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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212D1911999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App A,General Design Criterion 57 Closed System Isolation Valves for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211G5261999-08-24024 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief 98-004 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20206N3511999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs ML20198A4481998-12-11011 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That for Relief Request 97-004, Parts 1 & 2,ASME Code Exam Requirements Are Impractical. Request for Relief & Alternative Imposed,Granted ML20249B6281998-06-12012 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting 980303 Request to Review & Approve Proposed Change to Plant,Units 1 & 2 TS Re Relocation of Meteorological Tower ML20248B0441998-05-27027 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative Use of Current TS Section 3/4.7.8 Requirements for Snubber Visual Exam & Functional Testing,Based on Finding That Proposed Alternative Proposes Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20197A6551998-03-0202 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Proposed Action to Set Gwl Alarm at Higher Elevation than Current Level of El 731 Feet ML20203B1071998-02-0404 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Augmented Exam Requirement of Reactor Vessel Shell Welds,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) ML20199F3361998-01-28028 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting 951227 Request for NRC Approval of Proposed EALs to McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198J7651997-10-15015 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting 10-yr Interval Insp Program Plan Alternatives for Listed Plants Units ML20211E6871997-09-22022 September 1997 SER Accepting DPC Responses to GL-95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20148S2231997-07-0202 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Supplemental Test Program for Relief Request 1.4.2 for Units 1 & 2 ML20148H2501997-06-0505 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Restructuring of Util Through Acquisition Of,& Merger W/Panenergy Corp ML20134P2421997-02-20020 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting TR BAW-10199P for Ref in Plants Licensing Documentation & Use in Licensing Applications ML20134G5551996-11-0707 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Application of BWU-Z CHF Correlation for Plants Mark-BW 17x17 Type Fuel ML20059G8601993-10-29029 October 1993 SE Granting 921130 Request for Relief from Requirements of 1986 Edition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI Re Inservice Insp of safety-related Snubbers During Second 10-yr Interval ML20057F4121993-10-12012 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program Requests for Relief.Alternatives Authorized Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) or Relief Granted Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) ML20057A0361993-08-26026 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 138 & 120 to Licenses NPF-9 & NPF-17,respectively ML20056H3191993-08-24024 August 1993 SER Accepting Proposed TS Changes Re RWST & Cla Boron Concentrations ML20126H3171992-12-28028 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Granting Extension of First 10-yr ISI Interval to Coincide W/Start of end-of-cycle 8 Refueling Outage ML20058N7961990-08-0909 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Approving Relief Request 89-01 Re ASME Code Test Requirements for Nuclear Svc Water Sys ML20248C0731989-08-0303 August 1989 Sser Accepting 880601,0909 & 890602 Changes to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry for Plants ML20247H7611989-07-18018 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 100 & 82 to Licenses NPF-9 & NPF-17,respectively ML20246C4621989-06-29029 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Relief from Hydrostatic Testing Requirements of Section XI of ASME Code ML20247C0171989-05-18018 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Actions to Recover from 890307-08 Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event ML20235M7781989-02-23023 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 890505 Relief Request 88-04 Re Addition of Insp Port on Containment Spray HX 1A ML20154H2171988-05-18018 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 880414 Submittal Re Reload Startup Physics Test Program ML20236M9631987-11-0606 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed ATWS Mitigating Sys Actuation Circuitry for Facilities,Per 10CFR50.62(c)(1) & Pending Final Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20236A2901987-10-14014 October 1987 SER Supporting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20236H5291987-07-31031 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 870407 Request for Relief from Hydrostatic Testing Requirements of ASME Code Section XI for Portions of Safety Injection Sys ML20214M3361987-05-22022 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Rept Entitled, Rod Swap Methodology Rept for Startup Physics Testing ML20209B1511987-01-28028 January 1987 SER Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys on-line Testing ML20207E7551986-12-30030 December 1986 SER Supporting Removal of RCS Thermal Sleeves ML20212D7271986-12-29029 December 1986 SER Re Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2), Vendor Interface Programs for Reactor Trip Sys Components. Response Acceptable.Item 2.1 Closed ML20212D7411986-12-29029 December 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 850827 Request for Relief from Hydrostatic Testing Requirements of ASME Code Section XI for Portions of Safety Injection Sys.Relief Justified ML20206M5621986-08-13013 August 1986 SER Accepting 840808 & 850621 Responses to IE Info Notice 84-90, Main Steam Line Break Effect on Environ Qualification of Equipment. Higher Temp Will Not Preclude Ability to Shut Down Reactor in Safe Shutdown Condition ML20215A9671986-05-22022 May 1986 SER Re Util 851207 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs Pertaining to Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation & Surveillance,Per Generic Ltr 85-09.Proposed Tech Specs Should Be Submitted for Review,Per Generic Ltr.Salp Input Also Encl ML20137Y1761986-02-28028 February 1986 SER Accepting SPDS for Interim Implementation Until Listed Open Items Resolved ML20137T8871986-02-0606 February 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting SPDS as Interim Implementation Until Open Issues Resolved.Issues Include Hot Leg Temp,Rhr Flow Rate,Stack Monitor,Steam