ML20058B091
| ML20058B091 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1993 |
| From: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Marriott P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9312010388 | |
| Download: ML20058B091 (60) | |
Text
l November 15, 1993
~'
Docket No. 5?-001 Mr. Patrick 9. Marriott, Manager Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy L
175 Curtner,ivenue San Jose, California 95125
Dear Mr. Marriott:
SUBJECT:
INDEPENDENT QUALITY REVIEL GROUP INITIAL COMMENTS ON GE NUCLEAR ENERGY (GE) ADVANCED BOILING WATER REACTOR (ABWR) CERTIFIED DESIGN MATERIAL (CDM) AND STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (SSAR)
In a letter dated November 1, 1993, we provided Review grcup comments on GE's CDM and the SSAR for the ABWR. Due to a xerographic error, the copy did not contain all of the pages.
I have enclosed a replacement opy whi.,
includes the missing pages, which were also provided to your staff during the meeting held in San Jose on November 10 and 11, 1993.
If you have any questions, contact T. Boyce at (301) 504-1130.
Sincerely, OriginalSfmM N-Chester Poslusny, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
. Docket File.
PDST R/F Independent PDR PShea Review Comments CPosiusny TBoyce CMcCracken, SD1 ACRS (11) cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
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Mr. Patrick W. Marriott Docket No.52-001 General Electric Company cc:
Mr. Joseph Quirk Mr. Raymond Ng GE Nuclear Energy 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
General Electric Company Suite 300 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 Washington, D.C.
20086 San Jose, Califorr :.a 95125 Mr. Victor G. Snell, Director Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager Safety and Licensing
' Regulatory Programs AECL Technologies GE Nuclear Energy 9210 Corporate Boulevard 12300 Twinbrook Parkway Suite 410 Suite 315 Rockville, Maryland 20850 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Director, Criteria & Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
20460 Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C.
20585 Marcus A. Rowden, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20004 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Newman 1. Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
5:.:ite 1000 Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr. Steve Goldbeig Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 i
Washington, D.C.
20503 Mr. Frank A. Ross U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, Maryland 20874 i
ASWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.2.4 SLC Page 1 of I Ho.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
The boron concentration of 1070 ppm on system 1
/b4JJ 175 CE E description page 2.2.4-2 (3rd paragraph) is inconsistent with SSAR section 9.3.5.3 (page 9.3-14) of 1320_ ppm. These need to be reconciled.
2 Tier 1 figure 2.2.4 depicts an instrument on the 1
j34 gji prd d9s5I storage tank as a "TE", this nomenclature is not defined in Tier 1 Appendix A.
Should this be a "T"?
I i
i By: Phil Ray (504-2972)
Resolved by:
I
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+
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ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No.
2.2.6 Remote Shutdown System Page 1 of 2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
The functional testing of pumps, valves and EDGs 2
from the remote Shutdown Panel should be included in the ITAAC.
2 SSAR Section 7.4.2.4.2 assumes the operator can 2
reach the RSS within 10 minutes after scram.
This should be. verified in ITAAC.
3 When the use of the RSS is terminated, the controls 2
will be transferred back to the control room (when habitable). This function should be verified in ITAAC.
4 SSAR figure 7.4-3 (she' et 20 of 27, portions' 2
attached) indicates that the HPCF suppression pool suction valve (F006B) will not open, unless the CST is below a setpoint or the suppression pool water level is above a setpoint. This interlock needs to be verified in ITAAC.
5 ITAAC item 49 (page 2.2.6-5) second line from the 3
pAJ5 yo GE bottom in column 3 should be changed from " closed" to "close".
I By: Tom 1ella (708-790-5798)
Resolved by:
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.2.6 Page Z _ of 2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 6
SSAR section 7.4.2.4 does not completely list all 1
JM 73 (E
RSS interface systems.
Should include: atmospheric control, make-up, EDGs, and suppression pool monitoring systems to be consistent with ITAAC.
7 SSAR section 7.4.2.4.2 indicates electrical power 3
36v/
Tb (rE distribution has A, B, C, and D channels. No reference was made to electrical divisions I, II, and III.
8 ITAAC entry 4a specifies that the RHR minimum flow I
$ gyp p
gg valve will open on low system flow and high discharge pressure. The corresponding SSAR figure (7.4-1, sheet 12 of 27) states the valve will open on low discharge pressure. The drawing needs to be corrected.
9 SSAR figure 5.4-10 (sheet 5) indicates there are 2 1
Jh#
Ta GE normally closed MOVs on the drywell spray B line.
However, the RSS panel figure (7.4.2) only shows F017 but not F018. These figures should be consistent.
By: Tom Tella Resolved by:
a 5;j
- ~
.e 2.1A6100 Mov. I ABWR sisaws sarmansorsis a,e.n i
s xcommodate additional failures for all scenanos. The effects oisuch failures are inaivzed as follows:
The loss oione compiete RHR loop could extena the ume neened for tne reactor in reach the emergency shutdown conditions. However, the ability or the RSS to uiunimen facilitate such conditions is not impaired. An analysis was performed for this scenano usmg the nominal decav heat curve. The results showed that tne ume to reach 100*C with only one RHR loop available saned from 38 to 51.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as the temperature or the ultimate neat sink vaned from 29 to 35'C.
i
- n the event of a comolete loss of Division II, safe shutdown can be achieved bv depressunzing the reactor with the three SRVs in Division I to the pomt at which RHR shutdown cooling can be initiated. Dis assumes that the operator reaches the RSS panels in a timely manner (i.e., within 10 minutes after scram). No core uncovenng is expected even though no high pressure coolant makeup capability is available.
l
.i In the event of a complete lou of Division I, the reactor can be depressunzed with one j
SRV,in Division II. Therefore, the time required to reach low pressure conditions will be extended. However, the probability of an event reouiring control room evacuation in addition to a failure resulting in loss of Division I (external to the control room) is so =
low that it is not considered credible.
)
Other sections ofIEEE-279 which relate to testability of sensors. etc.. are not applicable
.j to the RSS ofitself, but are applicable to the primary svstems which interface with the j
RSS. All other applicable criteria ofIEEE-279 are met by the RSS.
i (2) General Design Criteria (GDC)
In accordance with the Standard Resiew Plan for Section 7.4. and with Table 7.1-2, the following GDCs are addressed for the RSS:
< c (a) Cdteria: GDCs 2. 4,13,19,33,34,35, and 44.
(b) Conformance: Assuming the clarification for a single failure explained in Subsection (1) above, the RSS is in compliance (in part, or as a whole, j
as applicable) with the GDCs identified in (a). All GDCs are generically j
discuned in Subsection 3.1.2.
(3) Regulatorv Guides (RGs)
In accordance with the Standard Review Plan for Section 7.4. and with Table 7.1-2 the following Reg. Guides are addressed for the RSS:
(a) RG 1.5S-Applicanon ofIhe Single. Failure Cntenon to NuclearPowerProtecuan.
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2.2.6 Remote Shutdown System Design Description i
The Remote Shutdown Sntem (RSS) prendes remote manual control of safetv-related svstems to bring the reactor to hot shutdown and subsequent cold shutdown conditions from outside the mam control room (MCR). Figure 2.2.6 shows the basic swtem configuracon and scope.
The RSS has two divisional panels and associated controls and indicators for interfacing with the following systems:
(1) Residual Heat Remova] (RHR) Sptem (2) High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) Sptem (3) Nuclear Boiler Sptem (NBS)
(4) Reactor Service Water (RSW) System (5) Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System (6) Electrical Power Distribution (EPD) System (7) Atmospheric Control (AC) System (8) Emergency Diesel Generator (DG)
(9) Make-up Water System (Condensate), (MUWC)
(10) Flammability Control System (FCS)
(11) Suppression Pool Temperamre Monitoring (SPTM) System 1
RSS controls and indicators are hard-wired direct to the interfacing components and j
sensors.
The RSS is classified as a Class IE. safety related system.
Operation of transfer switches on the RSS panel overrides and isolates the controls from the MCR and transfers control to the RSS. Transfer switch actuation causes alarms in the MCR. Indications required for plant shutdown are prouded on the RSS panels as shown on Figure 2.2.6.
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- 1Assoonov s ABWR suumsaim Anime erneer The RSS oronces instrumentauon anc controis outsice one man controi room to atiew prompt not snutoown or tne reactor aner a scram ano to mamtam sme conosuons iunne not snutoown. it.nso oronces capacility for suosecuent cc:a 3:.t:toown or the
- cactor tnrougn the use ci suitaoie procedures.
7.4.2.4.2 Specific Regulatory Reauirements Conformance Table 7.'.."idenu5es tne Remote Shutdown system iRSS) ano tne associateo coces anu 5:andards aopiied in accordance with the Standard Renew Plan. The toilowing anaivus
- ists tne appitcaole entena m orcer or tne usung on tne taoie, ano discusses tne ae::ree
,t conformance for eacn. Any excepuons or clanscauons are so notea.
