ML19347D156
| ML19347D156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347D155 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103110275 | |
| Download: ML19347D156 (22) | |
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SAFETf EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION j.
EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR DUKE POWER COMPANY i
i McGUIRE UNIT 1 i
DOCKET NO. 50-369
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810s110 1
CONTENTS Page 1
Introduction................................
1 2
Background.................................................
1 2.1 Purpose...............................................
2 2.2 Scope.................................................
2 3
Staff Evaluation...........................................
3 3.1 Completeness of Safety-Related Equipment..............
3
- 3. 2 Service Conditions....................................
3 3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment....................................
4 3.4 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment...................................
5 3.5 Submergence...........................................
5 3.6 Chemical Spray........................................
b 3.7 Aging.................................................
5 3.8 Radiation.............................................
6 4
Qualification of Equipment.................................
7 4.1. Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action.......
7 4.2 Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action.....................................
7 4.3 Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable............................................
9 5
Deferred Requirements......................................
9 6
Conclusions................................................
9 APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable APPENDIX D Safety-Related Systems List e
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-0 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH FOR DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-369 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 INTRODUCTION General Design Criteria 1 and 4 specify that safety related electrical equip-ment in nuclear facilities must be capable of performing its safety related function under environmental conditions associated with all normal, abnormal, and a':cident plant operation.
In order to ensure compliance with the cri-te %, the NRC staff required all licensees of operating reacto s to submit a reevaluation of the qualification of safety related electrical equipment which may be exposed to a harsh environment. Additionally the staff required near-term operating license applicants to reassess and evaluate their environmental qualification documentation and/or test data for their safety related electrical equipment.
2 BACKGROUND By letters dated October 11, 1979 and February 19 and 21, 1980, the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) requested operating license applicants to review and evaluate the environmental qualification documentation for each item of safety related electrical equipment and to identify the degree to which their qualification program complies with the staff position as described in NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualifi-cation of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment." The applicants were directed to provide a submittal reporting the results of this review.
On February 8,1979, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) issued to all licensees of operating plants (except those included in the systematic evaluation program (SEP)) IE Bulletin' IEB 79-01, " Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment." This bulletin, together with IE Circular 78-08 (issued on May 31, 1978), required the licensees to perform reviews to assess the adequ.acy of their environmental qualification programs.
Subsequently, Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 (issued on May 23, 1980) states that the 00R guidelines and portions of NUREG-0588 (which were issued on January 14, 1980, as enclosures 4 and 5 to IEB-79-018) form the requirements that licensees must meet regarding environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment in order to satisfy those aspects of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A,, General Design Criterion (GDC)-4.
This order also requires the staff to complete safety evaluation reports (SERs) for all opera-ting plants by February 1, 1981.
In addition, this order requires that the licensees have qualified safety-related equipment installed in their plants by June 30, 1982.
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Supplements to IEB 79-01B were issued for further e.larification and definition of the staff's needs. These supplements were issued on February 29, September 30, and October 24, 1980.
In addition, the staff issued orders dated August 29, 1980 (amended in September 1980) and October 24, 1980 to all licensees.
The August order required that the licensees provide a report, by November 1, 1980, documenting the qualifica-tion of safety related electrical equipment.
The October order required the establishment of a central file location for the maintenance of all equipment-qualification records. The central file was mandated to be established by Decemitr 1, 1980.
The order also required that all safety-related electrical equipment be qualified by June 30, 1982.
In response, the licensee submitted information through letters dated October 20 and December 23, 1980.
'2.1 Furpose The purpose of this SER is to identify equipment whose qualification program does not provide sufficient assurance that the equipment is capable of per-forming the design function in hostile environments.
The staff position relating to any identified deficiencies is provided in this report.
2.2 Scope The scope of this report is limited to an evaluation of the equipment which must function in order to mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a high-energy-line-break (HELB) accident, inside or outside containment, while subjected to the hostile environments associated with these accidents.
.3 STAFF EVALUATION The staff evaluation of the licensee's response included an onsite inspection of selected Class IE equipment, audits of environmental qualification documenta-tion, and an examination of the licensee's report for completeness and accepta-bility.
The criteria described in the DOR guidelines and in NUREG-0588, in part, were used as a basis for the staff evaluation of the adequacy of the licensee's qualification program.
