ML20064C104

Forwards Justifications for Interim Operation of NSSS & balance-of-plant Equipment Per 821123 Commitment & to Facilitate NRC Review & Close Out SER Open Issue 8.Remaining Justifications Will Be Provided Prior to Fuel Load

ML20064C104
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	12/29/1982
From:	James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SNRC-810, NUDOCS 8301040314
Download: ML20064C104 (23)

Text

~ -

3

-p, we ,

J gg LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY

/##m/ww SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

" P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792

' ~

/

.i w,

December 29, 1982 SNRC-810 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

' , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Safety Evaluation Report Issue No. 8 Dynamic Qualification Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1

. s Docket No. 50-322

-' [

Reference:

(1) Letter SNRC-796 LILCO (J.L. Smith) to NRC (H-R. Denton) dated 11/23/82 f

l

Dear M'. .~ Denton :

Ln the above referenced letter, LILCO stated that justifications for int,erim operation for SQRT equipment, whose qualification documentation would not be fully completed by fuel load, would be subalitted by December, 1982. In accordance with that letter, please' find enclosed ten (10) copies of justifications for interim operation for both NSSS and BOP equipment. This information is being submitted in order to facilitate the NRC's staff review and clusaout of SER open issue number 8.

Attachment 1 is a complete listing, by specification and equipment mark number, of equipment for which justifications for interim operation have been provided. Justifications have not been pro-videc' for all outstanding equipment items since LILCO anticipates obtainiaq full qualification documentation for those items prior to fJel load.

k R301040314 '821229 I I

Io FOR ADOCK .05000322 g PDR 1 I - .

J

December 29, 1982 Mr. Denton Page 2 In accordance with R.L. Tedesco's letter to LILCO, dated January 23, 1981, four (4) copies of this submittal are being forwarded directly to Dr. Morris Reich at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Very truly yours,

)

. L. Smith Manager, Special Projects Shoreham Nuclear Power Station WVB:jm Enclosure cc: J. Higgins All parties Dr. M. Reich (4)

J. F. Etzweiler i

1 I

. b .

A'ITIGFlTP 1 JUSTIFICATIG;S FOR IITTERIM OPERATIa1 BOP Scog: .

Sill'-475 ID21*IHLll7A,B Sill-492 1Z93 *PCV010.'\,B 1T48*PCV143,A,B,C,D lT48"PCVl44A,B 1T48

• PO'14 3A, B ,C, D lT48*PCV146A,B NSSS Ecope SDV Solenoid Valvo 1Cll*SCN044 SDV Vent & Dra.in Valves ICll*AOV081/82 IIPCI Turbine 1E41*TU-002 Pater Innge l'onitor Panel lilll*PNL-608 In-Vessel Rick 1FlG* PIE-09

i INIERIM JusunrATION Mark No. 1D21*PNL ll7A,B Conpcrient Name lE Cabinets Systen Name Ibdiation Monitoring Vendor Kaman Instrumentatio'n Spec. No. SH1-475-1.1 Model No. KE-CRC Quantity 2 EQUIPMENT le>.mitMENIS Hot Standby -- - Cold Shutdown Both Neither X ,

Other )( Operation / Post Accident GJALIFICATIN SWbMRY The equignent is scheduled to be seismically tested in January 1983 -

at Acton Environmental Iabs with final test reports due in April 1983.

CD@ONEt7f SAFETY FUNCTION

\' Ccrnponents in these cabinets are not used to achieve safe-shutdown i

nor to mitigate the consequences of an accident. bbnitoring caponents located in these cabinets are used to estimate and evaluate the real or potential radioactive effluent releases and are Reg. Guide 1.97 (Rev. 2) nonitors. Ccxnponents for the High Range Area Radiation Monitors and the Post Accident Effluent bbnitors are located on these cabinets.

Ccrnponent Fhrk Number Cabinet Name .

