
IIcrbein 247 2
'.g A
Yes, sir, I see that, and a report to a:
9 3
Mr. Tony Murray.
4 Q
And on page 11, "9/24/77 - Electromatic t
5 relief valve stuck open.
Rupture disc ruptured,"
6 do you see that?
I A
Yes, sir, I see that.
8 g.
Did you review those minutes at or 9
ab'out the time you received them?
10 A
I don't recall.
11 Q
Let me show you another document which 12 has been previously marked as B&W Exhibit
~
l3 and we will just fill in the blank later.
O I4 Do you recognize this as a-copy of a 15 letter-written to you by Mr. Rogers in or about July'30, 1975/
A I see that it's sent to me.
It's signed 18 by Lee Rogers.
I see that it's got what I recognize 10 to be my handwriting on the memorandum,.so I believe 20 -.that I received it'and wrote those notes.
ll)
Q Do you see - the second-sentence which 21' says, "This failure prevented valve closing which l caused:overpressurizationofthe 23 -
RCDT and rupture
~
24'
-disk' actuation"?
fy t
5
- see that.
n g
.yes, y
'. l-.
- S g.
'*N A
248 4
I s
Herbein_
3 y-et l
2' Q
D'id you circulate thin letter to the q
r e
.V^
g 3
trainings department at Met Ed?
s 4
I
~4 s'
A I
a,n't tell if I did.
It's difficult
,s g
,t i '
5 for me to make out the distribution of my memorandum.
6 N
MR. FISKE:
Let me just; note for the record that this particular copy of this letter 8
with Mr. Herbein's handwriting has not.been 9
I previously marked, although a copy without
- 10 his handwriting has, so why-don't we mark this 11 as the next B&W exhibit.
12 (Copy.
of a letter dated July 30, 1975 A ~\\
13 to J.
G.
He rb ein from L.
C.
Rogers with T
14 handwriting in the upper right-hand corner
\\
15 marked B&W Exhibit No. 881. fo r 1
1(i
. identification 2s of this.date.)
17 Q
Mr. Herbein, going back to s
the pressurizer
,,Y 18 system-failure p rocedu re for' Unit 2 that we'were 2.
talking (
T 19 about before, did you understand before the y%
s s
1-
- 20 x. accident that that procedure.pru'vided a basis for 3
s N trh operators to distingu$sh-between,a-piidt operated-
~
21
)
\\
i reliefvalve-thatLhadopeneda$diclosedias 22 it was
,?
w
\\
23 supposed to;doas opposed to 'a pilot od, erated relief
[
24 valve that h'ad stuck o' pen'or failed open?'
.(A-). ;
25 Please ask'the.qu,estion again?-
A 1
.h g
i
. p.
F
[ a %.. '%
_ f.
ib 3
249 S'
I IIo rba in 2
MR. FISKE:
Read it back.
fs t
)
Nf 3
(Record read back.)
4-
-Q Going back to the perioil of time, 5
Mr. Herbein, before the accident, and particularly G
the period of time in which you were participating 7
in the preparation or review o f eme rgen cy. procedures,
8 did at-any time during that period you have any 9
understanding as to whether the p re ss uri ze r syntem 10 failure procedure for Unit 2 would enable the 11 operators to distinguish between a pilot operated 12 relief valve that had opened and closed as it was 13 supposed to on the onehand and a pilot operated O
i>
14 relief valve that had stuck open or failed open on 15 the other hand?
16 MR. SELTZER:
This is be fo re t i.e 17 indicator light on Unit 2?
18 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
That's precisely 19 the period I am talking about.
20 A
well, symptom 2 on this procedure, on ggl 21 page 2.0, indicates that an inoperative electromatic 22 relief valve has as a symptom a system pressure below t-23
-2205 and the fact that RC-RV-2 failed to close prior 24 to the installation of the light on Unit 2,
we.had no
,y(.,)
25 real_way to determine that that valve was in fact v
6' ~
!!e rbe in 250 i
2 required to be closed but had failed to close.
A '1
/-
3 We: relied on the light to give us an 4
indication.of the valve position..
5 Q
Well,,did it occur to you, Mr.. IIe rbein,
6 -
before the open PORV transient on March 29, 1978, 7
ithat it would be
- a. good idea to have a procedure f
0 which. enabled-the operators to determine whether or U
not they.had a fa'iled open or stuck open PORV?
-10 A
I think that'particular event brought.
11 into sharp focus the need for a PORV indication,
.and we went to Babcock & Wilcox and asked them 3
for'a device that would'give us a good indication
').
I4 of valvesposition, and they 15 MR. SELTZER:
0.K., he knows that story.,
IG A
asked us to install the light.
17 Q
My question, Mr. IIe rbe in ' --
18 MR. FISKE:
I move to strike the last 19 part of the last. answer.'
20 MR. SELTZER:
Why don't you listen to
- lll 21 the first:part.
I t was fully responsive.
22 Q
My question was directed'to;the period 23 of time be fore the light was installed,.and maybe
' 24 you'could read it back.or I will put ' it: again..
3 4 A.
.'\\_/
. 25 1
MR. SELTZER:
-Let's read it back.
I think-T 1;'
+
a
.5........
7 1
lie rbe in 251 j_q 2
he did answer the question for the period.
\\. 'l' 3
(Record read back.)
4 Q
Itaving heard the question and the answer 5
again, could I ask you now what is the answer to my 6
que s tion ?
7 A
I believe your question is did we know 8
before March 28 that we needed a PORV indicator light
,9 on TMI-27 10 Q
No.
That isn't the question.
11 The point is this, Mr. lie rb e in, and then 12 I will put the question:
13 There was a period of time during which O
\\-
14 procedures were being drafted-for Unit 2 starting, 15 as you said yourself, back in '74 and 1975, going 16 right through the time in 1977 when procedures were 17 finalized.
18 During all of that period of time-there 19 was no' light on Unit 2,
and I am asking you whether 20 during that period of time you thought-that it was gg 21 important that the operators have a procedure which 22 would enable them to tell.whether or not there was
.[
i 23 a failed open,or stuck open PORV.
24 A
Sir, I don't believe.I had any particular
(~h
\\_j 25 reason to focus on that issue, and the time frame 11
c.
..y 1
8 I
Harbein
'252-J2 j.-4 we are talking about, this was a unit that was Q_,i
' l 3
unde r construction.
We hadn't really gone through 4
the operations', 'startup and tes t period, the shakedown 5
period that a plant goes through be fore it goes into i
6 official commercial operation.