The NRC Office of Inspection ara Enfo cement performed an onsite verification inspection (April 30 through May 2, 1980) of selected safety-related electrical equipment.
Selected components in the pressurizer, reactor coolant sample, conta'inment pressure, and cabling systems were inspected at Unit 1.
The inspec-tion verified proper installation of equipment, overall interface integrity, and manufacturers' nameplate data. The manufacturer's name and model number from the nameplate data were compared to information given in the Component Evaluation Work Sheets (CES) of the licensee's report.
The site inspection is cacumented in report IE 50-369/80-7.
No deficiencies were noted.
For this review, the documents referenced above have been factored into the overall staff evaluation.
NRR performed an audit on November 19 and 20, 1980 of environmental qualification documentation and/or test data for 11 types of items.
No significant concerns were identified during the IE inspection or the NRR audit.
i 3.1 Comoleteness of Safety-Related Equipment In accordance with IEB 79-01B and NUREG-0588, the licensee was directed to (1) estabifsh a list of systems and equipment that are required to mitigate a LOCA and an HELB and (2) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display information, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and radiation monitoring.
The staff developed a generic master list based upon a review of plant safety analyses and emergency procedures.
The instrumentation selected includes parameters to monitor overall plant performance as well as to monitor the per-formance of the systems on the list.
The systems list was established on the basis of the functions that must be performed for accident mitigation (without regard to location of equipment reiative to hostile environments).
The list of safety-related systems provided by the licensee was reviewed against the staff-developed master list.
Based upon information in the licensee's submittal, the equipment location references, and in some cases subsequent conversations with the licensee, the staff has verified and determined that the systems included in the licensee's submittal are those required to achieve or support:
(1) emergency reactor shutdown, (2) containmer.t isolation, (3) reactor core cooling, (4) containmeat heat removal, (5) core residual heat removal, and (6) prevention of signifi-cant release of radioactive material to the environment.
However, the licensee did not include the main steam isolation system.
The licensee should address or justify the omission of this system.
The staff therefore concludes that the systems identified by the licensee (listed in Appendix D) are acceptable, with the exception of thosa items noted above and discussed in Section 5 of this report.
The licensee identified 114 types of equipment items which were assessed by the staff.
3.2 Service Conditions Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 requires that the DOR guidelines and the "For Comment" NUREG-0588 are to be used as the criteria for establishing the adequacy of the safety-related electrical equipment environmental quali-fication program. These documents provide the option of establishing a bounding pressure and temperature condition based on plant-specific analysis identified in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or based on generic profiles using the methods identified h these documents.
On this basis, the staff has assumed, unless otherwise noted, that tre analysis for developing the environmental enveTopes, relative to the temperature, pressure, and the containment spray caustics, has been performed in accordance with the requirements stated above. The staff has reviewed the qualification documenta-tion to ensure that the qualification specifications envelope the cot:ditions established by the licensee.
In addition, the staff assured, and requires the licensee to verify, that the containment spray system is not subjected to a disabling sinole-component failure.
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t Equipment submergence has also been addressed where the possibility exists that flooding of equipment may result from HELBs.
3.3 Temperature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Inside Containment The licensee has provided the results of accident analyses as follows:
Max Temo ( F)
Max Press (psic)
Humidity (%)
LOCA:
Lower compartment 230 14.8 100 Upper compartment 180 14.8 100 MSLB:
Lower compartment 327 not provided 100 The staff has concluded that the minimum temperature profile for equipment qualification purposes should include a margin to account for analytical uncertainties in the calculated temperature profiles for postulated acc. _nts.
The licensee's minimum temperature profile for qualification purposes is based on a conservative MSLB analytical model that results in temperatures higher than what might realistically be expected; it is therefore acceptable.
The staff has also concluded that, for the equipment items which are qualified for LOCA environment only, use of the steam saturation temperature corresponding to the total building pressure (partial pressure of steam plus partial pressure of air) versus time will provide an acceptable margin for the environmental effects on equipment during a postulated LOCA.
The licensee's specified temperature (service condition) of 230 F for the lower compartment and 180 F for the upper compartment does not satisfy the above requirement. A saturation temperature corresponding to pressure profile (249 F peak temperature at 14.8 psig) should be used instead.
The licensee should update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change.
If there is any equipment that does not meet the staff position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
The licensee has not provided a temperature and pressure profile for MSLB accidents in the upper compartment.