1i
- 0CFR50.55a ilEEE-279)
The Remote shutoown system iRSS) consists of two panets iDinsion i ana
.l Division II) which are located in separate rooms in the Reactor Building.'
i The RSS pronces remote control capability as defined by the followmg interfaces-i Smem Total (%nnels RSS Interface l
Residual Heat Removal A.B,C AB High Pressure Core nooder B, C B
1 Nuclear Boiler 57 tem A,B,C.D A. B i
1 Reactor Bldg. Cooling Water A,B,C A. B l
Reactor Senice Water A B,C A. B Electric.al.P.ower Distnbution A.B,C,D A. B Flammability Control System B, C B
The RSS is designed such that it does not degrade the capability of the mterfacmg j
systems. All equipment is quali5ed as Class 1E, consistent with the safetv related interfaces.
Separauon and isoladon is preserved both mechanically and electricallyin accordance with IEEE-279 and Regulatory Guide 1.75.
With regard to Paragrapn 4.2 of IEEE-279, a s nglefailure. eve.nt tsusumed to have occurred to cause the e.acuauon of the control room. The RSS is not deugned to n.n saema neourree vne safe shuteown--amenoment 31
- 1 Ass 00aev.s ABWR stamin samanorsis norerr The RSS provides instrumentauon ano controls outside the mam controi room to allow prompt hot shutdown.ot the reactor : uter a scram and to mamtam sate condadons
- iurme hot shutdown. It also oronces capacility for subsecuent cold shutdown or the reactor through the use on suitable procedures.
7.4.2.4.2 Specific Regulatory Requirements Conformance Table 7.1-2 idenufies the Remote Shutdown system tRSS) ano the associated coces ano standards applied in accordance with the Standard Review Plan. The followine analvsis
'ists the applicable cntens m oroer or the itsung on tne taose, and discusses tne cecree of conformance for each. Anv excepuons or clanficauons are so noteo.
i1) 10CFR50.55a ilEEE 279)
The Remote shutoown System (RSS) consists of two panels iDivision I and Division II) which are locat,d in separate rooms in the Reactor Buildine.
The RSS provides remote control capability as denned by the followmg interfaces:
Sptem Total channels RSS Interface Residual Heat Remoul A.B,C A. B High Pressure Core Hooder B, C B
Nuclear Boiler Svstem A'B,C,D A. B Reactor Bldg. Cooling Water A,B,C AB Reactor Service Water A,B,C A. B pEcctrical Power Distribution A,B,C,D A, B Rammability Control System B, C B
The RSS is designed such that it does not degrade the capability of the mterfacing svstems. All equipment is qualiSed as Class IE, consistent with the safetwrelated interfaces.
Separation and isolation is preserved both mechanically and electrically in accordance with IEEE 279 and Regulatorv Guide 1.75.
With regard to Paragraph 4.2 ofIEEE-279, a smgle-failure. event isusumed to have occurred to cause the evacuadon of the control room.The RSS is not designed to 52ND Swe Meauired for Sste Shutdoorn - Amenoment.11
4 Table 2.2.6 Remote Shutdown System b
I Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The equipment comprising the RSS is 1.
Inspections of the as-built system will be 1.
The as-built RSS conforms with the defined in Section 2.2.6.
conducted.
description in Section 2.2.6.
2.
Operation of transfer switches on the RSS 2.
Tests will be conducted on each as-built 2.
Operation of transfer switches on the RSS panel overrides and isolates the controls RSS division by placing the transfer panel overrides and isolates the controls from the MCR and transfers control to the switches in the RSS position. Continuity from the MCR and transfers control to the RSS.
tests will then be conducted between RSS RSS.
control devices and interfacing equipment. Additional tests will be conducted to attempt actuation of the interfacing equipment from the MCR.
3.
Transfer switch actuation causes alarms 3.
Tests will be conducted on each as-built 3.
Transfer switch actuation causes alarms in the MCR.
RSS division by placing the transfer in the MCR.
switch in the RSS position.
4.
RSS Division A has the following
- 4. -
4.
automatic controls and interlocks for HHR System Division A. RSS Division B has R
o the following automatic controls and interlocks for RHR System Division B and HPCF System Division B:
a.
RHR minimum flow valve A(B) is a.
Tests will be conducted on the RSS
- a.,,11HR minimum flow valve receives an commanded open upon receipt of a using simulated RHR System flow and
,open signst when low flow and high signalindicating low RHR flow and pump discharge pressure signals.
. discharge pressure signals are I{
high RHR pump discharge pressure.
. simulated. This valve receives a close a
s The valve is commanded closed upon signal when a high flow signal is j.
g receipt of a RHR high flow signal.
simulated.
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- b. Tests will be conducted on the RSS b.
P**. pump receives a start signal starting and commanded to stop using simulated valve position s en simulated signals indicate a k
unless position signals exist which signals.
stion path is fully open. A stop l
Indicate that the valves in the suction signalis received when simulated piping are fully open.
signals indicate absence of a fully f
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ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Coments ITAAC No. 2.4.2 - Hiah Pressure Core Flooder Page 1 of _2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
SSAR chapter 6.3.2.2.5 discusses use of MUWC system 2
to fill HPCF discharge lines. The keep fill function is shown on Tier I figure 2.4.2.a. The design description needs to discuss this design feature or importance of keep fill system.
2 Tier 1 control diagram 2.4.2.b shows an input from a 2
SW 7D 6-E discharge pressure as input to automatic /and manual initiation of the system. The pressure instrument needs to be shown on system figure 2.4.2.a.
3 SSAR table 18F-2 and Tier 1 table 2.7.1.a should 2
include position status for valves F008 and F009.
If the valves are open, injection flow would be much less than indicated flow. Figure 2.4.2.a shows only one of the valves. As a general comment, the instruments and power operated valves shown in Tier 1 figures should be listed in Table 2.7.1.a.
4 An ITAAC entry is needed to verify that the itPCF 2
suction piping design process provides adequate protection for ISLOCA which is a unique requirement for the system discussed in the design description.
An ITAAC entry is needed to verify this capability.
5 As the MOV testing is done under pre-op conditions, 2
there should be a generic ITA entry to demonstrate by' analysis (or otherwise) that the MOVs will l
operate under design conditions (see SSAR 3.9.6.2.2).
By: Sam Malur (504-2963)
Resolved by:
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.4.2 Page 2 of 2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 6
Why are the actual valve mover.ents not verified in 3
jpg g) 77) gf-ITAAC entry 3g as done for entry 3h?
7 The design description states that both divisions of 2
the HPCF system actuate when the reactor water level is below the RCIC actuation level. This should be verified in the ITAAC.
By:
Sam Malur Resolved by:
.m 2 r
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e
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ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.11.3 RCW Page 1 o f _3_
No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
Page 2.11.3-2 of the design description should state 3
gy g
gE the heat exchanger design basis heat removal capacities is for only one heat exchanger to remove ambiguity.
Suggest units of kcal/hr/hx.
2 Tier 1 figure 2.ll.3d should include displays and 3
controls in the MCR associated with local area plant sensors such as temperature and flow elements.
3 Tier 1 figure 2.II.3.c should be corrected to show 1
S Ew/
To GE the level indicator on the surge tank standpipe, change the ASME code break at the SPCU/RCW M0V, to delete piping that is not in system, and to relocate the piping class notation for the MOVs upstream and downstream of the CRD pump. (mark-up attached).
4 ITAAC entry 9 for MOVs should include a statement 2
that "the results of these-tests will be used to demonstrate the capability of the MOVs to operate under design conditions."
5 ITAAC entry 10 for check valves should include "to 2
demonstrate the operability of the check. valves under design conditions."
B M eYroe Cha (617-538-0088)
Resolved by:
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Coments ITAAC No. 2.11.3 Page 2 of 3 I No.
Coments Cat.
Resolution 6
The system radiation monitor should be added to the 2
RCW Tier 1 figures. (This is considered within scope by the SSAR) 7 Page 2.11.3-1 of design description, 4th paragraph, 1
SFd TJ GE should be revised to read "LOCA and/or LOPP"'instead of "LOCA".
8 Page 2.11.3-1 of the design description, 2nd 1
y sp?
~/o GE paragraph, should be revised as follows: "following a loss-of-coolant-accident and/or loss-of-preferred-power (LOCA and/or LOPP), assuming a single active failure in any mechanical or electrical division or RCW support system which disables any one of the three RCW divisions, the other..."
9 Tier I figure 2.ll.3b should be revised to show 1
5 Ei#
TJ 66 piping class designation upstream and downstream of the fuel pool cooling Hx and room coolers from to - - -.. Figure 2.ll.3a, relocate code break at MOV for irywell equipment coolers per mark-up.
