ML20058E596
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April 22, 1981 MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B THRU:
N. Jackiv, Acting Chief, Test Program Section FROM:
F. Maura, Reactor Inspector
SUBJECT:
RESULTS OF ZIMMER INVESTIGATION On April 17, 1981 I completed my write-up of the investigation of the Zimmer diesel generator subsystems and gave a copy to Paul Barrett.
The purpose of this memo is to give you my recommendations on what actions are required to correct the problems noted.
Small Bore Piping Weld Fit-up Verification The licensee shall be required to tabulate all small bore piping in systems important to safety where the QA inspector failed to verify proper fit-up prior to welding.
The tabulation should be by system, drawing number and line number.
Initially our position should be that all those welds be radiographed to verify that approximately a 1/16" gap was maintained prior to welding.
Our fall-back position should be that IE:RIII will determine which welds the licensee shall radiograph.
Our selection shall be based on system function, type of service the system is subjected to (design pressure, temperature, etc.) materials used, etc.
For example, all safety related systems shall require 100% verification by radiography.
Lack of Adequate Material Heat Number Traceability The licensee shall be required to walk down all systems important to cafety, using the latest as-built drawings, and record the heat number of all pipes, fittings, etc.
If the heat number can not be found on the component, it shall be marked on the drawing as " unknown".
Next, the licensee shall verify that the installed heat numbers are acceptable (material certifications are available at the site and meet the ASTM Specifications).
All material with unacceptable heat numbers shall be replaced. With regards to material of unknown heat number (not stamped on pipe) our initial pisition l
chould be that it be replaced.
Our fall-back position should be for IE:RIII to review each item and based on system function, type of service, environment, etc. make a determination of which components shall be replaced and which j
to accept.
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Alterntions of Weld Records (KE-1) Based on We fg forms to correct I
Th2 licensee shall discontinue using the material issuefurther deterioration of t To prevent
" already made, instead the QA records.
fied using Construction sh ll not attempt to remove the " corrections licensse shall tabulate all QA records which were modiFor turnover pu D2p rtment records.ccespt from Kaiser the records as they now exist.h ll be to perform a
now exist are unacceptable, the only solution s a 1
ovsr again.
NRC's Performance during its routine Th? NRC shall determine why it failed so miserably,l ow surfacing inspection program in identifying and correcting the prob ems nThese Either our inspection program, ct ths Zimmer site.
cnd corrected two or three years ago.
bination of all three allowed these the inspectors, our management, or a comCorrective action must be taken to prevent blems are for so long.
problems to existOur findings raise the question whether Zimmer s prod similar problems to en isolated case or whether our program has alloweTo answer that question RIII recurrence.
RIII plants under construction develop in other plants within our region.
must conduct similar team inspections at other as.soon as possible.
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.F. Maura, Reactor In pector i
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