05000311/LER-1982-133, Forwards LER 82-133/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-133/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20070D876
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 12/01/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20070D880 List:
References
NUDOCS 8212160381
Download: ML20070D876 (3)
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LER-1982-133, Forwards LER 82-133/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111982133R00 - NRC Website
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text

- g.

O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jccsey 08038 Salem Generating Station December 1, 1982 Mr.

R.

C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DP R.-7 5 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-133/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-133/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours.

b c sw H.

J. Midura I

General Manager -

l Salem Operations RF:k; p

CC:

Distribution h)'%

8212160381 821201 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR The Energy Peopkr w a nn aow n ei

r Report Number:

82-133/03L Report Date:

12-01-82 Occurrence Date:

11-07-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Containment Gaseous Activity Monitor - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-418, 82-423, and 82-424.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - RX Power 82 % - Unit Load 910 MWe, DESCRIPTION _QF OCCURRENCE:

On three separate occasions, at 2358 hours0.0273 days <br />0.655 hours <br />0.0039 weeks <br />8.97219e-4 months <br />, November 7, 1982, at 1936 hours0.0224 days <br />0.538 hours <br />0.0032 weeks <br />7.36648e-4 months <br />, November 10, 1982, and at 1654 hours0.0191 days <br />0.459 hours <br />0.00273 weeks <br />6.29347e-4 months <br />, November 11, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator discovered that the Containment Gaseous Activity Monitor (Channel 2R12A) had malfunctioned.

In all caser the channel logic was electronically locked up.

On each occasion the instrument was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Limiting Condition 3.3.3.1 Action 24 applied retroactive to the time of discovery.

The redundant Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak detection systems, including the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity and fan cooler condensate flow rate instruments, were operable throughout the occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

l In each instance the channel was powered down then re-energized to clear the memory.

In the first case, the power supply voltages checked j

satisfactorily, no other problems were evident, and the monitor was restored to operation.

Following recurrence of the malfunction, several minor problems were discovered; the problems were rectified I

and the channel was again restored to service.

After the monitor failed for the third time, the major integrated circuits and circuit boards were rescated.

Wiring bundles in the back of the modulo were l

l shifted.

The channel was restarted and tested satisfactorily; no further problems have been noted.

The occurrence was therefore assumed to involve an intermittent connection on one of the components l

which were reseated.

j ANALYSIS OF O.CCURRENCE:

{

Operability of the containment gaseous monitor insures that the levels l

of radio gases in the containment atmosphere are continually measured.

I The channel together with the containment fan cooler condensate flow rate instrument functions as an RCS leak detection system.

Either of the instruments are required to meet the requirements of the limiting i

l l

l t

T LER 82-133/03L ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENC_E: (cont'd) condition for operation. As noted, the redundant RCS leak detection systems were operable and radioactivity levels in.the containment were continuously monitored by the containment particulate monitor.

The event therefore involved no risk to the health and safety of the public.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1 Action 24 requires:

With the number of channels operable less than the minimum number of channels operable required, operation may continue for up to thirty days, provided that grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

In the first instance, following satisfactory testing, the channel was declared operable, and at 1625 hours0.0188 days <br />0.451 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.183125e-4 months <br />, November 8, 1982, Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1 Action 24 was terminated.

On the second occasion, compliance with the limiting condition for operation was regained at 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, November 11, 1982.

In the last case, the channel was declared operable and the action statement terminated at 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br />, November 11, 1982.

As stated, following reseating of the integrated circuits and boards, no further problems were noted.

Intermittent connections in digital electronics circuitry on an isolated basis are not unususal.

No previous occurrences were documented; in view of the nature of the occurrence, no further action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Victoreen Instrument Div.

Controller Module Model 866CD Prepared By R.

Frahm

/

b o

'e'nerai Manager -

G SORC Meeting No.82-107

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