ML20044B966
| ML20044B966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1993 |
| From: | Brinkman C ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LD-93-039, LD-93-39, NUDOCS 9303160019 | |
| Download: ML20044B966 (89) | |
Text
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LD-93-039-v 1 Docket.No'. 52-002 ] : Attn: Document Control Desk 'I U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ; Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
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Subject:
System 80+" Supplemental Information l
Dear Sirs:
a Attached is 'nformation' requested by the' staff to'supplementj i . [ information.on:the System-80+ design. description which)isialready -; , on the docket. In general,=this material elaborates on-. analyses : and tests which are specified elsewhere and provides SSAR-pages- ' marked up for consistency with.the certifled design-. descriptions. - If you have questions related to this material, please' contact me' ~[ or Mr. John Pec (203-285-286). , ll Very truly yours, ;
-i COMBUSTIONJENGINEERING,'INC.- l 0 '
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- T C. B. Brinkman.' !
Acting-Director ; Nuclear Systems'LicensingT-J
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'cc: T. Boyce (NRC) .i T. Wambach-(NRC)- 1 P. Lang: (DOE) i J. Trotter (EPRI) :l A.-Heymer-(NUMARC) -! '
.J.-Egan (SPPT)- .
T. Crom (DE&S) . -
, S. Stamm (SWEC)-
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ABB' Combustion Engineering Nuclear _ Power , ;
.- ' Cornbusbon Engreenng, Inc. . ,1000 Prospect hat Road - Telephone (203) 6BB %11 - ., .
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SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL STRUCTURES (1.3.6)
- 1. Amplifyine Information for RVIS A description of the Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program (CVAP) is provided in CESSAR-DC Section 3.9.2.4.
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Annlicable to RVIS None. Covered by testing description in CESSAR-DC Section 3.9.2.4.
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' SYSTEM 80+" For retenace purposes only. Not latended .
to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or l
. Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. ;
REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL STRUCIURES (13.6) u Relationship of RVIS to the Safety Analysis : None j P 1
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SYSTEM 80+" For referrace purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the 'Iler 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL STRUCTURES (13.6) Relationshin of RVIS to PRA None s 1.3.6 03-05-93 , s
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' SYS1EM 80+"- ;
SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l
' (1.5.1) - !
- 1. ~ Amotifyine Information for Reactor Coolant System' RCS
Description:
CESSAR-DC Section 5 !
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- 2. CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Anolicable to RCS' Pre-operational Tests: CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.1, .2,' 3, 37, .55, .57,'. 58,' .59 i
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SYSTEM 80+" . For reference purposes only. Not l intended ,to comprise a part of either the 'ller 1 or Tier 2 System ; 80+ submittal. l REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l
-i (1.5.1) 3
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'I Relationship of the Safety Analysis to RCS i j
The PZR safety valve set pressure and Dow capacity are tested in ITAAC #1. The steam flow limiting venturi threat area is inspected in ITAAC #7. 'i a '
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SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM , (1.5.1) Belationship of PRA to RCS
- 1) Each spray loop is connected to separate cold legs of the Reactor Coolant System.
- 2) Both loops are connected to a common header prior to entering the pressurizer.
- 3) The operation of the spray control valves can be accomplished manually.
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i SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. , REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (1.5.1) Relationship of RCS to Shutdown Risk Evaluation The following instrumentation was added to the RCS as a result of the Shutdown- , Risk Evaluation: l Reactor Vessel water level (DP detector) wide range indications and alarms,
- Reactor Vessel water level (DP detector) narrow range indications and alarms Reactor Vessel water level (narrow range) and temperature (clustered heated junction thermocouples) indications and alarms +
Core exit temperature (thermocouples) indications and alarms l t 1.5.1 -4 03-04-93
SYSTEM 80+= e SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (1.5.2) 8
- 1. Amnlifvine Information for Shutdown Cooline System SCS Heat Removal Capacity Tests will be performed to measure shutdown cooling flowrates at the combined discharge of the SCS heat exchanger and heat exchanger bypass line using the permanently installed instrumentation. Tests will also be performed to measure shutdown cooling flowrates and temperatures of the SCS heat exchanger inlet and outlet, for both the reactor coolant and component cooling water sides. The results of these tests, together with vendor supplied as-built information, will be u.wd in an analysis to calculate the overall heat transfer coefficent for the SCS heat exchanger.
In addition, an analysis will be performed to calculate the heat removal capability of the SCS heat exchanger during refueling conditions. Determination of NES11
.t Confirmation of adequate pump NPSH will include testing and analysis with the following conditions:
Shutdown cooling system piping anangement and pump locations and elevations. Reactor coolant system water level at a minimum value for reduced inventory operation and maximum RCS water temperature for reduced inventory operation. Maximum design basis RCS water temperature for SCS operation. Pressure losses for pump inlet piping and components. The calculated minimum available NPSH shall exceed NPSH required by the vendor for each SCS pump. Testine Class 1E Power Availability Testing of Class 1E power availability to SCS components will include confirmation of the following: Within a division, one component cooling water pump motor is powered from one Class 1E bus in that division and the other SCS pump motor is powered from the other Class IE bus in that division. 1.5.2 03-04-93
SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (1.5,2) r The SCS pump motor and the CSS pump motor in a division are powered from separate Class 1E buses in the same Class IE division. The SCS pump control circuit and pump motor for a specific pump are powered from the : same Class 1E division.
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to SCS Test
Description:
CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.21 k i i k i f 1 I i 1.S.2 03-04-93
l-CESSAR naibou s e: . 5 RCS from two SCS pumps running at design flow rate was also included with no credit taken for component energy losses to the k - external environment. E I
-l' At each time interval in the cooldown, an iterative process is utilized to analyze transient performance, whereby the heat" +
removal is established by balancing the available heat load with # ' the SCS heat exchanger hqat removal ' capability. The cooldown
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rate is ' limited to a , maximum of 75'F/ hour .throughout' the . cooldown. he-nor two train cooldown curve is shown in Figure $"' ; 5.4.7-1. -tT I - With the most limiting single active failure in the SCS, RCS temperature can be brought to 200*F within 24 hours following shutdown using one SCS pump and one SCS heat exchanger, assuming C ;
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that the RCS pressure and temperature are reduced to SCS l initiation conditions by other heat rejection means in~3.5 hours. h khe----single) train cooldown curve is shown in Figure 5.4.7-2. s
- l A4fc4 "Aagit j
*g The SCS is designed utilizing a philosophy of total physical .
i separation of redundant trains such that the system can carry out ! its safety function assuming a single. active failure during both q ; normal and short-term post accident modes and a single active or W {- passive failure during long-term _: wt accident modes (i.e., time Q -i
% periods >24 hr) after event initiation. Total train separation C 5 :'
assures that a single failure in one train cannot preclude the f second train from accomplishing its safety functions. A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the SCS is presented in Table j ,
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5.4.73 2- ! Adequate sampling capability of the SCS is ensured for all modesf y .i of SCS operation to verify boron concentration- and fission i j product activity. 3 i 5.4.7.4 Br$ppgerpt;ionpp'I)psidag v v v
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7 Preoperational tests are conducted to verify proper operation of _y , the- SCS. The preoperational -tests include' calibration __of , U instrumentation, verification of adequate cooling flow, *and ! verification ' of the operability of all associated valves. In ; addition, a preoperational hot functional performance- test is . made on the installed SCS heat exchangers as part of the precore ! hot functional test program. See. Chapter _14 for further details l on these tests. The SCS also undergoes a series of preoperational- hydrostatic tests conducted in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler. , and Pressure Vessel Code. i MerUbCA 'fC $ 6CS lr{9 Y CCYnfdYtfNS JS a&wk m see.% v . c . Amendment I 2
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5.4-33 December 21, 1990 ;
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CESSAR EEnne.nw Shutdown Cooling System Test 14.2.12.1.21 1.O OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate proper operation of Shutdown Cooling , System and the Shutdown Cooling Pumps. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the systems-to be tested are complete. ' operable 2.2 Plant systems required to support testing are and temporary systems are installed and operable. 2.3 Permanently installed instrumentation is operable and calibrated. I E 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. 2.5 All lines in the Shutdown Cooling System have been j filled and vented. t 3.O TEST METIl0D ; 3.1 verify proper operation of each shutdown cooling pump with minimum flow established. including head and flow 3.2 Verify pump performance characteristics for all design flow paths. test of the shutdown cooling Perform a full flow 3.3 system. , Verify proper operation, failure mode, stroking speed, y 3.4 indication and response to interlock of position control and isolation valves. , l 3.5 Verify the proper operation ofalarms. the protective devices, using actual 'or E controls, interlocks, and l simulated signals. 1 3.6 Verify isolation valves can be opened against - design J { differential pressure. , j 3.7 Verify setpoint{ ofV"' the LTOP relief valves.P58'INJb, ; E 4.0 DATA R UIRED b e m k e$ QAMt> b Y)9Unff5 4.1 Valve position ' ndications. ' ' T4AA4 YChdi~t.q' th q M Amendment J 14.2-54 i fpril 30,'1992 SM v & <><c44: vee Q 1 U 1
CESSAR Uni"icui:, 4.2 Pump head versus flow. E 4.3 Valve opening and closing times, where required. 4.4 Setpoints of alarms and interlocks. J I 4.5 Setpoints of the LTOP relief valves. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA E 5.1 The Shutdown Cooling System performs as described in Section 5.4.7. f l >g e,a y 9J andennd - m i Amendment J 14.2-55 April 30, 1992
SYS1EM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not latended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 Systemi 30+' submittal.' REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
- (1.5.2)
Relationship of SCS to the Safety Analysis Basis: The SCS pump delivers a flow rate no less than 5000 gpm. ITAAC: ITAAC #1 tests the SCS at its design flow point (5000 gpm). I l i l I 1.5.2 0344-93 __-___.__-__-____-_________2_-__-_-_-_-____-..-____-_.___ _:_- _ .
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l SYSTEM 80+" For refertace purposes only. Not intended ~ to comprise a part of either the ' Der 1 or ' 11er 2 System 80+ abmittal. .j REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLINO SYSTEM
. (1.5.2) {
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.'i Relationshin of SCS to PRA ' . 1 l
- 1) The SCS pumps can be aligned to the IRWST via a valve. j q
- 2) The SCS discharge valves to the RCS are not interlocked on RCS pressure '!
and can be opened when the RCS pressure is less than or equal to the SCS pump shutoff head.
- 3) The SCS pump in each division can perform the functions of the Containment -;
Spray (CS) pump in that division for containment spray operation. ;j
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- 4) The SCS pump in each division can perform the function of the CS pump in that division to provide IRWST inventory cooling. ,
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- 5) The SCS pump motor in each division is powered from one of the two vital Class 1-E 4.16 Kv buses for that division. Each SCS pump derives its _125 VDC control power from the Class 1-E 125 VDC bus associated with the class'. 1 1-E 4.16 Kv bus that provides its motive power. -{
The SCS pump motor in a each division is not powered from the same Class - jl 6) 1-E 4.16 Ky bus as the CS pump motor in that division. t 1
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. . . . . ~.. - t l SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not latended ! to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or
' Tier 2 System 80+ submittal-'
REFERENCE INFO'RMATION FOR SIIUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (1.5.2) ' Relationshin of SCS 'to Shutdown Risk Evaluation The following instrumentation was added to the SCS as a result of the Shutdown Risk N Evaluation: ; SCS pump suction low pressure alarm ! SCS pump discharge low pressure alarm l l SCS pump motor current drop alarm ,
.i' SCS heat exchanger inlet and return line high temperature alarms j q
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I SYSTEM 80+" ' For reference purposes only. Not intended ' ! to comprise a part of either the 11er 1 or -l Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. .- ,
- REFE9ENCC INFORMATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
'(1.5.2) l Relationship of SCS to Severe Accident Manacement ' t The suction of each SCS pump can be aligned to the IRWST.
