ML19289D854
ML19289D854 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | 05000584 |
Issue date: | 03/09/1979 |
From: | Prieto R GIBBS & HILL, INC. (SUBS. OF DRAVO CORP.) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML19289D852 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 7903190225 | |
Download: ML19289D854 (277) | |
Text
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GIBBSSAR Amendment 10 Instruction Sheet The following instructional information is being provided to insert Amendment 10 into GIBBSSAR, the Gibbs & Hill Standard Safety Analysis Report. Please destroy the sheets removed and insert the new sheets as indicated below.
7903190 Pk
Remove Insert (Front /Back) (Front /Back) 1.1-1/l.1-2 1.1-1/1.1-2 T1.8-1 Sh 3/T1.8-1 Sh 4 T1.8-1 Sh 3/T1.8-1 Sh 4 T1.8-1 Sh 9/T1.8-1 Sh 10 T1.8-1 Sh 8/T1.8-1 Sh 10 T1.8-1 Sh 13/T1.8-1 Sh 14 T1.8-1 Sh 13/T1.8-1 Sh 14 T1.8-1 Sh 15/T1.8-1 Sh 16 T1.8-1 Sh 14a/T1.8-1 Sh 15 T1.8-1 Sh 15a/T1.8-1 Sh 16 3.1-11/3.1-12 3.1-11/3.1-12 3.1-14/3.1-16 3.1-15/3.1-16 3.2-1/3.2-2 3.2-1/3.2-2 T3.2-1 Sh 10a/T3.2-1 Sh 11 T3.2-1 Sh 10a/T3.2-1 Sh 11 3.5-7/3.5-7a 3.5-7/3.5-7a 3.6-3/3.6-3a 3.6-3/3.6-3a T3.ll-4 Sh 1/T3.ll-4 Sh 2 T3.ll-4 Sh 1/T3.ll-4 sh la T3.ll-4 Sh 2 8-i/8-ia 8-i/8-ii 8-ii/- 8-iii/8-iv 8-iii/-
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T9.4-4 Sh 1/T9.4-4 Sh 2 T9.4-4 sh 1/T9.4-4 Sh 2 T9.4-8 Sh 1/T9.4-8 Sh 2 T9.4-8 Sh 1/T9.4-8 Sh 2 T9.4-9 Sh 1/T9.4-9 Sh 2 T9.4-9 Sh 1/T9.4-9 Sh 2 T9.4-12/- T9.4-12/-
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T10.4-2 Sh 1/T10.4-2 Sh 2 T10.4-2 Sh 1/T10.4-2 Sh 2 T10.4-2 Sh 3/T10.4-3 T10.4-2 Sh 3/T10.4-3 Tll.2-2/Tll.2-3 Sh 1 Tll.2-2 Sh 1/Tll.2-2 Sh 2 Tll.2-2 Sh 3/Tll.2-2 Sh 4
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Tll.2-3 Sh 2/- Tll.2-3 Sh 1/T11.2-3 Sh 2 Tll.2-3 Sh 3/Tll.2-3 Sh 4 Tll.2-5 Sh 1/T11.2-5 Sh 2 Tll.2-5 Sh 1/Tll.2-5 Sh 2 Tll.2-5 Sh 3/T11.2-5 Sh 4 T11.2-5 Sh 3/T11.2-5 Sh 4 Tll.2-5 Sh 5/T11.2-5 Sh 6 T11.2-5 Sh 5/Tll.2-5 Sh 6 T11.2-5 Sh 7/Tll.2-5 Sh 8 Tll.2-5 Sh 7/T11.2-5 Sh 8 T11.2-5 Sh 9/Tll.2-5 Sh 10 Tll.2-5 Sh 9/Tll.2-5 Sh 10 Tll.2-5 Sh 11/Tll.2-5 Sh 12 T11.2-5 Sh 11/Tll.2-5 Sh 12 Tll.2-5 Sh 12a/T11.2-5 Sh 13 Tll.2-5 sh 12a/Tll.2-5 Sh 13 Tll.2-5 Sh 14/Tll.2-5 Sh 15 Til.2-5 Sh 14/Tll.2-5 Sh 15 T11.2-5 Sh 16/Tll.2-5 Sh 17 Tll.2-5 sh 16/Tll.2-5 Sh 17 Tll.2-5 Sh 18/Tll.2-5 Sh 19 Tll.2-5 Sh 18/T11.2-5 Sh 19 Tll.2-5 Sh 20/Tll.2-5 Sh 21 Tll.2-5 Sh 20/T11.2-5 Sh 21 Tll.2-5 Sh 22/Tll.2-5 Sh 23 T11.2-5 Sh 22/Tll.2-5 Sh 23 Tll.2-5 Sh 24/Tll.2-5 Sh 25 T11.2-5 Sh 24/T11.2-5 Sh 25 Tll.2-5 Sh 26/Tll.2-5 Sh 27 Tll.2-5 Sh 26/T11.2-5 Sh 27 T11.2-5 Sh 28/Tll.2-5 Sh 29 Tll.2-5 Sh 28/Til.2-5 Sh 29 T11.2-6 Sh 1/Tll.2-6 Sh 2 Tll.2-6 Sh 1/Tll.2-6 Sh 2 Tll.3-2/Tll.3-3 Sh 1 Tll.3-2/Tll.3-3 Sh 1 Tll.4-1/T11.4-2 Sh 1 Tll.4-1/Tll.4-2 Sh 1
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Tll.4-2 Sh. 2/Tll.4-2 Sh. 3 Tll.4-2 Sh. 2/T11.4-2 Sh. 3 Tll.4-2 Sh. 4/T11.4-2 Sh. 5 T11.4-2 Sh. 4/Tll.4-2 Sh. 5 Tll.4-2 Sh. 6/Tll.4-2 Sh. 7 Tll.4-2 Sh. 6/Tll.4-2 Sh. 7 Tll.4-2 Sh. 8/T11.4-2 Sh. 9 T11.4-2 Sh. 8/Tll.4-2 Sh. 9 Tll.4-2 Sh. 10/T11.4-2 Sh. 11 T11.4-2 Sh. 10/Tll.4-2 Sh. 11 Tll.4-2 Sh. 12/Tll.4-2 Sh. 13 T11.4-2 Sh. 12/T11.4-2 Sh. 13 Tll.4-2 Sh. 14/- Tll.4-2 Sh. 14/Tll.4-2 Sh. 15 3/4 8-1/3/4 8-2 3/4 8-1/3/4 8-2 3/4 8-3/3/4 8-4 3/4 8-3/3/4 8-3a 3/4 8-4/3/4 8-4a 3/4 8-4b/3/4 8-4c 3/4 8-7/3/4 8-8 3/4 8-7/3/4 8-8 3/4 8-9/3/4 8-10 3/4 8-8a/3/4 8-9 3/4 8-9a/3/4 8-10
Insert (Front /Back) 0010- 22/Q010- 23 0010- 34/Q010- 35 0010- 82/Q010- 83 0010- 84/Q010- 85 0010- 86/0010- 87 0010- 88/Q010- 89 0010- 90/0010- 91 0010- 92/0010- 93 0010- 94/0010- 95 0010- 96/0010- 97 0010- 98/0010- 99 0010-100/0010-101 0010-102/0010-103 0010-104/Q010-105 0010-106/Q010-107 0040- 1/0040- 2 0040- 3/0040- 4 0040- 5/0040- 6 0040- 7/Q040- 8 0040- 9/0040- 10 0040- 11/0040- 12 0040- 13/0040- 14 0040- 15/Q040- 16 0040- 17/Q040- 18 0040- 19/0040- 20 0040- 21/0040- 22 0040- 23/Q040 24 0040- 25/Q040 26 0040- 27/Q040 28 0040- 29/0040- 30 0040- 31/0040- 32 0040- 33/0040- 34 0040- 35/Q040- 36 0040 37/00^o- 3R
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0040- 45/Q04^- - s 0040- 47/Q040- 48 0040 49/Q040- 50 0040- 51/0040- 52 0040- 53/0040- 54 0040- 55/Q040- 56 004'1- 57/Q040- 58 0040- 59/0040- 60 0040- 61/0040- 62 0040- 63/0040- 64 0040- 65/Q040 66
Insert (Front /Back) 0040- 67/0040- 68 0040- 69/0040- 70 0040- 71/0040- 72 0040- 73/0040- 74 0040- 75/Q040- 76 0040- 77/0040- 78 0040- 79/-
FIGURES Remove Insert 3.6-1A 3.6-1A 3.6-1B 3.6-1B 3.7-8 3.7-8 3.7-9 3.7-9 3.7-10 3.7-10 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-12 3.7-12 3.7-14 3.7-14 6.2-25 6.2-25 8.3-2 8.3-2 8.3-3 8.3-3 8.3-4 8.3-4 8.3-5 8.3-5 8.3-6 8.3-6 8.3-7 8.3-7 8.3-8 8.3-8 8.3-9 8.3-9 8.3-10 8.3-10 8.3-11 8.3-11 9.1-3 9.1-3 9.1-3a Sh. 2 9.1-3a Sh. 2 9.2-1 9.2-1 9.2-2 9.2-2 9.2-4a Sh. 1 9.2-4a Sh. 1 9.2-5 9.2-5 9.2-6 9.2-6 9.4-4 9.4-5 9.4-5 9.4-6 9.4-6 9.4-7 -
9.4-7 9.4-8 9.4-8 9.4-9 9.4-9 9.4-10 9.4-10 Sh. 1 9.4-10 Sh. 2 9.4-12 9.4-12 9.4-13 9.4-13 9.4-14 9.4-14 9.4-15 9.4-15 9.4-19 9.5-1B 9.5-1B 9.5-4 9.5-4 9.5-5 9.5-5 9.5-8 9.5-8 9.5-9
FIGURES Remove Insert 10.1-1 10.1-1 '
10.1-4 10.1-4 10.1-7 10.3-1 10.3-1 10.3-la Sh. 2 10. 3-la Sh . 2 10.3-lb Sh. 2 10.3-lb Sh. 2 10.4-3 10.4-3 10.4-3a Sh. 1& 2 10.4-3a Sh. 1 & 2 10.4-4 10.4-4
GIBBSSAR
- 1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT 1.1 Introduction This Gibbs & Hill, Inc. Standard Safety Analysis Report (GIBBSSAR) supports an application for preliminary approval of the standard plant design described herein. GIBBSSAR is submitted to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission (NRC) in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
specifically 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 0. GIBBSSAR follows NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70 (Standard Format and Content of Safety 1 Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2, issued for comment by the NRC in September, 1975).
GIBB6SAR is intended to support a Utility-Applicant's construction permit application for a station of any number of units in either single or nultiple layouts. The Utility-Applicant will incorporate, by reference, the GIBBSSAR design.
The standard plant design described in GIBBSSAR accommodates a large number of sites within the continental United States. The acceptable range of site-related design criteria is established in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report.
The nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) supplied by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
The containment is a steel-lined, reinforced-concrete, cylindrical structure with a hemispherical dome designed by Gibbs S Hill, Inc. (GSH) .
Each generating unit is rated to operate at core power levels up to 3800 regawatts thermal (MWt) ; this corresponds to an electrical output of approximately 1335 negawatts electrical (MWe) at the generator terminals. However, the 10 radiological consequences of plant accidents are evaluated for a core power level of 4100 MWt. This power rating is used in the analyses of all postulated accidents that bear significantly upon y the acceptability of a site (per the criteria set forth in 10 CFR Part 100).
E-414 1.1-1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR The interfaces between the systems described in GIBESSAR and those of the NSSS vendor are identified in Section 1. 8 ar.d discussed in the applicable sections of this report.
1 The NSSS vendor's Reference Safety Analysis Report, RESAR-414, will be referred to as NSSS SSAR (Nuclear Steam Supply System Standard Safety Analysis Report) , The NSSS SSAR applies in GISBSSAR in all areas except where noted. Specific exceptions taken to RESAR-414 are listed in Table 1.1-1. Text pages and tables containing infornation specific to the Westinghouse NSSS 6 SSAR, RESAR-414 will be printed in blue and marked with W-414, and Kestinghouse-414 respectively.
O E-414 1.1-2 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 3 of 20)
Systeg E-414 GSH U-A
- d. Combustible Gas Control in Containment (6. 2. 5) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x
- e. Containment Ieakage Testing (6. 2. 6) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x
- f. Hydrogen Purge System (6. 2.7) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x
- g. Containment Hydrogen Moni-toring System (6. 2. 8) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 CESIGN PESPCTSIEILITY (Kestinchouse-414)
(Sheet 4 of 20)
Syntog K-4_14 GCH U-A
- h. Emergency Core Cooling System (6. 3) :
Overall system design x Component design require-nents x Piping layout and stress analysis . x
- i. Habitability Systema (6.4) :
Overall system design x ggg Component design require-ments x
- j. Emergency Boration System: Deleted 10
- 7. JNSTFUMENTATION bNC CCNTFOLS
- a. Peactor Trip System (7. 2) x
- t. Control Panel Layout and Design:
Main control board x Auxiliary shutdown panel x Diesel generator panel x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 9 of 20)
System W-414 GSH U-A Lighting systems (see sub-section 9.5. 3.) x Lightning protection x Computer x Seismic instrunentation x Electric space heaters x Heat tracing x
- 9. AUXILIABX_ SYSTEMS
- a. New Fuel Storage (9.1.1) :
Overall storage system design x Storage system component design requirements x 10 new fuel storage racks x
- h. Spent Fuel Storage (9.1. 2) :
Overall storage system ,
design x Storage system component design requirements:
spent fuel storage pool x spent filel cask storage pool x spent fuel storage racks x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 10 of 20)
Systeg W-413 GSH U-A
- c. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System ( 9.1. 3) cverall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
- d. Fuel Handling System
( 9.1. 4) :
Cverall system design within O
containment x overall system design within fuel handling building x Fuel handling system compo-nent design requirements refueling cavity bridge x uponder x fuel transfer tube and transfer car x 0
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 CESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 11 of 20)
System W-414 GSH U-A Spent fuel pool bridge x l 10 new fuel elevator x 130-ton fuel building crane x spent fuel cask x decontamination equip-ment x l 10 other fuel handling tools and equipment x containment polar crane x l 10
- e. Station Service Kater Sys-tem (9. 2.1) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
- f. Cooling System for R'eactor Auxiliaries ( 9. 2. 2) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPCNSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 12 of 20)
System W-414 GSH U-A
- g. Denineralized Kater Makeup System (9. 2. 3) :
Cverall systen design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
- h. Potable and Sanitary Water Systems (9. 2. 4) x
- i. Ultimate Heat Sink (9. 2. 5) x 4
- j. Condensate Storage Faci-lities (9. 2. 6) x
- k. Kater Treatment System (9. 2. 7) x
- 1. Plant Ventilation Chilled Kater System (9. 2. 8) x
- n. Ventilation Safety Feature Chilled Water System (9. 2. 9) ,
x
- n. Compressed Air Systems
( 9. 3.1) x
- c. Process Sampling System (9. 3. 2) :
Feactor plant sanpling system design x Turbine plant sampling system design x
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 13 of 20)
System W-414 GSH U-A
- p. Equipnent and Floor Drain-age System ( 9. 3. 3) x
- q. Chemical and Volume Control System (9.3.4) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
- r. Air-Conditioning, Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation Systems design x
- s. Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling, and Ventilation Subsystem Design:
Control rocm area ventila-tion system ( 9. 4.1) x Spent fuel pool area ven-tilation system (9. 4. 2) x Auxiliary and radwaste area ventilation systems (9.4.3) x Turbine building area venti-lation system (9.4.4) x Engineered safety features ventilation system (9.4.5) x Containment ventilation system (9. 4. 6) x
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 14 of 20)
System W-414 GSH U-A
- t. Fire Protection System (9. 5.1) :
cverall system design x Component design require-nents x
- u. Communications System (9. 5. 2) :
cverall system design x Component design require-nents x ggg
- v. Lighting Systens (9.5.3):
cverall system design x Component design require-nents x
- h. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil-Storage and Transfer Sys-tem (9. 5. 4) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
- x. Diesel Generator Cooling Water System ( 9. 5. 5) x Overall system design x l 10 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 CESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Eestinghouse-414)
(Sheet 14a of 20)
System W-414 G6H U-A Component design require-nents x
- y. Diesel Generator Starting System (9. 5. 6) x 10 cverall system design x Component design require-nents x 6 Amendment 10
GIBESSAR TABLE 1.8-1 EESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 15 of 20)
Systg W-414 GSH U-A
- 2. Diesel Generator Lubrica-tion System (9.5.7) x overall syster design x 10 Component design require-Kents x aa. Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System ( 9. 5. 8) :
Overall system design x Component design require- 10 ments x
- 10. ETEAM_AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
- a. Turbine-Generator (10.2):
Overall system design in-cluding turbine steam system x Component design require-Kents x Piping layout and stress analysis x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 15a of 20)
System W-413 G6H U-A
- t. Main Steam Supply System (10.3) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
(
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 1.8-1 EESIGN RESPONSIBILITY (Westinghouse-414)
(Sheet 16 of 20)
Systen W-414 GSH U-A
- c. Main Condensers ( 10. 4.1) :
Overall systen design x
- d. Main Condenser Evacuation System ( 10. 4. 2) :
Overall system design x
- e. Turbine Gland Sealing Sys-tem ( 10. 4. 3) :
Overall system design x Component design require-ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x
- f. Turbine Bypass System (10. 4.4) :
Overall system design x Control system analysis x Component design require . -
ments x Piping layout and stress analysis x 0
GIBBSSAR 3.1.13 Criterion 13 - Instrumentation and Control Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pre ssure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems.
Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.
Discussion GCH supplied instrumentation, control and power systems interf ace l 10 with appropriate NSSS vendor instrumentation and control systems to monitor significant variables in the reactor core, reactor coolant systems and containment structure over their anticipated range for all conditions to assure adequate safety. The installed instrumentation provides continuous monitoring, warning, and initiation of ESF. Refer to Chapter 7 and 8 for l 10 deta ils.
For information on the instrumentation and controls within the NSSS vendor's scope, refer to Section 3.1 and Chapter 7 of the NSSS SSAR.
3.1-11 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 3.1.14 Criterion 14 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Eoundary The reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, fabr icated, erected and tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure, and of gross ruptore.
Discussion This criterion is within the scope of the NSSS vendor. Refer to Section 3.1 of the NSSS SSAB.
O 3.1-12
GIBBSSAR 3.1.17 Criterion 17 - Electric Power Systems An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems and components important to safety. The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limite and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and
( 2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
The onsite electric power sources, including the batteries and the onsite electrical distribution system shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions, assuming a single failure.
Electric power from the transmi ssion network to the onsite electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights-of-way) designed and located so as to minimize to the e xtent practical
- the likelihood of their simultaneous f ailure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard common to both circuits is acceptable. Each of these circuits shall be designed to be available in sufficient time following a loss of all onsite alternating-current power supplies and the other offsite electrical power circuit, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. One of these circuits shall be designed to be available within a few seconds follcwing a loss-of-coolant accident to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained.
Provisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss from the onsite electrical power supplies.
3.1-15
GIBBSSAF Discussion Onsite and offsite electric power systems are provided, and designed with adequate independence, capacity, red undancy, and testability to assure the functioning of safety-related systems.
Independence is provided for both systems by physical separation of components and cables, to minimize vulnerability of redundant systems to single credible accidents. For details of separation see Chapter 8.
Two independent offsite power sources are available on an immediate basis from two physically independent transmission line systems.
The primary offsite power source provides power through the station service transformers to the ESF buses. If this system fails, the alternate of fsite power source immediately available provides power to the ESF buses through the main stepup and unit auxiliary transformers. Thus, a single component failure does not prevent power from being supplied to the ESF buses. See Sect ion 8.2 for details.
The onsite ac source of electric power consists of two diesel 4 generators; one connected and used exclusively for Train A, and one connected and used exclusively for Train B. One diesel generator is capable of supplying sufficient power for the operation of the minimum ESF required for the unit during a postulated LCCA. During a postulated ICCA, both diesel gene rators start automatically; if offsite power is also unavailable, then the generators will be automatically connected to their respective ESF buses. 10 Safety-related loads are sequentially loaded onto the ESF buses whether the ESF Buses are powered from the onsite or offsite power source.
The two ESF buses and their associated diesel generators are arranged so that failure of a single component does not preven t the power supply systems from performing their function. See Section 8.3 for details.
Four dc batteries are provided in physically separated rooms, and each b:.ttery is adequate to supply the de control power required for the ESF. Failure of a single component in this system does not impair control of the minimum ESF required to maintain the unit in a safe condition. See Table 8.3, Failure Mode Analysis.
3.1-16 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 3. 2 Classification of Structures, components, and Systems This section classifies structures, systems, and components according to their importance in providing reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
For the seismic and safety classifications of the NSSS vendor's piping systems and their components, refer to the NSSS SSAR, Section 3.2.
3.2.1 Seismic Classification Seismic design classification is in accordance with NRC Pegulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification."
Table 3. 2-1 lists all systems, other than those referenced above, which are important to plant safety and their classification acco rding to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 and ANSI N18.2. The exceptions are the electrical power systems, which are listed in Sect ion 3.10.
Seismic Category I structures, componants, and systems are designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and operating basis earthquake (OBE) as discussed in Section 3.7, and other applicable load combinations as discussed in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. All Safety Class 1, Safety Class 2, or Safety Class 3 components are classified as Seismic Category I. Seismic Category I structures are sufficiently isolated or protected from other structures to insure that their integrity is maintained.
Classification of instrumentation, piping and valves, ductwork and dampers, and associated supports, hangers, and restraints is consistent with the boundaries shown on the flow diagrams.
In addition, certain systems designated as non-nuclear-safety-related, and whose failure could impair the function of an ESF system are designated Seismic Category I, and their safety classification is shown on the flow diagrams.
GIBBSSAR 3.2.1.1 Seismic Category I Structures The following structures are classified as seismic Category I:
- a. Containment
- b. Internal structure of containment
- c. Auxiliary building (including control room, fuel handling area including spent fuel pool and fuel pool liners, and l 10 engineered safety features area) 3.2.1.2 Seismic Category I Lifting Devices The following lifting devices are classified as seismic Category I:
- a. Fuel handling area overhead crane
- b. Polar bridge crane
- c. Containment Fuel storage crane
- d. Crumming storage area crane 9
Individual mechanical components other than the lifting devices deta iled in this subsection, which are designed to remain functional during a SSE, are listed in Table 3. 2- 1.
3.2.2 System Quality Group Classification The quality group classifications for each water and stean-containing pressure component are shown in Table 3.2-1.
The components are classified according to their importance to safety as dictated by service and functional requirements and by the consequences of their failure. The quality group classifications are in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.26, "Q ua lity Group Classifications and Standards for Water , Steam ,
and Fadioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants."
The code requirements applicable to each quality group classification are identified in Table 3.2-2. The quality group classifications and the interfaces between classifications in a system with components of different classifications are indicated on the appropriate system flow diagrams.
3.2-2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Sheet 10a of 21)
CLASSIFICATION OF COMPONENTS, AND SYSTEMS ANSI Construction Classi- Codes and System fication Standards Components (Note 1) (Note 2) _
Fire Protection System Fire protection booster pumps 3 g. 3)
System piping and valves (used 3 g. 3) as seismic Category I makeup supply to CCW and Safety 10 Feature Chilled Water system and Spent Fuel Pool)
System piping, valves, and NNS e. 3) , n, u hose stations (serving safety related equipment)
IDgrumeDt Air sygem Air compressor NNS w Containment isolation valves 2 g. 2)
Air receiver NNS g. 5) 5 System piping and valves NNS e . 3)
(up to and excluding containment isolation valves)
Accunulators NNS g. 5)
Amendment 10
1 GIBBSSAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Sheet 11 of 21)
CLASSIFICATION OF COMPONENTS, AND SYSTEMS l5 ANSI Construction Classi- Codes and System fication Standards Components (Note 11 (Note 2) __
Fervice_b_ir System Air compressor NNS w 5 Containment isolation valves 2 g. 2)
Air receiver NNS g. 5)
Piping and valves (up NNS e.3) to and excluding 5 containment isolation valvcs) lll Elcor orainaae System ESF huilding sump pumps NNS w 5
Piping and valves (pump NNS e. 3) discharges)
Service Kater System Pumps 3 g. 3)
Piping and valves (required 3- g. 3) for the performance of those components for normal- and saf ety-f unction operation)
Strainers 3 g. 3)
Amendment 5
GIBBSSAR Missiles generated by floods are not a design consideration as the PMF level generally is not higher than plant grade. In the 10 event the PMF level is higher than plant grade, protection from water borne missiles will be provided if needed and will be addressed in the Utility Applicant's SAR.
3.5.1.5 Missiles Generated by Events Near the Site Accidental explosions near the site are site-related. The Utility-Applicant's SAR will identify locations of train, truck, ship or barge, industrial facilities, pipelines, and military facilities which may become sources of explosions and create significant loadings on structures. All Seismic Category I structures are designed for tornado loadings for Region I and associated missiles in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.76, Fef. 2. (see subsection 3. 5.1. 4.) For any specific site, the adequacy of the Seismic Category I structures is verified for loadings caused by explosions near site in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.91, Ref. 3.
3.5.1.6 Aircraft Hazards This info rmation is site-related and is presented in thel 7 Utility-Applicant's SAR.
3.5.2 Systems to be Protected All plant structures, systems, and components whose failure could lead to offsite radiological consequences or which are required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition, assuming a single failure, are listed in Table 3.2-1.
In addition, the systems protected inside containment are listed in Table 3. 5-11 systems outside containment required for safe 7
shutdown are all protected regardless of the missile source.
The safety-related system has redundancy and/or is protected against damage by internally generated missiles by a combination of barriers and physical arrangements. Only one internally generated missile is postulated at a time.
6 All safety-related NSSS and BOP systems are housed in seismic Category I Structures which are designed to provide protection from tornado-generated missiles.
3.5-7 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR In general, reinforced concrete floors and internal compartment walls are used as barriers for protection of all essential components and systems against postulated missiles. For arrangement of floors and internal walls see Figures 3.8-1 to 3.8-3 (Structural Plant Arrangement) : for general arrangement see Figures 1.2-3 through 1.2-10.
9 3.5-7a Amendment 7 9
GIBB3SAR
- b. Fluid flow from a crack is based on a circular opening equal to that of the area of a rectangle, one-half pipe diameter in length and one-half pipe wall thickness in width.
- c. The flow from the crack is assumed to result in an environment that wets all unprotected components within the compartment, with consequent flooding in the compartnent and communicating compartments. Flooding effects are determined on the basis of a conservatively estimated time period required to effect corrective actions.
The following discussion is included to demonstrate how the RHP! 7 and CCW system will be protected from high and moderate energy line breaks, in the engineered safety features area of the 10 Auxiliary Building, in accordance with BTP APCSB 3-1.
for the engineered safety 7 The preliminary piping arrangement features area is shown on Figures 3.6-9 through 3.6-14 showing the PHR and CCW piping and other safety related systems. l 10 The PHR equipment, ie, pumps, heat exchangers, valves, and piping 7 are all located in comparments separated from other equipment, as shown on the figures. There are two redundant trains of PHP and CCW equipment, each physically separated from the other so that 10 the effects of a pipe break in one train will not affect the operation of the other train. There are no high energy lines l 7 located within the RHR compartments. The only high energy lines located within the CCW compartments are the auxiliary feedwater pumpo discharge and the steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump. The only moderate energy lines located in the RHR rooms, besides PHR piping, are the 20" component cooling water supply 10 and return for the RHR heat exchanger and 1" component cooling water supply and return for the RHP pump lube oil cooler. The only moderate energy lines located in the CCW compartments, besides CCW piping, are the service water supply and return to the CCW heat exchanger.
These compartment walls, along with other barriers and restraints, will be designed to provide protection of the RHP and CCW equipment f rom the dynamic ef fects of pipe rupture f rom high energy lines resulting from pipe whip and jet impignment.
Protection against the effects of an elevated temperature / pressure / humidity environment associated with a break 7 of a high energy line will be provided by barriers between these lines and the PHP and CCW equipment designed to direct water and Piping falling into this 10 steam vapors away from these rooms.
3.6-3 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR category are the main steam and feedwater lines running between the Containment and the Turbine Building & the steam lines going 10 to the turbine driven feedwater pumps. These barriers will also be water proofed as necessary, to prevent damage resulting from flooding.
There are no moderate energy lines in the safeguards area which would result in an elevated temperature / pressure / humidity environment.
Protection against the flooding affects of both high and moderate energy lines, will be as follows:Jil R HR Pump Room & Valve Room A five foot curb will be provided at the entrance to these rooms and waterproofing will be provided up to this level to protect against a flood resulting from a break in a line outside the room. The flooding level is based on an analysis assuming a crack in the 30-inch component cooling water supply, the worse possible break in the engineering safety features area (except for feedwater break previously discussed) .
The flow rate through this crack was calculated, to be 2200 GPM and the rate of water rise 0.16 feet per minute. With a five foot curb this would allow sufficient time, over 30 minutes, for corrective action to be taken. Total floor area for flooding was lll calculated to be 2400 square feet. A crack of the moderate energy component cooling water piping located in the RHF pump compartment will result in a leak of less than 20 GPM. In 7 30 minutes the room will flood to a level of 6-inches. This level of flooding will not damage any safety related equipment.
No liquid filled lines, other than RHR lines, are in the valve room. Protection of the RHR equipment in these compartments from a failure of RHR piping is not required since a redundant RHP train is available, and in accordance with BTP APCSB 3-1 a single failure of the redundant RHR train need not be assumed.
RRR__ Heat Exchancer Compartment-There is no safety related equipment in this compartment which can be damaged by flooding.
RHR_ Valve Operating Roog-The entrance to this room is located above the flood level calculated previously and therefore no special provisions for water proofing are required.
( 1) Except for steam and feedwater lines which have already teen discussed above.
3.6-3a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF TABLE 3.11-4 (Sheet 1 of 2)
Fnvironmental Conditions f or Qualificat ion Tests for ESF Components Located Out side Containment Integrated Total Test Felative Rads Doses Time Pressure Temp. Humidity (%) JEads) (4L Duration System Components (psig) (F) ( 5) Gamma Beta (Sec) pH (5) Notes Con *.ainme nt Valve Operators atm 110 95 4x106 negli- 105-10* 7.0 (1)
Spray Pump Motors atm 120 100 4x10* qible 105-10* 7.0 Instrument Sensors atm 120 95 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 gible 8
Emergency FSF Diesel Generator atm 120 100 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 (1)
Powe r Valve Operators atm 120 100 1x103 gible 105-10* 7.0 Control Panels (local) atm 120 100 1x103 negli- 105-10* 7.0 gible ESF 6.9kV SWGR atm 104 100 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 ESF 4.80kV SWGP atm 104 100 1x103 gible 105-106 7.0 ESP t ransformers atm 104 100 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 battery chargers 8 atm 104 100 1x103 gible 105-106 7.0 inverters atm 104 100 1x108 negli- 105-106 7.0 batteries atm 80 100 1x103 gible 105-106 7.0 l Hot Shutdown Panel atm 104 100 1x103 negli- 105-10* 7.0 i ESF de SWGR atm 104 100 1x103 gible 105-106 7.0 ESF ac-dc Distribution atm 104 100 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 Panels gible ESF Motor Control Centers atm 104 100 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 ESF Aux. Panel Boa rd atm 80 100 1x103 gible 105-106 7.0 Aux. Bldg. ESF Fan Motors atm 104 95 4x10* negli- 105-106 7.0 Ventilation Instrument sensors atm 104 95 4x10* gible 105-106 7.0 (1)
Auxiliary Pump motor assembly atm 104 100 4x10* negli- 7.0 (1)
Feedwater Sensors atm 104 100 4x10* gible Turbine driven AFW atm 114 100 4x10' negli- 7.0 (1)
Pump, associated gible valve operators, 10 controls, and instruments
(
Service Water Valve operators atm 120 95 1x103 negli- 7.0 (1)
Sensors atm 120 95 1x103 gible 7.0 (1) 8 Amendment 10
GIEPSSAR TABLE 3.11-4 (Steet la of 2)
Fnvironme ntal Conditions f or Qualification Tests for ESF Corponents Located outside Containment Integrated Total Test Felative Fads Doses Time Pres s ure 7emp. Ilumidity (%) (Pads) (4L Duration 8 System Components (ps ig) (F) (5) Gamma Beta (Sec) pH ( 5) Notes SG Feedwater Control valve operator atm 100 1x103 negli- 100 7.0 ( 2)
Pump controls atm gible Main Steam Turbine driven AFW Pump 100 1x103 negli- 100 7.0 (2) steam supply valve cible operators Amendme nt 10 0 9 e
i GIBPSSAR TABLE 3.11-4 (Sheet 2 of 2)
Fnvironment al Conditions f or Quali ficat ion Tests for ESF Components Located Outside Cont a inme nt Integrated Total Test Felative Fads Doses Time Pressure Temp. Humidity (%) JPadsl,j4[ Duration System Componen t s (ps io) (F) (5) Ga mma Peta (sec) pH (5) Notes Sencors 100 1x103 negli- 100 7.0 (2)
Control Valve Operators gible component Pump motor atm 104 95 1x103 negli- 105-10* 7.0 (1)
Cooling Water Cont rol Valve operators atm gible Sensors atm 104 95 1x103 negli- 105-106 7.0 gible Control Poom Control board instruments atm 80 (0 1x10b3 negli- 7.0 (1) and instrument racks gible Seismic Pooster Pump atm 104 95 1x103 negli- 7.0 (1)
Category I E motor assembly, valves gible Portion of S controls, sensors Fire Protec-tion SFP Cooling Valve controls, sen sors atm 120 100 4x10* negli- 10* 7.0 (1) gible Hydr ogen Hydrogen detect ion atm 120 100 4x10* negli- 106 7.0 (1) ,(3)
Purge gible Note: 1. Environmental conditions listed are assumed to te the same f or either LOCA or MSLB cases.