7 It was during that shakedown period,-
8 1.e.,.the startup and test pe riod, that we determined 9
things like the need-for additional valve position 10 indication, so the answer to your ' question is 11 there was no real reason to focus on that.
12 Q
When did the plant start operating?
I3 A-I believe criticality would have occurred h%--
14 early-in 1978.
15 Q
And early in 1978 there was no light, 16 correct?
17 A
We didn't put the light in until after 18 the March '78 event.
19 Q
How did you think before the light'was 20
. installed and while the plant was in the early stages h
21 o f its' criticality the operators were supposed-to 22 determine ' whether or not they had an open PORV?.
- l 23 l
~
MR. SELTZERi Objection; asked and-24-on'that answered.
He said he'didn't focus f'/
i A-25
'before the March _29, 1978 event.
.a y
9
I 9
-lie rb e i n 253 2
Q Is that your answer, you didn't think O.,
'v#
3 about that one way or'the other?
4 A
I didn't focus on that before the 5
March '78 event.
6 g-I take it you focused on it after'the 7
March 28, 1979 event?
8 A
I believe in my previous testimony 9
I indicated that our people recognized the need for 10 an indicator light and went to Babcock & Wilcox for 11 the particular type of indication, and we were told 12 to put in the light similar to the one at Davis-Besse.
IO Q
I think we are going to save L a lot of time,
(/).
x.
I4 Mr. Herbein, if you and I understand that every time 15 you say that, I am going to move to strike it, and IG I think you have said iL three times aircady, and 17 if that 's a legitimate thing for you to say, you have 18 said it enough times.
If it isn't a proper thing for 19 you to say under the rules of' evidence, it isn't going 20 to help to keep saying it, so I would j ust like to llh' 21 move on, and unless I ask you a, ques tion tha t is
'22 directed-specifically at that, we are going to save 23 a lot of time if you would just answer my questions.
24 MR. SELTZER:
I thought'what he was
( ~}
25 saying was helpful, in context with what he~was i
6 4
~
~
e o
1 Herbein 254 2
saying and was responsive.
y.
t x /
~ ~ '
3 I will also suggest that now that 4
you have made th.a t point, which I think is 5
important for context, you probably don't have (i
to keep reminding Mr. Fiske of i t.
7 MR. FISKE:
I move to strike it for 8
what I think are fairly obvious reasons.
9 Q
Now, let's continue, Mr. Herbein.
10 You did become aware, did you not, that 11 the light that was installed at Unit 2 was a light 12 which was activated by power to the solenoid?
13 A
I believe that I became aware of that (G
s I4 fact.
15 Q
Did you become aware at any time prior III to the Three Mile Island accidant of anyone at 17 Metropolitan Edison who suggested that it would be 18-desirable to have a light that gave a more direct 19 indication of the-position of the pilot operated
-20 relief valve?
gg)-
21 A
We had no reason to believe that.
We-l 22
- relied.on Babcock & Wilcox.
i i
I I
23 Q
Is the answer to my question no?
24.
A The answer _to your question is no.
(a)'
'25 Q
Prior.to the Three Mile. Island accident,
~
l l
i-
1 I
lie rb e i n 255 l
.,..q _
2 did you know someone by the name o f D.
M.
Shovlin?
/
\\
L)
A Y*8*
3 Q'
Was his position superintendent of 5
maintenance at Three Mile Island Unit 27 g
A As I recall, he was in charge of 7
maintenance for both units.
8 Q
Did you know someone before the g
accident by the t.ame of R.
C.
Noll?
10 A
I knew a Larry Noll.
11 Q
Let me show you a collection of documents 12 that has been marked.B&W Exhibit 767 and ask you 13 whether you saw any of these documents before the n
I l.1 Three Mile Island accident.
15 A
I don't recall ever seeing these 16-documents.
17 Q
Did it come to your attention before 18 the Th ree Mile Island accident that anybody within 19 the Met Ed organization.had made a recommendation 20 that there be installed at Unit 2'a devic $ which 21 would provide a better indication, a more direct 22 indication of PORV position than the light that 4
{
23 was-then installed?
f-21 A
No, it did not, and to put my answer
()
25 in context, we relied _on Babcock & Wilcox for that
- q b
b
'2 I
256 Herbein l-( (g) 2 position indication as I previously stated, lO 1.
3 MR. FISKE:
Well, I am going to move
( -'
4 to strike the answer beginnisig with "to put
(
5 my answer in context."
6 Q
Did it come to your attention at k
}
I any time before the accident, Mr. IIe rb ein, that b
8 anyone at Met Ed was recommending that any kind 9
of a different indication for the position of the 10 valve be supplied to Unit 27 11 A
Sir, I don't believe it did.
12 Q
Is it correct that in terms of your 13 understanding before the accident that when power 11 was put on to the solenoid that that activated a 15 plunger which went down an'd pressed on a' lever 16 which in turn opened the pilot valve to allow the 17 steam to escape?
18 MR. SELTZER:
Doesn'.t the pilot valve 10 open the main valve which allows the steam to 20 escape?,
h.
2I MR. FISKE:
Yes.
1 22 MR. SELTZER:
So you left out a step.
3 MR. FISKE:
Mr. Seltzer has'been helpful.
~
24 Q
Is it correct that as you understood it o,,1
'25 before the accident, the way the pilot' operated relief m.__
_J
3 I
'Herbein 257 2
valve worked in a very general way was that when the 73
'%)
3 power came on, activating the solenoid, the solenoid 4
plunger went down, p ressed - on a lever, which in 5
. turn activated the pilot valve, which in turn li opened the main valve?
7 A
That's true, but operators don't think 8
in that context and I 9
MR.' SELTZER:
Wait a second.
He didn't 10 ask you about that.
11 Q
And you understood, did you not, that 12 when the powe r was on to the solenoid, that then 13 the light would go on, is that correct?
'f%
~')
t ll A
I didn't understand that.
15 Q
You didn't understand that that's 16 the way it worked?
17 A
There is a di f fe ren ce between understanding 18 the way it worked and the way in the course of 19 operations one views indications.
20 Q
Well, that's exactly the difference (h) 21 I am trying to get at, Mr. Herbein.
22 MR. SELTZER: :That's'what I think he l
23 l
is responding to right now.
24 Q
I am asking you not how you construed 5--)
25 the light at the time.
