ML20072H894
| ML20072H894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1982 |
| From: | Macmillian J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-05, TASK-06, TASK-1, TASK-10, TASK-2, TASK-5, TASK-6, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290800 | |
| Download: ML20072H894 (190) | |
Text
. _ _ _ _ _.
dab 134 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
~
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, t'
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, D,'
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and l
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683 (R.O.)
_against-
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i j
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and
{
J.
RAY McDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
(
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x Continued deposition of JOHN HENRY
\\, '1 MacMILLAN, taken by Plaintiffs,. pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Esgs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Thursday, June 10, 1982, at 9:40 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles Shapiro, a certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York, n,.
s 8306290800 820610 PDR ADDCK 05000289 7
PDR l
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DOYL$ REPORTING. INC CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTER:
369 LextNGTON AVENUE WALTER SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
New Yonx. N.Y.
10017 CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
TsLapNo N r 212 - 867 8220
. _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ ~
1 135 l
O i -d 2
-Appe a ra n c e s :
4 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
()
5 425 Park Avenue New York, New York 6
By:
DAVID KLINGSBERG, ESQ.,
4 7
't-of Counsel 8
. a A....
9 l-10 g
11 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
Attorneys for Defendants 12 One Chase Manhattan Plaza
~~
' " ~
ROBERT B.
- FISKE, JR.,
ESQ.
14
-and-i KATHRYN ANN MCDONALD, ESQ.,
15
,of Counsel 16 17.
18 19 Also Present:
20 DAVID TAYLOR
-I
(
l 22 23.
-A 24 J,.m) 25
/
1 136
(~b TV-2 JOHN H EN R Y Ma cM I L LAN, 3
resumed, having been previously duly sworn, a
i 4
was examined and testified further as follows:
{,
5 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
6 BY MR. KLINGSBERG 7
Q I would like to show you a document 8
previously marked as GPU Exhibit 217.
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Which is a memorandum frog J.
H.
MacMillan, 11 Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation Division to 12 R.
E.
Kosiba, Manager, Customer Service Department,
)
13 NPGD dated July 23, 1979.
14 Can you identify Exhibit 2 1 7,, a s a 15 memorandum which you wrote and sent to Mr. Kosiba in 16 the regular course of your duties as vice president 17 of the B&W NPGD?
18 A
Yes.
i
.19 Q
Is that your signature on that memo?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
'As you testified yesterday, that indicates 22 that you sent it out to Mr. Kosiba?
23 A
Yes.
i j
24 Q
The first sentence states, "The follow-up o
25 on the Davis-Besse incident of September 24,.1977 m
1
'MacMillan 137
. <m t
).
-(s-2 indicated-an untimely resolution of engineering 3
recommendations and notification of operating 4
utilities."
{
5 What was the nature of the follow-up to 6
which you referred in that memorandum?
7 A
This memorandum addressed the entire issue 8
of the incident at Davis-Besse, the evaluation of that 9
incident-by Mr. Kelly, the assessment by Mr. Dunn 10 and his recommendations for modificatipn of operating 11 instructions, the response of.our service organization i
12 expressing concern about thode recommendations as 13 perhaps being responsive to a loss of boolant accident 14 but may create problems in other undercooling accidents 15 such as steam line break --
16 MR. FISKE:
You mean overcooling?
17 THE WITNESS:
Overcooling, yes.
18 A
such as steam line break. 'The 19 untimeliness refers to the time that it took to try 2D to resolve th,is technical dispute between the two 21 organizations and to either resolve the problem.or 22 issue supplementary instructions to augment the 23
'nstructions that were already in the field, the i
yry 24.
service department personnel. feeling that the s
i
%./
25 operating procedures that were in existence were h
l' MacMillan 138 2
correct and adequate, the engineering people feeling 3
that some supplementary instructions should be 4
' issued and this resolution of this had taken some rs 5
time and in fact had not been worked out-at the time 6
of the Three Mile Island 2 accident.
7 As you know, this was the subject of a 8
good deal of attention following the accident and my 9
letter to Mr. Kosiba was directed to his attention tomaking 10 sure that we had appropriate and timely 11 method of handling field service reports and site f
12 problem reports and getting those resolved and getting
[
13 either a decision made that there was nothing to be 14 done or getting the field change if there was 15 equipment modification to be made or get instructions 16 to the utilities where it would seem appropriate to 17 issue supplementary operating instructions.
18 Q.
What follow-up had you engaged in or J.
[
19
.been aware of between the accident in March 1979 and 20 the time you wrote this memo on July 23, 1979 which 4
21 led you to these conclusions?
h
(
t-22 A
Your question was what follow-up was 23 I personally involved in during this period?
24 d
Yes.
LJ 251 A
Naturally,'during this period, I was very
O 1
MacMillan 139 2
much involved in supporting GPU in recovery of the 3
operations at Three Mile Island 2,
in the congressional 4
testimonies and the investigations and I had raised 5
this question in conjunction with the preparations for
{
.6 those various public appearances and this was an 7
effort to document it and put it specifically at 8
Mr. Kosibas responsibility to take whatever 9
recommended -- whatever actions he felt were 10 appropriate in response to the issue o timeliness
~11 of resolution of site problem reports.
12 Q
Did the follow-up consist of any yo$r part with 13 discussions, interviews or talks on 14 any of the personnel directly or indirectly involved 15 in the Davis-Besse matter?
16 MR. FISKE:
And you are referring to 17 discussions that took place outside the presence 18 of counsel?
19 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Yes, of course.
20 A
Lyes,_I had some discussions with personnel 21 who were involved in the recommendations and response
- km '
22 to those recommendations following the Davis-Besse 23 1977 incident.
l f'Sp 24' Q
With whom did'you have such discussions?
A._./
25 A
I am not sure that-I can recite all of p
i n,
1 MacMillan 140
.j
~
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2' them but I do remember having discussions with Bert 3
Dunn, with Joe Kelly, I believe I had some discussions 4
with Don Hallman, I dicussed these with Allen Womack.
5 Those are the ones that I remember g
6 specifically.
I would -
7 Q
Dr. Roy?
8 A
I believe I did discuss this with Don Roy.
i 9
Q Kosiba?
10 A
specifically with respect o the follow-up 11 on the Davis-Besse incident, I don't remember having
+
12 I don't remember having discussions with Kosiba other 13
.than to say we need to make sure that Ye are handling 14 site; problem reports expeditiously, the precurser to 15 this formal memorandum (indicating).
~
16
-Q Bruce Karrasch?
17 A
I don't remember talking with Bruce.
f 18 Q
Taylor?
~
19 A
I believe I did talk with' Taylor, yes.
20' Q
How many conversations did you have with 21 Dunn on the subject?
22 A
I don't know that I could tell you 23 specifically.
I remember one conversation I-had in
~
24 his office'specifically on the. subject.
.u 25 -
g-Did you take any notes?
i L's----y*
9--
- =
7
1 MacMillan 141 2
'A No.
3 Q
Were there any documents 4
A No.
({
5 Q
looked at in the course of the 6
conversation?
7 A
No.
8 Q
What was the substance of the conversation 9
with Dunn?
What did he say to you and what did you 10 say to him?
t 11 A
Well, I can't repeat I don't remember 12 what I said to him and he said to me.
The general 13 theme of the discussion was I wanted t o' talk with him 14 about his involvement in the engineering' recommendations 15 and I wanted to reassure him that in the discussions 16 I had had and the evidence that had been presented 17 to me that I had satisfied mysalf that he had acted 18 responsibly and his in writing the mem'o and his 19 follow-up discussions, that I had satisfied myself 20 that there was in fact a genuine difference of opinion, 21 engineering judgment, a technical dispute between 22 his recommendations and the people in the service 23 department, that I was satisfied that nobody had 21 acted irresponsibi)y or tried to cover up or set 25 aside the assessment of these concerns.
- ^ ' ' ^
1 MacMillan 142 r"$
i i
1\\,/!
2 I told him,as I had testified with the 3
Kemeny Commission, I regretted these' issues had not 4'
been resolved more promptly but that there wasn't 5
g going to be any disciplinary action or retribution, 6
I wanted him to focus on getting back to the job 7
and getting on with the work we had to do.
8 It was a session that, the general theme 9
of which was to reassure Bert that he was a valuable 10 employee to our company.
g.
11 Q
What facts did Mr. Dunn relate to you?
12 A
Well, as I said earlier, I don't remember
(~h q,)
13 specifically what was said.
14 I think at that time that he.' expressed 15 to me also a regret that this issue hadn't been more 16 promptly resolved and that he was prepare'd to get on 17 with the job.
18 Q
Do you remember in substance what
.19 Mr. Dunn told you was his version of what -happened 20 or 21 A,
We didn't discuss the sequence of events
(
22 that took place in any way.
This was a discussion 23 that.we had:after I had had some information made
~
24 available to me by people who had inquired.about
(~)}
L 25 the whole situation and it was really directed at
~
1 MacMillan 143 q
jems k_).
2 reassuring Mr. Dunn.
3 Q
Did Mr. Dunn tell you that if his 4
recommendations had been carried through, the accident 5
might have been avoided?1 g-6
-A Mr. Dunn didn't tell me that nor do I 7
think that's a logical conclusion.
8 Q
Did Mr. Dunn tell you that he thou'ght 9
his recommendations had been implemented?
10 A
Mr. Dunn did not tell me that but I had 11 been told that he had recorded that at some point 12 in the sequence of events he thought they had been 13 implemented, 14 Q
Did you ask Mr. Dunn why he didn't put j
i 15 his recommendations or concerns in the form of a 16 preliminafy safety concern report?
17.
A I did not.
18 Q
Was that subject discussed at'all with 4
19 hin?-
20 A
Not with him, no.
2 21 Q-What was the' substance of your discussion 22 with Mr. Kelly in regard to any. facts which he 23' related to you?
i
(~\\
' 24 A
'My discussion with Mr. Kelly took' place Q).
- 25-in ab'out the same time frame as my. discussion with y
1 MacMillan 144 n
~
V-2 Mr. Dunn and the purpose of my discussions with 3
Mr. Kelly were similar to those I had in discussing 4
in my discussions with Dunn, a sense of reassurance 5
and the statement that on the basis of the information
{s 6
I had, Kelly had acted responsibly and that I had no 7
evidence of any'. effort on anybody's part to either set 8
aside or to cover up significant safety issues, that 9
they had in fact been made evidence and had been 10 brought to the surface, repeated that I had regretted 11 we didn't get closure on the issues more rapidly but 12 now was the time to get on with the job.
(
13
~
Kelly for any Q
And again you didn't ask Mr.
14 factual information?
15 A
I did not.
16 Q
When you spoke to Mr. Hallman, did you 17 try to obtain any factual information from him?
18
~
A I have -- I don't have a very good 19:
recollection of my duscissions with Mr. }{allman.
20 I vaguely remember that I talked to him but I don't 21 have the same kind of clear recollection I had of 22 the meetings I.had with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Kelly.
23 Q
If it is a fact that your conversations
.f3 24 '
with Dunn, Kelly and Hallman were in regard to
~
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25 reassuring them that they should get on with.the job,
/
1 MacMillan 145
' q 52 2
et cetera, what was the nature of the follow-up in 3
your memorandum which led you to the conclusion that 4
there had been untimely resolution of' engineering i
{
5 recommendations and notification of operating 6
utilities?
7 A
In the period immediately following Three 8
Mile Island and in the evaluation of the events that 9
led up to that, there was a substantial amount of 10 evidence produced relative to the even a that had 11 transpired and the actions that were taken by the 12 individuals involved and I had access to that 13 information in arriving at the judgmen't that there 14 had been in fact this genuine dif f erence of opinion 15 between the engineering and the service organization 16 and that that had not been resolved by the time of 17 the Three Mile Island accident.
18 Q
What was the substance of you'r conversation 19 with Taylor in regard to any factual information he 20 provided concerning Davis-Besse?
21 MR. FISKE:
You are just limiting your 22:
question to any factual informa' tion that 23 Taylor gave Mr. MacMillan?
(~'j 24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
In regard to
'O 25 MR. FISKE:
Davis-Besse?
9,-
m
?) 5 e
s s
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1 MacMillan 146 rm
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3 2
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KLINGSBERG
-- Davis-Besse, untimely m
'3 resolut$on. notification of utilities and
['_5 m
~
N 4 matters of that sort.
s g
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A The discussion that I recall having with s
' s.',.
6 Taylor was a discussion-that I had with Taylor we are w
directed toward getting factual information on 7
not g
.s g
e s
s
,7 8,
the follow-up.
~'
't i
9 Q
What was the nature of your discussion
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with,Taplor? (
e 11 A
Again, m y ;\\
s interest in talking with s -
12 Mr. Tay1'or was go give hi,m the samb kind of O
s t
s
-(_j 13 reassurance that I'hadJwith the other individuals.
IM '
Q Would you.,look at GPU Exhibit 80 which is 15 the so-called Hallman memo.
' (
16 A
yes.
l-17 Q
This is a memo from Hallman to Karrasch 18 dated August 3, 1978, a copy to Dunn and 'others.
19 Doaa this memo contain the reference to 20 the technical dispute to which you have referred 21' several times in your prior testimony?
~ ' '
22 A
This is the this expresses the concern 8
23 -
- that the service department had relative to the 4
t
(y 24-
~s issuing of the supplementary instructions which-
\\._/
25 Mr. Dunn had recommended.
()
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1 MacMillan 147 t'~}
NJ -
2 Q
Yes.
3 A
That there may be circumstances in which 4
other than the loss of coolant accident in which the g
5 instruction-Mr. Dunn had issued could create some 6
problems in operation.
7 This is that side of the statement, that 8
side of the concern.
9 Q
Apart from this document, was there any 10 other document that you know of that r,eflects in 11
-any way, shape or form any technical dispute between 12 departments or sections concerning the Dunn C
13 recommendations?
14 A
I don't remember any others.
15 Q
Are you aware of any other information 16 from any source that you knew of which would support 17 the conclusion that there was a technical dispute 18 between two organizations within B&W apar't from this 19 piece of paper?
20 MR. FISKE:
Do you mean apart from what 21 the individual employees of B&W may.have k.
22-testified to?
l 23 MR. KLINGSBERG:
No. -
I am talking about
/T 24 anything the witness knows about.
t
%/-
25-MR. FISKEs~ You mean --
1 MacMillan 148 jy_
(m) -
2 A
well, as I have indicated, following the 3
accident there was a good deal of attention directed 4
to this issue.
(
5 Q
Yes.
6 A
And a number of inquiries were made.
7 The results of these were reported to me as part of 8
the response to the Three Mile Island accident.
9 Q
Let me put it this way -- I'm sorry, I 10 interrupted you.
11 A
And I am aware of testimony that was 12 given by members of the organization that elaborates
. f'h
(_)
13 on th,e information that is contained ih this particular 14 document (indicating).
15 Q
Apart from testimony on the record, 16 whether before Congress, the Kemeny Commission, in 17 this case or otherwise, do you have any other source 18 of information such as interviews with pe~ople that 19 you conducted or anything of that sort which we might 20 not be aware of which would support the conclusion-21 to which you have testified concerning this dispute 22 between organizations?
23 A
I don't recall.anything other than
' (]
24 information that was discussed in the presence of V
25 counsel.
7
=
1 MacMillan 149
'rN 2
Q You stated in your prior testimony that 3
the service department felt that the procedures were --
4 I mean your testimony a few minutes ago, that the 5
service department felt the procedures were correct 6
and adequate.
7 Where did you get that information from?
8 A
Well, again, that's information that was 9.
developed in the post-accident evaluation.
10 I have personally looked at the loss of L
11 coolant accident p,rocedure and have satisfied myself 12 that the procedures as written and in force at th'e b
(_/
13 time of the accident, had they been followed, would 14,
have precluded the entire accident from being any more 15 than a minor incident.
I'm sorry -- about 16 Q
I am not asking you 17 your own evaluation, I am asking you about your 18 testimony _that the service department, according to 19 your testimony, felt the procedures were correct-20 and adequate, and I am asking you what you base that 21 on.
Was,that based on testimony, on some information (c
22 you got from counsel, from some document, from some 1
23 interview you conducted or can't you --
i
[^')
24' A
That information was based on data that i
Q)-
25 was developed in the post-accident investigation and
_a
L 1
MacMillan 150
'e s
%_))
/
l 2
was presented to me in the presence of counsel.
3 Q
" Post-accident inve s tiga t' ion," y ou are i
4 talking about the public testimony or something
(
(
5 internal?
6 A
Well, the accumulation of evidence and 7
data internally within our own organization, among I
8 other things, to get prepared for testimony and for 9
the investigations that followed.
10 Q
Was there anything that you can point to 11 specifically other than something that is privileged 12 which would support that statement?
/~'
(
13 A
I don't remember anything that I could l
l 14 point to specifically other th'an information l
15
. presented in the presence of counsel.
16 Q
Would the same be true of your statement 17-that there was a genuine technical disput,e between 18 two organizations?
19 A
Yes, I think that would be trde also.
20 MR. FISKE. I think it should be clear, 21 just so we understand what the scope of the 22 answer is, that I don't think Mr. MacMillan 23 is representing in giving that answer that he
-[
)
24 has read all of the testimony that was given
- . G (.
25 before the Kemeny Commission or the Rogovin
1 MacMillan 151
<-5
~
2 Commission,let alone the depositions in this
-s 3
case.
4 If the purpose of your question is to
({
5 find out whether Mr. MacMillan knows anything 6
that you don't already know, I have no trouble 7
with it but if the thrust of it is to suggest 8
that that evidence doesn't exist because 9
Mr. MacMillan gave answers which said that he 10 had based his conclusion on info.rmation that 11 was given in the presence of counsel, then I 12 just think the record should be clear that ' I 13 dop't think Mr. MacMillan purports to speak 14 for the entire scope of evidence that has 15 been developed in this case.
16 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Well, my purpose in 17 asking the questions is twofold.
18 Number one, was it a discovery purpose
~
19 to find out if there is some interview, note 20 or doctments that we are not aware of and 21 the result of the questions I think indicates 22 that there is not; and, secondly,- it would q
23 establish'that Mr. MacMillan's statement,
[k.)j.
['
24 which was made baldly, is.not a statement that-25.
rou could rely on atLtrial because if you were
I 1
MacMillan 152
[/\\
\\_
2 going to attempt to rely on it at trial to 3
establish that fact, we would then have to 4
inquire into the discussions with counsel to 5
see what the basis for it was but 6
MR. FISKE:
I think we understand each 7
other.
8 We will be satisfied at trial to rest 9
on evidence that has already been developed, 10 irrespective of Mr. MacMillan's estimony.
11 MR. KLINGSBERG:
0.K.
12 Q
I would like to show you a document
(
13 previously-marked as GPU Exhibit 85 which is a 14 Babcock & Wilcox supplementary operating' instruction 15.
for HPI system dated April 4,
1979.
16 Are you familiar with that document?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Could you state what.it islfor the 19 record?
20 A
This is'a letter from Tom Fairburn, who 21 was our. service manager, to his service department 22 representatives who-are accountable.for and 23
. responsible for issding instructions to the utilities,
[~5-24 service' bulletins--I am not sure what the official
~%)
25 Etitle is instructing these people to contact the
1 MacMillan 153
-6 7
2 identified utilities under the subject of customer 3
or under the heading of customer to modify their 4
operating procedures to maintain high pressure 1
(( ~
5 injection flow -- well, let me correct that.
It is 6
to modify the procedures in the operation of the f
7 high pressure injection system.
3 8
Q Essentially this is the guideline which i
9 Mr. Dunn had recommended be sent out as early as 1
i-10 February 1978, is that correct?
t 11 A
These are supplementary instructions 12 which were the purpose of which was to be 13 -
resprasive to the concerns that Mr. Dunn recommended.
14 I couldn't testify as to whether they I
j 15 are specifically what Mr. Dunn had suggested or not.
{-
16 Q
When you said in. Exhibit 217 in your
{
- 17 memo to Mr. Kosiba that the follow-up on Davis-Besse l
18_
indicated'an untimely notification of opekating 19 utilities, one of the items you were talki~ng about 1
20 was a recommendation.such as was sent out:on
- 21 April.4, 1979 in Exhibit 85, is that correct?
L
(.
L 22 A'
'My letter to Mr. Kosiba indicating l
. 23 untimely resolution and the notification of utilities
)
j-24 was directed'toward-the time which was-required to
.J :
25
- resolve the recommendations ofL Mr. Dunniand the v-e v
6
.e-~
,, _. ~
1 MacMillan 154 f \\
2 2
concerns of the service department in response to 3
those. The ultimate resolution of those concerns was 4
manifested in the instructions that are included in
((
5 GPU Exhibit 85.
6 Q
And you concluded that the notification 7
in GPU 85 should have been sent out earlier by 8
Babcock & Wilcox, is that correct?
9 A
As I indicated previously, my concern 10 and the regret which I have expressed s that the 11 difference of opinion between engineering and service 12 was not resolved mor'e rapidly.
In this particular
-oO N,,/
13 case, the resolution ended up being su'pplementary 14 -
instructions which were issued to these operating 15 utilities.
16 Q
And you concluded that those supplementary 17 instructions should have been sent to the operating 18 utilities earlier than they had been, isn~'t.that 19 true?
20 A
If the resolution of that differenc'e 21 had been the issuance of these supplementary (c
22 instructions, the answer to your question is-yes.
23 Q
And the resolution immediately following
(~}
24 the-Three_ Mile' Island accident was to send out the
-u/
25 supplementary instructions.in the. form.of GPU Exhibit w
r-e-
1 MacMillan 155
. 9 2
85, i,s that correct?
3 A
That's correct.
4 Q
In the course of your various 5
{
conversations with personnel that you mentioned or 0
ar.y conversations following the Three Mile Island I
accident, did you ask anybody if they remembered 0
being at this meeting in your office at which the 9
Davis-Besse event was discussed?
10 A
I don't recall having asked that question 11 of the people that I mentioned earlier.
I Q
Did you ask anybody?
O
- Q 13 A
No, I don't remember asking anybaody who 14 was at that meeting.
15 Q
You never asked any of your colleagues 16 or subordinates "Do you remember being at a meeting 17 in my office?
Do you remember what was d,iscussed there?"
~
19 A
'I don't recall raising that qtie s tion,
no.
20 Q
Did you ask anybody whether they 21 remembered you being at the training room B session?
22 A
Not unless'it was in the presence o f-23 counsel.
(rm 24 i
Q
'Is there any reason.why in all of your
%,/ -
95 prio'r. testimony before Kemeny, ACRS,'et cetera, you
-)
r
,-)
Lt._
1 MacMillan 156 (3
e I
\\_/
2 never mentioned this meeting in your office?
3 MR. FISKE:
I am going to object to that 4
question, Mr. Klingsberg.
I don't think you can 5
ask a question like that without showing
(
6 Mr. MacMillan what questions he was asked that 7
he was trying to be responsive to.
8 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Are you directing him 9
not to answer?
10 MR. FISKE:
Well, number ope, I don't 11 know for a fact whether the representation 12 that you made is correct and, number two, I n
()s 13 think that you as an experienced'11tigator 14 know as well as I do that a witness is supposed 15 to respond to questions that he is asked and 16 if_you have a, question that Mr. MacMillan 17 was asked that would fairly call for discussion 18 or mention of that meeting in-his office, I 19 would invite you to read that question and 20 answer to him.but I.think that the.way you 1
21 framed that question is really very unfair.
h 22 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Are you directing the
- 23 witness not to answer?
l f*$
24 MR.'FISKE:
No, I won't direct him not
.(_) '
25 tofanswer;it.-
1 MacMillan 157
~
~
2 A
Mr. Klingsberg, I do not know whether in 3
the course o.f the testimony that I have given before 4
ACRS, various congressional committees, the Kemeny 5
Com' mission, whether or not I have discussed the
(
6 meeting that was h, eld in my office following the 7
September 1977 incident at Davis-Besse.
8 I have been pretty open in discussion of 9
that meeting and I just couldn't attest to whether 10 that has been part of my testimony or pot.
11 MR. FISKE:
Off the record..
12 (Discussion off the record.)
13 Q
I would like to show you some prior 14 testimony before the Kemeny Commission, page 415.
15 A
Yes.