10 For SSAR section 9.2.11.1.2 add (e) loss of 3
SW TJ 66_
preferred power (LOPP).
By: Georae Cha Resolved by:
6 4 e e
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.11.3 Page 3 of 3 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 11 SSAR section~9.2.ll.2, the second paragraph should 3/I S/Es/
7b GE be deleted as it is duplicative.
The values in 9.2.11.2 are not consistent with tables 9.2.4a,b, and c.
4 12 SSAR table 9.2.4c should be revised to show the 1
JELS$7 745 dhf_
exponents for heat and flow units.
The additions should be verified (total heat load shutdown at 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is 31 vs. 32 in table).
13 SSAR section 7.3.1.1.7 (i), Division III should be 3
(FELa9 75) dF/E deleted with respect to RSS as 7.4.1.4 and 7.4.2.4.2 discussed Divisions I and II for the control panels t
which correspond to mechanical divisions A and B. In addition the " low pressure signal" should be deleted as it is not listed in 7. 4.1. 4.~4 ( 5 ).
14 SSAR section 7.1.2.3.7 should be revised as follows:
1 JEy;p>
13 dLfE "LOCA" to "LOCA and/or LOPP", "non-essential" to "non-safety related" and " essential service water" to " reactor building cooling water".
15 SSAR P&ID 9.2-1 sheet 8 of 9 needs to be completed 1
SEha9 73 d? /E-at A-14 and A-11.
By: _Georae Cha Resolved by:
1
- 1asraon n.2 ABWR standsre saim Aasirsia,s.gr (7) The safetv.related electnc modules and safetv-related cables for the RCW System are m the Control Building, wnich is a Seismic Category I. tornaco-missile resistant and flood crotected structure.
t8) Protection from being impacted adverselv by missiles generated by any non-saferv-related component shall be provided as discussed in Subsection 15.1.
Y (9) Protection agamst high-energy and moderate energy line failures will be provided in accordance with Secnon 3.6.
3
.3 (10) Piping wnhin the Control Building shall be fabricated and installed as all N
welded piping.'.\\faior components may have flange bolted or welded
[
]
connections to the piping system. No expansionjoints or bellows assemolies
-c shall be used within the Control Building.
[.g.-
~u 9.2.11.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 5%
b The RC\\
m shall be designed tojool various plant imries as required dunng:
(a) no operation; (b) emerg shutdown; (c) no hutdown;and (d) tesung.p 9 2.11.2 System Description ne RCW System distributes cooling water during various operating modes, during shutdown, and during post-LOCA operation. The system removes heat from plant aunbaries and transfers it to the Reactor Service Water System (Subsection 9.2.15).
Figures 9.2-1, sheets 1 through 9, show the piping and instrumentation diagram. Design characteristics for RCW System components are given in Table 9.2-4d.The temperature valves in the process Dow diagram (PFD) (Figure 9.2-la), were calculated under l
rpminal conditions,i.e., with an uldmate heat sink,(UHS) temperature of 37.8,'C.
SY /tWI kpWg the temperature valves in the process Dow diagram (PFD), Figure 9.2 l g1
- calculated under nominal condidons (i.e., with a UHS temperanne of 37.8'C).
t ne RCW system serves the auxihary equipment listed in Tables 9.2-4a. 9.2-4b. and 9.2-4c.
Some of the cooling loads are serviced by only one or two RCW divisions. These componenu may be reassigned to other RCW divisions if redundancy and divisional alignment of supponed and supporting systems is maintained and the design basis cooling capacity of the RCW divisions is assumed.
The remetor decay heat at four hours after shutdown is approximately g\\
I 6
31.8 x 10 kcal/hr. Each division of the RCW System has the design heat removal i
6
{
capability of 25.7 x 10 kcal/hr from the RHR System. If three divisions of C
ana/aCw/asw >re used for heat re=ovai. =>ch division =ust re=ove cae inird or the
s 21as100Mev.2 ABWR samentsenrAase sseat t?
decay heat. or 10.6 x 10 kcauhr. This means that each division will remove N'_
0 l
6 6
6 25.7 x 10 minus 10.6 x 10, or 15.7 x 10 kcal/hr of sensible heat pnmanly by cooling Se,w '
the reactor water. If only two divisions of RHR/RCW/RSW are used for heat removal.
6 each division must remove one half of the decay heat. or 15.9 x 10 kcale hr. This means 6
6 6
the sensible heat removal will be 25.7 x 10 minus 15.9 x 10 or 9.8 x 10 kcal/hr of sensible heat primanly from the reactor water. Of course the decay heat will decrease with time.
~
The above analysis shows that there is suf5cient heat removal capability to remove not 4 :-
only the decay heat but also sensible heat primarily from the reactor water. If a division fy of RHR/RCW/RSW is not'avulable or if heat removal capability has been lost due to i
tube plugging in any of the heat exchangers, only the rate of heat removal will decrease, but heat wsil still be removed.
Shutdown cooling times are ducussed in Subsection 5.4.7.1.1.7. 8[(
The RCW System is designed to perform iu required safe reactor shutdown cooling function following a posmlated LOCA, assuming a single acuve failure in any mechanical or electrical system. In order to meet this requirement, the RCW System provides three complete trains, which are mech =nie=Hy and electrically separated. In
)
case of a failure which disables any of the three dmsions, the other two division meet plant safe shutdown requirements, including a LOCA or a loss of offaite power, or both.
Each RCW division is supplied electrical power from a different division of the ESF power system.
During nonnal operation RCW cooling water flows through all the equipment shown in Tables 9.2-4a,9.2 4b, and 9.2-4c.
-g
.1bf Durmg all plant operating modes, a RCW water pump and two heat nehangers are ye normally operating in each division. Therefore, if a LOCA occuzz, the RCW System AtM required to shut down the plant safely ase already in operation. The second pump and the third heat neh=nger in each division are put in senice if a LOCA occura.
The non-safety-related pans of the RCWSystem are not required for safe shutdown and, hence, are not safety systems. Isolation valves separate the essential subsysams from the non-safetprelated subsystems during a LOCA, in order to assure the integrity and safety
~
functions of the safetprelated parts of the system. Some non-safetprelated pans of the system are operated during all other modes, including the emergency shutdown following an LOPP or LOCA, as shown in Tables 9.2-ta,9.2-4b. and 9.2-4c.
The surge tanks have an upper pan connected to both RCW and HECW Systems and containing 7 liters of waters (Figure 9.2-1).
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2.11.3 13
25AS447 Rev. 0 -
ABWR-onie cmwcaria weari,1 fgf: f RID F'A 5.2 - 0 o d & S t tw ed.
i
, _t e*! ) gy ACW OTHERS OTHERS RCW rm 3
CU
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L-_______'
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"3RCW
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m TO OTHER (SAFETY-RELATED) HXs HECW
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pt( l'o STM Y3 g
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g l OTHER(NON-SAFETY-RELATED)HXs
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i I
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(C ntror Bueng) 3Acw FROM RSW W QSW TonsW ACWHX (Control Buen9) 3ACW ppgy RSW W QASW ACW PUMP TO RSW (Contrat Buong)
NOTES
- 1. ALL ELECTRICAL POWER LOADS FOR THE CLASS 1E COMPONENTS SHOWN ON THtS FIGUAE ARE POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DivislON til.
' Figure 2.11.3c Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-C)
ReactorDwerOfGD]g1022ImftGDa
9*
5 h
as LOCAL AREA MAIN CONTROL ROOM LOCAL AREA Pbnt Sensors Device Actuators RCw IAanues i
ots
}
l A
I i
i SSLC PROCESSING RCW SYSTEM LOGIC
)
Autornanc.
- Sensor chemes Trip Dodsen j
-LOCA Alignrnens 4
- s.iem concenne. trip o.o.en r
new sure. in* t ev.e
. corou c,a ine.e to,e new - smg. rce t.=i conuoi
-p*ws orieypass l
-Cambra!iors Set Depose
- sep rw. io non se.ey n.iu.o componeets
@ if u v D evi l
l a
sue r >.7.71 r--------
i o
'Rsw tocA sagn.e j jRHM LOCA W l
- Rcw Manual Pump and Veve Aduebn (nft.-pt&tofMktvet(<adv l
?
((tG.n/Cvc-T%
l I
d4 I.
.n b
g%
S Notes:
- 1. Diagram represents one of three RCW divisions.
g.
i[
- 2. See Section 3.4, Figure 3.4b for SSLC processing.