The staff will accept the same tempera-ture profile used for LOCA conditions in the upper compartment.
The licensee should either update his equipment summary tables to reflect this change or provide justification for not using this value.
If the latter option is chose'n then the licensee should provide the analysis--including the basis, assumptions, and the results 11 the form of temperature and pressure profile.
If the licensee agrees with the staff's position, the licensee must provide either justification that the equipment will perform its intended function under the specified conditions or propose corrective action.
3.4 Temoerature, Pressure, and Humidity Conditions Outside Containment The licensee has provided the temperature, pressure, humidity and applicable environment associated with an HELB outside containment. The following area cutside containment has been addressed: :
(1) Auxiliary building The staff has verified that the parameters identified by the licensee for the MSLB are acceptable.
3.5 Submergence The maximum submergence levels have been established and assessed by the licensee.
Unless otherwise noted, the staff assumed for this review that the methodology employed by the licensee is in accordance with the appropriate criteria as established by Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21.
The licensee's value for maximum submergence is 740 ft. O in.
Equipment below this level has been identified by the licensee, along with some justification.
The licensee identified 27 safety-related electrical equipment items as having the potential for becoming submerged after a postulated event.
In these cases, the licensee indicated that these components perform their function. prior to submergence and are not required to operate after a LOCA.
The licensee should provide an assessment of the failure modes associated with the submergence of these components.
The licensee should also provide assurance that the subsequent failure of these components will not adversely affect any other safety functions or mislead an operator.
Additionally, the licensee should discuss operating time, across the spectrum of events, in relation'to the time of submergence.
If the results of the licensee's assess-ment are acceptable, then these components may be exempt from the submergence parameter of qualification.
3.6 Chemical Spray The licensee's FSAR value for the chemical concentration is 2000 ppm boric acid solution; the exact volume percent used by the vendor for qualification testing should be verified by the licensee.
Therefore, for the purpose of this review, the effects of chemical spray will be considered unresolved.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
3.7 Aging NUREG-0588 Category II delineates two aging program requirements.
Valve operators committed to IEEE Standard 382-1972 and motors committed to IEEE Standard 334-1971 must meet the Category I requirements of the NUREG.
This requires the establishment of a qualified life, with maintenance / replacement schedules based on the findings. All other equipment must be subjected to an aging program which identifies aging-susceptit'le materials within the component.
Additionally, the staff requires the licensee to (1) establish an ongoing program to review surveillance and maintenance records to identify potential age-related degradations (2) establish component maintenance and replacement schedules which include considerations of aging characteristics of the installed components #
The licensee identified a number of equipment items for which a specified qualified life was established (for example, 5 years,15 years, or 40 years).
In its assessment of these submittals, the staff did not review the adequacy of the methodology nor the basis used to arrive at these values; the staff has assumed that the established values are based on state-of-the-art technology and are acceptable.
For this review, however, the staff requires that the licensee submit supple-mental information to verify and identify the degree of conformance to the above requirements.
The response should include all the equipment identified as required to maintain functional operability in harsh environments.
The licensee indicated that this phase of the response is outstanding and that the review is in progress.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss its evaluation in a supplemental report.
3.8 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)
The licensee has provided values for the radiation levels postulated to exist following a LOCA. The application and methodology employed to determine these values were presented to the licensee as part of the NRC staff criteria con-tained in the 00R guidelines, in NUREG-0588, and in the guidance provided in IEB-79-01B, Supplement 2.
Therefore, for this review, the staff has assumed that, unless otherwise noted, the values provided have been determined in accordance with the prescribed criteria.
The staff review determined that the values to which equipment was qualified enveloped the requirements identified by the licensee.
The value required by the licensee inside containment is an integrated dose
~anging from 4 x 105 to 1 x 10s rads.
The radiation service condition pro-r vided by the licensee is lower (4 x 107 rads) than provided in the 00R guide-lines for gamma and beta radiation.
The licensee is requested to either provide justification for using the lower service condition or use the service condition provided in the DDR guidelines for both gamma and beta radiation.
If the former option is chosen, then the analysis--including the basis, assumptions, and a sample calculation--should be provided.
A required value outside containment of 1 x 108 rads has been used by the licensee to specify limiting radiation levels for the annulus ventilation system fans in the auxiliary building.