16
,- Q I would like to direct your $ttentio'n to 17 the portion of your answer where you say, "I
do 18 remember in the weeks following the D avis'--B e s s e 19 situation being involved in discussions of the 20 incident."
21 Does that refresh your recollection _that L
22 you had.more than one meeting'or discussion in which 23 you participated concerning the Davis-Besse situation?
24 A
In that testimony 'I was referring
- 25 specifically to the' meeting.that I'had in my office
1 MacMillan 158
~.
\\-
2 in which we did discuss the cause of the stuck open 3
valve and that modifications were made or corrections 4
were made to that valve and the evaluation of the
_ ({
5 impact of the incident on the pressure boundary of 6
the nuclear steam supply system.
7 Q
Yes.
8 A
That is in fact a direct reference to the 9
meeting that we have talked about here previously 10 (indicating).
g.
11 Q
Were there any other discussions?
You 12 used the plural.
13 A
I don't recall other discuisions but I 14 don't know why I used the plural there.
15 Q
Would you look at GPU Exhibits 78, 79 and e
16 80 which I believe are before you.
17 A
Yes.
~
18 Q
And 63 as well.
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
That is th'e so-called Kelly memorandum, 21 the two Dunn' memoranda and the Hallman memorandum.
22 A
.Yes.
23 Q
To the best of-your knowledge, is-it a N)N -
24 fact that prior to-the Three Mile Island accident,
- (
25 Metropolitan Edison was not notified.of the concerns n- - -
1 MacMillan 159
/ 'i
(_)
i 2
raised in those documents?
3
.MR.
FISKE:
You mean by B&W7 4
MR. KLINGSBERG:
Yes.
(
5 MR. FISKE:
Off the record.
6 (Discussion off the record.)
7 MR. FISKE:
I think we should clarify 8
this question because there are a lot of 9
different concerns.
10 Are you asking him whethert -- well, maybe 11 you ought to ask your question.
12 A
I would appreciate a clarification.
D(-
13 Are you asking me whether I had any 14 communication with Metropolitan Edison?
15 Q
Whether you did or whether you have any 16 knowledge that anybody else did.
17 A
Are you asking me if I know t, hat now or 18 whether I knew that at the time prior to the accident?
19 Q
At any_ time.
20 MR. FISKE:
I believe he is asking you 21 as you sit here today, do you have any knowledge 22 that Met Ed was advised of these concerns l
23 before the accident by B&W?
(~'y 24_
A Well,I am aware that there were.some meetings
~%J
-25 attended ~by Metropolitan Edison personnel in which
1 g
MacMillan 160 1
2 the Davis-Besse incident of September 1977 was discussed and to that extent, I have personal 3
information that says Metropolitan Edicon had been 4
aware f the Davis-Besse incident.
(
5 6
Q My question was addressed to the concerns expressed in the memoranda, not to the fact that there 7
8 was a Davis-Besse incident.
MR. FISKE:
I think Mr. MacMillan was 9
10 responding to that.
gi MR. KLINGSBERG:
We will find out.
12 Let me repeat the question.
13 Q
To your knowledge, was Metropolitan Edison 14 ever notified of the concerns raised in these 15 documents?
16 A
I don't have any knowledge of whet'aer 17 they wers or were not raised I don't recall having 18 any knowledge of that.
~
19 Q
I w uld like to show you your testimony bef re 20 the Kemeny Commission in deposition at page 25 -- well, let me pass that.
gg MR. KLINGSBERG:
Off the record.
22 23 (Discussion off the record.)
24 Q
I will show you the Kemeny deposition, 25 page 25.
1 MacMillan 161 2
We can go back, if you will, to page 23, 3
lines 12 an.d 13, that refers to Exhibits 78 and 79 4
which I have shown your page 24, line 21 refers to
({
5 GPU Exhibit 80.
6 Now I would like you to look at the 7
~ question on line 14, page 25, which states, "To your 8
knowledge, was Met Edison ever notified of the 9
concerns raised in any of the documents which you 10 have just reviewed?
t 11
" Answer:
Not to my knowledge."
12 MR. FISKE:
Are you telling us, 13 Mr. Klingsberg, that Dunn Deposition Exhibit 14 41, Dunn Deposition Exhibit 40, Dunn 15 Deposition Exhibit 37 and Dunn Deposition 16 Exhibit 38 are the same four documents that 17 are GPU 63, 78, 79 and 807 18 MR. KLINGSBERG:
No, you have'the 19.
numbers wrong but among the documents'he 20 was shown was 78, 79 and 80.
21-MR. FISKE:
Oh, O.K.
22_
A Yes, I have read this. testimony.
23 I'm sorry,.what was your question?
~
('N 24 Q
Do you remember giving. deposition-L) 25 testimony before.the Kemeny Commission?
+
L t
m n
4=
w
1 MacMillan 162
('j '
2 A
Yes, I do.
3 Q
.In the course of that testimony, were you 4
asked the question and did you give the answer which I
({
5 just showed you?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Is that an accurate answer?
8 MR. FISKE:
You mean at that time?
9 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Well, we will start 10 with that.
e 11 Q
Was that an accurate answer at that time?
12 A
To the best of my knowledge.
A
\\ms) 13 Q
Is it an accurate answer today?
14 A
Yes, I believe so.
I think I said I have 15 no recollection of whether they were notified of the 16 concerns or not.
That's the same as not to my 17-knowledge.
18 Q
Would-you look at Exhibit 78, which I 19 think you have before you.
20 A
Yes.
~
21 Q
In that exhibit, Mr. Dunn expressed a
(.
22 concern concerning premature interruption of high 23 pressure injection flow, is that correct?
/~'s 24l A'
Yes.
U 25 ;
'Q Is it your view, based on your inquiries-w w
w
1 MacMillan 163 2
into the Davis-Besse and Three Mile Island events 3
that premature interruption of high pressure injection 4
flow was the most important event in the TMI-2
. ([
5' sequence of accident events?
6 A
Well, I have testified that having been
.7 involved in the inappropriate operation of the 8
feedwater system which caused the interruption of 9
main feedwater at Three Mile Island, and having 10 operated with the block valves on the emergency 11 feedwater system closed, and havin'g failed to 12 evaluate that the pilot operated relief valve was 13 stuck open, that the. step of interruption ~of high 14 pressure injection was the most inportant the most 15 significant item.in the operator response at Three-3
^
16.
Mile; Island 2.
-17 Q'
Isn't-it also a fact that',in,your view, 18
- Babcock & Wilcox had'a responsibility toTave notified-h 19-Metropolitan Edison.following the Davis-Besse-event'
~
~
-20 that:there was a premature termination of high 21' pressure. injection 1%nere and.that.it was a' necessity
(
E 22
.for keep'ing1the high' pressure: pumps on along:thei 23 _
lines ofithe recommendations-in.the?Du'nn memorandum?
' '24 MR. FISKE. Welli.I.am going to object'
. S$-
to'that question,'Mr. Klingsberg,Junless you s
9 7
y u
5
1-MacMillan 164 2
define what you mean by " responsibility."
3
.MR.
KLINGSBERGr I mean by " responsibility" 4
what Mr. MacMillan means by " responsibility" in
([
5 his prior testimony which I would be happy 6
to show to him if you want me to.
7 MR. FISKE:
Yes, I think that might be 8
useful.
9 MR. KLINGSBERG:
What?
10 MR. FISKE:
I say I think that might be 11 useful because if the question connotes some 12 sort of legal conclusion, obviously Ok-13 Mr. MacMillan isn't qualified to express a view 14 on that.
15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
O.K.
16 Well, I would like to get MrI MacMillan's 17 answer first and if he wants to qua,11fy it o
18 along the lines of your objection having been 19 alerted to that, he is free to do s o'.
- 20 MR. FISKE:
Well, I think I have a couple 21 of other objections to the question in addition 22 to that so maybe we ought to hear it again so 23 I can state them.
'p 24
(. Record was read back.)
25 MR. FISKE:
I think you have two
y MacMillan 165 fx
- (_ -
2 dif ferent parts of that question,in addition 3
to the problem I have with the word 4
" responsibility."
4
({
5 I think'if you are going to pursue it 6
without reading him his prior testimony, I think 7
at least he can take those things one at a time.
8 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Sure, I have no problem 9
with that.
10 Q
Do you want the question b'ack?
11 A
Yes, I guess I need it.
12 (Record was read back.)
13,
MR. FISKE:
Could I also ask you,
~s 14 Mr. Klingsberg, whether that question is 15 predicated on an assumption that Metropolitan 16 Edison was not aware of either of those two 17 facts from some other source?
18~
MR. KLINGSBERG:
I don't think I have 19 to elaborate on that.
20 MR. FIS KE :
Well, the. question is a 21 little I mean I wil1~not object to it and I-22.
will not instruct him'not to answer-but I am 23
' objecting to the question.because I-think it
)
24 is really unfair-to put that kind of a. question G
25 to Mr..MacMillan.who may or may not know al1~
~
Z s.
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1 MacMillan 166
.p s
a
" '/
2 of the circumstances surrounding this 3
situation as they had been developed in the 4
discovery in this case.
J{
5 You are asking him to say whether he 6
feels B&W had a responsibility to do something 7
without necessarily giving him the benefit of 8
all of the facts upon which he might fairly 9
make such a determination.
10 so I will let him answer ist but it is 11 subject to that objection.
12 MR. KLINGSBERG:
O.K.
k'_)N 13 Q
I suppose you want the question again?
14 A
No, I think I have heard it enough.
15 I would like to-introduce my response by 16 two comments:
17 We did have in place a procedure and a 18 practice of evaluating incidents that occ'urred in 19 nuclear p1' ants having nuclear steam suppip systems
- 20 and that procedure did require an assessment of the 21 cross-contract applicability of the events that 22 :
occurred in the incident and any modifications that 23 might have~ arisen either to the procedures or to the
(y 24 -
. equipment as a result of tha t -incident and to that-
%. l 25 extent, it was our practice to inform utilities-A g
y -
1 MacMillan 167
. f')
V 2
where there was applicable information or evidence i
3 that evolved from incidents that occurred at other 4
nuclear plants.
((
5 I think it is also important in this i
6 particular case to recognize the second factor and 7
that is that the operating procedures that drafts 8
that we had forwarded to our customers, including 9
Metropolitan Ediscr, which were incorporated by the 10 utilities in their operating procedures for Three 11 Mile Island 2 were adequate to handle this situation, 12 that they had in fact instructions in there to continue
' O
\\s/
13 the high pressure injection until both the pressurizer 14 level and reactor coolant system pressure was above 15 the let me restate that -- until you could 16 maintain both an adequate pressurizer level and the 17 reactor / coolant system pressure above 16Q0 pounds 18 per square inch so that the instructions.then and 19 operating procedures-that were in force at the time,
~
20 had they been followed, would have fulfilled the 21 concern that'Mr. Dunn raised.
22.
Now, having raised'the' concern that-
. 23 LMr. Dunn had, and then having the-service department 24' look at the thing from the standpoint of other-25
.accidentsLthat might occur and whether those F
_m
g MacMillan 168
()
v rec mmended instructions were appropriate or not, 2
I would like to have seen that issue' resolved more quickly and if the resolution of that was to alert 4
perafngu
(
es r.
Dunn's concern in the ur 5
f rm f supplementary instructions of the sort that 6
were ultimately issued, I regret that that wasn't 7
done earlier.
8 Q
I would like to show you your testimony g
before the ACRS on September 5,
1979, page 241.
10 MR. FISKE:
Just 2417 77 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Yes.
12
~
13 Q
Do you remember testifying before the ACRS?
74 A
Yes, sir.
15 16 Q
Were y u asked this question and did you give this answer:
17 18
" Question:
Would you feel it~ your legal gg responsibility to recommend -- to call thi's to the attention of the users, that there's a problem here, 20 that they better leave the HPI pumps on?"
l MR. FISKE:
Just a minute, Mr. Klingsberg.
I am g ing to request that you read him the 23 entire: question, not just part of it.
24 a
"O
- G' O'**
25
1 MacMillan 169 s,.
2 Q
Page 240, " Question:
Mr. MacMillan, 3
I'd like to,get a little bit better apprecaition of 4
the responsibility of the vendor versus a utility.
(
5 Let me go back to the question of Mr. Dunn's 6
memorandum.
If I understand you correctly, you 7
indicated that your organization simply hadn't 8
finished the analysis of" -- mine is blanked out.
9 MR. FISKE:
"Whether it was best to 10 follow."
e 11 Q
"whether it was best to follow his 12 recommendations or whether some other problem might O)
(m 13 come up.
If there had been no other problem that 14 was foreseeable, would you feel it your legal 15 responsibility to notify the users?
What I'm thinking 16 about is the fact that apprently -- well, you-indicate 17 that the users are advised to leave the HJPI pumps on.,
18 Yet one user didn't, and there was a concern-19 expressed here that you should advise other users 20
'of problems that they could run into if they did turn 21
.the pumps off.
(.
22 "My question:
Would you feel it your 23 legal ~respon'sibility to recommend ---to call.this to AV
. 24 the attention of.the users, that there's a problem 25 here,.that they'better leave the HPI pumps on?
w~w 4
a 4
m qm
1_
MacMillan 170 7,
(N l' 2
"Mr.
MacMillan:
Dr. Carbon, I shake a little bit at the words ' legal responsibility.'
I 3
think there isn't any question that in that event we 4
([
w uld have felt it our responsibility to notify the 5
6 utility that this circumstance had occurred at Davis-Besse and we think it's important to reiterate 7
8 the necessity of keeping the high pressure pumps on.
g And that would go out in the form of a service 10 bulletin or instruction issued to each of the 11 customers with operating units, to being this,to 12 their attention and recommend that they reassess
- l '
13 their operating procedures and operator training
^
l g4 accordingly."
l l
15 were you asked that question and did you 16 give that answer?
17 A
To the best of my knowledge, yes.
Ig Q
Was that an accurate answer a't the time?
19 A
Y e s.,
I believe it is.
20 Q
And is it still accurate?
A
.Again, I want to reiterate that I shake 21 a little bit on the words " legal responsibility" and 22 23 exactly what that i m p l'i e s.
f]
24 Q
Yes.
%.J-
= 25 A
But as I said, in practice, we do have a i
_____________1.___._________.______
1 1.
MacMillan 171
- p 2
system for making valuations of this sort and l
3 bringing, issuing supplementary instructions through
~
0 4
service bulletins and in that framework I would say j(
5 yes.
6 Q
Is the practice that you have in place
.7 or that you had'in place at the time of the 8
Davis-Besse accident related in any way to the 9
site problem report procedure?
10 A
The site problem report is..one source 11 of information that could-lead to a service bulletin, 12 yes.
13 Q
And it is a fact, is it not, that your 14 site problem procedure at the time of the Davis-Besse 15 event allowed only the or required only B&W personnel 16 at the site to originate site problem reports?
17 A
I guess I am not sure about that.
I don't 18 know.
-19 Normally,-a site problem report would be 20,
initiated by a-B&W man at the site.-
21
.Q Yes.
(_
32 A
Whether they are the only ones that would
~
23 do that, I simply don't know.
. [~) '
\\
24 Q ~
One.of the changes that you made as a 25 result ~ of the1 Davis-Besse/Three_ Mile Island situation
.-3
1 MacMillan 172 (m
2 subsequent to the Three Mile Island accident was to 3
allow site problem reports to be initiated by any 4
NPGD persons, is that correct?
((
5 MR. FISKE:
I will object to the form of 6
that question, Mr. Klingsberg.
7 If you want to simply say or ask him 8
whether at a point in time after the Three Mile i
9 Island accident they made that change, that is 10 perfectly appropriate but you have a couple of 11 predicates in there that I think are 12 objectionable.
13 MR. KLINGSBERG:
O.K.
We can take it 14 one step at a time if you want.
15 Q
I would like to show you GPU Exhibit 223 16 which is the site problem report procedure dated 17 8/20/79.
18 MR. FISKE:
Is there a particular part 19 of this that you want to call his attention to?
~
20 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Yes, there are a few 21 parts.
L 22 A
Yes.
M Q
Now, as a result of the memorandum that
- [ j:
24 you wrote to Mr. Kosiba, there were various changes
- V 25 made in your internal procedures for dealing.with 1
r
.~
i 1
MacMillan 173 I
J 2
safety concerns, is that correct?
3
.MR.
FISKE:
Well, wait a second.
4 A
With safety concerns o r --
({
5 MR. FISKE:
Which memorandum are you 6
referring to?
7 MR. KLINGSBERG:
The first one we showed 8
the witness'this morning, Exhibit 217.
9 A
Exhibit 217 addressed to Mr. Kosiba 10 requested that he evaluate the procedures on 11 reporting for field problems.
12 -
Q Yes.
~
-' \\._/ '
13 A
And the appropriate follow-up, s
N 14 Q
Yes.
+
15 A
That is different from preliminary safety 16 concerns.
1 17 Q
Yes.
18 And various changes were made in your 19 procedures relating to site problem reports, 20 preliminary safety concerns and the like as a result 21 of inquiries that were made following the Three Mile d
22 Island accident, is_that correct?
23 A
Yes.
24 Q.
'And among the changes was.a revised site
' 3J 25 problem report proce' dure which you have before you in j
1
A.
s
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.w n
1 MacMillan 174
... 3 ;A
.OA,
. g,2 C 2
the form of GPU Exhibit 223, is that correct?
4
,v N
g.,
A-3-
A Well, I couldn't attest to whether or t
4' not the specific revision to this field service
' g('f,
'. '5
' site problem report was a response te my request to 3
h, x, '
6 Mr. Kosiba or not. In the time frame in which it
.- }
-7
- occurred, it's likpl'y that that was the case but s >/
=
Q' J1 S}.
I don't'know that specifically.
^
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_l 4
}/
9 Q
It.is also likely, is it not, that
'c t
i r.
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10 changes that' were r,tade lwere a response to concerns
~.,
}1 relating to.the losso,ns:: learned / from the Three Mile
-s 5._
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N.
12 Island accident?
//
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i
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13 J,,
' MR.,,FIS KE :
I will obj ect. to ' the' f or1n 1
14 of that~ question.
- Ic f
15 MR. KLINGSBERG:
There.fs an'cbjection 4
!g t.
16 t,\\
,(and I will show you something/specifiv.
i r_,
o show you GPU Exhibip 221,\\thieLis 17 Q
I a
v s 18-memorandum from Mr. Kosib,a to Mr. MacMillan da,ted 9
y
+
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September '~ 4,'
197 9.
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20 l'
l+
Will you identify Exhibit 221.as a A
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y.
f ly
. g.
'21
,.memorandumfyou received from Mr.,K$siba in the',,
" ' (s -. <,
~ <
s about be,ptembsr 4,
^22q.
regular cour.,sa of yc.ur ' duties. on 'or I.
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19797 3
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24 A
I ded':t speci.fically. remember receiving n
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g: :,,
s I cerEainly was a -- it was addressed
- z..
25; thdletter but 1
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_MacMillan 175 i
. f~%
?
I
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to me and I am sure I saw it.
3 Q
And that memorandum was in response, was 4
it not, to your memorandum of July 23, 1979 which
(
5-we have marked as Exhibit 2177 6
A That's what Mr. Kosiba said in the first 7
paragraph, yes.
8 Q
And one of the t'hings that Mr. Kosiba 9
repo'ts to you is that NPGD Instruction Revision 7 r
10 was issued to. upgrade the site problemtreport 11 handling, is that correct?
12 A
That's correct.
(~
k/
13
-Q And that Revision 7 I have shown to you 14 as Exhibit 223, is that' correct?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Is it not a fact that, as indicated in-17 paragraph 1 of Appendix 1'of Exhibit 223 3,as of allbwed to be 18 August 1979' site problem reports were 19 initiated by other NPGD personnel aware of'a site 20 problem other'than the residents,at the operating 21 plants?
22' A
~That's correct.
23 Q
There.were other amendements, were there-n't, to the site problem report ^ procedure expanding
- 24 o
25 it'beyond its previous limitations,nis.that correct?-
~
1 MacMillan 176
/~m
(
)
- ~'
,2 MR.'FISKE:
Well, I
,ill object to the w
3
' form of the question but you can answer it.
4 A
I really don't know the answer to that
-l(
5 question.
I don't know specifically what revisions 6
were incorporated in this site operating -- site 7
problem report procedure.
8 The purpose was to make the site problem 9
report -- reporting system more effective in 10 addressing issues that could be raisedt; relative to 11 the operation of our NSS units.
12 Q
Specifica111y, there was an attempt,
('N
'ws 13 was there not, to expand the site problem report 14 procedure to make sure that it would pick up the kind 15 of concerns relating to operation in accord with 2
16 certain operating practices along the lines that 17 were expressed in the Dunn and Kelly memoranda?
18 MR. FIS KE :
Well, wait a second.
19 Can.I hear that question again, please.
4 20 (Record was read back.)
21 MR. FISKE:
I will object to the form 22 of the question.
23 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I will reframe it then.
[)
24 Q
Isn't it a fact that one of the things g
25 you were trying to do in revising your site problem
11 MacMillan 177
. f
~
.2 report procedure was to make sure that the site 3
problem repqrt' procedure from here on-in would pick 4
up the kind of thing that was not picked up in site
- (
5 problem reports in the case of Davis-Besse, 6
specifically.the kind of concerns that were raised 7
in the Dunn memorandum?
8 MR. FISKE:
I wil1 object to that because 9
you have a lot of assumptions in that question.
10 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Sure there are a lot of 11 assumptions.
I am asking the witness whether 12 they are correct or not.
13 MR. FISKE:
Well, you are asking 14 Mr. MacMillan whether he knew whether or not 15 the site problem report for Davis-Besse picked 16-up the circumstances surrounding HPI termination?
17 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Well, Mr. Fiske, we went 18 all through this yesterday, we showed the 1
19 witness the site problem reports -- ~
20 MR. FISKE:
He said he never.saw it until 21 you showed it to him yesterday.
kJ 22 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I know that.
c 23 MR. FISKE:
'So now younare asking him f'i -
24 a question which is built on an assumption that
- \\s.)
'25' the. site problem report was inadequate.-
4
1 MacMillan 178
- ('1
(' ')
,2 MR. KLINGSBERG:
But he functioned on the 3-site problem reports, on the revision of the 4
site oroblem report procedure, he wrote a
(
5 memorandum to Mr. Kosiba'asking him about 6
changes in procedure, he testified for pages
'7 and pages before every commission and 8
congressional committee concerning lessons j
9 learned, he is in charge of this department.
10 Are you saying this witness doesn't know 11 and is not qualified to testify as to what 12 the reasons were for changing the site problem Os/
13 report procedure and whether one of those 14 reasons didn't have to do with what fell 15 between the cracks in connection with 16 Davis-Besse?
17 come on.
I mean, these interruptions 18 are really getting to be beyond the pale.
~
19 MR. FISKE:
Wait a minute.
~
20 I'have no objection to your asking him 21 the question which is designed to find out-his k.
22 understanding of the reason for the change in 23 the site problem report procedure but you built
[J-24
.an assumption'into your question, wh.ich, it 25 seems'to me, is totally unjustified in light
1 MacMillan 179 r~h
(
)
~s 2
of the answer he gave you yesterday which was 3
that he had never seen the site problem report 4
until you showed it to him so I have to object
({
5 to the question on that hssis.
I am not 6
objecting to the line of inquiry at all, I am 7
simply basing my objection on the fact that
.8 your question has an improper assumption in it.
9 I think that is my obligation.
10 Q
Mr. MacMillan, it is a fact, is it not, 11 that you asked Mr. Kosiba to reevaluate the various 12 procedures for notifying utilities of safety problems
.o
~
\\
13 in your memorandum of July 23, 1979, GPU Exhibit 217, 14 is that correct?
15 A
I asked him to review the procedure for 16 reporting field problems and getting those problems 17 resolved, yes.
18 Q
And one of the things.Mr. Kosiba reported 19 back to you was that the site problem report procedure
~
20' had-been amended, is that correct?
^
21 A
That's correct.
22 Q
And you understood at the time, did you 23 not, that changes were made in the site problem
['D 24 report to avoid a repetition of the untimely Lf 25 notification offutilities concerning the' Davis-Besse
MacMillan 180 g
2 concerns of the kind raised by Mr. Dunn in his 3
memorandum?-
'4 A
The site problem report procedure was
((
5 modified with the intent of improving the system of 6
reporting and resolving concerns that developed in 7
'the operation of'the B&W NSS.