I am asking you as to what r
(
.~_;
258 4
I -
Ilerbein 2
f'}
you unde rstood in fact activated the light, and
%d 3
isn't it correct that what activated the' light _was 4
power going to the solenoid?
5 A
Power going to the solenoid activated 6
the light.
7 Q
And when the light was off, that meant 8
that power was no longer flowing to the solenoid, 9
isn't that correct?
10 A
There is a difference, and the 11 difference is you asked what it meant when the ligh't -
12 was off,and what it meant when the light was off 13 was that the valve in fact was shut.,
gg
(_)
14 Q
You knew, didn't you, that what 15 caused the light to go off was power no longer 16 flowing to the solenoid?
17 MR.-SELTZER:
You mean would energize 18 the circuit to the light?
10 Q
In other words, when power stopped flowing 20 to the solenoid, the-light would go off, isn't ~that g
21 correct?
22 A
It was supposed to work that way, yes.
.i l
23 '
Q
. You knew -be fore the accident, didn't i
5 24 you, Mr..Herbein, that there could be mechanical
/
25 problems with'the valve that could cause it_to stay
5 1
Ilarbein 259 I
1 2
'open even though power was no longer flowing to the
/~T A
c 3'
solenoid?
4 MR. S E LT Z1s R :
Are you asking him is that 5
something he thought about before the Three 6-Mile Island accident?
7 MR. FISKE:
Something that he knew.
8 MR. SELTZER:
Knew because he focused 9
his mental powers on.that, right?
10 MR. FISKE:
I don't want to draw a-11 lot of fine semantical lines 12 MR. SELTZER:
I.am asking you to say 13 is this something he thought about.
/~ Y k-)
14 A
Sir, when my speedometer says I am going 15 50 miles an hour, I believe it can fail.
I believe 16 there is a di re ct parallal, a direct tie between 17 what I have stated and what I was discussing.. We 18 believed that that light told'us that'the valve 19 was open or-the valve was closed.
20 Now you are asking me in the context' 1
'21 of the entire Three Mile Island accilent to go 9
22 back and ' review whether I in some fashion or form j
l 23 went through.the diagnostic process as a vice president 24 of gene ration to develop in my own mind the fact that-
-m qf
. 25.
since this solenoid was an* opener of the valve and in e
ee-c
'6 I
Ite rbe in 260 2
fact tied to-a position indication light that 7~
N.<'
3 I recognized that the position indication light 4
'could in fact be off when there was power on the 5
-solenoid, I can't recall that I ever had occasion 6
to go through that kind of developmental logic.
7 Q
Would you have expected from your 8
. managerial position that there would be brought to 9
the attention of the training department and the 10 operators situations
'in which the pilot operated 11 relief valve had stuck open for mechanical reasons?
12 MR. SELTZER:
I object to the hypothetical 13 nature of that.
If you want to ask him did he wJ I4 think about that before'the accident, I will 15 perntt him to answer it.
16 A.
I don't resull that I did.
17 Q
Would you have. expected there to be 18 procedures in effect for the training department 19 to be advised of situations in which actual 20 experience with the light showed that it didn't g
21 indicate the position of the valve?
22 MR. SELTZER:
I have-the same i-tjection 23 I made before.
It's hypothetical.
24 A
I would have expected that those
_)
25 procedures were in place, and, in fact, quite heavily
-.w-
261 "7
1 Herbein 2
involved the site B&W team who was tied back to the 3
front office in Lynchburg and in turn able and 4
ready to tie directly into our plant :s i t e the 5
experiences that were present at other B&W plant ti sites in this~particular
- regard, i.e.,
PORV 7
difficulties.
8 Q
I am talking about procedures, l
f 9 i Mr. Herbein, whereby Mot Ed would bring to the l
l 10 attention of the Met Ed training department experiences 11 on the Met Ed PORV at the Met Ed Unit 2 which 12 indicated that the Met Ed light did not accurately 13 indicate the position of the Met Ed valve or the 14 valve on the Met Ed unit?
15 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
There is no Iti foundation that Mr. Herbein was aver informed 17 that there was such an incident at Unit 2 or 18 that he thought about the hypothetical 19 possibility of a valve failing and its failure 20 not being indicated by the light.
g9 21 MR. FISKE:
You may answer the l
22 question.
23 A
My answer is very similar to the one 24 jI just gave you.
The site team was there.
We relied 25 on the site team to help us with things that were D
8 I
lie rbe in 262 k
2 directly related to the nuclear s team sunnly systems.
l
,_(I
'~'
3 B&W was involved with that.
They had 4
inp u t to the site training program and into the various 5
de pa rt me n t s in Met Ed, and the
- opportunity was
)
G certainly there, and wa relied on them to provide us 7
with that kind of information.
8 Q
To the exclusion of your own people?
9 A
In a commentary fashion, certainly not 10 to exclude our own people.
They were part of the team.
11 We relied heavily on them.
We relied on their 12 technical expertise and detailed knowledge of B&W's 13 knowledge of pressurized water systems.
ll Q
I take it nobody at Het Ed brought to 15 your attention the fact that t.he re had been an 16 eve.nt in November 1978 in which the pre ss u re reached 17 the setpoint at which the valve was supposed to 18 open, the power went on to the solenoid, the light 10 went on, and the valve remained closed?
20 A
I don't recall tha t that was brought 21 to my attention.
ggg 22 Q
M r.
Herbein, you re ferred to an 5-23 incident in March 1978 when the pilot operated relief 24 valve failed to open, is that correct?
_)
25 A.
Yes, that is correct.
We w
I e
9 1
lie rbe in 263 2
MR. SELTZER:
Just wait until he asks 3
you a question.
4 Q
Do you know whether an investigation 5
was conducted by GPUSC of that event?
6 MR. SELTZER:
When you say " investigation,"
7 what do you mean, a full blown task force?
8 Q
Do you know whether anyone at GPUSC was 9
asked by Met Ed to review the events in that transient?
10 A
Sir, I believe we may have, but there 11 were other transients that we asked the service 12 company to come in and help us review.
13 I know specifically they helped us on e
14 4/23/78.
I am not sure if they helped us on the 15 March '78 transient or not.
16 Q
Do you remember Mr. Wilson at GPUSC 17 being asked to conduct an in ve s ti g a t io n into that 18 transient?
19 A
I don't specifically remember that.
l 20 That is not to say that it didn't happen.
g 21 Q
At any time before the Three Milo.
l 22 Island accident, Mr. Herbein, did it come to your il 23 attention that there had been any incidents at Unit 2 i
l 24 involving the closing of the discharge valves on the I
l condensate 25 polishers?
