ML20059G755
| ML20059G755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 11/01/1993 |
| From: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9311090068 | |
| Download: ML20059G755 (12) | |
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o UNITED STATES
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l s WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 p
November 1, 1993 i
Docket No.52-001 .
APPLICANT: GE Nuclear Energy (GE)
PROJECT: GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
OF SEPTEMBER 21, 1993 i
A meeting was held between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and GE ,
Nuclear Energy (GE) staff in the GE San Jose office on September 21, 1993. ;
Attending from the NRC were C. Poslusny, and J. Holmes, and from GE were A. Beard, M Nik-Ahd, and C. Oza. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the resolution of a limited number of issues related to the design of the ABWR fire protection system. The enclosure is a list of the staff who attended the meeting. Most of the meeting was dedicated to GE's identification of design-deviations from the Branch Technical Position 9.5.1. Additional staff concerns were also discussed. The following is a summary of the items which .
were discussed, the agreed upon NRC or GE actions required for resolution, or i options for resolution yet to be exercised by either parties. i i
- 1. Fire protection and mitigation features in primary containment internal '
areas during shutdown conditions. '
The staff had raised a concern related to the shutdown risk evaluation for the ABWR. Specifically, under conditions where the containment head was
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. removed after de-inerting, the staff questioned GE about the lack of !
dampers in the HVAC system being used to provide a supply of' fresh air in !
the work areas. The focus was on the risk of a fire affecting the HVAC ,
system and potentially the safety equipment outside containment, as well !
as the operation of the residual heat removal (RHR) system.
GE indicated that the standard safety analysis report (SSAR) includes the :
following design information. The permanent equipment in primary contain- i ment include sump pumps, drywell coolers, and motor-operated valves. The '
sump pumps include a minimal amount of lubrication oil and therefore the constant combustion loading is insignificant. GE further proposed that i the administrative procedures implemented by the COL applicant will 1 con? +1 the mount of additional combustibles brought into the area. In '
addhion, it es stated that the area would be continually manned during periods of permitted staff entry, will have fire watches, and the provi- !
sion of fire suppressants. Thus, GE implied that the probability of a l fire was very low, and if it should occur it would be on low intensity, ;
easily extinguished, and would have negligible impact on safety related !
equipment within containment and on the HVAC system. 2 Further, assuming there was a significant fire in the area, GE indicated l that the results would not affect the maintenance of core cooling or the i 9311090068 931101 PDR h 4 ll 4
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November 1, 1993 operability of safety related equipment. Specifically, containment sprays
! would be initiated to suppress the heat and smoke of the fire. Also, the HVAC system would be switched to a smoke removal mode. If the fire did ,
2 breach the HVAC integrity, the routing of the system piping and ductwork l 1 would run through only one safety division and the other two divisions i would continue their safety functions. Considering a localized fire near ;
the motor-operated valves for the RHR, at most two divisions would be -l affected, but the high pressure core flooder which does not rely on active j valves would still be available for core cooling. GE also provided .
details on the relative location of the HVAC intake and exhaust-and RHR '
valves for staff consideration. )
The staff indicated that GE's design capabilities supported by operational controls and procedures appear to adequately address the concerns. j Further evaluation of this information will be completed and followup +
discussions will be conducted to provide feedback to GE and to identify any required SSAR changes if necessary.
- 2. Smoke control The staff had requested a change in the SSAR to indicate that the smoke control capability would take into account the fact that the fire doors would be maintained open between a fire area and a non fire area. GE committed to providing a revised markup which will be included in a SSAR amendment to address this item.
- 3. Combustible loading j
! 1 The staff identified a statement in the SSAR that cables in trays with {
bottoms were not considered in the total combustible loading. This was not in compliance with Generic Letter 86-10 which states that all cables -!
in trays need to be part of the total loading. j GE agreed to delete the statements in the SSAR which indicate the exclu-sion. The staff found this to be acceptable. GE will provide additional :
changes if other exclusions are found in the SSAR.
This GI deals with the design to mitigate the effects of inadvertent ;
actuation of fire suppression systems on safety related equipment. The staff specifically focused on the effects of the fire retardant spray ,
actuation on an operating emergency diesel generator. GE's design employs l a fused head sprinkler system of 9 heads with foam spray initiation based t on both the heatup rate and actual temperature. The staff raised a '
question whether the design of the fused closed head system could ade- !
quately provide the design basis application rate of_ .16 gallons per ;
minute per square foot, i.e., could the system adequately contain or i extinguish the fire? ,
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l November 1, 1993 Based on the premise that open sprinkler head (beluga system) was needed '
to provide the proper foam application rate why the system was not designed to minimize damage to the diesels based on the direction of spray heads or by having protective barriers over diesel air intakes. This
- concern was based on the fact that combustion air is taken from the diesel ;
room and the partial vacuum would pull in fire suppression foam or water ;
and damage the diesel. ,
i The staff and GE discussed options for resolution of the GE and confor-mance with the BTP. GE could redesign the EDG to duct in air from outside j the diesel room to eliminate the effects of the foam and water spray on- '
the air intakes. Alternatively, with the current design, additional !