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SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (1.6.6)
- 1. AmeliMnc Information for CIS See CESSAR-DC Sections 6.2.4 and 3.11
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to CIS '
See CESSAR-DC Sections 14.2.12.1.135 and 14.2.12.1.140. i 1.6.6 03-05-93 , i
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.- SYSTE'M 80+" For reference purposes only. Not latended '!
to compdse a part of either the ' Der 1 or }
'Her 2 System 80+ submittal. ';
REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM -l
- (1.6.6) .!
Relationship of CIS to the Safety Analysis: .] See CESSAR-DC Section 6.2.4.3
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- SYSTEM 80+" - For reference purposes only. Not intended ' o
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Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. ;; . i REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM l
.(1.6.6) y i
Relationship of CIS to PRA
, Containment isolation seals perform as designed.
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P SYSTEM 80+ SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM (1.7.1)
- 1. Amplifyine Information for Plant Protection System See CESSAR-DC Sections 7.1,7.2 and 7.3.
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Annlicable to the PPS a) Response time tests will be performed on PPS equipment from sensors through the logic to the actuation signal outputs. The response time for reactor trip is defined as the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the input to the channel sensor until electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive ' mechanism. The response time for ESF actuation is defined as the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the input to the channel sensor until the output of the actuation relays in the ESF Cabinet change state. Detailed acceptance criteria will be based on the System 80+
Parameter List data input to the CESSAR-DC analyses. Excluded from testing are sensors (Excore Neutron Detector and CEA Position) whose response time is negligible compared to the signal delay time. b) CPC testing to verify it's constants and setpoints will be performed during power ascension testing in accordance with the initial plant startup test plan
- defined in design documents.
l < c) Functional testing and performance testing of the PPS Interface and Test Processor data communications to the Data Processing System, the Discrete ' Indication and Alarm System and the Power Control System will be performed in accordance with initial plant startup test plan to confirm that performance requirements are met. Premperational Tests: CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.26. 1.7.1 03-05-93
F SYSTEM 80+ For reference purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal J REFERENCE INFORMATION IOR PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM (1.7.1) Relationship of PPS to the Safety Anahsis PPS trips used in the Safety Analysis are listed in Chapter 15 of CESSAR-DC. k f 1.7.1 03-05-93
e SYSEM S0+ For reference purposes only. Not intended . to comprise a past of either the Tier 1 or -
~ Tier 2 System 80+ submittal.
' REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR' PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM (1.7.1)
Relationship of PRA to PPS None q T e I
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SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR STATION SERVICE WA'IER SYSTEM (1.9.2.1)
- 1. Amolifyine Information for Station Semice Water System a) Confirmation of the SSWS heat dissipation capacity during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions will be performed as part of the CCWS heat dissipation capacity analysis.
The analysis will demonstrate that only one station service water pump matched with one component cooling water heat exchanger receiving component cooling water flow is required to operate during post design basis accident conditions. The analysis will also demonstrate that each Division of the SSWS matched with one operating CCWS Division has a heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. I
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Anolicable to SSWS See CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.78 i l
I i 1.9.2.1 03-04-93
CESSAR nuiLou
'i 9.2 WATER SYSTEMS I 9.2.1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM E :
-. t The Station Service Water System' (SSWS) is an open system that i takes suction from - the Ultimate . Heat Sink (UHS) and provides >
cooling water to remove heat released by plant . systems, l structures and components. The SSWS returns.the heated, water to the ultimate heat sink. The SSWS cools the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) which in turn cools essential and non-essential reactor auxiliary loads. The SSWS is shown in I Figure 9.2.1-1. ; 9.2.1.1 Design Bases E ; 9.2.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- Safety design bases applicable to the SSWS are as follows:
A. The SSWS, in conjunction with - the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) and ultimate heat sink, is capable of removing
- sufficient heat from the essential heat exchangers to ensure -
a safe reactor shutdown and cooling following a postulated accident coincident with a loss of offsite power.- )
.B. The SSWS is capable of maintaining the component cooling water supply temperature of 120'F or less following the I; !
design basis accident under the most adverse historical - meteorological conditions consistent with the intent of l Regulatory Guide 1.27. s C. A single failure of any component in the SSWS will not ! impair the ability of the SSWS to meet its functional l requirements. L D. Adverse environmental occurrences will not impair the ability of the SSWS to meet its functional requirements. E. The SSWS is designed to detect leakage from the system. F. The SSWS is designed to ' minimize the effects of long-term l corrosion, silt, mud and organic buildup. G. The SSWS is designed to withstand the effects of a Safe ' Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) . l H. Components of the SSWS are capable of being fully tested during normal plant operation. In addition, parts and '3 components shall be accessible for inspection at 2.ny ti;;. , i Amendment I
'9.2-1 December 21. 1990 ,
CESSAR Einhuou t I. All essential SSWS components are fully protected from floods, tornado missile damage, internal missiles, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. J. The system is designed to minimize the potential for water hammer- by providing for adequate filling and high point venting. j 9.2.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis Power generation design bases pertinent to . the SSWS are as ; follows: I A. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS and SCS, is designed to cool the reactor coolant from 350*F to 140*F through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers and the component cooling water heat exchangers. The reactor coolant system can be i cooled to 140'F within 24 hours after reactor shutdown by , first cooling the reactor coolant to 350'F through the steam generators and then cooling to 140'F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and SSWS. The cooling rate of the reactor coolant does not exceed the administrative limit of 75'F/hr. B. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS, is designed to 3 IE provide a maximum cooling water temperature of 120*F to all J components required to operate during a normal shutdown. C. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS, is designed to provide a maximum component cooling water temperature of I + 105'F or less during normal operating modes. D. The SSWS through the CCWS is designed to provide cooling water to the RCPs, letdown heat exchanger, sample heat exchangers,4 non caccntial chilled water condensers, and J other non-essential reactor auxiliary cooling loads. ncrrnal 9.2.1.1.3 Codes and Standards The SSWS and associated components are designed in accordance E with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 44, 45 and 46 and the intent of the Standard Review Plan. Amendment J - 9.2-2 Anril 30, 1992 i
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System Description
}9.2.1.2 l
@The SSWS consists of two separate, ,
redundant, open loop, E- ' safety-related divisions. Each division cools one of. two ; ddivisions of the CCWS, which in turn cools 100% of the
'Csafety-related loads. The SSWS operates at a lower pressure than >
gythe CCWS to prevent contamination of the CCWS with raw water. ' 4- Q o O
, N Each division of the SSWS consists of two pumps, two strainers, 3E two sump pumps, and associated piping, valves, controls and -+~
g k instrumentation. The station service water pumps circulate 5 h ' cooling water to the component cooling water heat exchanger and 037 back to the ultimate heat sink. Provisions are made to ensure a i under normal and accident
- c. 3T continuous flow of cooling water c..,d r.1 room +o %;ly .2gt 4 a O conditions.e Cordrels are . prended ;n %.
"S, stdion serece vdu- 4 tow 4 A companuk c .t.n) g,. y$n 1 Components Description e u:%er S.
]{+=f9.2.1.2.1 t
"- Stable 9.2.1-2 lists component design parameters. Each component l
_S h is also described in the following sections. Table 9.2.1-3 lists [
"73 the active valves for the SSWS. These valves are described in
- i M.Section 9.2.1.2.1.8.
s@' C M (-9.2.1.2.1.1 0 SSWS Pumps , Four identical station service water pumps are provided, two pumps per division. t Each pump provides 100% of the required flow I for post-LOCA conditions.vdjiuring normal operation only one pump ' per division is required to be-operating. The second pump in the respective division will automatically start on a low pump discharge pressure signal. This is indicative of a failure of the operating pump. i The pumps are of the vertical centrifugal type and are installed in the station service water pump structure. -Thcy are inoto11md such t5*t they meet the minimum-r-equired "PS!! ct- thc si;.altausvu. , l oosur-rence of the-UMS-pond d rau-dcun , mcw4 mum pond tenparcture, medmum fler t-brough the ccreens and piping to the pits, cnd i nesurnng-the cafety grcdc ccreens crc 50t clogged. De station service water pump motor coolers receive cooling water trom their i respective station service water pump discharge at all times while the pump is in operation. The pump motors and all other electrical equipment in the pump structure are located above the maximum flood elevation. l The pump motors are connected to their associated 4160 volt Class ; 1E Auxiliary Power System. In the event offsite power is lost, ' the pumps are stopped and restarted in accordance with the diesel I generator's load sequencing. I Amendment I 9.2-4 December 21,.-1990 i
t CESSAR Mancaricu - ' I r i The sizing of the station service water pumps is based on the , following operating mode requirements: E Normal power operation - 1 pump per division operating ! Normal shutdown - 4 pumps operating y (24 hours)
.n a s,wje dwasion Safety-grade shutdown - 2 pumps requiredp i pcr divisica E (36 hours) cr 2 in One di.isicn i feer-recpending . tith the opercting CC" hcot cxchengar) 4 Post-LOCA - 1 pump required, (corresponding with the operating CCW heat b exchanger) : $ +
2 The station service water pumps are provided with at least 7% margin in head at the pump design point. The head versus flow
$ curve is continuously rising from the design point to shut-off. <c The minimum available NPSH is the smaller of (1) 25 percent of, or (2) 10 feet greater than the required NPSH specified by the i pump vendor.