8 Q
Including,specifically,the type of 9
. concern that was raised by Dunn in his memorandum 10 concerning the Davis-Besse event?
(
11 A
That is one type of concern or field 12 problem which could' fall under the ambit of the site s
13 problem reports, yes.
14 Q
And that was one of the principle focuses, 15 was it not, in terms of improving your site problem 16 reporting procedure?
17 A
Yes, I stated in my letter to Mr. Kosiba 18 that the follow-up of the Davis-Besse incident had 19 indicated untimely resolution and I was trying to 20 make sure that we modified our procedures to Laprove 21 in that area.
I%
22 '
MR. KLINGSBERG:
Why don't we take a 23 break.
/'d 24 (Recess taken.)
.Q.
~ 25, Q-I would like to show you a copy of GPU k
r-
MacMillan 18.1 g
' C-Exhibit 219 previously marked, which is a copy of a 2
memo from Mr. Kosiba to Mr. DeCarli and others, a copy to Mr..MacMillan.
4 A
Y***
- 5 Q
Did you receive Exhibit 219 in the regular 6
cour:2e 'of your duties in or about July 1979?
7 A
I am identified as having been sent a 8
copy.
I don't remember receiving it specifically.
g Q
And this was another me:morandum,was it 10 not, which was responsive to Exhibit 217, your memo to Mr. Kosiba to recommend changes in internal B&W g
(G
,]
procedures following the Davis-Besse and Three Mile g
Island accidents?
-15 E
Y " "9#**
16 4
first paragraph "o" starting with " Investigate i.s 18 pr edures (and practices) for reporting field problems," which states, " Note one change we need to gg make here is tc make clear that if the field problem is first_ perceived and recognized by someone within the_ building, he still has the obligation and the access to initiate a site problem report.
This, for example,_could have been the vehicle for the Bert A../
Dunn memo, instead of having a memo. floating"?
m y
rvw-
=
m y
q Av"
1 MacMillan 182 1
~
-2 A
I'm sorry, your question was did I agree?
3 Q
Did you concur in that recommendation?
4 A
I don't specifically remember concurring
({
5 in that' recommendation. As you indicated previously 6
that has been incorporated in the modified site 7
problem report, that procedure.
8 Q
If you turn the page and look at the 9
last paragraph which' talks about "One additional 10 action I believe to be appropriate.in r,e sp o n r, e to 11 MacMillan's charter is separate from the independent 12 steps of the positive policy and practice for
(>
\\-
13 handling operating experience.
I beli ve that one 14 of the elements of the Davis-Besse experience is that 15-rather than using established channels as a manner 16 of normal practice to raise concerns in such a way 17 that they could be tracked'and followed up, the 18 participants followed a somewhat normal practice of 19 the division of writing a memorandum.
In this 20 instance and in several other problem areas that we 21 have discussed, these memoranda float around the 22 division _and are answered in whole or in part such 23
.that it is very easy for the participants to believe e^s -
24 that action was taken to resolve the problem, when in
.(v)
' 25 fact it has merely been discussed."
- g
.I 1
MacMillan 183 2
were you ever informed of the other 1
3 instances referred to in this quotation apart from 4
the Davis-Besse/Dunn memorandum situation?
(
5 A
I don't recall being informed of any 6-others that would be identified by these -- by this 7
memo.
8 Q
Were you aware, prior to the Three Mile 9
Island accident, that it was normal practice within 10
.your division to write memoranda rather than to put 11 the raising of concerns into either site problem 12 reports or preliminary safety concern documents?
O
-As 13 A
I can't say that I was aware that it was 14 normal practice.
We did have procedures for handling 15 both preliminary safety concerns and site problem 16
. reports which provided a means of reporting and 17-tracking these events.
~
18 I think it ~is better'to handle the i
'19 concerns through those -- through'those-channels.
4 20 It's clear in. retrospect that the Davis-Besse concerns 21 were not handled through either of those channels.
22 On the other hand, I.think it is clear 23 from events that took place following that that we
-(
24 do encourage our. people to speak up and express
. w) -
25 I
.their-concerns and document them in a way that they
~
a
c_
1 MacMillan 184
(~'"s'
\\",)
2 can -- that they can be addressed.
3 Q
I would like to now show you GPU Exhibit 4
251-which is a memo from Roy to Taylor, a copy to
((
5 Mr. MacMillan dated May 15, 1979.
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Is this a memorandum which you received I
8 in the regular course of your duties in or about 9
May 1979 pertaining to procedures for identifying 10 and resolving safety concerns?
L 11 A
I am shown as a recipient of a carbon 12 copy.
13 I don't specifically remember receiving 14 the document b'ut I probably did.
15 Q
Were you aware of the fact that in 16 addition to the action you had initiated through 17 your memorandum to Mr. Kosiba tcat work was being 18 done by Mr. Roy and Mr. Taylor concerning a review
~
19 of your systems and procedure for resolving safety 20 concerns?
21 A
.Yes, I was aware of that.
22
-Q I would like to show you a document which 23 we will mark as an exhibit next in order, which is a l'
)_
24 memo'from Taylor to Roy dated September 4, 1979.
\\_/
25 (Memorandum dated September 4, 1979 from
1 MacMillan 185
_ (D
~'
2 J.
H.
Taylor to D.
H.
Roy marked GPU Exhibit 3
No. 5-30 for identification, as of this date.)
4 A
Yes.
(
5 Q
Have you ever seen Exhibit 530 before?
6 A
I believe I have seen this before, yes.
I 7
Q Have you reviewed it in the regular 8
course of your duties?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Were the items referred td',in this 11 memorandum reviewed with you to determine whether you 12 were in agreement with the concept and details of 13 the formation of a safety review group 7 14 A
I had discussions with Dr. Roy about the 15 recommendation that we form a safety review committee.
16 0
Was a safety review committee in fact 17 formed?
w 18 A
No, it wasn't.
19 Q
It was not.
20 What was the reason that it was not 21 formed?
22 A
In looking at the activities of the 23 safety review' group, I felt that these
()
24 responsibilities could and should be carried out u-
'25 through the - existing Nuclear Power Generation
I 1
MacMillan 186 I
A '
2 Division organization and further I had a concern 3
about.the fundamental philosophical point that in the 4
design of nuclear plants, safety must be the
(
5 responsibility and accountability of the designer 6
and'that actions to set up separate safety review 7
organizations or safety review committees can cloud 8
that clear line of defined responsibility and I did 9
not want to introduce that type of situation in the 10 Nuclear Power Generation Division.
U 1
11
, MR. KLINGSBERG:
Can I have the last 12 part of the answer back, please.
1 3
.s/
13 (Record was read back.)
. 14 Q
What were you referring'to in your answer 15 when you say "the responsibility of the designer"?
16 Who was the designer?
Do you mean the whole NPGD?
l 17 A
No' the de' signer is the individual 18 engineer who is responsible fordevelopinhthe systems
-19 and the equipment that go into those systems and the
~
20 method of operhtion for those systems.
It's not a.
21 whole broad group responsibility, it E s e.; individual 22 responsibility of the. engineer working on whatever 23
.his particular equipment responsibility might be.
'['N 24 Q_
.But that in terms of a nuclear-steam
(_)
L 25-
. supply: system is not. one person?
om.m--
1 MacMillan 187
[
2 A
No, it's a number of persons in each 3
responsible.for different segments of the scope.
4 Q
In the B&W Nuclear Power Generation
(
5 Division?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
And were those people also responsible 8
for informing the utility of the basis on which the 9
equipment they have designed and supplied should be 10 operated, particularly as it applies to emergency 1:
11 procedures?
12 MR. FISKE:
You mean those same people
%-)
13 that do the design?
14 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Yes.
15' A
The definition of how equipment should
'16 be operated is communicated to the utility in our 17 draft operating procedures and the design,er has the 18 responsibility for assuring that those are consistent 19 with his design.
20 Q
Do the. designers also have responsibility 21_
.for seeing to it that there have been safety analyses L
22 to take'into account,such things as the likely 23 breaks in the system?
,/~'V 24 A
The designer would be responsible for
%,f 25 identifying-what' kind of safety analyses-ought to be
~a
-,-r
1 MacMillan 188 2
performed and he probably would not actually do the 3
analysis himself but he would be aware of the results 4
of the analysis.
(
5 Q
And is it essential to the development 6
of the draft operating procedures to know what the 7
results of those safety analyses are?
8 A
Well, I would say' generally yes.
9 Q
The safety analyses are an important 10 factor in the drafting of the operating procedures, 11 are they not?
12 A
They are really more of an important O...
1 13 factor in the drafting of the emergency procedures.
14 Q.
Yes.
15 A
The operating procedures themselves deal 16 more with normal operation.
17 Q
Yes.
18 A
Which would not be particularly. impacted 19 by the safety analyses.
20 Q
In what way do the safety analyses relate 21 to the emergency procedure drafting?
L.
22 A
Well, the~ emergency procedures and the' 23 design of the safety equipment are predicated on 24 certain assumptions with respect to what equipment 25 will be operational under what conditions and also
1 g-MacMillan 189
' lV integral with that is the are the steps which 2
would'be_inyolved in the emergency procedure for dealing with a malfunction of the equipment in that 4
c system.
6 Those assumptions are input data for the safety analyses.
The safety analyses then are 7
8 calculations which predict what will happen in the ase of an equipment. failure and demonstrate that, 9
in that event, that the equipment will perform within 10 the guidelines of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission gg 12 requirements and regulations.
13 Q
And that whole function is performed, in the case of B&W equipment, by B&W, is that correct?
g4 A
As it applies to our equipment, it's 15 4
16 perf rmed by us and supplied to the utility for submittal to the NRC.
1, 18 Q
In performing that function, was B&W 19 supposed to analyze-all likely or probable ~ breaks-in their rea tor coolant system?
20 A
Well, we don'_t analyze all likely or 21 22 probable breaks.
It is practice in the industry to evaluate those breaks which are the most severe and 23
' p) then to satisfy ourselves that breaks at other 24
\\s.
1 cati ns or other sizes.are no more -- the consequence 25
-=
1 MacMillan 190
_ f~s,
\\
_ -)~
2 is no more severe in the case that we did the 3'
-extensive and specific analysis on.
4 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident,
([
5 had B&W done analyses specifically directed to breaks 6
of the size below
.05 square inches which is about i
7 the size of the break resulting from a stuck open 8
PORV at the top of the pressurizer?
9 A
.05 square inches or square feet?
10 MR. FISKE:
Hold it just one minute.
11 Q
.05 square feet.
Correct.
12 MR. FISKE:
Let's hear the question again,
[
k.
13 please.
14 (Record was read back.)
15 MR. FISKE:
I think that may be a little e
16 confusing there.
17 Off the. record.
18 (Discussion off the record.)
19 MR. KLINGSBERG:
I will reframe the 20 question.
~
21 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, k
22 had B&W done analyses specifically directed to a break 23 in the reactor coolant system which-was of the size y.s.
4
}
24 '
of a stuck.open PORV at the top of the pressurizer?
_,./
25' A.
Are you asking me did I know before the
1 MacMillan 192 e~
\\-
2 Three Mile Island whether we had or had not?
3 Q
.Yes.
4 A
I did not know at that point.
(
5 Q
Are you familiar with a document called G
the Michelson report which discusses this question?
7 A
I am familiar with a document that's 8
usually referred to as the Michelson report.
9 Q
Had you ever seen that before the Three 10 Mile Island accident?
t 11 A
I had not.
12 Q
Had the concerns raised by Michelson
(_,
13 concerning analyses of small breaks been brought to 14 your attention before the accident?
15 A
, It had not.
g 16 Q
I would like to show you'GPU Exhibit 252 17 which is a package of information relatin,g to the 18 10 CFR 21 proceeding before the NRC involving B&W
~
19 and I am particularly interested in directing your 20 attention in the first instance to the attached 21.
revisions of the policies and procedures relating C
22 to processing of safety concerns which are appended.
23 A
Yes.
['T 24 Q
Were you aware.of the-fact that changes
' 't,i 25 had been made in your preliminary safety concern E
w
1 MacMillan 192 2
procedures in order to deal with what you regarded 3
as deficiencies shown by the Davis-Besse and Three 4
Mile Island events?
({
5 A
No, I was aware that we had modified our 6
procedures to improve them.
7 Q
But to improve them specifically in 8
relation to things, lessons you learned as a result 9
of Three Mile Island and Davis-Besse?
10 A
That was a primary motivation, yes.
11 Q
And is it also a fact that one of the 12 things you wanted to accomplish in these revisions
\\--)
13 is to provide assurance that safety co cerns would 14 be raised and reported and processed by B&W employees 15 regardless of the form in which the concerns 16 originally arose?
17 A
That's correct.
18 Q
Am I correct, alco, that the $evision 19 of the preliminary safety con ern report e'xtended 20 preliminary saf ety concern rr. ports specifically to 21
_ include training and operations activities?
i k_
22 MR.-FISKE:
We will agree that that is 23 what it says.
[)
24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
What?
N -.
25 MR. FISKE:
I said we will agree that
1 MacMillan 193 lf y U
2 that is what it says.
3 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Well, I would like the 4
witness to read it.
](f 5
A It includes an entire class of activities 6
including training and operations activities, f
7 Q
And was one of the lessons which was 8
learned as a result of the Davis-Besse and Three Mile 9
Island experiences was that inadequate attention had i
10 been given to evaluating operating experience and 11 training activities in connection with preliminary 12 safety concerns?
(~h
+
(s) 13 MR. FISKE:
Well, wait a second.
14 THE WITNESS:
I would like to hear that 15 question.
16 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
17 (Record was read back.)
18 MR. FISKE:
I think I am going'to object 19 to the form of that question.
20 If you are asking him about whether 21 after the Three Mile. Island accident he felt k[
22 that the-Davis-Besse experience could have been i
23 resolved more promptly, I think he told you
[~}
24 that several times. But you have a lot of "was" v
25 words in the_ question.and I think I am going
1 MacMillan 194
.(-)
~
'\\-') ~
2 to object to it in its present form.
3 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Do you want to hear the 4
question again?
(
5 THE WITNESS:
I would like to hear the 6
question.
7 (Record was read back.)
8 A'
Mr. Klingsberg, I would like to divide 9
my answer into two parts, the first dealing with the 10 lessons learned from Three Mile Islani with respect 11 to the attention that was given to evaluation of 12 operating experience and-training, I think I felt,and
.O k
I' s
13 I believe it was widely felt in the industry, that 14 more attention needed to be directed toward that 15 operating experience and training throughout the 16 nuclear industry following Three Mile Island.
17 The second part of your question was 18 directed at whether or not that review of experience, 19 operating experience and training, was inadequate 20 with respect to'the evaluation of preliminary safety 21 concerns and I don't believe that's quite right.
22 I think the thrust of these modifications 23 and revisions in the procedures were to try to
~[v]
24 encourage and make sure that our employees utilize 25 these procedures for identifying safety concerns so
-t 1
MacMillan 195
.g."
') ~
2 that they could be correctly resolved in a timely t
3 fashion.
4 Q
I would like to show you your testimony
(;
5 in a deposition before the Kemeny Commission, page 6
61.
7 Particularly I direct your attention to 8
the question which begins at line 17, which says, 9
"Would it be fair to say that another lesson learned 10 not presented by Mr. Favret was the question of 11 attention to experience as to previous operating 12 experience, particularly with respect to the Os/
13 Davis-Besse September 1977 transient?
14
" Answer:
Well, let me say that I believe 15 that the importance of evaluating operating experience 16 and feeding that back into the training programs 17 and the procedures for an operating unit.was an t
18
.important lesson learned and I would have put that'in i
19 the general category of operator effectiveness."
20 were you asked that question and did you 21
.give that answer in your testimony before the Kemeny i
22 commission deposition?
l 23 A-Yes.
..- ['[
24 Q
'And was that an accurate answer at the m;
25 time?
4-
=3 y
e e -
1 MacMlllan 196
(
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
And is it accurate today?
4 A
I believe so.
(
5 Q
What is an SBOG7 6
.A If I see the context in which it is used, 7
I could probably answer that.
8 Q
Sure.
9' MR. KLINGSBERG:
I will withdraw that 10 question.
t 11 Q
Would you look at one of the attachments 12 which is.a memorandum from the managers of departments O
\\_/
, 13 of engineering and customer service, et cetera, dated 14 April 10, 1980, particularly the second page.
15 The bottom of the first page and the 16 second page, please.
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Is it a fact that the assignment of
~
19 priorities to. preliminary safety concerns was a new 20 procedure implemented after the Three Mile Island 21, accident?
22 MR. FISKE:
You mean assignment of l
23 relative priority?
1[
24 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Yes.
w 25 A
I believe that was so.
I do know that we l
1 x(
1 MacMillan 197 j'~).
2 did modify the procedure at that time to try to put 3
some time limits on the closure or completion of the 4
evaluation and I believe the priority issue was also
-(
5 implemented at that time.
6 Q
Priority 1 is " Operating plant high 7
probability event."
8 What is your understanding of what that 9
means?
10 A
My understanding would be that it would 11 be a preliminary safety concern that was applicable 12 to a plant that was in operation or more than one 13 plant in operation and that the concern that was
~
14 raised had a high likelihood of being experienced-15 by that operating plant or operating plants.
16 Q
Would a PORV getting stuck open be a 4
17 high probability event?
18 MR. FISKE:
You mean today?
19 MR. KLINGSBERG:
We will take'it today.
20 A
My' opinion, and this is my judgment, 21 PORV's being stuck open would not be a high
- k_
22 probability event in that I would expect it to happen 23 once'a month.
[)-
24 Q-Once a month would not be a high Nj-
~25 probability event?
e
1 MacMillan 198 2
A I say once a month would be a high 3
probability. event.
4 Q
Oh, it would be.
((
5 Do you know whether the various departments 6
have been informed as to what is a high probability 7
event versus a low probability event?
8 A
I don't know.
I believe the priority, 9
or the assignment of assining priorities resides 10 with the leasing section.
t 11 Q
Item C, it says, "The licensing section 12 will maintain status records and all preliminary O
13 safety concerns and will provide a monthly status 14 report to the a.bove department manager."
15 There are two things in there, you can 16 answer this separately or together, but as it a 17 fact that neither of those things was done before 18 the Three Mile Island accident?
19 A.
From personal knowledge, I couldn't 20 answer the question.
21 Q
Is it a fact that item 4, which was L
22 setting a date for closure, "Where operating plants affected,'a very significant safety is involved 23 are 24 and customer action is required," is something that 25 was not part of the procedure before the Three Mile
1 MacMillan 199
~
(
\\~J-
'2 Island accident?
3 A
The setting of closure dates or time 4
limits for evaluation was added to the procedure
(
'5 following Three Mile Island.
6 Q
Is it a-fact that a purpose of the i
7 Babcock & Wilcox preliminary. safety concern 8
procedures, even before the Three Mile Island 9
accident, was to comply with Part 21 requirements 10 in connection with notifying the NRC and utilities 11 of substantial safety hazards?
12 A
The preliminary safety concern procedure 13 was the vehicle by which we internally conformed to 14 '
that 10 CFR 21 requirement, i
15 Q
And it was to assure notification to 16 utilities as well as others,'was it not, of 17 substantial safety concerns?
I 18
~ A Well, 10 CFR 21 is.a requirement to I
19 notify the NRC or to be assured that the.N'RC had been 20 notified.
21 Our practice in general was-to alert the 22 affected utility to provide them with the opportunity 23 of reporting and if they did not report in, I believe I ;[ \\
24-it's 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, then we had an obligation to report
.LJ 25 directly.
c l-
- 1 1
MacMillan 200 2
Q.
I would like to show you GPU Exhibit 95 3.
which is the B&W policy and procedure relating to 4
reporting of defects and noncompliance concerning
(
5 safety in effect on 12/6/77.
6 I am just going to address a particular 7
Part of this.
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Was it the policy of B&W as stated in 10 paragraph 2 at page 2 at the time in 19.77 that when 11 it is determined that a defect or noncompliance 12 exists in material or services supplied to a customer t ' f' ' '
13 for use in a nuclear faciligy, the customer and the 14 Commission shall be notified unless there is evidence 15 that the customer has notified the Commission within 16 the required '48-hour period?
i 17 A
Yes.
~
18 Q
In connection'with the inquiries that 19 you made concerning the handling of the Davis-Besse 20 matter,-did you reach any conclusions on whether 21 the preliminary safety concern procedures as they 22 then' stood would have required the concerns expressed 23 in the Dunn memo to be identified as a preliminary
' 24 safety concern?
3.,
25 A-In reviewing the Dunn memorandum'and the
~
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y m
n
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4
~
MacMillan 203 g
2 concerns that were expressed, I believe that those 3
would normally legitimately be an issue that should 4
he covered by the preliminary safety concern.
5 Q
And if those concerns had been identified 6
in a preliminary safety concern report, do you believe 7
they would have been resolved in a more expeditious a
W I
8 manner?
9 MR. FISKE:
I am going to object to that, 10 Mr. Klingsberg.
That is just asking him for 11 present speculation.
12 I don't think Mr. MacMillan has to 13 answer that question.
[
i 14 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Are you directing him 15 not to answer?
4 16 MR. F IS KE :
Yes, I think I will.
1 i
17 MR. KLINGSBERG:
He has already so 18 testified.
~
19 MR. FISKE:
Well, if you want to read 20 him his-prior testimoiy, maybe.that-will j
al resolve the issue but I think it is an
{-
+
22 inappropriate question at this time, i
23 MR. KLINGSBERG:
Are you directing him.
I s'
P)
J ' X'
-(
24 not to-answer?
consistent with a jolicy' 25 MR. FIS KE :
- Yes, p.
......, ~
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t 4
+
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t.
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.)
I 5
q 1
/MacMillan 202 i
n i
i'7 A
l 0, )
b 2
establi.khed on both sides which I don't want i
1 3-to waive.
J 4
Q.
As a' result of the meeting that you had 4
m
('
5 on Davis-Besse and the discussions that you had at t
'.I 1
.C, or about the time following,the Davis-Besse event in il s
7
'1977, you bec.ame aware of the fact,,did you not,
?
7
\\
8 that n'c. prelimin ary safety concern report had been y.
l
\\ l f
']f
\\.pr,e, pared or filed withi,n B&W7
/19 y%*
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- .- s
,i.
3 7;
.,.10 MR. FISKE:
,Can I hear that question t
./
p
-f
'3 t.[,1 il bg i
i
.again, please.
y
'y r
y' ' ',r
/
I
/ 2 d2
(. Record was read back.)
1 x p.
Q
~
g 7'
_A
.Well, Mr. K1'in5sberg, I h.'i't e testified 13 f-4,3 y
r.
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g 1
I<
sthat I was unaware of :the coheerns that Mr. Dunn l))14 4 [
- (1/
.i s
r
?
fi{
! ' had raised until after the Three Mile Island accident
.,/
l.,ri
/
}I 7s
_+, i,,
16 l, so that in the time frame of late 1977 I had no I
- ((n knowledge of the concernr which he expros, sed.
4 s
4 y
f
., / ' ',s -
I-.
); jj e.
) f } lllli>
y l
l 3'.r/
\\5 18' Therefore -.and. therefor"e Iswas not aware of
.c+
p,'
s,
'} whettje'rf'a,PSC had been filed
~
-C-19' had not been.
\\
- 20. ]
,O\\ '
Q In the discussions'which you had in your
\\a
/cg' Je
_/
- 4o fice, did,you obtain an understanding as to whether
,21
@f,l
, ( [V,oa,[PS C I al&> b f * ~'
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s
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22
.A J
pn ' prepared or would be prepaa ed a
l14l 1
/
- v. 3,
. :ry(,S,;>
,7,
c; vi 23 relating t Davis Ppsse?
l f//' p y'N l ' sh{ ts 21 f'
MR.
.t w
,p
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l' h, S KTi:
f I think he answered that 8 % <J :f p y,,a
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-. ~ $ #y '}
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quest @on yds'terday.