- 2. Conditions are ba s ed on MS LB - see Fiqure 3.11-2
- 3. System is NNS, non-seismic Category I, serving as a backup to the hydrogen reccabiners.
- 4. Fadiation doses as total for entire test time
- 5. Humidity and pH are held constant during the test Amendment 8
1 GIBBSSAR
- 8. ELECTRIC POWER CONTENTS Section Pace 8.1 Introduction 8.1-1 8.1.1 Utility Grid Description 8.1-1 8.1.2 Onsite Electric System Description 8.1-1 8.1. 3 Safety Related Loads 8.1-3 8.1.4 Design Criteria 8.1-3 8.1.5 Compliance 8.1-10
- 8. 2 Offsite Power System 8.2-1 8.2.1 Interf ace Requirements 8.2-1 8.3 Onsite Power Systems 8.3-1 8.3.1 ac Power System 8.3-1 8.3.1.1 Description 8.3-1 8.3.1.2 Analysis 8.3-20
- 8. 3.1. 2.1 Compliance with GDC-17, Electric Power Systems 8.3-20
- 8. 3.1. 2. 2 Compliance with GDC-18, Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems 8.3-21 8.3.1.2.3 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.6 3.3-21 6
- 8. 3.1. 2. 4 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.9 '3.3-22
- 8. 3.1. 2. 5 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.32 3.3-22 8.3.1. 2. 6 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 8.3-23 8.3.1.2.7 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 and 384-1974 8.3-24 l 10 8-i Amenenent 10
GIBBSSAR g
Sect _ ion Page l 10 8.3.1.2.8 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.93 8.3-24 8.3.1.2.9 Compliance with IEEE 308-1974 8.3-25 6
8.3. 1.2. 10 Failure Mode Analysis 8.3-25 8.3.1.2.11 Equipment Operation in Hostile Environments 8.3-25 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety-Felated Equipment 8.3-27
- 8. 3.1. 4 Independence of Redundant Systens 8.3-28 8.3.1.4.1 Cable Voltage Grouping 8.3-28 8.3.1.4.2 Cable Routing Separation 8.3-29
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2.1 Cable Spreading Areas 8.3-29 8.3.1.4.2.2 General Plant Areas 8.3-30 6
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2. 3 Hostile Environments 8.3-30
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2. 4 Electrical Penetration Areas 8.3-30
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2, 5 Cable Tray Crossover Areas 8.3-31
- 8. 3.1. 4. 3 Seismic Requirements 3.3-31 8.3.2 dc Power Systems 8.3-31 8.3.2.1 Description 8.3'-31 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3-35 8.3.2.3 Deleted 8.3-37 l 10 8.3.3 Fire Protection for Cable Systems 8.3-41 8.3.3.1 Cable Derating and Cable Tray Fill 8.3-41 8-ii Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR y TABLES 8.1- 1 Safety Loads and Function 8.1- 2 Acceptance Criteria for Electric Power System 10 8.3-1a Loading Requirements for Loss-of-Coolant- Accident and Loss of offsite Power
- 8. 3- 1b Loading Requirements for Steam Line Break and 10 Loss of Offsite Power
- 8. 3- 2 Emergency Electrical loading Fequirements for Loss of Offsite Power without loss-of-Coolant-Accident
- 8. 3- 3 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for Auxiliary ac Power System 8.3-4 Estimated 125-Vdc Battery Load Requirerents BT1ED1 and BTIED2 l 10 8.3-5 Estimated 125-Vdc Battery Load Requirements BT1ED3 10 and BT1ED4 8.3-6 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for Auxiliary dc Power System
- 8. 3- 7 Loading Capacity l6 8.3-8 Assignment of Control Power Sources for 10 Switchgear P
8-iii Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 1 FIGURES 8.3-1 Simplified Main One Line Diagram
- 8. 3- 2 Standby Diesel Generator Automatic Starting and Loading Sequence 8.3-3 Containment Electrical Penetrations 8.3-4 Electrical System Safety Routes Below Grade Plan
- 8. 3- 5 Electrical System Safety Poutes Ground Floor Plan
- 8. 3- 6 Electrical System Safety Routes Mezzanine Floor Plan 8.3-7 Electrical System Safety Foutes Operating Level Floor Plan 10 8.3-8 Electrical System Safety Routes Elevation 171'-11" Floor Plan ggg 8-iv Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.0 ELECTRIC POWER 8.1 Introduction 8.1.1 Utility Grid Description This information is provided in the Utility- Applicant's " AR.
8.1.2 Onsite Electric System Description The onsite electric system includes power supplies, distribution ll equipment, and instrumentation and controls to supply power to the unit auxiliary loads (normal and safety-related) during startup, normal operation, and normal and emergency shutdown.
Connection of the generator to the unit output switchyard is made 11 0 via isolated-phase bus duct (generator main leads), load break switch, and main step-up transformers.
Power to the unit 690 0-V auxiliary bus systems is furnished through either the unit auxiliary or station service transf ormers.
Normally when the plant is in operation, the non-safety-related auxiliaries are supplied from the main generator via the load break switch, and two unit auxiliary transformers. The offsite l1-0 power supply via the station cervice transformers serves as a backup source. The supply to the unit auxiliary transformers is derived from a bus tap located between the load break switch and the main step-up transformers by means of isclated-phase bus duct.
Safety-related auxiliaries normally are supplied from the primary of fsite power source via two separate and independent station service transformers. When the load break switch is open the back feed connection from the Unit output switchyard, via the main transf ormers and the unit auxiliary transformers, serves as the alternate of fsite power sourcp.
8.1-1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g During startup and shutdown of the plant, the non-safety-related auxiliaries are powered f rom the alternate offsite power source via the main step-up and unit auxiliary transformers. After synchronizing the main generator with the alternate of fsite power source, the load break switch is closed without interruption of power to the non-saf ety-related auxiliaries. The safety-related auxiliaries are continuously powered from the primary of f site power source. The station service and the unit auxiliary transformers are connected to the 6900-V bus system and provide two independent means of supply to the safety-related equipment from the offsite powe r systems without relying on the main generator.
The plant startup can also be achieved by supplying power to the Class IE and non-Class IE buses from the primary offsite power source via the station service transformers. Synchronization between the main generator and alternate offsite power source can be achieved either across the load break switch or a switchyard breaker. Following synchronization of the main generator to the alternate offsite power source the non-Class IE buses will be transferred (live) to the unit auxiliary transformers.
Upon a loss of all external ac power, station standby power sources consisting of two diesel generators are provided to lll satisf y the loading requirements of the ac Class IE loads.
System redundancy precludes loss of all onsite power due to any single f ailure.
A third diesel generator, non-Cla ss IE, is provided to satisfy the loading requirements of the ac non- saf ety- rela ted essential loads.
Dire ct-current Class IE loads of the unit are supplied by four l 10 inde pendent and redundant 125-V Class IE battery systems.
Dire ct-current loads tnat are not Class IE receive power through an independent non-Class IE 125/250-V battery system to protect the integrity of the 125-Vdc Class IE systems.
Alternating-current and direct-current Class IE loads of the unit are each divided into redundant load groups, each energized from an independent Class IE power supply. There is no interconnections between redundant load groups. 10 Table 8 .1- 2 outlines the acceptance criteria for the electric power system.
8.1-2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.1.3 Saf ety-Related Loads The safety loads that require electric power to perform their safety functions are identified in T able 8.1- 1. This table includes the saf ety load, saf ety f unctions perf ormed, and type of electric power (ac or dc or both) .
8.1.4 Design Criteria The des ign bases, criteria, Regulatory Guides, standards, and other documents that are implemented in the design of the safety-related systems are listed below. These documents are described in Sections 3.1, 8. 2 and 8.3. 110
- 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A; General Design Criteria 110 for Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission, January 1, 1976 1 10
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1. 6, Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 10, 1971
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1. 9, Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power S upplie s*, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conraission, March 10, 1971
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.12, Instrumentation for Earthquakes , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1974
- 5. Regulatc ry Guide 1.22, Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 17, 1972
- 6. Regulato ry Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classificatian, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February, 1976 l 10
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.30, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment, U.S. Nuclea:: Regulatory Commission, August 11, 1972 8.1-3 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Use of IEEE Std 308-1974, criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February, 1977 11 0
- 9. Regulatory Guide 1.40, Qualification Tests of Continuous-Duty Motors Installed Inside the Containment 10 of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, March 1973.
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.41, Preoperational Testing of 110 Redundant Onsite Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 1973
- 11. Regulatory Guide 1.47, Bypassed and Inoperable 110 Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1973
- 12. Regulatory Guide 1.53, Application of the Single 110 Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1973
- 13. Regulatory Guide 1.62, Manual Initia tion of 10 ll Protective Actions, Octo ber 1973.
- 14. Regulatory Guide 1.63, Electric Penetration 110 Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May, 1977 l10 8.1-4 Amendment 10 0
GIBBSSAR
- 15. Pegulatory Guide 1.64, Quality Assurancel10 Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1976 l10
- 15. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Preoperational and Initiall10 Startup Test Programs for Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1977110
- 17. Regulatory Guide 1.73, Qualification Tests of l10 Electric Valve operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Pla nt s , U. S . Nuclear Pegulatory Commission, January 1974
- 18. Regulatory Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of ilo Electric Systems, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Janua ry 1975
- 19. Regulatory Guide 1.81, Shar ed Emergency and 110 Shutdown Electric Systems f or Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants January 1975
- 20. Regulatory Guido 1.89, Qualification of Class 1E l10 Equipment for Nuclear Power Pla nts , U.S. Nuclear Fegulatory Commission., November 1974
- 21. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Availability of Electric 110 Power Sources, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis sion December 1974
- 22. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Periodic testing of Diesel Generator Units used as onsite Electric Power systems at Nuclear Power Plants, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1*)77 and ERR ATA issued in September 1977.
- 23. Regulatory Guide 1.118, Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems June 1978.
- 24. Regulatory Guide 1.128, Installation Design and 10 Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants October 1978.
- 25. Regulatory Guide 1.129, Maintenance, Testing, and Feplacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants February 1978.
8.1-5 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g
- 26. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 1, November 1975, Backfitting of the Protection and Etnergency Power Systems of Nuclear Reactors.
- 27. Branch Technical Position (EICS B) 2, November 1975, Diesel - Generator Reliability Qualification Testing, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 28. Branch Technical Position (EICS B) 6, November 1975, 10 Capacity Test Requirements of Station Batteries - Technical Specification, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 29. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 7, November 1975, 10 Shared Emergency Electric Power Systems for Multi-Unit I
Generating Stations.
O 8.1-Sa Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 30. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 8, November 1975, Use of Diesel - Generator Sets for Peaking, U.S. Nuclear 10 Regulatory Commission
- 31. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 10, November 10 1975, Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Seismic Qualifica tion Program, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 32. Branch Technical Position (EICS B) 11, November 1975 Stability of Offsite Power Systems , U. S . Nuclear l10 Pegulatory Commission
- 33. Branch Technical Positiop' (EICSB) 15, November 10 1975, Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Qualification, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 34. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 17, November 10 1975, Diesel - Generator Protective Trip Circuit Bypasses, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 35. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 21, November 10 1975, Guidance for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 36. Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 22, November 10 1975, Guidance for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.22, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- 37. Branch Technical Positiop (EICSB) 27, November 10 197 5, Design for Thermal Overload Protection f or Motors of Motor Operated Valves, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8.1- 6 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 38. IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for l10 Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 39. IEEE 308-1974, Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power l1 0 Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 40. IEEE 317-1976, Electrical Penetration Assemblies in l10 Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 41. IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E l10 Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (Basic Acceptance Criteria)
- 42. IEEE 334-1974, Standard for type Tests of l10 Continuous-Duty Class 1E Motors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 43. IEEE 336-1977, Installation, Inspection, and l10 Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment During the Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations 44 IEEE 338-1977, Trial-Use Standard Criteria for the 10 Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems
- 45. IEEE 344-1975, Recommended Practices for Seismic l10 Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 46. IEEE 352-1975, Guide for Gene ral Principles of l10 Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems
- 47. IEEE 379-1977, Guide for the Application of Single l10 Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems
- 48. IEEE 380-1975, Definitions of Terms Used in l10 IEEE Standards on Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 49. IEEE 382-1972, Guide For Type Tests of Class 1 l10 Electric Valve Operators For Nuclear Power Generating Stations 8.1-7 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 50. IEEE 383-1974, Standard for Type Tests of Class 1El10 Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generatir.g Stations
- 51. IEEE 384-1977, Trial-Use Standard Criteria forl10 Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits
- 52. IEEE 387-1977, Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units l10 Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 53. IEEE 420-1973, Trial Use Guide for Class 1E Control l10 Switchboards for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (ANSI N41.17)
- 54. IEEE 422-1977 Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Power Generating Stations. 10
- 55. IEEE 450-1975, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Peplacement of Large Stationary Type Power Plant and Substation Lead Storage Batteries
- 56. IEEE 484-1975, Recommended Practice fort 10 Installation Design and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries 57 IEEE 494-1974, Standard Method for Identification l10 of Documents Related to Class 1E Equipment and Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations
- 58. IEEE 497-1977 Trial-Use Standard Criteria for Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
- 59. IEEE 577-1976 Requirements for Feliability Analysis in the Design and Operation of Safety System for Nuclear 10 Power Generating Stations.
- 60. IEEE 603-1977 Tr ial-Use Standard criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
- 61. ANSI C37.20, Switchgear Assemblies, Including Metal Enclosed Bus (IEEE 27)
- 62. AN SI N45.2.11-1974, Quality Assurance Requirements l10
~
for Design of Nuclear Power Plants 8.1- 8 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g
- 63. ANSI C57.12, General Requirements for Distribution, l10 Fower and Regulating Transformers.
- 64. IPCEA S-19-81 1969, " Rubber Insulated Wire and l10 cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy."
- 65. IPCEA P 426 1962, Power Cable Ampacities
- 66. IPCEA P-54-440 1975, Ampacities for Cables in Open Top Cable Trays.
- 71. NEMA TR1-1974, Transformers, Pegulators and Reactors
- 72. NEMA MG-1-1972, Motors and Generators O
- 73. NFPA NO. 70-1978, National Electrical Code 1978 Edition 10
- 74. NEMA VE 1-1971, cable Tray Systems
- 75. Illuminating Engineering Society Lighting Handbook, 5th Edition, 1972 Additional standards, g uid es , recommended practices , and test procedures, for specific equipment are detailed in the equipment purchase specifications from among the publications of ANSI, IZZL, IPC EA , NEMA, NFPA, and others as required.
The a xta nt of i=nlementation of the design criteria for NSSS equipment is discussed in the NSSS SSAR.
8.1- 9 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.1.5 Compliance
- a. Compliance with Regulatory Guides)1.6, 1. 9, 1.32, and IEEE Standards 308, 344 and 387
- 1. 75 l 10 Class 1E electric systems are designed to comply with Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1. 9, 1.32, 1.75 and IEEE 308, 344, and 387 as discussed in Section 8.3.
- b. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.93 The reactor operation conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.93 as described in Technical Specification subsection 3/4.8.
- c. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 and IEEE Standard 317 Electric penetrations are designed, tested and documented in accordance with IEEE 317 as augmented in Regulatory Guide 1.63 as discussed in subsection 8.3.1.2.6. l10
- d. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.41 Preoperational testing of redundant onsite electric power systems conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.41.
- e. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.22 The protection system is designed to permit periodic testing as required in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.22.
- f. Compliance with IEEE Standard 338 The periodic testing of the reactor trip systems and engineered safeguards feature actuation systems conforms to the requirements of IEEE 338.
- g. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.30 The quality assurance program of Class 1E instrumentation and electric equipment satisfies the requirement outlined in Fegulatory Guide 1. 30.
8.1-10 Amendme nt 10
GIBBSSAR h
- h. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.29 Instrumentation and ele ctric components designated as seismic Category I required for systems described in P egulatory Guide 1.29 are designated to withstand the effects of the SSE and remain functional.
- i. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.81 Since the standard plant is designed to be independent of other units the Class 1E system satisfies the Regulatory Guide 1.81.
- j. Compliance with Pegulatory Guide 1.89 and- IEEE Standard 323 All groups of Class 1E equipment are environmentally qualified in 110 accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.89 and IEEE 323 using valid techniques as discussed in Section 3.11.
- k. Compliance with Pegulatory Guide 1.40 Qualification tests of continuous-duty motors installed inside the containment conform to Regulatory Guide 1.40.
ll)
- 1. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.47 Bypassed and inoperable status indication for ': lass 1E equipment conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.47.
- m. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.53 The application of single failure criterion to plant protection 10 systems conforms to Regulatory Guide 1.53.
- n. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.62 The manual initiation of protective. actions is designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.62.
- o. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.73 Qualification tests of electric valve operators installed inside the containment conform to Regulatory Guide 1.73.
The extent of imple mentation of Regulatory Guides for NSSS equipment is discussed in the NSSS SSAR.
8.1-11 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)
SAFETY LOADS AND FUNCTION (Westinghouse-414). 1 Safety Load Func tion Power Safety injection Provide emergency core cooling ac pumps Centrifugal charging Provide borated water to primary ac pumps coolant during main steam line break 10 Fesidual heat Provide emergency core cooling ac removal pumps and reactor heat removal during blackout 1 Containment spray Provide cooling spray in ac pumps containment following LOCA and main steam line break 10 Service Water Provide cooling water f or ac pumps component cooling water heat exchangers, emergency makeup source to auxiliary feedwater system Component cooling Provide cooling water to ac water system safety-related equipment pumps 1
Auxiliary Provide adequate water to ac feedwater pumps steam generators in the event of a unit trip coupled with a loss of offsite power Spent-fuel pool Cool spent fuel ac coolant pumps Hydrogen Reduce hydrogen concentration ac recombiner in containment following DBA l10 Emergency air Maintain saf e operating ac conditioning anbient conditions for personnel and ventilation and safety-related equipment 1
4 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
TABLE 8.1-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)
SAFETY LOADS AND FUNCTION 1
(Westinghouse-414)
Safety Load Function- Power 110 Boron injection Prevent boric acid ac 11 tank heaters, surge crystallization 110 tank heaters, and heat tracing system Motor-operated Ensure coordinated operation ac valves, small of saf ety-related systems motors, fans and heaters associated I with safety-related equipment Feactor trip system Provide safe plant shutdown ac and dc Engineered safety Provides for actuation of ac and de l10 features actuation engineered safety features system dlh Safety-related Provide safe reactor operation ac plant instrumentation and postaccident shutdown Instrument buses Provide power to vital ac instrumentation and control equipment 1
Shutdown control Provide contrcl to ac and dc and instrumentation shutdown plant from outside of control room Instrument bus Provide power to vital dc inverters instrument buses Battery chargers Provide charging to ac batteries 10 Amendment 10 6
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 1 of 5)
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM (Kestinghouse - 414)
Onsite Cnsite Offsite ac dc Power Power Power Criteria System System System
- 1. 10 CFR Part 50
- a. 10 CFR Part 50.34 x x x
- t. 10 CFR Part 50.36 x x x
- c. 10 CFR Part 50.55a x x x
- 2. General Design x x x 10 Criteria, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.6 x x 1.9 x 1.12 x x 1.22 x x 1.29 x x 1.30 x x x 1.32 x x x 1.40 x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 5)
ACCEPTANCE CRI'IERIA FOR ELECTRIC PCHER SYSTEM (Westinghouse - 414)
Cnsite Onsite Offsite ac de Power Power Power Criteria System System System 1.41 x x 1.47 x x 1.53 x x 1.62 x x 10 1.63 x x g 1.64 x x 1.68 x x 1.70 x x x 1.73 x 1.75 x x 1.81 x x 1.89 . x x 1.93 x x x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 3 of 5)
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC PCHER SYSTEM (Westinghouse - 414)
Cnsite Onsite Offsite ac de Power Power Power Criteria System System System 1.100 x x 1.006 x 1.108 x 1.118 x x x 1.128 x 10 1.129 x
- 4. Branch Technical Pcsitions (BTPs)
EICSB 2 x EICSB 6 x EICSB 8 x EICSB 10 _, ,
x x EICSB 11 x EICSB 15 x x
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 4 of 5)
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM (Kestinghouse - 414)
Cnsite Onsite Offsite ac de Power Power Power Criteria System System System EICSB 17 x EICSB 18 - x EICSB 21 x x x EICSB 22 x x EICSB 27 x x g 10
- 5. IEEE Standards 279-1971 x x 308-1974 x x x 317-1972 x x 323-1974 x x 334-1974 x
~
336-1971 x x x 338-1975 x x x 344-1975 x x 352-1975 x x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8.1-2 (Sheet 5 of 5)
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR ELECTRIC PCWER SYSTEM (Westinghouse - 414)
Cnsite Onsite Offsite ac de Power Power Power Criteria System System System 379-1972 x x 380-1972 x x x 382-1972 x 10 383-1974 x x 384-1974 x x 387-1972 x 420-1975 x x 450-1975 x 484-1975 x 494-1974 x x Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 8. 2 Offsite Power _ System This section is provided in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
8.2.1 Interface Requirements The Gibbs & Hill Standard Nuclear Power Plant is designed to have two physically independent and separate offsite power so urces.
The primary offsite source provides power to the station service transformers. The alternate offsite source provides power via a back feed connection f rom the unit output switchyard through the main transformers and the unit auxiliary transformers. This is as shown on the Simplified Main One Line Diagram, Figure 8.3-1.
Both of the offsite sources may be in the same switchyard. Two independent circuits are required so that a failure of one circuit will in no way af fect the other and result in the loss of both circuits. The Utility-Applicant's must per. form a system stability analysis and the of fsite power system must be capable of satisfying the following station power requirenent:
- a. Two independent power aources as described above
Steady state load of approximately (later) MVA b.
- c. Nominal voltage (for station service transformers) as available for primary, 6.9 kV for secondary
- d. Allowable voltage variation, assumed to be 15 percent 10 during normal operation
- e. Nominal frequency, 60 Hz The Utility Applicant must also perform an analysis to determine the frequency decay rate of the grid system. This frequency rate is required by RESAR-414, in setting of the reactor coolant pump underspeed trip set point.
W-414 8.2-1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.3 ODsite Power _Systegs 8.3.1 ac Power Systens 8.3.1.1 Description The onsite ac powe r systems consist of various auxiliary electrical systems designed to provide reliable electrical power to safety-related and non-safety-related station loads.
Fedundancy of systems and components ensures safe reactor l 7 shutdcwn during an SSE or DBA, or both, and mitigates release of radicactive material to the environs. Figure 8.3-1 depicts the nain one line of the electrical power distribution system.
Figures 8.3-3 to 8.3-8 show the physical arrangement of major l 10 Class 1E equipment and the separation of redundant power raceways. Power to the onsite Class 1E ac power distribution systens are furnished by one of the following systems: a main generator or an alternate offsite power source, primary offsite power source, or a standby power system (diesel generators) .
- a. Non-Safety-Felated Distribution System The unit distribution system uses voltage levels of 6900 V and
- 480 V for main power distribution. Bus arrangements, bus interconnections, transformer supplies, and power supplies are shown on Figure 8.3-1 Simplified Main one Line Diag ram. The l 10 non-Class 1E distribution system consists of eight 6900-V buses which furnish power to non-Class 1E loads. Transformation from 6900 V to 480 V provides the required power for the 480-V-auxiliaries and a 120/208-V lighting system. Power distribution at 480-V is accomplished through non-safety-related tuses for the unit.
7he unit auxiliary transformers are connected to the main generator via the load break switch. The supply for the primary winding of the unit auxiliary transformers is tapped between the load break switch and the low-voltage bushings of the main step-up transformers.
During startup of plant the load break switch is in the open position, the non-safety-related tuses are powered from the 10 alternate offsite power source via the main and unit auxiliary transformers. The safety related buses are powered from the primary offsite power source via the station service tran sformers. The operator monitors the synchronizing system displays and when the aain generator is in proper phase and voltage relationship witn the alternate offsite power source, the 8.3-1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR load break switch will be manually closed by the operator without interruption of power to the non-safety-related buses. The bus supply breakers are not interlocked with the load break switch.
During normal plant operation, the non-safety-related buses are energized by the main generator through the load break switch and unit auxiliary transformers, and the safety related buses remain energized from the primary offsite power source. The load break switch is in a closed position.
- a. In the event of a failure of the primary offsite power source the safety related buses will automatically fast-transfer to the main generator output.
- b. In the event of a turbine trip, the load break switch will open automatically and isolate the main generator from the system. The nonsafety related buses will then remain energized via the backfeed connections from the alternate offsite powe r source through the main and unit auxiliary transformers.
10
- c. In the event of an electrical fault in the generator protection zone, since the load break switch is not designed to interrupt fault current, it will remain closed and the main generator switchgear breaker will trip. The non-safety-related buses will automatically transfer to the primary offsite power source.
During a planned shutdown of the plant, the load break switch will be opened manually and the non-safety-related buses will remain energized via the backfeed connecticn from the alternate offsite power source through the main and unit auxiliary transformers. Safety related buses will remain energized f rom the primary offsite power source.
The capability of the load break switch to perform its required operational function will be demonstrated by qualification testing. The qualification testing program will show that the load break switch is able to perform its required operational functions reliably to assure that the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 are met.
8.3-1a Amendment 10
GIEDSSAR 10 The plant has two three-winding, three phase, 60-Hz unit auxiliary transformers with secondary voltage of 6900-V. The secondary windings of each unit auxiliary transformer are connected to the 6900-V buses by means of metal-enclosed bus ducts as follows (see Figure 8.3- 1, Class IE bus supply circuit breakers in normal cubicle) :
Transformer Buses TIA-1 x winding 1A1, 1AS, 1EA1 y winding 1A2, 1A6 TIA-2 x winding 1A3, 1A7 y winding 1A4, 1A8, 1EA2 Alternate locations for circuit breaker elements provide a means for naintaining power to the Class 1E buses; the details are described in subsection 8.3.1.1.b.
Switchgear for all the 6900-V buses is standard 500 MVA interrupting-capacity 7.2-kV class metal clad medium-voltage ( 10 switchgear. All circuit breakers are air-break type. Continuous current ratings are 1200 A for load feeder breakers. Incoming supply breakers for buses IA1, 1A2, 1A3, and 1A4 are rated 2000 A continuous. Incoming supply breakers for reactor coolant pump buses are rated 1200 A continuous. The switchgear is metal clad with metal barriers between breakers. The 6900-V Class 1E switchgear and the 6900-v switchgear that energizes the non-Class 1E reactor coolant pumps are located in a seismic Category I structure, as shown in Figures 8.3-5 and 8.3-7, and are seismically qualified in accordance with the criteria discussed in Section 3.10. Two circuit breakers are connected in 10 series to feed each reactor coolant pung notor, as shown in Figure 8.3-1. The circuit 9 8.3-2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP h
breakers conform to principal design criteria specified in IEEE 308-1974. l1 Each of the circuit breakers on reactor coolant pump buses 1AS, 1A6, IA7, and 1A8 receives a trip signal in the event of an underspeed condition. The underspeed trip signal design is described in Section 7.2 of the NSSS SSAR. The f reque ncy decay 10 rates of the grid do not influence or prevent the full coastdown of the reactor coolant pumps under this condition.
Generally, motor loads exceeding 250 hp are rated 6600-V, and are connected to the 6900-V tuses for across-the-line starting.
Dry-type transforners (6900 V to 480 V, three-phase, 60 Hz) are connected to a 480-V metal-enclosed switchgear ( 600 -V-class) arranged as double-ended load centers. The switchgear is arranged in several independent station service distribution bus connections. Air-break circuit breakers are turnished with rated interrupting capability of 50,000 A. A bus tie between the buses provides service if one transforner is unavailable. The 480-V switchgear provides power to various motor control centers (MCC) and notors.
Generally, motors rated up to 100 hp are connected to MCC and larger motors are connected to 480-V switchgear.
The 118-Vac, single phase, 60-Hz power, which is required for essential non-Class 1E loads is supplied by solid-state inverters IVIC-1, IVIC-2, and IVIC-3 as shown in Figure 8.3-1.
Each inverter receives incoming normal power supply from either non-safety-related 480-Vac MCC 1BS-1 or 1BS-2, and a backup
. de power supply from 125/250-V battery BT1D2-2 by means of an auct ioneering-type circuit. The distribution panel RTIC1 provides an alternate source of regulated ac power to the 118-Vac buses during inverter maintenance periods. During blackout conditions, 480-Vac M0 Y IBS-1 and 1B5-2 receive power from a self-contained diesel generator 1G1 which ensures continuity of essential non-safety-related services.
8.3-3 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Control power for all switchgear is obtained from the 125-Vdc systems. The 125-vac systems are described in subsection 8.3.2.l 10
- b. Safety Related Distribution System
- 1) Fower Supply Feeders The primary of fsite power source supplies power to the Class 1E buses through the station service transformers during all modes of operation of the unit, while the supply from the unit auxiliary transformers serves as a backup.
The station service transformer connection to the offsite substation is site-specific; however, it is independent of the connection to the main step-up tranf ormers f rom the unit output switchyard.
The plant has two three-winding, three-phase, 60-Hz station service transformers, each with secondary voltage of 6900-V. l 10 The secondary windings of each station service transformer are connected to the 6900-v busen by means of metal-enclosed bus ducts as follows (see Figure 8.3-1, Class 1E bus supply circuit breakers in normal cubicle) :
TIaDsformer Puses T1A-3 x - winding 1A1, 1AS, 1EA1 y - winding 1A2, 1A6 T1A-4 x - winding 1A3, 1A7 l 10 y - winding 1A4, 1A8, 1EA2 The alternate offsite power source connections to Class 1E buses 1EA1 and 1EA2 are achieved through ma in step-up transf orme rs T1-1 and T1-2, and the unit auxiliary transformers T1A-1 and T1A-2. The main step-up transformer secondary are connected to the unitj 10 output switchyard via an overhead transmission line, the length of which is site specific.
8.3-4 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR The secondary windings of each unit auxiliary transformer are connected to the 6900-V buses by means of metal-enclosed bus duct as follows (see Figure 8.3-1,l 10 Class IE bus supply circuit breakers in normal cubicle) :
Transformer Buses 71A-1 x-winding 1A1, 1AS, 1EA1 y-winding 1A2, 1A6 T1A-2 x-winding 1A3, 1A7 y-winding 1A4, 1A8, 1EA2 Class 1E buses 1EA1 and 1EA2 of the unit can be supplied by two independent and reliable imnediate-access of fsite power sources, the first through the station service transformer and the second through the main step-up and 10 unit auxiliary transformers.
As noted previously and as shcwn in Figure 8.3-1, further flexibility of alternate power sources to Class 1E buses 1EA1 and 1EA2 can be achieved by relocation of various supply circuit breakers when either one station service transformer or one unit g
auxiliary transformer, or the proper con.bination of both transformers are out of service. The following paragraphs describe the planned relocation of these circuit breakers for the various postulated operating conditions.
khen station service transforner T1A-3 is out of service, relocation of circuit breaker, item 8, to alternate cubicle, as shown in Figure 8.3-1 , enables station service transformer TI A-4 to supply power to Class 1E bus 1EA1 in addition to Class 1E bus 1EA2.
Khen station service trans.former T1A-4 is out of service, relocation of circuit breaker, item 12, to alternate cubicle, as shown in Figure 8.3-1 , enables station service transformer T1A-3 to supply power to Class 1E bus 1EA2 in addition to Class 1E bus 1EA1.