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Figure 2.11.3d Reactor Building Cooling Water System ControlInterface Diagram g
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l
- sAs w new.o ABWR cosie conwestiaa ngeria y
MUWP RCW 0THEAS 'RCW ACW -
45 3
w hR SPCU t
rag 3
3 I
j (Resetor Salong) ra J
t
- - - - - -l
@a -
'f2,'.'^4 9 I
(Reactor Budsng)
K- '
__J 3mCW
[dN h
3 M
I "ECW pT4
' ' 5 b>
- Fuet poor Coonng Hx and Room Cooiets T
NlNN (Reactor Swieng) u L
$q 3
NNS 3 i CrHER (SA,ETY-RELATEo) MXs a
I f Aesctor and Contma palong)
J RCW OTHERS OTHERS RCW p
FE M
m-----q c*-s CUW PUMP g
N I"**C WI
,r-_ ___ _J _N_N_S _I e
a,NNsi g
i___ ___
_____l p.___ 4 _q cuw = -x i- - ( a r sm) i______ _._._-"1 h
l
,a i_____e ___~
orsER <Nou.S4,tiv.REttrsoi p
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l i_
___.Lca_**l e._._ _.,
g
,gg L
___ _ _ _ _ d sga !
u g w_q o_av_wEtt souirusurcootra$ g_4 L_g gei 2l NNS g,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( Roncor W)
NNSl2 J NNSl2 f 2lNNS se m RCWHX e
g ra (Conimi 8seng 3mgW g
RSV 3'
IW ph TORSW RCW PUMP i
A RCWMX I
I ecento su engt 1
ra RS.
3 R M TomSW RCW Hx g
m C
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RbW i
RCW PUMP TOR $W (Come bene)
NOTES.
i
- 1. THt5 OMSCN IS POWERED FROM CLASS 1E DivtSON 11
.. PRIMARY CCNTAINMENT I
EXCEPT FOR THE CONTAINMEM. DUTBOARD ISOLATON VALVE. WHICH IS POWEkED FROM OfVtSCN lll.
i Figure 2.11.3b Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW-B) g,,,_,.,
a.
. a..uai..
. s:.. w.~. c---
t 25AS487 Mov.1
+
ABWR ossign conisatin ustuier h
MUWP RCW RCW OTHERS OTHERS RCW 3
i 3
3 SPCU RCW
)
l RHA MX 8
(Asactor Bueng)
Em n-__
m M A SURGE TANK l
DGHX (Reactor Susoing)
L
'._ - _(Aeactor Building) r_.m L
_J 3RCW I
l l
MECW
{
y l Fuel Pool Coahng HX anc Room Coodem L
TO Y
m K-3
~l (Reactor Bueng) g
~~
r-a 3 NN S '-- - - - - - - -l' NNS 3
HECW l
l OTHER(SAFETY AELATED)Hxa
)
(Reactor and Control Building)
J OTHERS RCW R NNS lr"~ ~ - - - -
1 RCW OTHERS FE NNS CRD AND CUW PUMPS c-s
--"'Td h *T""-
b,-
r.-.m Km gp e,,,
3 r as r
3lNNSj t I._
_, {NNS j 3 l,
I CUW HWH l___
..[
_ _ _ _ a, I
i C,
r-OTHER (NON PFETY-RELATED) g.,,,,. _
( C-a
-- - --- --1 1- - - - _ m_ _ _1 y
i i
g h, _______4_= C=Pagag,NX. p._______J i
2 r__-_~._-.q y
N_ ' DRYWELL EOutPMENT COOLERS M
I l
p i
/.
J w_
NNSl2 d
2 l NNS g,.,,.
I
^
- Sl2 2l NNS
- y. _
i RCW HX
,._. e i
R
"-"'ppoy (Con m 8ucao 3 aCW g
R$W 4 QR5W RM TO RSW RCW PUMP RCW HX I
ra (Con a Sw*hnol 3 RCW N8*
qg RS M A
RCW MX C
C3 rem sanone) 3ACW FAOM RCW PUMP R$WM Q RSW (Cons Susang)
TO RSW
. M - ' <*t-a t '1?t1.
t. ts itd<
NOTES-
- 1. ALL ELECMCAL POWEm LOADS FROM THE CLA$$ if CouPO%ENTS SHOWN
.. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ON THis FIGURE ARE POWERED FMOM CLASS 1E DmslON i EXCEPT FOR THE OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE. WHsCH IS POWERED FMOW DMSaON n.
Figure 2.11.3a-Reactor Building Cooling Water System (RCW A)
1 t
25A5447 Rev. 0 ABWR oasign camscation umrist 2.11.3 Reactor Building Cooling Water System Design Description i
The Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System distributes cooling water through three physically separated and electrically independent divisions. The sutem removes heat from plant auxiliaries and transfers it to the Uldmate Heat Sink (UHS) via the Reactor Senice Water (RSW) System. The RCW Svstem removes heat from emergency core cooling equipment, including the emergency diesel generators (DGs) during a safe reactor shutdown cooling function. RCW System configurations are shown in i
Figures 2.11.3a,2.11.3b. and 2.11.3c. Figure 2.11.3d shows the RCW Setem control interfaces. All components cooled bv the RCWSystem are parts of other sutems and are not part of the RCW System. Each RCW disision includes two pumps which circulate i
cooling water through the equipment cooled by the RCWSystem and through three heat exchangers which transfer the RCW heat to the UHS via the RSW Svstem, d
The RCW Sntem performs a safe reactor shutdown cooling function following a loss of-d cil7 coolant accidenhoss-of-preferred-power (LOCA/LOPP), dssuming a single activej failure in any mechanical or electrical division t r RCW support sntem,Me.c!M 4
/#,cy% hich disables any one of the three RCW divisions, the other two divisions s
3 perform safe reactor shutdown cooling.
9,
[' k I i
Tables 2.11.3a,2.11.3b, and 2.11.3c show which equipment receives RCW flow during Sgt various plant operating and emergency conditions. The tables also indicate how man heat exchangers are in senice under each condition.
V 4j s
The RCW Sprem is classified as saferv-related except for those portions as shown on bf Figures 2.11.3a,2.11.3b, and 2.11.Sc as non-nuclear safety.
l 3 /0/[ hr>led 1 ' 9 *-~
The RCW System responses to a ignal are the following:
)
' af a ro rf t:6 2.<' 5 4. b.c (1) Starts any standby RCW pumps.
gg q g # oaf pmM (2) Opens any closed standby RCW heat exchanger outlet valves.
(3) Opens all Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchanger cooling water outlet valves.
(4) Closes all RCW containment isolation valves.
(5) Closes olves to ncn-safetv-related components (to Reactor Water Cleanup System (CUW) and Hc,t Water Heating (HWH) System heat exchangers and reactor internal pump (RIP) MG sets).
2sAster new. o a
ABWR ossion cmweseea ueraist (6) Opens the RCW water temperature pneumatic control valves (located downstream of RCW heat exchangers) and closes the RCW heat exchanger hvpass valves.
(7) Overrides the RCW pump inp signal from low surge tank and low stand pipe level.
Safety-related valves separate the safetv-related portions of the RCW System from the non-saferv-related portions of the system. !.e separadon valves to the non-safetv-related RCW System are automatically or remote-manually operated, and their positions are indicated in the main control room.
Component design parameters are:
Division A/B Division C Discharge flow rate (Ipm/ pump) 2 23,700 2 20,600 gjf f Heat exchanger design basis heat 211.4 x 106 210.6 x 106 pc, M removal capacities:
kps(fhr kc)(fir h*
These heat removal capabilities include a 20% margin above the minimum required for design basis accident conditions. Consequently, plant operation is acceptable with heat 3
exchanger capacities greater than or equal to 80% of these values.
Figures 2.11.3a,2.11.3b, and 2.11.Sc show the ASME Code Class for the RCW System piping and components. The safety-related portions of the RCW divisions are classified as Seismic Category 1. The piping to the fuel pool cooling (FPC) system heat exchangers and room coolers are classified as Seismic Category I.
The RCW pumps and heat exchangers are located in the lower floors of the Control Building. The equipment cooled by the RCW divisions are located in the Control Building, Reactor Building, Turbine Building, and Radwaste Building, (Figures 2.11.3a, 2.11.3b, and 2.11.Sc).
Each of the three RCW divisions is powered from its respective Class !E division as shown in Figures 2.11.3a,2.11.3b, and 2.11.Sc. In the RCW Svstem, independence is i
provided between the Class lE divisions and also between the Class IE divisions and i
non-Class IE equipment. The saferv-related portion of each mechanical dhision of the RCW System (Dhisions A, B, C) is physically separated from the safety-related portions of the other divisions.
l 2.11.3 2 Reactor Building Cooling Water Sytt=m
" T'
.w 1148700 Now, f A8WR so s.v sdww a.,nr i
I l
The safety interfaces for the RCW System Division I,II, and IH controls are as follows:
LOCA signals to Divisio I,II, and III RCW pumps.
' Divisions I. II, and CW pump manual start signals from the main control room (MCR) and the Remote Shutdown System h
(RSSI.
, Division I, II, and RCW pump running signals to the MCR and f Ig '
ggj (( ~f,";>l,(,}(()
ggg,.
Sc6R',
' Division I, II, and III cooling water supply low p re signals to 9,4 *b the MCR and_RSS.