f 9.2.1.2.1.2 SSWS Pump Structure , The pump structure is a Seismic Category I design. . i The UHS inlet to the station service water pumps is equipped with a safety grade screen system (see Section 9.2.1.2.1.4). 9.2.1.2.1.3 Piping, Valves, and Fittings ! Piping to and from the CCW heat exchangers is corrosion resistant. Materials are to be selected on a site-specific basis 1 l to be compatible with the ultimate heat sink makeup water chemistry and water treatment. All safety-related piping, valves, and fittings are supplied in accordance with ASME Code ; Section III, Class 3. All material exposed to the raw water will be tested at t'ypical operating temperatures with similar station service chemistry to evaluate the adequacy of the materials. water lJ The supply and return piping to and from system components in a- { ' division is physically separated from the supply and return liner l E in the redundant division. I bring normal power opemhe os coolin) requirer.Ms increme., he, addib d p e p in et dtvtSten rnay be. needed. Amendment J 9.2-5 April 30, 1992 s
t b F i CESSAR-DC Attachment (Refer to page 9.2-5) . INSERT A: The available NPSH is calculated at the highest expected operating , temperature and flow, at the normal water elevations, and assuming the traveling screens are 50% clogged. The available NPSH exceeds the required NPSH for worst case UHS water elevations for all operation, flow, and temperature conditions. (Note: For worst case . UHS water elevation, the margins previously specified need not apply.) 8 t 7
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l CESSAR1ahuou ! i 9.2.1.2.1.8 Active Valves i: The following valves are required to maintain their functional capability during a safe plant shutdown. The active valves are listed on Table 9.2.1-3. ! i A. Station Service Water Pump Dircharge Check Valves -{ Valves SW-1302, SW-1303, SW-2302, and SW-2303 are required I ; to function during a safe plant shutdown. J B. Station Service Water Strainer Backwash Valves i Valves SW-100, SW-101, SW-102, SW-103, SW-104, SW-10S, ! SW-106, SW-107, SW-108, SW-109, SW-110, SW-111, SW-200, SW-201, SW-202, SW-203, SW-204, SW-205, SW-206, SW-207, SW-208, SW-209, SW-210, and SW-211 are required for a safe unit shutdown. These valves are provided with electric > motor operators. y C. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves , Valves SW-120, SW-121, SW-122, SW-123, SW-220, SW-221,. f SW-222, and SW-223 are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. These valves are provided with electric ; motor operators and can be remotely operated from the control room. ; 9.2.1.2.1.9 Electric Power Supply - SSWS Emergency Power ; Requ ement hrespechse d.v s..ml Safek reded cer'Poneros h' r Chu 17. 6,w.5, y e [ach division of the SSWS receive / power from 4 it : sciated g wissa 1E Auxiliary Poucr System. In the event of loss of offsite . power, this power system is supplied by the emergency diesel ; generators. There are two diesel generators, either of which is capable of supplying power for the operation of one division of , the necessary safety equipment. Division'l essential components are aligned to Emergency Load Centers A or C and Division 2 essential components are aligned to Emergency Load Centers B or D. The emergency load center and channel designation for the SSW l pumps, valves, and controls are .given in Table 9.2.1-4. (Note. , each pump start /stop control is from a different channel.) ; l 1 l l I Amendment J j 9.2-7 April 30, 1992 l
,- = :- --
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CESSARE!a h on l L 9.2.1.2.2.2 Normal Operation ypca\l) i y bdguring normal operation one station service water pump and one I component cooling water heat exchanger per division is- in service. Station service water is supplied to the component cooling water heat exchangers that are in service and receiving , i heat loads from the CCWS. ' 9.2.1.2.2.3 Unit Shutdown Both divisions of the SSWS (four station service water pumps and { four component cooling water heat exchangers) are required to accomplish a normal reactor shutdown, that is, a reactor coolant ; temperature of 140*F in 24 hours. Although a normal reactor ' shutdown is accomplished by operation of both SSWS divisions, shutdown and cooldown over 36 hours is possible with use of a i a single division. 9.2.1.2.2.4 Refueling Operations - Both divisions of the SSWS (four statien service water pumps and four component cooling water heat exchangers) are required to be ? in service during refueling. ' I i 9.2.1.2.2.5 Emergency Operation ! One station service water pump and corresponding component . cooling water heat exchanger is required to operate during f 1 post-LOCA. The SSWS will operate for the required nominal 30 ' days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup '! water to the UHS and without requiring any blowdown (that is, ; from non-open heat sinks such as a cooling pond) for salinity control. Provisions for non-essential makeup water and blowdown are discussed in Section 9.2.5. 9.2.1.2.2.6 Loss of Offsite Power A loss of offsite power results in the shutdown and restarting of the station service water pumps in accordance with the diesel generator load sequencing. 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation .1 Safety evaluations, bases, are as follows:numbered to conform to the safety design l 1 Amendment I 9.2-9 December 21, 1990 _, ._z_ _._ _ . . _ , . . _ ,
CESSAR1Enncyew [ i
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TABLE 9.2.1-4 (Cont'd) (Sheet 3 of 3) STATION SERVICE WATER-SYSTEM EMERGENCY POWER REQUIREMENTS- '! Station Service Water System Controls Controls Emergency channel Station Service Water Pump 1A A_ Start /Stop- ' Station Service Water Pump 1B C Start /Stop j i Station Service' Water Pump 2A B I Start /Stop_ l Station Service Water Pump 2B D Start /Stop j i Skion 6ervice, oker brotoc( c
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. . . _ - _.. _= . _ 1 i SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not' intended
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- to comprise a part of either the 'Iler 1 or '
Tier 2 System 804 submittal. i REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR STATION SERVICE WATER' SYSTEM (1.9.2.1) ' 1 i Relationship of SSWS to the Safety Analysis .: The Safety Analysis assumes that'the SSWS removes the heat loads from the CCWS' heat exchangers. ; I
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t SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not latended . t to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or i
'Iler 2 System 80+ submittal.
REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM l
- (1.9.2.1)
-i Relationship of PRA to SSWS' :
- 1) Each SSWS division has two Station Service Water pumps per Division. j t
- 2) The SSWS is precluded from entering th'e Nucicar Island. -
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.i 1.9.2.1 0344-93 ~ j
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SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (1.9.2.2)
- 1. Amotifyinc Information for Component Cooline Water System a) Confirmation of the CCWS heat dissipation capacity during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions will be performed. An analysis will be-performed based on the as built CCWS serviced components and measured flow rates.
The analysis will be based on the following: i
- 1) CCWS flow to cooled components for each plant mode
- 2) SSWS flow to each component cooling water heat exchanger
- 3) Design basis station service water inlet temperature
- 4) Vendor heat exchanger data The analysis will demonstrate that only one component cooling water pump matched with one component cooling water heat exchanger is required to operate during post-accident conditions. The analysis will also demonstrate that each Divicion has a heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
b) Confirmation of adequate pump NPSH will include testing and analysis with the ; following conditions:
- 1) Component cooling water surge tank and component cooling water pump locations and elevations.
- 2) Component cooling water surge tank water level at a minimum value with measured isolation valve closure times for cooling loops composed of non-ASME code component cooling water piping.
- 3) Maximum design basis component cooling water temperature.
- 4) Pressure losses for pump inlet piping and components.
- 5) Both component cooling water pumps operating in a single Divisions The calculated minimum available NPSH shall exceed NPSH required by the vendor for each CCWS pump.
1.9.2.2 03-04-93
SYSTEM 80+" i SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (1.9.2.2) L c) Testing of Class IE power availability to CCWS components will include confirmation of the following:
- 1) Within a Division, one component cooling water pump motor is powered from ,
one Class 1E bus in that Division and the other component cooling water - pump motor is powered from the other Class 1E bus in that Division.
- 2) Component cooling water pump control circuits of the two component cooling pumps in a Division are powered from separate Class IE buses. The component cooling water pump control circuit and pump motor for a specific pump are powered from the same Class 1E bus.
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to CCWS ITAAC See CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.79 6
1.9.2.2 03-04-93
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CESSAR nainema I (' l l 9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM i The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is shown in Figure y , 9.2.2-1. Table 9.2.2-3 lists the essential and non-essential nuclear component heat loads for the CCWS. { 9.2.2.1 Design Bases 9.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases Safety design bases applicable to the CCWS are as follows: E l A. The CCWS, in conjunction with the Station Service Water I System (SSWS) and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), is capable i of removing sufficient heat from the essential heat exchangers to ensure a safe reactor shutdown and cooling 1 [ following a postulated accident coincident with a loss of offsite power. B. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is capable of ; maintaining the outlet temperature of the component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger within the limits of 65'F and ; 120*F during a design basis accident with loss of offsite , power. i C. A single failure of any component in the CCWS will not E impair the ability of the CCWS to meet its functional . requirements. j D. Adverse environmental occurrences will not impair the ' ability of the CCWS to meet its functional requirements. , E. The CCWS is designed to detect leakage of radioactive water ! into the CCWS and to detect loss of component cooling water ' volume. F. The essential cooling loop piping and components are ; designed in accordance with ANGT- Safety Class 3 requirements. Containment isolation valves and containment J ; penetration piping are designed in accordance with 7.N S I-- ! Safety Class 2 requirements. G. The CCWS is designed to withstand the effects of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). E i H. Components of the CCWS are capable of being fully tested ' during normal plant operation. In addition, parts and components are accessible for inspection at any tina. i Amendment J 9.2-19 April 30, 1992 - F
CESSAR !! abo : i I. There will be no flow degradation to safety components-if , the non-essential and the spent fuel pool headers fail to ' isolate when required. i J. All essential CCWS components are fully protected from [ floods, tornado missile damage, internal missiles,- pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement, and interaction with non-seismic systems in the vicinity. K. The system is designed to minimize the potential for water .! hammer by providing for adequate filling and high ' point ' venting. '
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The CCWS is a closed loop cooling water system which cools I components and heat exchangers located in the Nuclear Island. l Heat transferred by these components to the CCWS is rejected to- ; the SSWS via the CCW heat exchangers. 9.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis I ; Power generation design bases pertinent to the CCWS are as follows: A. The CCWS, in conjunction with the Shutdown Cooling System i (SCS) and SSWS, is designed to cool the reactor coolant from 350*F to 140*F through the shutdown cooling and component cooling water heat exchangers. The reactor coolant - can be cooled to 140*F within 24 hours after reactor shutdown by , first cooling the reactor coolant to 350*F through the steam ' generators and then cooling to 14 0
- F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and.SSWS. The cooling rate of i the reactor coolant will not exceed the administrative limit of 75'F/hr. E i
B. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to ! provide a maximum cooling water temperature of 120*F to all y components required to operate during a normal shutdown. 3 C. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to E , provide cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps, letdown heat exchanger, sample heat exchangers, non csscatial y
-+ chilled . water condensers, and other non-essential. reactor auxiliary cooling loads.
normal i D. The CCWS is designed to accommodate a thermal' expansion from 65'F to 150*F. I E. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to provide component cooling water temperature of 105'F or less during normal operating modes. t Amendment J ; 9.2-20 April 30,-1992
CESSAR Minncum j r J F. The CCWS provides protection against station service water i leakage into the reactor coolant system. G. The CCWS provides protection against release of radiological contamination into the environment via the UHS. H. The CCWS is designed to minimize the effects of long-term ; Corrosion. 9.2.2.1.3 Codes and Standards 'I E . The CCWS and associated components are designed in accordance I with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms with : General Design Criteria 2,-4, 5, 44, 45, and 46, and the intent , of the Standard Review Plan. 9.2.2.1.4 Interface Requirements The Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Structure is an ; out of scope item which shall be provided by the_ applicant. The licensee shall verify that the following. int requirements are met to ensure adequacy with the System 80+gace Standard Design: ( A. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure shall meet Seismic Category I requirements. . B. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure.shall withstand the effects _ of the following' events: y
- 1. Natural phenomena, including SSE, floods, tornados,_and- .
hurr,icanccc. ; humcaces
- 2. Externally and internally generated missiles. .
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- 3. Fire and sabotage. l C. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure shall be located to ;
minimize the amount of SSWS piping and equipment surfaces j ^ exposed to the corrosion and fouling effects of the service water. An evaluation shall be performed to select the i preferred location based on site specific conditions. D. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure shall provide physical i barriers to maintain divisional separation of CCWS i components. I l E. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure. shall provide j compartmentalization of the heat exchangers such that .; I service water leaks and spills can be kept out of floor j
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drains which are processed through the Liquid Waste l Management System. R Amendment J 9.2-21 April-30, 1992 1
CESSAR !ancmo,, ; t Nech i5 (~emcVe.c fe m NE. CM b ovJ o hcdjon MCVice. ( Wcder 4brop ee. duk side. of Ae conponent coonn3 mgf. O e.Oany.
- 6. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System shall be controlled from the main control room. ,
Instrumentation and controls shall be provided in i accordance with ANSI /ANS 59.2. ! The CCW heat exchangers are also out of scope items. A reference J , horizontal shell and tube heat exchanger is discussed in - the ' following sections, however a plate type heat exchanger may _ be , substituted. Sites selecting the plate type heat exchanger shall : provide strainer protection against debris or arrangements which allow backflushing on the service water side. 9.2.2.2 System Description The CCWS consists of two separate, independent, redundant, closed loop, safety related divisions. Either division of the CCWS is capable of supporting 100% of the cooling functions required for a safe reactor shutdown. Wcder _ coelh3 one component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with 4 operating SSWS division) is required to operate during post-LOCA. Cooling + to the spent fuel poo1# heat exchanger (s) and the non-essential * +eep-is isolated on a SIAS. If these headers fail , to isolate, the idle component cooling water pump in- the respective loop will automatically start on a low pump : differential pressure signal. This assures that there is no flow y , degradation to the essential components. hader(.s)
> The CCWS operates at a higher pressure than the SSWS)( This
--) pr cycnt.5 the leakage of station service water into the CCWS in ,
the event of a CCW heat exchanger tube leak. 4Ws pravanhrg ' Each division of the CCWS includes two heat exchangers, a surge : tank, two component cooling water pumps, a chemical addition ' tank, a component cooling water radiation monitor, two sump pumps, a component cooling water heat exchanger structure sump : pump, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. No cross t connections between the two divisions exist.