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'r 0 % :h',vlp;., V)s ' -'. , ; f, f'. t ^ ~ng - - r;, i ' l /,,j/ 7
- 4 9,: b_
.1 v 'r (_ a x r-m f .. 7 a, m i-..) / tl I M. 'T* 9 41 (( h I'., i # J-a, k l ~' 174?,1 1 6 U */' s _o; .. E -A .. d.4 L. u
1 MacMillan 203 CT 2 A I don't I don't remember in those 3 discussions there was any discussion of PSC. The 4 Primary thrust of that meeting was to review the (( 5 impact of the transient on the pressure boundary 6 at Davis-Besse and to understand what had caused 7 the PORV to fail and what corrective measures had 8 been taken to make sure that that type of failure 9 did not occur again and whether or not those measures 10 should be taken at other operating plants. 11 Q In the various interviews which you 12 conducted which you have testified about this [/\\ N. 13 morning, did you ascertain any facts as to any 14 reasons why the concerns expressed by Kelly or Dunn 15 had not been put into a PSC? 16 MR. FISKE: Well, Mr. Klingsberg, I have 17 no objection to the thrust of the question but 18 I think it is inappropriate to characterize 19 those as interviews. 20 MR. KLINGSBERG: All right. 21 Q In the discussions. k 22 A. I don't recall that we discussed the PSC 23 - in those discussions,'that was not, as I testified (J~) 24 carlier, the primary purpose of my meeting with those l 25 peoP e. m
1 MacMillan 204 C) ~ 2 Q Are you aware of the fact that one of 3 the changes in policies and procedures was to, 4 following the Three Mile Island accident, was to ( 5 shift the responsibility for determining whether 6 matters raised in a site problem report constituted 7 a possible safety concern from the Nuclear Service-l 8 Support Division to the engineering division? 9 A I guess I wasn't aware of that. 10 Q You are not aware of that? 11 A I don't believe so. 12 Q Are you aware of any consideration of O 13 the inadequacies or lack of abilities of the Nuclear 14-Service Support Division to have made the appropriate 15 determinations in^ connection with the Davis-Besse l 16 event? 17 A I am not sure I understand your question. 18 Q Was there any consideration after the 19 fact that the Nuclear Service Support Division was 20 lacking in capability-to make a full and accurate-21 determination of safety concerns and therefore that 22 responsibility should be shifted to the engineering 23 department? r ( 24 A I don't recall any discussions along that - v, 25 line, no.
I 1 MacMillan 205 ,/- 's 2 Q Coming back to Exhibit 252 for a moment, 3 did you make the determination that B&W should 4 respond to the NRC's charges by paying the fine? ( 5 A I made the decision that we should take 6 that action and recommended that course of action 7 to my superiors. 8 Q Apart from discussions with counsel, 9 did you undertake any inquiries other than those you l 10 have already talked about relating to Babcock & l 11 Wilcox's position in regard to the accuracy or the 12 inaccuracy of the NRC's charges? 13 MR. FISKE: Could I hear the question 14 again, please. 15 (Record was read back.) 16 A Mr. Klingsberg, I am not sure that I 17 can be entirely responsive to your questi.on. 18 Having received the letter, [ am a 19 confident that I discussed the charges with my -- 20 with members of my staff to ascertain their assessment 21 of the validity of the charges. 22 'There were, as you can imagine, a number 23 of discussions in'this time frame, many'of which ( 24 involved counsel and I am not sure I'can recall 25 specifically what those~ discussions were or who was a
i 1 MacMillan 206 2 involved in them. 3 MR. KLINGSBERG: This is an appropriate 4 break point. ( 5 'MR. FISKE ' Fine. 6 MR. KLINGSBERG: And if we could come i 7 back, say, at a quarter to 2, that would assure 8 us finishing on time. 9 .MR. FISKE: Fine. 10 (.Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken 11 at 12:26 p.m.) 12 13 14 15 16 -17 18 19 ~ 20 21 22 23 - 24-25
1 207 2 (AFTERNOON SESSION) 3 (Date: June 10, 1982) 4 (Time noted: 1:33 p.m.) [ 5 JOHN HE NRY MacMILLAN, .N 6 resumed, having been previously duly sworn, 7 was examined and testified further as follows: 8 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.) 9 BY MR. KLINGSBERG: 10 Q It is a fact, is it not, that Babcock & 11 Wilcox sells what is called a pressurizer water 12 reactor? 13 A They sell pressurized wated reactors. 14 Q Pressurized water reactors. 15 A Yes. 16 Q And that is distinguished fr m. boiling 17 water reactors which are sold by some of,your 18 competitors? 19 A One of our competitors. 20 Q GE? 21 A Yes. There are other reactor types, 22 gas-cooled reactors, sodium-cooled reactors. 23 Q Westinghouse also sells pressurized (T 24 water reactors?
- J 25 A
Yes.
l 1 MacMillan 208 4 2 Q And indeed Westinghouse is your leading E 3 competitor in the sale of pressurized water reactors, i 4 is it not? l( 5 A They have the largest market share in 6 pressurized water reactors, yes. 7 Q Have you had occasion, prior to the 8 Three Mile Island accident, to compare the Babcock & i 9 Wilcox design of pressurized water reactors with i ' 10 the Westinghouse design? O -11 A Are you asking me did I? 12 Q Yes. 13 A Have a comparison? 14 - Q Yes. 15 A As manager of. engineering and earlier ~ e 16 than that in the -- in my design life, we, yes, we -17 used to maintain a comparison of the two. products. 18 Q Later on even when you got t[ be a vice . 19 -president, NPGD, you_were aware, were you not' of the 20 salient differences.between ~ the two designs? 21 .A Yes. -22. Q Bab' cock &'Wilcox had as a central part of-its design what was called the once-through steam 23 : e . 24. generator, is_that correct? 25 A Yes. u-l l z y.m --,m+. y-,.%,,,,-.-,-c, ny,.,,~.-....,,
1 MacMillan 209 i 2 Q Could you explain what is meant by the 3 once-through steam generator that you had as compared 4 with what Westinghouse had? ( 5 A Basically the once-through steam 0 generator is a heat exchanger in which the pressurized 7 water which is used to cool the reactor flows down 8 through steam generator tubes from the top to the 9 bottom and discharges at the bottom of the generator. 10 Feedwater from the steam system which is used to 11 drive the turbine to generate electricity is admitted 12 to the once-through steam generator and flows upward (}^ 13 around the outside of the tubes, absorbs the heat 14 from the outer reactor coolant through the walls of 15 the tubes, is completely converted to steam and c 16 somewhat superheated by the time it reaches the top 4 17 of the steam generator and is discharged from there 18 to the turbine. ~ 19 The word "once-through" describes the 20 flow of feedwater coming into the bottom of the 1 .I 21 steam generator passing directly over the outside j 22 of the tubes as it rises-through the steam generator 23 and then being discharged at the top of the steam [') 24 generator'as superheated steam without any internal ~ G /- 25 recirculation. 1 ,G.
1 MacMillan 210 0 2 Q Go ahead. 3 A The recirculating steam generator, which 4 is provided by Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering, ( 5 has a different configuration. In that steam generator, 6 the tubes through which the reactor coolant flows 7 are in the shape of a U and are located in the 8 generator in an inverted U configuration, the high 9 temperature water from the reactor enters one side 10 of the bottom of the steam generator, flows up through 11 the tubes, around the U and back down and discharges 12 on the other side of the bottom of the steam [~h \\' 13 generator. 14 The feedwater is introduced around these 15 U tubes and is contained -- well, let me modify 16 that. 17 The feedwater is introduced around these 18 tubes and as it boils, steam is released at -- in a ~ 19 steam drum at the top of the steam generator but 20 a major.part of the.feedwater recirculates internally 21 and comes back down to the bottom of the tube L 22 bundle as it boils off and steam is formed and the 23 feedwater rises and then recirculates so that there r-( )l 24 is internal recirculation-of the feedwater on the u. 25 secondary side of'the Westinghouse generators. ~And
1 MacMillan 211 d~ 2 thereby they get the name recirculating steam 3 generators. 4 They deliver saturated steam, steam at ( 5 exactly the saturation temperature of the pressure 6 on the secondary side of the steam generators whereas 7 the once-through steam generator delivers superheated 8 steam slightly above the saturation temperature for 9 the pressure on the steam side. 10 That's the distinguishing difference ,11 between the once-through steam generator and the 12 recirculating steam generator. [h ~ \\ '- 13 Q Now, is it a fact that on the Westinghouse 14 steam generator the tubea that you described are 15 all submerged whereas ca the B&W once-through 16 generator the tubes are only about half. submerged? 17 A on the Westinghouse steam gen,erator, the 18 tube bundle is under water. 19 Q Yes. ~ 20 A or a mixture of water and steam, but it 21 is below the free ~ surface of the water within the 22 -steam generator and on the once-through steam 23 generator, water on the steam side, on the secondary n(v; 24 side will vary in elevation from maybe=25 percent 25_ of~the height.of the generator up.to 75-or 80 percent,
I i 'l MacMillan 212 f 2 depending on the power level. The water level in i 3 the steam generator is higher at full power than 4 it is at low power. ( 5 Q Would it be more than halfway up at full 6 power? ~ 7 A I have to make a definition of terms 8
- here, 9
Q All right. 10 A We define the percentage of the steam 11 generator that is used for boiling as that portion 12 of the steam _ generator in which there is a mixtsre ("h \\J' 13 of steam and water and as you go up the generator, 14 - you convert more and more water to steam and ultimately 15 .it all becomes steam. 16 The level at which full steam is achieved 17 at high' power,. full power, is_probably in,the range 18 of 75 percent of the height of the steamhenerator. ~ 19 Q So would you say that the amount of heat 20 that is removed by the steam generator from the 21 ' system, from the primary system, varies with the 22 water level? 23 A' The level in the generator _at which you i[ l\\ 24 . achieve _100 percent steam varies.with'the amount of 25-heat-that you are transferring or the power level. y
1 MacMillan 213 J 2 Q The more power level, the more heat you 3 have to remove, correct? 4 A That's right. So the more surface ([ 5 you need to accomplish that, so the further up into 6' the generator this transition level occurs. 7 Q The further up in the generator of the 8 amount of water on the secondary side, the greater 9 amount of heat removal? 10 A The higher the level of heat removal, 11 the higher the elevation in the steam generator at 12 which you achieve 100 percent steam. O. '13 Q Right. 14 Now, one of the things that you tried 15 to achieve in the operation of a nuclear steam supply e 16 system is that.there has to be.a balance between 17 the amount.of heat generated by the reactor and the 18 amount that is removed through the steam generator, 10 is that correct? 20 A In any stable condition there, they are - 21 equal, they are the same. k 22 Q Right .23 Now,.there.are from time to time in the ) 24 course of operations upsets that decrease this level w/ 25 in the steam generator, is that correct?- mm r-r r-
1 MacMillan 234 2 A You can have upsets that decrease or 3 upsets that. increase, depending on the character. 4 Q One of the things that would decrease (( 5 the level would be a loss, a reduction of feedwater? 6 A That's correct. 7 Q As a matter of fact, that is what 8 happened at Davis-Besse, correct? 9 A Yes, I believe that's right. They had 10 a loss of feedwater as the initiating event there. 11 Q And that is what happened at Three Mile 12 Island No. 27 %~) 13 A That's correct. 14 Q A turbine trip can also cause a reduction 15 in steam generator level, is that correct? e 16 A No, that isn't necessarily correct. 17 Q I mean it could happen? f 18 A In a turbine trip condition, 5'ou stop 19 removing steam from the steam generator while you are . 20 continuing to pump feedwater in so in fact you 21 probably increase the amount of feedwatar in the 22 steam generator. 1 Q If you'have:a reductior it removal -l f') 24 when you have a turbine trip -- - \\_) 25. A. That's correct. e -~e + s y
.. ~ ~ b 1. MacMillan' 215 2 Q -- because the turbine stops operating 3 so there is less heat removal from the primary 3 4 system? ( 5 A That's correct. i 6 Q And the nuclear steam supply system is i 7 designed, is it not, to deal with a turbine trip, ) 8 deal with it safely? 9 A Yes. 10 Q You mentioned yesterday intyour 11 testimony, I think, that prior to the Three Mile .12. Island accident, one of the features of the BabcEck & '13 Wilcox design was'that they had set points in which 14- 'the reactor could be kept on line even if you had a 15 turbine trip, is that correct? e 16 A-That's correct. 17 Q And in order to do that -- we,ll, let's 18 go back. ..19-If you have a turbine trip, you.would 20 ordinarily have pressure, temperature and pressurizer-s ~ 21. level in_the primary system going up, is that ? (_ 22 correct?. ju 'A That's correct. 24 'Q And thereforefin order-to deal-with this Q; l n-rise [in' pressure without h'aving-a reactor 1 trip, your ~ 4 i- ..w- -w-ew. .m 2.w g g g_., -p... g
1 MacMillan 236 O ~ 2 design, prior to the Three Mile Island accident, 3 relied on the pilot operated relief valve to open 4 and release pressure, is that correct? ([ 5 A That's only correct at certain power 6 levels. If your turbine trips when you are at low 7 power, that relief valve will not open. If your 8 turbine trips at full power, then the relief valve 9 will open. 10 Q And following the accident,.those set 11 points that you recommended to your utility customers 12 who had your equipment were to change the set poi ~nts O 13 in order to have the reactor trip earlier, is that 14 correct? 15 A Following the accident and review of the 16 accident with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we 17 did recommend that they change the set p o,in t s of the 18 reactor scram and the pilot operated relief valve 19 setting so the reactor would scram before ~ he pilot t 20 operated relief valve opened. 21 Q Despite the fact that the PORV opens L 22 well, it can come about, can it not, that even if 23 the pilot operated relief valve opens to relieve ( 24 pressure, you might still under certain circumstances 25 have a reactor trip even under the old set points?
1 MacMillan 217 O 2 A It's possible to postulate an accident 3 sequence in.which you could have the pilot operated 4 relief valve open and have the pressure continue ( 5 to the level at which the reactor would scram. That 6 was not the normal expectation in the event of a 7 turbine trip. 8 Q And in that event, the steam generator 9 would be removing -- in the event that the reactor 10 tripped, the steam generator would start removing 11 more heat than is being generated by the reactor, is 12 that correct? O-13 A I can't. answer that question directly 14 because it depends on what other things are happening 15 in the steam system or the steam system valves, 16 safety valves opening, is the turbine bypass valv'e 17 open? There's no simple answer. 18 Q That is a possibility? ~ 19 A That's a possibility, yes. 20 Q And in that event, pressure, temperature 21 and pressurl=er level would go down, is that correct? L 22 A Are you saying in that case temperature, 23 pressure and pressuri=er level would go down? Yes. ( 24 You said that if the PORV opens I asked 25 you if the PORV opens, can you still have a reactor
1 MacMillan 218 ). ~- 2 trip, would one of the circumstances where that would 3 he a normal expectation even under the old set 4 points be when you had' a loss' of feedwater? ( 5 A I believe the answer to that is yes. 1 6 Q If you have a situation where the reactor 7 trips and the steam generator is removing more heat 8 than is being generated and temperature, pressure 9 and pressurizer level is going down, that is sometimes 10 called an overcooling event, is that right? 11 A Well,' I am not sure that specific 12 sequence is usually called overcooling but (~) l 13 overcooling refers to the fact that you are taking 14 more heat out of the reactor coolant system through 15 the steam generators than you are putting into the 16 reactor coolant system through the reactor. 4 17 Q And if the pressure, temperat.ure and 18 pressurizer level are going down, then your ~ 19 procedures'even before the Three Mile Island accident 20 provided for the operators to htart the high i 21 pressure injection, is that-correct? 22 MR. FISKE: Well, I don't know whether 23 it was -- are you asking Mr. MacMillan did he p') 24 understand that before the accident what the (tj 25 procedures required? l
1 MacMillan 239 O ~ 2 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes, did they require 3 HPI to.be put up. 4 MR. FISKE: I don't understand the ( 5 predicate for the question. ,6 Q When you have a reactor trip and 7 temperature and pressurizer level coming down, would, 8 under those circumstances, at particular points under 9 the old procedures, the operators start the high 10 pressure injection? e 11 A I don't know what the specific procedure 12 said. I haven't seen those procedures but I do know b \\# 13 that at a number of utilities', when they had a 14 reactor trip and pressure, temperature and level 15 were coming down, that they would turn on a second 16 makeup pump. 17 Q Yes. 18 A Now, that's not the same as actuating 19 high pressure injection. ~ 20 Q But that would add water into the system? 21 A Yes.' 22 ' " - Q And that would be done even if there 23 wasn't a loss of coolant accident? -( Q - 24 ' MR. FISKE: You mean according to these x/ 25 procedures at the different utilities? l l
1 MacMillan 220 2 MR. KLINGSBERG: Right. 3 A In the event of a reactor trip with 4 pressure, tsmperature and level coming down, the I 5 operators woui_ actuate a second makeup pump, yes. 6 Q The makeup pump and the high pressure 7 injection pump on most of these units was the same 8 pump, wasn't it? 9 A They served the dual purpose in most e 10 cases, yes. il Q Now, prior to the Three Mile Island j 12 accident, thers had been a numbe'r of situations, had v 13 there not, when either the operators wo 1d have to 14 start the makeup pumps or HPI came on automatically 15 in your B&W units? e 16 MR.:FISKE: Are you asking whether 17 Mr. MacMillan was aware of that? 18 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes, whether he was ~ 19 aware of that before the accident. ~ 20 A Yes,,I think there were circumstances 21 where that_ happened. '22 Q If this was an overcooling situation, 23 ^ then thgoperators under the procedures and guidelines fh () 24 would have to throttle back the high pressure 25. Jinjection, would they not, after the pressurizer _ =. _ -
1 MacMillan 221 0 2 level went back u,p? 3 A Well, Mr. Klingsberg, you are getting 4 into an area where I don't really feel I am an 5 expert. 6 Q Yes. 7 A It involves a complex operation of the 8 plant under a variety of circumstances and I don't 9 think I can give you any just straightforward answer. 10 Q Let me ask you this. Weretyou aware of 11 the fact that as compared with a Westinghouse unit, 12 the Babcock & Wilcox once-through generator set up on O 13 the way your set points were resulted in a greater 14 reliance on the pilot operated relief valve opening 15 under certain circumstances? 16 A I was aware that on the Westinghouse 17 design, their pressure settings were arranged so that 18 the reactor would scram before it reached the ~ 19 pressure at which the pilot operated relief valve 20 would open. 21 Q Yes. 22 A And to that extent, transients of the 23 character that you mentioned, turbine trips, would 24 not as frequently require the operation of the pilot 25 operated relief valve.
1 MacMillan 222 '_T] 2 Q Were you also aware of the fact that on 3 B&W type once-through generator units as compared 4 with the Westinghouse, that the use of makeup pumps l 5 or high pressure injection would be more frequent 6 than in a Westinghouse unit? 7 THE WITNESS: Can I hear that question 8 again, please. 9 (Record was read back.) 10 MR. FISKE: Those are only two different 11 questions. 12 MR. KLINGSBERG: He said the makeup pdmp 13 and the HPI served a dual purpose. 14 MR. FISKE: It's the same pump but they 15 serve, I think, different purposes. It would e 16 be helpful if you broke it up. 17 A I would-like to distinguish between the 18 makeup function and the high pressure injection pump. 19 Q You can do that in your answer'. 20 A .While the pumps are the same pumps, 21 one function is a normal makeup to the1 reactor coolant 22 system to offset for the letdown that you are using 23 for cleaning up on a continuing basis, cleaning up n. - (,j 24 the reactor coolant. In transients where your 25 pressurizer level gets.out of certain areas, you will
1 MacMillan, 223 2 increase or decrease makeup flow. 3 Q Right. 4 A That's one function. ( 5 The other function,which is an emergency 6 core cooling system function, is one in which these 7 pumps are automatically started. 8 Q Yes. 9 A And they are intended to continue 10 operation to supply emergency' cooling to the reactor 11 coolant system. That's a separate function and is 12 initiated by a separate set of instrumentation an'd 13 a separate set of events. 14 Now let me hear your question again. 15 Q My question is in the case, for example, 16 of makeup flow, would there be more actuation of 17 the reliance on the makeup pumps on your unit than 18 on the Westinghouse? 19 A I can't say that I would, as a' 20 generality, believe that that was necessarily true. 21 Q Were you aware of the fact, prior to the 22 TMI accident, that in the event of a reactor trip, 23 if pressure, temperature and pressurizer level start ( 24 going down, that that would ordinarily happen faster 25 in a B&W unit than in a Westinghouse?
) o 1 MacMillan 224 f^) (_/. 2 A You are talking about the time frame 3 before the Three Mile Island accident? 4 -Q Yes. ( 5 A I think I had a general recognition of 6 that. 7 Q Have you ever heard the expression 8 " bucking bronco" as applied to the Babcock & Wilcox 9 unit? 10 A Yes, sir. e 11 Q Did you hear that expression before the 12 Three Mile Island accident? 13 A No. 14 Q What does that term convey to you? 15 A The occasion on which I recall hearing 16 the term " bucking bronco" to describe the B&W system 17 was in the congressional hearings, I beli, eve it was 18 Senator Hart's committee, in shich he rai$ed the 19 question about whether or not I would agre'e with 20 the comment that our unit was much more s eris itiv e 21 almost as a bucking bronco. 22 Q Yes. 23 A And my response on that and other i ~ ( ) 24 occasions when this question has come up is'to s_- 25 indicate that we recognized and felt that there was
1 MacMillan 225 (:) ~ 2 an advantage in the responsiveness of the B&W 3 once-through steam generator and its ability to 4 accommodate load change rapidly and that we looked ([ 5 upon that as a favorable characteristic of the 6 once-through steam generator. 7 Q Had you heard before the Three Mile 8 Island accident, not necessarily with reference to 3 the term " bucking bronco," any reference to the 10 sensitivity of the B&W unit as a criticism or 11 disadvantage? 12 A I don't recall having heard that 13 expressed. I do know that it was recognized as an 14 operational advantage by a number of the utilities 15 that we -- to whom we were proposing our unit. ~16 Q Have you ever heard any B&W units 17 referred to as " racehorses"? 18 A I have heard that term used. 10 Q Did you hear that before the Three Mile 20 Island accident? 21 A I don't believe so. I believe that was 22 something that was brought to my attention after 23 Three Mile Island. ( 24 Q Does that involve the same connotation 25 as the " bucking bronco"?