When unit auxiliary transformer T1A-1 is out of service, relocation of circuit breaker, item 9, to alternate cubicle, as shown in Figure 8.3-1 , enables unit auxiliary transformer T1A-2 to supply power to Class 1F bus 1EA1 in addition to Class 1E bus 1EA2.
8.3-5 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Khen unit auxiliary transforner T1 A-2 is out of service, relocation of circuit breaker, item 13, to alternate cubicle, as shown in Figure 8.3-1 , enables unit auxiliary transformer T1A-1 to supply power to Class 1E bus IEA2 in addition to Class IE bus 1EA1.
When one unit auxiliary transformer or one station service transformer is out of service, or proper combination of both are out of service, and after their associated circuit breakers have been re loca ted , the safety-related buses of the unit can be supplied by two independent and reliable inmediate-access offsite power sources.
In addition to the two offsite sources described previously, the onsite standby diesel generators can supply power to Class IE buses 1EA1 and 1EA2; refer to subsection 8.3.1.1.c.
- 2) Busing Arrangement Two independent and redundant 6900-V Class 1E buses are provided for the unit,each capable of supplying the minimum safety-related loads required to safely shut down the unit following a DBA. Each bus can be fed from two independent of fsite power sources or fron the diesel generator assigned to the bus.
Each Class 1E 6900-V bus supplies a double-ended load center (600 V class) through dry-type transf orme rs (6900 V to 480 V, thr ee- phase , 60 Hz) supplying 480-V, metal-enclosed switchgear. A bus tie between the bus sections of the double-ended load center provides continuity of service if one transformer is unavailable.
Arrangement of buses is shown in Figure 8.3-1.
The voltage levels at the safety related buses will be optimized for the full load 'and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power source by the automatic operation of the on-load top charger of the Station Service and Unit Auxiliary Transformers. 10 To permit verification that bus voltage is within the suitable range during plant operation, voltages on the safety related 6900-V and 480-V buses are indicated in the control room.
8.3-6 Anendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
- 3) Loads Supplied From Each Eus The loads supplied from each independent and redundant 6900-V bus and 480-V load centers are shown in Table 8.3- 7. The loads supplied from each of the various motor control centers will be shown in the 10 Utility Applicant's FSAR.
O 8.3-6a Arendment 10
GIBBSSAP
- 4) Manual and Automatic Interconnections Between Buses, Buses and Loads, and Buses and Supplies There are no manual or automatic interconnections between a Class 1E bus and its redundant count e rpa rt .
There is no way of connecting a load of one Class 1E bus 10 to the redundant Class 1E bus. Therefore, each Class 1E bus is completely independent of its redundant counterpart. The only time a Class 1E 6900-V bus is connected to more than one power source is after manual synchronization of one standty diesel generator to its related Class 1E bus. Paralleling of diesel generators is not possible due to electrical isolation and separation and administrative procedures which preclude testing more than one standby diesel genera tor at a time. Automatic transfer of a Class IE 6900-V bus from the primarv offsite power source to the alternate 10 offsite power source is by sequential transfer _ f ast transfer.
- 5) Interconnections Between Safety-Related and Non-Safety-Related Buses There are no manual or automatic direct connections between any Class 1E (sa f ety-related) bus and any non-Class 1E (non-safety-related) bus.
- 6) Pedundant Bus Separation All redundant buses are arranged to maintain electrical and physical isolation from each other in orde r to satisfy the single-failure criterion. Physical locations of these buses and related electrical distribution are shown in Figures 8.3-5 and 8.3-7. l 10 The 6900-V and 480-V switchgear for the redundant safety-related loads are located in individual rooms in the seismic Category I auxiliary building. Each room contains only electrical equipment, thereby, minimizing exposure to mechanical, water, or fire damage caused by failure of equipment such as steam lines, waterlines, pumps and motors. Switchgear of redundant trains are further separated by placing the equipment on different floor elevations.
8.3-7 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
- 7) Equipment Capacities All switchgear is adequately sized and coordinated to permit safe and reliable operation under normal, short circuit, and comentary current conditions.
The diesel generators are sized so that each set is capable of carrying the safety-related loads of its respective train for a DBA. 10 The estimated capacity of each diesel generator set and the estimated loads used to determine this capacity are given in Table 8.3-7. This estimated size will be revised, if required, as the detailed plant design progresses and depending on the manufacturer's standard sizes. The design and continuous rating applied is consistent with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE 387.
Capacities of individual loads are determined on the basis of nameplate rating, pump pressure, and flow conditions or pump runout conditions. The basis of selection is noted in Table 8.3-1. ggg Interrupting capacity of switchgear, load center, MCCs, and distribution panels are selected on the basis of short-circuit calculations. Transformer impedances are selected to permit starting the largest motor on the bus without the voltage at the motor terminals dropping below 80 percent of the motor voltage rating, while still remaining within the interrupting and momentary capabilities of the breakers.
- 8) Automatic Loading and Stripping of Buses The 6.9 kV Class 1E buses are normally fed from the primary offsite power supply through the Station Service Transformers.
In the event of a DBA the following significant operations are initiated:
a) The reactor is shutdown and the turbine generator 10 is tripped b) Tripping of the turbine generatox will open the generator load break switch automatically.
8.3-8 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP c) All non-safety-related loads (non Class 1E) connected to the Class 1E busses are s hed by the accident signal.
d) The diesel generator sets receive starting signals, however, the diesel generatcr circuit breaker remains open.
e) The safety related loads continue to operate and other safety related loads which are required for the safe shutdown of the plant are sequenced on in accordance with Table 8.3-1.
In the event of a DBA followed by the loss of the preferred offsite power source the following significant operations are initiated:
a) The reactor is shutdown and the turbine generator is tripped.
b) Tripping of the turbine generator will open the load break switch automatically. 10
/
c) All non safety related loads (non Class 1E) connected to the Class 1E buses are shed by the accident signal.
d) The diesel generator sets receive starting signals, however, the diesel generator circuit breakers remain open.
e) Automatic " fast transfer" of each 6.9 kV Class 1E bus to the corresponding unit auxiliary transformer will be initiated.
f) If the fast transfer is successfully completed safety related loads already operating continue to operate and the balance of safety related loads will be applied automatically in sequence in accordance with Table 8.3-1.
g) If the fast transfer is not completed, within the dasign time limit, then fast transfer is automatically blocked and the loads on the Class 1E t u.: e e s , except those permanently connected will be automatically shed by either of the bus undervoltage protection schemes.
8.3-9 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
h) After load shedding is completed and if the alternate offsite power source is available automatic " slow transfer" (dead bus) is initiated.
i) If " slow transfer" is successfully completed the safety related loads will be applied automatically in sequence in accordance with Table 8.3-1.
j) In the event the " slow transfer" is not completed, within the design time, then the " slow transfer" is automatically blocked. After blocking the slow transfer and when the diesel generators have attained rated speed and voltage (approx 10 seconds from receipt of accident signal) and if there is no voltage on the 6.9 kV Class 1E buses, the diesel generator breakers will close automatically and the loading of the diestl generators will follow the sequence in accordance with Table 8.3-1.
In the event of a DBA concurrent with the loss of both offsite power sources the following significant operations are initiated: 10 a) The reactor is shutdown and the turbine generator is tripped.
b) Tripping of the turbine generator will open the load break switch automatically provided no fault currents are present.
c) All the non safety related loads (non Class 1E) connected to the Class 1E busses are tripped by the accident signal.
d) The diesel generator sets receive starting signals, however, the diesel generator circuit breakers remain open.
e) The loads on the Class 1E busses, except those permanently connected will be shed by either of the bus undervoltage protection schemes.
f) Khen the diesel generators have attained rated speed and voltage and if there is no voltage on the 6.9 kV Class 1E buses, the diesel generator breakers will close automatically and the loading 8.3-9a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR of the diesel generators will follow the sequence in accordance with Table 8.3- 1.
In the event of a loss of the preferred offsite power source without a DBA the following significant operations are initiated:
a) The diesel generator sets receive starting signals, however, the diesel generator circuit breakers remain open.
b) Automatic " fast transfer" of each 6.9 kV Class 1E bus to the corresponding unit auxiliary transformer will be initiated.
c) If the transfer is successfully completed no further operations are necessary.
d) If the fast transfer is not completed within the design time limit, than fast transfer is automatically blocked and the loads on the Class 1E 10 busses will be automatically load shed by either of e- the bus undervoltage protection schemes.
e) After load shedding is ccepleted and if the alternat. offsite power source is available automatic " slow transfer" (dead bus) is initiated.
f) If " slow transfer" is successfully comp 1.eted t..e loads will be applied autonatically in sequence in accordance with Table 8.3-2.
g) In the event the slow transfer is not completed within the design time then the " slow transfer" is automatically blocked. After blocking the slow transfer and when the diesel generators have attained rated speed and voltage and if there is no voltage on the 6.9 kV Class 1E busses, the diesel generator breakers will close automatically and the loading of the diesel generators will follow the sequence in accordance with Table 8.3-2.
8.3-9b Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR In the event both offsite power sources are lost without a CBA the following significant ope rations are initiated:
a) The reactor is shutdown and the turbine generator is tripped.
b) Tripping of the turbine generator will open the load break switch automatically provided no fault currents are present.
c) The diesel generator sets receive starting signals, however, the diesel generator circuit breakers remain open.
d) The loads on the Class 1E busses, except those permanently connected will be load shed by either of the bus undervoltage protection schemes.
e) When the diesel generators have attained rated speed and voltage and if there is no voltage on the 6.9 kV Class 1E busses, the diesel generator g, breakers will close automatically and the loading 10 w of the diesel generators will follow the sequence in accordance with Table 8.3-2.
In the event of a loss of the alternate off site power source, main step-up and unit auxiliary transformers back feed not available, without a DBA the following significant operations are initiated:
a) Turbine, reactor and rain generator trip.
b) Load break switch opens provided no fault currents are present.
c) The diesel generator ' sets receive starting signals, however, the diesel generator circuit breaker remains open.
d) Automatic " fast transfer" of each 6.9 kV non Class 1E bus (normal busses) to the preferred offsite power source is initiated. 6.9 kV Class 1E busses recain energized from the preferred offsite power source.
8.3-9c Arendment 10
GIBBSSAR e) If the transfer is successfully completed plant shutdown proceeds with all auxiliary loads still available.
f) If the fast transfer is not completed within the design time limit, then fast transfer is automatically blocked and the loads on the 6.9 kV non Class 1E busses will be automatically shed by the bus undervoltage relays.
g) The loads on the Class 1E busses, which are being supplied by the preferred offsite source, continue to operate and any additional loads required for safe shutdown are sequenced on in accordance with Table 8.3-2.
Voltage conditions on the 6.9 kV Class 1E busses are monitored by two systems of undervoltage protection.
Cne system senses a low or total loss of voltage and a second system which senses a sustained voltage 10 degradation of bus voltage. Each system consists of three voltage sensors connected in a two out of three coincidence scheme on each bus. The resultant output will incorporate a time delay to prevent spurious trips due to momentary voltage distrubances. Setpoints for the voltage sensors and time delay relays will be determined by analysis of the voltage requirement characteristics of the safety related equipment for all onsite distribution voltage levels. The time delay, including suitable margin, will not exceed the maximum time delay assumed in the Utility Applicant's FSAR accident analysis and will not result in a failure of any safety system component due to extended operation a t a degraded voltage condition.
When the diesel generator is supplying power to the 6.9 kV Class 1E busses load shedding is automatically blocked during the sequencing cycle and is automatically rainstated at the completion of the sequencing cycle.
.dication of the load shed blocking status will be provided in the control room. Details of this design will be provided in the Utility Applicant's FSAR.
8.3-9d Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 9) Safety-Related Equipment Identification Safety related equipment identification is discussed in subsection 8.3.1.3.
10 Instrumentation and Control Control of the 6900-kV Class 1E supply breakers is froml 10 the control room where voltmeters, ammeters, frequency meters, synchroscopes, control switches, and controls are available as required by the operator. Control of the supply breakers is also available at the switchgear, but synchronizing control is on?.y provided in the control room. Control of each supply breaker from the control room is dependent on the remote-local control switch in the switchgear being in the remote position.
To close a circuit breaker requires operation of two switches; the first, the synchronizing two position (of f, sync) switch, and the second, the control four position (pull out, trip, neutral, close) switch. l1 0
8.3-10 Anendment 10
GIBBSSAR Kith power to the Class 1E buses supplied from the primary offsite source and with the alternate offsite source available, the nornal position of the control switches is " remote" for the switchgear remote-local control switch and "off" and " auto" for the control room synchronizing and control switches respectively. 10 respectively. With this configuration the system automatically responds to the transfer schene which provides continued operation of the Class 1E tuses in the event of loss of either or both offsite sources.
Control of the 6900 volt feeder breakers and the 480-VI 1 nain breakers is from the control room. Synchronizing l 10 control is not required. These breakers are controlled by four-position (pull out, trip, neutral, close) ,
control switches.
Control power for the Class 1E circuit breakers is from two of the four Class 1E 125-Vdc batteries.
- 11) Electric Circuit Protection System Electric circuit protection is provided to prevent damage to equipment, maintain operational continuity, and reduce the safety hazard to plant personnel.
Fast-acting relays respond to overloads, undervoltage, or faults on feeders or buses so that corrective action can be initiated to isolate the affected equipment,l 10 transfer loads, or start the onsite diesel generators.
Determination of relays that have operated is indicated by signal targets on the individual relays. Relay protection is also provided on each feeder and transformer. Class 1E motors are connected to 6900-V or 480-V Class 1E switchgear buses and, in general, are each provided with alarms in the control room on overcurrent to alert the operator. The feeder circuit breaker trips on a short-circuit fault. If the feeder circuit breaker fails to clear, backup protection is 10 provided by the automatic tripping of the incoming breaker. Scaller motors are connected to the combination starters, where short-circuit protection is provided by circuit breakers and overload protection by thermal relays. Thermal relays associated with Class 1E motor-operated valves alarm only, the alarms are located in the control room; thus neeting the requirements of 10 Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 27. However, overload 8.3-11 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR protection will be provided by the branch circ uit protective device for the safety related notor operated 10 valves inside the containnient.
8.3-11a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR The unit auxiliary and station service transformers are protected by differential relays and overcurrent backup relaying. Faults within the differential relay zone of the unit auxiliary transformer cause the unit to trip and the unit output breakers in the unit output switchyard to open. The non-Class 1E 6900-v buses fast transfer to the primary offsite power source. A fault 10 within the differential zone around either station service transformer opens the high-voltage breakers in the primary offsite power source substation. The 6900-V Class 1E tuses automatically transfer to the alternate offsite power source through the unit auxiliary transformers with no loss of operation.
All protective devices are coordinated to isolate a fault or abnormal condition as quickly as possible without damaging or interfering with the effective operation of the rest of the system.
Only conventional protective relays of reliable designs with well-defined and proven theory of operation and operating characteristics will be selected for Class 1E application.
Relay settings are based on calculation Cl?ish* takes int 10 account manufacturer's tolerances. _
Acceptance tests and calibration tests for each relay will be performed in accordance with manufacturer's recommendation. Pe riodic testing is performed on each relay to verify proper relay operation.
8-3-12 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 12) System Testing and Surveillance Circuit design incorporates test provisions to periodically monitor the operational capability of the safety-related Class 1E systems during power operation.
Initially, all safety-related equipnent is tested to verify compliance with performance specifications after final assembly and during the startup testing phase.
The diesel generators are tested prior to plant startup to demonstrate their capability to satisfy design requirements. The following tests are administered to certify the adequacy of the units for the intended service:
a) Starting tests b) Load acceptance tests c) Rated load tests d) Design load tests Load rejection tests k e) f) Electrical tests g) Functional tests 8.3-12a Amendment 10
GIDBSSAR The suitability and qualification testing program of each diesel generator unit of the standby power systen is confirned in accordance with IEEE 387-1972 and NRC l1 Regulatory Guide 1.9. If the diesel generator sets are of a type or size not previously used as standby emergency power sources in nuclear powerplant service, reliability qualification testing for the diesel generator sets is performed in accordance with Branch Technical Position (EICSB) 2.
Manual starting of each diesel generator from the control room is incorporated into the design to permit periodic testing. During testing, the diesel generator is manually synchronized to its bus after reaching rated voltage and f req uency. Automatic sychronizing is not used. An accident signal occurring during pe riodic testing of a diesel generator automatically overrides the test mode and places the diesel generator in the emergency mode.
Periodic testing of the diesel generators is scheduled to verify their continued capability and availability to perform their design function. The schedule of diesel generator tests are described in subsection 16.3/4.8.1.1.2.
Functional testing of the interlock to prevent load-shed during sequencer operation will be performed at lea st once every eighteen nonths during shutdown in conjunction with the testing of the diesel generators. 10 Pro'ii '3 ion s are incorporated to allow testing and calibration of both 6.9-kV Class 1E bus undervoltage protection systems during plant operation.
- 13) Systems and Equipment Shared Between Units No electrical Class 1E systems and equipment are shared between units.
- c. Onsite Standby Electric Power Sources The onsite standby ac power source is an independent onsite autonatically starting system designed to furnish reliable and adequate power for safety-related loads to ensure safe plant shutdown and standby when preferred and alternate offsite power sources are not available.
8.3-13 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Two independent diesel generators are provided, each capable of sequentially starting and supplying the reinimum power requirements required for a DBA. The diesel generators are electrically and physically independent.
O s
8.3-13a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR The standby powe r diesel generator sets are used to provide emergency power, and are not used for peaking or other nonenergency service; therefore, the system is in accordance with Eranch Technical Position (EICSB) 8.
Diesel generators and associated equipnent are located in a seismic Category I building as shown in Figure 8.3-5. The l 10 building structures protect the diesel generators and associated 11 equipment against SSE, tornadoes, missiles, fire and flood.
Within the protected stru ctures , separation and protection 10 against these phencmena are achieved by neans of a seismic Category I partitioning wall between the two diesel generators.
- 1) Starting Initiating Circuits Each diesel generator set autonatically starts upon receiving any one of the following signals:
a) Undervoltage on its respective safety related tus b) Sustained degradation of voltage on its respective safety-related bus c) High containment pressure d) Low pressurizer pressure 10 e) Excessive cooldown signal f) Manual actuation from the control room g) Undervoltage and protective relay trip signal on the primary offsite source or alternate offsite source.
Figure 8.3-2 shows start signals a), b) , f) , and g) ;
signals c) through f) are shown in the applicable NSSS SSAP.
8.3-14 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
- 2) Starting Mechanism And System Each diesel generator is capable of attaining rated voltage and frequency and can be fully loaded within a time consistent with the requirements of the ESF under accident conditions. Generator reactances and characteristics of the static exciter and voltage regulator are coordinated to provide satisfactory starting and acceleration of sequenced loads. The exciter-regulator system design ensures rapid voltage recovery when starting large motor loads. Voltage drops do not exceed the limits established in NRC Fegulatory Guide 1.9. 10 starting of the diesel engines is accomplished by a compressed air system consisting of independent and redundant air compressors, receivers, and solenoid valves. Each of the redundant receivers has sufficient compressed air storage for five starts. Section 9.5 presents a more detailed description of the starting mechanism.
Fast starting and load acceptance is facilitated by maintaining engine temperature by heating and forced circulation of cooling water and lube oil. In addition, the units are located in heated rooms.
- 3) Tripping Devices The diesel generator protection systems initiate automatic and immediate protective actions to prevent or limit eq uipment damage and allcw restoration of the equipuent upon correction of the trouble.
Excluding accident conditions, tripping of the diesel generators occurs for any of the following reasons:
a) Low lube oil pressure b) Engine overspeed c) Lube oil high temperature l 10 d) High crankcase pressure e) Generator differential 8.3-14a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR f) Generator overcurrent with voltage restraint g) Reverse power flow h) High cooling water temperature i) High generator bearing temptrature j) Loss of excitation k) Generator negative sequence 10 l) Generator ground m) Generator field trip With the exception of items b) and e), these trips are bypassed when the diesel generators start due to a SIAS which is consistent with Branch Technical Position (EICSE) 17. The possibility of the diesel generator protective devices tripping the diesel is precluded under accident conditions by bypassing these trip 10 signals.
The possibility of diesel generator protective devices not tripping the diesel, when required, is minimized by selecting devices wit h high reliability based on operating experience and testing. Only generator differential relays that have a high degree of field-proven reliability are used.
- 4) Interlocks and Permissives 10 Interlocks are provided to ensure safe and proper l1 operation of the electrical systems: and the follcwing are typical applications:
a) To lock out all possible sources of energy to a bus if a fault exists on the bus b) To prevent automatic closing of the diesel generator breakert if voltage is present on the associated Class 1E bus with the diesel generator control switch in the automatic mode 8.3-15 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR c) To prevent closing of a diesel generator breaker until the diesel generator achieves rated voltage and frequency 8.3-15a Arrendment 10
GIBBSSAR d) To prevent paralleling both battery chargers associated with each 125-Vdc system
- 5) Ioad Shedding Circuits 10 For a discussion of load shedding circuits of the onsite standby diesel generators, see Subsection 8.3.1.1,b.,8.
- 6) Testing For a discussion of testing of the onsite standby diesel generators, see Subsection 8. 3.1.1,b. ,12 and 16' 3/4.8.1. 10
- 7) Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer Systems For a discussion of the fuel oil storage and transfer system of the onsite standby diesel gene ra tors , see Section 9.5.
- 8) Cooling and Heating Systems l 10 For a discussion of cooling and heating systems of the onsite standby diesel generators, see Section 9.5.
- 9) Instrumentation and Control System and Alarms 10 8.3-16 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Automatic control of the diesel generators and Class 1E loads requiring sequencing is provided. Manual control l 10 of the diesel generators and safety-related systems is available locally and in the main control room.
Arrangement of control circuitry maintains the required redundancy compatible with the related power circuit.
Control power is obtained from redundant 125-V de systems. Train A loads receive power from battery ET1ED1 and Train B loads from battery ETIED2. Seel 10 Figure 0.3-1.
The de power from the station batteries is required by each diesel generator for controls, alarms, protective relays, air-starting solenoid valves, and, if required, generator field flashing. Taese loads are estimated and tabulated in Table 8.3-4 and will be finalized in the Utility Applicant's FSAR. l10 Instrumentation is provided to continually monitor the status of the safety-related systems. Diesel generator status is indicated and alarmed in the control room. If running, automatic shutdown of a diesel generator is also annunciated.
g The following instrumentation is provided to monitor the operability of the diesel generators:
a) Voltreters b) Ammeters c) Frequency meters d) varmeters e) Nattmeters f) Running time meters g) Tachometer =
8.3-17 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Instrumentation and alarms for the diesel generator 10 cooling, starting, lubricating, and ventilating systems are discussed in Section 9.5.
The following indicating or alarm devices for the onsite standby power system are provided locally and in the 10 control room.
d) pus Voltage, Current, and frequency h) Circuit breaker position lights c) Diesel generator power flow and starting status d) Battery voltage e) Protective relaying operational alarms Each condition that renders a diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal is alarmed separately in the contrcl room. A separate alarm point engraved " Auto Start Blocked" is initiated in addition to the alarm window identifying the abnormal condition. Conditions that block automatic emergency start are as follows:
Condition Annunciator Wording 10 Local mode selector switch Mode Switch-Off Auto not in " Auto" position Controls not reset from a Controls Not Reset previous trip loss of AC or EC control power Control Power Not Available Insufficient starting air Starting Air pressure Pressure Low Insufficient fuel oil pressure Fuel Oil Pressure Low Valves in improper position Valve Position which is not Konitored by Of f Noraal by other instrumentation m
8.3-18 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR In addition a " Diesel Generator Trouble" alarm is provided which is initiated for any malfunction not included in the above list. 10 Each Diesel Generator local panel contains an annunciator which identifies the origin of any trip or nalfunction.
- 11) Prototype Qualification Program For a discussion of the prototype qualification program see Subsection 8.3.1.1,b.,12.
- d. Safety Related Systems
- 1) Motor Size Motor size for the individual loads are determined on the basis of nameplate rating, pump pressure, and flow conditions or pump runout conditions. Basis of selection of motor size for the purpose of determining the preliminary size of the onsite standby diesel generator is noted in Table 8.3-1. ggg 8.3-18a Amendment 10
GIBB3SAR
- 2) Minimum Motor Accelerating Voltage The trinimum voltage required for Class 1E motors to accelerate their connected load is 80 percent of motor voltage rating.
- 3) Motor Starting Torque The selection of motor staring torque of the safety-related motors is based on speed-torque curves, wk2 factor, expected voltage at terminals of motor, and acceleration time requirements.
- 4) Minimum Motor Torque Margin In accordance with the loading sequence established in Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2, specified acceleration times require that the motors achieve rated speed within 5 seconds or less. The minimum design margin of motor torque over the pump load torque, at 80 percent of motor rated voltage, is 20 percent minimum for the range l 2 between standstill and breakdown torque speed for the EOP motors.
- 5) Motor Insulation Motor insulation is selected on the basis of ambient temperature and expected temperature rise based on the worst loading conditions. In most cases, the motors have Class B irculation.
- 5) Temperature Monitoring Devices Provided in large Horsepower Motors Temperature-monitoring devices are provided for those motors that are 100 hp or more.
- 7) Interrupting Capacity of Switchgear, Load Centers, Control Centers, and Distribution Panels Interrupting capacity is as described in Section 8.3.1.1.b.7. l 10
- 8) Electric Circuit Protection For electric circuit protection, see subsection 8.3.1.1,b.,11.
8.3-19 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 9) Grounding High impedance grounding of the standby diesel generator neutral limits the ground fault current to low values which allows continuous operation with a single phase to ground fault in the onsite standby power system. A ground fault is alarmed in the control room.
Motors are grounded to ensure tripping of ground fault current protective relay where applied and to ensure personnel protection.
Panels, racks, control boards, switchgear, MCCs are grounded to ensure personnel protection. I1
- 8. 3.1. 2 Analysis The onsite ac -and dc electric systems conform to GDC, Begulatory Guides, and other applicable criteria, as listed in subsection 8.1.4.
8.3.1.2.1 Compliance with GDC 17, Electric Pcwer Systems The electric power system design complies with GDC 17 Electric 4,
Power Systers.
The first immediate offsite power circuit access to the safety-related buses is from the primary offsite power source substation through station service transformers. In the event of failure of the primary offsite power circuit, the safety-related buse s are powered from the main generator via the load-break switch and unit auxiliary transformers. If the main generator is not available (load-break switch in open position) , then the alternate immediate offsite power circuit access to the safety-related buses is from the unit output switchyard through the nain and unit auxiliary transformers. The primary and alternate offsite systems are physically independent circuits from offsite transmission networks; each is continuously available.
Two independent diesel generators and their distribution systems are provided to supply power to the redundant safety related 10 loads. Each diesel generator and its distribution system are designed and installed to provide a reliable source of redundant onsite-generated ac power, and is capable of supplying the safety-related loads assigned to the Class 1E buses which it serves.
8.3-20 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Four independent 125-V de batteries and their distribution systems supply power to the redundant dc systems. Each battery and its distribution system are designed and installed to provide a reliable source of redundant onsite de power, and are capable of supplying the safety-related loads assigned to the safety-related bus which they serve.
Fedundant parts of the ac and de systems are physically and electrically independent to the extent that a single event or single electrical fault does not cause a loss of power to extend beyond the particular safety load group.
8.3.1.2. 2 Compliance with GDC 18, Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems The electric power systems are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those which are safety-related and do not normally operate.
The ESF electrical system is designed to permit:
- 1) Inspection and testing during equipment shutdown, of wiring, insulation, connections and assess continuity l 10 of the systems and condition of conponents
- 2) Periodic testing, during nornal plant operation, of 10 the operability and functional performance of the Class 1E systems, including actuation devices, protective relays, ESF loads, sequencing circuitry, and buses.
The periodic testing of the diesel generator and batteries (onsite power system) is described in technical specification subsection 3/4.8. Plant design also provides testing capability for cther Class 1E equipment as required by IEEE 308-1974. l10 8.3.1.2.3 Conpliance with Begulatory Guide 1.6 The design complies with the provisions of Pegulatory Guide 1.6.
The electrically pawered safety loads (ac and dc) are separated into redundant load grcups such that loss of any one group will not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed.
I Each Class 1E ac bus has access to two of f site power sources and an onsite standby power source. Two diesel generators are provided, each connected exclusively to its respective Class 1E 8.3-21 Amendment 10
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART 4 $
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GIBBSSAR ac tus. There is no automatic or manual tie between redundant Class 1E ac buses.
The sa fety related de loads are separated into four independent 10 load groups; each load group is energized by its exclusive battery and two tattery chargers (one spare) . The tattery-charger combination has no automatic or manual connection to any other redundant de load group.
O 8.3-21a Arrendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10
- 8. 3.1. 2. 4 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.9 The design complies with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1. 9 Diesel generator ratings are based on the continuous load demand required at any one time. This rating exceeds the sum of the conservatively rated loads. Motor loads are estimated based on nameplate rating, pump runout conditicns, or estimated flow pressure conditions. A conservative motor efficiency is assured as shown in Table 8.3-1 and 8.3-2.
Sequencing large loads at five-second large motors have reached rated speed and that intervals ensures thatl 1 the voltage and frequency are stabilized before the succeeding loads are applied.
- 8. 3.1. 2. 5 Compliar.ce with Regulatory Guide 1.32 The design conplies with the provisions of Pegulatory Guide 1.32.
The first offsite power circuit access to the safety-related Luses is from the primary of fsite power source substation through station service transf ormers. In event of failure of the primary offsite power circuit, the safety-related buses are powered from the nain generator via the load-break switch and the unit auxiliary transformers. If the main generator is not available (loa d-brea k switch in open position), the alternate immediate of fsite pcwer circuit access to the safety-related buses is f rom 8.3-22 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g
the alternate offsite power source in the switchyard through the main step-up transf orme r and unit auxiliary transformers.
The refore , each Class 1E bus has innediate access to the two of fsite power sources available from the primary and alternate 10 offsite transmission networks.
Each battery charger is sized to supply the combined steady-state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the designed minimum-charge state to the fully charged state under all nodes of plant operation.
8.3.1. 2. 6 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 In reference to position C1, the electrical penetration assembly is designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum current versus time conditions permitted by backup protective devices or conductor fusing characteristics.
The electrical distribution for power and control circuits incorporates coordinated circuit design which selects penetrations with thermal capability greater than the thermal capability of the associated externally connected field cabling.
This approach ensures that in the unlikely event of two failures l of circuit protection devices, the externally connected field conductors fail before the penetration conductor or penetration seal.
Electrical penetrations are not currently available with self-fusing characteristics. Circuit breakers or fuses used for circuit overload protection preclude compliance with the requirements of IEEE 279-1971. l1 Powe r and control circuits incorporate backup protective devices that are provided as follows:
- 1) For three phase power circuits, subsection 8.3.1.1.b.11 seel 10
- 2) Single phase and de circuits; either two circuit breakers or one circuit breaker and a set of fuses are used in series. In this case one of four overcurrent devices, when actuated, isolates the fault from the energy source.
- 3) The protection ensures that both primary and backup protective devices operate for the same fault in a coordinated manner.
8.3-23 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 4) The circuit design will only comply with y IEEE 279- 1971 in the aspect that the protective devices l are redundant. Circuit independence and physical separation are limited in that both protective device s are in series in the same circuit.
- 5) The protective devices are ccnnected in series for penetration circuits, as opposed to the channelized protection systems specified Consequently, the in IEEE 279-1971.( l capability of online testing, bypassing, and manual initiation, as stated in paragraphs 4.10, 4.11, and 4.17 of IEEE 279-1971 are notl 1 possible.
8.3.1.2. 7 Conpliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384-1974l 1 The design complies with the provisions of Begulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384-1974. l1 Complete physical separation of the redundant protective and safety-related equipment, cables, raceways, and internal wiring is achieved by one of the following: the use of separate rooms or floors; appropriate distance; the use of barriers in a room.
All safety-related equipment, exposed raceways, cables, and internal wiring are identified by distinct color markers so that the plant personnel will be able to distinguish, without resorting to any reference material, Class 1E circuits from redundant Class IE counterparts and Class 1E sys ten s fron non-Class 1E circuits.
Separate cable-spreading areas located above and below the control room are provided, one for each safety-related train and two protection channels.
- 8. 3.1. 2. 8 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.93 As described in technical specification subsection 3/4.8, the power operation is initiated and continued without restriction cnly when the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) are met.
If the LCO are not met, the power operation is restricted in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.93.