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Each division onsists an ess ntial an non-essen al coolin loo . The e sential ops are composed f ANSI Sa ety Class ! pi ing and omponents The n -essenti 1 loops a composed of > n-nuclea safety ping an compone s, with te exceptio of he conta ment iso ation va ves and netration iping whi are ANSI Safer)ty Class . A i pg g AND ADD M W b Amendment J 9.2-23 April 30, 1992
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f CESSAR-DC Attachment (Refer to page 9.2-23) , INSERT A The CCWS provides cooling water to the _ essential components and non-essential components listed in_Section 9.2.2.2.2. Essential components are supplied' component cooling water by means of Safety Class 3 cooling loops. Non-essential components are supplied component cooling water by means of non-nuclear safety class cooling loops with the exception of the charging pump miniflow heat exchangers and the charging pump motor coolers which are supplied component cooling water by means of Safety Class 3 cooling loops.
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Containment isolation valves and penetration piping are designed in ; accordance with Safety Class 2 requirements. i i t 4 9 0 t r
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1 i CESSAR 8!aincuion l i headers The non-essential hcct icadc and the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers$ .ith the exception of the RC" hcct icadsy are i isolated frcr the cccential iccdc automatically on an SIAS. The J , non-essential hcct iccds the RCP h 10cdr isolate on a ; low-low surg tjnk level * (and h bect
%ded e C WS rM id s co ling ' ater t the ssenti 1 comp nents a d !
on- ssen ial c mpon nts isted 'n Sec ion 9. .2.2.2 Heat is N emo ed rom he S b the low f sta ion se vice w er I '! y thr ugh the ube side of th comp nent ooling , water eat l ex ang rs. ' d i
$ Makeup water to the CCWS is normally supplied by the l Demineralized Water Makeup System, described in Section 9.2.3. !
If the Demineralized Water Makeup System is unavailable, such as J during an accident, a backup makeup water line of Seismic Category I construction is provided. This essential safety-related makeup water source is from the Station Service I Water System (SSWS). A removable spool piece is placed in this line to prevent inadvertent addition of station service water. t Surge tanks, one per division, are connected to the suction piping of the component cooling watar pumps. ThesurgetanksarelJ
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located at the system's high point to facilitate venting andly filling. System leakage is replaced with water from thei Demineralized Water Makeup System. Both of the makeup water lJ , supplies, sumo and demineralized water, are integrated andgy , A- recorded. An assured Seismic Category +i makeup source, which ist i not utilized during normal operation, is available to each surge tank from the corresponding division of the Station Service Water lJ . System. I : The CCWS serves as an intermediate cooling water system between the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the SSWS. A radiation ; monitor is provided at the outlet of the component cooling water I pumps to detect any radioactive leakage into the CCWS. Thisp ! monitor is indicated and alarmed in the control room. The wetted surfaces in the CCWS are of materials compatible with , the cooling water chemistry. The major portion' of the CCWS is I constructed with carbon steel. The system water chemistry is i controlled for the prevention of long term corrosion. Organic l fouling and inorganic buildups are controlled by proper water ; treatment. The use of demineralized water and corrosion ! inhibitors will minimize these problems. f f Amendment J } 9.2-24 April 30, 1992 l
CESSAR !annemox 9.2.2.2.1.1 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers , L Four component cooling water heat exchangers are provided, two per division, to handle the essential and non-essential cooling ! requirements. The heat exchangers are sized to provide cooling I . water at no greater than 105'F during normal operation and at no i greater than 120*F during shutdown or post-LOCA operating modes. Each operational mode requires a different alignment of component ! cooling water heat exchangers. These requirements are listed i below: Normal Power Operation - 1 HX per division ' Normal shutdown (24 hours) - all 4 HXs Safety grade shutdown (36 hours) - 2 HXs required , i pcr division er - 4-in a single division (this errenger.cnt is dependent upon fina1- I hcot exchonger cizi:;g) Post-LOCA - 1 HX in either division
- E !
' % is g vvides en instslied sparc fcr all Opersting -cdes, ucept g for nor=ci chut4ewn Occling. , The component cooling water heat exchangers are horizontal, single pass, fixed tubesheet, counterflow heat exchangers with I straight tubes. Heat is transferred from the component cooling water to tne station service water through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Although a horizontal heat exchanger with straight tubes is specified for this design, specific stations can replace these heat exchangers with a plate type. Station service water flows through the tube side of the component cooling water heat exchangers to facilitate their cleaning and maintenance. Adequate tube pull space is provided. J The tube side is operated at a lower pressure than the shellside as noted in Section 9.2.2.2. The shell side carries the component cooling water. This closed loop shell side water is initially supplied with demineralized water from the Demineralizea Water Makeup System (Section 9.2.3). The heat exchanger fouling factors are based and documented for . each heat exchanger in accordance with TEMA (Tubular Exchanger y Manufacturers Association) standards and the system water chemistry. An appropriate margin in heat exchanger area is provided to allow for tube plugging. bring nemal power cperdien as cochru3 er quirmf1 Amendment J
)'Cout, % add April 30, 1992 .a a ainsi.- g@mQM ga.)exh"$72-26
CESSAR annnemo,. E M e-The maximum flow velocity for nominal flow e conditions in the tubes is in accordance with Heat Rchanga Institute (HEI) ! standards for power plant heat exchangers. The tube velocity for I 7 nominal flow conditions is not less than 3 ft./second. The component cooling water heat exchanger tube and tubesheet materials are selected on a site specific basis to be compatible with the site Ultimate Heat Sink makeup water. chemistry and water y treatment.
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The material selected for the component cooling water heat exchanger tubes exposed to service .ater w in a fresh water I environment with a maximum chloride concentration of less than , 200 ppm and less than 500 ppm is Type 304L stainless steel and , Type 316L stainless steel, respectively. An alternative material with improved corrosion resistance may be specified. i For component cooling water heat exchanger tubes in a servicel water environment of salt or brackish water, titanium or AL-6XN y stainless steel is specified. The component cooling water heat exchanger tubesheet materials ; are specified as follows: A. For 304L stainless steel tubes: 304L stainless-clad carbon steel or solid stainless steel tube sheets. I i B. For 316L stainless steel tubes: 316L stainless-clad carbon steel or solid stainless steel tube sheets. i C. For AL-6XN stainless steel tubes: solid 304L or 316L stainless steel tube sheets. ! D. For titanium tubes: solid titanium tube sheets are - preferable, however, solid 304L stainless steel or solid i 316L stainless steel tube sheets can be specified. ! J' { ( Amendment J ; 9.2-27 April 3 0, 1992 ' i
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CESSAR Ennnemon 1 1 Mnum} darY cind dop ac.ludion of 4k componcrd cooling Wcde,- ded h h c.nbl caom +a oemde oubAc. gpg 9.2.2.2.1.2 haponent 1 C Cooling Water Pumps Four identical component cooling water pumps are provided, two nucos ner division. #,dguring normal operationf only one pump per division is required te be in service. If cooling water flow requirements exceed the capacity of this one pump, the second pump in the same loop will automatically start on a low pump I differential pressure signal. This signal can be an indication of either a failure of the running pump or an increase in cooling . l l water flow requirements. A component cooling water pump high differential pressure signal opens the containment spray heat exchanger isolation valve associated with that division. This assures a minimum flow path for the component cooling water pump. Pump sizing is based on the following:
- 1 pump in each division E Normal power operation l
- 4 pumps J l Normal shutdown (24 hours)
Safety-grade shutdown (36 hours) - 2 pumps required ( g I i peruli'/icicn -er-
-E-in a single division
-(entched with-eperet4cg
-heat-exchangercF Post-LOCA - 1 pump required I (matched with operating heat exchanger) s
' This-prov-ides-an-insta44ed-spare-for- all operating-eede; cxcept E normal shutdcwa cooling.- The pumps are of a double suction centrifugal design with a Mechanical horizontally split casing for ease of maintenance.The component cooling seals are provided to minimize leakage. water surge tank is located at a higher elevation than the component cooling water pumps. This will ensure flooded suction y and maintain a constant pressure at the suction side of the pump. Each CCW pump motor is connected to a separate Class 1E E=ergency Load Center. In the event offsite power is lost, the pumps are stopped and restarted in accordance with the diesel generators' load sequencing. The component cooling water pumps are provided with at least a 7 percent margin in head at the pump design point. The head versus flow curve is continuously rising from the design point to shut-off. recuiremeMr increctse_ , 300ng notr<nl pcWer epwatico 4s ccoling ne additional punp in cx dtVttien my be needed Amendment 9.2-28 April 30, J 1992
CESSARnaiL0s i f 1-se, valves con k manually CPed d CN bom b ; cordrol reo rn. A. Non-Essential Supply Header Isolation Valves ' Valves CC-102, CC-122, CC-202, and CC-222 are pneumatically lJ controlled valves that fail closed on loss of instrument ' air. These valves close to terminate component cooling I water flow to the non-essential equipment in the event of an accident. These valves automatically close on an SIAS or y low-low component cooling water surge tank leveh The valve y3 ,\ closure times are adequate to prevent complete loss of surge tank volume due to a break in the non-safety piping.+ 7 , B. Non-Essential Return Header Isolation Valves Valves CC-103, CC-123, CC-203, and CC-223 isolate thelJ non-essential return headers from the essential return-headers in the event of an accident. These valves are I pneumatically controlled and fail closed on loss of instrument air. They automatically close on+SIAS or low-low lJ > component cooling water surce tank leveh The valve closure Yg times are adequate to prevent complete loss of surge tank I volume due to a break in the non-safety piping. 4 ; C. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Control Valves [ Valves CC-110 and CC-210 provide a constant component y cooling water flow of 11,000 gpm to their respective heat exchangers. The valves are pneumatically controlled and fail open on loss of instrument air. These valves are ; provided with travel stops to restrict maximum flow. i D. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Isolation Valves Valves CC-111 and CC-211 provide component cooling water ' flow isolation for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. These valves are provided with electric motor operators and can be manually opened and closed from the control room. E. Spent Fuel Pool Co'oling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Isolation Valves Va.lves CC-113 and CC-213 close to terminate component cooling water flow to the spent fuel pool cooling heat y exchangers in the event of an accident. These valves are provided with electric motor operators and automatically close on SIAS. A manual Ovc.ridc is providcd ir. th; centrol ruem .a v th6; fiv. wu Lu t uus Labilaited , ia e a t. load y to the Scat cxchon cr; durin a do;ign basis pernitting e c -id cr.t . %se vahms cm ,ba eneuc q open,) M close) 6, N. I c n. A ri$adsip basis qui , 46, ce 6 reeMllskJ Q l**
% par,NHirv3volves c o n b enoe. ~Jiy ee.neA m ,J clo rw m .
- h. con 6) ro. n.