~ - - -
(b Division I,II, and CW flow signals to the MCR andASS.,
RCW Hx A or D s er differential pressure MCR annunciator.
q j,'
3 g
V Overload and power failure signals from all RCW and RSW pumps 1[,
- p to the MCR annunciator.
6 6.W y 4
hp p RCW surge tank low and high level signals to the MCR e
[7 f
RCW cooling water high temperature signals to the MCR
'P k
-i j
k I
p (j)
Operational Considerations l
h.
The RCW System is capable of operating at a variety of cooling load
[f p Y conditions as required for all plant operating modes, including normal g):J4/7 and emergency conditions.
t Cooling water is required for the operation of the RHR. HECW, FPC, h[p CAM, and Emergency Diesel Generator Systems.
.l l
When the plant is in the hot standby or cooldown mode, safety related -
RCW cooling water is required for the RHR heat exchangen. Refer to Subsection 7.3.1.1.4 for a discussion of the manual or automatic operation of the RHR heat exchanger inlet and outlet isolation valves.
Process operating parameten and equipment status information are provided in the control room for the operator to accurately assess system performance. Alarms are also provided to indicate malfunction in the Enginewed Sa% Fenwe Syawne. Innmmemmen omt ConmW-Amendment 2f 1.s-e6
n
?
Table 9.2-4c Reactor Building Cooling Water Division C b
C 133 3 {?
Emergency
}
No, mal
}
lLOCA)
Operating Shutdown at 4 Shutdown at Hot Standby Hot Standby (Suppression Operating Mode / Components Conditions Hours 20 Hours (No Loss of AC)
(Loss of AC)
Pool at 97'C
- l Heat' Flow
- Heat Flow Heat Flow Heat Flow He.t Flow Heat Flow
-l Essenti.I Emeroency Diesel Gene,ator C -
3.2 229 32 729 RHR Heat Exchanger C 24.8 1.119 8.3 1.119 6.1 1.119 21.3 1199 Others (essential)'
1.5 631 1.6 631 1.6 631 1.5 631 1.5 631 1.7 631 Non-Essential Others (non-essential)'
g 4.3 422 4.6 422 1.8 g 422 4.3 422
.13 50
,.18[}50 hl 2.252 11.6 2.252 6.4 1.053 10 8 2112 [' 26.4
)2112 Toial Load 6.4 1.053 flo
. may not be equ.I to rounding.
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- 1A6100 Rev.1 ABWR stunnisstarr Antrsis Rooort Specific Re'gulaton Requiremenu:
The specific regulatorv requirements applicable to this ssstem are given m Table 7.12.
(2) Non-safetv-Relatea Design Bases
- al Process gaseous edluent from the primary containment and secondan-containment when required to limit the discharge of radioacovity to the environment during normal and abnormal plant operations.
<b)
Maintam the secondazy containment at a negative pressure followmg a loss of offsite power.
7.1.2.3.6 Emergency Diesel Generator Support Systems-4nstrumentation and Contro(s (1) Safety Design Bases _
General Functional Requirements:
1 i
The general functional requirements of the instrumentation and controls for the diesel generator and its aux 1haries and support systems assure the automatic startup and continued operation of the diesel generator uniu of the plant standby power system under emergency or DBA conditions.
Specific Regulatory Requirements:
SpeciSc regulatorv requirements applicable to the diesel generator and its auxiliaries are listed in Table 7.1-2.
(2) Non-Safety Related Design Bases There is no power generation design basis for this system.
7.1.2.3.7 Reactor Building Cooling Water System-Instrumentation and Controls (1) Safety Design Bases General Functional Requirements:
The general functional requirements of the instrumentation and controls of q
this system shall be to:
(a) Maintain control of cooling water to equipment that requires cooling during reactor shutdown modes and following a LOCA.A/s t t.uo?.
EIpg
/
(b) Provide for the automatic isola. ion of the(Lon-essen% arts of the j
Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System (except CRD pump oir
w-4 2.1A6100 Rev. 2 ABWR sinwseeAnstrsk nevert coolers and instrument air coolers) from the essential parts during a LOCA or upon detection of a major RCW leak in the non<ssential sutem.
Specific Regulatorv Requirements:
Specific regulatory requirements applicable to the sutem instrumentation and controls are given in Table 7.1-2.
(2) Non-Saferv-Related Design Bases l
(a) Instrumentation and controls shall be provided to monitor and control the distribution of reactor buddmg cooling water to remove heat from plant auxiliaries during normal plant operation.
(b) The(Eisennal Service Water] System shall be capable of being tested during normal plant operation.
('l 7.1.2.3.8 Essential HVAC Systems-Instrumentation and Controls.
(1) Safety Design Bases
.See Subsections 9.4.1.1.1 and 9.4.5.1.1.
7.1.2.3.9 HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System--4nstrumentation and Controls (1) Safety Design Bases General Functional Requirements:
j The general functional requirements of the HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System instrumentation and controls shall provide control for cooling units j
that ensure a controlled environment for essential equipment and control room areas following a lossof-coolant accident, loss of preferred power, or isolation of normal heating, venting, and air conditioning (HVAC). See Subsection 7.8.1 for COL license information.
Speci5c Regulatory Requirements:
SpeciSc regulatory requirements applicable to the system instrumentation and control are given in Table 7.12.
(2) Non. Safety-Related Design Bases The system shall provide a continuous supply of chilled water to the cooling coils of air conditioning systems which provide a controlled temperature environment and proper humidity to ensure the comfort of the operating 1
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ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.12.12 DC Power Supply Page 1 of 4 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
SSAR chapter 8.3.2.1.3.1 and figure 8.3.4 describe 2
the design of the 125 vdc system with a normal charger for each division and standby chargers shared by two divisions. The standby chargers should be discussed in the Tier I design description and in ITAAC (interlock verification to prevent paralleling is shown in ITAAC entry 3) 2 SSAR chapter 8.3.2.2.1 discusses important system 2
parameters such as the charger failure alarm in the main control room. This alarm is not mentioned in the design description to ensure ITAAC verification.
(see mark-up attached) 3 The design description does not specify worst case 2
charger sizing requirements (see mark-up of page 2.12.12-1).
ITAAC entry 5 should be modified as shown to reflect ability to recharge the battery from fully discharged to fully charged (see mark-up).
4 The battery discharge test is not mentioned in the 2
design description to ensure ITAAC verification.
5 ITAAC item 7.b should be clarified as noted in the 3
SG adF 1G5 (E 6E attached mark-up.
By: Roy Mathew (504-2965)
Resolved by:
- -, _ _ _ ~ - - - - -
r
ABWR ITAAC Independent Reeiew Comments ITAAC No. 2.12.12 Page 2 of 4 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 6
The design and operating temperatures and location 2
of the battery rooms are not discussed in the design description. The battery sizing and capacity analysis must be performed for the worst case temperature conditions.
This parameter should be included in the system description 7
ITA entry 2 needs to be clarified as shown in 3
Jifsv%?
73 GF/E attached mark-up.
8 There are currently no requirements for 2
demonstrating electrical cable integrity (by testing) in the design description or ITAAC.
This element should be considered for ITAAC treatment.
9 Why are drawout type.m'olded case circuit breakers 3
f25409 77)
(FIE shown on SSAR figure 8.3.47 10 Where is the legend provided for electrical symbols 3
5 5137 7 27 GF /E used in the SSAR7 By: Roy Mathew Resolved by:
e-
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.12.12 Page 3 of 4 i
No.
I Comments Cat.
Resolution 11 The symbols used for relays (27DC, 84D) in the SSAR 1
- ggg g7 77)
(g_f[
g figure are not consistent with ANSI V32.2.
,54= ap 7q) dF 2E 12 SSAR ptge 8.3.29 needs to be clarified with respect 3
4 to the statement that " tripping current for load breakers is supplied by battery".
Typically this is fed from another source.
13 SSAR section 8.3.2.2.1 states that power circuit 3
54L 9 73 dFl[
4 breakers in each division receive control power from the batteries in the respective load groups.
For a fault at the battery terminal, there might be insufficient power available to trip the output breakers.
Clarification is needed.
14 The purpose of the molded case circuit breakers in 3
5154a9 7 75 - 6?/I the battery output circuit is not defined. Separate voltmeters should be provided for the battery and charger output circuits. (mark-up attached) 15 SSAR figure 8.3.4 should identify where the displays 3
gM 7D 6E and alarms are installed (NCR, local panel, RSS).
By: Roy Mathew Resolved by:
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.12.12 Page 4 of 4 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 16 The SSAR description should show the power divisions 3
assigned to the battery chargers.
17 Incorrect page numbers are referenced on SSAR page 3
SF_q?