8.3-24 Amendment 1
GIBBSSAR g 8.3.1.2.9 Compliance with IEEE 308-1974 l1 All aspects of the electrical station design comply with IEEE 308-1974. l1 Class 1E electrical equipment is designed to satisfy the functional requirements under conditions produced by the design basis events listed in IEEE 308-1974.
l1 Separation, redundancy, and independence of components eliminate the possibility of a common mode failure. All Class 1E equipment is located in seismic Category I structures and is qualified in accordance with IEEE 344-1975, as supplemented by Branch l 1 Technical Position (EICSB) 10. Seismic design of electrical equipment is discussed in Section 3.10.
""rveillance of
. Class 1E systems demonstrate their readiness to gerform intended safety functions. Availability and operability of these systems are monitored by periodic testing.
8.3. 1.2.10 Failure Mode Analysis verification that the safety-related ac systems satisfy the ggg single failure criterion is demonstrated by the failure mode analysis given in Table 8.3-3 where component failure and the effects of failure are noted.
8.3.1.2.11 Equipment Operation in Hostile Environments wherever posrible, electrical equipment is located to avoid, or minimize, the ef fects of hostile environments during all modes of plant operation. With the exception of the containment atmosphere, the environnent in all areas of the plant containing Class IE equipment is approximately the same as in conventional powe rplants. Expected radiation levels outside of containment are low, having little or no effect on equipment performance.
All Class 1E equipment is specified to perform its intended function under the maximum expected environmental conditions at the equipment locations. Specifications include radiation, temperature, pressure, and humidity requirements, as well as margin.
Electrical equipment required to operate inside containment during and after an accident is capable of functioning under the conditions discussed in Section 3.11 and tabulated in 10 Table 3.11- 2.
8.3-25 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10 Equipment operation is not inpaired by the cunulative effects of radiation released during the accident and radiation released during long term nornal operation. For steam line breaks or a LOCA, the equipment is designed to function for the required duration and to perform its safety function. The required duration constitutes the length of time required for operation of safety-related equipment which permits safe shutdown of the plant and prevents significant release of radioactive material to the environment. This tire interval varies for specific items of equipnent, depending on equipment function.
See Section 3.11 of the NSSS SSAR for tests performed on safety equipnent supplied by the NSSS vendor. Valve motor operators and cables not supplied by the NSSS vendor are tested by the manufacturer to verify performance capability under accident conditions. Type tests of valve notor operators are required, conducted, and documented in accordance with IEEE 382-1972 andl 1 Pegulatory Guide 1.73. All Class 1E cables are tested, and the tests are documented as outlined in IEEE 383-1974. l1 The heating and ventilation systems of safety-related structures are discussed in Section 9.4.
8.3-26 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment safety-related electrical equipment is uniquely numbered so that identification as safety equipment is evident. In addition, color-coded nameplates conspicuously identify the equipment as safety-related.
Cable and cable tray identification is acconplished by distinct color markings at intervals not exceeding 15 feet, at junctions, points of entry to and exit from enclosed areas, and at each end.
These raceways are marked prior to the installation of their cables.
Cables installed in these raceways are marked by a distinct color narking at intervals not to exceed 5 feet to facilitate visual veri fication that the cable installation is in conformance with separation criteria. In addition, color coding of the cables enables plant personnel to distinguish, without having to resort to any reference material, between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment and circuits, between non-Class IE systems associated vith different redundant Class 1E systems, and between redundant Class 1E systems. The follcwing is a list of equipment and cable and raceway color codings of separation routings of Class 1E and non-Class 1E electrical systems (see the NSSS SAP for 10 identification of equipnent supplied by the NSSS vendor) :
Subsystem Name Color Peactor Protection Ch I Actuation Train A Red Pattery I Associated cables routed White-Black stripe 10 with Train B Eattery II Feactor Protection Ch II White Actuation Train B I 1 Associated cables routed Red-Elack stripe with Train A 10 Feactor Frotection Ch III Dattery III Blue Peactor Protection Ch IV 1 Pattery IV Yellow 8.3-27 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Non-Class IE Galvanized (cable trays)
Black (cable) e
~
8.3-27a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems -
Separation between redundant Class 1E systems is based on the potential hazards in the particular area so that e ven in the event of a single failure, the design still provides a sufficient number of circuits and equipment to accomplish protective functions during any design basis event.
Separation of equipment is achieved either by distance, separate rooms, or barriers. Possible effects of pipe whip and/or jet impingment on redundant safety related equipment or system are considered in determining the separation.
Possible effects of non-safety-related equipment on safety-related equipment are also considered in determining the adequate separation of components.
The QA program discussed in Chapter 17 ensures compliance withl 1 established criteria. Class 1E equipment and circuits are clearly identified on documents and drawings in accordance with IEEE 494-1974. The electrical cable system for the Class 1El system is described in the succeeding subsections. Cable 1 installations for redundant systems are in conformance with IEEE 384-1974 as augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.75. l1 8.3.1.4.1 Cable Voltage Grouping cables in raceways are grouped on the basis of function and voltage. Independent raceways are provided as follows:
- a. 6900-V power
- h. Low voltage power
- c. Control (control cables and cables for intermittent 10 duty, e.g., valve operators, are not restricted to one layer and may occupy the same raceway.)
- d. Instrumentation l 10 In a vertical stack of trays, the highest voltage level is on top with lower trays descending in voltage level with instrumentation at the lowest level whenever feasible.
8.3-28 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- e. Nucl'ar Instrurrentation l 10 The minimum separation from the NIS conduits and containment penetration assemblies to electrical noise sources such as power sources of 118Vac, and above shall be two feet. The minimum separation from 6.9 kV shall be six feet.
9 8.3-28a An.endment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2 Cable Pouting separation Power, and control and instrua. ntation cables are installed in trays and rigid steel conduits. The cable tray system conforms to NEMA VE1-1971, Cable Tray Systems.
Wherever feasible, redundant circuits are routed at different floor elevations or on opposite sides of rooms or spaces.
Fedundant circuits are installed in separate cable t ra ys ,
conduits, ducts, and penetrations. Separation of tray systems is as follows:
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2.1 Cable-Spreading Areas separate cable-spreading areas located above and below the cont rol room are provided, one for each Class 1E train and two protection channels. Neither cable-spreading area contains high-energy equipment (i.e. switchgear, transformers, rotating equipment) or potential sources of missiles or pipe whip.
Mininum separation between redundant Class 1E channels, or between Class 1E and non-Class 1E trays in the cable-spreading 10 areas is 1-foot horizontal
- and 3 feet vertical.**
Where teraination arrangements preclude maintaining this separation, totally-enclosed raceways, barriers, or tray covers 10 are used as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.75.
The 6900-V and 480-V power cables are not routed in the cable-spreading area. Power supply feeders to instrument and control room distribution panels are installed in enclosed raceways.
In addition to the fire barriers, used only if adequate physical sepa ration cannot be obtained, fire detection and fire protection systeas are provided as discussed in subsection 9.5.1. Alarms l 10 located in the control room give operators early warning of fire.
8.3-29 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2. 2 General Plant Areas In plant areas where hazards are limited to failures or faults internal to the electric equipment or cables, minimum spacing tetween redundant cable trays separated horizontally
- is 3 feet l 10 and 5 feet between those sepa rated vertically.** If minimum spacing is unattainable, a fire barrier is provided with IEEE 384-1974. in accordancel 1
- (measured from the side rail of one tray to the side rail of the adjacent tray)
- * (measured from the bottom of the top tray to the top of the side rail of the bottom tray) .
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2. 3 Hoctile Environments In general Class 1E wiring systems will not be routed through an area where there is potential for accumulation of large quantities of oil or other combustible material. If such routing is unavoidable, only one system of redundant cables is allowed in any such area, and the cables are protected by flane reta rdan t material as discussed in Section 9.5.1. In areas containing pote ntial missiles, physical arrangement or protective barriers preclude simultaneous loss of more than one redundant system. l1
- 8. 3.1. 4. 2. 4 Electrical Penetration Areas separate penetrations are provided for 6900-V power, 480-V power, control, and instrumentation cables of each class 1E t rain and protection channel. The design objective is maximum possible separation between Class 1E trains, and between any large piping penetrations and Class 1E trains to minimize damage f rom steam or waterline ruptures. Protection from the main steam and feedwater lines is provided by means of reinforced concrete walls or floors. Electrical penetrati on areas located on dif ferent floor elevations provide adequate pnysical separation between redundant circ uit s. In cases where redundant instrumentation channels will te routed on the same elevation, and in the same general area, the redundant channels will be located on opposite sides of the a rea s , if feasible. Minimum separation distance between individual penetration nozzles is 6 foot centerline to centerline Location and separation of penetrations are shown in Figure 8.3-3.
8.3-30 Amendment 10
GIBESSAR 8.3.1.4.2.5 Cable 7 ray Crossover Areas In cases where redundant trays cross over each other in areas where only electrical equipment is located, there is a minimum vertical separation of 15 inches (free air space) . Fire 10 protection requirements are in accordance with Section 9.5.1.
8.3.1. 4. 3 Seismic Pequirements Cable trays, supports, and ducts carrying Class IE circuits meet Seismic Category I requirements. In addition, trays and supports carrying non-Class 1E circuits that cculd jeopardize the integrity of Class 1E circuits or other safety related equipment are also designed to meet seismic requirenents.
8.3.2 dc Power Systent 8.3.2.1 Description The de systems provide de and ac (inverters) energy for plant cont rol and instrumentation and energency lighting under all modes of plant operation, including loss of all ac power sources, until these sources are restored. Safety-related loads are supplied by four redundant 125-Vdc systems designed to operate withcut interruption during and after a CBA, an SSE, or a tornado. These systems are classified Class 1E, seismic Category I, and as such, their design requirements conform to IEEE 308-1974, IEEE 344-1975, IEEE 384-1974, IEEE 450-1975, IEEE 484-1975, and NRC Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, 1.75, and 1 1.93. Figure 8.3-1 depicts the main arrangement for the station de s ystems.
The de systems are comprised of four independent anu redundant Class 1E 125-V systems and one 125/250-V battery system. Each Class 1E 125-V system consists of one battery, one main distribution bus with air circuit breakers, two static battery chargers, local distribution panels, and feeders.
Battery ET1ID1 feeds distribution panel 1ED1-1 and inverter 1V1PC-1 which supplies channel I and train A load requirements.
Eattery BT1ED3 feeds distribution panel 1ED3-1 and inverter 1VIPC-3 which supplies channel III load requirements.
Battery BT1ED2 feeds distribution panel 1ED2-1 and inverter 1CIPC-2 whch supplies channel II and Train B load requirements. l 10 8.3-31 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Fattery BTIED4 feeds distributior. panel 1ED4-1 and inverter IV1PC-4 which supplies channel IV load requirements. l 10 8.3-31a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR See Tables 8.3-4 and 8.3-5. There are no bus ties between the de systems. Battery chargers for each independent de system are fed from 480-V MCCs which are supplied power through 480-V double-ended unit substations from 6.9-kV Class 1E buses 1EA1 and 1EA2. Battery chargers for batteries BTIED1 and BT1ED3 have connections to bus 1EA1, and battery chargers for batteries BT1EE2 and BT1ED4 have connections to bus 1EA2. The assignment of sources of control power for all switchgear is shown in 10 Table 8.3-8.
Independence and separation for each Class 1E dc system are maintained. This precludes a single failure from causing loss of more than one Class 1E system. There is no connection of non-Class 1E loads *o these Class 1E systems. The objective is to supply only Class 1E loads from these syste;as.
To supply non-class 1E loads, a 125/250-vde system is provided that is completely independent of the Class 1E 125-V systems.
This non-Class 1E system consists of two 125-V batteries, connected to provide 125/250-V supply, three 125-V battery chargers, and the main distribution bus with air circuit breakers, motor starters, and feeders.
Two chargers are provided for normal operation of non-Class 1E 10 O
batteries BT1D1-1 and BT1DT1-21 the third charger is a spare.
The loads on the 125/250-Vdc system essentially consist of the follcwing:
- a. 250-V turbine-generator emergency tearing oil pump
- b. 250-V turbine-generator emergency hydrogen seal oil pump
- c. 250-V feedwater turbine emergency oil pumps
- d. Control power for non-safety-related switchgear
- e. Non-emergency lighting and distribution panels l 10
- f. Non-a'fety-related BOP instrumentation and plant computer inve. ers Each Class 1E 125-V battery is located in a separate, seismic' Category I rcom of the auxiliary building (Figure 8.3-5 and
- 8. 3- 7) . In 'ddition to providing protection a,ainst an SSE, the 10 walls of these rooms act as fire and missile barriers to maintain the integrity of the redundant systems. The battery chargers and 8.3-32 Agendment 10
GTBBSSAR distribution boards associated with a particular battery are located in a room, adjacent to the battery room, of simila r construction. 10 8.3-32a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Separation of batteries from associated equipment negates the effect of any corrosive fumes emanating from the batteries, maintaining a high degree of system reliability and availability.
All battery rooms are ventilated to remove gases produced during charging operations. Battery room ventilation systems are 10 described in Section 9.4.8.2.
A separate room is provided in the electrical building to house the non-safety-related 125/250-V system batteries,
- a. Station Batteries All batteries are lead-acid type, designed for continuous float duty. The Class 1E batteries are mounted on corrosion-resistant steel racks with high-inpact noncombustible spacers between cells and cell clanps to prevent shifting and to facilitate maintenance, while permitting the batteries to function during an SSE. These Class 1E 125-V batteries and battery racks are seisnic Category I components seismically qualified as referenced in Section 3.10.
The batteries are maintained in a nominal fully charged condition, and have sufficient capacity to carry essential loads continuously for a minimum of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without battery chargers.
g The batteries will be connected to their respective buses under all nodes of operation. No operator action is required to maintain battery power on the buses. Conplete loss of offsite power concurrent with the loss of all standby diesel generator power is not considered credible. In the event that all 10 preferred sources are lost, ac power to the chargers is furnished immedictely by the diesel generators; therefore, the 4-hour criterion is conservative. A preliminary load estimate for the 125-V batteries is given in Tables 8.3-4 and 8.3-5.
It is expected that loads will be modified as the design details are finalized. Final load sizes and battery capacities will be given in the Utility Applicant's FSAR. l 10 Battery instrumentation consists of de amreters (in the battery leads) and voltmeters, ground detection, and undervoltage relays on the de buses. Ground detection and undervoltage conditions are annunciated in the control room.
8.3-33 Amendment 10
g GIBBSSAR
- b. Battery Chargers Each Class 1E 125-V battery system chargers to permit charger maintenance withouthas two redundant battery degrading systen integrity. The solid-state chargers float the battery on the bus and supply the de load demand up to raximum charger capacity, maintaining the battery in a fully charged condition.
Each charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge of 1.75-V per cell to its fully charged state in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> while supplying its largest steady-state loads.
The chargers will have the capacity for periodic batter y 10 equalizing charges.
Input power to the chargers associated with the Class IE 125-V systens is obtained through independent 480-v, three phase ac feeds fron safety-related Class 1E MCCs. Battery chargers associat_d with battery BT1ED1 are supplied from 480-V MCCs 1EB1-1 and 1EB3-1 as indicated in Figure 8.3.1. These MCCs are powered from Class 1E 480-V switchgears 1EB1 and 1EB3, respectively. Arrangenents of power supplies for the chat'erE associated with hattery BT1ED3 are similar.
Pattery chargers associated with battery BTIED2 are supplied fron 480-V MCCs 1EB2- 1 and 1EB4-1 as indicated in Figure 8.3-1. These MCCs are powered from Class 1E 480-V switchgears IEB2 and IEB4, respectively. Arrangements of power supplies for the chargers dssociated with battery BT1ED4 are similar.
There are no combinations of ac power sources from redundant trains feeding the two chargers associated with a particular safety-related battery system. If the preferred ac power sources are unavailable, the standby diesel generators will provide the required ac power.
~Each charger is automatically regulated and equipped with a de voltmeter, dc ammeter, ac f ai' lure ~, hattery charger hig h voltage relay and battery low voltage relays. Malfunction of a charger annunciates in the control room and trips the cha rger main treaker; charger main breaker status is indicated in the control 10 room and alarms for an of f-normal position indication.
Protection is incorporated to prevent the ac supply source from beconing a load on the tattery caused by power feedback resulting trom the loss cf ac power to the charger.
8.3-34 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 8.3.2.3 References Deleted 10 8.3-37 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10 Deleted 8.3-38 Amendtoent 10
GIBBSSAR 10 Deleted 8.3-39 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10 Deleted 8.3-40 Amendtrent 10
GIBBSSAR 8.3.3 Fire Protection for Cable Systems 8.3.3.1 Cable Derating and Cable Tray Fill Established cable ampacities are based on IEEE publication S-135 (IPCEA P-46-426) , AIEE-IPCEA Power Cable Ampacities for Copper or Aluminum Conductors, and manufacturer's standards.
Considerations for determining cable size are as follows:
- a. Nornal and emergency load currents
- b. Short-circuit heating capacity
- c. Voltage regulation
- d. Load factor of 100 percent
- e. Grouping derating
- f. Load diversity Ampacities of cables installed in trays are derated in accordance
, with the appropriate derating tactors given in IPCEA P-46-426 and IPCFA P-54-440. I 10 Cable tray fill criteria limit the sun cf the cross-sectional arcas of control cables to a maximum of 40 percent of the usable cross section of the tray. Cabie tray fill criteria for powre cables will te according to " calculated depth of cables in tray, inches" of IPCEA P-54-440. In the case of medium-voltage and 600-V power cables larger than AEG No. 4/0, a mininum se pa ration of one quarter of the dianeter of the larger cable is maintained; 10 for this case, fill may exceed the " calculated depth of cables in tray" but is limited to a single-cable layer.
8.3.3.2 Fire Detection and Protection A detailed description of the fire protection and detection systens in areas of heavy cable concentration is given in subscetion 9.5.1.
10 8.3-41 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
10 8.3.3.3 Fire Barriers and Separation Between Bedundant Trays Fire barriers and separation between redundant trays are discussed in subsection 8.3.1.4.
8.3.3.4 Fire Stops at Penetrations in Walls and Floors Cable and cable tray penetrations through fire-rated walls and floors and all other types of cable ways or conduits are provided with fire stops. The fire stops prevent fires from spreading along raceways and are rated with sufficient time to maintain the integrity of the floor or wall and to provide time to bring tire-fighting equipment into service. The fire stops are tested by a recognized labor :ory, in accordance with ASTM E119, Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials (including the hose stream test) .
Design criteria considerations for fire stops are as follows:
- a. Gas tightness L. No reaction between the materials used and cable ,
insulation jackets 8.3-42 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- c. Minimal poisonous gases or fumes developed during installation or during a fire
- d. No expansion which might injure insulation or jacketing during installation and operation
- e. Provision for the installation of additional cables
- f. Heat dissipation
- g. Temperature rise during curing of material within acceptable linits
- h. Cable ampacity consistent with the requirenents of the penetration
- i. Ehere sleeve penetrations are used beneath control boards or other panels, all voids are plugged with a ncnflowing fire-resistant material after the cables are installed.
- j. If the sleeves are installed in metal plates in the floor, the plates are coated with a fire-resistant compound. All fasteners are similarly protected to prevent failure.
- k. The finished floor penetrations do not contain open wells into which debris can f all and accumulate.
- 1. Where a metal enclosure functions as a fire barrier, penetrations into the enclosure are provided with a fire stop.
- m. Where radiation is a consideration, shielding material is used.
Vertical runs of cable trays in plant areas are provided with hcrizontal fire stops at every fire-rated floor penetretion.
Hcrizontal runs of cable trays in plant areas are provided with vertical fire stops at every fire-rated wall penetration.
Vertical runs of cable trays in cable chases or shaf ts are provided with horizontal fire barriers at every fire-rated floor or fire-rated wall penetration. (See Figures 8. 2-4 through 8.2- 11 for wall locations and elevations.)
A list of materials used and their characteristics will be provided in the Utility Applicant's FSAR. The materials used 10 will he in accordance with the criteria listed for fire stops.
8.3-43 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF Quality assurance procedures used to verify that the penetration fire stops and seals have been properly installed are in accordance with Section 17.1 and NRC Regelntory Guide 1.30.
To ensure that fire stops and seals are properly installed, al 1 portable carbon dioxide extinguisher is activated at the seal, and a visual inspection is pe r forned to see if there is any leakage.
Scheduled tests of fire stops and seals are perforned; to qualify as having passed the test described in tiie previous paragraph, there shall be no leakage.
The administrative procedures and controls followed when it becones necessary to treach a complete fire stop of seal or to add or to renove cables are in accordance with Section 17.1.
Scheduled visual inspections are performed to identify open or deteriorated fire stops and seals.
O 8.3-44 Anendment 1
GIPESSAR TAPLE 8.3-4 ESTIMATED 125-vde EA7TEPY LCAD FEQUIFEMENTS ETIEDI AND BTIED2 l10 (Westinghouse-414)
L9Ad DeSEIiEliSD 3DICISS. Fertuired Per .T1EID t erv31sJfter loss of acJoyer 0-1 Min. 1-239 MiD. 2J9-240 MlD-Annunciators and 15 15 15 indicating lamps Inst rument btm 102 102 102 inve rters Diesel gererator panel 2 2 2 Diesel generater field 70 - . l10 flasting solenoid valv( s ,
20 - -
Breake r cperations 100 - 75 Felay operations 10 10 10 Miscellaneous 10 10 10 Total amperes / interval 329 139 214 l 10 i
i t
hair'nt 10
IIEI~:fr T M-I F 9.3-E EST I.M AT F D 12 5-Wie IATTEF Y ICAD E ECUI P FMFN13 ,
LT 1 FC 3 A':" PTIEC4 l 10 (Feet inghouse '414) 122d_ErHCriL11DD ocIrrr2_EraL2 ired _frI_Iitt_Itte rv.ils Af t er I.ons of ac rou r 0-1 Min. 1-239 Min. 230-240 Min.
Ar nur ci ators or:d 15 15 15 it.di ca t i r.g l a:r rs Inst r ument Los 72 72 72 inve rt ers Felay oper at ions 10 10 10 Miscel la r.c o u n 10 10 10 Tot a l amr*? res/i nt e rval 107 107 107 8 9 e TsTrds -nt 10
GIEPSSAB T,iPLE S.3-8 ASSIGN.YENT OF CONTFCL PCKER SCUFCES FCE SKITCHGEAF Switchgear Type source of Control Power IPur ?7onenclaturet ______
(125 Vdc) Classification 6.9 kV 480 V Feactor Trip Switchgear Pattery Actuation Train A PT-11, BT1EC1 Feactor Protection IEA1 IEB1, 1ED3 PT-I2, Channel I 1AS*, IA7*
Pattery Actuation Train B IEA2 IFD2 FT-III, Pi1EC2 Reactor Prot ect ion IA6*, 1A8* 1EB4 PT-II2 Channel II Pattery Peactor Protection PT-III1, 10 ETIEC3 Cha nnel III - -
PT-III2 Pattery Peactor Protection FT-IV1, ET1EC4 Channel IV - -
FT-IV2 Battery Non-Safety 1A1, 1A3, 1AS, IB1, I P 3, 131A, -
ET1D1-1 Train C 1A7 1B3A, 1P5 Pattery Non-Safety 1A2, 1A4, IA6, 1E2, 1E4, IP2A, -
BT 1D 1-2 Train C 1A8 1E4A
- The reactor coolant punp motor feeder breaker is equipped with a back-up trip coil actuated by pump under speed trip Amendment 10
O O
O
GIBBSSAR 8.4 Interface Information Electrical interf ace requirements with the Utility-2cplicanc are described in subsection 8.2.1. The onsite de electric system is designed on the basis of four Class 1E batteries and their respective distribution. The cable routing system is designed on the basis of the routings defined in subsection 8.3.1.3, Physical Identification of Safety-Related Equipment, wherein both a reactor protection channel and an actuation train are in the same routing; a difference in potential of the circuits is the only basis for the separation requirenent.
The GIBBSSAR/RESAR-414 interface requirements that are listed below correspond to the same items listed in RESAR-414, Section 8.3.1.2
- 1. The AC electrical power supply system are separated into two redundant load groups or electrical power trains.
- 2. Each of these two electrical power trains has access to both a preferred and a standby powe r supply as described in Section 8.3.1.1. Therefore the Class 1E bus in each of the 10 two electrical power trains, has access to an off-site power source and one emergency diesel generator.
- 3. Each of the two energency diesel generators is sized to provide all the electrical power required to operate the engineers safeguards equipment assigned to the corresponding electrical power train. The se diesel generators start automatically on receipt of an engineered safeg ua rds actuation signal ("S" signal) independent of the availability of off-site power.
- 4. In the event that of f-site power is available following the accident, the emergency diesel generators are not connected to the respective Class 1E buses in each electrical power train. With off-site power available, all equipment operating prior to the accident continues to operate. The safeguards equipment associated with each power train is sequentially started.
- 5. In the event that a loss of off-site power occurred coincident with or subsequent to the postulated accident, the two emergency diesel generators are automatically started and connected to the respective Class 1E buses when a loss of voltage is sensed. They will be designed to accept a W-414 8.4-1 Amendment 10
GIBBS3AR sequential loading of all the assigned safeguards equipment within 10 seconds a f ter receipt of the "S" signal.
- 6. 7his temporary loss of voltage associated wit).the loss of off-site power terminates the ope ra tian of all dependent equipment and only the required engineered safeguards equipment will be scquentially started and loaded on the corresponding diesel generators.
- 7. In regards to the on-site emergency standby electrical jower systems frequency and voltage variations of a transient nature (i.e., not steady state) meet the requirements of Fegulatory Guide 1. 9, 1971.
- 8. The 6900 V and 480 V Class 1E buses provide sufficient voltage to start Class 1E motors. The minimum starting voltage for Class 1E motors is 80 percent of the motor rated voltage at the motor terminal.
- 9. Means will be provided through limited operator actions to manually transfer residual heat removal suction isolation 10 valves 9000A, 9001B to the alternate Class 1E power supplies.
- 10. The GIBBSSAR design takes exception to the RESAF-414 requirement to provide redundant Class 1E power source s ,
through manual switet over to the positive displacement charging pump. As described in RESAR Section 9.3.4.2.5, the poisitive displacement charging pump is used for hydrotesting the Reactor Coolant System but is capable of providing sufficient flow for reactor coolant purp seal injection during the abnormal conditions when both centrifugal charging pumps are inoperable. This pump is supplied from the Train A Class IE bus.
In addition to the criteria described above, GIBBSSAP also complies with the following requirements required by the NRC in the " Report to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguard by the Office of Nuclear Regulation in the Matter of Kestinghouse Electric Corporation Reference Safety Analysis Eeport RESAR-414", July 1978.
- a. Four redundant and independent Class 1E 120 volt vital buses are provided. Each vital bus has the capability of being powered from either a Class IE ac bus or a Class 1E dc bus via an invertor.
W-414 8.4-2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- b. Four redundant and independent Class 1E batteries are provided to conform to the redundancy required for the 10 safety-related systems and components.
W-414 8.4-3 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 8_,4-1 DELETED 10 i
Amendment 10 .
GIBBSSAR 9.1.2.2 Facilities Description The spent-fuel pool is designed to store spent-fuel assemblies underwater for a suitable decay period af ter their removal from the reactor. The shielding for operating personnel and removal of decay heat generated by the spent-fuel assemblies is provided by borated water.
Spent-fuel facilities consist of a transfer canal, a spent-fuel pool, in-containrent spent-f uel pool, a spent ~ fuel-cask-loading pit and cask decontamination area.
All structures in contact with borated water are lined with austenitic stainless steel plates. The design parameters of t e spent-fuel storage area are shown in Table 9.1-2.
There are drainage grooves at the pool liner interf ace which, when isolated sequentially, help locate liner le a ka ge s. The exact location of the leak can be determined by pressurizing an individual groove with air. All components are se pa ra ted from each other by sealed gates which allow independent adjustments in water levels of various areas.
All components stainless steel.
immersed in borated water are made of austenitic Spent-f uel pool instrumentation is described in Chapter 7.
The spent-fuel pool requires periodic makeup to maintain its design level. A low-level alarm alerts the operator to the need
, to initiate makeup to restore the water level to initial elevation.
The normal source of makeup water is the demineralized water system via the spent fuel pool cooling water pump. If the normal source is not available, an alternate source is the refueling 10 water storage tank via the refueling water purification pump.
The seismic Category I makeup source is taken from the Fire Protection System, as discussed in Section 9.5.1. The design of the makeup sources is in accordance with the requirements of Pegulatory Guide 1.13, Fuel Storage Facility Design Easis. The pool water periodical local sanpling and manual additions of boric acid will ensure required boron concentration during makeup ty demineralized water. 10 Ventilation of the fuel-handling area is described in Section 9.4.2.
9.1-4 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation The spent-fuel pool is designed to store spent-fuel in a safe manner and to limit potential offsite exposure.
- a. The spent-fuel pool is located inside the fuel-handlina building, a seismic cateqory I structure, to withstand all the effects or natural phenomena described in Chapters 2 and 3. It is designed in accordance with the requirements of Reaulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification and with Fequlatory Guide 1.13, Fuel Storage Facility Design Dasis.
2
- b. The spent-fuel pool is designed in accordance with the applicable requirements of General Design Criterion 61.
- c. The fuel-handling building and the spent-fuel pool are designsd to withstand the effects of external missiles and internally generated missiles, pipe whip, and jet impingement forces associated with pipe breaks, so that the safety functions will not be precluded.
The integrity of the pool liner is monitored continuously usino pool level instrumentation. Small leaks are detected by jg) spent-fuel pool monitoring grooves. The performance of the spent-fuel pool makeup system can be tested during plant operation. Provided level alarms are to warn operating personnel 2 of drop in pool level and with radiation monitoring to alarm if excessive levels of radiation occur.
A minimum shielding cover of 10.5 feet of borated water on top of the spent-f uel element s is maintained at all times during fuel storace and fuel-handling.
Fuel-handlina building ventilation safety evaluation is discussed in Section 9.4.
Spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system saf ety evaluation is discussed in subsection 9.1.3.3.
All penetrations into the fuel pool are at least 11 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies, and equipped with siphon breakers to prevent unplanned drainage of the spant-fuel pool durino normal operation and following an accident.
- d. Spent-fuel elements are stored in racks with a minimum cent er-to-center spacing suf ficient to ensure that a Fef f of 9.1-5 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAP The cleanup function is accomplished by the purifica tion loops and the spent-fuel pool skimmer loop.
9.1.3.1 Design Bases The design bases for the spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup systems are:
- a. The temperature of the spent-fuel pool is maintained below 120 F when one-third of a core is stored, and below 150 F if two and one-third of a core are stored - item e of Table 9.1 with one of the two cooling loops in operation.
For f urther details see Table 9.1-3
- b. The cooling system design temperat ure depends on CCW supply temperature of 105 F and decay heat prod uction of 1 spent fuel.
- c. The clarity of spent-fuel pool water is maintained at a level sufficient to facilitate visua l observation during fuel-handling operations.
- d. Filtration and ion exchange capability are provided to l1 remove suspended radionuclides.
- e. The cooling portion of the system is classified seismic i l Category I and Safety Class 3, and the cleanup portion is classified nonnuclear safety.
f.
Design of the SFPCS is in accordance with the applicable l1 requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 44, 45, 46, 61, l10 and 63, Pequlatory Guides 1.13 and 1. 29, and NPC Branch Technical Position APCSB 3-1.
9.1.3.2 System Description The SFPCS consists of two redundant loops, each containing one pump and one heat exchanger. Residual heat is removed by component cooling water. The SFPCS is in operation continuously and the spent-fuel pool pumps are supplied by two different emergency power buses if a loss of of' site power occurs. A second pump is automatically started in cas' of failure of the first pump, since both are sized to handle flow to one heat 1 exchanger only.
9.1-7 Ame ndment 10
GIBBSSAR h
2 pent fuel is removed from the reactor core durino the refuelina sequence and is then placed in the spent-fuel pool where it in stored until shipped offsite to a reprocessing facility.
When the SFPCS is in operation, water is drawn from the spent-fuel pool by the spent-fuel pool cooling water pump, pumoed through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and returned to the pool. The suction line, which is protected by a strainer, is located at an elevation 4 feet below the normal water level; the return line terminates at an elevation 6 feet above the top of G
9.1-7a Amendment 1 l1
GIBBSSAP 9.1.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements All components of the spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system are in either continuous or intermittent use durina operation. normal Inspection and performance testing is done in accordance with the normal plant maintenance program.
9.1.4 Fuel Handling System The servicing of the pressurized water reactor nuclear system includes the refueling of the reactor core. This operation is provided by means of the fuel handling system, which handles the nuclear fuel and asociated equipment in a safe and ef fective way from the time it reaches the plant until it leaves the plant after post-irradiation cooling.