Amendment J 9.2-31 April 30, 1992
1 CESSARnui6ou F. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Control l Valves Valves CC-112 and CC-212 provide constant flow to their respective heat exchangers. These valves are pneumatically controlled and fail open on loss of instrument air. Travel stops are provided to restrict the maximum flow.- G. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers 1 and 2 Isolation Valves Valves CC-114 and CC-214 provide component cooling water flow isolation for the containment spray heat exchangers. These valves are orovided with electric motor operators. a-J These valves open automatically on*high component cooling water pump differential pressures CCAC, cr cen he cpened metmelly frca th; control rcom. Siyal or *a o CS AS. 'Tkse. valses can be mam. lly opensd and closed bn N. c.dren ree. ' H. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B Bypass Control Valves I Valves CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201 regulate the : component cooling water heat exchanger bypass flow. These ' valves modulate the component cooling water bypass flow to maintain a relatively constant component cooling water i outlet temperature. The service water flow remains constant. These valves are pneumatically operated and are required to fail closed. These valves automatically close on an SIAS. I. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves Valves CC-106, CC-107, CC-108, CC-109, CC-206, CC-207, CC-208, and CC-209 are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. These valves arc provided with electric motor operators and can be remotely operated from the control room. J. Component Cooling Water Pump Discharge Check Valves , Valves CC-1302, CC-1303, CC-2302, and CC-2303 are required to function during a safe plant-shutdown. In the event that one of the pumps ceases to produce flow and pressure head, J these valves prevent flow reversal through the nonoperating pump. K. Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Vacuum Breakers I The CCWS surge tank vacuum breakers are required to function during a safe plant shutdown. Amendment J 9,2-32 April 30, 1992
CESSAR 88Lmn s ( L. Containment Isolation Valves , The following containment isolation valves close upon , receipt of a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS): Supply to the letdown heat exchanger: CC-240, CC-241 Return from the letdo-n heat exchanger: CC-242, CC-243 J The following containment isolation valves are automatically i closed on a low-low CCW surge tank level: CC-130, CC-131 - Supply to reactor coolant pumps 1A and IB I CC-230, CC-231 - Supply to reactor coolant pumps 2A and 2B CC-136, CC-137 - Return from reactor coolant pumps 1A and 1B CC-236, CC-237 - Return from reactor coolant pumps 2A . and 2B These valves can be manually opened or closed from the control room should leakage be detected. j M. Cheuical and '701unc Ocntrol Oysten (CVOC) Cupply ::cader ! Iscletica V;1vcc- , Valvcs CC 100 and CC 200 providc ccaponcnt cooling water , flew icc12tien for thc CVCC Cupply ::cadcrs ( i . c. . , supply ;c J the Charging Pump Motcr Occ1cr and Charging Pump Miniflow ;
!! cat Cxch ngcr in division 1 and to th c. Charging T-y Mwivr '
Ccc1cr and Chcrging Pump Minific; !! cat Cxchanger in divisien 2, rccpectively). Thcsc valvcc arc providcd with clecti-ic . meter oper terc and ccr he .cnually Opened and c it.,c cd frca j th; centrci rccm. th )[. f- CCWS Emergency Power Requirements Electric Power Supp
&% rekked c.ompme or e ach division of the CCWS receives power from it: cccccicted {
--+[4,100 volt Olsss 1E Auxilisry Power Systen. In the event of !
loss of. offsite power, the Auxiliary Power System is I ' supplied by the diesel generators. There are two diesel generators, either of which is capable of ' supplying 100% , power for the operation of one division of the necessary l safety equipment. Division 1 essential components are (- '- aligned to Emergency Load Centers A or C and Division 2 essential components are aligned to Emergency Load Centers B l or D.
--Mew re,spc.hn, clivisieml Chss 1E hsses wifb Amendment J k =>cephen of coAmmed 9.2 April 30, 1992 tzlabe n vatves W anecidal co& meed iseIdion va\wc_ 'insterM% W OS.
1 __ , . . _ . , .. _ _ , , _ , , . . . , . ~
CESSAR EHMemon The Emergency Load Center and channel designation for the CCW pumps, valves, and controls are given in Table 9.2.2-6'. (Note: Each pump start /stop control is from a different channel.) 9.2.2.2.2 System Operation and Control 7 The CCWS has two 100% capacity divisions, each. with 100% redundancy of safety related components. Each division is connected to its corresponding SSWS division through the component cooling water heat exchanger. The component cooling water heat exchangers serve as a pressure-thermal barrier between the SSWS and CCWS. Each division has a 100% heat dissipation capacity to obtain-safe cold shutdown. Heat is transferred from the shell side to the tube side of the CCW heat exchanger and lJ dissipated by the SSWS to the UHS. I At least one CCW pump is operational in each division for all operating modes. If cooling requirements exceed the capacity of one CCW pump, the second pump in that division will automatically start on a low pump differential pressure signal. This signal is indicative of a failure of the running pump or an increase in cooling water flow requirements. The cutict temperature of the component cooling water leaving each component cooling water heat exchanger is regulated by the component cooling water heat exchanger bypass control valve (CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201) . As the temperature of the component cooling water leaving the heat exchanger rises, the , bypass valve closes which allows more component cooling water to : flow through the heat exchanger and be cooled. The CCWS is ! designed to maintain a relatively constant component cooling : water supply temperature to its heat loads. 7 F Each - division of the CCWS provides cooling for the . following , redundant safety related components. A. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers (2 total, 1 per. division) . i B. Shutdown cooling mini-flow heat exchangers (2 total, 1 per division). C. Safety injection pump motor coolers (4 total, 2 per , division). l D. Containment spray heat exchangers (2 total, 1 per division). , E. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers (2 total, 1 per ; division). t 5 Amendment J 9.2-34 April 30,1992 e h
- . m-- 4-wwe
CESSAR 8Hibiou H. Sample heat exchangers (14 total, serviced by division 2 - 8 ' Primary. Sample Heat Exchangers and 6 Steam Generator Primary Sample Heat Exchangers). ; I. Gas stripper (1 total, serviced by division 2).
~
J. Boric acid concentrator (1 total, serviced by division 2).. NormM l K. "on ;;;cntial chilled water condensers (4 total, 2 per ' division) l L. Charging pump motor coolers (2 total, 1 per division). M. Instrument air compressor (4 total, 2 per division). 9.2.2.2.2.1 Unit Startup CcW I- , Typically during a unit startup, cooling water is supplied to all equipment except for the containment spray heat exchangers and y possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. This ; requires the use of both divisions of the component cooling water system, two+ce4cnent cooling heat exchangers, and four component -> ccoling pumps. Certain components will not be in service at all y times therefore allowing for a reduction in CCWS load. ccw ' 9.2.2.2.2.2 Normal Operation Generally during normal operation, one CCW pump and one CCW heat exchanger (matched with operating pump) is required in each division. As the cooling requirements increase, additional system equipment may be needed. Cooling flow is supplied to all y _; components except the containment spray heat exchangers, the , shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. The CCWS temperature is maintained at no greater than 105'F. j 9.2.2.2.2.3 Unit Shutdown Both divisions of the CCWS (4 heat exchangers and 4 ' pumps) are required to accomplish a normal ~ reactor shutdown, that is to cool the reactor coolant from normal operating temperature to 140
- F within 24 hours of reactor shutdown. A normal reactor shutdown I a entails cooling the reactor coolant to 350*F through the -steam generators and then cooling to 140*F by utilizing both divisions of the SCS, CCWS, and SSWS. Cooling water flow to the shutdown ,
cooling heat exchangers is manually aligned from the control room i Amendment J ! 9.2-36 April 30,-1992 i _ _ ~ _ . _ _ , ..,s _ _ . ,
CESSAR Ea!% mon ( , for normal or safety grade shutdown. The CCWS, in conjunction I with the SSWS, is designed to provide a maximum cooling water temperature of 120'F to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers 7 during normal shutdown. Typically, during initial shutdown cooling, cooling water is J supplied to all components except the containment spray heat exchangers and the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers. , However, during final shutdown cooling, cooling water is supplied to all components except the containment spray heat exchangers and possibly one spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger. 9.2.2.2.2.4 Refueling Operations I With both divisions of the CCWS supplying cooling water, (i.e., four CCW pumps and four CCW heat exchangers) , the RCS will' be at lJ 120*F, refueling temperature, at 96 hours after reactor shutdown. The component cooling water temperature will peak at 120'F at the I initiation of shutdown and decreases to 105'F prior to refueling. Component cooling water flow is supplied to all components other y than the containment spray heat exchangers. The heat load on the shutdown cooling heat exchanger is from the reactor decay heat. Both divisions of the CCWS are required to maintain the spent fuel pool bulk water temperature at or below 120'F. This I requires that both spent fuel pool heat exchangers are supplied , with component cooling water at the design flow rate. 9.2.2.2.2.5 Emergency Operation , headers The non-essential supply and return header isolation valves, CC-102, CC-103, CC-122, CC-123, CC-202, CC-203, CC-222, and CC-223 isolate component cooling water flow to the non-essential J
->cquip;;r.t on a SIAS or low-low component cooling water surge tank ,
I level. T.- siged The isalation valves to the RCP supply and return headers isolate on a low-low component cooling water surge tank level. t_._ signal I only one component cooling water pump and heat exchanger (matched with operating pump) is required to operate during post-LOCA. j Cooling + to the spent fuel pool. cooling heat exchangers is i automatically isolated on a SIAS by valves CC-113 and CC-213. operator action is required to reestablish flow to the spent fuel y pool cooling heat exchangers, j Water l Amendment J l 9.2-37 April 30, 1992
CESSAR !ali"icuiou l l l r E C. The CCWS is composed of two physically separate, l which independent, full-capacity divisions each of is g 7 powered from separate Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems and I i separate diesel generators. This ensures that a single j failure does not impair the system's effectiveness. Refer ! to Table 9.2.2-2 for the single failure analysis. E , D. Components of the CCWS are installed in buildings that protect against adverse environmental conditions. E. Leakage into or out of the CCWS is detected by the surge l tank high, low, and low-low level alarms in the control I room. Radiation monitors indicate leakage of radioactive fluids into the CCWS. Also, grab samples are utilized as a ; means of detecting leakage into the CCWS.
'Ee, J
- F. -T-h+s-statement in Section 9.2.2.1.1 is self explanatory.
G. The essential portions of the CCWS are Seismic Category I. H. Components of the CCWS are capable of being fully tested I during normal operation since one pump from each division is operating at full flow conditions. ASME Code Section XI, in . service pump tests may be satisfactory performed without . violation of Technical Specifications. ; I. Automatic start of the CCW pumps on a low CCW pump : differential pressure signal ensures that flow degradation l J g to the safety related components is prevented. This j situation could occur if the non-essential and spent fuel ; pool heat exchanger isolation valves fail to close during a' ~ Design Basis Accident (DBA). This ensures adequate flow to the essential components when required. I J. Components of the CCWS are located such that flooding, tornado missile damage, internal missile, pipe breaks and whip, jet impingement and interaction with non-seismic . i systems from any- source would not impair the system's functional requirements. The two divisions of the CCWS are physically separated and are routed such as to be protected ! from the above mentioned sources. , K. To prevent damage to components and piping, the system.is ! i designed to minimize the potential for water hammer - by providing adequate filling and high point venting. i i i Amendment J , 9.2-40 April 30, 1992 4 ._.--_.-------------------i_-_L. ' ' * "~ "'f
- 4
' ~ ~ ' ~
- CESSAR inWICATION i
- 16. Component cooling water pump motor coolers 1A, 1B, 2A, . y and 2B inlet and outlet pressures. i
- 17. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 inlet and 7 ,
outlet pressures.
- 18. Charging pump mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet y and outlet pressures.
- 19. Charging pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures.