0 1
264 1
flo rbe in l
l f
2
- )
A Sir, I remember that there was an s
3 incident where an operator went into the control i
4 cabinet on the Unit 2 polishers and thought he 5
went for the light switch but threw another 6
switch which completely isolated the polishers.
7 I vaguely remember that particular incident, and I 8
believe I was made aware of that in close proximity 9
to the time it occurred and I further believe that 10 that happened in the '78 time frame, 11 Q
Do you remember learning of a 12 transient at Unit 2 in the spring of 1978 which 13 resulted from water from the service air lines I4 getting into the instrument air lines and causing 15 the valves to close?
M A
I don't remember that one, sir.
17 Q
Let me show ycu a document which has 18 been marked Exhibit B &il 166, a copy of a memorandum 19 from Mr. Zewe to Mr. Seelinger dated May 1978.
20 Do you want to take a moment to look at g
21 that?
22 A
I have the document before me that you ll 23 l re ferred to from Bill Zowe to Jim Seelinger.
24 Q
Did you see that document at any time 25 before the Three Mile Island accident?
1
-1 He rbei n 265 2
A No, I don't believe I did.
,7-
~
3 Q
Did it come to your attention at any 4
time before the Three Mile Island accident that 5
Mr. Zewe had made any of the three recommendations 6
which appear at the bottom of that page?
7 A
I generally remember that someone prior 8
to the Three Mile Island accident thought it 9
would be a good idea to have the automatic actuation 10 of COV-12 in the event of high polisher differential.
11 That particular item corresponds to N o.~ 1 of the 12 Bill Zewe recommendations on the 5/15/78 memo to 13
'Seelinger.
- r'T 14 However, I don't recall any of the other 15 items which are listed.
16 Q
Did it coma to your attention before the 17 accident that anyone had expressed concern that unless 18 something was done about a problem involving water 19 in the instrument air lines that a very serious 20 accident could occur?
ggg 21 A
Sir, I am not sure where you get the 22 connotation " accident," but no one did give me 23 ' ' that information or make me aware of that concern.
[
24 Q
Now, there was an automatic bypass, was
/
' 25 -
there not, on Unit'17
._/
Y
l 266 l
2 1
lierbein l
2 A
Yes, sir, there is a high differential
!)
3 signal that opens a demineralizer bypass valve on 4
Unit 1.
5 Q
How soon after May 15, 1978 did it come 6
to your attention that someone was r e co mme n ding 7
that the same kind of automatic bypass valve be 8
installed on Unit 27 9
MR. SELTZER:
I don't think he testified 10 that it was after May
'78.
You are making 11 the assumption that the only catalyst for 12 his learning about that suggestion was Zewe's 13 memo, which might be correct.
p_
/
14 MR. FISKE:
I am willing to assume 15 that that's a fair assumption based on prior 16 testimony by otbar witnesses, but if you want 17 me to rephrase it, I will be happy to.
18 THE WITNESS:
Yes, please rephrase it.
19 Q
When did it first come to your attention lthat s o me o'n e was recommending that there be an 20 gy 21 automatic bypass valve for the condensate polishers 22 on Unit 27 I'
i 3
23 A
I don't recall.
t 24 Q
What action did you take, Mr. Herbein, 25 to see to it that that recommendation was followed i
e
3-I licrbein 267 2
through to its conclusion?
d,eT 3
MR. SELTZER:
Objection; there is 4
no foundation.
5 A
I just stated that I told you I was 6
generally awa re of some concerns at Three Mile 7
Island regarding the needs for a bypass valve at 8
Unit 2 around the demineralizers that would be 9
actuated on a differential-pressure signal or some 10 automatic device, but I in no way had knowledge 11 that some accident could be caused or initiated by 12 the absence of such an automatic feature.
13
,g Q
Were you aware of any steps that were
'u]
14 taken before the Three Mile Island accident to try 15
'to resolve that recommendation?
III MR. SELTZbt:
Could we-hcar that again?
17 (Question read back.)
'18 A
Not specifically, but I know'that the 19 Three Mile Island staff had a variety of problem-20 reports and field questionnaires that they were able ll) 21 to submit when they had specific concerns about the 22 design or operation of the plant.
t 23 Q
I am not asking you about the general 24 procedures.
I am asking you if you know anything
.. \\
p 25 -,specifically that was done on this particular problem.
ll
[
4 1
Ite rb e i n 268 2
A
.I can't recall now that I know that.
i 3
.Q Mr. Herbein, I would like to ask you a 4
few questions about the training department at 5
Met Ed, if we can switch gears for a second.
6 (Recess taken.)
7 BY MR. FISKE:
8 Q
Mr. He rb ein, directing your attention 9
to the period September 1977 through the date of 10 the accident, is it correct that Mr. Troffer 11' reported to you during that period of time?
12 A
It's correct that Mr. Troffer reported 13 to me.
14
.Q Did the head of the training department 15 at Met Ed report to Mr. Troffer during that period 16 of time?
17 A
That's true.
18 Q
.Did you yourself take an interest in 19 the performance of the training departnent during 20 that period of time?
ggg 21 A
I was interested-in the training function 22 at Met Ed.
Obviously that's an-important function 23-
.and as.vice president generation, I-was concerned I
it.
24 l about
-m) 25 Q
Were you satisfied during-that period
269 5
g Herbein
/
).
2 of time that there were enough instructors in
-s t,_) :
3 the training department to provide the kind of f
4 training that you felt the operators should receive i
5 at Met Ed?
I i
6 A
At the time I thought we.had sufficient I
l 7
number of instructors and would point out that i
8 the number of instructors we had then for operators 9
and auxiliary operators was not' appreciably different 10 from what we have now.
I 11 Q
How many instructors did you have 12 in the training department during the period September 13
'77 through the Three Mile I sland accident?
O
%s 14 A
Are you speaking now in the whole 15 training department or are you speaking for operators 16 or just what are you re ferring to?
17 Q
That's a fair question.
For operators, 18 both licensed and unlicensed.
19 A
I believe that we probably had four or 20 five people that focused on the operator licensed 1
ggg 21 and non-operator licensed training programs for 22 Unit 2.
23 Q
Did you ever become aware of a request 24 from anybody in the training department during that' O
r _J 25
' period of time to have more instructors?
\\
6 1
!!c rbe in 270 2
A I can't specifically recall that kind 3
of a request, but I know that all of the departments 4
within the generation function were interested in 5
adding additional people at budget time.