9.1.4.1 Design Bases The design bases for the NSSS supplied components are presented in the NSSS SSAP, subsection 9.1.3.1 The overhead crane provided in the fuel handling building will meet the Regulatory Guide 1.104. The containment polar craneintent will of NRC the meet
, intent of NPC Regulatory Guide 1.104 if the Westinghouse topical by report regarding a vessel head drop is found unacceptable the NPC. Exceptions taken to Regulatcry Guide 1.104, if any, 10 will be discussed following acceptance of the Westinghouse topical report by the NRC.
9.1.4.2 System Description This subsection is presented in the NSSS SSAR, 1 subsection 9.1. 3. 2.
- b. Component Description
- 1) The NSSS supplied components are presented in the NSSS SSAP, subsection 9.1.3.2.3 and listed in GIBBSSAP l 6 Table 1.8-1.
- 2) The fuel handling structure design and fuel handling procedures limit accidental free fall of the spent fuel cask to 27 feet. The cask is denigned to [ 2 W-414 9.1-10 Amendment 10
GIBESSAR h
withstand a free drop through a distance of 30 feet in accordance with the Department of Transportation 2 regulations contained in 49 CFR Part 173, and 10 CFP Part 71, Appendix B.
- 3) A fuel building overhead crane, sized to handle a spent fuel cask, is provided in the fuel handling building. Its 0
9.1-10a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR (l
c.
The cask lifting rig uses a double yoke concept shown in Figure 9.1-4. The cask is lifted using four 90 degrees apart.
trunnions located Any failure of one portion of the system results in the other taking over its full load duties.
The location of the spent fuel cask loading area was determined on the basis of the requirement for sufficient distance between the spent fuel storage pool and the transfer path of the spent fuel shipping cask. The postulated drop of the cask on the between the cask loading area and the decontamination area wall with 7 subsequent tipping or rolling is limited with consequences to the cask loading area as shown in Piqure 9.1-5. I2 No safety related equipment will be damaged.
The design safety evaluation of the NSSS fuel I2 handling storage and equipment is presented in the NSSS SSAR, 1 Subsection 9.1.3.3.1 9.1.4.4 Inspection and Testing Pequirements
,, The inspection and testing requirements for the NSSS supplied components are presented in the NSSS SSAR, subsection 9.1.4. The fuel building overhead crane will meet the intent of the inspection and testing requirements of NRC Pequlatory Guide 1.104. The containment pola r crane will meet the inspection if the and testing requirement of NPC regulatory guide 1.104 Westinghouse topical report regarding a vessel head drop 10 is found unacceptable by the NRC.
quide 1.104, Exceptions taken to regulatory if any, will be discussed following acceptance of the westinghouse topical report by the NEC.
It is assumed that the cranes are fully loaded and operating at maxinum speed when they are analyzed for SSE. 6 w-414 9.1-13 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP 9.1.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements The system instrumentation and controls, and the adequacy of safety-related features to meet the single-failure criterion are presented in both the NSSS SSAR, subsection 9.1.3. 5, and in 1 GIBBSSAP subsections 9.1. 2. 3 and 9.1. 4. 2.
9.1.5 Interface Pequirements The interface requirements for the fuel storage and handling systems are described in Tabl e 9.1- 5. 11 Design of the fuel building overhead crane and containment polar crane will meet all applicable ccdes and standards as follows:
a) Crane Manufacturers Association of America (CMAA) ;
Specification 70 b) American Society for Testing and Materials ( ASTM) c) American Gear Manufacturers Association (AGMA) d) Antifriction Bearing Manufacturers Association (AFBMA) g American Institute of Steel Construction (ATSC) 10 e) f) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) g) American Welding Society (AWS) h) National Fire Protection Association (NFFA) i) National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) i) Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) k) Instrument Society of America (ISA)
- 1) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) m) Code of Federal Regulations - 10 CFR Part 50 Detailed specifications of cranes will be provided and vendor's compliance with the intent of Fequlatory Guide 1.104 will be included in the Utility Applicant's Final Safety Analysis Peport.
9.1-14 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.1-5 (Sheet 1 of 2) 1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING SYSTEMS-INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS (Westinghouse-414)
RESAP-414 ' BBSSAP
_ Interface _ Items Feference eeference Comments Sampling of Appendix 9A.1 Figure 6.2-25 Local sampling is PHST after provided.
makeup from the RMWS Spent fuel pool Appendix 9A.2, Section 9.1.3 G6H scope of supply cooling and 9A.3 cleanup system New fuel racks Appendix 9A.4 Section 9.1.1.1 uplift force Electrical Appendix 2A.4 NA
% requirements of To be addressed in l 10 the FDP refueling equipment Air requirements Appendix 9A.4 Section 9.3.1.1 110 of refueling equipment q I
Water require- Appendix 9A.5 Section 9.2.3 ments of refueling equipment Spent fuel pit Appendix 9A.5 Table 9.1-3 (boron concen- I 10 tration)
Layo ut, dimen- Appendix 9A.7 NA sions, supports, To be addressed in 110 the FDP tole rance s, and erection require-ments of the manipulator crane Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF TABLE 9.1-5 1 (Sheet 2 of 2)
FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING SYSTEMS-INTERFACE PEOUIFEMENTS (Westinghouse-414)
RESAR-414 GIBBSSAR Interface Items Peference Feference Cgmggnts CVCS values to be Section 9A Table 9.3-6 10 locked shut during refueling Mechanical and Appendix 9A.11 NA To be addressed in structural the FDP requirements for the fuel transfer system General Design Table 9A-1 Section 9.1.2.1, Criteria and 9.1.3.1 Beg.latory Guides Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.3.3.2 System Description Segregation of drain headers is provided for each level of the auxiliary building and containment (as described in Sect ion 11. 2) .
Collection and transfer of liquids from the building lower levels are f acilitated by sump pumps, sumps, and drain collection tanks.
Pedundant full capacity sump pumps are provided at each transfer point in the drainage system. Ultimately, all d rains are directed to the waste-processing system.
- a. Floor Drainage of Areas Containing ESF Equipment ESF floor drain pumps are located on the lower elevation of the section of the auxiliary building which contains the ESF equi pment . The pumps are divided into two redundant trains; each is located in an area separated from its backup train watertight walls to prevent by total flooding of one area from interfering with the operation of pumps located in the other area.
Each ESF equipment train area is provided with its own sump. The collection sumps are equipped with two 100 percent-capacity sump 9.3-10a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF pumps which transfer floor drainage into the collection cank. The component coolirg wter low activity drain waste ank l
compartment is provided with a numn and m surrp pu:tp. The mmp is!
norma))" c 11one C. For dincharge to the component coolina wc< te r l surge tank. I
- b. Floor Drainage of Auxii ta ry Puildia i Auxiliary building drainage i:, designed :o that upper floors drain dire:tly to the lov act: rit; u,ute c o '. lc :r ion tmtk.
Thel ,
drainq f on the lowest floor a re routed t' >
S urm cd } c:, ped toj -
the lou act i vit > waste coliectio, tank.
rioor drains from the Laundry und Iat showr: are routed :o the launary and aot shower tanks.
All storage cank areas are provided with the necersary wa te rproo t ing (curh5 or water-tight c o:0pa r t me nt s) to proventj into ot her areas and damaqo to safety related componencsl 10 1 r ab mu it oank 12eak occuts.
P'i oo r ira i nt fror: the water-tight compartments have al 10 locPed-closed tranually onerated gate valve, located within each g comaartment and aperat ed, ii a rank break occurs, frem above the W mqccted water 1.evel in t he co:rpartment.
9.3.3.3 Sa f ety Evaluations Compartments which contain ESF pumps, recycle holdup tanks, and waste tants arc designed to seismic Category I requirements. .
f u r t- ho - classification of structures see Section 3.2.1. Fo r l. 6 Con.inntd c.peration of the system is not required for plant.
catoty. The cont a i n:,e n t portion of this system is prevented frorr r, operating durinq a LCCA by automa tic closure of the containment drain piping i solati on valves on a containment isolation Phase A ntanol.
The main pipina headers have a minimum diameter of 4 inches.
Ifeader size is sufficient to preclude total flooding of the pipina and to ensure that the lines ate not pres suri zed or rupt ured.
Two 50 opm sump uumps per tra in are provided in the lowest; elevation of the ESF area of the Auxiliary Buildina '
to 6
acco:naodate drains wi* hout flooding ad-ia cent areas.
9.3-11 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Each sump is equipped with two pumps; either one can handle the design leakage rate.
The leakage is postulated to occur as a result of a gross flange gasket failure or a severely damaged pump seal.
All piping to is designed in seismic the safety features Category I area of the Auxiliary Building requirements, therefore pipe 10 rupture in the safety features post ula ted.
area caused by the SSE is not The auxiliary building floor drainage system is designed to accommodate normal expected leakages without localized flooding.
If an accident occurs, i.e.,
ruptures of tanks or cracks in large piping, total flooding of the auxiliary l uilding is prevented the following: by
- a. Operator's action to isolate af fected system.
for operator No credit action is taken for 30 minutes following a 10 high-level alarm in the sumps or low activity waste collect! Jn tanks b.
An arrangement of floor drains which will ensure that an i 1 increased number of floor drains are used as the flooding expands These two will not occur.
actions ensure that deep flooding of a building floor l 1 Overflow or drainage of a tank will be detected by the high-low level alarm instrumentation displayed in the control room.
After a tank failure, the operator manually opens the valve to initiate the processing of the water in the Because of administrative controls placed compartment.
on this valve, the possibility of inadvertently leaving this va lve ope n is not 10 considered to be credible. Access to the compartment is not-allowed until the contents have decayed to acceptable levels.
- 9. 3. 3. 4 Tests and Inspections Leaktightness of the system.
and flowpaths are tested prior to initial operation Pumps and level controls are adjusted for maintenance of proper sump levels.
9.3-12 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP h
- 9. 3. 3. 5 Instrumentation Applications Each ESF area sump has high- and low-level ala rms and sump-water-level indication in the control room to indicate that water is entering the sump. In addition, the operational status of t he sump pumps is indicated. Based on this inf orma tion and the design flov of the sump pumps, the operator can determine the approximate leakage inflow to each sump.
If the leakage inflow f rom one train to the sump is suf ficient to keep the pump running for more than 30 minutes without a decrease O
9.3.12a Amendment 10 er
GIBBSSAR in sump water level, the operation is switched to the redundant safety feature train and the leaking train is isolated.
The auxiliary building sumps have high- and low-level alarms; the operational status of the sump pumps is indicated in the control room.
The containment sump pump discharge line has a flow totalizer to indicate total flow as a factor in containment overall leakage control. (See section 7. 6.1. 2. )
All sump pumps operate automatically; start and stop of a pump is controlled by sump level.
Peferences:
- 1. Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water, Steam-and Padioactive-Waste-Containing components of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1.
- 2. ANSI N18.2, " Nuclear Safely Criteria for the Design ofl 1 Stationary Pressurized Water Peactor Plants; 1973.
- 3. ASME ESPV,Section III, Class 3. 1 l
9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Control System l 6 Refer to NSSS SSAR.
Interfaces with the NSSS SSAP CVCS system Table 9.3-6. are addressed in 6
9.3.5 Standard Liquid Control System (EWRs)
This section is not applicable to the standard plant.
9.3-13 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.3-6 CVCS INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS (Westinghouse-414)
The interface requirements of RESAR-414 Section 9A are satisfied as follows:
- a. CVCS components are located in the Auxiliary Building and maintained above 65 F and furnished with redundant temperature indicating alarms.
- b. The piping layout in the Utility-Applicant's SAR will run the 4 inch letdown line long enough to contain the specified j volune and subsequently delay time required for decay of N .
sa 6
- c. The volume control tank vent and safety valve discharge lines are located in the tank compartment to shield radioactive gas released from the tank.
- d. Steam for the CVCS batching tank is provided by the auxiliary steam system. See GIBBSSAR Figure 10.3-1. Steam is provided at a pressure of 50 psig. Average capacity is 280,000 Ptu/hr of steam.
- e. Instrument air is provided for the CVCS air-operated valves from the instrument air system. See Figure 9.3-1.
- f. Gas space sampling for volume control tank is provided for and shown in Figure 9.3-2.
- g. Makeup for the RWST is provided from the Reactor Makeup Water l 10 Storage Tank. A local sample connection on the RWST provides for i 6 the testing of boron concentration. See Figures 9.2-6 and l 10 6.2- 25. Makeup to the RCS from RWST is prevented during supply i 6 from RMWST to RWST by means of an interlock between the valve 10 supplying the RWST from the RMWST and the discharge valve on the FWST to the RCS. -
- h. Samples from various points of Boron Recycle system are piped 6 to a sample sink. See Figure 9.3-2.
- j. CVCS valves 110B, 111B, 8339, 8355, and 8361 will be locked shut during the refueling operation 10 Amendment 10
O G
O
GIBBSSAR Fans are rated and tested in accordance with the standards of the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) (1).
HEPA filters and iodine adsorber are tested periodically during plan t operation, in accordance with NFC Regulatory Guide 1.52, using the test methods contained in ANSI N101.1 (2) and ANSI N510 ( 9) . Filter units are arranged to facilitate cell replacement.
Heating and cooling coils are tested as per ARI Standard 410 (12)
Ductwork and filters are tested ir accordance with ANSI 510 (9) and industry standards.
Fedundant standby equipment is operated on a cyclic basis to assure the availability of the equipment.
9.4.2 Fuel-Handling Area Ventilation Systen
- 9. 4. 2.1 Design Bases The fuel-handling area ventilation system which is part of the controlled access ventilation system is designed to providt yg ventilation and conditioned air to the spent fuel pool area and other fuel-related areas in the auxiliary building. The system provides safe ambient conditions for operating equipment and perscnnel d uring normal plant operation. Pertinent design conditions are presented in Tables 9.4-1, 9.4-2 and 9.4-7. l6 A slight negative pressure is maintained by pressure controls during normal operation, refueling, loss of offsite power, follcwing a LOCA or following a fuel handling accident to prevent the release of radioactive gaseous effluent to the environment.
During normal operation, exhaust air is channeled through the controlled access filter units (CAFU) . During all other listed modes of operation, exhaust air is drawn through the Engineered Safety Feature filter units (ESFU) . These units are redundant and powered from the Class IE electrical bus.
Auxiliary cooling units are used to maintain the safety-related 10 fuel pool cooling system pump rooms below the maximum ambient temperature allowed by the equipnent design. The auxiliary cooling units, which are interlocked to the pumps, a re supplied with water from the safety-related chilled water system (see Figu re 9. 4-5) , or with component cooling water or service water depending on site conditions. The fuel pool cooling system pumps are not required for safe shutdown of the reactor and are not immediately required to maintain the f uel pool temperature below
- 9. 4- 9 Ame ndment 10
GIBBSSAR the toiling point (see Section 9.1. 3. 3) , and are tripped upon receipt of a safety injection signal, or loss of of f site power. 10 The operation of the auxiliary c)oling units is automatically restored when the fuel pool cooling pumps are manually loaded i rather than automatically sequenced onto the emergency diesel I6 gene rators within 11.08 hrs. See Section 9.1.3.3. I 10 IIVAC equipment is designed to operate in and *c raintain the required ambient conditions. The supply and x .a st ventilation 6 units are O
9.4-9a Arendment 10
GIBBSSAR ainpart of the controlled access area ventilation systems as shown Figure 9.4-6. 10 Tritium concentration buildup and dispersion throughout the fuel-handling area is prevented by a local network of supply exhaust ducts at the spent fuel pool, as shown schematicallyand in Figure 9. 4- 8.
to The fuel pool area ventilation system is designed l 6 reduce operator dose as a result of the evaporation of irradiated water; it prevents the contamination of fuel pool water by entrapping dirt and other particulate matter that might othe rwise settle on the water surf ace. Fresh air is supplied over the pool and exhausted from all sides of the pool by exhaust ducts located near the pool surface.
Pipe type duct work is embedded in the walls of the fuel pool, with exhaust registers at approximately 6 inches above the water surface.
6-foot centers and Air delivered by the CASU (supply air outlets are located above the refueling crane apprcximately 25 ft high) is drawn downward over the surface 10 through the exhaust troisters. This arrangement floods the occupied spaces with contaminant-free air, thus minimizing personnel exposure to contaminated air.
The concentration of airborne radioisotopes throughout the area during fuel bar.dling operation is maintained below the maximum permissible concentration levels specified (MPC) in 10 CFR Part 20.
The CAFU and ESFU provide sufficient redundancy in equipment and power supplies for the system to sustain a single active compcnent failure without loss of function. Instrumentation and controls which incorporate visual as well as audible ala rms are provided; these enable the operator to continuously monitor system performance and manually switch to standby units when required.
All exhaust air is rassed through charcoal iodine adsorber beds and HEPA filters prior to discharg'e through the plant ventilation discharge duct.
10 The CAFU's and the ESFU's are designed to meet the requirements of regulatory guides 1.140 and 1.52 respectively and data for each element of filter are shown in Tables 9.4-4 and 9.4-5. The CAFU and ESFU filter unit details are shown in Figures 9.4-17 and 9.4-2.
k 9.4-10 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Mist eliminators are provide d in the spent fuel pool exhaust to remove noisture in the exhaust air, that exists due to evaporation of high-temperature f uel pool wate r. The evaporate is routed by a drain system to the suction side of the fuel pool skimner pump which returns it to the fuel pool or to a hot drain. 10 In addition, care is taken not to impair the visibility for underwater observation by employing the following:
- a. Maintain a low sweep velocity over the spent fuel pool surface to prevent ripple propagation L. Supply sufficient heated air manually set to avoidI lo saturation of the air at the spent fuel pool surface 9.4>2.2 System Description The fuel handling area ventilation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.4-7 and 9.4-8. The controlled access supply system (CASS) delivers filtered and tempered outside air to each floor 10 of the f uel-handling area through a duct distribution system.
Each Controlled Access Supply Unit (CASU) consists of a roughing filter, heating and cooling coils, and a 100-percent-capacity fan. (See Figure 9. 4- 6. ) Chilled water from the plant ventilation chilled water system shown in Figure 9.4-9, or 6 component cooling water or service water depending on site conditions is supplied to the cooling coils. The cooling water supply to these coils is maintained by the plant ventilation chilled water system only during normal operation. The CASU and associated ductwork are NNS.
The exhaust system ductwork- branches to all areas within the fuel-handling area. Exhaust air is discharged to the atmosphere thro ugh the plant ventilation discharge duct via the CAFU or the ESFU during a f uel handling operation. The nodular filter units shown in Figures 9.4-6, 9.4-2 and 9.4-17 are connected in parallel to the discharge plenum. Each module is also connected 10 to a common suction plenum which contains branches for the auxiliary building, safeguards area, containnent and the condenser vacuum pump as well. Two of the filter units are classified as Engineered Safety Feature filter units,. (ESFU) and are maintained on a standby mode. However, the housing of all the nodules, suction plenum, and the exhaust ductwork leading to the plenum are all Nuclear Safety Class 3 and 9.4-l' Anendmen t 10
GIBBSSAR Seisaic Category I to avoid inplant release of raiioactivity as well as damage to other equipment during a EBE. Train oriented motor operated dampers powered from the Class 1E electrical buses, in the common suction plenum of the exhauet allow the fuel-handling area exhaust to be routed through the ESFU d ring refueling or spent fuel handling operations. The filter units which are train oriented and powered from the Class IE buses, are separated in two equipment rooms separated by a heavy concrete wall enabling separation of redundant modules in accordance with NEC Fegulatory Guide 8.8. The filter units which are designated FSFU will remain on standby during the nornal plant mode of operation, and only operate 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> a month in accordance with Fegulatory Guide 1.52, when not used during fuel handling operations. In this manner the NBC Regulatory Guide 1.52 requirement C.6.b of testing the iodine removal efficiency of the 10 ESFU af ter 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of operation will not be attained during a year of reactor operation, and the ESF modules can te tested annually together with the CAFU.
The filter unit design incorporates the guidelines of NRC Pegulatory Guides 1.52 and 1.140, and the recommendations of ERDA 76-21. Specific problems in previously designed units as shown in WASH-1234 were also considered.
The CAFU and fans are designed for normal operation only and the cenpcnents comprisini; the units are as follows, in sequential orde r: prefilter, HEPA filter, iodine absorber and HEPA filter.
Moisture separators and electric heaters are not used since the rela t '.ve humidity of the exhaust air does not exceed 70 percent (see Figure 9. 4-3) .
only in that The ESFU units differ from the normal unit 3 the prefilter has been replace 6 by moisture separators and electric heater in order to maintain the same standard size of the other CAFU. All filter units are furnished with preset temperature detectors in the absorber section which autonatically initiates a water deluge to prevent auto ignition of t he charcoal.
Prior to spent fuel-handling ior refueling operations, thel 6 faligning uel-handling area exhaust is routed through the ESFU by manually the necessary dampers. (See Figure 9.4-6. ) Each of the two ESFU is capabla of handling 50 percent of t he required ventilation flow. If a fuel-handling accident occurs, 10 9.4-11a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR at least one unit is capable of maintaining the f uel-handling area at a slight negative pressure. One CASU is stopped and the 10 supply damper is closed by manual operation.
9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation The fuel-handling area ventilation system conf e rms to the Fagulatory Position established in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.13 and the exhaust portion is ANSI safety Cla ss 3 und Seismic 10 Category I, The system complies with the environmental and components design crit e ria , the qualification testing provisions, and the applicant's understanding of the intent of system design criteria promulgated in NRC Regulatory Guides 1.52 and 1.140, which is 10 show n in Table 6. 5- 1. Even if the system fission product removal features failed to function properly, the exclusion boundary doses resulting from a postulated fuel-handling accident would still te well celow the exposure guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
(See s '11's e ct ion 15.7.4 for an analysis of a postulated f uel-hardling accident.)
Duri ng an abnormal condition, as the spent fuel pool water temperature increases, from the normal operating tempe rature of g
120 F, the evaporation rate f rom the pool also increases, because the temperature of the ventilation air is kept at or below 115 F is required to climinate fog. A water temperature above 130 F raiscs the relative humidity of exhaust air above 70 percent. To protect the iodine adsorber and HEPA filter 3 from above 70 percent relative hu.aidity (which decreases the efficiency oi filters) , it is necessary to remove moisture from the air prior 10 to entering the filter units (see Table 9. 4. 5) . For this purpost mist eliminators are provided in the exhuast and also in the ESFU. The water drainage from the exhaust mist eliminators ic returned to the pools, or to a hot drain, thus limiting the tritium concentration in the exhaust air.
Alarms are provided in the main contrcl room to alert thc rperator for equipment malfunction and to facilitate the startup of standby units. Radiation levels are monitored continuously, by area monitors (see Section 12.3.4) and Figure 12.3-4. I 10 The system is sized to maintain the concentrations of airborne radioisotope s, during fuel-handling operations below the MPC levels specified 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, and to maintain the area radiation levels as low as is reasonably achie vable 10
( ALAE A) in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 8.8. To minimize 9.4-12 Amendment 10
GIBBSSMt the release of airborne contaminants to the outside ambient during a fuel-handling accident, ESFU 10 9.4-12a Amendment 10
GIEBSSAR are provided and will be in operation prior to any spent 10 fuel-handling. For a discussion of a fuel-handling accident, see Section 15.7.4.
The exhaust filter units are physically separated and protected from pipe whip.
The fuel-handling area ventilation syster is designed with sufficient redundancy in all active components and with a modular filter unit approach. The ventilation failure mode incorporates 1 10 manual switching from an inoperative fan to the available standby fan. During a periodic filter change, the airflow is temporarily reduced, but not interrupted; thus preferred airflow patterns can still be maintained throughout the fuel-handling area per Fegulatory Guide 8.8. The scheduling of the filter change is such that it does not interfere with refueling operations.
The auxiliary building houses the fuel-handling area ventilation 10 equipment and is a seismic Category I structure; the air inlet structure is designed to seismic Category I requirements and to withstand the tornado loads and tornado-related missile conditions described in subsection 3.3.2. However, the air supply duct leading to the CASU is not seismic Category I.
instrumentation and control requirements are discussed in The ll[
Sect ion 7. 3.
9.4.2.4 Inspection and Testing Fequirements See subsection 9.4.1.4.
9.4.3 Auxiliary (Controlled Access Area) and Fadwaste Areas Ventilation System 9.4.3.1 Design Bases The auxiliary building (controlled access area) and radwaste areas ventilation system is designed to maintain suitable and safe ambient conditions for operating equipment and personnel during normal plant operation.
In addit ion , a slight negative pressure, by pressure control, 10 with respect to the environs is maintained either during normal operation, a loss of offsite power or following a DBA by operating at least one ESFU of the controlled access ventilation syst em. This reduces the radioactive effluent released to the environment to permissible levels. The dissipation of heat fron the 9.4-13 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR charging pumps and the CASU and CAFU/ESFU equipment rooms is acconplished by using supplementary auxiliary cooling 10 units consisting of a cooling coil and a fan mounted in a housing which maintain these rooms below the maximum permissible temperature.
BVAC equipment is designed to operate in and to maintain the required ambient conditions. The supply and exhaust ventilation filtration units are a part of the modular arrangement for the controlled access area ventilation system as shown in Figure 9.4-6.
Ambi ent temperatures throughout the building are maintained below 104 F during normal operation. During loss of offsite power and LCCA safety related equipment rooms are kept below 104 F.
Other system design conditions are presented in Tables 9.4-1, 9.4-2 and
- 9. 4- 7. 6 The ductwork layout is arranged so that under normal operation in areas where airborne radioactivity may be present, airflow is directed from areas of low activity toward areas of high activity per Pegulatory Guide 8.8. The waste gas evaporator and waste gas 10 compressor areas are provided with direct exha ust duct ccnnections to the exhaust filter units, while the supply air
, originates from the surrounding areas of lesser possible radicactivity.
Filters and demineralizers, as well as gas decay tanks are located in separate closed compa rtments; flexible hose duct connections are provided for attachment to a manifold in the 10 exhaast systems when it is necessary to ventila te these compartments. The compartments are not ventilated unless personnel access is required. The compa rtments can then be loaded manually and individually onto the ventilation system.
The airflow quantities are adequate to ensure that the concentration of radioisotopes in all areas, including the radwaste area, is below the MPC specified in Appendix B to 10 CFP Part 20.
The auxiliary building can pressure
.' >e ~ maintained a t a slight negative during abnormal conditions as described in 10 Section 9.4.2.1.
The system is provided with sufficient redundancy in equipment and power supplies to sustain a single active component failure withcut loss of function. Redundant safety-related fans are powered f rom redundant Class IE electrical buses. (See Section 8.3 for buses description) 10 9.4-14 Amendment 10
GIEPSSAR The CAFU/ESFU equipment room auxiliary cooling units are supplied with chilled water from the Nuclear Safety Felated Chilled Water system Figure 9.4-5 while the remaining non-safety class auxilia y cooling units are supplied with chilled wa ter from t h< 10 Flant ventilation chilled water system (Figure 9.4-9) during normal operation and loss of offsite power. The NNS cooling unit s are not required to operate during LCCA since the charging pumps are not required for a plant shutdown f ollowing a ICCA.
7he pump room auxiliary cooling unit is interlocked so that it starts sinultaneously with the equipment it serves.
The system is provided with sufficient instrumentation to enable thc operator to continuously monitor the system performance and manually switch to the standby units when required.
Differential pressure measurement equipment is_provided to ensure that a slight negative pressure with respect to the environs is naintained in the building; this prevents outward leakage of unfiltered contaminated air to the environment.
E xha ust air is passed through iodine adsorter beds; its activity is mcnitored prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The estimated annual radioactivity released from this source is discussed in &'
section 11.3. Radioactivity is monitored by area monitors (See W Eccticn 12. 3. 4) . 10 9.4.3.2 System Description The auxiliary building (controlled access area) and radwaste area s ventilation system is shown schematically on Fig ure 9.4-10 16 sheets 1 and 2. The air supply system delivers filtered ano tempered outside air to each floor of the auxiliary building th ro ugh a duct distribution system. Two CASU of the controlled access ventilation system are utilized for ventilation of the auxiliary building (controlled access area) and radwaste areas.
The CASU and the operation is described in Section 9.4.2.2. The exhaust system duct work branches to all areas within the auxiliary building.
10 9.4-15 Amendment 10
GIBESSAR Exhaust air is passed through the CAFUs and discharged to the 10 atmosphere through the plant ventilation discharge duct. The CAFU is described in Section 9.4.2.2. Four CAFUs are required to handle the auxiliary building air during no rmal operation.
During any abnormal condition, the exhaust is passed through the ESFU with the CASUS shut down in order to maintain a negative pressure in the building.
9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation The exhaust pcrtion of the auxiliary building ventilation system 10 is ANSI Class 3 and Seismic Category I. The reliability and safety of the auxiliary building (controlled access area) and radwaste areas ventilation system is ensured by the following features:
- a. The modular arrangement as shown on Figure 9.4-6, with 16 redundant capacity and redundant power supplies, enables the system to sustain a single active failure without loss of function.
10
- b. The charging pump and CASU auxiliary cooling units are supplied with chilled water from the plant ventilation 10 (non -sa f e ty) chilled water system. These pumps are not required follcuing a LOCA.
- c. The CAFU/ESFC auxiliary cooling units are supplied with chilled water from the safety-related chilled water system since the ESFU are in operation following a LCCA.
- d. Instrumentation and controls which incorporate audible and visual alarms in the control room facilitate continuous monitoring of system performance and alert the operator in the event of system malfunction.
- e. Standby units can be remotely actuated from the control 110 room.
- f. Fail modes for isolation valves and dampers are set so that their failure doe not render the system inoperable. Motor 10 operated dampers are pcwered from the Class 1E busses.
- g. The supply system component hangers are designed for seisnic Category I loadings to negate the possibility of these components interfering with the operation of safety-related 10 compcnents, although the system is non-nuclear safety.
9.4-16 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP
- h. Exhaust air will be passed through iodine adsorter beds i 10 prior to its discharge. Data concerning iodine adsorters is presented in Table 9.4-5.
- i. The auxiliary building (controlled access area) and 110 radwaste areas ventilation system complies with the environmental and O
9.4-16a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR components design criteria, the qualification testing provisions, and the applicant's understanding of the intent of the system's design criteria promulgated in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, which is shown in Table 6.5-1.
The auxiliary building and radwaste areas ventilation system 10 (controlled access ventilation system) supply and exhaust units are located in the auxiliary 6 inches as shown in Figure 1.2-4.
building at elevation 146 feet, The instrumentation and control requirements are discussed in Section 7.3.
9.4.3.4 Inspection and Testing Pequirements See subsection 9.4.1.4.
9.4.4 Turbine Building Area Ventilation System 9.4.4.1 Design Bases The turbine building ventilation system is designed to maintain suitable perscnnel and safe ambient conditions for operating equipnent and during nornal plant operation.
delivered through a system of intake louvers. Fresh outside air is The air is delivered at each level of the turbine building.
The air is either recirculated or rises to the ceiling of the turbine where it is exhausted to the atmosphere through roof exhausters. room, Multiple fans provide flexibility of operation and system balance. Steam supplied fram the auxiliary boiler provides heat 12 during a unit shutdown in winter. System design conditions are presented in Tables 9.4-1, 9.4-2 and 9.4-7. The turbine building 6 ventilation system is shown in Figure 9.4-11.
9.4.4.2 System Description Adjustable air.
louvers provide weather protection and flow control of en System balance is set and maintained by adjusting dampe rs the roof exhausters and the makeup louvers. The steam for unit the heaters is extracted from the auxiliary steam system when unit is in operation, or from the electric auxiliary toiler when the unit is shut down.
10 9.4-17 Amendment 10
GIEBSSAP l
The exhaust fans are located on the roof of the building. For surmer design conditions, a flow rate of approximately 1,460,000 ft3/ min (with a discharge temperature of 115 F) is used.
For winter design conditions, a recirculated flow rate of approximately 146,000 ft3/ min (with a discharge temperature of 80 F) is used.
9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation The reliability of the turbine building ventilation system is i ensured by the following features: 11
- a. The use of nult iple fans (total of which is one more than required for nornal operation) , with excess capacity and mult iple power supplies, enables the systen to sustain a single active component failure without loss of ventilation.
L. Instrumentati on and controls incorporating audible and visual annunciation facilitate continuous nonitoring of system performance and alert the operator for system malfunctions.