J
- 20. Instrument air compressor 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B inlet and outlet pressures. 'l' tlorrnd
- 21. L u-cauuuLial chilled water condensers 1A, 1B, 2A, and I
2B inlet and outlet pressures. ,
- 22. Emergency feedwater pump motor coolers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures. g
- 23. Spent fuel pool cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 J inlet and outlet pressures. i
- 24. Containment spray heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and -
outlet pressures. 7 ;
- 25. Containment spray mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 ,
inlet and outlet pressures. l
- 26. Shutdown cooling mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 inlet and outlet pressures. ,
l
- 27. Sample heat exchangers (each) inlet' and outlet J pressures. ,
D. Controls - Component Cooling Water Pump Differential Pressure 7 i When a low. CCW pump differential pressure signal is t actuated, the idle pump in that- division automatically . starts. This signal is indicative of a failure of the ! operating pump or an increase in cooling water flow requirements. A component cooling water pump high differential pressure-signal opens the containment spray heat exchanger isolation ; valve associated with that. division. This provides. a minimum flow path for the component cooling water pump. I J Amendment J' 9.2-44' April 30, 1992 ;
CESSAR !aMemot : ( ,
- 12. Instrument air compressor 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B outlet temperatures. y ,
Norm \
- 13. Non cascr.tial chilled water condensers 1A, IB, 2A, and -j 2B outlet temperatures. ;
E. Controls i
- 1. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet I Temperature Component cooling water heat exchanger bypass control' valves, CC-100, CC-101, CC-200, and CC-201, are i' modulated to maintain a 95*F minimum heat exchanger outlet temperature. !
- 2. Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control !
-i Letdown heat exchanger valve, CC-244, is modulated to I control the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature on the CVCS side.
- 3. Charging Pump Mini-Flow Heat Exchanger Temperature Control y Charging pump mini-flow heat exchanger control valves, !
CC-145 and' CC-245, are modulated. to control outlet temperature of the CVCS side of the heat exchanger. , E. Alarms Component cooling water heat. exchanger high and low outlet temperature is alarmed in the control room. l 9.2.2.5.3 Plow ' A. Local Indication I ' Local indication is provided for the following process flow parameters:
- 1. Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers 1 and.2 outlet flows. -
- 2. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2~ outlet flows.
7
- 3. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
r Amendment J ! 9.2-47 April 30, 1992.
. _ . , . . . . . . . _ . . ~ . . ,~ . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . . . . - _ _
CESSAR Ennneme,. (
- 22. Diesel generator engine jacket water cooler 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 23. Diesel generator engine starting air af tercoolers .1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B outlet flows.
y
- 24. Component cooling water pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows.
- 25. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 outlet l' flows.
26. Charging flow. pump mini-flow heat exchangers 1 and 2 outlet lJ
- 27. Charging pump motor coolers 1 and 2 outlet flows. I
- 28. Instrument air compressor 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B outlet '
flows. J Nomu\ '
- 29. Nca cascntial chilled water condensers 1A, 1B, 2A and
- 2B outlet flows. i
( 30. Makeup water to surge tanks 1 and 2 inlet flows. I B. Control Room Indication Control room indication is provided for component cooling heat exchangers 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B outlet flows and component cooling water pumps 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B discharge J flows. C. Test points I Flow test points are provided for the component water heat exchangers 1A, 18, 2A, and 2B outlet flows.cooling lJ D. Controls The following essential heat exchangers have control valves I that modulate their outlet flow.
- 1. Spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2: i CC-112 and CC-212.
- 2. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers 1 and 2: CC-110 and CC-210. ,
l Amendment J 9.2-49 April 30, 1992
CESSARnn%ma {
- 16. Diesel generator engine starting air aftercoolers 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B low outlet flows.
- 17. Component cooling water pump motor coolers 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B low outlet flows.
- 18. Essential chilled water condensers 1 and 2 low outlet flows. I.
- 19. Charging pump motor coolers 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
- 20. Instrument air compressor 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B low outlet flows.
Norm
- 21. "on ccscntici chilled water condensers 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B low outlet flows. J
- 22. Component cooling water heat exchangers 1A, 1B, 2A, and ,
2B low and high outlet flows.
- 23. Component cooling water pumps 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B low and high outlet flows. -
- 24. Component cooling water radiation monitors 1 and 2 low outlet flows.
9.2.2.5.4 Level
'A. Component Cooling Water Surge Tank Level I Level indication is provided in the control room for component cooling water surge tanks 1 and 2. High level, domineralized water automatic supply, low level, and low-low level alarms are provided in the control room.
ord &c.12cP kade.rs p- 5%=1 A low-low level cler= isolates the non-essential headersf+em lJ
-.y the eccentici 'cederc in the cvent of a pipc break ;. t. lie ncn-cefety relcted.c/ctem, Gm %e. remni% prhens of he I
B. Component Cooling Water Sump Level The component cooling water sumps 1 and 2 water levels are l indicated and a high level alarm is provided in the control room. Each component cooling water sump pump is automatically started at a specified sump level, and the pumps are automatically stopped at sump low level. C. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure Sump Level Component cooling water heat exchanger structure sumps 1 and 2 water levels are indicated and a high level alarm is l Amendment J 9.2-51 April 30, 1992 _ r. ~m ;.,wsy' ,-
m ^ g s a
-TABLE 9.2.2 3 (Cont *di
- (Sheet 3 of 16)
L TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYTEM HEAT LOADS AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS y g (.. NORMAL OPERATION I Number With Total Number Receiving. Total Component Heat Load Heat Load - Row Flo w ..[' Div. 1 l a Div. a (E+06 Btu /hrl Div. 1 Div, 2 (nomi / Boric Acid Concentrator 3~ O 1 14- 0
' Norrwd
.",c.,
1 700 3 C;;...Je: Chilled Water Condensers
~
1 1 24 2 2- 12000 . Instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers, intercoolers,
. Jacket Coolers, and Aftercooters -
1 1 0.585 2 2 200 J TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 1 = . 42.9385 - E + 06 Btu /hr -! TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 2 ~ = . 78.9815- E + 06 Btu /hr TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 1 = 15159- opm
- i TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 2 = 13419 gpm
.s
( i
.[-
y
; Amendment J April 30,1992 -
-m--.es 6 Me<, e en e unid e e= e Wuse-a-e er w 54we-- w4 W-mew :o ww+ 6 1 % + +D-i t we '- e te w m-eis4-e4a w +++e '44 4 r N^'u+-wtmi--was+- s -'e-~966'WwHF
++ eM.+ e a- es=e"a we ow di .t-o--.c:4 aVeev-s f n e-a.p,-"yyh 4,wia w ee- m e, =wr up w t Y w- -v-- --
p- e-v- i -w T 4e
TABLE 9.2.2-3 (Cont'd) (Sheet 6 of 16) i TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYTEM HEAT LOADS AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS SHUTDOWN COOLING (INITIAL) I Number With Total Number Receiving Total Comoonent Heat Load Heat load Flow Flo w Div. 1 Div. 2 (E + 06 Btu /hr) Div. 1 Div. 2 igpm] Boric Acid Concentrator O 1 14 0 1 700 No#.. d C;;;.dsJ Chilled Water Condensers 1 1 24 2 2 12000 Instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers, Intercooters, 1 1 0.585 2 2 200
- Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers i
i U l TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 1 = 139.4825 E + 06 Btu /hr TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 2 = 187.8455 E + 06 Btu /hr TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 1 = 23159 opm TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 2 = 25909 opm Amendment J April 30 '2
r, m. _( R s . . TABLE 9.2.2-3 (Cont'd) (Sheet 9 of 16) TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYTEM HEAT LOADS AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS SHUTDOWN COOLING (FINAL) I i Number With Total Number Receiving Total Component Heat Load Heat Loed Flow Flow l Div,1 Div. 2 (E + 06 Btu /hri Div.1 Div. 2 Lepd Boric Ac d Concentrator 0 1 14 0 1 700 14orrm Nm. . Caseni.al Chilled Water Condensers 1 1 24 2 2 12000 l Instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers, Intercoolers, 1 1 0.585 2 2 200 Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers J 4 TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 1 = 64.5705 E + 0G Btu /hr TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 2 = 78.4235 E +06 Bru/hr TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 1 = 28159 opm TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 2 = 24954 opm l. J l i 1 Amendment J j April 30,1992
TABLE 9.2.2-3 (Cont'd) s (Sheet 10 of 16) TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOADS AND FLOW REOUIREMENTS REFUELING OPERATIONS 7 ? } Number With Total Number Receiving Total Component Heat load Heat Load Flo w Flo w Div.1 Div, 2 (E + 0G Btu /hr) Div.1 Div. 2 (opm) 2 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 1 51 1 1 26000 Shutdown Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 0.222 1 1 60 Shutdown Cooling Mini-Flow Heat Exchangers 1 1 1.36 1 1 320 Safety injection Pump Motor Coolers O O O 2 2 160 J Containment Spray Heat Exchangers O O O O O O Containment Spray Pump Motor Coolers O O O 1 1 60 ! Containment Spray Mini-Flow Heat Exchangers O O O 1 1 320 Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Coolers 2 2 0.82 2 2 354 f Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Motor Coolers 1 1 1.24 1 1 80 Emergency Feedwater Pump Motor Coolers O O O 1 1- GO f e Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers 1 1 22.4 1 Ol 10000 } Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Coolers O O O 1 1 2000 Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air Aftercoolers O O O 2 2 100 Amendment J April 30,1992 w.
TABLE 9.2.2-3 (Cont'd) (Sheet 12 of 16)
; TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYTEM HEAT LOADS AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS REFUELING OPERATIONS I i-i i ! Number With Total Number Receiving Total $. Component Heat Load Heat load Flo w Flo w ! .' Div.1 Div. 2 (E + 06 Btu /hr) Div.1 Div,E (apm) j Boric Acid Concentrator O 1 14 0 1 700 i Hof m l 24 2 2 12000 1 Nor C;scris' Chilled Water Condensers 1 1 i
Instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers, Intercoolers, 1 1 0.585 2 2 200 'l Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers J 1 4 TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 1 = 50.8135 E + 06 Btu /hr ? TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 2 = 82.4135 E +06 Btu /hr
- TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 1 = 28159 gpm TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 2 = 29919 gpm l
4 i' i Amendment .I f April 30, If i 1
^ m
.Q .
l TABLE 9.2.2-3 (Cont'd) (Sheet 15 of 16) i TYPICAL COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYTEM HEAT LOADS AND FLOW REQUIREMENTS t DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT I 'i i Number With Total Number Receiving Total I Comoonent ligat load Heat load Flo w Flow Div.1 Div. 2 (E+ 06 Btu /hr) Div.1 Div, 2 Ignml Boric Acid Concentrator O O O O O O
.Jer $_
;e; Chilled Water Condensers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Instrument Air Compressor Oil Coolers Intercoolers, 0 0 0 0 0 0 Jacket Coolers, and Aftercoolers J
TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 1 = 142.9502 E +06 Btu /hr TOTAL HEAT LOAD PER DIVISION 2 = 140.3932 E+0G Btu /hr
. TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 1 = 12059 gpm TOTAL FLOW PER DIVISION 2 - 12059 Opm Amendment J April 30,1992 L _._ - - -
4 . _ _ . CESSAR na?"icaricu r i TABLE 9.2.2-5 (Cont'd) l (Sheet 2 of 3) I' ACTIVE VALVES, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM ASME Valve Safety Valve Section III Actuator . Number Function Type Code Class Type r CC-137 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor None J CC-1507 Operate Swing Check 2 , CC-154B Operate Swing Check 2 None . CC-100 Ch: 5tterfly 3 Electric N tcr ! CC-1717 Cp;r;t: ing Cht k 2 kr.; ; CC-200 Close Throttle 3 Pneumatic. CC-201 Close Throttle 3 Pneumatic , CC-202 Clo.se Butterfly 3 Pneumatic i CC-203 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic-CC-206 Operate Butterfly 3 Electric Motor I t CC-207 Operate Butterfly 3 Electric Motor i CC-208 Operate Butterfly 3 - Electric Motor CC-209 Operate Butterfly 3 Electric Motor-l CC-210 Open Throttle 3 Pneumatic CC-211 Operate Butterfly 3 Electric Motor , CC-212 Open Throttle 3 Pneumatic-l CC-213 Close Butterfly 3 Electric Motor l CC-214 Open Butterfly 3 Electric Motor CC-222 Close Butterfly 3 Pneumatic J Amendment J April 30, 1992 3
CESSAR !alincamn TABLE 9.2.2-5 (Cont'd) (Sheet 3 of 3) I ACTIVE VALVES, COMPONENT COOLING-WATER SYSTEM ASME Valve Safety Valve Section III Actuator Number Function Type Code Class Type Close
~
CC-223 Butterfly 3 Pneumatic- ; CC-230 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor '! s CC-2302 Operate Swing Check 3 None CC-2303 Operate Swing Check 3 None CC-231 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor l CC-236 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor i CC-237 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor J ' CC-240 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor 4 CC-241 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor - CC-242 Close Butterfly 2 Electric Motor , CC-243 Close Butterfly 2 Electric'Hotor- l CC-2507 Operate Swing Check' 2 None-CC-2548 Operate Swing Check 2 None CC 200 Cl;;; Sutt;rfly : El;;tri; ;;;ter CC-2622 Operate Swing Check 2 None . CC-2628 0perate Swing Check 2 None l 00-2717 Cp; ret; %i,9 Ch;;k 2 nvua j
-t
~- a l Amendment J s April 30, 1992 I
CESSAR !!aincamn - TABLE 9.2.2-6 (Cont'd) t (Sheet 2 of 3), , COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EMERGENCY POWER REQUIREMENTS , I , Component Cooling Water System Motor-Operated Valves (Cont'd) Valve Emergency Channel , CC-113 C , CC-114 C r CC-211 B t CC-213 D CC-214 D J CC 100 ?.