78 GE 8.0 v/vi.
)
18 SSAR figure 8.3.4 shows different capacities for 3
sed 72) 6f batteries (3000 AH for Div II and III, 4000 AH for Div I and 1400 AH for Div IV). How many divisions are needed for design basis accident? Are they redundant? Provide clarification.
I 19 SSAR description should show capacities of battery 3
chargers (normal and standby).
l By: Roy Mathew Resolved by:
cy>vn m 2148447 Aev. O ABWR ouiencormeekn m orw O
Clus 1E battery, battery charger. DC distribudon panel, and MCC circuit breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt fault currents.
Clus 1E DC electrical distribudon svstem circuit interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault opens before other devices.
Clus 1E DC electrical distribudon system cables are sized to supply their load requirements and are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.
The Class 1E DC electrical distribution system supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class 1 E utilization equipment that is within the utilizadon equipment's voltage tolerance limits.
Each Class IE battery is located in a Seismic Category I structure and in its respective didsional battery room.
Class IE DC distribution panels and MCCs are identified according to their Clus IE division and are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective divisional areas.
Class IE DC distribudon system cables and raceways are identified according to their Clus 1E division. Class lE divisional cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective d visional raceways.
For the Clus IE DC electrical distribution system, independence is provided between Clus IE divisions, and also between Class IE divisions and non Class lE equipment.
The Class IE DC power supply has the following alarms and displays in the main control room (MCR):
(1) Alarms for battery ground detecdon.
(2) Parameter Displays for battery voltage and amperes.
(3) Status indication for battery circuit breaker / disconnect posidon.
1 m
ekapik w en/am M
A' Class TE equipment is clusified as Seismic Category 1.' '
Class IE equipment which is located in areas designated u harsh environment areas is qualified for harsh environments.
O Derect Current Power SupoW 2.12.12 2
1 J84847 Aev. O ABWR conian cormw neennew p
\\
2.12,12 Direct Current Power Supply 1
Design Description The Direct Current Power Supply consisu of Class 1E and non Class IE batteries, batterv chargers, and their respeedve direct current (DC) distribudon panels, motor control centers (MCC), power, and instrumentation and control cables to the distribudon system loads. The DC distribudon system also includes the protecdon equipment provided to protect the DC distribudon equipment. The Class IE Direct Current Power Supply and its connections to the Electrical Power Distribution (EPD) System are shown on Figure 2.12.12.
The Cass IE DC electrical power dists:bution system consists of four Cass IE divisions (Divisions I, II, III, and IV) of batteries with their respective DC electrical distribution panels, DC MCCs, if provided for motor loads, and battery chargers. The Cass IE DC distribution system provides DC power to Class IE DC equipment and instrumentation and control circuits.
The non Class IE DC electrical power distribution system consists of non-Class 1E batteries with their respeedve DC electrical distribution panels, DC MCC,if provided for j
g motor loads, and battery chargers. The non Class IE DC distribution system provides j
DC power to non Class lE DC equipment and instrum, ntadon and control circuits.
Except for Division IV, each Class IE divisional (Divisions I,II, and III) battery is provided with a normal battery charger supplied ahernating current (AC) power from a MCC in the same Class IE dhision as the battery. The Division IV normal battery charger is supplied AC power from a Division II MCCMare no automatic
~
connecdons between Cass IE battery chargers, either at the AC power supplies to the battery chargers or at the DC power outpuu from the battery chugers. Mg r
connections between the Class IE battery chargers are interlmked at the AC power supplies to the battery chargers and at the DC power outputs from the battery chargers To prevent paralleling between n= IE divhinm
. Each Class 1E battery is sized to supply its design loads, at the end of-installed-life, for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> without recharging.
C:s i
Each Class IE normal battery charger is sized to supply its respective Cass 1E division's 3
%Q ngrmal steady 4 tate loads while charging its respecdve Cass IE battery.gre'*ta scksif Sl<ts to s Flug c}wf. sin,te.
The Cass IE battery, and battery charger circuit breakers, and DC distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses are sized to supply their load requirements.
A
to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.
' ones cumnt roww supe +1 2.r2.12 1 i
t g"
Table 2.12.12 Direct Current Power Supply (Continued) h ig:tx, Tests And ses and A i
Wence Criteria tig Design Commitment.
Inspections. Tests. Analyses g.
Acceptance Criterte M
5.
Each Class IE normal battery charger is 5.
Tests of each as-built Class 1E normal
- 5. Each as-built Class 1E normal bettery sized to supply its respective Class 1E 3
division's normel steady state loads while battery charger will be conducted by charger can supply its respective Class 1E charging its respective Class 1E batte supplying its respective Class 1E division's normal steady state loads while 8fe cAarf 4 SM Ap division's normal steady state loads while chat 'n
%fy K A
~ts respective Class 1E batteryg a
char i its rpspective Class 1Ebattarysvem A
The gse 1E DC battery and battery yq 45Ck'f [8I*fA b....
en. )
g gg c,ha r y g S je fg ja Q,,
Q. )
6.
kAt Ma g.
charger circuit breakers, and DC K
w rped s data.*.
6.
/
distribution panels, MCCs, and their.
Analyses for the as-built Class IE DC s.
circuit breakers and fuses, are stred to electrical distribution system to Analyses for the as-built Class 1E DC a.
electrical distribution system exist supply their load requirements.
determine the capacities of the battery.
and conclude that the capacities of and battery charger circuit breakers -
and DC distribution panels, MCCs, Class 1E battery and battery charger and their circuit breakers and fuses, circuit breakers, and DC distribution will be performed.
panels. MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, as determined by f
their nameplate ratings, escoed their E
analyzed load requirements.
b.. Tests of the as built Class 1E battery
- b. Connected as-built Class 1E loads o
and battery charger circuit breakers, DC distribution panels, MCCs, their operate at less than or equal to the circuit breakers and fuses, will be minimum allowable battery voltage and at greater than or equal to the conducted by operating connected Class 1E loads at less than or equal to maximum battery charging voltage.
the minimum allowable battery voltage and at greater than or equal to O
k the maximum battery charging es j=.
voltage.
P 3
D i
S a
e ee ik q
e O
i
rL)
V
(
n w
U Table 2.12.12 Direct Current Power SWy (Continued) h n
h ;::t'r-., Tests, A.=!yses and As.,g,;ence Criteria Design Commitment lelone, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7.
7.
7.
The Class 1E battery, battery chargers.
- a. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E DC a.
{
and DC distribution panels, and MCCs electrical distribution system to electrical distribution system exist a.
Analyses for the as built Claes IE DC
}
are rated to withstand fault currents determine fault currents will be and conclude that the capacities of as-for the time required to clear the fault performed.
fr6m its power source.
built Class 1E battery, battery charger, DC distribution panel, and MCC current capacities exceed their I
analyzed fault currents for the time r
required, as determined by the circuit
[
interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its gg g
g power source.
=
b k. Class 1E battery, battery charger. DC
- b. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E DC
- b. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E DC g
distribution panel, and MCC circuit9 electrical distribution system to electrical distribution system exist E
L
'-- m :M '~- are rated to determine fault currents will be and conclude that the anal Jed fault interrupt fault currents.
performed.
currents do not exceed th
- aftery, f
battery charger, DC distribi teion panel.
- ~
and MCC.C:: L __^._:
- d?x
- ;-
g.-- -- - ----ah as de armined by their nameplate ratings.
8.
Class 1E DC electrical distribution system 8.
Analyses for the as-built Class 1E DC 8.
Analyses for the as-built Clash 1E DC circuit interrupting devices icircuit electrical distribution system to determine electrical distribution system circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so circuit interrupting device coordination interrupting devices exist an'l conclude that the circuit interrupter closest to the will be performed.
fault opens before other devices.
that the analyzed circuit int rupter ta closest to the fault will operi before other j.
devices.
D
}-
hwe a
0 ap-c. s m 4 3
mei:
- c,. edt br,e.a.,, f r
- W -
E-t I
~,
p I
Teide 2.12.12 Direct Current Power SupW A
3b g
u J"-
_. Tests.." _"r : and M Ju Criterls 9
}
Design C;..." _..;
i- :
3 r"_.._, Toots, Analyses Acceptance Cettede f
- 1., The basic configuration of the Direct 1.
Inspections of the as-built system will be 1.
The as-built Direct Current Power Supply I
t Current Power Supply is described in conducted.
, Section 2.12.12.
conforms with the basic configuration -
gg described in Section 2.12.12.
- 2. Except for Division IV, each Class 1E 2.
Inspections of the as-built N -_ !!.J. J
- 2. Each as-built Class IE divisional g divisional IDivisions 1.11. and Illi battery is S -.: "t. _. C- ;;"; will be conds.csed.