Generator Radiation & Containment Isolation ML20138R5841985-10-31031 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.1.3,3.2.1,3.2.2,3.2.3,4.1 & 4.5.1 ML20134B8221985-08-0606 August 1985 Sser Supporting Dcrdr ML20128G1111985-06-21021 June 1985 SER of Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2 Re post-trip Review (Data & Info Capability).Response to Item 1.2 Complete & Acceptable ML20129D5521985-05-30030 May 1985 SER Accepting Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review Program Description & Procedure ML20126J3601981-04-30030 April 1981 Safety Evaluation Re Emergency Preparedness Evaluation Rept 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G7951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217F3661999-09-22022 September 1999 Rev 18 to McGuire Unit 1 Cycle 14 Colr ML20212D1911999-09-20020 September 1999 SER Accepting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App A,General Design Criterion 57 Closed System Isolation Valves for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8851999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20217G8101999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 & 2 ML20211G5261999-08-24024 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief 98-004 for Plant,Unit 1 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20210S2371999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E8951999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20209H1631999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210S2491999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H1731999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20195K3691999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N3511999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs ML20195K3761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised MORs for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206R0891999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205L2341999-04-0505 April 1999 SFP Criticality Analysis ML20206R0931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P8991999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205C4171999-03-25025 March 1999 Special Rept 99-02:on 801027,Commission Approved for publication,10CFR50.48 & 10CFR50 App R Delineating Certain Fire Protection Provisions for Nuclear Power Plants Licensed to Operate Prior to 790101.Team Draft Findings Reviewed ML20207K2051999-03-0505 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990128,DG Tripped After 2 H of Operation During Loaded Operation for Monthly Test.Caused by Several Components That Were Degraded or Had Intermittent Problems.Parts Were Replaced & Initial Run Was Performed ML20204C8911999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9021999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C8961999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0301998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20198A4481998-12-11011 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That for Relief Request 97-004, Parts 1 & 2,ASME Code Exam Requirements Are Impractical. Request for Relief & Alternative Imposed,Granted ML20198D7561998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199E0491998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20199E9651998-11-24024 November 1998 Rev 1 to ATI-98-012-T005, DPC Evaluation of McGuire Unit 1 Surveillance Weld Data Credibility ML20196D4171998-11-24024 November 1998 Special Rept 98-02:on 981112,failure to Implement Fire Watches in Rooms Containing Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetrations,Was Determined.Repair of Affected Fire Barriers in Progress ML20196G0581998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 17 to COLR Cycle 13 for McGuire Unit 1 ML20196G0761998-11-0606 November 1998 Rev 15 to COLR Cycle 12 for McGuire Unit 2 ML20198D7771998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E5961998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154L6251998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195E6021998-09-30030 September 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154B4131998-09-22022 September 1998 Rev 0 to ISI Rept for McGuire Nuclear Unit 1 Twelfth Refueling Outage ML20151W3521998-09-0808 September 1998 Special Rept 98-01:on 980819,maint Could Not Be Performed on FPS Due to Isolation Boundary Leakage.Caused by Inadequate Info Provided in Fire Impairment Plan.Isolated Portion of FPS Was Returned to Svc ML20154L6321998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 1 to MOR for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20153B3741998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236U1601998-07-31031 July 1998 Non-proprietary DPC-NE-2009, DPC W Fuel Transition Rept ML20237B2381998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20153B3931998-07-31031 July 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1998 for McGuire Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236P0451998-07-0808 July 1998 Part 21 Rept Re non-conformance & Potential Defect in Component of Nordberg Model FS1316HSC Standby Dg.Caused by Outer Spring Valves Mfg from Matl That Did Not Meet Specifications.Will Furnish Written Rept within 60 Days 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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-[ Sc UNITED STATES -
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- ij_ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wAsmNoToN. D.C. 3000H001
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l SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION t 1
RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 95-07. " PRESSURE LOCKING
[
t AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY-RELATED POWER OPERATED GATE VALVES" MCGulRE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 f
l DOCKET NOS. 50-369 AND 50 370
1.0 INTRODUCTION
i i
Pressure locking and thermal binding represent potential common-cause failure mechanisms that can render redundant safety systems incapable of performing their safety
- functions. The identification of susceptible valves and the determination of when the
- phenomena ml0 ht occur require a thorough knowledge of components, systems, and plant operations. Pressure locking occurs in flexible wedge and double-disk gate valves when fluid becomes pressurized inside the valve bonnet and the actuator is not capable of overcoming the additional thrust requirements resulting from the_oifferential pressure
' created across both valve disks by the pressurized fluid in the valve bonnet. Thermal binding is generally associated with a wedge gate valve that is closed while the system is hot and then is allowed to cool before an attempt is made to open the valve.