This value appears to consider the radiation levels influenced by the source term methodology associated with post-LOCA recirculation fluid lines and is therefore acceptable.
4 QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT The following subsections present the staff's assessment, based on the licensee's submittal and staff audits, of the qualification status of safety-related electrical equipment.
The staff has separated the safety-related equipment into three categories:
(1) equipment requiring im.ediate corrective action, (2) equinent requiring additional qualification information and/or corrective action, and (3) equip-ment considered acceptable if the staff's concern identified in Section 3.7 is satisfactorily resolved.
In its assessment of the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff did not review the methodology employed to determine the values established by the licensee.
However, in reviewing the data sheets, the staff made a determination as to the stated conditions presented by the licensee. Additionally, the staff has not completed its review of supporting documentation referenced by the licen-see (for example, test reports).
It is expected that when the review of test reports is complete, the environmental qualification data bank established by the staff will provide the means to cross reference each supporting document to the referencing licensee.
If supporting documents are found to be unacceptable, the licensee will be required to take additional corrective actions to either estaclish qualifi-cation or replace the item (s) of concern.
This effort will begin in early 1981.
An appendix for each subsection of this report provides a list of equipcent for which additional information and/or corrective action is required. Where appropriate, a reference is provided in the' appendices to identify deficiencies.
It should be noted, as in the Commission Memorandum and Orcer, that the deficien-cies identified do not necessarily mean that equipment is unqualified.
- However, they are cause for concern and may require further case-by-case evaluation.
4.1 Ecuicment Recuiring Immediate Corrective Action Appendix A identifies equipmer! (if any) in this category. The licensee was asked to review the facility's safety related electrical equipment.
The licensee's review of this equipment identified one equipment type requiring immediate corrective action; these items are
>lenoid valves.
In Significant Deficiency Report SD 369/80-18, the licensee documented that the corrective action for these solenoid valves will be to reolace their coils with a coil of a new design whicn will undergo' qualification 'esting.
The staff will review t
and evaluate the results of this qualification testing for the new coil design.
With the. exception of the above, in this review the staff has not identified any safety-related electrical equipment which is not able to perform its intended safety function during the time in which it must operate.
4.2 Eouiement Recuiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action dppendixBidentifiesequipmentinthiscategory,includingatabulationof deficiencies. The deficiencies are noted by a letter relating to the legend (identified below), indicating that the information provided is not sufficient for the qualification parameter or condition.
Legend R
- radiation T
- tem:erature QT - cualification time RT - required time
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pressure H
- humidity CS - chemical spray j
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- material-aging evaluation; replacement schedule; ongoing equipment 1
i surveillance S
- submergence M
- margin I
- HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM qualification method RPN - equipment relocation or replacement; adequate schedule not provided EXN - exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - separate-effects qualification justification inadequate QI qualification information being developed RPS - equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided As noted in Section 4, these deficiencies do not necessarily mean that the equipment is unqualified.
However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case-by-case evaluation.
The staff has determined that an acceptable basis to exempt equipment from qualification, in whole or part, can be established provided the following can be established and verified by the licensee:
(1) Equipment does not perform essential safety functions in the harsh environ-ment, and equipment failure in the harsh environment will not impact safety-related functions or mislead an operator.
(2a) Equipaent performs its function before its exposure to the harsh environ-ment, and the adequacy for the time margin provided is adequately justified, and
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(2b) Subsequent failure of the equipment as a result of the harsh environment does not degrade other safety functions or mislead the operator.
(3) The safety-related function can be accomplished by some other designated equipment that has been adequately qualified and satisfies the single-failure criterion.
(4) Equipment will not be subjected to a harsh environment as a result of the postulated accident.
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- The 1,icensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presenteu by providing resolutions to the deficiencies identified; these resolutions should include a description of the corrective action, schedules for its completion (as applicable), and so forth. The staff will review the licensee's response, when it is submitted, and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
It should be noted that in cases where testing is being conducted, a condition may arise which results in a determination by the licensee that the equipment i
does not satisfy the qualification test requirements.
For that equipment, the licensee will be required to provide the proposed corrective action, on a timely basis, to ensure that qualification can be established by June 30, 1982.