1 MacMillan 226 pd 2 A That's my understanding from the people 3 who use that term. 4 MR. KLINGSBERG: We have stipulated that 5 in regard to a document known as " comprehensive 6 Business Plan" issued November 16, 1978 by 7 the Nuclear Power Generation Division, that we 8 will not mark it as an exhibit but it will be 9 recognized that, because of its confidentiality, 10 that a few items which we have agreed.could be 11 read into the record from that and would, / 12 without the presence of the document, be g,3 \\,) 13 considered for trial purposes as coming from 14 this document, is that correct? 15 MR. FIS KE : Yes. 16 MR. KLINGSBERG: I take it there is no 17 necessity to ask the witness about the document 18 being a regular business record? 19 MR. FISKE: I don't think so. 20 Q I would_like to show you page 4 of ( 21 Section V-A dated November 16, 1978 which says, (. 22 under the broad heading on the previous page of 23 " Marketing Strategy," " Emphasize reliability and (% (,) 24 availability, continue R&D programs aimed at confirming 25 ~ and improving design margins to increase design fe _
1 MacMillan 227 x 2 conservatism and reduce competitive argument that 3 the B205 is the racehorse of the industry." 4 I will ask you'if that refreshes your ( 5 recollection that you had encountered that term in 6 a critical sense prior to the Three Mile Island 7 accident? 8 A I think there may be some confusion here 9 as to what " racehorse" applies to. It can also 10 apply to a design which has-higher p'e,rformance 11 parameters and specifically as it relates to core 12 thermal design margins. O 13 I believe, and I would want to do some 14 checking on this, I believe that the racehorse 15 connotation here is directed toward thermal design e 16 margins in the reactor core and not the responsiveness 17 or bucking bronco that we talked about earlier. 18 You could.use that general term 19. " racehorse" to apply to either. I'believe in the 20 connotation that it is shown here it is directed 21 toward the degree of design margin that we had. In 22 fact, the sentence as you read it says, " Continue 23 R&D programs aimed at confirming and improving .(o} 24 design margins to increase design. conservatism," and ~j 25 I believe'it's in that framework that the term
i 1 MacMillan 228 O 2 " racehorse" is usod in th'is document. 3 Q In what sense did the competitors 4 criticize B&W for the racehorse aspect? ( 5 A I can't tell you what our competitors 6 said about Bsw. 7 Q Well, did you ever hear that, directly 8 or indirectly, the criticisms which are mentioned in g, that document? 10 A The concept of " racehorse" tin the 11 industry, of the industry, would be something that 12 would be brought to our attention by the utilities 13 or our customers. 14 Q Right. 15 A Where they develop that concept, I have 16 no way of knowing. 17 Q What did you understand that, involved by 18 way of criticism? ~ 10 A I;think the concept that our. customers 20 would be indicating would be a question with respect 21 to the design margins that we might have in our 22' hydraulics and thermal in the core design. 23 MR. KLINGSBERG: I wouldLlike to mark i ew li ) 24 as the exhibit next-in order, a memorandum 25 from Mr. Roy[to Mr.~WomackidatedLJune 5,, 1979, s 5 g. 7.. ,s
= v,,_ e / i 1 MacMillan 229 p- . f) 't;') 'O 2 attached to which is a memorandum from 3 Mr. MacMillan to Mr. Embrey dated June 4, i. 4 1979. ( 5 (Memorandum dated June 5, 1979 from-6 D. H. Roy to E. A. Womsck and F. R..Fahland 7 with. attached memorandum dated June 4, 1979 8 from J. H. MacMillan to N. S. Embrey marked s 9 GPU Exhibit No. 531 for identification, as of t. 10 this date.) L 11 A Yes. 12 Q Do you recognize the memo dated June 4th 13 from you to Mr. Embrey as a memo you wrote and sent rl, 14 to Mr. Embrey in the regular course of your duties 1-U 15 on or about June 4, 19797 16 A' Yes. e m 17 Q And that is your signature? ,, - l $f ). 18 A Yes. .t .,.g J.fp / critici[m t!h,~at- -is. 'S-. 1r 19 Q' It says, "A recurrent 20 leveled against the B&W NSS is its sensitivity.to. g. / Y / ;,+ = /f f needh,- .[ 21 transients - the ' bucking bronco syndrpme.' We r s / ', n '...o ,4 . l 22 to prepare a' convincing' presentation," et cetera. ? ? .23 .Had you heard'any of that r e cu rr e n t', L - C i .l ig)
- y 24 criticism prior to the Three Mile *IslandVaccident?
,M r'- O' 5.LOV .,vs. -A 25 A LWell, _ a s. I -indica ted = iyarlier,, '.I don't '"?F r l
- . g y;*
.fa j .;f & i
,...t i ,c t l _/ (',' . [ /, -l s, 1. i.; /- 1,( )(. ( / g MacMillan 230 w i / i f,,- ,/ t / 2 recall tit'itt' being an issue bef ore' the Three Mile ~
- t
't' i , f t 3 Island j acal dy.nt. Therelvas an intense level of 1 6 7,.a f / > t i ,ci.i, tic tsn an2. coacern exptdd' sod by the Nuclear / 4 .s ( t
- - i 5
?,ag,u[atc ry Commis si on,. by, congressional committees 5-x 3 t. t. r /<3. an d l o, th e.rs, a f ter the,Three Mile Island accident, .L. .r r x s, 'i ;f ./,..< !~ 'L-ancirthe-sutive' tion ', f I <3 ' L, fcr this letter tc Mr. Embrey i / ~ [# i ~ O h _ -, vIs' t o o'r ep a r e a positive response to that criticism. / j ht y // g,f.),, Q This memo states in the third paragraph er - /., lj / .i / c, 10'!} "that D &W',his lons water inventory i n 1.,t s steam 'J 'i l. w j << n / il; ' / 11 g'en ratotsj thu's making it inherently more responsive." f s' s l 'l2 Q _,,/, ! a ~ That is whst we were talking about y.s -f i ~ i j( ) f. c s h e'f o r e in terms of the/kmount of water y 'f' . 13 S ~1\\- - covering the si i. i' 14
- t u.buci and so on?
.a, .. t i 13 ' ~ ' )
- ^
A Yes, I don't'think we ever got to that j [ ,ihste.'in our earlier discussion .1 16 but the recirculating / > i, 17 6' e te r. generatorslin <Jeneral do have more. total water .g d. inventory on the secondary side on the steam side 5 L i $ fk than the once-thro' ugh steam generators do and ,e 1 i i - 2d' therafore the once-through steam generator tends to ?/ . s' ) .f > i g ,I i f fj j,, 21 // be more stesponsive than the recirculating steam f h.M / u, 33 1 'fcneraior. 4 ? i s i j 23 Q As a result of having less water, does ,r' ~. s ( h i
- 21 t-9&W steam generator-boil dry faster than the
' f , r, ] ' b il 'l ' i,, '5-Westi..4cuse would following a loss of feedwater ). j 9 ~ y J. k" ~ f i
1 MacMillan 231 fh ~ v' 2 assuming that the emergency feedwater doesn't come s 3 on? 4 A In the circumstance where there is no (' 5 emergency feedwater and you lose feedwater to the 6 steam generators, the B&W units will evaporate the 7 water in there, more rapidly in a shorter period of 1 8 time because there is less water than the 9 recirculatiIng steam generator. 10 Q What is the order of magnitude as the 11 time'in which the B&W.would run dry as compared to 12 the Westinghouse? \\- 13 MR. FISKE: You mean assuming no feedwater 14 at all? 15-MR. KLINGSBERG: Assuming no emergency i -16 feedwter actuation. 3 17 A Mr. Klingsberg, I would have,.to-do some 18 checking on that. At one time I could answer that 2. 19 very quickly but I don't remember those-numbers 20 specifically. 21
- Q Do you have any idea on a comparative 22 basis of-the order of magnitude?
23 MR. FISKE: -1 am not sure J 24 A Anything.I ' told' you now I would feel 25 uncertain about. I think if you want an answer to
1 MacMillan 232 '2 that, I would be happy to provide it. 3 Q .Are you aware of the fact that in the 4 event of a loss of feedwater, the emergency feedwater l 5 on the B&W steam generator has to actuate within 6 about 40 seconds? 7 MR. FISKE: What do you mean "has to"? 8 Q By design, actuates in about 40 seconds. 9 MR. FISKE: Designed to come on? 10 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes. t 11 A That sounds to me to be the right order 4 12 of magnitude. A 13 Q And that if it didn't come on because 14 the emergency feedwater didn't actuate because there f 15 was something wrong, the steam generator would boil e 16 dry in less than a minute, wouldn't it? 17 A I can't confirm that. I don't know-i 18 what I feel uncomfortable about what the boilout 19 time is. 4 20 '- It also is a function of the initial 21 power level and so -- f . \\_ 22 Q-Well, at full power. 23 ^ A At-full power? Well, I would feel c 24 comfortable with saying it's;a matter of minutes. -25 -Q Yes. r 4 ..y+ ,-p
1 MacMillan 233 O O 2 A I don't know precisely what the number 3 would be. 4 Q And Westinghouse would be more like ( 5 20 minutes or so,-wouldn't it? 6 A I have testified I don't really remember 7 the numbers. 8 Q It would be considerably longer? 9 A It would be longer, yes. 10 MR. KLINGSBERG: Do you wa'nt to make a 11 call? ~ 12 MR. FISKE: Yes, I think I had better. 13 (Recess taken.) 14 BY MR. KLINGSBERG: 15 Q We have talked about Davis-Besse events 16 in September and October. 17 Were you aware, prior to the.Three Mile 18 Island accident, of a Davis-Besse event in November 19 of 1977 which was what has been called an overcooling 2'O event? 21 A I don't recall being familiar with that. 22 Q Did there come a time, prior to the Three 23 Mile Island event, when you were apprised of the fact [) 24 that there had been events in which the pressurizer w.- 25 lever indication had been lost on the low side in
1 MacMillan 234 r3 2 a number of B&W units? 3 A I have difficulty with that, on that 4 particular subject, discriminating as to whether I d 5 knew about those, that situation before the accident 6 or after the accident. 7 There was a good deal of discussion 8 after the accident, particularly with respect to 9 Mr. Creswell's letter, and I just can't remember 10 whether I had any knowledge of that be' ore the f 11 accident or not. 12 Q Did you attend any meetings within B&W 13 concerningothe NRC investigation into,that matter 14 or the Creswell letter? f 15 A Not to my recollection. e 16 Q Do you recall any discussion within B&W
- 17 concerning safety implications of the pressurizers-i.
18 emptying in B&W-supplied systems? 19 A Prior to Three Mile Island? 20 Q Yes. 21 A I-don't recall that being an issue or a 22 point of discussion. 23 Q Do you remember particularly in or about 24 January 1979 any concern with pressurizer emptying 25 in B&W plants, the NRC investigating that situation?-
I l 1 MacMillan 235 [) 2 A As I said, I have a little bit of trouble 3 sorting out just when I did become aware of that. 4 I know that after the accident, I was ({. 5 informed that there had been an investigation and 6 whether I knew that before or not I just I am 7 uncertain. 8 Q Did you hear anything in any way, shape 9 or form within B&W prior to the Three Mile Island 10 accident dealing at all in a critical way with the 11 size or diameter of the pressurizer? 12 A Again, I am afraid I will have to put . f') \\> 13 that in the category of not being able to remember 14 just when I heard these comments or questions. 15 I know there have been discussions about 16 the size of the pressurizer but whether that was 17 before or whether I heard about it afterwards having 18 taken place, I just can't discriminate. 19 -Q Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, 20 did you ever hear of any B&W technical perconnel 21 being concerned about or complaining about fear of 22 overreaction of the NRC to safety concerns? ,23 A I don't belleve I recall anything that f') 24 would be classified as "being concerned about" or V 1 25 " fear of the NRC overreacting."
1 MacMillan 236 .f~y u.) 2 Q Was this something close to that that 3 you have in your mind? 4 A well, any time that you are dealing (, 5 with a regulatory commission, there is a concern on 6 the part of the engineers as to just exactly what 7 will be the reaction of the regulatory commission 8 to certain information, what kind of questions they 9 might be asking, that is -- that's fairly typical, 10 a concern in any design area, but I doh,'t think I 11 would classify,that as being a fear of overreaction. 12 Q Did you ever have any safety concerns O 13 prior to--not you personally, but did you ever hear 14 of any safety concerns within the, company where there 15 was also a concern with the NRC delicensing, shutting e 16 down plants, requiring power cutbacks or anything 17 like that? 18 A We have discussed at some length the 19. 10 CFR 21 reporting requirements. 20 Q Yes. 21 A After the preliminary safety concern has 1 (~ 22 been identified and, of course, requires an 23 evaluation to determine whether or not it is a ..fs i 24 significant safety item that needs to be reported s 25 under 10 CFR 21, that evaluation process takes some
1 MacMillan 237 ~ 2 time. f 3-If the determination is, and this usually 4 occurs in a very small percentage of the cases, but ( 5 if the determination is that this is a significant-6 item and needs to be reported under 10 CFR 21, I 7 think it's perfectly natural in that situation to !~ 8 ask yourself the question, "What do-you think the a 9 regulatory commission reaction to this will be?" p 10 So any time you had a significant 11 deficiency that needed to be reported, I think it 12 would be typically -- you would typica ly ask yourself LO l 13 how is the NRC going to respond. 14 I don't think that is again-in the class-15 of your original question of engineers asking or i 16' expressing concern about overreaction by the-NRC. 17 Q Are you aware of any safety concerns 4 ) 18 that were raised where it was decided not to report j -19 to the NRC under 10 CFR 21,after the evaluation ~ prior '20 to the TMI accident? 21 MR. FISKE: Can I hear the question.again, -22 please. .n. 23 (Record was read back.) .b .(j 24 A Let me preface my response by saying that 25 ~the-only necessity of bringing safety concerns to my-m .a ~. a.-
1 MacMi13an 238 (') U 2 attention under our division operating procedure 3 is.when it is a reportable item under 10 CFR 21. I 4 stated earlier that a large majority of preliminary ( 5 safety concerns that are registered never reach that 6 stage. And so I wouldn't ne.cessarily be aware of 7 those that didn't get to my desk. 8 Q Yes. 9 A so your question, am I specifically aware 10 of any that didn't get to -- weren't brought to my 11 attention, were not determined to be, after evaluation 12 determined to be reportable, I don't know that I can ~ b \\/ 13 identify a specific preliminary safety concern,that is 14 in that category but I do know that the majority of 15 them fs11 in that category. 16 Q Were there any preliminary safety concerns 17 that di-reach your desk which you decide,d did not 18 warrant 10 CFR 21 reporting as a result ok 19 evaluations? 20 A I believe that in every instance where 21 a safety concern has been brought to my attention as 22 requiring reporting under 10 CFR 21, I have concurred 23 with the recommendation that it should be reported. [) 24 Q Were there ever any dissents-raised.by x_- 25 any people'you consulted with.in that. respect?
l 1 MacMillan 239 0 2 A Yes, I believe there have been occasions 3 on which the recommendation has not been a unanimous 4 recommendation. 5 Q Can you specify those occasions? 6 A I don't believe I can identify one 7 specifically at this point. l 8 I would have to look back through the 4 9 list to refresh my memory on that. 10 Q Is there'such a list? 11 A We maintain a file of reported incidents 12 and I would have to go through that fige. ( 13 Q Where is that file maintained? 14 A .When I get through signing off that I l 15 have observed or I have been notified of this and n 16 put the date and time down, I sent it back to the i 17 licensing section. ~~ 18 Q And they retain a file of all of this?. 19 A I believe they do. 20 Q _You were the person who was designated . h - (_ 21 as responsible for the 10 CFR 21 reporting by B&W, 22 is that correct, prior to the accident? 23 A-Any responsible manager within B&W, of 24 . which I am one, has a responsibility to report items ~ 25 that come to his attention under 10 CFR 21. He has
1 MacMillan 240 2 the authority to delegate that in writing to somebody 3 in his organization. 4 Q And-you delegate it to Mr. Taylor? ( 5 'A Yes. 6 Q Did you e,ver discuss with Mr. Taylor 7 whether he fulfilled his obligations under 10 CFR.21 8 as'to which you had made a delegation in regard to 9 the Davis-Besse situation,for example, considering -10 the fact that Taylor was a recipient of, the Dunn l-11 memo? 12 A I need to state, I think at this point, 13 that the Davis-Besse incident in the Dunn memo was 14 never evaluated to be a significant safety hazard 15 which required reporting to the NRC because the 16 ' procedures which were in existence in the field i 17 were correct and consistent with the assumption of 18 the safety analysis. 19' MR. FISKE: Can I hear the last part of. - 20 that answer, please. 21 (Record was read back.) 22 Q Who told you.that? 23 A I'm sorry,"Who told you that"? ' /~h 1( p 24 Q What you just said. i 25 MR. FISKE: Off the record. i n, s- --e w
1 MacMillan 241 .,em 2 (Discussion off the record.) 3 MR. FISKE: When you said who told him 4 that, are you asking who told him the ( 5 Procedures were adequate and -- 6 MR. KLINGSBERG: That the procedures 't 7 were believed prior to the Three Mile Island 8 accident to be sufficient and that's why no 9 preliminary safety analysis report was prepared 10 relating to Davis-Besse. E 11 A The correctness of the procedures is O - something I personally have reviewed in looking at 12 13 the procedures to assure that had the rocedure been 14 followed, it would have been responsive to the 15 concerns that Mr. Dunn raised. 16 Q And as to the fact that somebody made 17 that determination and decided not to fil.e a 18 preliminary safety report, nobody ever told you i 19 that, did they? ~ 20 A No. I merel said that we did not e 21 report, there was no necessity to report the 22 Davis-Besse incident because it was not evaluated 2 23 as a significant safety concern because the operating ( ) 24 Procedures were consistent with the safety analyses. 25 g I mean is that a conclusion that you .~
1 MacMillan 242 .f~) \\_/ 2 are drawing after the fact based on your re, view of 3 the proce dure or is that something somebody told you 4 they considered at the time? j( 5 A That's a conclusion I have drawn in 6. retrospect looking back at the procedures and the 7 concerns that were raised in Mr. Dunn's memo. 8 Q As a result of your review of the 9 procedures, did you conclude that those procedures 10 were adequate for all small break losstof coolant 11 accidents? 12 A I would not represent.that I reviewed ~ (~') 13 the procedures for the idea of seeing that they were 14 adequate for all small breaks. My review of the 15 procedure specifically again in retrospect was to 16 see whether they were correct for handling the Three l 17 Mile Island accident case. 18 Q You don't know whether they are correct 19 across the board? 20 A I wouldn't represent that I have made 21 that kind of analysis. 22 Q Has anybody? 23 A I don't know specifically the answer to-f*h \\.sJ 24 that question. -t 25 g You don't know whether anybody reviewed y y ,,-3 r
1 MacMillan 243 m 2 the procedures after the Davis-Besse accident and 3 before the Three Mile Island accident to determine 4 if they were adequate other than what is contained ( 5 in the Dunn memo, do you? l 6 A I don't know from the Dunn memo whether 7 he reviewed the procedures. 8 Q Right. Putting that aside for the I 9 moment, you don't know of anybody else.who made that 10 review and analysis? E 11 MR. FISKE: I think, Mr. Klingsberg, 12 again we are getting into a question here w'here 13 Mr. MacMillan certainly knows certain things 14 that he has learned in the course of discussions 15 with counsel. e 16 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes. 17 MR. FISKE: Most of which are or will 18 be reflected in the evidence as it is developed 10 in the case and again if you are asking this 20 for the purpose of discovery to find out whether 21 he knows something that you don't yet know, L 22 I havo no objection to your asking him as long 23 as his answer does not include what he learned () 24 from counsel and as long as you understand that vs 25 a negative. answer does not mean that there
1 MacMillan 244 O) q. 2 isn't such evidence. 3 MR. KLINGSBERG: The problem I have as 4 I ask the witness a question about a discussion ( 5 with Mr. Taylor and I get an answer that has 6 to do with analyses of procedures and I ask 7 questions on the analyses of procedures and 8 you say, "Well, he learned all that from 9 counsel," but I am getting the conclusions 10 based on evidence that he is getying from 1 11 counsel, and I can't stay with that conclusion i 12 unless I pursue it to its end, f 13 MR. FISKE: I haven't objected to any 14 question you asked up to now because you were 15 asking questions based on his own personal 16 analysis. 17 Now you are asking him whether he knows 18 whether someone between Davis-Besse and Three 19 Mile Island analyzed the procedures to 20 determine whether they were adequate to prevent 21 that kind of an accident, k 22 MR. KLINGSBERG: _Right. o. 23 MR. FISKE: And all I am saying is now b) 24 you are getting into an area where if you put V 25 that into a question, he will tell you he does g e i1
.1 MacMillan 245 2 have that knowledge based on discussions that 3 he has had with counsel but I don't think we 4 need to get into that in this deposition. ( 5 If you want to ask him whether he has 6 any knowledge of that independent of what ha 7 learned from counsel, he can certainly answer 8 that question, just so long as it is understood 9 that that is not the dispositive B&W position 10 on the sufficiency of the evidence. 11 MR. KLINGSBERG: If you want to, I mean 12 we can stipulate that the witness' answer that O 13 he just gave that there was no preliminary 14 mafety concern report and 10 CFR reporting 15 because the procedures were considered adequate 16 is based on some discussion with counsel and 17 we all forget about it, that's fine _, but if 18 it is based on something else, I have to find 19 out what it is so I can get it into the record 20 because I think it is wrong. 21 MR. FISKE: I guess we can take it one 22 question at a time from here but I will instruct 23 Mr..MacMillan not to answer any of-these [\\ 24 ~ questions based on any information that he / ,U, 25 obtainedifrom counsel.
1 MacMillan 246 . f'S. 'L,] 2 MR. XLINGSBERG: No, but I think that -- 3 MR. FISKE: And I don't think he answered 4 any questions -- ( 5 MR. KLINGSBERG: I think that if the 6 witness is giving conclusions based on 7 information that he has gotten from counsel, 8: not necessarily saying what that counsel is or 9 what that information is, he should at least 10 indicate on the record that that, conclusion 11 is not based on his personal knowledge but based 12 on something he heard in the course of 13 preparing this case with counsel. 14 MR. FIS KE : My understanding is that all 15 the questions he answered up until now have been 16 based upon his own personal knowledge. The i 17 one you just asked him, I think, goes beyond 18 that to include information from counsel'. I 19 think the way to deal with this is t'o have the 20 question read back and I will certainly allow 21 Mr. MacMillan to answer it so long as it is 22 clear that his answer does not include anything 23 that he learned from counsel. O g i 24 MR. KLINGSBERG Will you repeat the xj 25 questjon, please. Sh..,
1 MacMillan 247 .%_). 2 (Record was read back.) 3 A -Now I am confused. What is the specific 4 question? ( I 5 MR. KLINGSBERG: Do you want to read it 6 again, please. 7 (Record was read back.) 8 Q Separate and apart from what you may 9 have learned from your counsel, are you aware cf any 10 information to the effect that someone',at B&W,after 11 the Davis-Besse event and before Three Mile Island, 12 reviewed the guidelines or procedures for dealing /~ k 13 _ with a loss of coolant accident of the type that 14 occurred at Davis-Besse and found them to be 15 adequate? 16 A I don't know whether anybody did or did 17 not. 18 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark 19 as the exhibit next in order, an NRC report of 20 investigation, Babcock & Wilcox, dated 21 October 25th -- well, it is dated I guess 22 January 24, 1980. 23 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report (h (y 24 of Investigation dated January 24, 1980 of 25 Babcock & Wilcox marked GPU Exhibit No. 532
1 MacMillan 248 s/ 2 for identification, as of this date.) 3 Q Have you seen this document before? 4 A I don't believe I have. ( 5 Q You didn't see this in connection with 6 your determination of how to respond to the NRC 7 charges? 8 A I don't believe I saw this in the process 9 of making that review. 10 Q Will you look at GPU Exhibi,t 250 which 11 you,said you did see and I will call your attention 12 to the fact ('% \\- 13 A GPU 2507 14 Q Yes. 15 MR. KLINGSBERG: Off the record, e 16 (Discussion off the record. ) 17 Q Are you familiar with GPU 2507 18 A Yes. 19 Q When you saw GPU 25, was item 4 on the 20 . third page enclosed or appended? 21 A Item 4 on the third page? 22 Q Right. 23 MR. FISKE: That's this (indicating). () 24 A. I don't know. When I saw this letter, 25 =the enclosure was not attached. e
1 MacMillan 249 %) 2 Q O.K. In it on the first page of GPU 3 Exhibit 250; the NRC states, "It distresses us to 4 note that B&W technical personnel stated that some ( 5 of these matters should not be reported to NRC 6 licensees or to the NRC because of fear of 1 7 overreaction on the part of the NRC. We will examine 8 further the question of withholding of information 9 from the NRC." 10 Did that come to your attehtion at some 11 point? 12 A Yes. \\~' 13 Q Were you aware at any time before the 14 Th'ree Mile Island accident of any B&W personnel who 15 stated that matters should not be reported to NRC v .16 licensees or to the NRC because of fear of 17 overreaction on the part of the NRC? 18 A I don't believe so. 19 Q Did you speak with any of the indiv34uals 20 who, according to the NRC, expressed that view? l 21-A Specifically with respect to that ([. 22 question? l 23 Q Yes. ) 24 MR. FISKE: I object to the form of 25 that question. I think there is only one.