Pressure locking or thermal binding occurs as a result of the valve design characteristics (wedge and valve body configuration, flexibility, and material thermal coefficients) when the valve is subjected to specific pressures and temperatures during various modes of
- plant operation. Operating experience indicuea that these situations were not always considered in many plants as part of the design basis for valves.
. 2.0 - REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR) Part 50 (Appendix A, General Design Criteria 1 and 4) and plant licensing safety analyses require or commit (or both) that licensees design and test safety-related components and systems to provide adequate assurance that those systems can perform their safety functions. Other individual criteria in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to specific systems, in accordance with those regulations and licensing commitments, and under the additional provisions of 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix B, Criterion XVI), licensees are expected to act to ensure that safety related power-operated gate valves susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their required safety functions.
On August 17,1995, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves," to request that licensees take certain actions to ensure that safety-related power-operated gate valves that are I
yc;Soo W 9709300207 DR 970922 ADOCK-05000369 PDR ,,
. s 2-susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their safety functions within the current licensing bases of the facility. GL 95-07 requested that each licensee, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter, (1) evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related power operated gate valves in its plant to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, and (2) perform further analyses and take needed corrective actions (or justify longer schedules) to ensure that the susceptible valves, identified in (1) above, are capable of performing their intended safety functions under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration, in addition, GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days of the date of issuance of the generic letter, provide to the NRC a summary description of (1) the susceptibility evaluation used to determine that valves are or are not susceptible to pressure locking or l thermal b% ding, (2) the r6sults of the susceptibility evaluation, including a listing of the susceptible valves identified, and (3) the corrective actions, or other dispositioning, for the valves identified as susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The NRC issued GL 95 07 as a " compliance backfit" pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i) because modification may be necessary to bring facilities into compliance with the rules of the Commission referenced above.
In a letter of February 13,1996, Duke Power Company submitted its 180 day response to GL 95-07 for McGuire Nuclear Station. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's submittal and requested additional information in a letter dated July 1,1996. By letters dated July 31,1996, and June 11,1997, the licensee provided the additional information.
Between December 9 and 12,1996, the NRC staff performed an inspection to review specific aspects of information summarized in the licensee's responses to GL 95-07. This inspection is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-369, 370/97-11. The licensee responded to the inspection report findings in a letter dated February 3,1997. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's four submittals as discussed in this safety evaluation.
3.0 STAFF EVALUATION 3.1 Scope of Licensee's Review GL 95-07 requested that licensees evaluate the operational configurations of safety-related power-operated gate valves in their plants to identify valves that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. The Duke Power Company's letters of February 13 and July 31,1996, and February 3,1997, described the scope of valves evaluated in response to GL 95 07. The NRC staff has reviewed the scope of the licensee's susceptibility evaluation performed in response to GL 95-07 and found it complete and acceptcble.
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3.2 Corrective Actions GL 95-07 requested that licensees, within 180 days, perform further analyses as appropriate, and take appropriate corrective actions (or justify longer schedules), to ensure that the susceptible valves identified are capable of perforniing their intended safety function under all modes of plant operation, including test configuration.
The licensee's submittals discussed its proposed corrective actions to address potential pressure-locking and thermal-binding problems. The staff's evaluation of the licensee's actions is discussed in the following paragraphs.
- a. The licensee stated that the following valves were evaluated for pressure locking and modified to eliminate that potential:
2 N10121 A, 0152B Medium Head injection Pumps to Hot Leg 1,2 N101848,0185A Containment Sump Isolation 1,2 SA0048A,B,C Steam Generator C to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1,2 SA0049A,B Steam Generator B to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1 FWOO27A Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply 1 ND0058A Low Head Inj. Pump to High and Medium injection 1 N10121 A, 0152B Medium Head injection Pump to Hot Leg 1 N101368 Low Head injection Pump to Medium Injection 1 N10183B Low Head injection Pump to Hot Leg 1 NS00018,0018A Containment Spray Pump Sump Suction 1 NS0038B,0043A Low Head injection to Auxiliary Spray 1 NV0221A,0222B High Head injection Pump Suction The staff finds that physical modification to valves susceptible to pressure locking is an appropriate corrective action to ensure operability of the valves and is thus acceptable,
- b. The licensee stated that the following valves will be modified to eliminate the potential for pressure locking during the Unit 1 refueling outage, Cycle 12, scheduled for fall 1998, and the Unit 2 refueling outages, Cycles 11 and 12, scheduled for fall 1997 and spring 1999, respectively:
2 FWOO27A Refueling Water Storage Tank Supply 1,2 LD0108A,0113B Diesel Generator Lube Oil Filter Bypass 2- ND0058A Low Head in). Pump to High and Medium injection 1,2 N10009A,0010B High Head injection Pump to Cold Leg 2 N10136B Low Head injection Pump to Medium injection 2 NIO183B Low Head injection Pump to Hot Leg 2 NS0001B,0018A Containment Spray Pump Sump Suction 2 NS00388,0043A Low Head injection to Auxiliary Spray 2- NV0221A,0222B High Head injection Pump Suction
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I 4
Until these valves are modified, a methodology developed by the Commonwealth Edison
- Company (Comed) to predict the thrust required to overcome pressure locking was used to demonstrate operability for valves 1,2 LD0108A,0113B; 2 NIO183B; 2 NS0001B,0018A; and 2 NV0221 A,0222B. Operational experience or testing representative of prest:re- '
locking conditions was used to demonstrate operability for the rsmaining valves. The staff finds that these provide reasonable assurance that the valves will be operable until the i
planned modifications to prevent pressure locking are completed as scheduled. See paragraph 3.2.d for more discussion of the Comed pressure-locking methodology. The licensee's commitment to modify these valves in the long term is an acceptable final resolution.