That's ti typical of any organization, i.e.,
the development of 7
new programs and desire to have more people.
8 Q
Well, I am not asking you, again, about f
9 the general practice, 10 I am asking you specifically about 11 the training department.
l 12 Do you remember at any time in this
{
13 period, September '97 to the date of the accident, 14 a specific request from the training department l
15 that they be allowed to add more instructors for i
l(i the training of licensud and unlicensed operators?
17 A
I indicated I generally recall that 18 all of the departments wanted to add people 19 when we assembled the annual budget, so I believe 20 that probably the Three Mile Island training ggy 21 department would show as requesting additional people 22 at budget time during this '77-79 time frame.
i 23 Q
What was the reason which they gave 24 for wanting more instructors?
25 (Record read back.)
i
'l t
7 g
Herbein 271
-2 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
There is no t
i
, v/
f un da ti n that he has a recollection of the 3
training department's specific request as 4
5 distinct from every unit at budget time 6
. gene rally wanting more staff.
7 MR. FISKE:
I guess that is specifically 3
what I was trying to find out, Mr. Seltzer.
9 -
MR. SELTZER:
Well, you had a rather 10 blique way of doing it.
11 MR. FISKE:
I thought I was kind of 12 direct.
13 Q
D you want to answer the question,
' /'h IV y
Mr. Herbein?
15 A
As I previously stated, many of the
~16 dep ar t me nt s in'-the Met Ed generation wanted to add
-17 people, and I believe that very probably the Three 18 Mile Island. training department wanted toLadd' people 19 also,_and_this'came to my knowledge on an annual 20 basis at budget time.
~
21 Q
My question was, what were the 22 re asons that they gave for wanting more people?.
23
_A I can't-recall.specifically, but.I could
'24 probably speculate fairly-accurately' what the reasons 25 would'be.
272 8
I lie rbe i n 2
Q Well, I don't think anybody is
,l 3
interested in that.
4 Did you reject those requests?
5 A
I don't know that I specifically ever 6
rejected on a personal basis particular departments' 7
requests for additional personnel.
O But we went through a fairly complex 9
process that evolved from a general consensus first 10 among supervisors, then managers, and ultimately 11 myself on the personnel priorities; which meant 12 that if a hundred people were requested, we 13 didn't necessarily include a hundred people in the I4 budget addition.
15 Q
Did it ever come to your attention 16 that people in the training department were saying 17 that unless they got more instructors, they didn't 18 think they could do the proper job in training your 19 operators?
20 A
You are asking me did that come to my gg) 21 attention?
.i
).
22 Q
Yes.
j, i
23 i
A I don't know that.it specifically did in I
24 the context which,I believe you are inferring that 25 it may have.
9 1
IIe rbe i n 273 l
2 Q
Now, in September 1977, Mr. Zechman
\\
3 was made acting supervisor of the training 4
department, is that correct?
5 A
I am not sure.
6 Q
Well, there came a time when he was 7
made acting supervisor, right?
O A
That's true.
9 Q
Who did he replace as head of the 10 training department?
11 MR. SELTZER:
You mean whom did he 12 succeed? -
13 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
A
-)
14 A
Well, Jim Seelinger initially was 15 quite heavily involved in the Three Mile Island 16 training program and did a lot of work on Unit 1 17 and Unit 2 initial programs.
He was relieved by.
18 Mr. Tsaggaris and I believe when we moved Mr.
19 Tsaggaris into corporate training as manager of 20 Met Ed trainingi Mr. Zechman was installed on an gg,-
acting basis as the acting supervisor training at 21 ~
22 Three Mile Island.
U Q
Did you ' participate in that decision?
24 A
Yes, I'm su're I did.
)
, )-
25-Q A year.later Mr..Zechman was made 1
0 1
Herbein 274 2
s up'e rvis o r, was -he no t?
t i
3 A
Yes, I believe that's correct.
4 Q
And did you participato in that de cis io;a ?
5 A
I am sure that I was made aware of the 6
proposed moves with regard to Mr. Zechman and 7
having been made aware, indicated my concurrence.
O Q
Did you think that the person who was 9
the head of the training department should be 10 a licensed operator?
11 A
I believe I may have indicated it would 12 he good for Dick Zechman to get an SRO license.
P 13 Q
We re you aware of the fact that during esO I4 the approximately one year when he was serving 15 as acting supervisor that Mr. Zechman was spending 16 substantial amoun t of his tine studying and being a
17 trained to obtain a license instead of' spending that 18 amount'of time running the training department?
19 MR. SELTZER _ You mean his. time studying 20 for the_ license-was-taking time ~away from what g
21'
'he would have otherwise 'de vo'te d to the-22 training department?
23 -
l MR. FISKE:
Yes.-
24 A-I wouldn't state it'in that context.
m
}
/'
- 25 -
I believefI knew that'Zechman was spending some period a-9 g
y
-m apt--
m y
3 1
Ila rbe i n 275 2
of time working on a license, and I believe that 3
Marshall Beers was assisting with the training 4
in such a way that the time Dick waa spending on 5
license activities wouldn't detract from the 6
training effort.
7 Q
Isn't it a fact, Mr. li e rbe in, that 0
Mr. Beers didn't join the Met Ed training department 9
until some time in the summer of 19787 10 A
I can't really recall the time frames 11 that these events took place.
12 I,
just to the best of my ability, 13 can give you my recollection of particular 14 circumstances.
15 g
I am talking now about the time 16 period while Mr. Zechman hela the pocition of acting 17 supervisor which is roughly September '77 to roughly IO September
'78, and I guess the question I asked 19 before, which I am not sure has been completely 20 answered is, did you understand that the time that
({;-
21 he was spending on his own personal studying and 22 training was taking a substantial amount of time 23
,away from what he would otherwise have devoted to l
24 I the responsibilities of running the training I
25 department?
,. g,_. _.
,m
- y
'I 1
y
\\
276 2
1 IIe rbe in c~/,
4 4
'2 A
I don't bo licv,e tita t I had particular
%.)'T 3
occasion'to develop that understanding.
- s 4
I might add that Kr. Zechman had been
\\
5 with the company for a numoer of years and had been k.,
(i assigned to Three, Mile 191and,and,in my opinion 1
ef-dis' assignment had 7
at least,in the cource
't
's.
q
<w s
'y 1
4 8
, developed a' fair degree of knowledge about the g'\\
s s
I 9
facility'and'how it operated, and.I also. feel Dick 10 had'apretty)goodhandle on the reactor technology t
5 1
t 11 and the core physics and particularly the 4
.h 12 reactor side of the operation at Three Mile Island,
)
13
'so it dfdn ' t 'see m to me that asking Dick to obtain D
(
d 5
senior libase would have had an undue impact 14 a
s b
s
% 5 L, g.