specification of the direction of the spray heads away from the air !
intakes and protection of the intakes could be added to the SSAR. A third option would be to use a different suppression medium like carbon dioxide l which would not affect the diesels operability to the same extent. ;
t GE's firm position is that the fire suppression design (3 independent systems) is highly reliable with an initiation logic that prevents !
inadvertent actuation. Further, assuming initiation of the sprays onto an operating diesel results in the loss of the diesel, GE's design still has '
two additional units available plus a combustion turbine generator. GE emphasized that its design is adequate to meet the BTP and address the GI. i This item remains unresolved subject to management reviev '
- 5. Wall Deviations ;
The staff identified that in the SSAR GE had referenced the ICB01495 Code !
fo'r design of the type I walls. The staff stated that ASTM E-IIB code ;
needed to be referenced. GE committed to revising the SSAR and providing- !
markups.
- 6. Deviations from BTP 9.5.1 GE provided a discussion of deviation from the BTP. Enclosure 2 is a handout provided by GE which justifies each deviation. The following is a summary of the discussions for each item.
- a. High Impedance faults A deviation from the specification of the commitment to perform a high impedance fault analysis to ensure that such faults could not affect the operation of safety related equipment. GE committed to revising the SSAR to address this item.
GE committed to correcting the error.
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- November 1, 1993
- c. Diesel Fuel Storage Area.
GE has located in the reactor building, outside secondary containment, 3 diesel fuel tanks which are greater than 1100 gallons in capacity.
The staff requested that GE show that the sunken floor below each tank will accommodate fire suppression water and foam for 30 minutes without forcing spilled fuel to migrate to other are'., of the plant.
GE agreed to consider the staff's concern.
- d. Control Room Complex GE committed to changing the design to add fire detection capability to the sub-floor area which was acceptable to the staff.
- e. Plant Computer Room GE indicated that this was not a deviation from the SRP and would not need to be further discussed.
- f. Outdoor Transformers For this item GE indicated that a commitment to NFPA 15 will be added to the SSAR and to indicate that the barrier walls to be used will be equivalent to a one-hour fire barrier.
(Original signed by) !
Chester Poslusny, Jr., Project Manager Standardizatior Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:
Docket File PDST R/F DCrutchfield CPoslusny PDR PShea DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosures:
TMurley/FMiraglia,12G18 WRussell ACRS (11)
EJordan, MNBB3701 JMoore, 15B18 TGody, Jr. , ED0 SNinh JNWilson TBoyce GZech, 10A19 DTang JHolmes, 8D1 Oh CI) _
0FC LA:PDST:ADAR PM:PDMADAR SCfPIST:IDkR NAME PShea 9 b CPoslusny:sg JNWilson DATE lp/ l /93 }$4 /93 1$/ \ /93 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY: FIREMEET
2 _ a u - a_ - .. ._ ~ s
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cc: Mr. Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Mr. Joseph Quirk Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy i GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 San Jose, California 95125 San Jose, California 95125 1
i Mr. Victor G. Snell, Director Safety and Licensing 9210 Corporate Boulevard ,
l Suite 410 ,
j Rockville, Maryland 20850
- i Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager r
! Regulatory Programs !
- GE Nuclear Energy !
12300 Twinbrook Parkway i Suite 315 l Rockville, Maryland 20852 !
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! Director, Criteria & Standards Division j Office of Radiation Programs ;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency l 401 M Street, S.W. j Washington, D.C. 20460 l Mr. Sterling Franks i
, U.S. Department of Energy !
a NE-42 I Washington, D.C. 20585 i i !
l Mr. Steve Goldberg :
j Budget Examiner 4
725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 Washington, D.C. 20503 ;
i Mr. Frank A. Ross l
. U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 +
i Office of LWR Safety and Technology !
19901 Germantown Road !
< Germantown, Maryland 20874 !
l Mr. Raymond Ng i 1776 Eye Street, N.W. ;
Suite 300 ,
Washington, D.C. 20006 !
Marcus A. Rowden, Esq. i Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson !
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. '
Suite 800
- Washington, D.C. 20004 ,
Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
j Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. ,
. 1615 L Street, N.W.
1 Suite 1000 t i Washington, D.C. 20036 i .
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l MEETING ATTENDEES !
SEPTEMBER 21, 1993 l
NAME ORGANIZATION C. Poslusny NRR i J. Holmes NRR !
A. Beard GE I M. Nik-Ahd GE C. Oza GE l
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Enclosure 1 l
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l Deviation from BTP 9.5-1, item 7 j- Diesel Fuel Storage Areas-page i 9.5.1-48
' Diesel Fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons should not be located inside buildings containing safety related equipment'.