1 MacMillan 250 2 Q Will you answer the question? 3 A I don't believe I have. 4 Q Will you turn to page 8 of Exhibit 532. C 5 Let's start rather with page 5. 6 Do you know Mr. Cartin? 7 A Yes. 8 Q About the middle of that page, it says, 9 "His comments regarding trying to keep.this 10 information from NRC were meant in the pontext that 11 the NRC might demand such an analysis in an 12 unreasonably short time, and that B&W's inability 43 to respond could result in NRC shutting down or 14 derating plants. Similarly, to. notify the customer 15 would be tantamount to notification of'the NRC due e 16 to the more stringent reporting requirements that 17 apply to licensees." 18 Did you ever' discuss the subj ct of that 19 quotation with Mr. Cartin? l-20 A No, I don't believe I have. 21 Q Will you turn to page 6, second f 22 paragraph, it says, "Luken stated that he agreed with 23 the concerns that Lou Cartin expressed in his \\,,,J. 24 December 19, 1978 memo regarding possible NRC action - 25 .being taken if:it became known that neither issue e y
n-1 MacMillan 251 /3 .L/' 2 had been analyzed in accordance with Appendix K. He 3 felt that NRC, lacking the assurances that he had l 4 gotten from Bert Dunn, might overreact to what l ([ 5 appeared to him to be a technicality." 6 Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Luken? 7 A I don't believe so. 8 Q Will you turn the page. 9 Do you know Mr. Jones? 10 A Yes. c 11 Q It says in the second sentence of the 12 last paragraph, "He agreed that the purpose in \\- 13 withholding the information from TECO as to avoid 14 NRC harassment which would be occasioned by TECO's j 15 mandatory reporting of the information to NRC." 16 Did you discuss that with Mr. Jones? 17 A I don't believe so. 18 Q Did you discuss the subject oh these 19 quotations-with any of your managers or su'pervisory 20 persohnel? 21 A At the time that we were making a L 22 decision on the action which we should take relative 23 to the' proposed fine by the NRC, I did have some ID 24 discussions about the source of the comments that LJ 25 were made in the NRC letter to B&W.
1 MacMillan 252 .f~ 2 Q With whom did you have those discussions 3 other than counsel? 4 A I don't know that I can recall ( 5 specifically the individuals. 6 I would expect that Mr. Gilbert, who was 7 then the vice president of the Nuclear Power 8 Generation Division; Dr. Roy would have been involved 9 in those discussions. 10 Q Did any of those individual,s or anyone 11 express to you their belief or understanding that 12 they were aware of feelings on the part of B&W 13 technical personnel prior to Three Mile Island that 14 the NRC might ove,rreact to safety concerns? 15 A I don't believe so. e 16 Q Did anybody suggest to you or did you 17 suggest to anybody that action needed to be taken 18 within the NPGD to disabuse technical personnel of 19 this view.regarding the NRC's proposition? 20 A If I remember correctly, I made a comment 21 at the time that we were reviewing this that I was 22 not satisfied and not pleased with the comments thal 23 had been made. ' /-s-() 24, Q Turning to'another topic. '25 M R.' KLINGSBERG: Off the record. a ,.--7 m e e v'
1 MacMillan 253 ,,4 2 (Discussion off the record.) 3 .MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark 4 as an exhibit next in order, a letter from ( 5 Mr. Embrey dated August 29, 1979 which has 6 attached to it a document entitled "Some TMI 7 Lessons Learned" by J. H. MacMillan. 8 (Letter dated August 29, 1979 from 9 N. S. Embrey to James Huckfeldt with attached 10 document entitled "Some TMI Lessbns Learned" 11 by J. H. MacMillan marked GPU Exhibit No. 533 12 'for identification, as of this date.) 13 MR. FISKE: I guess you are going to 14 have to read the whole thing. 15 A Yes. 16 Q Are you the author of the "Some TMI 17 Lessons Learned" document which is attached to 18 Mr. Embrey's letter in Exhibit 5337 ~ 19 A That document was written for me by 20 somebody else. I reviewed it and approved it 21 before it was sent out. 22 Q Was it published in ehsentially 'the form 23 that it is. contained in this document? f ') 24 A I don't know. v 25 Q In reviewing it here, did you see
1 MacMillan 254 2 anything that is wrong? 3 A -I very quickly scanned it. I don't see 4 anything, nothing that came to my attention that ([ 5 seemed to be particularly incorrect. 6 Q , Will you turn to page 3. It refers to 7 the Bailey 855 computer that was supplied by Babcock 8 & Wilcox to TMI for use at TMI-2, does it not? 9 A That's correct. 10 Q The memorandum states in about the 11 middle of the page, second paragraph, last sentence, 12 "At TMI-2 the printer got as much as 2-1/2 hours 13 behind at some points. Obvioqsly, the computer 14 system was not designed to handle abnormal conditions 15 of such an extent and to faithfully record the actual 16 time and sequence of events." 17 Is that an accurate statement.? 18 MR. FISKE: I think you had better make 19 clear, Mr. Klingsberg, which printer you are 20 referring to. The top of the paragraph, it 21 says, the preceding paragraphs says, "The 22-computer'is connected to two automatic 23 typewriters. One is used to print alarm-signals _( 24 signals...while the other provides the value 25 of any parameter or of preprogrammed groups of e
1 MacMillan 255 l 2 values on. request of an operator." ? ~ 3 If you are asking Mr. MacMillan whether i 14 the statement is accurate, you ought to make -l(- F 5 clear which of those you are referring to 6 in your question. ~7 Q' Can you answer the question and j 8 incorporate Mr. Fiske's point? 9 MR. FISKE: It is not a point, it is a 10 question. E 11 MR. KLINGSBERG: What? I can't hear 12 you. 13 MR. FISKE: It is not a point, it is a 14 question. 15 MR. KLINGSBERG: What is your question? i e 16 MR. FIS KE : As to.which of those two you 17' were referring to in your question.. 18 Q In~the statement I quoted, wh ch of.the 19 two printers were you referring to, Mr. MacMillan? - 20
- A I believe that the statement
- refers to 21 the. alarm printer.
22 Q: And in regard to the alarm printer, was 4 23 it an ' accurate statement? 3 24 A It is my understanding that the alarm printer A = 25 did run substantially behind and I can't verify the
~ c 1 MacMillan 256 a-A' Q 2' two and a half hours but it was a significant time 3 lag. 4 The Bailey 855 computer and its printers ( 5 and typewriters were' supplied to specifications which 6 were submitted for appr, oval of Metropolitan Edison 7 and reflected the contract bases on which the compueter 8 was supplied. 9 Q B.abcock & Wilcox knew the purposes for 10 which they were being supplied, did th'ey not? 11 A That's correct, yes; 12 Q Did Babcock & Wilcox reac'h a conclusion O V 13 before the Three Mile Island accident that a computer 14 system was needed to handle abnormal conditions and 15 a faithfully record the actual ~ time and. sequence of 16 events? ~ 17 A Wa?1, the fact tha't we supplied the 18 computer with the alarm printer indicates that we 19 felt this would be a-helpful piece'oA.qu pment 20 for the operatiors of the plant. n, ';i c.E O 21 'Q Do you knok Nhather or not Bab' dock & L 22 Wil cox~- b elie ved. b e'f bre the Three Mile Island s 23, accident,that a different kind of computer system
- ^. \\
,) 2-i fb 'wasineeded which was designed to faithfully record s ~ _ * ' 4 p. 'n.,\\ j x s 25 'the time and sequenc,e ofi events 'since this computer cC;, 1 _. J Q, - x t, \\\\ %
- a...
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- 257, j
I' 4). E 2 referred to here was not so designed? 3 MR. FISKE: Well, Mr. Klingsberg, I don't e s. 4 think there is any indication in this statement ( 5 that people knew that before the accident. .6 MR. KLINGSBERG: I didn't say there was. 7 That's why I am asking. If all I wanted was 8 a statement, I could have stopped after I had 9 the document identified. 10 MR. FIS KE : I don't think %t is clear 11 from your question. 12 Q Can you answer, the question?' 13 MR. FISKE: Just so I understand it, 14 are you asking whether before the accident 15 B&W realized that the alarm -- the computer 16 system was not designed to handle abnormal 17 conditions and felt-some other kind of computer 18 system would be better? 19 MR. KLINGSBERG Yes. 20 A' I think I ought to answer that in two 21 parts. 22 Q Sure. 23 A In general, as we supplied nuclear plants <^s ( ) 24 and as we upgraded those plants,_we also upgraded the . w./ r 1 25 computer facility that went with those and in the 1
L, d[ dl QQ f ' 7;/ . :t l 'i s[ 1 l MacMillan 258
- e-
- -) I it ?
- g
2 time frame that we are talking about here in 1979, f we were proposing different computers than the 3 4 Bailey 855 which had more high-speed capability and i 52pd more (? 5 rapid response than the Bailey 855. That's p y part 1. 7 Part 2, I am not aware or I don't know h 8 of'a conclusion that had been reached by B&W prior 9 to'Three. Mile Island 2 that the Bailey 855 conputer 10 and its related alarm printout was inadequate. 11 Q Will you turn to page 4. Under the 12 heading " Transient Analysis," it says, "TMI-2 has
- / I
\\ 13 sensitized the NRC, the utility operators, and the 14 NSS designers to the need for rapid and accurate 15 analyses of plant transients and other operating i t 16, analyses" -- 4 17 A That's " anomalies." " anomalies. Much of this $urden 18 Q 19 will fall'on the NSS designer who will be' expected 20 to describe what happened, how important it was in 21 terms'of design or operational deficiencies or plant k.1 22 safety, and what changes or corrections are needed 23 to prevent future. occurrences." l - f) 24 Was.that an accurate statament?- w/ 25 A In general, yes. y e m
^ 1 MacMillan 259 r'O) 2 Q In particular, did you have in mind when 3 you' wrote this the rapid and accurate analysis that 4 should have been made by B&W of the Davis-Besse l{~ 5 incident in September of 19777 6 MR. FISKE: Well -- 3. s 7 A That was not the primary thrust of my 8 comment here. 9 At Three Mile Island 2, by good fortune, had the reactimeter hooked up and ob,erating. This 10 we 4 11 r.ormally would only-be used during the startup 12 program on the new plant but it happened to be running O 13 at the time that the Three Mile Island 2 accident 14 occurred and it'was from this reactimeter that we 15 gained the most useful information with respect to .e 16 the changes in pressure, temperature, flow and 17 level around the plant during-the a c cid en,t. 18-The thrust of my comment here was that I 19 felt that every nuclear. plant ought to have such an 20 on-line recorder of certain vital information Much 21 as I said in the earlier part of this, as you have a ~' 22 flight recorder in an airplane I put a great deal of 23 pressure on my organization to try to get installed (s 24 in each of the units involved, which has a B&W NSS, ~ 25 such a data logging system which we called recall =-e y r yr-- + y y- - + v -iy* ,t-ee 9 -- -- 1
1 1 MacMillan 260 [ 2 and I was very -- I have been very disappointed in 3 our ability to persuade the utilities that they 4 should incorporate such equipment in their operating 5 plants. 6 Q The recall data logger and, transmitter 7 doesn't do transient-analyses, does it? 8 A The recall data logger and transmitter 9 provides the information from which knowledgeable 10 engineers can-perform rapid and accurate analyeses 11 of plant transients. 12 Q And without belaboring what we have been 13 through seyeral times in the last two ays, isn't i 14 it a fact that TMI-2 sensitized Babcock & Wilcox 15 to the fact that there should have been,.a more 16 rapid analysis of the plant transient at Davis-Besse 17 and the operating anomalies that occurred in that-18 event? 19 THE WITNESS: Could I hear that question 20 again, please. 21. (Record was read back.1-22 A I think I have testified both.here and 23 at other places I regretted that the evaluation that if'} 24 was made following the' Davis-Besse incident in v. 25
- September'3977 was not concluded more. rapidly.
That l l c
1 MacMillan 263 2 was not the thrust of my comments as recorded in 3 this document that we are presently looking at. 4 Q Were you aware of the fact that the ( 5 Davis-Besse plant in September of 1977 had a B&W 6 reactimeter? 7 A I was not aware of that. 8 Q It says on the bottom of the page, "Some 9 of the control room instruments at TMI may have given 10 ambiguous or inadequate signals to thetoperators. 11 For instance, the PORV indicating light only shows 12 whether power is applied to the actuation solenoid (~) 2 13 or not. It does not indicate the actual valve 14 position. Thus, the operators did not have a direct 15 method of knowing that the PORV had stuck open 16 following the feedwater transient early in the 17 TMI-2 accident sequence." 18 Was that an accurate statement? 19 A As far as I know, yes. 20 Q In any of your discussions prior to 21 TMI-2, particularly the discussion in your office k_ 22 after Davis-Besse at which the pilot operated relief 23 valve.was a principal subject of discussion, was there A) i 24 any mention of the fact that the indicator light was
- s. /
25 an incorrect signal or it had given a misreading
l 1 MacMillan 262 0 2 indication to the operators during the Davis-Besse 3 cvent? 4 A I don't recall that we discussed that at { 5 the meeting in my office. 6 Q Were you ever advised, prior to the Three 7 Mile Island accident, that Davis-Besse had asked B&W 8 to look into the provision of a better indicator of 9 valve position after the Davis-Besse accident? 10 A Again, I have a hard time discriminating 11 as to when I knew certain pieces of information. 12 I'do know that we had on at least one O 13 occasion looked at the pilot operated relief valve 14 to determine whether there was a more direct means 15 of measuring its -- the actual position of the valve 16 and I don't remember whether my knowledge of that 17 predates Three Mile Island 2 or that is something 18 that I have learned subsequently. 19 Q What is the source of your inEormation 20 in that regard? Is this something somebody told 21 you, something you read? k. 22 A Well, there has been a lot of discussion 23 since Three Mile Island about the pilot operated () 24 relief valve and the buttons and the indicators that 25 were associated with it.
I 1 MacMillan 263 2 Q Yes. 3 MR. FISKE: I am not sure whether -- 4 Q You can't pinpoint anything prior to the (( 5 accident that may -- 6 A That's correct. 7 MR. FISKE: It is not clear to me when 8 in the prior answer Mr. MacMillan said they 9 looked at the PORV whether he was talking 10 generically or whether he was referring 11 specifically to the PORV at Davis-Besse. I 12 think that ought to be clarified. \\- 13 -A In fact, I don't know whic unit was. 14 associated with that general evaluation, whether it' 15 was Davis-Besse or oconee or Three Mile, but I 16 do know we had at one point looked at the valve to 17 see if there was a more positive means of_ identifying 18 actual position. 19 Q What was the conclusion? 20 A The conclusion at that point was as far 21 as measuring the position of the plunger.in the valve, (. 22 that there was no practical way to accomplish that. 23 Q After the accident, a different indicator -( [ 24 arrangement was derived by B&W, was: it not? 25 A After the accident, we did adapt an.
1 MacMillan 264 U(3 ' 2 acoustic indicator which, listened to the flow 3 through the valve to determine whether the valve 4 was passing fluid or not but that was not the kind 5 of indicator we were examining to see whether or 6 not we could physically measure the position of 7 the plunger of the valve. It's an entirely different 8 principle. 9 Q And as to the examination about the 10 position of the plunger, you don't remember if that 11 was before or after the Three Mile Island accident? 12 A No, I really can't determine in my mind 13 when that discussion took place or with which unit 14 it might have been associated. 15 Q As a matter of fact, the next paragraph 16 talks about the new measure that you developed, 17 does it not? 18 A Yes. 19 Q It says that "B &W has already' responded 20 to that situation with the development of an acoustic 21 sensor and readout system which can accurately sense 22 fluid flow in a relief valve discharge line. Operators 23 can now have a direct and positive measurement of - .f~T 24 ' valve position." L) 25 Do you know if any request was made by l
1 MacMillan 265 O) .t'". 2 Davis-Besse for development of a more direct and 3 Positive measurement of valve position prior to the 4 Three Mile Island accident? g 5 A I don't know. 6 Q Did you ever ascertain any reasons why 7 Babcock & Wilcox did not attempt such a development 8 after the Davis-Besse event? 9 THE WITNESS: Can I have that question 10 again, please, t 11 LRscord was read back.) 12 A I don't believe so but I want to qualify 13 that again by saying I am not sure of the time frame 14 in which we were looking at alternative valve 15 position indicators. e 16 Q Right. 17 The final" Lessons Learned" item to which 18 you' refer is a new instrument called a s[turation -19 temperature meter. ~ 20 That was designed to provide a ready 21 indication of whether there was saturation in the L 22 reactor coolant system, is that correct? 23 A It was designed to give a digital readout .h-24 of the number of degrees of subcooling in the >~J 25 reactor-coolant system, yes. i 4
MacMillan 266 O Q Was there any attempt or discussion of 2 the need for such instrument prior to the Three Mile 3 Island accident of which you are aware, particularly in relation to the Davis-Besse aftermath? (_ 5 A I am not aware of any. 6 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would now like to 7 mark as Exhibit 534, a copy of a letter from Mr. MacMillan to the NRC dated April 26, 1979. (Copy of letter dated April 26, 1979 10 from John H. MacMillan to Mr. Harold R.
- Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission marked GPU Exhibit No. 534 for identification, as of this date.)
^ A Yes. Q Can you identify Exhibit 534 as a copy of a letter which you wrote to the NRC on'or about April 26, 1979 in the regular course of your duties? A Yes. 20 Q And that is your signature? 21 A Yes. 22 Q Thi.s refers, does it not, to two of the .p dasign improvements referred to in your previous 1%) 4 article, particularly the position indicator for the
1 MacMillan 267 (~h ~ V 2-PORV and the saturation temperature indicator? 3 A .Yes. l 4 Q And according to the letter, these two ( 5 design improvements occurred within six weeks? 6 A I believe the letter says that we would 7 be in a position to complete the design and 8 development phases within six weeks. 9 Q has that accomplished? 10 A Yes. ( 11 Q Apart from the equipment items which 12 you mentioned in your Power Magazine article, there O-13 were other lessons learned as a result of the it. Davis-Besse and Three Mile Island situat$ons, were 15 there not? 16 A Yes. 17 Q What were the other lessons 1. earned from 18 B&W's point of view? 19 MR. FISKE: You mean after the Three 20 Mile Island accident? 21 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes. 22 A Mr. Klingsberg, that's a very broad 23 question and is one which received a good deal of (} 24 attention in the months following the'Three Mile 25 Island accident, not only at B&W but at the NRC and
1 MacMillan 268 l f%U. 2 around the industry generally. 3 I was a member of an ad hoc committee 4 formed at-the Atomic Industrial Forum which had ( 5 the purpose of trying to identify what these lessons 6 learned were, what the more significant ones were 7 and in dealing with the NRC, to try to assist them 8 in the formulation of their modifications in the 9 regulations reflecting these lessons learned. 10 There has been a very longt list of 11 lessons learned that have been developed and various 12 people have tried to assign priorities to those. 13 Q Let me,show you part of yo r ACRS 14 testimony on September 5, 1979, beginning at page 15 200 and see if we can't use that as a basis for 16 ticking off some of these points. 17 MR. FISKE: Before we do that, why don't 18 we just take a short break. 19 (Recess taken.) 20 .BY MR. KLINGSBERG: 21 Q-Is it fair to say from your prior 22 testimony that most of the things that you did in 23 response to the Davis-Besse accident related to, (oy 24 focused.on,the equipment at Davis-Besse? s_/. 25 A I think that l
1 MacMillan 269 y ~ ~ 2 MR. FISKE: "You" meaning Mr. MacMillan? 3 .MR. XLINGSBERG: Yes. 4 A I think that's a fair asscssment, yes. 5 Q And is it fair to say that one of the .( 6 things that the company should have pursued more 7 aggressively was to look at the operational aspects 8 of the Davis-Besse transient as distinguished from 9 the equipment aspects? 10 MR. FISKE: I think Mr. MacMillan has 11 said that in his testimony in retrospect. 12 MR. KLINGSBERG: Yes, in retrospect. 13 A After the Three Mile Island accident, I 14 think there is a greater sensitivity to that, not 15 only with Babcock & Wilcox but with the other ~ l 16 reactor manufacturers as well. 17 Q You previously testified at the bottom 18 of Page 200 of the ACRS, "The thing that'we did not 19 do that we should have pursued more aggre5sively J 20 was to look at the operational aspects of this 21 transient," referring to Davis-Besse, "as distinct 22 from the equipment aspects." 23-You so testified, did you not? A Yes. L(%,).- 9~4 25 Q And that is accurate, is it not?
J 1 MacMillan 270 -fN h. 2 A Yes. 3 Q And one of the particular things that 4 you concluded should have been looked at more () 5 carefully, aggressively, regarding Davis-Besse was 6 whether the operator's training and procedures he 7 was using'were appropriate for the conditions, is 8 that correct? 9 A Well, I want to qualify the answer 10 there by saying that the training program for the 11 operator is a utility responsibility and we assist 12 in that to the extent they request us to. O. .c 13 The procedures are written and prepared 14 by the utility usually based on the draft procedures 15 that we supply them and what I was int'erested in e 16 saying here was that I felt that we should evaluate 17 the operator's reaction and where we feel,there ought i 18 to be.some modification, that we ought to bring that they co'uld assess 19 to the attention of the utility so 20 their training programs and procedures and make sure -21 they are adequate to cover the conditions. L 22 Q' In addition, B&W should assess the 23 training programs it provides'to the utilities and
- f 1' 24 the procedures it recommends _in order _to see whether q,
25 they are adequate for the conditions of transients,
1 MacMillan 271 6 ~ ( 2 is that not so? A ."* * "Id
- i"1Y "*"* *
- i*"
3- ' draft operating procedures in that sense and you 4 understand the training that we perform is performed { 5 6 to a scope that-is agreed to between the utility and B&W. 7 8 Q As a' matter of fact, it is also, 9 according to the procedures, that B&W as the designer 10 of the nuclear steam supply system, is,the most l gi important source of expertise, is it not? l 1 12 A For the operation of the nuclear steam 13 system? 1. Q Yes. 15 A Yes. 16 Q You-also testified in the sade ACRS 17 testimony at the bottom of page 202, did you not, 18 "And, f i n a'l l y, utilize the reported operator actions, 19 .the' assessment of what the operator did and why he 20 didn ' t, to go back. and.reasses s the procedures," it says "in," I.think it should.say "and the training 21 22 programs to make sure that the other operators with B&W systems and the. operators: coming up for 23
- O,:
. 24 .requalification get the appropriate kind of attention 25. to-the procedural aspecta.of.the transient as it .,m gg-i.i..,.... y
- .i
_____i______._______________i_____________m___.
1 MacMillan 272 .,y 2 occurred there." 3 Did you state that in your testimony? 4 A Yes, I think it is stated correctly as ({ 5 recorded that what I was driving at there was we 6 needed to make sure that the procedures we were using 7 in the training program reflected this evaluation. 8 Q And -- 9 A And the requalification referred to here 10 is when the utility sends its operators back on a 11 periodic basis for refresher training and 12 requalification. O' 11 Q And looking back, do you feel that that 14 should have been done after the Davis-Besse 15 accident? Is that correct? 16 MR. FISKE: Mr. Klingsberg, I have a 17 little trouble with that, the sensq of that ~ 18 question. 19 In other words, in terms of what you 20 are asking him, whether lo'oking back, if he .had to do it all over again, would they do it 21 i 22' . differently or do -- l 23 MR. KLINGSBERG: He made the statement I (/) 24. before.the ACRS and without going back and ~. 25; reading six pages to get the question and all j e
l 1 MacMillan 273 -~. V 2 of the context, I just want to establish that 3 this statement was given as part of a list of 4 things which, looking back, Mr. MacMillan (' 5 thought should have been done following the 6 Davis-Besse event. 7 MR. FISKE: Well -- you may answer. 8 A Well, with the benefit of the hindsight 9 of Three Mile Island 2 and the experience we had 10 there, looking back at the D avis-B e s s e',in ciden t, 11 that's the context in which I made these comments. 12 Q Right. t N-13 I would like to show you a document l l 14 previously marked as Exhibit 214 dated June 4, 1979 l 15 from you to various addressees,the " Top Ten Lessons 16 Learned." 17 A Yes. t 18 MR. KLINGSBERG: Just one second, there 19 is a second page to that. 20 Q Can you identify Exhibit 214 as a memo-21 you wrote in the regular course of business at B&W 22 on or about June'14, 1979? 23 A .Yes. <N 24 June 4th. 25 Q Yes,-I'm sorry.