- c. There is no treatment of the turbine building exhaust air, since the discharge from the vacuun pumps during normal plant operation is routed to the plant vent stack via the 2 controlled access area systems filtration units. (See subsections 10.4.2.2 and 9. 4. 2.) The vacuum pump discharge is monitored for radioactivity (see subsection 10. 4. 2. 3) . See Sect ion 7.3 for instrunentation and controls. 10 9.4.4.4 Inspection and Testing Pequirements Shop inspection and testing are perforned for all moving equiprent, heating coils, and controls.
The system is initially tested and adjusted for proper flow raths, flow capacities, heating and cooling capacities, 10 and mechanical operability.
Fans are rated and tested in accordance with the standards of AMCA. (1). Coils are tested as per AFI Standard 410 (12).
nuct work is tested in accordance with industry standards. l 10 9.4-18 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Fedundant standby equipment is operated on a cyclic basis to assure availability of the equipment.
9.4.5 Engineered Safety Features Area Ventilation System 9.4.5.1 Cesign Bases The engineercd safety features area ventilation system is designed to maintain suitable and safe ambient conditions for operating equipment and personnel during ncrnal plant operation.
In addition, the building is kept at a slight negative pressure 10 with respect to the environment either during a loss of offsite powe r or following a LOCA, by operating the ESFUs and tripping the CASU thus reducing the radioactive effluent released to the environment to permissible levels. The removal of heat during these periods is accomplished by using auxiliary cooling units 5 which maintain the safety-related equipment rooms below the permissible maximum temperature (104 F) . Ventilation equipme nt is designed to operate in and to maintain the 10 required conditions. The supply and exhaust ventilation units are a part of the controlled access area ventilation systems, described in Sect ion 9. 4. 2 and shown in Figure 9.4-6.
Temperatures throughout the building are maintained below 104 F 10 during all modes of operation. Other system design pa rame te rs are presented in Tables 9.4-1, 9.4-2 and 9.4-7.
The system is provided with sufficient redundancy in equipment and power supplies to enable it to sustain a single active component failure without loss of function.
10 9.4-19 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
The supply and exhaust air quantities are sized on the basis of 10 providing ventilation of the area rather than cooling of the safety related equipment in the area due to the intermittent operation of the equipment. To remove the large quantities of heat which are rejected from the safety-related equipme nt to11cwing a DBA, each of the compartments in which this equipment is located is supplied with cool air from auxiliary coaling units. Each auxiliary cooling unit is powered from the same Class 1E electrical bus as the equipment it serves. Also, each unit is connected in such a way as to start simultaneously with the equipment it serves. The auxiliary cooling units are supplied with chilled water f rom the safety related chilled water system shown in Figure 9.4-5. The chilled water supply is interlocked with the fan during normal testing or operation of the equipment. In case of an emergency, override assures continuous water supply to all auxiliary units.
The system is provided with sufficient instrumentation to enable the operator to continuously monitor the system performance and manually switch to the standby units when required.
Exha ust air is passed through iodine adsorber beds and its activity is monitored prior to discharge to the a tmos phe re , as shown on Table 9.4-5. Area monitors continuously monitor the
'2 10 h
radiation levels (see Section 12.3.4 and Figures 12.3-1 and
- 12. 3- 2) .
9.4.5.2 System Description The safety features area ventilation system is shown schematically in Figure 9.4-7. The safety features area main air i6 supply system delivers filtered and tempered outside air to each floor of the saf ety feature area through a duct distribution systcm. The supply unit is discussed in Section 9.4.2.2.
10 The supply and exhaust system ductwork tranches to all areas within t he safety feature area. The exhaust unit is discussed in So ct ion 9.4.2.2. 10 Auxiliary cooling units, each comprised of a water coil and fan section, are provided for all compartments which con ta in safety feature equipment.
10 9.4-20 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR The cooling units are operated in conjunction with the equipment, served through interlocks. l10 9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation The exhaust system, cooling units and Safety Features Chilled Kater System are of seismic Category I and ANSI Safety Class 3 10 design. The supply system supports are designed to seismic Category I criteria, in order to prevent the damage to this system and compcnents.
thus interfering with the operation of safety-related The reliability and safety of the safety feature area ventilation systen is ensured by the following features: 11
- a. The modular arrangement as shown on Figure 9.4-6 excess capacity and redundant power supplies) enables the (with system to sustain a single failure without loss of function. 10 L. Each safety-related equipment room has a 100 percent-capacity cooling unit to remove the heat dissipated by the equipment. Auxiliary cooling units are supplied with chilled water from one of two independent and separate chilled water systems. Each chilled water system and the auxiliary cooling units it serves are powered from the same Class IE electrical bus.
- c. Instrumentation and controls which incorporate audible and visual alarms in the control room facilitate continuous monitoring of system performance and alert the operator if the systen malfunctions.
- d. Safety related fans are autonatically started upon receipt of a loss of offsite power or LOCA signal. 5
- e. Chilled water is supplied to all auxiliary units during an energency by an override signal to open all valves. Failure modes for isolation valves and' dampers are set so that their 10 f ailure does not render the system inoperable, f.
Exhaust air is passed through iodine adsorber beds prior to its discharge. Data concerning the iodine adsorters is presented in fable 9.4-5.
- g. All ccmpartments containing ECCS equipment are furnished 10 with isolation dampers in the supply system to prevent backflow.
In case of a DBA and subsequent operation of the ECCS, the 9.4-21 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR compartments are isolated, the ventilation system is shut down, except for the ESFUs that provide a slight negative pressure 10 within the auxiliary building, and the auxiliary cooling units operate on a recirculation basis and provide cooling of the ECCS equirnent.
O 9.4-2fa Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10 Any contaminated air will be vented through the CAFU.
The safety features area ventilation system part of the controlled at building access ventilation system, is located in the auxiliary elevation 146 fee t, 6 inches, as shown in Figure 1.2-4. The instrumentation requirenents and control of the system are discussed in section 7.3.
9.4.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements See subsection 9.4.1.4.
9.4.6 Containment Ventilation Systems The containment ventilation systems as shown in Figure 9.4-12 16 consist of the containnent air recirculation cooling, and cooling, CRDM neutron detector well cooling preaccess filtration, containment pressure relief, and containment purging systems.
These systens are not required for operation following a LOCA.
The systems are designed in accordance with the interface data requirements presented in Table 9. 4- 9. Specific data for the varicus systems are presented in Table 9.4-8.
9.4.6.1 Cesign Eases a.
Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System The containnent air recirculation and cooling system maintains containment ambient temperature at or below 120 F and relative humidity between 20 and 70 percent during nornal plant operation. 3 The containnent air recirculation and cooling systen is designed to remove all heat generated by equipment within the containment, with the exception of the reactor coolant pump motors cooled separately by the Component Cooling Water System which are i 10 service water) , depending on site related conditions. (or j 5 The system operates following a loss of offsite power, and provides it nixing of fresh air during refueling and shutdown, but is not operative following a DBA. Postaccident cooling is provided by the containnent spray system (see subsection 6. 2. 2) .
9.4-22 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- b. CRDM Cooling Units l10 The CFDM cooling system maintains temperatures within the CRDM shrouds in accordance with the NSSS SSAP. Specific data concerning this system will be presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
- c. Neutron Detector Well Cooling Geutron detector well cooling units prevent neutron detectors 110 from exceeding their temperature limitations. (See Table 9.4-2. )
These units also provide cooling for reactor shield wall concrete and nozzle supports. Two 100-percent-capacity cooling units are provided for redundancy and cooling water is provided by the plant vantilation chilled water system.
The system also works in conjunction with the containment purge supply and exhaust system to control the radioactivity in the reactor cavity during maintenance and refueling.
- d. Containment Preaccess Filtration The need for safe, periodic, or emergency access to the containment necensitates the use of containment preaccess filtration. This filtration system provides air circulation and air filtering within the containment area. Containment preaccess 10 filt ration equipment reduces the concentration of fission product particulate activity in the containment atmosphere prior to personnel entering the containment or containment purging. The reduced level of airborne particulate permits access to the containment for brief time intervals during reactor power or hot shutdown operations without containment purging. MPC level and required time pe riod of unit operation prior to entry will be presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAP.
- e. Containment Purge Supply and Exhaust Containment purge supply and exhaust equipment satisfies the prerequisites for safe prolonged access to the containment following shutdowns. The use of this system will te restricted to ccid shutdown operations. During all other ope ration s, the systems containment isolation valves will remain closed. 3 Tempered fresh air is supplied and circulated throughout the containment. Ventilation equipment is designed to maintain containment temperature above 60 F during the winter season.
Exhaust air is passed through the controlled access filter units 10 9.4-23 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR (CAF C) and discharged into the atmosphere through the plant ventilation discharge duct. The rate of release ensures that the offsite concentration of radioactive material is within the litri ts of 10 CFR Part 20. A discussion of the estimated annual 10 radicactivity discharges from purging is presented in Sect ion 11.3.
9.4-23a Amendment 10
GIEESSAR
- f. Containment Pressure Relief The containnent pressure relief system is designed to prevent an increase in the containment positive pressure above the maximun permicted during normal operation, and per branch technical 110 I
position CSB 6-4 9.4.6.2 System Description
- a. Containment Eecirculation During ncrmal operation, air in the containment is recirculated and naintained at or below 120 F. Four cooling units are provided, each sized for 33-1/3 percent of the normal duty cooling load. Fans are provided with a connection to the Class 1E electrical buses to preclude loss of cooling due to loss of o f f site power. The cooling medium is water provided from the plant ventilation chilled water supply during normal operation and loss of offsite power. Instruments are provided to 10 cont inuously monitor air temperature and pressure within the containment during all phases of reactor operation.
The cooled air is distributed throughout the containment by the supply ductwork. No return ductwork is provided; the warm air rises through various openings in the floors and returns to the Suction side of the fan coil units.
- b. Control Pod Drive Mechanism Ventilation System The CFDM ventilation system will be supplied by Kestinghouse and 5 designed in accordance with the interface requirements listed in FFSAF-414 Se;tt.on 9A.11.
- c. Neutron Detector Well Cooling The neutron detector well and nozzle support cooling system is a closed loop system provided to effect cooling of the neutron detector well and nozzle supports while limiting the concentrati0n of radioactive Argon in the containment atmosphere.
During normal operation, the reactor cavity is isolated from the containment atmosphere by use of a cavity seal ring. The cavity ring is positioned over the gap between the reactor vessel 2
seal flange and the reactor cavity concrete. Reactor cavity seal shims are provided on the cavity concrete to raise the seal ring to the level of the reactor after thermal expansion of the reactor takes place. The thickness of the shim is designed to K-414 9.4-24 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR match the thermal expansion of the reactor vessel. Clamping devices anchor the cavity seal ring in place to prevent leakage.
During refueling, the reactor vessel cools and its size is reduced to the level cf the cavity concrete. The ca vity seal 2
ring is now used without the seal shims tc isolate the reactor cavity. The clamping devices again anchor the ring and form a water tight seal for the refueling process.
9.4-24a Amendment 5
GIBBSSAR The reactor vessel is therefor isolated f rom the containment atmosphere in the reactor cavity with the exception of the reactor head and CRD nechanism. The air is cooled and directed up around the reactor from the underside of the vessel. Part of 9
~
the air cools the neutron detectors and part is directed to the nozzle and reactor vessel supports. The air is returned to the fan via duct work embedded in the concrete. Two 100-percent-capacity f an-cooled units are provided. Each unit consists of a fan, cooling coil, and inlet and outlet dampers.
Poth units are connected to the Class IE electrical hus to preclude loss of cooling if a loss of of fsite pcwer occurs.
Ifowe ve r, the units are automatically tripped on receipt of a LCCA signal - instrumentation continuously monitors air temperature in 10 the area of the neutron detection instrumantation.
The system is connected to and is used in conjunction with the containment purge system to lower the level of radioactivity in the reactor cavity prior to periodic naintenance. 12
- d. Containnent Preaccess Filtration Preaccess filtration equipment is operated prior to reactor shutdown for containment access. Air inside the containme nt is ggg recirculated by two 50 percent-capacity fan and filter units.
Each unit includes fan, roughing filter, two HEPA filters, and iodine adsorbers. Both units are required to operate for designed iodine removal. The equipnent is der ened to remove fission product iodine gas, as well as radicac + ,e particles, to permit prompt access to the containment. Air in discharged at the suction side of the containment recirculation system which supnlies the air through ductwork and guarantees prope r mixing.
The nininum total air flow required is 30,000 ft3/ min. The 3 assigned decontamination efficiency of the filtration equipment for both elemental and organic iodides is 90 percent.
Temperature detectors and a deluge system permit flooding of the charcoal adsorber beds in case of a fire. Filters are designed as per NRC Branch 7echnical Position ETSB No. 11-2. Data 10 concerning preaccens filtration equipnent are precented in Tables 9.4-4, 9.4 and 9. 4- 8. I 3
9.4-25 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- e. Containment Purge Supply and Exhuast The purge supply and exhaust units are part of the controlled access area ventilation systems (see Figure 9.4-6). Description l10 of each system is as follows:
- 1) Containment Purge Supply Fresh air is passed through CASU and discharged near the 10 recirculation supply fans in the containment, or in the neutron detector well below the reactor vessel.
9.4-25a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cne CASU is required. 10
- 2) Containnent Purge Exhaust Exhaust air is drawn through the CAFU and released to 10 the atmosphere via the plant ventilation discharge duct.
Two CAFUs are required. Both tans are required to maintain desion purge rate. The air is nonitored before discharge to the environment to limit the concentration of contaminants as required by 10 CFR Part 20. The purge isolation valve is designed to close automatically on detection of high radiation levels, as indicated in Table 12.3-1. l3
- f. Containnent Pressure Relief 7he containment pressure relief system is designed to alleviate containment pressure increases caused by tenperature or humidity transients during startups or air leakage from pneumatic instruments during power operations. The syster is manually operated from the control room. A high containment pressure 3 alarn, located in the control room, alerts the operators to pressures exceeding noraal operating limits. The alarm has a set point dictated by naximum pressure permitted within the containment during nornal operation.
The pressure relief line, as shown in Figure 9. 4- 12 and 9. 4- 18 is 10 connected to the containnent purge exhaust system. The exhaust air is decontaminated by the CAFU prior to being discharged to the plant ventilation discharge <1uct.
Both pressure relief containment isolation valves autonatically close if high radiation is detected as discussed in Section 12.3 or on a phase A isolation signal, as disc ussed in 3
subscction 6.2.4 and Section 7.3. The isolation valves have a naxinum size of 8 inches and are designed to close within 5 seconds (including instrumentation delays) per branch technical 10 position CSE 6-4. Cetris are prevented from affecting valve closure tp the use of a heavy gauge 1/4-inch resh sc ree n and a 150-It-class tee at the inlet of 9.4-26 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR the inner containment isolation valve. This aethod prevents both entrapment and direct impingement of debris on the valve internals. The valve and actuator design basis include consideration of buildup of containment pressure for the LOCA break spectrum and relief line flows as a function of time up to and during valve closure.
The piping and ductwork downstream of the pressure relief valves will be designed to contain the escaping air and steam and will route the release to the CAFU. This will prevent ary safety related equipment required to function following a LCJA fron 10 being affected by the escaping mass.
The system design will ensure, that in the event of a LOCA, the radiological consequences will not exceed 10 CFR Part 100 limits. 3 Additional requirements for the design of the system isolation valves are presented in subsection 6.2.4.
3 9.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation The reliability and safety of the containment ventilation systems is ensured by the following features: I1
- a. Fedundancy in equipment and power supplies enables the systeas to sustain a single active component failure without total loss of function.
- b. Instrumentation and controls which incorporate audible and visual alarms in the control room facilitate continuous monitoring of the system performances and alert the operator for systen malfunctions.
- c. Standby units can be remotely actuated f rom the control room.
- d. Failure modes for isolation valves and dampers are set so that their failure does not render the system inoperable.
- e. The exhaust systems outside the containrent are of seisnic Category I and of ANSI Safety Class 3 design.
- f. The containment isolation valves for the containment pressure relief and purge systems are of seismic Category I and ANSI Safety Class 2 design. '3 9.4-27 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- g. The systems inside the containtrent are seismic Category I except for the fans and coils.
O 9.4-27a Amendirent 3
GIBBSSAR h.
Exhaust to its discharce. air is passed through iodine adsorber beds prior l3 See Section 7.3 for discussion on instrumentation. I 10 9.4.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Inspection and testing of the ventilation system components are discussed in subsection 9.4.1.4. The containment purge and pressure relief system isolation valves testing and inspection requirements are discussed in subsection 6.2.4. In addition, the pressure relief containment isolation valves are tested to determine the availability of the isolation function and the leak rate during reactor operation.
9.4.7 Service Water Intake Structure Ventilation System 9.4.7.1 Design Bases The service water intake structure ventilation system is designed to naintain suitable ambient conditions for personnel and equipment during nornal plant operation, scheduled shutdowns, and anticipated operational transients.
Ambient conditions are maintained below 104 F during normal 10 operation and below 120F during accident conditions. The minimum anbient temperature is maintained above 50F. The system is provided with sufficient redundancy in equipme nt and power supplies (as shown in the following) to enable it to sustain a single active conponent f ailure without loss of function.
- a. Supply units are equipped with two fans and cooling 10 coils employing service water as the cooling media, each having 100 percent capacity.
- h. The fans are powered fron independent Class 1E electrical buses to preclude any loss of coolina or heating in 10 the event of a loss of offsite~ power or following a LOCA. The system components are of seismic Category I and ANSI Safety Class 3 design, to ensure system availability for safe shutdown of the reactor during accident conditions.
9.4-28 Ame ndment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.4.7.2 System Description The service water intake structure ventilation system is shown schenatically in Figure 9.4-13. Sufficient air for heat i 6 dissipation is supplied from outside air louvers designed to seisnic Category I requirements to the equipment space. (See 6 Table 9.4-11 for service water intake struct tre ventilation systen interface requirements.) The supply unit consists of a roughing filter, heating coil, cooling coil, and two O
9.4-28a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 100 percent-capacity fans. Exhaust air is discharged to the atmosphere through air louvers of seismic Category I design.
The ambient temperature during the winter months and during shutdown is maintained by recirculation through the supply unit and electric heaters located within the supply unit.
Temperature during the summer months is maintained by air cooling as lcng as the site ambient temperature remains below 104 F. If the temperature increases, supplementary service water as ooling units employing 10 the cooling media becomes operational to maintain 104 F.
9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation The reliability and safety of the service water intake structure ventilation system is ensured by the following features: il
- a. Redundancy in equipment and power supplies enables the system to sustain a single active component failure without loss of function.
- b. Instrumentation and controls which incorporate audible llh and visual alarms in the control room facilitate continuous monitoring of system performances and alert the operator for system malfunctions.
- c. Standby units are automatically energized following failure of the functional unit.
- d. Failure modes for isolation valves and dampers are set so that their failure does not render the system inoperable.
- e. The system is of seismic Category I and ANSI Safety Class 3 design.
The service water intake structure is a seismic Category I structure; the air inlet and exhaust louvers and ductwork are designed to seismic Category I requirements and to withstand the tornado loads and tornado-related missile conditions described in subsection 3.3.2.
9.4-29 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.4.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirercents See subsection 9.4.1.4.
O 9.4-29a Arrendirent 10
GIBBSSAR 9.4.8 Miscellaneous ventilati on Systems 9.4.C.1 Diesel Generator Building The diesel generator building ventilation systen is designed to maintain suitable and safe ambient conditions for operating equipnent and personnel during nornal plant operation. In addition, the system ensures suitable operating conditions i 1 following a DBA. Each diesel generator conpartnent is supplied with 3-33 1/3 percent capacity exhaust fans which are manually started when the generators are in operation. A third, auxiliary diesel generator is served by two 50 percent capacity units which are also manually started when the generator is in operation.
Additionally, 1-100 percent capacity exhaust fan serves e.ch compartment and is operated continuously irrespective of the 2 diesel generator f unctional status. Both exhaust fans also serve the auxiliary diesel generator during normal operation. The equipment that serves each main diesel generator compartment is located in or above the compartment it exhausts.
is provided, since the diesel No redundancy generators themselves are redundant. The system is of Seismic Category I and ANSI Safety Class 3 design. Figure 9.4-14 shows the system schematically.
16 Maxinum ambient temperatures are maintained below 104 F for i 1 normal plant operation and below 120 F during operation of the i 10 diescl generators. A minimum temperature of 50 F is maintained l 1 during all nodes of operation.
Exhaust fans are sized to provide adequate ventilation for perscnnel and dissipation of auxiliary equipnent heat emissions during plant and diesel generator operations. Each of the diesel generator compartments is equipped with air exhaust units to dissipate the large qum..tities of heat which are rejected from the diesel generator following diesel starting. Each exhaust unit is automatically energized from the Class 1E electrical bus following the starting of the diesel generator it serves.
Electric unit heaters are provided to naintain the minimum anbient temperature within each compartment when the diesels are not in operation.
Monitoring of the conditione in the diesel generator rooms is acconplished with the followi,.g control room instrumentation:
- a. Diesel generator room high terperature alarm l2
- b. Ventilation system fan motor tripped alarms 9.4-30 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g
9.4.E.2 Uncontrolled Access Area - Auxiliary Building The uncontrolled access area ventilation system, shown schenatically in Figure 9.4-14, consists of redundant inlets, filters, cooling and heating coils, shutoff dampers and four 50 percent capacity supply fans, and four 50 pe rcent capacity 10 exhaust fans providing 100 percent capacity for each electrical train. The system is designed to maintain the area ambient temperature below 104 F in summer and above 50 F in winter.
Modulating dampers located in both the air inlets and the air exhausts provide a slight positive pressure for the uncontrolled access areas to prevent the in leakage of radioactivity from controlled access areas, The sistem contains provisions for 2 recirculation during winter operation in order to reduce heating and cooling requirements. The system is of seismic Category I ANSI safety-class 3 design and in accordance with the single component failure criteria requirement. l10 The uncontrolled access area ventilation provides ventilation to the Class 1E switchgear rooms, cable spreading rooms, battery rooms, inverters, and electrical penetration areas containing Class 1E equipment. Chilled water supplied to the uncontrolled acce ss ventilation cooling coils from independent and separate safety-related chilled water systems enables the ventilation g
syst em to naintain the required ambient temperatures during all modes of operation. (See Figure 9.4-5.) f6 The battery rooms are provided with separate exhaust systems.
Each room has an exhaust duct and two 100 percent capacity fans that discharge the exhaust air to the roof. The cooled air is supplied by the uncontrolled access area supply system and recooled by a coil placed inside the duct in order to maintain the ambient temperature at 7515 F during all modes of operation.
7he system is of seismic Category I and ANSI safety Class 3 10 desian and has 100 percent redundancy to sustain a single active component failure. The redundant fans are started manually from the control room upon initiation of a loss of ventilation alarm.
Hydrogen concentration monitors are not required in the battery rooms. The uncontrolled access ventilation system provides a sufficient number of room air changes, such that the hydrogen gas 2 concentration is maintained below explosive limits during normal plant operation.
If a LCCA or loss of offsite power occurs, the battery room 12 exha ust fans are automatically loaded onto the safety-related i 10 diesel generator bus to provide sufficient ventilation and adequate dispersion of hydrogen gas. l2 9.4-31 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Pecirculation of the uncontrolled access exhaust ensures a i mininum temperature of 50 F for winter operations. 1 The uncontrolled access area ventilation equipnent is located in the auxiliary building at elevation 100 feet, 6 inches and 150 feet, 6 inches adjacent to the control room HVAC system. The air intake is in the wall exposed to the outside; the intake louvers and inlet ducts are designed to seismic Category I requirements and to withstand the previously referenced tornado conditions. 7he exhaust is discharged through roof structures which are designed to withstand tornado loads and tornado generated missiles.
2 9.4-31a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
9.4.e.3 Flectrical euilding, Health Physicist Office, and 10 Service Area ihe electrical building ventilation and air conditioning system is shown in Figure 9.4-15. Two 50 percent capacity air cooled A/C units will provide conditioned air to the of fices and service area, normal switchgear area, non-safety related battery rooms, central alarm station, guards room, and throughout the entire building. A combination of recirculation and once-through ventilation is employed during the various seasons in order to conserve power. The offices and service area will be maintained at an anbient temperature of approximately 75 F and 50 percent relative humidity. The battery room, guard room and the remaining area at El. 135 ft-6 in. will be maintained at 80 F and 50 percent relative humidity. The normal switchgear area will be designed for a maximum ambient temperature of 104 F. The exhaust from the air conditioned, potentially radioactive areas, is ducted to the auxiliary building ventilation system and is passed through the controlled access area exhaust filters. Two 100 1.ercent capacity exhaust fans are provided for exhausting the battery area in order to remove the hydrogen contents within the rooms. In addition, two 50 percent capacity fans will be used for the toilet and locker exhaust. The system is not required to (gg operate following a LCCA or during a loss of offsite power.
9.4.8.4 Main Steam and Feedwater Area The main steam and feedwater area ventilation is shown schenatically in Figure 9.4-7. Approximately 2000 cfm of air lo from the atmosphere is introduced into this area by a fan located i t. the turbine building. This air, plus the air present in the room is cooled by four auxiliary cooling units supplied from the non-safety related chilled water system. Air is exhausted at all times from this area to the turbine building by the over-pressure caused from the supply fan. The system is designed to keep the area ambient temperature below 120 F in summer and above 50 F in winter. Provision for recirculation of ventilation air is made for winter operation. The system is not required to operate follcwing LOCA or during a loss of of fsite power.
9.4-32 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.4.9 Plant Ventilation Discharge Duct 9.4.5.1 Cesign Easis The plant ventilation discharge duct is designed to aid in the dispersion of gaseous effluents exhausted by the controlled access ventilation system during nornal operation.
Figure 9.4-6.) (See l6 9.4.9.2 System Description The plant ventilation discharge duct is the release point of the controlled access area ventilation systems. The duct is located adjacent to the southeast side of the containment.
The design parameters for the plant ventilation discharge duct are the following:
9.4-32a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- a. Height of Pelease The release point is approximately 77 feet 3 inches below the top 6 of tre containment and at least 68 feet 6 inches above other adjacent structures. The release point is at the springline of the Containment. I 10
- h. Discharge Temperature As shown in Table 9.4-2, the minimum indoor design condition is 50 F. The temperature of the outside air is site related; therefore the temperature dif ference between the gaseous ef fluent discharge and the outside air is also site related. Information concerning outdcor design conditions (Table 9. 4- 1) will be presented in the Utility Applicant's SAP.
- c. Effluent Discharge Quantity The quantity of gaseous effluent exhausted via the plant vent stack is as follows:
- 1) Normal 2peration, ft3/ min (ma ximum) 120,000 l 3 2) 3)
Fefueling, ft3/ min (maximum)
Loss of offsite power, ft3/ min (maximum) 150,000 30,000 12 3
g
- 4) LOCA, ft 3/ min (maximum) 30,000
- d. Plant Vent Stack Size and Shape The plant ventilation discharge duct is rectangular in construction. The free inside area depends on the gaseous effluent discharge rate, with a converging section at the discharge point. The ccnverging section is designed to create a dischage velocity of 3000ft/ min, based on the normal operation discharge quantity, and to provide good dispersion.
9.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation The plant discharge duct is designed to seismic Category I and as l 6 such no failure is anticipated. The duct is designed as non-nuclear safety above the exhaust equipment roofline. 10 9.4-33 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.4.10 References The following documents were used in the the preparation of this Section:
(1) Air Moving and Conditioning Association ( AMCA) ,
Test Code for Air Moving Devices, 210-67, 300, 211.
(2) Anerican National Standards Institute, ANSI N101.1-1972, Efficiency Testing of Air-Cleanin~
Systems Containing Devices for Pemcval of Particles.
(3) Anerican Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Guide and Data Handlooks, Vols. I to IV, 1970-1972.
(4) American Air Filter Topical Report, AAF-TR-7101, Design and Testing of Fan Cooler Filter Systems for Nuclear Application, February 20, 1972.
(5) American Filter Institute (AFI).
(6) National Bureau of Standards (NBS).
(7) ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Pefrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers) Standard 52-68, " Method of Testing Air Cleaning Devices used in General Ventilation for Removing Particulate Matter, Section 9".
(8) American National Standards Institute, ANSI N509-1976, " Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components".
(9) American National Standard Institute, 6 ANSI N510-1975, " Testing Nuclear Air Cleaning Systems".
(10) EP DA 76-21 " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook" (ORNL -
NSIC - 65 Rev. 1) .
(11) 10 CFP Part 50, Appendix A, General Cesign Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenonena."
( 12) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases."
9.4-34 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR (13) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Desig n Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components."
(14) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General De sig n Criterion 19, " Control Foom."
( 15) 10 CFF Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 60, " Control of Releases of Radioactive Materials to the Environment."
( 16) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 64, " Monitoring Radioactivity Feleases. "
(17) Eranch Technical Positions APCSE 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems 6 Outside Containme nt ," attached to Standard Review Plan 3.6.1, and MEB 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage locations in Fluid System Piping Cutside Containment,"
attached to Standard Review Plan 3.6.2.
(18) Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Pelevant to Ensuring that Occupational Fadiation Exposures at &
W Nuclear Power Stations be as low as is Reasonable Achievable", Fevision 2.
(19) Fegulatory Guide 1.13, " Fuel Storage Facility Design Easis."
(20) Fegulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water , Steam , and Fadioactive-Waste Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants," Fevision 1.
(21) Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Revision 1.
(22) Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2 " Design, Testing, and 110 Maintenance Criteria for Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
(23) Regulatory Guide 1.78 " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room 6 During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Pelease".
9.4-34a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR (24) Fegulatory Guide 1.95, " Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against An Accidental 6 Chlorine Release."
(25) Fegulatory Guide 1.140, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Vent ila t ion , Exhaust 10 System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
(26) Wash 1234 " Engineered Safety Features Air Cleaning Systems for Commercial Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power l6 Plants." I (27) 10 CFR Part 100, " Reactor Site Criteria". l 10 (28) 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E, " Concentration in Air l10 and Water Above Natural Background". l6 (29) Air-Conditioning and Befrigeration Institute ( ARI) , 110 for forced - Circulation Air - Cooling and Air Heating, Coils, 410. l6 9.4-35 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-1 1 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN CONDITIONS Maxirrum Sumner Design, F DB 110 F Summer design temperature, F WB 79 F Kinter design temperature, F DB -15 F Latitude Will be provided in the 10 Utility Applicant's SAF.
Elevation Will be provided in the Utility Applicant's SAF.
Average wind velocity Will be provided in the Utility Applicant's SAF.
The design temperatures were based on data abstracted fron ASHRAE Handtook of Fundamentals using 1 percent design for the summer and 59 percent design for the winter.
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-2 DESIGN CONDITIONS - INDCCBS (NORMAL OPEPATION, LOSS OF OFFSITE POEER, AND LOCA)
Air-conditioned areas summer 75F 5 F, 50% relative i 10 (control room) humidity t10%
winter 75F 15 F, 50% relative i 10 humidity 110%
Air-conditioned areas summer 75F tS F, 50% relative i 19 (of fice and service humidity 110%
area) 25 F, 50%
winter 75F relative I 10 humidity 110%
Non-air-conditioned area summer 104 F maximum (auxiliary, winter 50 F minimum i 10 safety features area, fuel handling, and electrical buildings) ggg Containment building 120 F maximum - 60 F minimum CBDM shroud (air temp) 120 F inlet
- 135 F normal I lo Neutron detector well 175 F maximum (excursions)
Main Steam and feedwater area, lo Diesel generator summer 120 F maximum
- area, Station service water winter 50 F minimum pumphouse, tank enclosure, and turbine buildings
~
Battery rooms summer 75 F 15 75 F 15 10 winter
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-3 EQUIPMENT LINEUP FOR CONTPOL FOOM AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM MODES OF OPERATION Dampers Dampers Dampers Mode Open* Fan On* Closed _ Modulated **
Normal 1, 7, 21 7, 1, 9 5, 11, 13, 15 3 l8 Creration 29, 32 19, 25, 27, 2, i 10 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22 e 24, 28, 30, 31 l 10 Energency 15, 19, 1,3 1, 3, 5, 7, 11, 25 Fecirculation 21, 27 13, 29, 31, 2, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22 24, 28, 30, 32 Energency 5, 15 1, 3, 5 1, 3, 7, 11, 29 13, 25 8 Fressurization 19, 21, 31, 2, 4, 6, 8, 27 12, 14, 16, 18 22, 24, 28, 30 32 Emergency 1, 11, 1, 3, 7 5, 7, 13, 27, 3, 25 Ventilation 15, 19, 9 2, 4, 6, 8, 12, 21, 29, 14, 16, 18, 22, 32 24, 28, 30, 31 l10 SEE subsection 9.4.1.2 for overpressure requirements
- Components normally function NOTE: Fan inlet flow control dampers 9, 10, 17, 20 compensate for filter conditions.