15 w or created'tproblems with the administration of the I' h
.+
t2 1(i training program.
l ?-
.i
'i; y 1 l17 Q
Did you understand that Mr. Zechman,,
/
4 N A t
f t
- +
r.,
e
[18 as you p'itkit,had a pretty good handle g
.s N
the,\\
l on how
)l s'
' ' 19,j.-deactor worked?
\\.,
4 2,
A i
J y(
20, A -
In my opinion, h,e did,-yes.
s s3
-s -
'e s,
y g
21
- Q Did you thdorstand he.had a pretty-4 s
o 22 -h good hand 1'e'on the operating and emergency procedures E
)h hat-were 23 used to run the reactor?
(
e) n 3
4' 24
..T i s- $
, A' I wouldn't go so far as to say*that.
3 as.
- - g' i
V 5
T(-
--~.,5
.25 My; remarks were neant to be fairly ge'neral.
Q 'n.
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- 3 1
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' ( D,_~
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l
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277
'3 1
flo rbe in 2
and applied to the amount of time that Dick spent at Three Mile Island and his basic background from 3
4 Penn State and knowledge in the reactor theo ry 5
and the reactor technology.
6 Q
Did it make any dif fe rence to you
\\
7 in selecting someone who was going to run the 1'
8 training department whether that person had any 9
familiarity with the operating and emergency 10 procedures?
11 A
I am not cure I understand that question.
12 Certainly someone who is going to run 13 the training department would have to have some x/
14 familiarity and knowledge of the station procedures.
15 Q
Did you understand that Mr. Zechman had Iti that requisite understanding?
17 A
I just stated previously that I felt 18 that Dick had a good knowledge of reactor technology.
19 I can't specifically state just what he knew about 20 the emergency procedures at Three Mile Island.
21 Q
In September
'78, Mr. Zechman was g
l 22 promoted to the position of supervisor as we I
23 l indicated before.
I 24 l
MR. SELTZER:
Well, he had been acting 25 supervisor previously, so I don't know if it's
278 4
g florbain 2
a promotion.
3 Q
He was given the official designation 4
of supervisor, is that a better way to put it, 5
Mr. Herbein?
6 A
Sir, if your records indicate that 7
that's the time the change in title took place, 8
I have no reason to believe that it didn't occur 9
then.
10 I don't have the specific knowledge that 11 can put a particular date on when that occurred.
12 Q
Did you understand at the time that 13 decision was made, Mr. Zechman still did not have his 14 license?
15 A
I believe that I generally understood 16 that, yes.
17 Q
Did you understand at the time that 18 decision was made that Mr. Zechman,was going to be 19 relieved of any responsibilities for running the 20 department in order that he could study and be trained gg) 21 full-time in order to try to obtain h i:s license?
2P A
I believe I had that understanding.
[
23 Q
From a point of view of management, 24 Mr. Herbein, did you think that it was a desirable ll).
25 thing to have the person who was the head of the
c 279 5
I Ilarbein 2
training department spending full time being
_ ]
3 trained by the people in the training department 4
he was supposed to be
- z. u p e r vi s in g ?
5 A
I think I have indicated previously that (i
with Dick's background and knowledge, I didn't see 7
that there was a particular problem with trying d
to get Dick up to speed to the point where he could 3
take a senior reactor operator's license, and I saw 10 no reason that we were creating a hardship on the 11 training department by having Dick spend several weeks, 12 a month or two, making final preparations to sit for a 13 license.
1
~.A I4 Q
And it's a fact, isn't it, Mr. Herbein, 15 that as of the date of the Three Mile Island accident, Ili he still had not receivud his license?
II A
I think that's a fact.
18 Q
And it's e fact, isn't it, that in the 19 fall of 1978, he took the examination for the senior 20 reactor operator's license and didn't pass?
jh) 21 A
That's true, t
22 l
Q After that event occurred, was any i
23
! change made in the situation where Mr. Zechman,instead t
24 o'f running the training department, was spending full
_/
25 time studying as a trainee?
I i
-6 I
lierbein 280
]
2
. f-s MR. SELTZER:
I didn't understand that k.
3 question.
4 (Question read back.)
5 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
There is no
)
6 foundation that Zechman was not running the 7
training department.
8 MR. FISKE:
I think Mr. Zechman's 9
testimony is good enough foundation.
10 MR. SELTZER:
I don't ha ve that in front 11 of me and the witness doesn't ha ve that in front 12 of him.
IU MR. FISKE:
I will take my chances on O
14 the foundation.
15 Q
Do you want to hear the question again, 16 Mr. Herbein?
17 A
Are you asking me was I aware that 18 Zechman af ter he flunk'ed his' fall '78 exam was 19 working full time on studying for a license?
20 Q
Yes, instead of running the training ll}
21 department.
22 A.
The thing that is giving me the problem
~
l 23 that instead of running the training department, 24 indicating thatLthe inference there that we took the~
(~h
\\
\\
(_)
25 person in charge and sent him off to work on a l
i I
7;
'l lierbein 281-2 license while someone else-ran the program, I don't g-
\\>
3 know>that that inference is necessarily correct.
4-Q Is that something that you wouldn't have
~
5-done?
6 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
There'is no 7
foundation that it's something that Mr. Herbein r
1 8
considered, and there is no ~ foundation that 9
he thought about that issue before the accident.
10 I don't want him to consider today whether that 11 is an action he would have taken back then.
12 MR. FISKE:
Fine, let's just find out.
13 Q
Are you testifying, Mr. Herbein, that you O
14 weren't aware-in the position that you held 15 whether or not between the period September '78 and 16 the day of.the accident someone else for all-practical 17 purposes was running.the training department 18 instead of Mr. Zechman?
4 19 A
I think I indicated previously that
't 20 during the time that Dick was involved with the S
'lgg 21-license preparation, and I'am not sure whether that 22 wasbe fore or after:he failed to. pass his'first 23
' examination, that we 'had liarshall' Beers standing in 24
.and, for all practical. purposes, ; taking care of the
- p.s
.'k-25
-day-to-day' operation of-th'e department.'-
.I indicated 4
e
~.,
e v--
4 h-v' r +-
'4--
r
- -e
l.