1 MacMillan 274 2 And that is your signature?. 3 A .Yes. 4 Q Will you explain the attached chart? ( 5 A Well, I wrote the letter to members of 6 my staff in order to get some input for an Atomic 7 Industrial task force on Three Mile Island which was 8 endeavoring to work with the NRC to modify their 9 regulations in areas that would reflect the lessons 10 learned at Three Mile Island. t 11 I asked them to respond with their -- 12 excuse me, let me say one other t'hing. [h \\> 13 There was a widespread interest in trying 14 to identify lessons learned, ACRS was-doing it, 15 NRC, various manufacturers, nuclear safety analysis -- 16 well, many people had a list of lessons learned and 17 there were literally hundreds of these and in order 18 to focus on the priority lessons, I had asked my ~ 19 people identified ~here to give me the benefit of 20 'their insight based on all their exposure to the .21 accident and to submit those to me, which they.did, (. 22 and the table that you see attached as page 2 of 23 this exhibit is a compilation of the responses of ( ) 24 the -- of four individuals, the letter was addressed j 25 to R. M. Ball, his initials are on the top,
1 MacMillan 275 2
- RMB, R.
M. Ball, REK, R. E. Kosiba, DHR is D. H.
- Roy, 3
and in addition to that D. W. Berger, he received a 4 copy of this memo, he wasn't requested to respond (' 5 but he responded anyway and then at the right-hand 6 side is a column of -- that I had written down as my 7 priority of top ten lessons. l 8 The column B&W, I am not sure I can 9 exactly identify that, I think that was the 10 compilation or the consensus of this g(oup following 11 their individual evaluations as tablulated in the 12 second page of this exhibit. 13 Q Do the figures, the order in the column a i 14 under your initials, come from some othe document 15 that you prepared? i e 16 A No. I took the information, the 17 letters that had been sent to me and I made this 18 table from those letters and then I put my own-19 priorities in that same table and I had it typed 20 up for the meeting. 21 .Q You put operator training right up 22 at the top? 23 MR. FISKE: You mean along with operator ) 24 qualification? 25' MR. KLINGSBERG: Right.
1 MacMillan 276 / i 2 A operator qualification, the management 3 structure of the operating organization and operator 4 training I lumped together as the highest priority. ( 5 Q Did that include any responsibility of 6 Babcock & Wilcox? 7 A Well, the operator qualification and 8 the management'-- the organization of the operating 9 unit is not our responsibility. 10 operator training is a primary 11 responsibility of the utility although we offer to 12 help the utility in that process. In the situation ,O \\-) 13 at Three Mile Island, we did provide simulator 14 training for the operators,about two months of 15 training out of nominally a two-year training program. e 16 Q After the accident, you revised your 17 simulator program to reflect the kind of, accident 18 that occurred at Three Mile Island, did you not? ~ 19 A That's correct. In addition to that, we 20 offered a training program for the operators of all 21 the other B&W units in which we went through the L 22 Three Mile Island accident sequence with them and 23 other means by which you might get to a saturated l\\ 24 condition in the reactor coolant system and rehearsed d 25 them on what actions you take to get out of that
1 MacMillan 277 2 problem. 3 Q .Is it a fact that prior to the revisions 4 after the Three Mile Island accident, the simulator ({ 5 was not programmed to reflect an accident in which 6 you would have saturated conditiens in the reactor 7 coolant system? 8 A It was not programmed to simulate a 9 saturated condition in the reactor coolant system 10 of the type that actually occurred at Three Mile. 11 There were some accidents that were programmed 12 into the machin'e such as a major loss of coolant sh 13 accident where you in fact got -- you got saturated 14 conditions in the reactor coolant system'but it was 15 not programmed to handle the Three Mile Island 16 type accident. 17 Q And it was not programmed either to 18 handle the Davis-Besse type accident, was it? 19 A Those were very similar accide'nts, that's 20 correct. 21 Q Were you aware of the fact, prior to 22 the Three Mile Island accident, that any 23 representative of Davis-Besse had requested that f} 24 the craining program or the simulator at B&W be 25 modified ~to better reflect what occurred at
1 MacMillan 278 ~ 2 Davis-Beuse in September 19777 3 A .I was not aware of that. 4 Q Did you become aware of that after the ( 5 Three Mile Island accident? 6 A I have since heard that and it was after 7 the Three Mile Island accident, yes. 8 Q Where did you hear that? 9 A I am not sure where I heard that, whether 10 it was in preparation for testimony or not. It 11 probably was, 12 Q You didn't hear it in a management b) \\v 13 context? 14 A No, no. It was in preparation for 15 testimony and I don't remember where, e 16 Q I take it you have not undertaken any i 17 management inquiries as to whether or why,that ~ 18 request was not acceded to or what consideration was 19 given to it at the time by B &W7 ~ ~ 20 A That's correct. 21 Q Is it a fact that B&W, as the designer 22 of the system, plays an important role in training 23 of operating personnel? f) 24 A As I ha e indicated,.the role that v 25 B&W plays in the training is determined-by the
1 MacMillan 279 (~V) 2 utility. We offer to help in many phases of the 3 training program and different utilities avail 4 themselves of different aspects of our training (( 5 pro gr am. 6 In general, most of the utilities 7 utilize our simulator training. I think we are 8 uniquely qualified to offer that, that segment of 9 the training program. 10 Q What makes B&W uniquely qualified to 11 offer the simulator part of the training program? 12 'A We have a simulator. 7s k. 13 Q Does what goes into the si ulator 14 reflect safety analyses of the kind we talked about 15 earlier in your testimony which B&W has the most 16 expertise on in regard to its own design of the 17 nuclear steam supply system? 18 A In order to design a simulator which 19 will reproduce various postulated equipmen't failures, 20 you must have a knowledge of how the nuclear steam 21 system, R&W nuclear steam system will perform. 22 We built that into our simulator. We 23 l are currently helping utilities who have decided to .[} 24 have their own simulators, we are currently helping-v 25 them to do the same sort of thing on the simulator
MacMillan 280 g that they are buying. 2 Q Because it is the designer who has done the safety analyses, B&W is uniquely qualified to 4 provide this simulator training or assistance in ( designing simulators, is that correct? 6 A I think it's more than just the safety 7 analyses. We also do control analyses which describe 8 how the plant responds to normal operations. It would g be a combination of safety and control analysis. 10 g Q I would like to show you Exhibit 213, g previously marked GPU Exhibit 213, which is a memo g3 fr m s a ac an a ed June 11~,' 1979 and 13 GPU Exhibit 463 which is a meino from Roy 'to, g MacMillan aatea June 8, 13;s. 13 ~ MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark 16 i ~,, as new exhibits next in order, GPU Exhibit 535, 14 a mem randum from Mr. Ball to Mr. MacMillan 18 dated June 8, 1979 and a memorandum-from gg "r- "*rsar to "r- "ac"i2 "a>^= 55> d^t** 20 June 5, 1979. 21 (Memorandum dated June 8, 1979 from I R. M. Ball to J. H. MacMillan marked GPU {d 'N Exhibit No. 535 for identification, as of this 24 date.) 5 j l l i
. _ = 1 MacMillan 281 2 (Memorandum dated June 5, 1979 from 3 D. W. Berger to J. H. MacMillan marked GPU 4 Exhibit No. 536 for identification, as of ( 5 this date.) 6 Q Have you had a chance to look at those? 7 A Briefly", yes. 8 Q Can you identify these four documents 9 as having been sent to you in the regular course 10 of business on or about the dates of the documents 11 in response to your memo of June 4, 1979 which we I2 marked as GPU Exhibit 214? U 13 A Yes, I believe these were. submitted to 14 me in response to my June 4th letter and the.results 15 were tabulated on page 2 of GPU Exhibit.214. 4 16 Q Was this the end of the road on this 17 exercise or-was there some other document, documents, 18 compilations, reports prepared on the subject of 19 lessons learned or in response to your memo? 20 A As I recall, I took these responses and 21 met with the group to discuss their logic in 22 arriving at the selection of the top ten priorities 23 and we distilled those in a consensus to try to ) 24 identify what we thought from the B&W standpoint 25 should be the-top ten and these then ,ce'used as
1 MacMillan 282 2 input information for my participation in the AIF 3 task force which met with Roger Mattson of the 4 Regulatory Commission and as far as the top ten I ( 5 issues are concerned, I think this is as far as 6 that went. 7 Q Wns the meeting with Mr. Mattson 8 recorded? 9 A No, I don't believe it was. 10 Q Were there any minutes or was a report 11 issued as a result of that meeting? 12 A The report that was issued was the NRC /"' t 13 report on -- and I can't identify that for you 14 offhand. I could find out. 15 Q Yes. 16 A Mr. Mattson was in charge of a task 17 force for the NRC in which he was charged with 18 recommending modifications and the regulations ~ 19 reflecting the experience at Three Mile Is1and. 20 His task force did produce a document with a 21 compilation of their recommendations. L 22 Q Did you just work from these four 23 memoranda or did you have any-report putting all G l i 24 of these together? v 25 A No, I think I just worked from these
MacMillan 283 and the tabulation. Q I note that you put reliability system required for safety and safety system status as the and also relief valve reliability as the third most important[ item. 6 Do you see that? A Yes. Q on what basis did you decide to put relief valve reliability as the third most important 10 t item? MR. FISKE: I think to be accurate, Mr. Klingsberg, this is sort of-like computing the baseball standings when there is a tie. I am not sure that -- Q On what basis did you include relief 6 valve reliability as among the items in the third Category, the third most important Category? A I would like to respond in a little i broader sense, if I may. I felt clearly the operator qualification k and the organization of the operating utility on the site combined with operator training was the most significant lesson-learned. V I felt, secondly, that the display of' 25 -
..N ^ s. s N t s I ' l 1 MacMillan 284 li ' ~. 2 information for the operator, to allow-him to 4 3 understand what was going on in the nuclear plant, r ( 4 was a second level of priority. \\ 8 ({ 5 And thirdly, then the reliabilit of l 6 the equipment as required for safety-I felt wap a 7 third level of priority,77 king sure that it did the y 8 job that it was intended'to do. Even though there 9 were procedures and means of handling equipment ~ w 10 failures, thatididn't lessen the respohsibility for 11 assuring that those systemsidid operate safely. s; ~ 12 Q What was the basis of your concern with 13 the reliability of.the relief" valve? Y I can recall hhat 14 A Well, I am not sure i .+ i 15 my line of thinking was specifically on that\\ s i 16 I would lump that relief valve in\\with 17 the reliability of thelother safety equip. ment. It's e s .18 in a general category, I think. 19 Q Did your concern ~with the rellati.11ty, a.* s t 20 ~ of the relief. valve stem from(failures of the relief ~_ s 21 valve other than the:Three Mile Island accident? ( N 22 A . W e l l,' I think I said-I am realiy not- -w 23 quite sure what my111ne:of: thinking was at that-time. 24 I.believe in.looking at this list and the. 25' letters-that you-can see, ILatarted making this chart g \\Y' U f '. $h e.. eV, ,4 w
1 MacMillan 285 2 by using Don Roy's 1 through 10 and he had put relief 3 valve reliability and then when I went down the list 4 and said operator training 1, instrumentation and human, ( 5 man-machine interface as 2, I lumped together 6 equipment reliability as 3 and I think I probably 7 threw relief valve in along with safety system 8 and safety system equipment reliability. 9 Q Isn't it fair to say that the concern 10 with relief valve reliability stemmed from 11 indications of lack of reliability even prior to 12 the Three Mil'e Island accident as well as the Three (~) .c 13 Mile Island accident? 14 A Well, I.think it's fair to say we had 15 had previous relief valve failures or failures ~in e-16 the relief valve system other than Three Mile Island 17 and that would be reflected in-the experience which 18 I brought to this a'ssessment. 19 Q In. terms of item No. 2, which is "I&C - 20 Human Engineering," that is instrumentation and. 21 control? k. 22-A Yes. 23 Q That would include such items as the n .. ( 24 Bailey computer which you talked about in your j l 4 25 magazine article?
1 MacMillan 286 O' 2 A Well, I don't think I was thinking 3 specifically of the Bailey computer there. I think l 4 I was thinking more in terms of the general display 1 ( 5 of information to the operators and the arrangement 6 of the control room, the display of instrumentation 7 in the control room. 8 We had been active in our new contracts 9 in a different control room concept which gave the 10 operator a more visible display of what the plant 11 parameters were. I think just the issue of making 12 information available to him in a readily (D (,/ 13 understandable form was what I was driving at here. 14 Q Is it a fact 15 A It could include -- the items we talked n 16 about earlier, acoustic relief valve indication 17 and Tsat meter. 18 Q The acoustical indicator for the pilot 19 operated relief valve open or closed position 20 ' indication? 21 A It can be used on either pilot operated k 22 relief valves or safety valves. ~ 23 Q Now, it is a fact, is it_.not, that [~/ ) 24 ~ B'abcock & Wilcox played'a role in the design of the x 25 control room at'TMI-2. prior to the accident?. 2 e .r _____i______.___________.__._'__
- = 1 MacMillan 287 \\' 2 A The design of the control room is 4 3 basically the responsibility of the utility. The 4 utility frequently delegates that responsibility ({ 5 to its engineer. 6 We provide for the utility and its 7 engineer a suggested hrrangament of the 8 instrumentation associated with the nuclear steam 9 system. What he does with that and how he arranges 10 it is his prerogative. t 11 Q But the fact is that you did recommend 12 an arrangement of the instrumentation used to monitor %~ 13 and control the nuclear steam system in the case of I 14 TMI-27 15 A We had a suggested arrangement.of that 16 instrumentation. 17 Q You recommended an arrangement, is that ~~ 18 correct? ~ 19 A I guess that's correct, yes. 20 Q And that recommendation was then 21 incorporated in a total control-room arrangement 22' -by Burns & Roe, the engineers, is that correct? 23 A I don't think.that's:necessarily correct..
- 24
'They used-that as guidance in arranging 4 25 and laying out.the control room but-to say it'.was-m m us v
1 MacM111an 288 2 incorporated I think is an overstatement. 3 Q .I show you testimony which you gave 4 before the Kemeny Commission in deposition at page { 5 74. .6 I direct your attention -- well, you 7 can look at it. Page 74 and 75. 8 You; do' recall testifying before the 9 Kemeny Commission on deposition, do you not? 10 A Yes. t 11 Q Were you asked this question and did 12 you give this answer at page 74, line 15: N-13 ". Question: Did Babcock & ilcox have 14 any role in the design of the control room at 15 TMI-27 16 " Answer: Yes. I believe tha we 17 recommended an arrangement of the instrumentation 18 that is used to monitor and-control the Euclear 19 steam system and that recommendation was then 20 incorporated in the total control room. arrangement 21 designed by Burns & Roe, and subsequently through k-22 a process involving Burns & Roe and GPU there was 23 arrived at a final configuration which GPU approved. [~ ') 24 " Question: Do I, understand correctly .v 25 that Babcock & Wilcox played some role in the e w W
1 MacMillan 289 ~ 2 formulation of the final control room design? 3 " Answer: As it applied to that portion 4 which is required to supply the nuclear steam system." ( 5 Were you asked those questions and 6 did you give those answers? 7 A Apprently I did, yes. 8 Q Were those accurate answers at the time 9 you gave them? 10 A I believe they were. 1 11 Q Do you still regard them as accurate 12 answers? D \\s 13 A Certainly within the framework th.at I 14 just mentioned in answer to your question, yes. 15 Q Apart from the table which is attached e 16 to Exhibit 214, were there any notes or minutes taken 17 of your discussions with Messrs. Berger,. Ball, Roy 18 and Kosiba regarding their recommendatio s? 19 A I don't remember that there were. 20 Q Would you tdrn to Mr. Berger's memo which 21 we have marked as Exhibit 536.and look at item 10 L 22 on page. 23 'A Yes. ). 24 Q Was there any-discussion of that item?
- s-25 A
I don't recall what discussion we may 4,-
1 MacMillan 290 2 have'had on that item. 3 Q That item states "Small 3reak Response. 4 The effect of small breaks in all parts of the system ( 5 should be investigated first from a safety viewpoint 6 but with equal importance to determining proper 7 operator response." 8 Was there any discussion of the fact 9 that there had not previously been adequate 10 investigation or proper operator respodse to small 1 11 breaks in all parts of the system, particularly the 12 top of the pressurizer? 1 (~h l c l 13 A As I say, I don't recall what kinds of l 14 a discussion we had at that point on.that subject. l 15 Q Would you look at item 27 on page 8 16 under " Pilot Operated Relief Valve." The second 17 sentence:says, "For the present, we have a PORV 18 which is basically unqualified for any service but 19 especially two-phase and water flow." 20 Was there any discussion of that? 21 A I don't recall there being a discussion L 22 on that. 23-Q Did that statement by Mr. Berger -[ ): 24 influence you in. putting reliability of PORV 'together Am/ 25 with other things in the third category? P - I-
i MacMillan 291 g tO V A I don't recall that it did but then 2 again I don't recall any discussion on that item. I don't recall what was discussed on 4 that item. 5 Q Would you look at page 9, item 4, particularly the sentence -- 7 A Yes. 8 Q -- which says, "I believe it is time for g B&W to examine, in the light of our special g knowledge, the safety rules as applied to our g Product. I suggest that it is time to become 12 a tive with the NRC in proposing safetp rules rather 13 than always defending ourselves against new rules." g Do you recall any discussion of that? ~ A don't. 16 Q Had you heard, prior to Three Mile 1,4 Island, anyone expressing the view that B&W was 18 always defending itself against new rules-rather g than proposing new ones? A Well, I don't remember specific discussions of that but I would have.to say that during the period of the seventies when there'were em escalating NRC requirements and changing NRC 24 _(n -) requirements, there were many discussions about.how 4 4 e
i l 1 MacMillan 292 2 we could be responsive to that and how we might 3 anticipate some of those new requirements rather 4 than waiting for them to be set down as requirements (( 5 and having to respond to them, but I don't recall 6 that more than in the general atmosphere in which 7 we were operating in the seventies. 8 Q Was there any discussion in the seventies 9 in terms of trying to defend against the imposition 10 of new safety requirements which mightteither be i 11 too expensive or cause delays in licensing or 12 shutdowns of plants? '/ 13 A Mr. Klingsberg, in the nuclear business 14 when you are coming-down-for the deadline on an 15 operating license, there'are always concerns between B 16 the utility and the reactor manufacturer about how 17 to be responsive to new interpretations c,f NRC 18' requirements which were imposed during the license l 19 negotiations. 1!0 clearly, the-concern-there was that l Jg1 changes might have to'be made-that would'in fact N. 22 take' longer than'the scheduled completion of the P ant so in every" license that I have been associated' l 23 4 p 24 - with, there .s always that concern'that has to be '25 addressed by the. combination of the utility and the ,,,w, -, - - + v-n -~-w -g - - ~ gy
1 MacMillan 293 1 I\\ v 2 NSS supplier. 3 I don't think that's unique to B&W, 4 that's a characteristic of the business. ( 5 So I would have to say that that kind 6 of thing was going on in the 1970's. 7 Q Was it also characteristic that there 8 would be resistance to safety rules that might apply 9 to plants that were already licensed? 10 MR. FISKE: Recistance by whom? 11 MR. KLINGSBERG: B&W. 12 A' I believe that every operating utility \\- 13 that has a nuclear plant at sometime a ter it has 14 gone into operation has challenged the rekuirement 15 to backfit.new regulations to its plant and the basic e 16 challenge is whether or not that new regulation or 17 that new interpretation, whatever it might involve 18 in the way of equipment modification, doeb enhance -- 19 does in fact enhance safety. 20 Q Let me show you Exhibit 23, which is a t 21 memorandum from Mr. Roy from the engineering. (_ 22 department. 23 Did you ever see this memorandun? h) 24 Have-you ever seen that memorandum? 'NJ 25 A I-believe I have s'een this memorandum for. e
1 MacMillan 294 O 2 the first time in just recent aeeks. 3 Q Just in preparation? 4 A Yes. 5 Q Do you know what resulted, if anything, ( 6 by way of written documents or reports from 7 Mr. Roy's memorandum which in turn, according to 8 the memo, was as a result of your review of the 9 candidates for top ten lessons? 10 A I don't. I don't know whether there was 11 any further documentation or not. 12 Q Did you have any meetings pursuing \\/ 13 this subject? 14 A We had a meeting at Wintergreen with 15 the staff of the division to review some of the ~ 16 suggested responses to Three Mile Island. l 17 I don't remember whether that came out m i 18 of the top ten lessons learned or not. I' don't 19 believe it did. I believe that was a separate i 20 task force that we had chartered. 21 Q Were there any minutes or documents k. 22 that resulted from the Wintergreen meeting? 23 A Yes, there are. [~h 24 Q When was that? (,' 25 A That would have been late in 1979. I
l. MacMillan 295 2 know that Russ Ball kept minutes of that meeting 3 and subsequently published those. 4 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark ( 5 as the exhibit next in order, a memo from Roy 6 to the engineering department dated 7 September 19, 1979 with a copy of Mr. MacMillan's 8 dated the same day for distribution, subject, 9 "TMI Response." 10 (Memorandum dated September 19, 1979 from 11 D. H. Roy to the engineering department staff 12 with attached memorandum dated September 19, (/ 13 1979 from J. H. MacMillan for. distribution 14 marked GPU Exhibit.No. 537 for identification, 15 as of this date.) 16 Q Can you identify the-second page of lL 17 Exhibit 537. as a memorandum over.your signature which 18 you sent in the regular course of your buiiness at. 19 B&W on or about September 19, 1979? 20 A Yes.. t 21-Q Was there a compilation, a list of L 22 significant actions-prepared as indicated in this 23-memo? Y 24 ~ A' I don't recall whether a list ~was made [V 25 or not.
MacMillan 296 g Q Did the people on the distribution list 2 submit to you lists of important changes made as requested? 4 i A Frankly, I am drawing a complete blank on this. g 1 Q Did you report 7 A 1 don't r ememb e'r. g Q Did you report to the board of directors g
- *d 10
( A I don't even remember that. gg Q Have you ever appeared before the board 12 of directors and talked about the Davis-Besse g accident or the Three Mile Island accident? -A I have talked to the board of directors la. about Three Mile Island, yes. 6 Q Was there an indication of'a eas in which you had not made changes in assigning 8 responsibility for accomplishing.those changes? g A I really don't remember. I have drawn a 20 blank. 21 k.