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-4 (SHEET 1 of 2)
FIL7ER DESIGN REQUIREMENTS PER NFC REGULATORY GUIDES 1.52 REV. 2 and 1.140 1 10 Prefilters Efficiency at rated air velocity 40 percent minimum per I3 ASHRAE STD 52 Initial (clean) resistance at rated air velocity 0.16 inch water I3 Maxinum (dirty), resistance at rated air velocity 1.0 inch water Dust-holding capacity at rated air velocity 175 gr/fta minimum of AFI l3 test dust
[@PA_ Filters Air flow capacity / 1000 ft3/ min ninimum cartridge Filtration efficiency 0.03% penetration on DOP l3 COP ** tests Challenge per ANSI N510 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52 Rev. 1 Air flow resistance 1.0-inch water maximum clean filter at rated l3 capacity 4.0-inch water maximum dirty filter at rated capacity
- Air Filter Institute National Bureau of Standards
- Dicctyl Phthalate Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g
TABLE 9.4-4 1 (SHEET 2 of 2)
FILTER DESIGN REQUIREMENTS PER NRC REGULATORY GUIDES 1.52 REV. 2 and 1.140 l 10 Iodine Adsorbers Material Impregnated activated charcoal meeting the requirements of Table 2, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52 Fev.-1 2
.iitial Efficiency In accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52 Rev-1, Table 2, Test 5 Mininum contact time 0.25 sec. per 2 inches Adsorter ted thickness 4.0 inches ggg Assigned decontamination efficiencies for clemental and organic 3 iodides ESF 99 percent, per Regulatory Guide 1.52 Non-ESF 90 percent, per Regulatory Guide 1.140 l 10 Mininum weight of carbon 250 lb per 1000 ft3/ min air Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-8 (SHEET 1 of 3)
CCNTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEMS DESIGN PARAMETERS Cont ainme nt Air Recirculation and Cooling _ Unit Number installed four Number required to operate three Type coil chilled water Heat removal capacity, Etu/hr (each) (later)
Fan capacity, ft3/ min (each) 65,000 l10 Cond itions Temperature, F (containment) 120 naximum Total pressure, psig atmospheric Cooling media plant ventilation chilled water or component cooling water or service water Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-8 (SHEET 2 of 3)
CCNTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEMS DESIGN PARAMETEFS Neutron Detector Well Unit bumber installed two Number required to operate one Type coil chilled water Heat removal capacity, Btu /hr (each) 344,700 10 Fan capacity, ft3/ min (each) approx. 10,500 Temperature, F 135 (possible excursions to 175)
Cooling media plant ventilation chilled water g Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-9 (SHEET 1 of 2)
CONTAINMENT VENTIIATION SYSTEMS INTERFACE PEQUIPEMENTS (Westinghouse - 414) l2 RESAR-414 Table 9.4-1 Reguitenents G6H Design Vessel Annulus & Cetector 135 F avg. 135 F avg.
Kell Cooling System 8hr 175 F max. 175 F max. 10 Excursions)
CRDM Shroud System 120 F inlet 120 F inlet Exhaust Fans 39 F rise 39 F outlet 110 56,000 SCFM 56,000 SCFM Containment Building System 120 F nax. 120 F max.
Piping NSSS Heat Heat Femoved Release Estimate By Ventilation _
JBtu/hr) ___ (Btu /hrt l3 Peactor Coolant System 148,800 148,800 - Note (2) l10' Other Piping 40,000 40,000 EGuiEE2Dt Peactor Vessel Above Seal 17,000 17,000 Below Seal 125,000 125,000 Reactor Coolant Pumps 5,537,700 701,800 - Note (1) 10 Stean Generators 1,150,200 1,150,200 - Note ( 3)
Pressurizer 171,50,0 171,500 - Note (3)
Control Rod Drive 2,334,000 2,334,000 Mechanisms Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-9 (SHEET 2 of 2)
CONTAINMENT VENTIIATION SYSTEMS INTEFFACE FEQUIREMENTS (Kestinghouse - 414) i2 NSSS Heat Heat Femoved Release Estimate By Ventilation (Btu /hr) JBtu/hr)
Pressurizer Felief Tank 42,800 42,800 1 10 Primary Concrete Shield 17,000 17,000 1
Pegenerative Heat Exchanger 34,500 34,500 Excess Letdown Heat 400 400 10 Subtotal A 9,618,900 4,783,050
+16% contingency 11,061,700 5,500,500 Heat Femoved By Ventilation JBtu/hr) g3 Main Stean Piping 270,000 Feedwater Piping 270,000 Incore Instrumentation 18,000 Fod Position Indicator 18,000 B.C. Crain Tank Pumps 17,000 F.C, Crain Tank Heat Exchanger 12,000 F.C. Drain Tank 12,000 Electrical Equipment 20,000 CPCM Fan Load 230,000 Containment Pecirculation Fans 496,400 Subtotal B 1,363,400 Subtotai B + Contingency 1,500,000 Subtotal A + Contingency 5,800,000 Subtotal B + Contingency 1,500,000 5 Total 7,300,000 Note (1) - Additional 4,835,900 Btu /hr are removed by the motor water coolers shown in Figure 9.2-4.
Note (2) - Includes hotlegs, crossovers, and cold legs.
10 Note (3) - Includes supports.
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.4-12 6
TOXIC GAS AND SMOKE DETEC7 ORS Ionization Detector Chlorine
- Other Toxic ** Smoke Type: Gases Detector ***
Detection Capability: 1 ppm of air by ** N/A (see 10 Volume Note 1)
Seisnic Category: I I I
- This detector will isolate the control room HVAC system by closure of damper within four seconds of detector trip. The system will automatically switch to the recirculation mode of 6 operation.
- Cther toxic gas detectors required by site-specific conditions will be discussed in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
These detectors will meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78.
- This detector will alarm in the control room and isolate the control room HVAC within four seconds. The operator will evaluate the need to manually perform any system re-alignment 10 required.
Note 1: Note applicable since the ionization detector design cannot te related to an established volume of smoke within the air.
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.5 other Auxilia_ry Systems 9.5.1 Fire _P_rotection The overall fire protection program was developed utilizing the defense in depth concept. The fire protection system deals with fire prevention, fire detection and suppression, and fire extinguishing techniques. The fire protection system is designed to balance these factors. These factors are applied to construction methods, selection of materials, plant general arrangement, and evaluation of fire effects. Further considerations, such as employee safety, effects on the environment and property protection have also been incorporated i
n the overall fire protection progran.
The fire protection program applies to equipment, procedures and plant personnel utilized in effecting fire protection and prevention as it relates to plant design. The fire hazards evaluation quantifies potential fire hazards throughout the plant is terms of combustible heat release loading. Subscquently, the fire protection and dete, tion systems are designed based on this heat release loading and the nature of the combustible material in the area, as well as on the criticality of equipnent and combustibles in adjacent fire areas. A summary of this information is presented in tabular form and provided in Table (lat er) . 8 The Gibbs S Hill, Inc. Standard Nuclear Power Plant fire protection program is in general conpliance with the criteria provided by standard Review Plan 9.5.1 and NFC Branch Technical Fosition ASE-9.5-1, Rev. 2.
An overall fire protection systen description is provided in sections 9.5.1.1 through 9.5.1.5. Section 9.5.1.6 provides the details which indicate the extent of confornance with Standard Feview Plan 9.5.1 and NRC Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, Pev. 2. ,,
- 9. 5.1.1a Design Bases The following are design functions of the fire protection system:
- a. To mininize the possibilities of fire starting in any area of the plant
- b. To provide quick-acting fire detection and suppression systens for use in the event of a fire.
N 9.5-1 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR g
- c. To minimize the possibility of personnel injury and equipment damage. 8
- d. To minimize the effects of fire to essential safety-related components of the plant.
The fire protection tooster cumps are also used as part of the seisnic Category I makeup supply to the CCW surge tank, the lo safety feature chilled water expansion tanks, and the spent fuel pool.
9.5.1.1b Identification of Fires The overall fire protection is ba sed on evaluation of potential fire hazards which can affect the safety-related structures.
Fireu that can directly or ir iirectly a f fect emergency safety features (ESF) equipment and structures are postulated to occ ur at the location of stored combustible material and are directly rela ted to the quantity of combustible material.
Safety related systems, structures, components and equipment are separated from each other either by 3-hour fire barriers (with openings having protection consistent with this rating) , or by equivalent and adequate spatial clearance. Fire areas are g
8 provided based on the anount of combustible material present and provide adequate isolation of redundant safety related systems and components.
9.5.1.1c Fire Characteristics 7he intensity of fire depends on the material and combustibility of the turning surface area.
Activated charcoal has an ignition temperature of approximately 340 C. When used in an adsorber filter, activated charcoal is encased in a steel or sheet metal enclosure. The incidence of fire with normal airflow is considered unlikely. Combustion prod ucts are mainly carton, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide.
Charcoal fires in relatively still air burn slowly with a low spreading intensity and little smoke.
- 9. 5- 2 Ane ndment 10
GIBBSSAR Cil fires burn rapidly with high intensity and snoke. Fires involving hydraulic oils are kept to a minimum by use of high-flashpoint fluids and where possible synthetic hydraulic 8
oils. Lubricating and diesel fuel oil fires are surface burning fires, which produce snoke and unburned fumes.
9.5-2a Arendnent 10
GIBDSSAP 9.5.1.2 System Description
- a. General Description Kater for the fire protection system is site specific. A discussion of the fire water source will be provided in the Ctility-Applicant's SAR.
7he water supply system is designed based on the largest anticipated water demand of any sprinkler or deluge system in the plant for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, plus 750 gpm for hose streams. The fire protection system water flow diagrams are provided on 8 Figures 9.5-1a, 9.5-1b and 9.5 (later).
Two equal capacity fire protection pumps, one motor-driven and one diesel engine-driven is provided. A jockey pumps is provided to maintain full system water pressure at all times.
The fire protection pumps are located outside the primary plant. As a minimum the fire suppression system shall be capable of delivering water to hose streams located near equipment and components required for safe shutdown f ollowing an SSE. These areas are supplied with fire water to the hose stations from a seismic Category I source by the tire protection booster pumps.
Eecause the fire protection booster pumps are used as part of 10 the seismic Category I makeup supply to the CCW surge tank, the safety feature chilled water expansion tanks, and the spent fuel pool, they are designed to Safety Class 3 and seismic Category I requirements, as shown on Figure 9.5-1B.
L. Fire Euppresion Components Fire protection consists of the following:
- 1) Sprinkler water systems located in various areas of the 8 plant equipped with alarm check valves and an annunciator in the control room
- 2) Deluge water systems located in various areas of the plant equipped with water motor alarms and an annunciator in the control room
- 3) Readily accessible portable extinguishers located throughout the various buildings to meet specific area requirements 9.5-7 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 4) Fire hose stations located throughout the various buildings 8
- 5) An automatic fixed hal n extinguishing system is used in the plant computer roc ..
O 9.5-7a Arrendment I C>
GIBBSSAF
- 6) Approved yard fire hydrants are providec for overall area protection of the plant structures.
- c. Fire Detection Components Fire and smoke detection devices include:
- 1) Ionization smoke detectors
- 2) Thermal Detectors
- 2) Flame detectors
- 4) Combination of items 1, 2 and/or 3.
The fire detection system is provided with backut on si te power supply for operation in the event of loss of normal cnsite power. The type of detectors provided throughout the plant are comparable with combustible material located in the specified fire areas.
- 9. 5.1. 3 System Evaluation Analysis of the potentially adverse effects of the fire protection and the fire detection system are evaluated as follows:
a) Fire Detection A fire detection system is provided to ensure that a single failure in one zone will not incapacitate the detectors in an adjacent detection zone. Primary and secondary power sources shall be provided for the fire detection systems. Fire detection system control and annunciation is addressed in the Ctility Applicant's SAR.
b) Fipe Fupture Fuptures in Fire Protection System piping are indicated in the control room by the starting of the main fire protection pumps without fire detection anunciation, automtic supression system alarms, hose stream actuation alarms or usage of yard fire hydrants. See the failure mode and effecte analysis provided in Table 9.5-7.
9.5-8 Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR
- 3) Two 100 percent capacity pumps, one ac motor driven and one diesel engine driven pump are provided. Each pump is rated at 2500 gpm. The day tank fuel supply for the diesel driven fire pumps is provided adjacent to the 8 engine driven pump. A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier separates the fuel supply from the pump. The fire water pumps shall comply with the requirements of NFPA 20, " Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire P ump s. " One ac notor driven jockey pump is provided to maintain system pressure.
Two 100 percert capacity fire protection booster pumps are provided. These safety Class 3, seismic Category I 1g pumps provide water to the piping and hose stations serving safety related equipaent.
- 4) The fire protection water supply system is site specific and is addressed in the Utility-Applicant's SAF.
- 5) The fire protection system water supply desian basis is discussed in section 9. 5.1.6.5b (1) .
- 6) Fire hydrants are located a maximum of 250 feet apart on the main yard loop. Fire hydrants pernit protection of onsite locations of fixed or transient combustibles.
Hose houses and equipnent are provided in accordance with NFPA 24, "Outside Protection".
Threads compatible with those used by the local fire g department are utilized on the hydrants, hose couplings and standpipe risers. Thread size and type is addressed in the Utility Applicant's SAR.
c) Kater Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systens
- 1) Hose stations and sprinkler systens have connections to the main yard piping which ensure that neither a passive or an active failure in a line will impair both the primary and secondary fire suppression systems. Piping and fittings meet the requirements of ANSI B31.1, " Power Piping." Each sprinkler and standpipe system is provided with an approved isolation valve.
- 9. 5- 23 b Arendment 10
GIBBSSAR Gafety related equipment which does not represent a fire a hazard and could be damaged by water, is protected against such damage through the use of water shields or taffles.
9 9.5-23b1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 2) Design of control and sectionalizing valves in the fire protection system ensures that they are suf ficiently monitored to indicate valve position. Electrical supervision of the valves conforms to NFPA 26 Code requirements. Electrical supervision signals are indicated in the control room.
- 3) Fixed water spray systems conform to the requirements of NFPA 13, " Standard ror Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA 15 " Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems".
- 4) Interior hose stations are able to reach any and all locations that contain safety related equipment which may te exposed to a potential fire hazard. Standpipes and hose systens are designed and installed according to the requirenents of NFPA 14, " Standpipe and HoacSystems."
Fire hose stations have been located to facilitate ease a of access to any given fire area as denoted by Table (later) . Sufficient hose stations and backup equipment have been provided to preclude physical blockage of a particular hose station.
Fire protection piping and hose stations located in or near areas containing safety related equipment required for safe shutdown following an SSE is seismic Category I and performs their intended design function following an SSE.
- 5) The proper type of hose nozzles to be utilized in each fire area are based on the hazard analysis. This item is addressed as plant design proceeds.
- 6) Foam fire suppression systens are addressed in the Applicant's SAR d) Ealon Suppression Systems Fixed automatic halen suppression systems are used in the plant computer roon.
e) Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems O 9.5-23c Amendment 8
GIBBSSAR Fuel oil required for recharging the fuel oil storage tanks for an indefinite period of operation in excess of 7 days will be 1 normally brought in by tank truck. However, railroad tank cars can te brought in on thc plant's railroad spur.
The single failur' analysis is provided in Table 9.5-2.
- 9. 5. 5 Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling Kater System The emergency diesel generator cooling water system is designed to provide a heat-removal medium for the station emergency diesel generators and it consists of two systems: a diesel engine jackct water subsystem and a jacket water to cooling water heat exchanger subsystem. The emergency generator cooling water 1 system is shown in Figure 9.5-4.
9.5.5.1 Design Bases The various components are sized to remove the maxium heat produced by the diesel generator sets using service, water as a 10 cooling medium. Essential system components are designed to seisnic Category I requirements and to withstand the worst anticipated environmental phenomernon.
This system is designed to mee t the requirements of 10 CFP Part 50, GDC 2, 4, 5, 44, 45, and 4 6, NFC Pegulatory Guidec 1.26 and 1.29.
The jacket water heat exchanger design parameters are shown in Table 9.5-3. The design bases for the diesel generators cooling water system are:
- a. The temperature of the diesel engine is maintained below the maximum design value for all modes of operation. The diesel engine jacket is kept warm by a standby electric heater during 10 the standby periods.
- b. The redundant emergency diesel generator cooling water systems are separated and do not share any components.
- c. System components and piping have sufficient physical separation or shielding to protect the system from missiles and from jet impingement caused by cracks or breaks in 10 moderate-energy piping. There is no high-energy piping in this area.
9.5-29 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- d. System components are classified as ANSI Safety Class 3 6 and are designed in accordance with ASME BSPV Code Section III, Class 3, seismic Category I, as detailed in Table 3.2-1.
However, when a component is ccamercially unavailable as ASME Class 3 design, the component will be of the highest 16 commercial quality available from the chosen manufacturer, see Table 9,5-10.
- e. Failure of non-seismic Category I structures and conpcnents would not affect the safety related function of the 6
system.
- f. Diesel engine cooling water protective devices are bypassed in the event of energency operation.
9.5.5.2 Systen Description The jacket water subsystem is an integral part of the diesel engine, and consists of the diesel engine jacket water heat exchanger, surge tank, an engine jacket water system stand-by electric heater, an engine driven jacket water punp, and a motor driven auxiliary pump.
7he jacket water subsystem is provided with the following instrumentation and alarus on the local diesel generator panels.
- a. Low-level and high-level surge tank.
L. Low-temperature jacket water in 10
- c. T.ow-temperature jacket water out
- d. High-temperature jacket water in
- e. High-temperature jacket water out
- f. Low jacket water pressure in
- g. Low jacket water pressure out
- b. Service water temperature in
- i. Service water temperature out 1 On-off temperature control for the jacket water heater 9.5-29a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- k. Auxiliary jacket water pump on-off control to ensure continuous water circulation through the engine on loss of the engine driven pump.
A general diesel trouble ala rm which includes pressure, temperature, and coolant system level alarms (which are annunciated separately on the local diesel generator panel) is provided in the Control Room. In the unlikely event of a failure in one diesel cooling system, the backup diesel generator is available for immediate emergency use.
Jacket water temperature is maintained constant by the use of an automatic three-way valve which is thermostatically operated.
Vents at high ponits in the system ensure that no air is trapped in the system. Leakage in the jacket water cooling system can 10 result in a high jacket water temperature alarm; the operator then switches to the redundant diesel generator.
To prevent degradation of system cooling performance and of the materials utilized, the jacket water cooling system is periodically cleaned and fiushed during planned maintenance.
The surge tank contains a sufficient volume of water and is located to maintain the NPSH required by the pump for seven days of continuous operation at maximum rated load.
- 9. 5. 5. 3 Safety Evaluation The systems is designed in accordance with the requirements of NFC Fegulatory Guide 1.26, 1.29 and ANSI N18.2 9.5-29b Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR ihe emergency diesel generator cooling water system is located inside the auxiliary building and is not af fected by the design maximum flood, tornado and tornado missiles.
Systen design pe rmits the control room operators to monitor component leak tightness. Rapid decrease in the water level in the surge tank or a level rise in the energency diesel generator compa rtmer.t sumps indicate abnormal system leakage and the operator will switch to the redundant diesel generator for plant operation.
If a mechanical failure of the engine-driven jacket water pump 10 cccurs, there is a redundant motor driven auxiliary pump to ensure continuous water circulation through the engine.
7he engine jacket water contains antifouling compounds to prevent organic fouling and corrosion inhibitor to prevent corrosion.
Anti-freeze protection will be described in the 1 Utility-Applicant's SAF.
An analysis of the ability of the system to meet the single failure criteria is shown in Table 9.5-4.
10 lll 9.5.5.4 Inspection and 7esting Fequirements Lenign of the system allows periodic inspection and testing in accordance with requirenents of Chapter 16 9.5.6 Diesel Generator Starting System The emergency diesel generator starting system is an air-powered system designed to provide engine starting pcwer and it is shown in Fiqure 9.5-5.
9.5.6.1 Cesign Eases Fedundant starting air systems are provided for each diesel generator set. Starting signals are listed in Section 8.3.1.1b.
The starting system is designed to meet the requirements of 10 10 CFF Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 2, 4 and 5 ,
and NRC Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29. The system is designed to seismic Category I rcquirements and to withstand the worst anticipated environmental phenomena described in Sections 3.3.,
- 3. 4 and 3.5.
9.5-30 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.5.6.2 System Description Each diesel is supplied with an air injection type starting system. Each engine is provided with an air compressor, redundant air receivers, piping, and valves and a starting appartus. Each of the redundant starting systems is capable of cranking a cold diesel engine five times without recharging the receiver. Each cranking cycle duration is approximately three seconds or two to three engine revolutions.
Two air supply lines are provide, each having redundant solenoid starting valves. One valve passes enough air to start the diesel engine, thus ensuring a sufficient supply of starting air if one valve fails to operate. Each of the two air receivers for each diesel engine is capable of independently starting the engine.
In addition, if one engine fails to start the redundant emergency diesel generator will provide the plant emergency power. Each receiver also has a valve to permit periodic blowdown of accunulated moisture and foregin material.
The lines from the air receiver to the engine are sloped such that any contaminants present in the lines will collect at a low 10 point prior to connection to the engine. To minimize fouling of the starting air valves with contaminants, drains are provided on the air receivers to collect water and oil carryover. Strainers located downstream of the receivers and designed to collect contaninats.
Periodic running of the diesel engine, and blowdown of the strainers and lowpoints will minimize the build-up of contaminants in the starting air system.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the operation of the system. On low receiver pressure, redundant pressure elenents actuate an alarm in the diesel generator room and a trouble alarm in the Contrcl Room.
Cleanliness of strainers is monitored and alarned by means of differental pressure across the strainers.
Emergency diesel generator air starting compressor, air receiver, and design parameters are to be specified by a diesel generator manufacturer.
9.5-30a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation The system is designed in accordance with the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.26 and ANSI N18.2, Safety Class 3. The system is designed to seismic Category I requirenents. The components in the system will be designed to comply with applicable ASME ESPV Code Section III, Class 3, as shcwn in Table 3.2-1.
However, when a component is commercially unavailable as ASME Class 3 design, the component will be of the highest commercial quality available from the chosen nanufacturer. See Table 9.5-10.
The emgergency diesel generator air starting compressor is located inside the Auxiliary Building and is not affected by the design naxinum flood, tornado or tornado missiles. 10 Essential portions of the system are housed within seismic Category I structures and are protected fron the effects of jet impingement caused by cracks in moderate-energy piping. There is no high energy piping in this area. The failure mode and ef fects analysis presented in Table 9.5-5 demonstrates the ability of the system to perform its design function while subjected to a single failure. g 9.5.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Design of the syster allows periodic inspection and testing in accordance with the requirement of Chapter 16.
9.5.7 Diesel Engine lubrication Systen.
Each diesel engine lubrication system is designed to provide adequate engine lubrication under all operating conditions, including full-load operation. The system is internal to the diesel engine. The Ilow diagran and the conponent design paraneters will be presented in the Utility Applicant's FSAR.
Figure 9.5-9 shows a typical diesel generator lubrication system.
9.5.7.1 Design Eases 10 The diesel generator lubrication system will be designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, General Cesign Criteria 2, 4, and 5 and NBC Pegulatory Guide 1.26 and 1.29.
9.5-31 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9.5.7.2 System Description A typical diesel generator lube oil system is shown in Figure 9.5-9. The diesel generator has one main lube oil pump that is engine driven and an auxiliary pung (motor-driven) that is capable of automatically supplying lube oil if the engine-driven pump fails. The rain pung is equipped with an integral relief valve and draws oil from the sump through a coarse suction strainer. The lube oil travels through the pump, cooler, and then through the strainer to the engine. The lube oil system is supplied with the following instrumentation and alarns on the local diesel generator panel.
- c. High temperature, lube oil in alare
- d. High/ low temperature, lube oil out alarm
- e. Hight differential pressure, lube Jil strainer alarm
- f. Low pressure engine oil alarm
- g. Low pressure engine oil trip alarm
- h. High pressure crankcase trip alarm
- i. An auxiliary lube oil pump on-off control actuated by lube oil pressure
- j. An on-of f temperature control for the lube oil heater
- k. Local flow indication khen an alarm sounds on the Diesel Poom Control Panel a "CIESEL GENEFATCR TROUBLE" signal will also sound in the control room.
The lubrication oil system is cooled by jacket water. The design of the lubrication oil cooler and lubrication design requirements will be based on paraneters established by the Diesel Generator Manufacturer. The jacket water system is cooled by service water.
9.5-32 Anendment 10
GIBBSSAR The required oil quality as specified by the engine manufacturer is maintained by automatically filtering and straining the oil as it is circulated in the engine.
The engine crankcase is protected from overpressurization by the following design features. The system is equipped with alarms and trips initiated by high oil temperature and/or pressure, which shutdown the diesel generator if operating limits as specified by the engine manufacturer are exceeded. The lutrication oil system trips are blocked by the safety iniection actuation signal. The lubrication oil sump, and the lutrication oil strainer are vented.
When the engine is not operating, a motor-driven auxiliary pump draws oil from the sump, passes it through an electrically heated t ypa ss filter, and the engine lubricating system. This ensures continuous pre-lubrication of the engine and standby heating of the oil.
9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation 10 The system is designed in accordance with the requirements of NBC Fegulaory Guide 1.26 and ANSI Standard N18.2, Safety Class 3.
The diesel generator lute oil system is designed to seismic g
Category I requirements.
The components in the system are designed to the requirements of the ASME BSPV Code, Section III, Class 3. However, when a componet is commercially unavailable as ASME ESPV Code,Section III, Class 3 design, the component will be of proven equivalent quality. See Table 9. 5- 10.
Low oil pressure to the main header is alarmed by a pressure switch. Cil pressure is indicated by a pressure gauge locally.
Another pressure switch trips the engine on low lube oil pressure (if no safety injection actuation signal is present) .
The volume of lubrication oil in the sump is sufficient to ensure continued operation under emergency conditions. A redundant diesel generator unit is provided to meet the single-f ailure criterion, should a failure of the diesel generator lube oil system necessitate the stoppage of a diesel generator unit.
Ecth the high lute oil temperature and the low lube oil pressure nonitoring systems have separate alarm and trip switches, since a 9.5-32a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR failure of these components could result in an engine malfunction teing undetected.
The diesel generator lube oil system is housed in a seismic Category I structare. Failure of non-seismic components outside this structure does not affect this system. This structure also protects the system from the maximum flood, tornado or tornad 10 missiles. A single failure analysis of the diesel generator lubrication system is presented in Table 9.5-9.
9.5.7.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Design of the system aloows preiodic inspection and testing in accordance will the requirements of Chapter 10.
9.5.8 Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System The emergency diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system supplies combustion air of reliable quality and sufficient quantity to the diesel engines, and exhausts the products of combustion from the diesel engine to the atnosphere and is in Figure 9.5-8. shown l 10 9.5.8.1 Design Bases
- a. The redundant emergency diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust systems are separated and do not share any components.
- b. The essential portions of the system are housed in a seismic Category I structure and are protected from flood, tornado or tornado missiles. Components have sufficient separation or shielding to protect the system from missiles and from jet impingement caused by cracks in moderate-energy piping.
10 There is no high energy piping in this area.
9.5-32b Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- c. The Diesel Generator Air Intake and Exhaust System is classified as ANSI Safety Class 3 and designed to Seismic Category I requirements. System components will be designed to 6 coaply with the ASME BSPV Code,Section III, Class 3. However, when a component is commerically unavailable as ASME Class 3 design, the component will be of the highest commercial quality available from the chosen manufacturer, such that no degradation of engine function will be experienced when the diesel generator set is required to operate continuously at the maximum rated 10 power output (See Table 9.5-10) .
9.5.8.2 System Description A typical emergency diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system consists of an intake pipe that brings outside combustion air to the diesel and an exhaust pipe that discharges conbustion gases to the environment. Both intake and exhaust pipe s are designed for maximum diesel generator ratings and for continucus operation.
The intake system consists of a filter, silencer, flexible connection, adapter for connection to turbocharger intake, air intake duct connection, and interconnecting piping. The filter is of the dry type and can be cleaned during operation, if g
necessary. The filter and silencer are located inside the diesel gene rator area of the Auxiliary Building. The flexible connection compensates for thernal expansion and absorbes vibrations. The turbocharger consists of a gas turbine driven compressor. Air coolers and heaters are provided to cool or heat the discharge air from the compressor when required. 10 7he exhaust system consists of the outlet adapter for the turbocharger gas turbine outlet, a flexible connection to provide vibration isolation and compensa te for themal expansions, a muffler to reduce exhaust gas sound level, exhaust duct connection, and interconnected piping. The system is provided with the following instrumentation:
- a. Intake air filter low pressure alarm
- b. Turbocharger inlet and outlet low pressure alarm
- c. Turbocharger gas turbine inlet low pressure alarm
- d. Turbocharger gas turbine outlet high pressure alarm
- e. Air cooler and heater high - low tenperature alarms
- 9. 5- 3 2c Anendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- f. Air cooler and heater temperature indicators
- g. Turbocharger gas turbine inlet temperature alarm
- h. Turbocharger gas turbine inlet and outlet temperature indicators
- i. Cylinder exhaust gas temperature direct-reading pyrometer 10 Pressure and temperature alarms from redundant pressure and temperature switches are provided at the local panel. High and low temperature indication is provided on the engine control panel. A general trouble annunciation is provided in the control room. Cylinder exhaust temperature is indicated on the engine control panel in the diesel generator room. Sufficient intake airflow is provided to ensure operation under emergency conditions. A more complete description of the system will be provided in the Utility Applicant's SAR.
9.5-32d Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 9. 5. 8. 3 Safety Evaluation 1
The location of the intake and exhaust are such that dilution or contamination of the intake air by exhaust air or other gases that may incidentally or accidentally te released on site is nininized. There are no intake or exhaust louvers or control devices that may block the air or exhaust gas flow. The air intakes and exhausts are protected by labyrinth shielding arrangements. These arrangements protect the intake and exhaust from:
- a. possible clogging during normal operation, including standby, from atmospheric conditions such as heavy or freezing rain, dust storms, ice and snow
- t. damage by tornado missiles The nornal air intake for each diesel generator is approximately 30 percent greater than the air intake required for combusion at 100 percent load. This 30 percent higher flow capacity means that a large quantity of smoke and extraneous gas such as carbon 10 dioxide and nitrogen would be required to cause significant dilution of the diesel combustion air before effecting the diesel generator performance.
g A redundant diesel generator unit is provided to meet the single failure criterion if a failure of the Diesel Generator Conbustion Air Intake and Exhaust System necessitates the stoppage of a diesel generator unit. A failure mode and effects analysi s is given in Table 9.5-11.
9.5.E.4 Inspection and Testing Requirenents The emergency diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system is tested periodically in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 16. System design allows visual inspection of compcnents.
9.5-33 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.5-3 (Sheet 1 of 2)
EMEFGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET WATER SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN PARAMETERS 10 Quantity two I Type tubes and shell fixed head Maxinum heat transferred, Btu /hr 18 x 106 (3) l 10 Shell side fluid service water Flow, gpr each 1350 (3) l 10 Temperature in F 100 ( 1)
Temperature out F 116 (3) l 10 Design pressure, psig 100 Tube side fluid engine jacket water Flow, gpm See Note 3 1
Temperature in F See Note 3 Tenperature out F See Note 3 Design pressure psig 100 Code - thermal design TEMA Class R Pressure retaining parts ASME B & PV Code Secticn III, Class 3 Naterials of ccnstruction See Note 2 l 1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.5-3 (Sheet 2 of 2)
EMEFGENCY CIESEL GENERATOR JACKET KATEF SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN PARAMETERS I
Note s :
- 1. Service water temperature is site dependent. It is y assumed that site water is available at 100 F.
- 2. Materials selection depends on the water quality and its source, which is to be specified after site location.
- 3. Cependent upon diesel-generator manufacturer selected by the Utility Applicant. This 10 information will be presented in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
O Amendment 10
GIEBSEAR TALLE 9.5-4 FAILUEE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESFL GENERATOR COOLING WATEP SYSTF24 Method of Failure Ca use of Effects on Failure Effect en 11em on IEGl__ F u nct ion Mode Egilure [ubsystem_ Detection gystem Engine driven Pumps jacket No output Mechanical Cannot pump High water None; motor driven jacket water pump water failure water temperat ure auxiliary pump is available.