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4.3 Eouioment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable Based on the staff review of the licensee's submittal, the staff identified the equipment in Appendix C as (1) acceptable on the basis that the qualifica-tion program adequately enveloped the specific environmental plant parameters, or (2) conditionally acceptable subject to the satisfactory resolution of the staff concern identified in Section 3.7.
For the equipment identified as conditionally acceptable, the staff determined that the licensee did not (1) complete and document the equipment material review and evaluation to ensure that no known materials susceptible to degradation because of aging have been used, (2) establish an ongoing program to review the plant surveillance and mainte-nance records in order to identify equipment degradation which may be age related, and/or (3) propose a maintenance program and replacement schedule for equipment identified in item 1 or equipment that is qualified for less than the life of the plant.
The licensee is, therefore, required to supplement the information presented for equipment in this category before full acceptance of this equipment can be established.
The staff will review the licensee's response when it is submitted and discuss the resolution in a supplemental report.
5 DEFERRED REQUIREMENTS IEB 79-018, Supplement 3 has relaxed the time constraints for the submission of the information associated with cold shutdown equipment and TMI lessons-learned modifications.
The staff has required that this information be pro-vided by February 1, 1981.
The staff will provide a supplemental safety evaluation addressing these concerns.
6 CONCLUSIONS The staff has determined that the licensee's listing of safety-related systems and associated electrical equipment whose ability to function in a harsh environment following an accident is required to mitigate a LOCA or HELB is complete and acceptable, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
The staff has also determined that the environmental service conditions to be met by the electrical equipment in the harsh accident environment are appropriate, except as noted in Section 3 of this report.
Outstanding information identi-fied in Section 3 should be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
The staff has reviewed the qualification of safety related electrical equip-ment to the extent defined by this SER and has found no outstanding items which would require immediate corrective action to ensure the safety of plant c;eration.
However, the staff has determined that many items of safety-related electrical equipment identified by the licensee for this review do not have acequate documentation to ensure that they are capable of withstanding the 9_
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harsh environmental service conditions. This review was based on a comparison of the qualification values with the specified environmental values required by the design, which were provided in the licensee's summary sheets.
Subsection 4.2 identified deficiencies that must be resolved to establish the qualification of the equipment; the staff requires that the information lack-ing in this category be provided within 90 days of receipt of this SER.
Within this period, the licensee should either provide documentation of the missing qualification information which demonstrates that such equipment meets the 00R guidelines or NUREG-0588 or commit to a corrective action (requalifi-cation, replacement, relocation, and so forth) consistent with the requirements to establish qualification by June 30, 1982.
If the latter option is chosen, the licensee must provide justification for operation until such corrective action is complete.
Subsection 4.3 identified acceptance and conditional acceptance based on noted deficiencies. Where additional information is required, the licensee should respond within 90 days of receipt of this SER by providing assurance that these concerns will be satisfactorily resolved by June 30, 1982.
Based on these considerations, the staff concludes that conformance with the above requirements and satisfactory completion of the corrective actions by June 30, 1982 will ensure compliance with the Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980.
The staff further concludes that there is reasonable assurance of continued safe operation of this facility pending completion of these corrective actions.
This conclusion is based on the following:
(1) that there are no outstanding items which would require immediate correc-tive action to assure safety of plant operation (2) some of the items found deficient have been or are being replaced or relocated, thus improving the facility's capability to function following a LOCA or HELB (3) the harsh environmental conditions for which this equipment must be qualified result from low probability events; events which might reason-ably be anticipated during this very limited period would lead to less demanding service conditions for this equipment.
APPENDIX A Equipment Requiring Immediate Corrective Action (Category 4.1) 1 LEGEND:
Designation for Deficiency R-Radiation T-Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P-Pressure H-Humidity CS - Chemical spray A-Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance 5-Submergence M-Margin I-HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency
- Valve Solenoid Operator VALCOR V70900+21-1 T,H,A,M V70900-21-3
^ Items for which NRR conducted an audit of environmental qualification documentation A-1
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i APPENDIX B Equipment Requiring Additional Information and/or Corrective Action (Category 4.2)
LEGEND:
Designation for Deficiency R-Radiation T-Temperature QT - Qualification time RT - Required time P-Pressure H-Humidity CS - Chemical spray A-Material aging evaluation, replacement schedule, ongoing equipment surveillance 5-Submergence M-Margin I-HELB evaluation outside containment not completed QM - Qualification method RPN - Equipment relocation or replacement, adequate schedule not provided EXN - Exempted equipment justification inadequate SEN - Separate effects qualification justification inadequate QI - Qualification information being developed RPS - Equipment relocation or replacement schedule provided Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Pressure Transmitters Barton Lot 2 CS,A,M Level Transmitters Barton Lot 2 CS,A,M Level Transmitters (NR)
Barton Lot 2 CS,A,M
- Resistance Temperature Rosemount 176KF CS,A,M Detectors (NR)
- Resistance Temperature Rosemount '.