GE Position:
1 Three 3200 gallons-8 hours supply of full power operation- Diesel fuel tanks are located in the Reactor building, but outside the secondary containment. URD-recommends a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> supply. K6/K7-Japanese plant uses 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> supply and US ABWR also uses 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> supply.
Fire Area - F6101, Room No.610, 23,500(mm) floor F6301, Room No.632,
- F6201, Room No.624, "
Wa!!s, ceiling, floors and doors are all 3-hour fire barriers.
The sunken volume of the room will hold the entire contents of tank should an uncontrolled leak occur.
The doors from either Rooms open into it's DG equipment room which still is the same division, but a different fire area. The fire has to burn through two 3-hour barrier before it can penetrate to another
- division. EHVAC provides the smoke removal.
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Enclosure 2 I
Deviation from BTP 9.5-1, item 7i-Diesel Generator area:
'Autt :atic fire suppression system should be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil fires; Such systems should be 1 designed for operation when diesel is running without affectina the !
diesel' GE Position:
GE ABWR has the automatic foam suooression systems for diesel cenerators and diesel cenerator day tanks. The generator is not a 100% sealed unit Openings are provided for cooling purposes. When a diesel is operating and fire occurs, automatic foam will come on and there is a possibility that the foam could get sucked in the ,
generator openings and damage the generator or short-circuit could occur.
A completely sealed SMW generator is not available. Hence a SMW generator with its own sealed Hydrogen cooling system will be a custom design.
ABWR assumes the loss of function / division should a fire occur. ,
There are two more diesel cenerators available for the duty.
Actuation of automatic foam system due to a fire or an inadvertent actuation of the foam system should lead to shutdown of that diesel i cenerator.
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I Deviations from BTP 9.5-1 Control Room Complex: j
- 1. Peripheral rooms in the control room complex should have j automatic water suppression and should be separated from the -l control room by non combustible construction with a fire . rating of 1 ,
hour. :
2.Smo'Ke detectors should be provided in control rooms, l cabinets and consoles, ;
- 3. Cables in the under floor and ceiling spaces should meet the l separation criteria. !
- 4. Automatic fire suppression should be provided for under {
floor.
GE Resoonse:
f No detection is orovided in the control room comolex for the i followino reasons:
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- 1. Very low amount of combustibles-mostly papers-trash can i fires !
- 2. The area is continuously manned-probability of detection is '
high. l
- 3. Hand held extinguishers are in the complex and available. )
. 4. Standpipe and hoses in the vicinity of outside of complex.
The subfloor does not have any detection or suppression because of the following:
- 1. Power cables are made of fire retardent insulation material.
- 2. Instrumentation and control cables are fiber-optics.
- 3. The area is continuously manned-probability of detection is high.
- 4. Hand held extinguishers are in the complex and available.
- 5. Standpipe and hoses in the vicinity of outside of complex.
- 6. Power cables if any in the conduits-no combustible loading.
i-l Deviation from BTP 9.5-1, item 7 d- olant comouter room:
' Computer rooms for computers performing safety related functions that are not part of the control room complex should be separated from other areas by barriers having a minimum fire resistance of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and should be protected by automatic detection and fixed automatic suppression' GE Position:
l Peripheral rooms do not have any suppression systems because l 1. Very low amount of combustibles-mostly papers-trash can fires
- 2. The area is continuously manned-probability of detection is l high.
- 3. Hand held extinguishers are in the complex and available.
- 4. Standpipe and hoses in the vicinity of outside of complex.
Computer room in ABWR is a part of the control room complex. These computers do not perform any safety functions.
Walls of the peripheral rooms are not fire rated being in the same fire area.
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i BTP 9.5-1:5. GENERAL PLANT GUIDELINES- ITEM 13. fOUTDOOR TRANSFORMERS.
' Outdoor oil filled transformers should have oil spill confinement features or drainage away from the buildings. Such transformers should be located at least 50 feet distant from the building, or by ensuring that such building walls within 50 feet of oil-filled transformers are without openings and have a fire resistance rating of at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />'.
l GE ResDonsE l The transformers located outside the turbine building have the ' tub' around them to contain the oil from spreading. Each is equipped with an automatic deluge system. The turbine building is not a safety
( building. The building is seismically analysed . ;
The shadow type fire walls are provided between the main, unit auxiliary & reserve transformers. !
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The permanent equipments located in the primary containment are sump pumps, drywell coolers, motor operated valves. Very limited amount of lube oil is present in the sump pump which are normally sealed.
The proposed activities during outage are carefully planned. The transient combustible loading being brought in during outage, maintenance etc. is strictly controlled. The area is continuously manned, fire watches are present, any fire will be reported to MCR and the fire brigade and extinguished quickly. The fire brigade is is aware of all the combustibles present and have appropriate fire l
suppressants available.
BTP 9.5-1 Item 2. Administrative controls.
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