-CC 2 0 0 C Component Cooling Water System Controls Controls Emergency Channel , f i
Component Cooling Water Pump 1A A ; Start /Stop Component Cooling Water Pump 1B C l Start /Stop t Component Cooling Water Pump 2A B Start /Stop ! I , t Component Cooling Water Pump 2B D Start /Stop i Non-essential Header 1 Supply and A l Return Isolation Valves CC-102 ; and CC-103, Open/Close Non-essential Header 1 Supply and C J ; Return Isolation Valves CC-122 .! and CC-123, Open/Close l Non-essential Header _2 Supply and B Return Isolation Valves CC-202 and I l CC-203, Open/Close Non-essential Header 2 Supply and i D Return Isolation Valves CC-222 and J. CC-223, Open/Close- ; i
?
Amendment J April 30, 1992
SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR COMPONENT COOLINO WATER SYSTEM (1.9.2.2) Relationship of CCWS to the Safety Analysis The Safety Analysis assumes the CCWS removes heat loads generated by the componenets connected to the CCWS during design basis accident conditions. t t i 1.9.2.2 03-04-93
SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the *Iler 1 or
'Iler 2 System 80+ submittal.
REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (1.9.2.2) Relationship of PRA to CCWS
- 1) The supply and return lines from components in a Division are completely separated from the supply and return lines in the redundant Division.
- 2) The ESF Actuation System signals isolate the non-safety related portion of the CCWS following an accident condition, except cooling for the' RCPs, charging pump motor coolers, and charging pump miniflow heat exchangers.
b b 1.9.2.2 03-04-93
SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not Intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR COMPONENT COOLINO WATER SYSTILM (1.9.2.2) Relationship of CCWS to Severe Accident Manacement A Seismic Category I makeup line is provided to each CCWS Division from the SSWS via a spoolpiece which can be connected. > a 1.9.2.2 ' 03-04-93
k SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS (1.9,6) i
- 1. Amplifyine Infonnation for Instrument Air Systems CESSAR DC Section 9.3.1 ,
- 2. CESSAR.DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to IAS See CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.88 i
)
l i 1.9.6 03-04-93 j
. +
. m
~ ~~
CESSAR an%mo,. '
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I 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES E 9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS i 9.3.1.1 Design Bases The Compressed Air Systems are non-safety related systemsI consisting of the Instrument Air, Station Air, and Breathing Air [J ; Systems. The Instrument Air System supplies clean, oil free, dried air to all air operated instrumentation' and valves. The Station Air Syster. cupplies compressed air for air operated tools, miscellanecus equipment, and various maintenance purposes. The Breathing Air System supplies clean, oil free, low pressure air to various locations in the plant, as required for breathing l protection against airborne contamination while performing certain maintenance and cleaning operations. 9.3.1.1.1 Codes and Standards E The compressed air systems and associated components are designed ; in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The design - conforms to General Design Criteria 1, 2 and 5 and meets the intent of the Standard Review plan. 9.3.1.2 System Description 9.3.1.2.1 Instrument dir System . A flow diagram of the Instrument Air System is shown in Figure - 9.3.1-1. The Instrument Air System consists of four parallel trains of instrument air compressors and associated equipment. Each train of equipment is capable of supplying _the plant's instrument air needs. The Instrument Air System equipment is located in the Nuclear Annex with two instrument air trains located in each division. Each instrument air train consists of an instrument air compressor, an air receiver, and an instrument air dryer J connected insseries. h Instvhi 6 S q s b E5 f v ect b A p m w a d n m % basses. Each compressor is of oil-free, water-cooled design and is capable of providing 100%.of the instrument air requirements for ' the generating unit. Cooling water is supplied to the compressors from the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). The compressors are designed to cool the hot compressed air and remove. water condensed in the cooling process. Each compressor is furnished with an intake filter / silencer rated to remove all particles greater than 5 microns ( m). The compressor intakes are- located in an area free of corrosive contaminants and hazardous gases. , Amendment J 9.3-1 April 30, 1992
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t 14.2.12.1.88 Comprammund Air Systant Test 1.O OBJECTIVE , t 1.1 To demonstrate that the Compressed Air System provides , a safe and reliable source of compressed air for the
- operation of plant equipment. ;
2.O PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities on the Compressed Air System have been completed. 2.2 Compressed Air System instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.3 Support system 5 required for operation of the Compressed Air System are^ complete and operational. l 2.4 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. , 2.5 Sufficient permanent loads are connected to the-Compressed Air System and are operable to verify air compressor loading. H 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Verify all control logic. 3.2 Verify the proper operation and capacity of the Instrument Air, Station Air and Breathing Air compressors. Verify proper operation of compressor unloaders, auto and manual start and stop circuits. 3.3 Demonstrate the operability of the air compressor dryers and filters, aftercoolers, moisture separators, air receivers, and pressure reducing stations. 3.4 Verify the proper operation of all protective devices, controls, interlocks, instruments, computer inputs, alarms and resets, pressure switches,. safety and relief valves, bypass valves using actual or simulated inputs. 3.5 Operate control valves from all appropriate control ' positions. Observe valve operation and position ' indication and measure opening and closing times. 3.6 Simulate failed conditions and observe valve response. 3.7 Verify proper operation of all moisture drains. Amendment H 14.2-165 August 31, 1990
CESSAR !!Mincum l i i ( *
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3.8 Verify relief valve settings. 3.9 Verify appropriate differential pressures (e.g., delta 1 P across prefilters and afterfilters). ! 3.10 While at system normal steady. state conditions, if practicable, simultaneously operate those plant components requiring large quantities of instrument H : air, to verify pressure transients-in the distribution system do not exceed acceptable. values. 3.11 Functionally test instrument air system to ensure . i credible failures resulting in an increase in supply system pressure will not cause loss of operability. i i 3.12 Verify that the total air demand at normal steady state' , conditions, including leakage from the system, is in J i accordance with design. l 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Capacity data on compressors. i 4.2 Cycle times and regeneration temperatures of air- ; dryers. .j 4.3 Air dryer dew point temperatures. , 4.4 Air quality -measurements. (Dewpoint, hydrocarbons, l particulates). t 4.5 Valve opening and closing times, where required. g j 4.6 Valve position indication. 4.7 Response of valves to simulated failed conditions. i i 4.8 Setpoints at which alarms and interlocks occur. 4.9 Pressure, temperature, and flow rate readings at remote ; and control board indicators. 4.10 Cycle times for automatic moisture drain valves. 4.11 System response to the simultaneous operation of plant , components requiring large quantities of. instrument air. 4.12 System response to an increase in supply pressure. l l Amendment'J 14.2-166 April 30,: 1992 l l
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lCESSAR E!ninc m. 5.O ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 The Compressed Air System operates in'accordance with Section 9.3.1. 'g 5.2 Air quality to' meet or exceed requirements of= ANSI /ISA. 57.3-1975 (R1981). Amendment-H 14.2-167 August._31, 1990
_i SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not intended .
- to comprise a part of either the Mer 1 or -
Der 2 System 80+ submittal j REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS ' (1.9.6) 1; i Relationship of the Safety Analysis to IAS . Safety systems supplied by IAS will not be rendered inoperable by loss of air supply.l l
.. [ Safety systems incorporate fail-safe configurations for air operated components and i equipment.] ;
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t i SYS11CM 80+"' For reference purposes only. Not latended , to comprise' a part of either the Tier 1 or ' !
- Tier 2 System 80+ submittal, i
- t REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS . ,
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(1.9.6) - Relationship of PRA to IAS 1 1
- 1) The Instrument Air System has four parallel trains. ;
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SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMA'ITON FOR CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM (1.9.12)
- 1. Amplifyine information for CCVS See CESSAR DC Section 9.4.1
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Anolicable to CCVS i'
14.2.12.1.103 Control Building Ventilation System Test 14.2.12.1.111 Control Building Ventilation Subsystem Test t 1.9.12 03-04-93
CESSAR nEncmou designed to other support areas are maximum E The control room, and 78'F and 20% to 60% maintain approximately 73*F to battery room is designed to maintain relative humidity. The 77*F (60*F min. to 90*F max.). The mechanical ture of lJ approximatelyequipment roomdesigned is designed to maintain amaximum maximum tem areas are to maintain a maintained E 104*F. All other These conditions are temperature of 85*F. tion of continuously during allcontrols, modes ofand operation for the for the proteco f.. the comfort lJ and instrumentationOutdoor design conditions are given in Table 2 0-1. operators. h connecting Continuous pressurization of the control room and t e offices is provided to prevent outside entry the of dust, dirt,zones pressurized smoke, in and radioactivity originatingintent of NUREG-0700 requirements. with the accordance Pressurization is maintained slightly positive relative to the pressure outdoors and in surrounding areas. two E is taken from either of Outside air for pressurization of uncontaminated air is available I locations such that a source Each air intakei is llocated as far All outside regardless of wind direction.away from the diesel generator ex air is filtered. ce of of Each outside air intake location is monitored e.g., chlorine, for theproducts and presen occurs radioactivity, toxic gases, the outside air intake high I combustion. Isolation of _20inim. le d,- / automatically upon indication of =hid. concentration in the intake. lutake chlorine concentration or j moke th 9WA Arth idrtre clrre, Ithe operator can -evezzi@ room readout 3 select
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.mcmhm mA $v inspection of the control This will ensure pressurization f j
intake. the least contaminated l of the control room. ci . is provided with A dant tornadom l J Each outside air intake isolation damper to prevent depressurization of the control roo and the control room area during a tornado. f ) i t is able El All essential air conditioning and ventilation equ pmen safety functions assuming the worst single ffsite to perform requiredfailure of an active component concurrent with a lo power. equipment, and ventilating conditioning ductwork All essential air and supports are equipment designed to withstand the safe shutdo earthquake. In addition, this is protected from pipe breaks and water the effects of internally generated missiles, i spray. Essential electrical components required for the heat ng, ident cooling, and pressurization of the control room during acc conditions are connected to emergency Class 1E standby power. l Amendment J April 30, 1992 9.4-3
CESSAREnMem ; .( Reg. Guide Title i 1.29 Seismic Design Classification 1.52 Design, Testing _and Maintenance -for -Post Accident. Engineered Safety- ~ Feature Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water ~ Cooled Nuclear Power Plants ,,g 1.78 Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability. of a Nuclear Power Plant During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release ; j 1.95 Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine - Release 1.140 Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria - for I; ' Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants , 9.4.1.2 System Description The main control room air-handling- system consists of two redundant air-handling units, each with. filters, essential chilled water cooling coils for heat removal, and fans for air . circulation. The emergency circulation system consists of filter trains with particulate filters, carbon filters, and fans for emergency air circulation. Chilled ' water is supplied from the-essential chilled water system. l During normal operation, return air :from the control room is mixed with a small quantity of outside air for ventilation, is e filtered and conditioned in the control room air-handling unit, and is delivered to the control reem1through supply ductwork. Duct-mounted heating coils 'and humidification equipment provida-final adjustments to-the control-room temperature and humidity for maintaining normal comfort conditions. In the event of a -less-- of coel-ent-acoident & a release of toxic gases, the hab tability -zone is isolated from the outside - environment, asutg- the emergency circulation system is actuated.4e-pressurize-the-contrarlmon. The _ main control room air-handling equipment is automatically actuated (or continues to operate, as applicable) to remove heat and provide mixing and circulating,of the control room air. The emergency circulation. system filters W hy n C cQ$ W-fObCR b$ b% ; S- M Amendment I J
'9.4-5 December 21, 1990 i
eSSAR 88Wncum upstream of the exhaust filter inlets. These monitors are y intended to work in conjunction with the ventilation Systems Multisampler Monitor to provide indication of radioactivity levels in the total exhaust and the more remote locations which are normally occupied. F. Control Room Air Intake Monitors Each of the two control room air intakes is continuously monitored for airborne radioactivity by means of off-line shielded gaseous radiation monitors. In order to provide redundancy, there are two safety class 3 monitors W h gimtef*mch 2-+ rte). Either monitor will cause the isolation of its respective air intake upon indication of high radiation cartridge is I levels. A particulate / iodine fixed filter included in the inlet sample tubing to each monitor. G. Reactor Building Annulus Monitor Annulus air is continuously monitored by this gas monitor to indicate radioactivity resulting from equipment failure or leakage. When an entry into the annulus is required on this monitor can give station personnel information cirborne activity. Sample tubing is routed to give
) a representative sample of annulus air, particularly lJ station personnel are likely to including areas where A maintenance or surveillance activities.