Hydrogen Recombiner Westinghouse-A CS,A,M Sturtevant
' Items for which NRR conducted an audit of environmental qualification documentation
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Containment Air Joy / Reliance 2XF-330081 CS,A,M Return Fans
- Hydrogen Skimmer Fans Joy / Reliance 1YF-882315 CS,A,M
- Valve Motor Operators Rotork NA1 QT,A,CS,M Valve Motor Operators Limitorque SMB QT,A,CS,M Valve Solenoid Operators -ASCO NP8316E34E CS,QT,A,M Valve Solenoid Operators ASCO NP8316E36E CS,QT,A,M
- Valve Solenoid Operators Target Rock 77CC CS,A,M Containment Air Return Isolation Damper Motors Rotork 11NAZ1 CS,A,M Differential Pressure Solon 7PSIADW CS,A,M Switch Electrical Penetrations D.G. O'Brien Types A,B,C,0,E,F, QT,CS,A,M G,H,J,K,L,M Control, Instrumentation Okonite EP Insulation CS,A,M and Power Cables Instrumentation Cables Okonite Tefzel 280 Insulation QT,CS,A,M
- Control and Power Anaconda EP and EP/Hypalon CS,A,M Cables Insulation Control Cables Brand Rex XLPE Insulation QT,CS,A,M
- Instrumentation Cables Samuel Moore EP/Hypalon Insulation QT,CS,A,M Cable Terminations /
Raychem WCSF-N Splices Material QT,CS,A,M
- Cable Entrance Seals 3M Co.
XR-5240 QT,CS,A,M Stem Mounted Limit NAMCO EA-180 QT,CS,A,M Switches EA-740
^2 ens for wnicn NRR conducted an audit of environmental qualification decamentation B-2
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Radiation Monitor General Atomics RD-23 T,P,H,R,A,CS, QT,M,QM,QI Radiation Monitor Rockbestos RSS-6-104 T,P,H,R,A,CS, Cables QT,M,QM,QI Acoustic Monitor TEC 914 T,P,H,A,R,CS, QT,QM,M,QI Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44587-1573 H,P,A,M,QH Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44587-2573 H,P,A,M,QM Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44587-3573 H,P,A,M,QM Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44587-4573 H,P,A,M,QM Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44689-1574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44689-2S74 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44689-3574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44689-4574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44690-1574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44690-2574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44690-3574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44690-4574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F36530-1575 R,H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F36531-1575 R,H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72L10936-1575 R,H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72L10937-1575 R,H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 73F69618-1575 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 73F69618-2575 H,A,M,QM,P B-3 y
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APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Pump Motors Westinghouse 73F69618-3575 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 73F69618-4575 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44649-1574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44649-2574 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44650-1576 H,A,M,QM,P Pump Motors Westinghouse 72F44650-2576 H,A,M,QM,P Air Handling Unit Reliance 3YF-882311 H,A,M,QM Current / Voltage Alarm Rochester Inst.