1D21*PNL ll7A A 1D21*RIS 085A Rateneter 1Dll*RIS 134A Kerdc 1Dll*RR 502 Reccxder 1Dll*E/S ll7A Power Supply (for Recorder) 1Dll*E/S ll7B Power Supply (for Rateneter)

Isolation bbdule Digital (2)

Isolation bbdule Analog (2)

- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ a

1 Couponent Mark thanber Cabinet ,

Name 1D21*PNL ll7B B i 1D21*RIS 085B Ratemeter 1Dll*RIS 126A Keric 1Dll*RR 503 -

Recorder 1Dll*E/S ll7C Power Supply (for Recorder) 1Dll*E/S ll7D Power Supply (for Rateneter)

Isolation Module Digital (2)

Isolation Module Analog (2) .

FAILURE CNSEOUENCE AIRLYSIS Failure of a cornponent in one channel would not affect the operaticn of other channels located within the rnh1 net. Each channel is mechanically isolated by barriers and electrically separated by being individually fused with Class lE fuses. Independent canpanent/

channel fusing protects lE power fran damage in the event of short circuiting within the canponents.

In'the event of failure of the High Range Area Badiation Monitors, samples of the containment atmosphere can be obtained using the Post Accident Sampling Systen and analyzcri to estimate extent of core damage. In the event of failure of the Post Accident Effluent

&nitors' components located in the lE cabinets, local iMir'ation and/or grab samples with analysis can be used to estimate releases.

JusnnCATION SIDNAIE The seismic failure of the components on these cabinets would not degrade the safety function of any other component required for safe-shutdown or for IOCA mitigation and would not mislead the operator. In addition, the Post Accident Sampling Systen can be -

usal in assessing the extent of core damage and local indication and/or grab samples can be used for rnd1ntion release assessment.

Basal on these considerations, interim plant oparation is justified.

1

EQUIPMENT JUSTIFICATION SQRT Mark No. 1Z93*PCV010A,a Component Name Press Control Valve system !!ame Post Accident Monitoring Vendor Circle Seal Spec. No. 492-1.1 Model No. NCRR20-9020 Quantity 2 EQUIPMENT REQUITIMENTS Ilot Standby Cold S.Nutdowri

• Both X Neither Other X (Post Accident Monitoring)

QUALIFICATION

SUMMARY

These Circle Seal pressure control valves are being seismically tested at Wyle Laboratories. The testing is expected to be complete and the test report and documentation issued by February, 1903.

COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION These pressure control valves regulate the pressure of nitrogen gas to the suppression pool level measuring bubbler system, 1Z93*LT012A, B (range: - 90" to normal water level to + 6"). The bubbler system measures level by measuring the hydrostatic pressure at the open end of a submerged tube. A constant nitrogen supply pressure to the bubbler and differential pressure transmitter is required.

FAILURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS These components employ spring-held diaphragms to regulate the pressure at a pre-set amount , which is determined by an adjustable spring tension. The postulated failure modes due to seismic load include spring failure and/or diaphragm rupture.

If the spring failed or the diaphragm ruptured, the valve would lese its ability to regulate and would fail open. If thin happened, the systcm would see the full supply pressure of 100-145 psig instead of the normal pressure of 60 psig. This would cause a zero shift in the level transmitter, but would not over pressure other components or piping in the loop.

In the event that 1Z93*LT012A, B are impaired or disabled, diverse Class IE level instrumentation (1Z93*LT001A,B) can be used as a backup (range: - 36" to normal water level to + 60"). This range is not as low as that of lZ93*LT012A,B but the suppression pool level is not expected to fall below - 36" so the effect would be minimal. These components have been installed to Category I requirements so they will not experience an external failure that would jeopardize other equipment.

The PVC is self-contained, with no electrical connections so the failure of this valve would not affect any Class IE electrical equipment.

JUSTIFICisTION SUE!ARY As indicated in the Failure Conseduence Analysis, diverse methods for measuring suppression pool level exist, wh'ich could bej d sed in the unlikely event of failure of 1Z93*LT012A,B caused by failure of lZ98*PCV010A,B.

It has been shown in the failure conscquence analysis above, that component failure would not affect any Class IE equipment. Hence interim plant operation is j ur,t i fied .

EQUIPMENT JUSTIFICATION SQRT Mark No. 1T48*PCV 143A,B,C,D Component !!ame Pressure Control Valves System Name Pri. Contain. Atmos. Cntrl. Vendor Circle Seal Spec. ?!o. 492-1.2 Model No. NCRR20-9020 Quantity 4 .

EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS Ilot Standby _ Cold Shutilown _ . Both _ Neither X Other X (Pbst Accident Monitoring)

QUALIFICATION

SUMMARY

These Circle Seal pressure control valver are being seismically tested at Wyle Laboratories. The testing is expected tc. Je complete and the test report and documentation issued by February, 1983.

COMPONENT SAFETY PUNCTION These pressure control valves regulate hydrogen reagent gas pressure at 25 psig f rom the 2400 psig hydrogen reagent gas bottic to the 11.,/0 3 analyzer panels 1T48*PNL 06AA,B & IT48*PNL OG9A,B. The analyzer systemis^ required for LOCA nitigation and for compliance with Heg. Guide 1.97 FAILURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS These PCV's cnploy a spring-held diaphragm to regulate the pressure at a preset amount, which is determined ny adjustable spring tension. There is a relief valvo on the outlet side of each valve integrally nounted on the PCV.

Possible post-seismic failure modes include a spring failure or diaphragm rupture, I

a stuck open relief valve, and/or a relief valve that failed to open.

If the spring failed or the diaphragm ruptured, the PCV would lose it's ability to regulate and coula fail open allowing full supply pressure through the valve. If the relief valve is operating correctly, this pressure would be vented, preventing damage to the downstream piping or the analyzer panels. However, if the relief valve failed to open due to seismically-induced damage, the downstream piping and the panels would be exposed to gas pressures of 2400 psig, potentially dan. aging them.

If the relief valve stuck open, the hydrogen gas would vent to the surrounding area, instead of going to the analyzers. The area surrounding these PCV's is sufficiently vented, assuring that the escaping hydrogen gas could not accumulate to an explosive concentration.

Any of these #ailure scenarios cevld cause the analyzers to malfunction or fail entirely. In the event that all analyzers are affected, the capability exists to obtain and analyzc grab samples of the containment atmosphere, with the post-accident sampling system.

There are no electrical connections to these PCV's, so their failure would not affect any Class IE equipment other than the analyzers, or any Class IE power supplies.

These items are installed to Category I requ'rements, i so they will not experience an external failure that would jeopardize other equipment.

JUSTIFICATIOII

SUMMARY

If a failure of thes, components disabled the H /03 analyzing system, grab sample 7

capability would still exist. Failure would noti affect any other IE systems or power supplies. Category I installation will prevent any external failure and resultant damage to other equipment. Ventilation is sufficient in the ar2a of these volves so that gross leakage of hydrogen would not reach explosive levelc. Hence, interita plant operation is justified.

i

FEMIPIRE JUSTIFICATION SQIT Fark Ib. 1T48'PCVl44A,B Component Name Press Control Valve System Nano Pri.Contain. Atnos. Cntrl. Vendor Circle Seal Spec. Ib. 492-1.3 Fbdel No. NCRR20-9020 Quantity 2 -

EQUIPPENT RDOUIREMDUS Ilot Standby Cold Shutdown Both Neither _.2L._

Other (Post Iccident bbnitoring)

OUALIFICATION SUWARY.

These Circle Seal pressure control valves are being seisntically tested at Wyle Laboratories. The testing is expected to be ecnplete and the test report and docum2ntation issued by February,1983.

COMPONErF SAETm' FUNCTION These pressure control valves regulate hydrcxJen calibration gas pressure at 25 psig from the 1100 psia hydrogen calibration gas bottles to the 11/0 2 2 analyzer [uncls, lT48*PNL 06dA,B & 1T48*PNL 069A,B. The analyzer systen is reluiral for IDCA mitigation and for (YJapliance with Reg. Guide 1.97.

FAITURE CONSEOUENCE ANAIXSIS These PCV's c: ploy a spring-held diaphragm to regulate the pressure at a pre-set arount, which is determincd by adjustable spring tension. There is a relief valve on the outlet side of each valve integrally nounted on the PCV.

Possible post-seismic failure nodes include a spring failure or dia-phragm rupture, a stuck open relief valve, and/or a relief valve that failed to open.