perform particulate / iodine fixed filter cartridge is included in the I inlet sample tubing to this monitor for laboratory analysis. Under post-accident conditions, this monitor can be used as a supplement to Regulatory Guide 1.97 monitorsor to measure from an lJ activity from expected containment leakage unexpected breach in containment. I H. Reactor Building Subsphere Ventilation Monitor continuously monitored by an off-line Each division is J monitor. These monitors continuously sample the exhaust Subsphere from both divisions of the Reactor Building Ventilation System. Sample points are upstream of the y exhaust filters and downstream of the last entry point to the exhaust subsystem. Detection of activity is indicative of equipment failure or leakage in the subsphere areas. ly I. Portable Airborne Monitor This monitor includes detector channels for particulate, detectors, I iodine, and gaseous activity. The samplers, and associated electronics are auxiliary equipment, assembled on a mobile cart. This monitor can be moved to Amendment J 11.5-13 April 30, 1992 m },-- _ _
CESSAR s!Ki"icari:= 0 14.2.12.1.103 Control Building Ventilation System Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To verify the functional operation of the Control Room envelope HVAC units and ensure a proper environment for personnel and equipment under all postulated conditions. 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities in the Control Building have been completed and all penetrations sealed. 2.2 Construction activities on the Control Building Ventilation System have been completed. 2.3 Contlol Building Ventilation system instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.4 Support systems required for operation of the Control Building Ventilation System are complete and operational. t
' 2.5 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated.
H 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Verify all control logic. 3.2 Verify, the proper operation, stroking speed, and position indication of all dampers. 3.3 In manual operating mode, verify proper operation of the units, system rated air flow, and air balance. Stwr5 3.4 In automatic mode, demonstrate the to emergency operations as a result transfer of radie [trion detection, toxic chemical detection, and safety injection actuation signals. 3.5 Verify the filter particle removal efficiency, carbon adsorber efficiency and filter bank air flow capacity. 3.6 Verify the proper operation of all protective devices, controls, interlocks, instrumentation, and alarms, using actual or simulated inputs. O Amendment H 14.2-193 . August 31, 1990
CESSAR !!!Encuia j 4 O 3.7 Verify .that the system maintains the control room at ' i positive pressure relative to the outside - atmosphere H ., during system operation in the pressurized mode as i required by the Technical Specifications. , i 3.8 Verify the isolation capability of the control room j upon detection of chlorine gas at the intakes meets the- J i requirements of Reg. Guide 1.95. ; 3.9 Demonstrate the operation of the battery room exhaust fans. 3.10 Demonstrate the operation of the Electrical Equipment Room Air Handling Subsystem. 3.11 Demonstrate the operation of the Smoke Purge-Fan. , 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Air balancing verification. H l 4.2 Fan and damper operating Data. .f 4.3 Temperature and humidity data in the Control Room i envelope. > 4.4 Response to radioactivity, toxic gas, and products of- f combustion. t 4.5 Setpoints of alarms, interlocks, and controls. 4.6 Pressurization data for the control room data. I
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4.7 Filter and carbon adsorber data. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ! L 5.1 The Control Building Ventilation System operates as described in Section 9.4.1. I O ; i Amendment H , 14.2-194 . . August 31, 1990
CESSARMah m ! 0 14.2.12.1.111 Control Building Ventilation Subsystems Test 1.0 OBJECTIVE 1.1 To demonstrate the operation of the Control Building Ventilation Subsystems. 1.1.1 Technical Support Center Ventilation Subsystem. _; 1.1.2 Computer Room Ventilation Subsystems. _; 1.1.3 Operations Support Center Ventilation Subsystem. I 1.1.4 Shift and Assembly Offices Ventilation Subsystem. 1.1.5 CAS & SEC Group Ventilation Subsystem. 1.1.6 Men's Change Room Ventilation Subsystem. .. 1.1.7 Women's Change Room Ventilation Subsystem. H 1.1.8 Break Room Ventilation Subsystem. 1.1.9 Ventilation Equipment Room Air Handling Units (3). 2.0 PREREQUISITES 2.1 Construction activities in the Control Building are complete with all penetration sealed in place. , 2.2 Construction activities on the . Control Building Ventilation _ Subsystems'have been completed. 2.3 Control Building Ventilation Subsystem instrumentation has been calibrated. 2.4 Support systems required for operation of the Control Building Ventilation Subsystems. 2.5 Test instrumentation is available and calibrated. 3.0 TEST METHOD 3.1 Verify control logic. 3.2 Verify ' the operation of the Technical Support Center air handling unit / fans and filter units. (~) 3.2 Verify the operation of the Computer Room air handling 4 \/ units / fans. Amendment H 14.2-206 ' August 31, 1990
# i CESSAR Eannema i f ;
3.3 . Verify the operation of the Operations Support Center air handling unit / fan. 3.4 Verify the operation of the Shift and Assembly Offices air handling unit / fan. 3.5 Verify - the operation of the CAS and SEC Group air handling unit / fan. 3.6 Verify the operation of the Men's Change Room- air handling unit / fan. 3.7 Verify the operation of the Women's Change Room ' air - handling unit / fan. 3.8 Verify the operation of the Break Room air handling unit / fan. , 3.9 Verify the operation of the Equipment Room air handling units / fans. 3.10 Verify operation of the Technical Support Center-smoke ! purge fans. p/
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3.11 Verify alarms,' indicating lights and status lights are functional. 3.12 Perform air flow balancing of the Control Building ; Ventilation' Subsystems. i 3.13 Verify the proper-operation of dampers. l LH Wr;fy T S C- P ersc ou.ita r.c o . [ 4.0 DATA REQUIRED 4.1 Fan operating data for each of the air handling units-and the smoke purge fans. 4.2 Damper operating data. 4.3 Air flow and balancing verification. 4.4 Setpoints at which alarms, centerbacks and control occur. 4.5 Temperature data for each of the CBV subsystems. 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 1 The Control Building Ventilation Subsystems operate as O described in Section 9.4.1. i Amendment H 14.2-207 August 31, 1990 , m -
[g - f l SYSTEM 80+" ' For reference purposes only.' Not latended l to comprise a part of either the "Iler 1 or , Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. *
. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM -
(1.9.12) . i Relationshin of CCVS to the Safety Analysis j See: CESSAR-DC TABLE 15A-10 $ The Safety Analysis assumes a maximum filtered air intake rate of 2000 CFM and : . recirculating iodine filter efficiencies.
- elemental 0.95 organic 0.95 -
particulate 0.99 t U 6 t
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1.9.12 03 04-93
i SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not latended - l to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or ' 11er 2 System 80+ submittal. ; REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM , (1.9.12) I i i, Relationship of CCVS to PRA .; Divisional separation of ventilation system assumed. . ; 1
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- SYSTEM 80+" j SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR CONDENSER CIRCUI.ATING WATER SYSTEM ]
_ (1.10.5) r
- Amplifyine Information for Condenser Circulatine Water System -
- 1. f
- CESSAR-DC Section 10.4.5 l
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- 2. 'CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Annlicable to CONDENSER CIRCULATING' 1 WATER SYSTEM '
CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.73 [ i 1 s
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l l j SYSTEM 80+" For refestnce purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or l Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. j l REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM l (1.10.5) ) l 1 Relationshin of CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM to the Safety Analysis None l 1.10.5 03 04-93
SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not intended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM (1.10.5) Relationship of PRA to CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM None 5 F 1.10.5 03-04-93
SYSTEM 80+" SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM (1.18.1) Amplifyine Information for Main Control Room
- 1. The following documents submitted on the docket are the bases for the MCR design:
- a. HUMAN FACTORS STANDARDS GUIDELINES AND BASES (NPX80-IC-DR79102) (DRAFT) ,
- b. NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN BASES (NPX80-IC-DB-790-01)
- c. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION FOR CONTROL COMPLEX INFORMATION -
SYSTEM (NPX80-IC-SD791-01)
- d. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION FOR CRITICAL FUNCTION AND SUCCESS PATH MONITORING (NPX80-IC-SD790-02)
- e. FUNCTIONAL TASK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY (CESSAR-DC SECTION 18.5)
- f. OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW FOR SYSTEM 80+ MMI ;
DESIGN (NPX80-IC-RR790-01)
- g. HUMAN FACIORS PROGRAM PLAN FOR' THE SYSTEM 80+
STANDARD PLANT DESIGN (NPX80-IC-DP790-01)- ,
- h. HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PLAN FOR NUPLEX 80+ (NPX80-IC-DP790-03)
- i. NUPLEX 80+ VERIFICATION ANALYSIS REPORT (NPX80-TE790-01)
- j. NUPLEX 80+ FUNCTION ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION REPORT See CESSAR-DC Section 18.6 for a discussion of the MCR configuration.
- 2. CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to MCR None 1.I8.1 03-04-93 l
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SYSTEM 80+" For reference purposes only. Not latended to comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or i Tier 2 System 80+ submittal. 1 REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM (1.18.1) . Relationshin of MCR to the Safety Analysis a Alarms credited in the Safety Analysis will be included in ITAAC Table 1.18.1-1. l 1.18.1 03-04-93 i i
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1 i SYSTEM 80+" For sference purposes only. Not intended . -i to' comprise a part of either the Tier 1 or 11er 2 System 80+ submittal. REFERENCE INFORMATION FOR MAIN CONTROL ROOM _ (1.18.1)
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1 Relationship of MCR to PRA j 1 Alarms, displays and controh required to execute PRA-significant tasks will be included in.- ) ITAAC Table 1.18.1-1. :)4 1 l 3 'l i
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1.18.1 -3 03-04-93
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