8 1
IIorbain 282 2
that previously.
I am fairly certain I did.
3 I would state with regard to Mr.
4 Zechman having failed to make it on the first exam, 5
yes, I believe I was aware of that.
I believe that 6
I was aware that we afforded him the time to get 7
himself up to speed for a retty at that exam, 8
and it's I think probably reasonable to state 9
that that took place in this Septenber through March 10 time frame, i.e.,
9/78 through 3/79.
11 Q
Now, during this period of time in July, 12 August '78 through the day of the accident, 13 Mr. Beers held the position of group supervisor 14 for licensed training, did he not?
15 A
I don't recall his specific title.
IG It sounds like that would be the pa rticular title 17 that he may have held.
.18 If you tell me that that's the case, 19 I will accept that.
20 Q
You knew there were two group 21 supervisors, one for licensed training and one for 22 non-licensed training, didn't you?
23 A
I probably knew.that.
24.
Q Who did you understand was doing, r~~
.(_)
25 Mr. Beers' job as group supervisor of licensed training
~
'9 1
!!arbein 2
while he was doing Mr. "echman' job as head of the
\\'d 3
department?
4 A
I. don't know that I have an answer to 5
that or that it would make sense that Mr. Beeru 6
would have to be replaced, that he wouldn't have 7
been fulfilling both functions.
8 Q
He would be doing both jobs?
9 A
That is a possibility.
I can't recall 10 '
at that time whether someone was specifically designated 11 to fulfill his other function or not.
12 Q
In terms of your understanding, 13 Mr. Herbein, as to what capability the head of t.he
(~\\
A,,/
14 training department should have at Met Ed, would 15 you have expected the person who is head of the 16 training department at Met Ed to know on which' side 17 of the neatup/cooldown curves an operator was supposed 18 to stay on?
19 MR. SELTZER:
I object.
This sounds 20' very hypothetical.
This isn't something 21 that ~ Mr. Herbein thought of before the 22 accident and you are just asking him to make 23 some logical deduction.today.
That is'not the i
24
. way we have conducted discovery.in this case.
(~T 25 MR..FISKE:
What I am asking, Mr. Seltzer,
%J v
- w
00 1
284 4
Herbein 4l 2
is Mr. Herbein'a understanding of the
_s.
3 qualifications of the person that was 4
selected to be head of the training I
5 department in Met Ed and I certainly think 6
it's a fair ques tion aus to whether he thought I
the person who was head of the traini'ng 0
department should be able to know which side 0
of the curve,the heatup/cooldown curve, an l'
10 operator should s tay on.
11 MR. SELTZER:
All I am saying is if 12 there is a foundation that Mr. Herbein thought 13 about whether the head of training thought I4 about what side of the heatup/cooldown curve 15 people should be on, fine.
16 Why don't you operate from thdt premise 17 first.
18 2
You go ahead, Mr. Herbein.
IO A
If you would'like me to talk.about' 20 that heatup/cooldown curve and j us t how many curves gg 21 are in fact illustrated on a single diagram and the-
'22 input we got from B&W to create that heatup and 23.
cooldown curve, I would be glad to talk abo a.'that 24 and shed that in the perspective one.might wish to
()
25 discuss when we-talk ~about who should know about'
01 1
Herbein 2
the heatup and cooldown curve.
That's an extremely O
3 complex curve.
4 Q
Let's just talk about the net positive 5
suction head curve.
l 1
6 Do you understand what I am talking 7
about?
Do you understand the curves I am talking 8
about?
9 A
I believe you are talking about the 10 net positive suction head curve on the reactor 11 cooldown pump.
12 Q
Would you expect the person who was head 13 of the training department at Met Ed to know 11 which side of that curve an operator should stay on 15 in following whatever procedures that curve appeared?
16 A
We would have to get specifically into 17 the curve, the way it was displayed, the ordinate 18 and abscissa, the instructions that went along with 19 it.
Certainly there are a number of ways to view 20 that net positive suction head curve.
And a number g.
21 of inferences that can be made from that, such,as 22 being to the right of that curve indicated there 1
i i
]was 23 steam in the loops or not, a number of thin gs 24 lthat could be drawn from looking at that curve,
()
25 and it's not very simply stated that well, it's a
A
'02 1
Herbein 286 2
single curve and there is a --
' ( )..
MR. SELTZER:
I think you have pointed out successfully that these hypothetical 4
questions.are not an easy way to proceed, and g
that's why they are not a proper way to proceed.
7 Q
Didn't you personally, Mr. Herbein, g
unde rs tand be fore the Three Mile Island accident that an operator was supposed to try to maintain the g
10 pressure / temperature relationship on one side or
.the other of the net positive suction head curve in 11 12 following whatever procedures that curve was contained in?
g3
()
g.g MR. SELTZER:
So you are positing as 15 part of the assumption.that the operator is 16 in a point in an evolution where it is 17 appropriate to oe applying a procedure which 18 has one of those curves?
19 MR. FISKE:
Sure, yes.
20 MR. SELTZER:
Yes, when he has got the curve out, the procedure'out, he is looking og
).
~
22 at the curve, the simple question is, did'you, 23 Mr. Herbein, in that situation know which side 24 of the curve you were supposed to t ry :.to stay on?
25 A
The reason I hesitate on the question is 5
03 1
Itcrbein 287 l
2 that I think back to the heatup and cooldown curve 3
and these curves were not that simple.
There were 4-a number of curves that were 5
Q No, I am just talking about the net 6
positive suction head curve.
7 A
But I don't believe that that curve 8
was a single curve displayed on a single ordinate 9
and abscissa with accompanying instructions that 10 very clearly delineated just where one was supposed 11 to be and not to be.
12 I believe that the curve that we are 13 talking aboet, the one that was in the procedures, (G
_)
la had to do with fuel clad ~ compression limits, had 15 to do with limitations on the decay heat heat exchanger, 16 had at one point to do with the NDT limits that were 17 applied to the PORV that in turn had a variable 18 setpoint.
19 There were other limitations that I am 20 not able to fully ' expound upon without the curve r,
21 in front of me, but.these curves were not simple 22 curves, and these we re the curves that were provided 23 to us by Babcock & Wilcox and they' we ren ' t the 24 easiest: things to interpret or operate with.
,a()
25' Q
Let'me show you a document.,.Mr. Herbein,
288 04 1
tie rbe in 2
which has been marked ueW Exhibit 261 which is a 7.x c - ;
)
v.