If the spring failed or the dialdu aga ruptured, the PCV would lose its ability to regulate and could fail open allowing full supply pressure tluccuqh the valve. If the relief valve is ooerating correctly, this pressure would le vental, ncevcntir. m caqe to the Cownstre:n. piping or the analyzer puiels. I lv..'ever , if the relief: valve failcd to open due to

4 seismically-induced damage, the downstream piping and the panels would be exposed to gas pressures of 1100 psig, potentially damag-ing then.

If the relief valve stuck open, the hydrogen cali'> ration gas would vent to the surrounding area, ins' cad of going to the analyzers.

The area surrounding these PCV's is sufficiently ventcxl assuring that the escaping hydrogen gas could not accumulate to an explosive concentration.

2 Any of these failure scenarios could cause the analyzers to malfunction .

or fail entirely. In the event that all analyzers are affectcd, the l' caInbility exists to obtain and analyze grab samples of the containment atmosphere, with the post-accident sampling systen.

There are no electrical connections to these PCV's, so their failure

.l would not affect any Class lE equipment other than the analyzers, or i any Class lE PJaer supplies.

i

'1hese items are installcx1 to Category I requirements, so they will not

experience an external failure that would jeopardize other equignent -

i

! JUSTIFICATION SIM ARY 4

If a failure of these comI:enents disabled the 11/02 2 analyzing systen, i grab sample catubility would still exist. Failure would not affect any other Class lE systems or pruer supplies. Category I installation j will prevent any external failures and resultant damage to other equiI r i

ment. Ventilation is sufficient in the area of these valves so that gross leakage of hydrogen would not reach explosive levels. IIence, interian plant operation is justified.

j i

l i

l l

4 k

i 4

-m.,,, _ . , , _ . . - - - , _ . - . _ , - _ _ _ . . ,,m._,___ _ _ _, _ . __ _ -.. , , _ _ - . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _____ _ __ _. _ ,_. -._.,, . .

i EQUIP!ENT JUSTIFICATION .

SORP R1rk Ib. 1T48*PCV145A,B,C,D Cauponent Name Press. Control Valve Systcm Mane Pri. Contain. Atnos Cntrl. Vendor Circle Seal Spec. No. 492-1.4 f bdel No. NCRR20-9020 Quantity 4 .

EQUIPMENT REO'JIPSH7PS Ilot Standby (bld Shutdown Doth Neither__X__.

Other (Post Iccident Ibnitoring)

QUALIFICATION SU M I These Circle Seal pressure control valves are being seismically testcd ,

at Wyle laboratories. 'Ihe testing is expected to be cceplete and the test report and docunentation issued by February 1983.

COMPONENT SAFLTI FUNCTIOd These pressure control valves regulate reagent gas pressure at 25 psig from the 2203 psig oxygen reagent gas bottles to the H2 /02 analyzer systen which is required for ICCA mitigation ard for compliance with Reg. Guide 1.97.

FAIIURE CONSEQUEtK'E ANALYSIS l I

1 These IW's cq1oy a spring-held diaphragm to regulate the pressure at a j pre-set annunt, which is deterntinal by adjustable spring tension. There  !

I is a relief valve on the outlet side of each valve integrally nounted on the PCV.

Possible post-seis:nic failure neden include a spring failure or diaphrac;m rupture, a stuck opea relief valve, and/or a relief valve that failo-1 to l open.

I If the spring fciled or the diaphragm ruptured, the PCV v.ould lose its ability in regulate, and could fail open allowing full supply pressure through t he valve. If the rolief valve in operating correctly, this prer .m wald Le vented, prewntlna av. ale to the dmnstream piping or the analy/cr pnels. I!cwe/er, if the relief valve t'ailtd to open due to

i i

1 .

1 seismically-induced danage, the downstream piping and the panels would l- be exposal to gas pressures of 2200 psig, potentially damaging thm.

j If the relief valve stuck open, the oxygen reagent gas would vent to i

the surrounding area, instead of going to the analyzers.

l Any of these failure scenarios could cause the analyzers to malfunction or fail entirely. In the event that all analyzers are affected, the capability exists to obtain and analyze grab samples of the containment atnosphere, with the post-accident sampling systm.