ET1215 R,H,P,A,M,QM, QT,QI Fuse Bussmann FNA R,H,P,A,M,QM, QT,QI Fuse Bussmann KiX R,H,P,A,M,QM Fuseblock Bussmann 3792 R,H,P,A,M,QM Fuseblock Bussmann 3839 R,H,P,A,M,QM
- Fuseblock Bussmann 4439 R,H,P,A,M,QM Fuseblock Bussmann 4575 R,H,P,A,M,QM Indicating Light Cutler-Hammer E29 R,H,P,A,M,QM Optical Isolator Electro-Max 1750123 R,H,P,A,M,QM PoweiSupply Lambda LCS R,H,P,A,M,QM, QT,QI Relay Cutler-Hammer D23 R,H,P,A,M,QM Relay Cutler-Hammer 026 R,H,P,A,M,QM Relay Struthers-Dunn 219 R,H,P,A,M, QM,T,
' items for wnicn NRR conducted an audit of environmental qualification J0cumentation B-4 4
APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Relay Agastat 7000 Series R,H,P,A,M, QM,T,QT Resistor Ohmite Brown Devil R,H,P,A,M, QM,T,QT Surge Suppressor General Semi-Tranzorb R,H,P,A,M, conductor QM
- Switch and Indicating Cutler-Hammer E30 R,H,P,A,M, Light QM Switch Cutler-Hammer 10250T R,H,P,A,M, QM Terminal Block States ZhN R,H,P,A,M, QM Terminal Block Buchanan Unknown R,H,P,A,M, QM,QT
' Valve Solenoid Operators ASCO NP8316E36E QT,H,P,A, M,QM Valve Motor Operators Limitorque SMB H,P,A,M,QM Valve Motor Operators Rotork NA1 H,P,A,M,QM Valve Motor Operators Rotork NA2 H,P,A,M,QM
- Limit Switches NAMCO EA-170 T,H,P,A,M, QM
- Limit Switches NAMC0 EA-180 QT,A,M Valve Scienoid Valcor V526 QT,A,CS,M Operators V573 Solenoid Valve Powers 265-0002 R,A Annulus Vent Fan Unknown Unknown R,A Unit Control Panel
^1tems for wnicn NRR conducted an audit of environmental qualification documentation B-5
6 APPENDIX B (Continued)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency AVFU Allison Control Unknown Unknown R,A Panel Temperature Controller Love Controls 54 R,A Temperature Controller Love Controls 834 P., A Temperature Controller Love Controls 838 R,A Temperature Controller Love Controls 8134 R,A Temperature Controller Love Controls 8160 R,A
-Temperature Ccntroller Love Controls 8165 R,A Temperature Controller Love Controls 8173 R,A Temperature Controller Love Controls 8174 R,A Thermostat United Electric 8006-6CS R,A RTD.
Weed 101-1 R,A 2N-A-3-C-6-2-1 Differential Solon 7PSIDW R,A Pressure Switch Differential Solon 7PS1ADW R,A Pressure Switch Diesel Batteries Nife HIP-4 R,A e
0 0
~
B-6 2
APPENDIX C Equipment Considered Acceptable or Conditionally Acceptable (Category 4.3)
Equipment Description Manufacturer Component No.
Deficiency Pump Motors Westinghouse 71F13494-1572 A
Pump Motors Westinghouse 71F13494-2572 A
Pump Motors Westinghouse 71F13495-1572 A
Pump Motors Westinghouse 71F13495-2572 A
Pump Motors Allis-Chalmers Unknown A
Fan Motors Reliance 2YF-273608 A
Fan Motors Reliance 1YF-882812 A
Fan Motors Reliance 1YF-273608 A
Fan Motors Reliance 2YF-882311 A
600 Volt Load Centers Gould K-Line A
Motor Control Centers Nelson Electric Class 10350 A
Potential Transformers, Westinghouse PTM-75 A
RCP Switch Gear Motor Operated Dampers Rotork
_7A/3MW A
Limit-Swtich Micro Switch LSM4N A
Level Transmitters Barton 386A A
O e
C-1
APPENDIX D i
Safety-Related Systems List Function System Emergency Reactor Shutdown Reactor Coolant Reactor Protection Safeguards Actuation Chemical and Volume Control Containment Isolation Containment Isolation Main Feedwater Chemical and Volume Control Component Cooling Residual Heat Removal Auxiliary Feedwater Sampling Safety Injection Reactor Core Cooling Upper Head Injection Residual Heat Removal Accumulators Safety Injection Charging Containment Heat Removal Ice Condenser Containment Spray Residual Heat Removal Core Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal Power Operated Relief Valves Main Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Component Cooling Water Service Water Prevention of Significant Release Ice Condenser of Radioactive Material to the Hydrogen Recombiners Environment Containment Radiation Sampling Supporting Systems Emergency Power Safety Equipment Area Ventilation Control Room Habitability 1The NRC staff recognized that there are differences in nomenclature of systems because of plant vintage and engineering design; consequently, some systems performing identical or similar functions may have different names.
In those instances, it was necessary to verify the function of the system (s) with the responsible IE regional reviewer and/or the licensee.
D-1
.