3 copy of the reactor coolant pump operation 4
procedure, and I j ust direct your attention 5
to a page that has the heatup/cooldown curve on it.
i 6
MR. SELTZER:
Do you have any better 7
copies of this?
l 8
THE WITNESS:
No, it's all right.
9 Q
I am pointing your attention specifically, 10 Mr. Herbein, to the curves, the net positive suction 11 head curves, which I believe are the two curves 12 which occur on the right-hand side of the chart.
13 Do you see those?
14 A
I see two curves on the right-hand 15-side of the chart, sir, but I also see the complexity 16 of the curve that is prcaented before me, and-it's 17 been some time since I was at the Babcock & Wilcox IO simulator and actually had an opportunity to-19 utilize this procedure on the machine and I'would 20 state that it's a simple, clear, concise ordinate and 21 abscissa circumstances where one~immediately 22 unde rs tands 'j us t how the curve is supposed to be 1
'23 used.
l 24 I see a ve ry complex curve with a rh (j.
25 1
number of points and a ' number - of instructional 1
^
\\
05 I
!!c rbe in 2
memorabilia that are required to be interpreted n
ins}
3 in order to utilize this curve.
4 This is not something that is extremely 5
simple or intuitively obvious to one who doesn't 6
operate with this curve on a routine basis.
7 Q
Can you tell us whether you know which
'8 side of those two curves the operator was supposed 9
to stay on?
10 MR. SELTZER:
During evolutions to 11 which this procedure on reactor coolant 12 pump operation was applicable?
I3 MR. FISKE:
Yes. All this is on the O'
\\_/
ll assumption that the operator is inta the 15 procedure, he has got the curve out, and the 16 question is, now that I am looking at this 17 curve, which side of the curve am I 18 supposed to stay on.
19 Q
Did you know before the accident,.
20 Mr._Herbein, which side of the curve the operator 21' was supposed to stay on under'those circumstances?
22 l
MR. SELTZER:
Do you have another copy 23-og this?
~
24 Q
You can take as long as you want to
~
25 study.it, Mr. Herbein.
9 J
LO6-
'l Herbein 290 r
2 MR. FISKE:
I think the record should 3
indicate that Mr. Herbein has been looking 4
at this curve for a couple of minutes.
5 A
Let's clarify that the curve that I am 6
looking at in these two procedures is di f fe ren t.
had been given b
7 On the one hand I 8
Q I am only showing you one curve, 9
Mr. Herbein.
It's the net positive suction head 10 curve which is page 1663 in Exhibit 261.
That's the 11 one you have had in front of you all this time.
12 MR. SELTZER:
I think that might be 1683 13 which only shows how illegible the page
()
I4 is which you have given the. witness to try
~
15 to puzzle out.
16 Q
I think tha curve.is very clear.
II A
The curve is not clear.
18 This is an illegible diagram. There are 19 three curves illustrated here that are in relatively 20
,close proximity.
It's difficult to determine gj just which one of these is the NPSH curve.
22 Q
I have told you they are the two on'the=
23~
, right-hand side.
24 A
Well, all right, I-would say that
. [~] ;
25 staying to the left of the NPSH curve _would~be the N/.
b e
4 s
-+r
.-n r
I v-
291 07 I
IIe rbe in
'2
,.4 correct way to go.
R.)
3 Q
Isn't it correct that you would 4
expect the head of the training department at 5
Met Ed to know which side of the not positive 6
suction head curve the operators should stay on?
I A
Not really.
I think that's an un f air i
0 characterization and analogy.
This is a difficult 9
set of curves.
It's not an awful lot more on it 10 than NPSH as we stated previously.
We have got NDT 11 limits here.
We have got heatup and cooldown math 1,
that we were to follow.
We have got probably some 13 limits on here due to the decay heat system, heat 14 exchanger design characteristics.
We probably got some 15 things on here that have to do with control rod
^
16 drive, the temperature / pressure limits.
.It's an 17 extremely complex set of curves to follow, so I think IO it's a little unfair to state that it's intuitively 19.
obvious in this particular circums tance j us t 'where one 20 was' supposed to operate and,'you know, unless someone
- 21 ggg had a good bit of experience using these curves, why, I think it's unfair to make it seem as simple 23 as you have attempted to outline it.
1 24
-Q Would you expect the head of the training gx
(,)
25 department at~ Met Ed.to be aware of situations at P
08 1
Herbein 292 i '
2 Met Ed in which ECCS had been automatically ry b
3 actuated?
4 A
To be aware of situations in which ECCS 5
had been automatically actuated?
6 Q
Yes.
7 MR. SELTZER:
I didn't understand that 8
question.
9 MR. FISKE:
Let me start again.
10 Q
Would you expect the head of the training
-11 department at Met Ed to be aware of transients at 12 Met'Ed in which the ECCS system was automatically 13 actuated?
p(d'
[4 A
Not particularly.
15 Q
Would you expect the training department 16 in general to be aware of thoso?
17 A
Not necessarily.
18 MR. FISKE:
I have got to run up to 19 Court, so we have got to stop.
But I told 20 Mr. Burns that we wouldn't have any problem f
21 finishing. tomorrow.
22
.(Time noted:
4:20 p.m.)
23 JOHN G.
HERBUIN
- 24
~
Subscribed and sworn to (x
before me this day
([
25
- of 1982.
H 9
r t
109 1
293 i
CERTIFICATE o
,n.
o
\\_/-
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
3
- ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 I,
NANCY A.
RUDoLPn a Notary 5
Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the continued deposition of 7
JOHN G.
HERBEIN was taken before 6
July 1,
1982 me on consisting 9
of pages through I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within transcript is a true record of said testimony; N
That I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties..nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor-am I in the employ of any of the counsel.
18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 19 hand thi's' /d day of July 1982.
20 21 92 h
u NANCY-
[RUDOLPH
[
21.
, ib 25
~
9
10 l
1 O
i I
I NDE X WITNESS PAGE John G.
Herbein 187 E X 11 1 B I T S B&W FOR IDENT.
d 880 Multipage document entitled 222 "Three Mile-Island Nuclear Station Unit #1 Ecergency Procedure 1202-29 Pressurizer System Failure" dated 6/02/75,
,y Revision 2 881 Copy of a letter dated July 30, 248 1975 to J.
G.
Herbein from l
L.
C.
Roge rs with handwriting 3
in the upper right-hand corner
' O 8
8 9
L e
1 1
r r
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,