'Ihere are no electrical connections to these PCV's, so their failure .

would not affect any Class 1E equiprent other than the analyzers, or any Class lE pcuer supply.

l These itms are installed t$' Category I . requirements, so they will not

! experience an external failure that wo,uld jeopardize other equipuent.

l JUSTIFICATION SUWARY If a failure of these components disabled the 11 2/02 analyzing system, grab sample capability would still exist. Failure would not affect any other Class lE systms or power supplies. Category I installation will l prevent any external failure and resultant dannge to other equipnent.

Ilence, interim plant operation is justifio3.

i I

i 1

J

)

i l

i i

l 1 t 4

EQUIPb223 JUSTIFICATION SORT bhrk No. lT48*PCVl46A,B Component Name Press Control Valve System Narre Pri. Contain. Atoms.Cntrl. Vendor Circle Seal Spec. No. 492-1.5 bbdel No. NCRR 20-9020 Quantity 2 -

EQUIPMEB7P REQUIRF167fS Hot Standby Cold Shutdown _ Both Neither _ X Other (Post Iccident bbnitoring)

OUALIFICATION SUteARY These Circle Seal pressure control valves are being seismically tested at Wyle Labaratories. The testing is expected to be complete and the test report and docunentation issued by February 1983.

CUTCXMF S7 Jim' FLUCTION These pressure control valves regulate oxygm gas pressure at 25 psig from the 2200 psig oxygen calibration gas bottles to the H 2/02 analyzer Innels, 1T48* pNL 068A,B and IT48*PNL 0691s,B. The analyzer system is require 3 for I(JCA mitigation and for ccmpliance with Reg. Guide 1.97.

FAILUPS CONSEOUENCE IM\INSIS i

These PCV's cnploy a spring-held diaphracm to regulate pressure at a pre-set anount, which is detemined by adjustable spring tension. There is a relief valve on the outlet side of each valve integrally nounted on the PCV.

Possible post-seisntic failure trades include a spring failure or diaphragm rupture, a stuck op'n relief valve, and/or a relief valve that failed to 01cn.

If the spring failcxl or the diaphragm rupturcx1, the PCV muld lose its ability to renulate, and muld fail opon allc'.s'ing full r,upply pressure j through the va}ve. ]f tha relief valve is operatina corrcctly, this l pressure wahl be ventcx1, pre- ating damge to the dc;*.astream piping or l

o the analyzer panels. However, if the relief valve failed to open due to seismically-induced damage the downstream piping and the lunels vm]d be exposed to gas pressures of 2200 psig, potentially danuging thcm. If the relief valve stuck open, the oxygen gas would vent to the surrounding area, instead of going to the analyzers.

Any of these failure scenarios could cause the analyzers to mal-function or fail entirely. In tha event that all analyzers are affected, the capability exists to obtain and analyze grab samples of the containacnt atnosphere, with the post-accident sampling -

system.

There are no electrical connections to these PCT s, so their failure would not affect any Class lE equipnent

• other than the analyzers, or any Class lE power supplies.

These itcsns are installed to Category I requirements, so they will not experience an external failure that would jeopardize other equip-ment.

JUSTIFTCATION SUDRRY If a failure of these components disab1cd the H 2/92 analyzing systcm, grab sample capability would still exist. Failure would not affect any other Class lE systcns or pcraer supplies. Category I installation will prevent external failure and resultant damage to other equipment.

llence, interim plant operation is justified.

l l

l l

l l

I

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPEPATION IWE: SDV Solenoid Valve MPI/ MARK NO. : Cll-F009/lCll*SOV044 SAFETI FUNCTIQ4:

'Ib open, pennitting air to vent fran the air supply header, thereby closing the CRD vent pnd drain valves.

FAILURE 10 DES:

Fail Open (deenergized) X Fail Closo:1 (energized)

Ioss of Po'er X Ioss of Air loss of Pressure Integrity _

Ioss of Structural Integrity Distortion of bbunting An evaluation of the solenoi:1 valve, and the control rod drive hydraulic control systan in which it is used, showc that the only credible failures which affcct this nonnilly closed valve's afety functions are " fail open" and " loss of power". Other failures i."e judged by General Electric to not be credible under worst case dynamic lt %i.ng conditions, or are subordinate to " fail open".

FAIUJRE EITIrP:

A. Effect on Prinnry Use Valve fails open, and hence safe, on loss of pcrer, permitting air to vent inn the air supply header. This closes the SDV vent and drain valves.