IDivisions I,H, and till battery is provided 4
MN j provided with a normal battery charger owd ibwJe f p art with a normal battery charger =w":;d
=_-;-;M:1 AC power from a MCC in the 7
same Class 1E devesson as the battery. The AC power from a MCC in the same Class 1E division as the bettery. The Division N Division IV normal battery charger is supphed AC power from a Division N.
normal battery charger is supplied AC MCC.
power from a Devision il MCC.
p 3.
Manualconnections between the Class IE 3.
Tests of the as-built Class 1E battery
- 3. The as-built Class 1E battery chstger AC l
bettery chargers are interlocked at the AC charger interlocks will be conducted by power supply and/or DC power output power supplies to the battery chargers attempting to close each interlocked pair interlocks prevent paralleling the AC and and at the DC power outputs from the of breakers.
bettery chargers to prevent paralleleng DC Class 1E diviseons. The AC and DC between Class IE devesions.
connections between Class 1E devessons g
4.
Each Class 1E battery is sired to supply its 4.
are manual only.
4.
desegn loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a min of 2 Ws W
. a. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E -
- e. Analyses for the as-built Class 1E -
8*8' batteries to determine battery batteries exist and conclude that each capacities will be performed based on Class 1E battery has the capacity, as the design duty cycle for each battery.
determined by the as-built battery rating, to supply its analyzed dessen je loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a e
minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> without i,
l recharging.
- b. Tests of each as built class IE battery
- b. The capacity of each as-built Class 1E h*
will be conducted by simulating loads battery atuais or exceeds the h
which envelope the analyzed battery analyzed battery design duty cycle
=
design duty cycle.
capacity.
i t
4
.-m-2
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u.
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.-.....:.+-...
23M100 Mov. 2 ABWR 3 " ***
- 3** * ^*a W * *** *r (6) Has a 25% capacity design margm to compensate for banery aging (7) Has a 19% capacity design margm to allow for the lowest expected electrohte.
temperature of 10*C (8) Has a number of batterv cells that correctly matches the battery tcnystem voltage limitations (9) Bues the nnt minute of the baueries' duty evele on the sum of all momentarv.
continuous, and non continuous loads that can be expected to operate durmg _
the one minute following a LOCA and/or LOPP (10) Is designed so that each battery's capacity can periodically be veri 6ed i
The batterv output breaker has an over current trip and intermpts fault current flow from the battery to a bus fault. A combination disconnect switch and fuse is an j
acceptable alternate for the battery output breaker. The charger output breaker is used ' gg as a disconnect switch only, because the charger is load limiting and therefore protects 4
j itself. Bus load breakers have over current trios coordimed with the banery output 1
- breaker @ ping current for the load breakers is supplied by the bYat j g; -- ( H M 4
~...
he battenes are installed in accordance with industry recommended practice as g g, defined in IEEE-484, and meet the recommendations of Section 5 ofIEEE-946 g je,p 1
(Subsection 8.3.4.32).
wwr 5 fer Jeu /2 i 8.3.2.1.2 Cfass 1E DC Loads a/- W.e A<#c e y ne 125 VDC Class IE power is required for emergency lighdng, diesekgenerator Seld r
flashing, control and switching functions such as the control of 6.9 kV and 480V switchgear, control relays, meters and indicators, multiplexers, vital AC power supplies, as well as DC componenu used in the reactor core isolation cooling system.
ne four dxvisions that are essential to the safe shutdown of the reactor are supplied from four independent Class IE 125 VDC buses.
l 8.3.2.1.3 Claes 1E Station Batteries and Battery Chorgers, General Considerations The four ESF divisions are supplied from four independent _ Class IE 125 VDC systems -
4 (Figure 8.5-4). Each of the Class IE 125 VDC systems has a 125 VDC banery, a banery charger and a distribution panel. One standby batterv@gM t - r-r.ed to either of two division _s and a,rin@e,JN_by.hattery charger can be connected to either 9.,,
p of tWwovisions. Kirk key interlocks prevent cross connecdon between F L
- The main DC distributigabuses include distribution panels, drawout-type breakers and moIded case dr-Nt breakers.
Star P*** Nor QC~r - Amensiment 3r
z.ussx an. 2 ABWR staaentsdurp-w neput (4) Power sources, distribution equipment and branch circuits are designed to maintain voltage within acceptable limits. Load and voltage drop analyses will be performed in accordance with IEEE 946 and/or other acceptable industn-standards or practices to assure that power sources and distribution equipment will be capable of tranimitting sufficient energy to start and operate all the required loads for all designed plant condinons.
(5) Capacity of motor control centen, and distribution panels and their circuit i
breaken is equal to or greater than the maximum available fault current to which it is exposed under all design modes of operation until the fault is cleared.
Interrupting capability of the Class IE breaken is selected to interrupt the available shon-c9cuit current at the circuit breaker load termnnh. Short circuit analyses will be performed in accordance with IEEE 946 and/or other i
acceptable industry standards or practices to determine fault currents.
(6) Breaker coordination analyses will be performed in accordance with IEEE 141,242, and/or other acceptable industrv standards or practices.
8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3.2.2.1 General DC Power Systems The 480 VAC power supplies for the divisional battery chargers are from the individual Class 1E MCC to which the particular 125 VDC system belongs (Figure 8.5-4). In this way, separation between the independent systems is main =dned and the AC power provided to the chargers can be from either preferred or standby AC power sources.
The DC system is so arranged that the probability of an internal system failure resulting in loss of that DC power system is extremely low. Important system componenu are either self-alanmng on failure or capable of clearing faults or being tested during senice to detect faults. Each battery set is located in its own ventilated battery rooni AD abnormal conditions ofim rtant system parameten such as charger failure or low bus.
% *=
in the main control room add /or Q. uipi.pb battery voltage, DC amperes, breakers / disconnect swita position and ground detection are p
provided in the Irrain control room.
C 13 Power circuit breakers in each division receive control power from the batteries in the respective load groups ensuring the following-s l
(1) The unlikelyloss ofone 125 VDC system does notjeopardize the Class IE feed supply to the Class 1E buses.
pg,1) c 6ta hf s.s-as onsite Powr syemms-Amausment xt
nusao nov. 2 ABWR smedadwarAsatrsus narar j
1 The Class IE 125 VDC sptems supply DC power to Divisions 1. II,III and IV, respectively, and are designed as Cass 1E equipment in accordance with IEEE-508. They are gg designed so that no single failure in any 125 VDC syst ngwill result in conditions that po prevent safe shutdown of the plant with the remainin er divisions.The plant design and circuit layout from these DC systems provid'e physical separation of the equipment, cabling and instrumentation essential to plant safety.
Each dhision of the swtem is located in an area separated physically from oth:r dhisions. All the components of Class 1E 125 VDC systems are housed in Seismic Category I structures.
t 8.3.2.1.3.1 Class 1E 125 VDC Systems Configuration Figure 8.5 4 shows the overall 125 VDC system provided for Cass 1E Divisions I, II,III and IV. One divisional battery charger is used to supply each dhisional DC distribution panel bus and its associated battery. The divisional battery charger is normally fed from its divisional 480V MCC bus, with no automatic interconnection or transfer between buses. Also, there are no manual interconnections between DC divisions except those involving the standby Sauery chargers, as described below.
Each Class 1E 125 VDC battery is provided with a charger, and a standby charger shared by two divisions, each of which is capable of recharging iu battery from a discharged state to a fully charged state while handling the normal, steady state DC load. Cross connection between two divisions through a standby charger is prevented by at least two interlocked breakers, kept normally open, in series in each potential cross <onnect path. (Figure 8.H and Subsection 8.3.4.18.)
The maximum equmbririg charge voltage for Cass IE batteries is 140 VDC. The DC system minimum discharge voltage at the end of the discharge period is 1.75 VDC per cell (105V for the battery). The operating voltage range of Cass IE DC loads is 100 to 140V.
1 The batteries have sufBcient stored energy to operate connected Qass IE loads continuously for at least two hours without recharrine. During the station blackout event, the load reductions also extend the times these batteries are available (STbsection 19E.2.1.2.2). Each distribution circuit is capable of transmitting suf5cient energy to start and operate all required loads in that circuit.
A mparity and voltage drop analyns will be performed in accordance with IEEE-141 to assure that power sources and distribution equipment will be capable of transmitting su5cient energy to start and operate all required loads for all plant conditions.
l A load capacity analysis has been performed based on IEEE-485, and submitted on the docket for estimated Cass IE DC battery loads as of September,1989. A final analyns will be performed when speciSc battery parameten are known (Subsection 8.3.4.6).
s.S.so chae n.w sywwne-Amendmem at
NS 21<sroo nv. 2 ABWR saaderssaury Anatysss napois Chapter 8 List of Figures Figure 8.2-1 Power Distribution System Routing Diagram (Sheets 1-7).............
.8.2-15 Figure S.3-1 Electrical Power Dist ibution Srstem SLD (Sheets 1-3).
...S.3-h Figure 8.3 2 Instrument and Control Power Supply System SLD..