c.
The licensee stated that procedures were modified to cycle the following valves following evolutions that could potentially create a pressure-locking condition:
1,2 NS0012B,0015B Containment Spray Pump Discharge to Header B 1,2 NS0029A,0032A Containment Spray Pump Discharge to Header A
)
The staff finds that the licensee's procedural changes to require cycling the valves provide assurance that pressure locking conditions are adequately identified and eliminated, and are, thus, acceptable.
d.
The licensee stated that, for long-term corrective action, the Comed thrust-prediction methodology was used to demonstrate that the following valves would open under pressure locking conditions:
1,2 NCOO31B, OO33A,0035B Pressurizer Power Operated Helief Valve (PORV)
Sock Valves Under certain conditions, the staff finds that the Comed methodology provides a technically sound basis for assuring that valves susceptible to pressure locking are capable of performing their intended safety-related function. On April 9,1997, a public meeting was held to discuss the Comed pressure-locking thrust prediction methodology presented '
in the licensees'submittals responding to GL 95-07. The minutes of the public meeting were issued on April 25,1997. . At the public meeting, Comed recommended that, when using its methodology, minimum margins should be applied between calculated pressure-locking thrust and actuator capability. - For those valves identified in this safety evaluation that use the Comed pressure-locking thrust prediction methodology for interim and long-term corrective action, the licensee should ensure that the margin between calculated pressure-locking thrust and actuator capability meets or exceeds these minimum requirements. At the meeting, Comed indicated that its methodology is undergoing review and may be revised or enhanced. The licensee is responsible for ensuring that the thrust-values calculated to overcome pressure locking for these valves remain valid following implementation of any revisions or enhancements to the Comed methodology. The staff is reviewing the Comed methodology and willissue a safety evaluation for the methodology.
)
- c. . .
.s.
- e. The licensee stated that all flexible and solid wedge gate valves in the scope of GL 95 07 were evaluated for thermal binding. When evaluating whether valves were susceptible to thermal binding, the licensee assumed that thermal binding would not occur below specific temperature thresholds. These assumptions were based on industry experience. The licensee did not consider that gate valves in systems with a normal operating temperature less than 200 'F were susceptible to thermal binding. Further, the liccnsee did not consider that flexible wedge gate valves that are shut and that experience a cooldown differential temperature of less than 100 'F, and solid wedge gate valves that are shut and that experience a cooldown differential temperature of less than 50 *F prior to opening, were susceptible to thermal binding.
Operating conditions for the pressurizer PORV block valves 1,2 NCOO31B,0033A, and 0035B exceed these temperature thresholds. In the February 3,1997, submittal, the licensee stated that valves 1,2 NC0031B,0033A, and 00358 would be modified before or during the respective unit's Cycle 13 refueling outage. Operability until the valves are modified is demonstrated by the valve bodies and disks being made of the same material with the same coefficient of thermal expansion, the valve bodies being insulated, and favorable operational experience.
The screening criteria used by the licensee appear to provide a reasonable approach to identify those valves that mi;ht t be susceptible to thermal binding. Until more definitive industry criteria are developeu, the staff concludes that the licensee's actions to address thermal binding of gate valves are acceptable.
4.0 CONCLUSION
On the basis of this evaluation, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has performed appropriate evaluations of the operational configurations of safety-related power operated gate valves to identify valves at McGuire, Units 1 and 2, that are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding. In addition, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has taken, or is scheduled to take, appropriate corrective actions to ensure that these valves are capable of performing their intended safety functions. Therefore, the staff ccncludes that the licensee has adequately addressed the requested actions discussed in GL 95-07.
Principal Contributor: S. Tingen Date: September 22, 1997 l
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