B. Secondary Effect Water accunulation in the SDV instrument volume.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:

The SDV solenoid valve is designed to fail safe on loss of power facilitating closure of the vent and drain valves. This is considered to be the only credible failure mode which the solenoid valve can experience. Any water accumulation in the SDV instrunent volune will be. detected by level switches nounted on the instrument volune. If the level exceeds a predetennined setpoint, tle reactor ,

will scram autonut.ically.

Therefore, interim operation with this valve does not pose a safety Inzard.

i l

l l

l i

l

JUSTIFICATIGJ IDR INTEIG4 OPEPATIQ4 NNE: SDV Vent and Drain Valves MPL/ MIRK No.: Cll-F010/F0ll/lCll*IOV081/82 SAFETY FUNCTIGJ:

To close, isolating the scram discharge volume fran the radwaste drain syntan.

FAIIDPC IDDES: '

Fail Open Fail Closed X Ioss of Power Ioss of Air X loss of Pressure Integrity loss of Structural Integrity Distortion of Ibunting These valves are air olcratod. Therefore, " loss of power" does not apply. "Ioss of air" causes the valves to close, subordinating this failure mie to " fail closed". Other fallure nodes identifio-1 which could cause the valve to fail open have been evaluated and judgod by Concral Electric to be not crcdible under worst case dynamic loading conditions.

FAIIDIE EFFErf:

A. Effect on Prjnttry Use If the valves fail closcd, there will be SDV water acctmulation.

l B. Socorrlary Effect l None DISCUS 3 ION IND CONCLUSION:

'1hc FDV vent and drain valves are designcd to fail safe on loss of air which is considero:1 to be the on'.y crefitle failure nrde. Imv water acetmulation in the SDV instrtment voltra2 will be detectcd by level switches nounted on the insLrtm2nt voline. If the level excecds a proleterinincd setroint, the reactor will scram autaratically.

Therefore intc.zim plant operation with the SOV valves not fully qualificd is justificd.

i

- .. . .. e

,r

• JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION NAME: HPCI Turbine MPL/bbrk No.: E41-C002/lE41*'IU-002 SAFETY FUNCTION:

To supply high pressure emergency cooling water to the reactor pressure .

vessel, in order to maintain reactor core temperatures within specifi-cation limits.

FAILURE MODES: .

Fail Open Fail Closed Loss of Power X Loss of Air Loss of Pressure Integrity X Loss of Structural Integrity X Distortion of Mounting X

" Fail open or closed", and " loss of air" are failure modes which are not, by their nature, applicable to this high pressure steam turbine.

The remaining failure modes, however, are credible under worst case dynamic loading conditions.

FAILURE EFFECT:

A. L: 'ect on Primary Use Failures could cause flow rate of emergency cooling water to be less than required to maintain reactor core temperatures within specification limits.

B. Secondary Effect None DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:

A HPCI turbine, similar to the Shoreham turbine, has just recently been subjected to a dynamic test which envelopes Storcham requirements.

Preliminary indications are that the turbine performed within RWH:Im:im/130-24 12/1/82

~ .- _ . _ - . - _

s.

specification limits both during and after the dynamic. events. These ,

preli.minary indications will be confirmed by post test analysis and reporting of the test data.

Based on the above test, interim operation of the HPCI turbine poses no safety hazard at the Shoreham Plant. In addition, in the unlikely t

event of failure of the HPCI Turbine, alternate EOCS systcras (e.g.

ADS, MIR, Core Spray) are available and would safely shut down the reactor.

i:-

5 1

.l I

i t

l

{

1 I

i j

i M:H:Im:in/13U-25 12/1/82

JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERIM OPERATION NAME:  ;

Power Range Monitor Panel MPIAMK NO.: Hll-P608/lHll*PNL-608 SAFETY FUNCTION:

Provide purposes.information on power level of reactor for monitoring and control Initiate rod block or scram signals when required.