.8.3-69 %
Figure 5.3 3 Plant Viral AC Power Supply System SLD (Sheets 1-2)...............
8.3-69 '
v 1S Figure 8.3-6 Plant Vital DC Power Supply System SLD (Sheets 1-3)....
....... 8.349 -
Figure SA 1 Site Plan (Grounding)....
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ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.14.1 Primary Containment Page 1 of 2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution I
The SSAR states that ASME/ACI-359 Division 2 will be 3
used for design. Has the staff accepted the design portion of the code as it was not endorsed by RG 1.1367 2
The liner plate thickness appears to be only briefly 3
mentioned in SSAR section 3.8.1.4.1.4.
More information is warranted on the details of liner plate thickness and reinforcement.
3 SSAR section 3.8.1.5 states the shear stress 3
SEMP GE allowable is 500 psi.
This is much higher than generally allowed. Has the staff approved this value.
4 SSAR section 3.8.1.6 should refer to RG 1.136 not 1
56k49
??
dh dE 1.1.36.
5 ITAAC entry 8 verifies MCR displays and alarms as 2
defined in system description. The system II'4I description only discusses vacuum breaker
/4-ri4a) instrumentation. Confirmation needs to be provided that items listed in SSAR section 6.2.1 are appropriately covered in ITAACs.
By: Hai-boh Wano (504-2958)
Resolved by:
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 2.14.1 Page 2 of 2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 6
The design description defines the drywell head 1
closure thickness as 31.7 mm.
SSAR figure 19F-4 states the thickness is 1.25 in which equals 31.75 mm.
These should be reconciled.
7 The design description and Tier 1 figure 2.14.1 I
state the total horizontal vent area is equal or l
greater than 11.55 m squared.
SSAR tables 6.2-2 and 14.3-2 state the area is 11.6 m squared. These should be reconciled.
SIE~.y9 23 (C.fE 8
SSAR section 6.2.1.1 discusses the safety importance 2
A of the drywell-wetwell vacuum relief breakers.
$fbf$_,
These should be included in ITAAC to verify the swing check valves will function to prevent excessive negative pressures.
I By: Hai-boh_Wana Resolved by:
e
_...m
__m______.=__m.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _.. _ _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. 3.3 Pipino Desian-Page 1 of 2 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
Design Description paragraph I states piping that I
must remain functional following an SSE is Seismic Category I and is classified as ASME Class 1,2, or 3.
This is not accurate as there is some non-ASME piping that is seismic Category 1.
The description should be revised to clarify this aspect.
2 The design description should include a statement 2
'SM 70 6E that the fabrication process for ferritic materials should be selected and controlled to prevent susceptibility to brittle fracture.
3 The piping design description should address the 2
accessibility requirements for in-service f
inspection.
4 The design description first sentence should use the 3
SM 73 6-6 word ' fluid" rather than " hydraulic and pneumatic".
5 The piping is designed for a 60 year life. This 3
SEJ Tb GE requirement has not been stated in Tier I for other gc pg ygJJgt, system components connected to the piping (for example pressure vessels and nozzles). Why is the 60 year life only specified for piping?
~
By: Sam Halur (504-2963)
Resolved by:
L
ABWR 'ITAAC Independent Review Coments ITAAC No. 3.3 Page 2 of _L No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 6
An ITAAC entry should be considered for verifying 2
criteria such as consideration of thermal stratification, use of ferritic and austenitic SS material, and for design to minimize erosion / corrosion effects.
7 In the design description second paragraph, add "I" 3
' SF-+#
9
.68 after " seismic Category."
8 The Basic Configuration description in section 1.2 2
should be augmented with a definition of Seismic Category 1 (RG 1.29).
By: Sam Malur Resolved by:
~
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No.-*;7 OTT A Power D e'571EiFurh)
Page 1 of 5 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 1
The ITAAC and design description allude to 3
possibility of more than one RAT whereas the SSAR only shows one. Clarification is necessary.
2 The design description does not clearly state what 3
are the " normal preferred" (UATs) and " alternate preferred " (RATS) feeds to. the class IE switchgear busses.
3 The design description does not address the limits 3
of the loading on the RAT.
Can the RAT pickup loads associated with a disabled UAT or additional loads of another disabled UAT after shedding some unnecessary loads?
4 The degree of loading of the CTG should be provided 3
in more detail (number of Class IE busses or PIP busses) in the design description.
5
- Each Class IE bus is supplied through single 3
switchgear cubicle. Revise last paragraph in design description on page 2.12.1-1 to reflect feed thorough _switchgear cubicle.
By: Ed Kleeh (504-2964)
Resolved by:
ABWR ITAAC Independent kutew Comments ITAAC.No. 2-Page _2_,of 5
No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 6
Design description page 2.12.1-2, 2nd paragraph, 3
should be revised to reflect that the PNG, the output breaker, and the UAT power feeders are separated from both the RATS and the CTG.
7 There do not appear to be any provisions to prevent 2
connecting either the RAT or.the CTG to more than one 6.9 kv Class IE switchgear bus simultaneously.
Provide clarification.
8 The design description should state where the 3
offsite power system electrical equipment are located with respect to site buildings.
9 The design description ~ does not provide information 2
about Class IE 6.9 ky switchgear bus interlocks that prevent paralleling the feeds from UAT, RAT and CTG to meet GDC-17.
Provide confirmation of interlocks.
10 ITAAC number 2 should be revised to read that 2
" analysis for..UATs...will be performed for each of their operating modes."
By:.Ed Kleeh Resolved by:
r
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments j
ITAAC No. 4,2 Page 3 of 5 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 11 The basis for ITAAC entry 5 to maintain 15.24 meters 3
for 6.9 kv circuits of MPT and UATs with RAT circuits does not seem necessary for medium voltage circuits inside the plant.
12 ITAAC item 8.a should be revised to read 2
SM 7b 6-E
" Analysis...of all breakers, switchgear,
/2Ev/JE_ AcctWMei c',MA-transrormers, feeders of the EPD system will be performed for all design operating modes."
13 ITAAC number 8.b should be revised to read " tests 2
will be performed by supplying Class IE loads with voltage in the range of 9% to 10% below/or above their nominal value."
14 ITAAC number 9.a and 9.b should be revised to read 2
" Analyses... will be performed for all design operating modes in order to determine the worst case fault currents applicable to each component."
15 ITAAC number 11 acceptance criteria should be 2
revised to read "The coordination study exists for the entire EPD system.
Primary protective systems actuate prior to backup systems. -Selective coordination is achieved as applicable for EPD-protective devices."
By: Ed Kleeh Resolved by:
e a
u-u
g ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No. &?P Page 4 of.b No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 16 ITAAC number 11 design commitment should be revised 2
Sf4 Td b6 to read "EPD system protective devices coordinate so
@,5jpEg goffg y e M that the one closest to a fault opens first or the designated protective device activates, before other g
g g g g g gg g backup devices actuate."
EEEPM ggE M 17 SSAR figure 8.3.1 (sh 1) single line diagram does 1
SEv/
D M
not use standard electrical symbols in accordance-with ANSI-Y32.2 (1975). The SSAR does not define alternate symbols. A legend should be provided in the SSAR.
18 SSAR figure 8.3.1 (.ch 1) and section 8.2.1.1 item 12 3
fed 7b GE do not agree about whether cable or non-segregated bus duct is routed from the UATs to the 6.9 Ky switchgear. This should be clarified.
19 SSAR figure 8.3.1 (sh 1) should be revised as 3
JEs>#
Ta 6-E attached mark-up for notes and revise isophase bus duct rating from 4KA to 5 KA.
20 SSAR figure 8.2.1 (sh 2) " Gas Turbine Generator" 3
SM 78 GE should be revised to " Combustion Turbine Generator" By: Ed Kleeh Reso'ved by:
-. ~ ~ -
.+
ABWR ITAAC Independent Review Comments ITAAC No.-4 +
Page 5 of 5 No.
Comments Cat.
Resolution 21 SSAR figure 8.2.1 (sh 2,3,4,5,6) feeder 10 tags 1
.5 M 73 GE should be changed from Al, 81, Cl to A4, 84, C4.
Switchgear M/C A4, 84, and C4 need to be shown on physical layout drawing (8.2.1, sh 1).
22 SSAR figure 8.2 (sh 6) should be revised to show 3
S E+d 74 66 feeds to motor control switchgear E; figure 8.2 (sh
- 7) should be revised to show alternate and normal feeds to 6.9 kv switchgear M/C E on opposite ends.
23 Abbreviations used in design description (TS, MPD, 3
SM 73 GE UAT, PMG) are not used in the SSAR, these should be consistent.
24 SSAR section 8.2.1.2 states the iso phase bus is 3
jeu 9 7b G6 rated for 36 KA, whereas only portions of it are rated at that value, this should be clarified.
By: Ed Kleeh Resolved by:
--