- 4R. KLINGSBERG:
I would like to mark as Exhibit 538, a memorandum from Mr. Stanek to r-Mr. Wallin dated November 20, 1979. (Memorandum date'd November.20, 1979
1 MacMillan 297 .f 3 (_) 2 from L. J. Stanek to R. A. Wallin marked 3 GPU Exhibit No. 538 for identification, as 4 of this date.) (' 5 A Yes. 6 Q Have you ever seen Exhibit 538 before? 7 A I don't believe so. 8 Q Can you identify Mr. Zipf, Z-i-p-f? 9 A Yes, Mr. Zipf is president -- at that 10 time was president of Babccck & Wilcox. 11 Q As has been indicated on the last page, 12 did you meet with Mr. Zipf and his staff an'd discuss 13 the items listed? 14 A Mr. Zipf did come to Lynchburg to meet 15 with me and my staff. I would.have to review the 16 list to see whether these were the items he -- 17 Q Did you submit a report to Mr. Zipf as 18 indicated in the memo? 19 MR. FISKE:. Where are you? ~ 20 MR. KLINGSBERG: The very last line. 21 Q It says, "Mr. MacMillan will be L 22 meeting with his staff'and later submitting a report 23 to Mr. Zipf." [ T 24 MR. FISKE: All right. - \\.) ' 25 A I am missing the last sentence of item 9
298 1 MacMillan i 2 on the second page of the exhibit. \\ ~ 3 THE WITNESS: Oh, here it is. 4 MR. FISKE: Is there a question? 5 THE WITNESS: He asked me -- ( 6 A I believe you asked me if the information 7 on pages 2 and 3 of this exhibit, GPU Exhibit 538, 8 reflect what Mr. Zipf discussed with the Nuclear 9 Power Generation Division staff? 10 Q My question is whether as iqdicated in 11 the last sentence in this document, a report was 12 submitted to Mr. Zipf relating to these matters o r' ~~ N,,) 13 related matters? 14 A I don't remember submitting a report. 15 I simply don't recall writing one. 16 Q You don't know whether a report was 17 submitted to Mr. Zipf, whether you wrote it or not, 18 relating to these matters? ~ 19 A I don't recall. 20 Q Do you recall meeting with your staff 4 21 to prepare responses on these questions? 22 A I don't recall that, no. 23 Q Do you recall discussing these items (G ,,/ 24 with Mr. Zipf? 25 A I'had forgotten it until I read this
1 MacMillan 299 ("h~-) 2 memo and it brought to my mind my discussions with 3 Mr. Zipf, yes. 4 Q Did you discuss item 1 with Mr. Zipf, 5 "Have we been as thorough as we should or can be ( 6 in response to problems in dealing with our 7 customers in a timely way?" 8 A To the best of my recollection, the ] I 9 items that are identified here were discussed with 10 Mr. Zipf, yes. 11 Q Did you discuss the second item, "Have been guilty of withholding or evading information 12 we 13 with the NRC7" 14 A Yes. 15 Q What was the substance of that 16 discussion? 17 A Well, the concern that Mr. Zipf raised 18 was the concern that was raised by the general ) 19 counsel to the Kemeny Commission with resp'ect to l 20 -whether we had made available to the NRC information 21' on the small break. analyses. I k. 22 Q Yes. 23 A And I recited for Mr. Zipf what information 24 I knew as to how we had handled-that situation and 25 said I didn't believe we were guilty of withholding
1 MacMillan 300 1 2 or evading.information to the NRC. 3 Q After the Three Mile Island accident, 4 immediately following the spring of 1979, you 5 testified before a number of bodies, did you not? ~ ( p 6 A Yes. 7 Q Do you remember testifying before the 8 ACRS in or about June 1979? 9 A I remember doing it in April. 10 Q April'of 19797 e 11 A Yes, I remember testifying in April, yes. 12 Q Do you remember responding to question's O 13 from Congressman Udall in or about June 1979? 14 A I met with both the Weaver subcommittee 15 of Mr. Udall's committee and with the full committee, 16 yes. 17 Q The McCormick subcommittee in,or about 18 May 19797 19 A In about that time frame, yes.' 20 Q And the Hart subcommittee in or about 21 April 19797 k-22 A Yes. 23 Q There came a time on or about June 5th m .i,) 24 whun you held a press conference relating to the 25 Three Mile Island accident. 2 .t .n ..m
1 MacMillan 302 [ )\\ ~ \\_ ~ 2 Do you recall that? 3 A Yes. 4 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to have ({, 5 marked as GPU Exhibit 539, material relating 6 to this press conference. 7 I am not sure if we have previously 8 marked this with Mr. Favret or not but we 9 will mark it fresh. 10 (Multipage document entitled "Three 11 Mile Island, Before, During and After. A 12 Briefing by Babcock & Wilcox" marked GPU O-13 Exhibit No. 539 for identification, as of 14 this date.) 15 Q can you identify Exhibit 539? 16 A This appears to be a recording of the 17 press conference that we held in Lynchbur,g on 18 June 5, 1979. ~ 10 Q At the time of the press conference, 20 you were aware, were you not, of the Dunn mem'orandum? 21 A Yes. L 22 Q And you knew that Dunn had identified 23 the-problem of premature termination of HPI? OQ 24 A Yes. 25 Q And that he had identified the Davis-Besse
1 MacMillan 302 (~h \\- 2 event azid his concerns as a serious concern? 3 A Yes. 4 Q Can you explain why there is no mention ( 5 of the Dunn memorandum or the concerns expressed 6 therein in the press conference in June 19797 7 A Well, I didn't believe they were relevant 8 to the purpose of the press conference and that was 9 to review the history of Three Mile Island and the 10 events that took place at the island and our s e'ents. 11 assessment of those v 12 Q Do you know why there was no mention \\ \\_/ 13 of the Dunn menorandum in the various bearings at 14 which you testified in your testimony prior to the 15 press conference? i 16 MR. FISKE: I am going to make the s ame 1 17 objection, Mr. Klingsberg, to that, question i 18 that I did to a similar one earliei. 10 It seems to me that if Mr. MacMillan 20 appears before some body in response to 21 questions, his obligation is to answer the ,L 22 questions he is asked. 23 I think, as I said before, unless you /"} 24 give him a particular question that would rLJ 25 fairly call for a discussion of the Dunn memo,
1 MacMillan 303 2 I think it is a little unfair to ask him the 3 9eneral question that you just did. 4 MR. KLINGSBERG: Well, if the witness ( 5 can answer, if that is his explanation, then 6 we can leave it up to whether, assuming that 7 becomes relevant, without bothering to spend 8 an hour going through all the testimony. 9 MR. FISKE: Well, I am not going to 10 instruct him not to answer the question but 11 I do note an objection to it. l l 12 Q Can you answer the question? l 13 A The Dunn memo was not presented in 14 testimony before the many bodies you enumerated 15 because I didn't believe it was relevant to our e 16 description of the events that took place at Three 17 Mile Island and our assessment of those events. 18 MR. KLINGSBERG: I would like to mark 19 as the next exhibit, No. 540, a memo'randum 20 from Mr. Esleeck to Distribution dated 21 -July 30, 1979. 22 (Memorandum dated July 30, 1979 from 23 S. H. Esleeck for distribution with attachment () 24 _ marked GPU Exhibit No. 540 for identification, 25 as of this date.)
1 MacMillan 304 1 (2h \\- 2 Q Is that your h,andwriting in the upper 3 right-hand corner? 4 A Yes. (( 5 Q Did you receive this memo on or about 6 August 1, 1979 in the regular course of your business 7 at Babcock & Wilcox? 8 A Yes. 9 Q Will you read the note into the record,- 10 please. ( 11 A The note is addressed to NSE who is 12 Nelson Embrey. It says, "Thanks. Looks like OTS'G 13 inventory and pressurizer size need ev$1uation." 14 Q What did you mean by that? 15 A Do we have a better copy of this? I 16 Jan't read portions of this which were apparently 17 marked over by a marker (indicating). 18 MR. TAYLOR: This might be be$ter. 19 This may be the one that. copies were'made l 20 .from. 21 THE WITNESS: Could I have the question k[ 22 again, please. 23 (Record was read back.) ("N 24 A well, I don't recall specifically what ( N,' ~ 25 I had in mind at the time I wrote that note. e w,- ,e r e
l l l 1 MacMillan 305 2 In reading through the memo, some 3 questions were raised by Duke relative to the 4 pressurizer size and the response of the nuclear ( 5 steam system and I would expect that I arrived at 6 that comment based on the reading of the memo. 7 Q Please turn to page 4, the bottom of 8 the page under item 3.2, it says, "For Oconee 1, 9 during the 19 reactor trips from loss of all feedwater 10 at least one OTSG was steamed dry on approximately 11 10 of the trips. It takes approximately 1-1/2' 12 minutes to steam dry for this case." And the second 13 line of that is underlined and then there is a line 14 in the margin and then it says, " Ouch." 15 Is that your handwriting? 16 A I believe it is. 17 Q Why did you write " Ouch"? 18 A I think I was surprised that they had 19 had that high a frequency of boiling a steam 20 . generator dry. 21 Q Had you, before the Three Mile Island k. 22 . accident, heard any concerns similar to the ones 23 expressed by Duke in regard to once-through steam (m) 24 generator inventory, pressurizer size, steam generator i 25 running dry or similar matters as expressed in W t
- v 4
1 MacMillan 306 'p V' 2 this memo? 3 A .I think I testified earlier that I have 4 difficulty discriminating as to when I heard certain 5 pieces of information. I know that pressurizer size [ 6 and steam generator inventory have been discussed 7 at various times and I don't know which of those 8 discussions took place before the accident and which 9 took place after. 10 My comment here I think indicates 11 some surprise on my part of the frequency at which 12 this steaming dry occurred at Oconee. 13 Q Would technical people in your ~ 14 organization below your level have been aware of 15 these.Oconee reactor trip and steam generator 16 running dry incidents as they occurred under your 1 17 site problem report procedures prior to the Three 18 Mile Island accident? 19 A Well, I know at Oconee 1 we kept a 20 running record of the number of reactor scrams or 21 trips that-occurred there and so there would have C' 22 .been people in my organization who were aware-of 23 the fact-that w'e had had a trip. ' (, s) 24 In that time frame, we didn't undertake x/ 25 the same degree or extent of evaluation of those ~_
.1 MacMillan 307 (~~ - k,)/ 2 trips as we have more recently and wnetner they 3 would have been aware of the steaming dry or not 4 I simply don't know. ( 5 Q Would that have been something you would 6 have expected to be included in a site problem 7 report? 8 A Again, in the time frame of Oconee, the 9 site problem reports are used primarily to reflect 10 equipment problems, there is something wrong with 11 the equipment, it's broken or not operating 12 correctly. These trips were initiated by the O 13 feedwater system which is outside the nuclear steam 14 system scope of supply and I wouldn't be sure that a 15 site problem report had even been prepared for these e 16 trips. 17 Q Does this refresh your recollection of 18 the time it takes for the once-through steam 19 generator to run. dry with a loss of all fe'edwater? 20 A It doesn't refresh my memory. It says 21 it takes-1-1/2 minutes and I think we discussed ~ 22 earlier it was just a matter of minutes before it .M went. dry. 24 MR. KLINGSBERG: I have no further -25 questions.
4 1 MacMillan 308 ~ 2 MR. FISKE: Just a couple of questions, i 3 Mr. MacMillan. 4 EXAMINATION BY MR. FISKS: ( 5 Q You testified earlier that it was your 6 understanding that it would take approximately a 7 minute to boil dry the steam generator in the event 8 there was a total loss of all feedwater? 9 A Yes. 10 Q And I believe you testified -- i 11 A And no auxiliaryoor emergency feedwater. 12 Q Well, I was going to ask you whether. f) + - 13 that calculation ass,umed,.as Mr. Klingsberg had 14 asked you, the loss of emergency feedwater as well .15 as regular feedwater? 16 A In making these calculations, it would 17' be assumed that you lost all main feedwater and then 18 if you did not get auxiliaryffeedwater, how-long 19 would it take to boil the inventory and th'at's the 20 way that calculation would be made.- 21. Q .Did you have'an understanding during 22 the period of time before the Three Mile Island 23 _ accident as to how'the utility was supposed to rm. A._. J - 24 - operate-the plant in terms of having emergency ( - 25 feedwater being available? b rs r ,n..
1 MacMillan 309 2 A Well, in the operation of the plant, it a 3 was expected.that emergency feedwater would be 4 available in the event of loss of main feedwater. (( 5 g You also testified, Mr. MacMillan, 6 I think in response to a question by 7 Mr. Klingsberg, that you had placed relief valve 8 reliability in category 3 of the lessons learned 9 after the accident. 10 Do you remember that? E 11 A Yes. 12 Q At the time you did that, were you aw'are /#') 13 aof the extent to which prior. failures of the pilot 14 operated relief valve at various B&W utilities had 15 been or was attributable to improper maintenance 16 or other fault on the part of the utility? 17 MR. KLINGSBERG: I object. T,here is no 18 foundation. 19 Q You can answer that. ~ 20 A In the preparation for the testimony 21 that I gava on.various occasions following the Three L 22 Mile Island accident, we did review the history of 23 pilot operated relief valve failures and traced the rh 1 24 cause of.those failures. In a number of cases, the LJ .25 valve failure was related to inadequate maintenance.-
1 MacMillan 310 Lq) 2 In other cases, such as the Davis-Besse case, the 3 valve failed because the electrical circuitry was 4 not wired as required in the diagram. ( 5 Q Was it B&W's responsibility to wire 6 the electrical circuitry for the valve? 7 A No. 8 Q One last point or question, Mr. MacMillan, 9 You testified, I believe in response to 10 Mr. Klingsberg's question earlier, that given the 11 loss of emergency feedwater and the stuck open pilot 12 ' operated relief valve, the operator action in (~% N-13 improperly terminating HPI was the most significant 14 factor in causing the damage that occurred at' Three 15 Mile Island. 16 Do you remember that testimony? 17 A Yes. 18 Q At tha time you gave that testimony 19 and today, were you aware of any other event, any 20 accident sequence, which, if it had been handled 21 differently, would have prevented the damage, would (. 22 have prevented any significant damage from occurring? 23 MR. KLINGSBERG: I object to the form. j ) 24 I object to the form of the question., N/ i 25 A. Well, in-the accident sequence, the 1 T =
1 MacMillan 333 , v) .I 2 problem was that we were losing coolant from the 3 reactor coolant system and through the open pilot 4 operated relief valve. Had the operators detected ({ 5 that and-closed that valve, then there would have 6 been.no damage, it would have been a minor incident. 7 Q As you sit here today, Mr. MacMillan, 8 do you have any basis for determining that the 9 improper act' ion by the operators in terminating 10 HPI played any greater role in causingtthe damage 11 than did the operators' improper failure to close 12 the block valve? /^\\ 13 MR. KLINGSSERG: Objection. 14 A Had the operators closed the block 15 valve, then the interruption of HPI would not have e 16 been a factor. 17 If -- ~ 18 THE WITNESS: Can I hear the question 19 again, please. ~ 20 Q The question is simply as you' sit here 21 today, do you have any basis for concluding that the 22 improper action by the operators in~ terminating 23 HPI was=any more'of a contributing factor to the .(m); 24 accident than the improper action of the operators s./ 25 in failing to diagnose the open PORV and close'the u_
1 MacMillan 312 ~ 2 block valve? 3 MR. KLINGSBERG: To which I objected. 4 A Either closing the block valve or letting 5 HPI to continue to run would have avoided significant ( 6 core damage. 7 MR. FISKE: 0.K., that's all I have. 8 MR. KLINGSBERG: We will take a minute 9 to sae if we have any questions in respvnse to 10 your questions, t 11 (Recess taken.) 12 BY MR. KLINGSBERG: 13 Q Mr. MacMillan, was the eme gency-14 feedwater system, prior to the Three Mile Island 15 accident, and the B&W nuclear steam supply system 16 regarded by the NRC as a safety grade system to deal 17 with accidents? 18 A The emergency feedwater systes was not 19 classified as a safety grade system. 20 Q And the emergency core
- cooling system 21 was the-system that was the safety grade system 22 designed to deal with loss of coolant accidents, was 23 it not?
/v) 24 A The emergency core cooling system is 25 designed to handle loss of coolant accidents and it
MacMillan 313 V is a safety grade system. Q Is it a fact that a plant with B&W reactors is designed so that it could operate safely even in.the event of a loss of emergency feedwater? i C A The B&W nuclear steam supply system 6 design and recommended operation utilizes heat 7 i removal through the steam generators for long-term 3 cooling of the reactor coolant system until it was g c 1 en ugh so that you could operate {our decay 10 heat system. There had to be some supply of g feedwater to the steam generators to accomplish that 12 E"#E *** 13 In the absence of main feedwater, emergency g feedwater would be required. g Q And in the absence of emerger$Cy feedwater, was the plant designed so that it could still' operate without a disaster? 18 A Well, I don't know what you mean by g " disaster." Q Was it designed so tha t-. even in the abseace of emergency feedwater, the' plant could still operate safety? MR. FISKE: You mean operate or survive? ~ MR..KLINGSBERG: I don't mean operate in
Y 1~ MacMillan 314 2 the sense of produce power. 3 Q ,I mean -- 4 A Well, there is in the event of a loss ( 5 of main feedwater, and loss of emergency feedwater, 6 there is some period of time during which the heat 7 from the decay heat in the reactor would merely heat 8 up the reactor core coolant, increase its temperature 9 and pressure and ultimately would open the relief 10 valves on the pressurizer and steam would boil off 3 11 from'the reactor coolant system. 12 Ultimately, there has to be some other 13 way of taking heat away in order to kebp water in the 14 reactor coolant system and keep the core covered. 15 That emergency feedwater is the mechanism by which 16 the plant was designed to accomplish that objective. 17 Q When the pressure operated relief-valve 18 opens, if as a result of that pressure, t'emperature 19 drops,the emergency core cooling system comes on at a 20 c'ertain point, is t_h a t correct? 21 A Well, the pressure may not drop. You may L 22 just keep boiling steam -- boiling water in the core 23 and keep the pressure up there so you keep boiling ~ 24 steam out of the pressurizer relief valves until you 25 are able to get some cooling through the steam e
4 MacMillan 315 i-fm I generators to get the temperature and pressure down. 2 Q The plant is designed to operate safely in that interim period, is it not? 4 8 88 9ne Perate safely. { 5 It's designed so that in the event that happens, the 6 core is protected. 7 9 Y*** 8 Do you know whether B&W took credit in its' safety analyses submitted to the NRC for the 10 ' emergency feedwater system? g A I really don't know the answer to that 12 13 i Q Do you know if B&W took credit for its g high pressure injection system in its loss of coolant 15 analyses submitted to the NRC? A Yes. 1 4 Q Now, you were asked about valve failures I 18 wl$1ch B&W studied after the Three Mile Island g accident, is that correct? A
- Yes, k
Q Where did B&W go.to get information about g the valve failures? A Well, the. primary source of information v in that type of evaluation would be from the utility -ts _____m.
1 MacMillan 316 O 2 and the utility. maintenance records. We would also 3 keep scme records ourselves. 4 Q Did B&W look to the site problem reports [ 5 as a source of information on the valve failures? 6 A That would be a possib1'e source of 7 information, yes. 8 Q Do you know in fact whether in this 9 review B&W relied on its own site problem reports 10 or went outside to the utilities? t \\ 11 A I don't know the answer. 12 Q Do you know how many valve failures were 'N 13 discovered? 14 A I don't remember now. I did at one 15 point when I was in the process of testifying in 1979. 16 Q ' Do you know that a number of valve 17 failures were-discovered which were not d,ue to -18 improper maintenance? 19 A I indicated earlier that thers wer.e - 20 failures,in the valve system which were related to I 21 electrical problems so the answer to that question k_ 22 is yes. 23. Q Apart from the Crosby problem in [T ' 24 Davis-Besse, there were valve failures apart from 25 ' maintenance problems, were there not?
MacMillan 317 g p 4 v/ A I believe there were, yes. 2 Q' Now, did you ever become, aware of the fact that at Davis-Besse, that in the September 24th incident the operators did not actuate high pressure injection even after they closed the block valve for significant period of time which was some 40-odd some ~ mi tes? 8 A I don't recall the specific events at Davis-Besse. I do remember that in that sequence, 10 e it did take the operators about 20 minutes to detect the fact that the,y had an open pilot operated relief valve and to close the block valve but-the other items .V 13 in the sequence I would have to say I don't have a very good recollection of. l Q You don't know for a fact, do"you, that-16 3 when the Davis-Besse operators closed the block 1 4 valve, they knew there was an open PORV7 - g A Well, I guess to be perfectly precise, all I know is they closed the block valve in about 20 minutes. 21 l b Q And you are not awarc :,2 tha fact that even after they closed the block valve for some 40 minutes, they didn't actuate high pressure '_% ] injection?
MacMillan 318 g A I don't know -- yes, I don't know. 2 Q A d y u are als nt aware of the fact 3 that when they finally did get around to actuating 4 high pressure injection, they only left it on until ( 5 pressurizer level recovered? 6 l A I don't know that. [ 7 Q Were you aware that those facts, 3 regarding the failure to actuate high pressure 9 injection even after the block valve was closed 10 t f and shutting it off again and pressurizer level gg was recovered, were revealed at the training room B 12 meeting and contained in the site problem report? g o'f the A I have said I am not aware sequence of events and I don't remember being at la, the meeting and so I would have to say I am not. 16 aware. g Q The fact that the operators did not gg actuate HPI even after they closed-the block valve would tend to indicate that they might not have known there was a loss of coolant accident in L progress, is that not.so? g MR. FISKE: I will object to that. g _Q Let me ask you this. Is there any reason why Babcock & Wilcox kept its site problem
1 MacMillan 319 ~ [^~'). ~ \\ 2 reports all in house and did not circulate them to 3 utilities before the Three M'ile Island accident? I don't know of any specific 4 A I didn't 5 reason. { 6 Q It is a fact, is it not, that site 7 problem reports were maintained internally and not 8 generally circulated among all B&W plant owners 9 before the Three Mile Island accident? 10 A I could not confirm that aq a fact. I 11 don't know. ~ 12 MR. KLINGSBERG: All right. f% '(-) 13 MR. FISKE: One last quest [on, 14 Mr. MacMillan. 15 BY MR. FISKE: 16 Q My question is'whether you have learned 17 at any time in the course of the training room B i 18 discussion or in.the site problem report 6r in the 19 LER that was filed by Davis-Besse with the'NRC it 20 was revealed that the operators had diagnosed that 21 there might be a problem at the top of the system k. 22 leading them to close the block valve based en the 23 fact that the rupture disk had blown? f^] 24 Did you become aware of that fact at-V 25 any time up until today?
l' MacMillan 321 i i I 2. disk. I do know and had been told.they did close 1 i I 3 the block valve in 20 minutes. 4' '4 MR.~FISKE: That's all. { 5 MR. KLINGSBERG: No questions. 6 (Time noted: 6:05 p.m.) 4 7 8 9 John Henry MacMillan 10 Subscribed and sworn to before me t 11 this day of 1982. 12 ~ 13 14 15 16 4 17 18-19 1 20 21 L 22 23 ~24 2,
l' MacMillan 320 fA >) 2 MR. KLINGSBERG: I object'to the form f the question. 3 4 MR. FISKE: 0.K. MR. KLINGSBERG: What was the answer? (( 5 6 Was there an answer? 7 MR. FISKE: No. All we have is an g objection so far. MR. KLINGSBERG: Oh, O.K. 9 10 A In our discussions yesterdgy of the it incident, I believe I was shown a sequence of events 12 that took place which indicated that the rupture . f~' (- 13 disk had blown and in fact had damaged'or blown off, the insulation of one of the steam generators so I 14 am aware as a result of that discussion here. 15 ~ 16 Q And did you become aware at any time after the Three Mile Island accident that the 17 18 operators had closed the block valve at D' avis-Besse 19 because of the conclusions that they had drawn as a result of the rupture disk blowing? 20 MR. KLINGSBERG: Objection. 21 L A I don't recall specifically being -- I 22 F don't recall specifically being told or having seen 23 (~h[ that the purpose or the reason that the operators 24 L.- closed the block valve was because of the rupture 25
y 322 ,r 1 CERTIFICATE 2n i STATE OF NEW YORK ) 3 i
- 33,:
l COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) 4 ( CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.R. and I, a Notary Public of the State of N'ew York, do.hereby certify that the continued deposition of 7 JOHN HENRY MacMILLAN was taken before Thursday, June to, 1982 consisting me on 9 of pages 134 through 321
- (,
I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within O 1 transcript is a true record of said testimony; That I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor an I in the employ of any of the counsel. 18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 19 yy hand thi's 1 8 day of 20 M 6 1982. 20 ((. 21 22 1 J '*3 ~ CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.'S [ 24 1 25
323 INDEX WITNESS PAGE John Henry MacMillan (resumed) 136 s m EXHI B I T S GPU g NUMBER FOR IDENT. 530 Memorandum dated September 4, 1979 from J. H. Taylor to a D. H. Roy 184 531 Memorandum dated June 5, 1979 from D. H. Roy to E. A. Womac'k and F. R. Fahland with attached memorandum dated June 4, 1979 from J. H. MacMillan to N. S. Embrey 229 532 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Investigation dated" January 24, 1980 of Babcock G' Wilcox 247 533 Letter dated August 29, 1979 from N. S. Embrey to James Huckfeldt with attached document entitled "Some TMI Lessons { Learned" by J. H. MacMillan 253 534 Copy of letter dated April 26, 1979 fro's John H. MacMillan to Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 266 J,i).a. >. 4:G i? Dd n-a - > ~A r k "* dE + 4l **ii k '- l i ' *' h *"Y'N - ~ - > + u
.~ 324 EXH I B I TS s (Continued) .GPU NUMBER 'FOR IDENT. 535 Memorandum dated June 8, 1979 from R. M. Ball to J. H. 3 ~ V,~ [280 3?! .MacMillan "!$ > T 4-4 536 Memorandum dated June 5, 1979 from D. W. Berger to J. K. MacMillan 281 et a 537 Memorandum dated September 19, 1979 from D. H. Roy to the engineering department staff with attached memorandum dated ] September 19, 1979 from J. H. MacMillan for distribution 295 538 Memorandum dated November 20, 1979 from L. J. Stanek to R. A. Wallin 296 539 Multipage document entitled "Three Mile Island, Before, During and After. A Briefing. 3 l by Dabcock & Wilcox" 301 1 7 540 Memorandum dated July 30, 1979, i from S. H. Esleeck for distribution with attachment 303 (.... 1 e
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