FAILURE MODES:

Fail Open X '

Fail Closed X Loss of Power X Loss of Air loss of Pressure Integrity Loss of Structural Integrity X Distortion of Mounting X j The PRM panel does not use air or pressure retaining parts. However, all otherconditions.

loading failure modes listed are credible under worst case dynamic FAILURE EFFECT:

A. Effect on Primary Use loss of electrical power would automatically stran the reactor.

Other failures could cause erroneous reactor power level readings leading to automatic or manual control actions different than desired. An erroneously high reactor power reading is fail-safe since the control system will take action to lower power. An erroneously low power reading could lead to control system commands to increase power. However, in this instance there are single

failure proof backup systems which will automatically scram the reactor.

1 In particular, should reactor power increase to excessively high levels, scram will automatically occur on high reactor pressure. As a last resort, the main s;eam radiation monitors will automatically scram the reactor should they detect high an radiationpower excessive levelsexcursion.

which might result from fuel danage caused by

< Because of built-in redundancy and j electrical reading are low. safeguards, the chances of an erroneous power level I

t 1

RWH: 1n:im/13U-22 j 12/1/82 1

i

u, _ - .. .. m .. . .

B. Secondary Effect

~

None -

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: '

The power range monitoring panel has been successfully qualified to IEEE 344-1971 standards. During testing, the panel was subjected to a resonance search followed by single axis, single frequency vibration over a range of 1-33 Hz. Six runs were made, two in each direction at ~

different table accelerations. These six runs were cot:rised of front-to-back at 0.69 and 1.89, side-to-side at 0.69 a d 1.89, and vertical at 0.49 and 1.29 The test data indica *te more than one resonance exists in each of the three orthogonal axes. However, 'since the resonance frequencies are widely spaced, and the second resonance in each axis is at or close to the ZPA frequency rather than in a region of response 2.plification, the probability of multi-mode excitation is low and single frequency testing is acceptable.

IEEE 344-1975 requires the equivalent of 5 OBE tests fcilowed by one SSE test. Although random motion OBE/SSEs were not perfor ed in the P608 test, it might be possible to take credit for the ZPA input frequency sweeps since single frequency tests generally provide rcre severe test response than multi-frequency tests. However, it woulc ba necessary to verify that the test duration was at least equal to the " strong motion portion" of the SSE in order to account for vibration build-up. No data on test duration can be found in the P608 test report and so it appears that the 1975 requirements cannot be verified, even thcugh the test duration was most likely greater than required.

Because of the lack of confirmatory data on test duraticn, and also because of an anomalous power supply failure due to a rechanical arm which physically inpacted the power supply midway throu;h the test, a retest of the H11-P608 panel to IEEE 344-1975 standards is planned.

(The mechanical arm has been redesigned).

The testing performed M date1 demonstrates that the poner range monitoring panel has a high level of seisnic capabilities. Therefore, interim plant operation with the power range monitoring panel not fully qualified to the IEEE 344-1975 standards is justified.

RWH:In:im/13U-23 12/1/82

s -

JUSTIFICAT10fi FOR INTERIM OPERATION HAME: In-Vessel Rack MPLAWM Ib. : F16-E006 /lF16*lFE-09 SAFETY FUNCTION:

Support fuel bundles inside reactor during refueling. -

FAILURE MODES:

Fail Open.

Fail Closed Loss of Power Loss of Air Loss of Pressure Integrity loss of Structural Integrity X Distortion of Mounting X The in-vessel rack is a passive frame type structure. It does not open, close, use power and air, or retain pressure. The only failure modes that are credible under worst case dynamic loadings are loss of st ructural integrity and distortion of mounting.

FAILURE EFFECT:

A. Ef fect on Primary Use Loss of structural integrity, or distortion of mounting, could permit up to four fuel bundles to fall down upon the tcp of the reactor core during refueling, j B. Secondary Effect l None l

i DISCUSSIGN AND CONCLUS10":

The in-vessel rack is used during refueling only, as a convenient i

t in-vessel parking place for fuel bundles. It is not used during the initial fuel loading. Ample time is available before the first refueling cutage to perfonn the required nonlir: ear analysis to qualify the Shorehan in-vessel rack to the SQRT criteria. Even if it is not qualified by the first refueling outage, refueling could proceed without the use of this rack.

Therefore, interim cperation befcrc the in-vessel rack is qualified poses no safety hazard, i

R'WH : 1m: ire /13U-9

! 12/1/82 l