Motor driven Pumps jacket No output Mechanical Cannot pump !!igh water None; 1EG2 is auxiliary pump water failure; loss water t emp era t ure available, of power; motor failure Jacket water heat Heat sink for a. Leaks Cracks, Temperat ure High water None; 1EG2 is exchangers diesel service and corrosion rises temperat ure available, jacket water systems 10
- b. No flow Blockage Temperature High water rises temperat ure Engine jackets Transports water a. No flow Blockage Cannot transfer High water None; 1EG2 is transfer lines water temperat ure available.
- t. Leakage Cracks and corrosion Standby electric Heats water for No output Loss of Fails to heat Low water None; IEG2 is heater standby readiness power water tempe rat ure available.
Diesel Generator No. 1= 1EG1 Diesel Generator No. 2= IEG2 Amendment 10
GIEESSAE TAELE 9.5-5 FAILUEE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESEL GENERATOI< STARTING SYSTEM FOR 1EG1 Method of Failure Cause of Effects on Failure Effect on Failure subsvet ers Detection Systeg__
Itee Descrirt ion Function _tode Air lines Transpor ts No flow Blockage, No start Low air receiver None: Second air c rac ks , pressure subsystem or corros ion 1EG2 is dya '. la b le .
Delivers air No flow Blocka ge No start Low air receiver None: 1EG2 is Manifold pres s ure available.
Refill air No air being Loss of No refilling of Air compressor None: All Compressor receivers are receiver supplied power air receiver f ailure to start automatically available. 1EG2 10 signal, low air is available.
air receiver pressure Air receive r Stores air Loss of air Leaks, No starting Low air rece.iver None: second for five rupt ure s air press ur e air receiver is starts available. 1EG2 is available.
1EG1 = Diesel Generator 1 IEG2 = Diesel Generator 2 Amendnent 10
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GIBESSAR TAELE 9.5-9 FAILURE MODE A!.T) EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESEL GENERATCR LUBRICATION SYSTEM Method of Failure Cause of Ef fect on Item Cescription Function Mode Failure Method of Failute QetectioD _ System Diesel 1EGt Pumps lube Pump f ailure Mechanical Low oil pressure None:
engine-driven oil Auxiliary pump pump (mot or-d riven) and 1EG2 are available Transfer lines Transports 1. No flow 1. Bloc'tage 1. Low oil pressure None: 1EG2 and valves lube oil is available.
- 2. Leakage 2. Cracks or 2. Low oil pressure corrosion 10 Lube oil cooler Cools oit 1. icaks oil 1. Cracks or 1. Low oil pressure None: 1EG2 or water corrosion is available.
- 2. No heat 2. Blockage 2. High oil temperature transfer Filter /lleater Cleans and 1. Fails to 1. Loss of 1. Low oil temperature None: 1EG2 warrs oil beat power is available.
- 2. Fails to 2. Clogs 2. High or low oil clean pressure Strainer Cleans oil Clogged Particalate High pressure drop None: IEG2 element matte r in oil drop across strainer is available.
1EG1 = Diesel Generator 1 1EG2 = Diesel Generator 2 I
l Amendrent 10 l
I I
I i
GIBBSSAR TABLE 9.5-10 (Sheet 1 of 2)
DIESEL GENEFATCP EQUIPMENT QUALITY CLASSIFICATICN GIDBSSAR ANSI Sa f et y Applicable Code Seismic Quality Feference System and Comportent Class Code Class Category Aqsura nce Section F e ma rks Diesel generator set Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9.5.4 Diesel fuel storage tank 3 ASME III 3 I Note 4 9.5.4 Diesel generator f uel oil Day tank 3 ASME III 3 I Note 4 9.5.4 Diesel fuel oil transfer pump 3 Mfra Stds Note 2 I tbte 4 9.5.4 Diesel generator f uel oil transfer strainer 3 ASME III 3 I Note 4 9.5.4 Diesel generator fuel booster pump 3 Mfra Stdn Note 2 I Note 4 9.5.4 Integral with diesel generator 10 Diesel generator engine driven fuel pump Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9.5.4 Integral with diesel generator Diesel fuel filter Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9.5.4 Integral with diesel ger.erator Jacket water heat exchanger 3 ASMZ III 3 I Note 4 9.5.5 Motor driven auxiliary jacket water pump 3 ASME II] 3 I Note 4 9.5.5 Engine driven jacket water pump Note 1 IEEE 387 - I Note 4 9.5.5 Diesel generator startup air rece iver 3 ASME II] 3 I Note 4 9.5.6 Diesel generator rtartup air ccmpressor Note 1 Mf rs Stcls -
I Note 4 9.5.6 Amendment 10
GI B ESS AP TABLE 9.5-10 (Sheet 2 of 2)
DIESEL GENERATCP ECUIPMENT QUALITY CLASSIFICATICN GIBBSSAR ANSI Sa f ety Applicable Code Seisnic Quality Feference Code Class Category Assurance Section Re ma r ks System and Component Class Diesel generator startup air dryers and af tercooler Nate 1 Mfrs Stds -
I Note 4 S.5.6 Motor driven auxiliary lute oil purp 3 Mfrs Stds Note : I Note 4 9.5.7 Engir.e driven lube oil pump Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9.5.7 Lube oil strainer 3 ASME III 3 I Note 4 9.5.7 3 ASME III 3 I Note 4 9.5.7 10 Lube oil cooler Intake air filters Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9.5.8 and silencers Exhaust silencer Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9.5.8 Piping and valves on the engine Note 1 IEEE 387 -
I Note 4 9. 5. 4 -9 . 5. 7 Piping and valves off the engine 3 ASME III 3 I Note 4 9.5.4-9.5.7 NNS ANSI B31.1 -
Note 3 Note 5 9.5.4-9.5.7 Note s
- 1. This equipment is not included in the scope of ANSI N18.2, but is covered by IEEE 387.
- 2. This equipment is not commercially available as ASME PSPV Code,Section III, Class 3; however the equipment is constructed to quality standards equivalent to ANSI Safety Class 3.
- 3. Seismically qualified by analysis.
- 4. Meets quelity assurance requirements of 10 CFR Part 53, Appendix B.
S. Meets certain portions of the quality assurance criteria set f ort h in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
Amendrent 10
- 9 e
GIBFSSAP T AELE 9.5- 11 (Sheet 1 of 2)
FAILUPE MCDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESEL GENERATOR 1EG1 (COMBUSTION AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM)
Method of Failure Cause of Effects on Failure Effect on Item Descript ion Eunction Mode Failure __ subsvgiggs Qetecti2D _EYstem__
Intake air Pipe air a. Pupture Crack, Loss of High exhaust gas None: IEG2 pipes and to the corrosion outdoor t empe ra ture available flexible hose engine intake air
- b. Low flow Bloc ka ge loss of High exhaust gas None: 1EG2 adequate terpe ra tu re available air Intake air Cleans in- Fails to Elockage Loss of High exhaust gas None: 1EG2 10 filter take air clean adequate t empera tu re availatle clean in-take air Air intake Reduce in- a. Pupture Crack, Loss of Excessive None: 1EG2 silercer take air corrosion outdoor intake air; noise available sound level excessive noise
- b. Low flow Blockage Loss of High exhaust None: 1EG2 adeq uate gas temperature available intake air Turbocharger Provide No air being Loss of No flow Stopping None: 1EG2 combustion supplied compre s sor of engine, available air or turbine high exhaust gas temperature Turbocharger Cools in- Leaks Cracks or loss of Loss of None: 1EG2 air take air corrosion adequately- engine available cooler cooled air output l
l Amendment 10
GIEPSSAR T ABLE 9. 5- 11 (Sheet 2 of 2)
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESEL GENERATCR 1EG1 (COMBUSTICN AIP INTAKE AND EXHAUSI SY STEM)
Method of Failure Cause of Ef f ects on Failure Effeet c r.
Item DescIlptioD fEDet19D _ Mode Failure subsyst ems Detection syftgE__
Crack, Exhaust Excessive None: 1FG; Exhaurt gas Pipe ex- a. P upture pipes and haust gas corrosion gas inside noise available flexible hose to the out- the Engine connection side of plant Poom
- b. low flow Elockage Canno t Excessive Norie : IFJ2 transport noise, loss availatic 10 exhaust gas of engine adequat ely output Ped uce a. Pupture Crack, Excessive Excessive None : IFG2 Muffler exhaust corrosion noi se noise a va i la ble air sound level
- b. Low flow Bloc ka ge Canno t Stopping None: 1EG2 transport of engine a vai la t'le e xhaust gas adequately 1EG1 = Diesel Generator 1 IEG2 = Diesel Generator 2 Amendnent 10
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GIBBSSAP TABLE 9.5-12 DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR EMEPGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TO BE PPCVIDED IN THE UTILITY APPIICANT'S SAP Fuel Cil Transfer Pumps Capacity Depend on the diesel 7DH Generator flow rate per Fotor Size Cylinder as specified by manufacturer Jacket Water System Heat Exchanger 10 Shell Side:
Flow Manufacturer dependent 7emperature in Site dependent Temperature out Manufacturer dependent Tute side:
Flow Temperature in Manufacturer dependent 7emperature out Materials of Construction Dependent on water quality at a particular site Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 10.1-1 MAJOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTICN - 3817MWt l 10 (Westinghouse -414)
Steam Generator Steam flow rate (total 4 steam generators) 16.86 x 106 lb/hr Feedwater inlet temperature 436 F Steam outlet temperature 556.3 F 10 Steam outlet pressure 1100 psia steam Quality 99.75 percent 6
Turbine Generator (Westinghouse)
Steam flow rate to turbine generator 15.27 x 106 lb/hr Throttle inlet pressure 1075 psia lo Throttle enthalpy 1187.5 Btu /lb Guaranteed output expected 1,334,512 kW rower factor .90 Hydrogen pressure 75 psig Turbine Generator (Allis-Chalmers)
Steam-to-turbine generator 15.18 x 106 lb/hr Throttle inlet pressure 1075 psia 10 Throttle enthalpy 1187.5 Btu /lb Guaranteed output 1,312,087 kW Power factor 0.90 Hydrogen pressure 60 psig Turbine Generator (General Electric)
- Steam-to-turbine generator 15.20 x 106 lb/hr Throttle inlet pressure 1075 psia Throttle enthalpy 1187.5 Btu /lb Guaranteed output 1,330,802 kW 10 Power factor .90 Hydrogen pressure 75 psig
- Based on 3800 MWt Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 1 5
10.2.3.6 In-Service Inspections To detect disc flaws leading to brittle failure at the design speed, the following periodic inspections and tests are 10 performed:
- a. Once each month
- 1) Overspeed trip - oil trip test
- 2) Low-vacuum trip
- 3) Low-bearing oil pressure trip
- 4) Electrical overspeed trip
- 5) Thrust bearing trip
- 6) Low electrohydraulic fluid trip
- 7) Extraction nonreturn valves 10.2-17 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 1 E. Once every six months l 10
- 1) Overspeed emergency trip by overspeeding the unit
- 2) Femote trip
- 3) Initial pressure regulator
- 4) Auxiliary governor (overspeed protection controller)
- c. Once each startup l 10
- 1) Check the overspeed protection controller.
A small percentage of the fuel elements may exhibit small pinholes or cracks over the lifetime of the station allowing the diffusion of radioactive fission products from the fuel into the reactor coolant.
- 2) Visually check to be sure governor and intercept valves close.
- d. Main steam stop and control valves, reheat stop valves r O and reheat intercept valves will be exercised at least once a week by closing each valve and observing by the valve position indicator that it moves smoothly to the fully closed position. At least once a month, this examination will be made by direct obse rva tion of the valve motion.
- e. At approximately 3-1/3 year intervals, during refueling or maintenance shutdowns, coinciding with the inservice inspection schedule required by Section XI of the ASME Code for reactor components, at least one main steam 10 stop valve, one main steam control valve, one reheat stop valve and one reheat intercept valve will be dismantled and visual and surface examinations will be conducted of valve seats, disks and stems. If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion are found in a valve, all other valves of that type will be dismantled and inspected. Valve bushings will be inspected and cleaned and bare diameters will be checked for proper clearance.
- f. Disassembly and complete inspection of normally inaccessible parts of the turbine at approximately
- 10. 2- 18 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10 year intervals during plant shutdown coinciding with inservice inspection as required by ASME ESPV Code,Section XI.
- g. An in-place visual examination of the turbine assembly lo at accessible locations is conducted during refueling shutdowns at intervals not exceeding three years.
- h. For further recommendations, see the applicable turbine vendor engineering reports.
10.2.4 Evaluation The turbine generator and its related stean-handling system are designed in accordance with the latest codes and standards, and erected in a manner to eliminate leakage at all joints.
The aussibility exists that activity in the secondary side of the stean generator can occur. This activity would be a function of the tube leakage from the primary side of the steam generator.
The reactor coolant circulates from the reactor core, where it removes heat from the fuel elements, to the steam generators, and back to the core. In the steam generators, heat from the pressurized reactor coolant is transferred across metal tube walls to the secondary coolant to generate steam. The steam passes through the turbine, is condensed, and returns to the stean generators.
A small percentage of the fuel elements may exhibit small pinhcles or cracks over the lifetime of the station allowing the diffusion of radioactive fission products from the fuel into the reactor coolant. This is discussed in the NSSS SSAF Section 11.1. The reactor coolant is continuously purified in a side stream which passes through filters and demineralizers in the CVCS. The filters and demineralizers remove a large portion of the iodine, other fission products, and radioactive corrosion prod uc ts.
10.2-18a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP 1 A steam generator tube leak is the only condition that could resu?.t in fission products entering the secondary coolant system.
If a leak develops, some radioactive reactor coolant is transferred to the secondary system. In addition to the steam generator leak rate, the secondary coolant system activity is af fected by moisture carryover, blowdown rates, and partition factors in the steam generator and condenser.
The activity in the reactor coolant is a function of several factors, such as, fuel defect level, system volumes, purification flow rates, and CVCS renoval factors.
Once a determination of these variables is made, the secondary side activity is calculable as a function of this leak rate. The stean generator blowdown processing system (described in subsection 10.4.8) and condensate cleanup system (described in subsection 10.4.6) both limit the activity of the steam generator secondary side water. Table 11.1-5 lists the expected secondary coolant (steam generator) equilibrium fission and corrosion prod uct activities.
The activity concentrations in the area of the turbine generator ggg are determined to be low enough to classify the area as Zone I, as defined in section 12.3. No shielding or controlled access are required.
Further discussion of releases to the Turbine Building and to the environment is given in Sections 11.2 and 11.3.
10.2-19 Amendment 1
GIBBSSAR 1 10.3.3.4 Main Steam Stop Valve Bypass Valves l 10 The main steam stop valve s are provided with 4-inch typass valves, which are normally closed and are designed to fail closed. Open typass valves would tend to negate the protection provided by the main steam isolation valves. Therefore, the valves close within 10 seconds of receipt of a closure signal using the same closing logic that exists for the main steam isolation valves.
10.3.3.5 Flow Pestrictors A flow restrictor is installed in each steam generator, primarily to limit the steam flow in the event of a main steamline break.
It also provides a portion of the pressure differential used for flow measurement.
10.3.3.6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Lines are provided upstream of the isolation valve (see Figure 10.3-1) in the steam outlet lines from the steam generators 3 and 4 to supply steam to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. These lines assure an adequate source of steam to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump when steam generators are isolated and are producing steam from reactor decay heat.
10 Each line is provided with an automatically operated isolation valve of Safety Class 2 design at its junction with the main steam line. The remainder of the line is constructed to safety Cla3s 3 req uirements. The isolation valves are automatically closed on a loss of pressure signal caused by steam blowdown through a postulated line break.
10.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Before placing the system into service, all foreign material and oxides are removed from the piping. During cleaning, entry of any fluid into the steam generators is prevented. The main steam lines are hydrostatically tested to confirm leaktightness. The testing of Safety Class 2 components conforms to the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, Arcticle NC-6000. l 10 10.3-7 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10.4.1. 5 Instrumentation Application
- a. Hotwell Each condenser shell is provided with local and remote hotwell level and pressure indication. The remote indication is by means of indicators and alarms in the control room. The condensate level in the condenser hotwell is maintained within proper limits by automatic controls which provide for transfer of condensate to and from the condensate storage tank as needed to satisfy the requirements of the steam system. Condensate tenperature is reasured in the suction lines of the condensate pumps.
Analytical monitoring equipment is provided to detect leakage of circulating water into the condenser. The condenser hot well is also monitored continuously and automatically for cation cond uctivit y, High conductivity is alarmed in the control room.
The condensate cleanup system maintains feedwater within chemistry specifications during normal operation. See 10 section 10.4.6. The maximum allowable leak rate is a function of the site specific circulating water chemistry and resin selection of the condensate cleanup system. Alarm set points for conductivity monitoring will be determined by site specific circulating water chemistry.
- b. Exhaust Hood An exhaust hood spray syst:2m with water supplied by the condensate system is provided. Excessive tenpera ture in the turbine exhaust hood causes a thermostatically controlled spray valve to open, thereby preventing further increases in temperature. The valve closes again after all criteria for shutting off the spray have been net. A high condenser tackpressure alarm set at 7 in Hg. abs. is provided. The high backpressure turbine trip setting is approximately 14 in. Hg abs.
- c. Water Box Water box pressure and temperature neasurements are provc.c ad.
10.4-5 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- d. Radioactivity Fadiation monitoring equipment on the condenser vacuum pump discharge lines detects the presence of noncondensable radicactive gases in the syster and initiates an alarm.
Radiation monitoring equipment on the steam generator blowdown sampling lines (subsection 9. 3.2) serves as a backup for the condenser off gas detectors and provides the means for detereining the steam generator in which leakage is occurring.
O 10.4-Sa Arnendment 10
GIBBSSAR 10.4.2 Main Condenser Evacuation System 10.4.2.1 Design Bases The condenser evacuation system is designed to renove all non-condensibles and associated water vapor from the condenser.
The systen will establish and maintain required system vacuum and will provide for deaeration of condensate.
The system is designed for a venting capacity in accordance with the reccamendations of the Heat Exchange Institute, Standards for Steam Surface Condensers. (HEI) l6 10.4.2.2 System Description The condenser evacuation system consists of three 50-percent-capacity motor-driven mechanical vacuum punps as shown in Figure 10.4-5.
During startup, all three pumps can be operated to reduce the startup time. During pcuer operation, one or two pumps are 4
required, depending on the anount of condenser leakage.
The exhaust from the vacuum pumps are discharged to the controlled access area ventilation filtering units except duringll6 the hogging period.
10.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation The safety evaluation of this system is given in subsection 10.4.1.3, in conjunction with the evaluation of the condensers.
The condenser off-gas normally is discharged to the controlled access area ventilation filtering units. The radiation level in the gas is continuously monitored by the condenser vacuum pumps 4
nonitor, and indication is given in the control room.
Radioactive elements present in the secondary systen, which can ultinately reach the condenser off gas, can also te detected by the stean generator liquid sample monitor (section 11. 5) .
The presence of radiation above the set point is annunciated by a single window category alarm on the nain control board, and 10.4-6 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR 10.4.4.4 Tests and Inspections The steam dump system meets the requirements of ANSI B16.10, face-to-face and end-to-end dimensions of ferrous valves, 1973 edition. During uni t operation each dump valve is periodically tested. The isolation valve are closed, and the dump valves are checked for performance and timing with remote operation. Similarly each isolation valve is tested with local operation. The dump valves are also operated during initial startup and during shutdown.
The steam dump lines are hydrostatically tested to confirm leaktightness. Visual inspection of pipe weld joints confirms the exterior condition of the weld.
10.4.4.5 Instrumentation Applications Indicating lights are provided in the control room for each danp valve to indicate when the valve is fully closed and fully ope n .
The low-low average temperature interlock for steam dump block isthe only safety-related instrumentation in this system, and it is in accordance with IEEE 279-1971.
Deta iled descriptions of the steam dump instrumentation and controls are provided in the NSSS SSAR, section 7.7.
10.4.5 circulating Water System 10.4.5.1 Design Bases The circulating water system provides cooling water for the main cond en se r. It is designed to remove approximately 9 x 109 Btu /hr of cycle heat.
This system is not safety-related and is classified nonnuclear safety.
The source of the cooling water is given in the Utility-Applicants SAR.
10.4.5.2 System Description The Circulating Water system description is given in the Utility-Applicants SAR.
10.4-11 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR
- 10. 4. 5. 3 Sa f ety Evaluation The safety evaluation of the circulating water system is given in the Utility-Applicants SAR.
Failure in the expansion joint at the main condenser interf ace (full CWS flow) does not cause failure of safety-related equipment due to flooding, as no such equipment is installed in the turbine building, and there is no direct access to thei auxiliary building from the turbine building. In leakage froml10 the common wall crack is considered negligible because of the thickness of the wall and the short duration of flood (the spillage will flow outside through dooru and opening in the turbine building).
10.4.5.4 Tests and Inspection The tests and inspection requirements are given in the Utility-Applicants SAR.
10.4.5.5 Instrumentation Application The description of the instrumentation and controls is given in O the Utility-Applicants SAR.
10.4.6 Condensate Cleanup System The condensate cleanup system is designed to treat 100 percent of the normal full load condensate flow. The condensate cleanup system utilizes a filter-demineralizer type design with vessels f abricated in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII. The filter-demineralizer vessels employ vert ical filter elements on which nonregenerated powdered ion exchange resin is coated which simultaneously filters and domineralizes the condensate to secondary side water chemistry requirements. Six filt er-demineralizer. units are provided. Five vessels are on-line; the sixth, freshly precoated, will remain in 6 the standby condition until such time that one of the five on-line vessels goes offstream. The conden sa te cleanup system accomplishes two main functions by filtration and demineralization of condensate:
- a. Peduce feedwater crud (iron, copper and other insoluable metallic oxides) picked up from the condenser, feedwater heaters 16 and steam generators.
10.4-12 Ame ndment 10
GIBBSSAR low pressure feedwater heaters between the discharg- of the condensate booster pumps and the suction of the feed pumps. This bypass is sized to reduce t he frictional resistance of the condensate system to allow the condensate pumps and booster pumps to run out on their characteristic curves while maintaining a satisfactory net positive suction head at the feed pumps.
- b. Steam Supply System Steam to drive the feedwater pump turbines is supplied from the main steam header at low loads. Reheated crossover steam taken between the high pressure and low pressure turbines drives these turbines during normal operation.
- c. Feedwater Heaters Feedwater heaters heated by the extraction steam from the turbine are used for regenerative feedwater heating in connection with a 1379-MW maximum-guaranteed turbine generator unit which operates at 1015 psia, 0.47-percent moisture inlet to 3 inches Hg absolute exha ust.
gll The feedwater heaters are arranged as shown in figures 10.4-1 and 10.3-2.
Eypass piping and block valves are provided around feedwater heaters to take them out of service for maintenance.
- d. Feedwater Control Valves l10 Feedwater flow is controlled automatically above 15 percent load by a three-element controller using steam generator water level, steam flow, and feedwater flow to control the main feedwater control valve to each steam generator. This valve also acts as a 10 back-up for the feedwater stop valve in the event of a containment isolation or feedwater line break. This valve is a nuclear safety class 3 valve and is designed to fail closed.
The feedwater control valve and the feedwater bypass control valve will have a stroke time of 20 seconds ope ning or closing 10 over the range of 0-1900 psig under normal feedwater control.16 These valves will close in five seconds forl10 emergency conditions excluding the signal generation and16 transmission time. As discussed in PESAR-414, Section 7.3.1.1.6 and RESAR-414, Figures 7.2-1 and 7.3-2r the feedwater control 10 W-414 10.4-15 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
valves and bypass control valves will receive signals to close from the feedwater isolation signal. 10
- e. Chemical Additives Hydrazine and an amine are used for oxygen scavenging and pH control, respectively. The chemicals are metered into the condensate downstream of the condensate polishing system and into the feedwater downstream of the auxiliary feedwater connection into each steam generator's feedwater line.
6 O
K-414 10.4-15a Amendment 10
GIPBSSAR The two notor driven and one turbine driven punp are arranged as shcwr. on Figure 10.4-3. Runout protection in the event of a drop y in the stean generator pressure is provided by flow orifices located in the discharge lines of the motor-driven punps and the turbine-driven purp. The individual auxiliary feed lines to each stean generator are provided with a nornally open, pneunatically operated feed regulator valve, designed to fail open, with a nonreturn valve downstrean, and locally operated nanual isolation valve upstream and downstrean. Remote manual control of the feed regulator is provided from the control roon, with provision for local manual operation. Air accumulators are provided for the pneunatically operated valves. They have sufficient capacity to permit renote valve closur*. for isolation of a secondary systen treak where local valve operation cannot be accenplished within the required tine period following the incident. The valves are located near the auxiliary feed punps to allow 1ccal manual operation in the event of a control rcon eva cua tion. The nonreturn valve prevents backflow in the event of a pipe treak on the penp side of the valve.
T he flow orifices installed in the discharge lines of the auxiliary feedwater punps provide a neans of limiting the quantity of water spilled in the event of a feedwater line break.
They also limit the auxiliary feedwater flow delivered to a faulted steam generator following a nain steam line treak inside containment prior to nanual isolation of the break by the operator. The naximun pernissible flow to a single stean generator is based on the containment pressurt < -its established by the containnent pressure analysis for a nait. . team line treak inside containnent.-
The two auxiliary feed lines to each steam generator (one from a notor-driven form punp and one from the turbine-driven pung) join to one line.
the auxiliary feedA check flow neter is located in this line as close to valves as possible to mininize the length of piping between the flow neter and the check valve where a treak would result in no flow indication. Fenote indication of flow neasurenent is provided in the control the rocn and at the hot-shutdown panel.
To avoid the possibility of a single failure auxiliary feedwater flow to a stean generator, no stopping valves are all located in this common line. The single auxiliary feedline joins the safety class section of the main feedwater line downstrean of 10.4-29 Anendnent 1
GIBBSSAR the last nain feedwater valve. Because the auxiliary feedwater systen is required to operate following an accident, all valves and instrumentation are located outside the containnent building.
The turbine steam inlet valve is a fail open air-operated type with a de pilot solenoid. The solenoid is supplied from a station 125-Vdc bus. 7he turbine speed control governor is nonelectric except for the renote speed-setting signal. The loss of the renote speed-setting signal results in the turbine running 6 at the high setting of the speed-setting range. The power supply for turbine speed-setting and for flow-contrcl manual stations is from the station inverters, which are supplied from the safety-related 125-Vdc batteries. An elecrical failure node analysis is shown in 'fatle 10.4-2 and Figure 10.4-4.
L. Punps The two electric-motor-driven, horizontal, centrifugal pumps are of identicJm design. Each punp is capable of delivering thel1 nininun r,' quired flow into two steam generators against a tackpressure equivalent to the accumulation pressure of the 10 lowest set safety valve plus systen frictional losses and static head.
A turbine-driven, horizontal, centrifugal pump is also provided with a rated capacity of approximately twice that of each notor 1 driven pump. The tine within which the pump delivers 1!s rated flow and the backpressure against which this rated ficw nust be discharged are as described previously for the motor-driven pumps. The system requirements of the auxiliary Feedwater systen y are given in Table 10.4-3.
10.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation 7he auxiliary feedwater system is designed to Safety Class 2 and 3 requirenents. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the moto r-dri ven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps start.
The cperator can then nanually stop the notcr-driven punps and keep the turbine-driven punp operating; this reduces the diesel 6 generator load. The turbine driven punp does not have any auxiliaries requiring electrical power. For redundancy, stean for the driver is supplied from two stean generators; supply fron one line neets the turbine driver requirements. The loss of stean supply to the turbine coincident with a single active failure of either motor driven punp will nct prevent the systen 10 from delivering the ninimum required flow into two stean generators.
10.4-30 Anendnent 10
GIBBSSAR Stean blowdown caused by line to the turbine driven a postulated break in a steam supply auxiliary feedwater punp will be stopped by autcmatic fast closure of the steam supply isolation 10 valves on a loss of pressure signal.
In the event of a feedwater line treak inside the containnent, the larger-than-noraal flow is detected by the flow-reasuring
- 10. 4-3 0a Amendnent 10
GIBBSSAR device in the common auxiliary feedwater line to the faulted to loop. Either the capacity of the turbine-driven pump or the capa city of the unaffected motor-driven pump is sufficient to deliver the minimum flow to two ef fective steam generators during l io this event (where all the flow of one motor-driven pump and part of the flow from the turbine-driven pump are lost until the break can be isolated). Flow limiting orifices are used to limit thel10 flow spilled from the break.
Sufficient redundancy is provided throughout the auxiliary feedwater system and supporting systems to ensure safe plant shutdown. This system supplies the required flow to a minimum of two steam generators, while subjected to a single active failure in the short te rm , (less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) or a single active or passive failure in the long term during period s when the main feed system is out of operation due to loss of electric power 6
(NSSS SSAF Section 3.1) . This flow is sufficient to enable the plant to be taken to and maintained in a safe condition under any accident situation. One motor-driven pump is capable of providing the required flow.
The auxiliary feedwater system is capable of withstanding adverse environmental conditions. It is designed to seismic Category I requirements. The system is located within tornado-resisting structures, and is protected from tornado-generated missiles.
The auxiliary feedwater storage tank is located within the auxiliary building, and is designed to withstand tornado and missile penetration. Adequate protection against corrosion is ensured by fabricating the tank from a corrosion-resistant material, such as coated carbon steel. The auxiliary feedwater pumps are located in an enclosed bay of the auxiliary building at 1
a floor elevation of 94 feet, 6 inches. It is not anticipated that any radioactive material is present in the system. All redundant components, including pumps, are physically separated from each other by a proper arrangement of concrete barriers.
These barriers are designed to preclude coincident damage to redundant equipment in the event of a postulated pipe rupture, equipment failure, or missile generatioh. Pedundant motor-driven pumps are supplied from the physically and electrically independent safety-related buses, which can be supplied by the diesel generators.
Power and control cables for redundant pumps are separated in accordance with the criteria described in Section 8.3. Each pump is situated in a separate compartment and is protected from other component failures by walls constructed to seismic Category I requirements.
10.4-31 Amendment 10
GIBB3SAR Flooding may occur from a pipe break in the auxiliary feedwater pump discharge; therefore, separate compartment design and drainage is provided to prevent flooding of adjacent equipment.
10.4-31a Amendment 6
TAELE 10.4-2 FAIL'JEF :1CDE ANALYSIS (ELECTFICAL)-AUXILI AFY FEEDWATFF SYSTEM PPEAK IN FEECWATEF PIPE TO STEAM GENEFATCP NC.4* INSIDE CONTAINMENT AND SINGLE EL ECTFICAL FAILUPE (She(t 1 of 3) y fail EC [fliSEiEll2D EUDEliOD Egilure Mgde EffegLgf_Eailmg anglni.g 1 Diesel gen. A Provides stand-by Diesel gen. A a. AFW pump (1) Meets single failure (active failure) Power to AFW fails to start inoperative criteria purp motor (1) b. Steam gen 1 and a. Steam gen 1 and 2 4 will not te s upplied s upplied frca ( 3) 10 ty pump (1) b. Steam gen. 2 and 3 supplied from (2) l 1 and (3) I
- c. valves (6),(7) l lo close f rom contrcl room 1
2 Diesel gen E Provides stand-by Diesel gen. B a. AFW pump (2) Meets single failure (active f ailure) Power to AFW fails to start inoperative c rit eria pump motor (2) t. Steam gen 2 and a. Steam gen 1 10 3 will not supplied from (1) te supplied and (3) 1 ty pump (2) b. Steam gen. 2 and 3 1 10 supplied fror (3) I 1
- c. valves ( 6) and l 10 (7) close from I control room 1
W-414 Arendment 10
7ABLF 13.4-2 FAILUPE MCDE ANALYSIS (ELECTF ICAL) - AUXILI AFY FEEDWATEF SY STEM FPEAK IN FEEDWATEP PIPE 70 STEAM GENEFATCE SC.4* II; SIDE CCNT AINME!n AND SI!;Gl.E ELECTFICAL FAILUFE (cheet 2 of 3) 1 EdilPIf DCECI1E119D F un c+ i on [dilgIe Mod! [11ect of Failure Analyf i g 3 Pattery A System a. Provides control Pattery A a. AFW Pump (1) Meets single failure (pa ssive f a ilure) power to pump System lost inopera t ive criteria (1) motor t. Stear gen 1 and a. Steam gen. 1 l 10
- b. Provides centrol 4 will not te supplied from (3) l
- b. S te am ge n . 2 and 3 1 power to valves supplied by pump supplied frce (2) I 10 (6) , (7) , (8) , (9) ( 1)
- c. valves (6) ,(7) , and (3) I 1
(8) , (9) , f ail open c. Val vt s (6) and (7) will require manual action locally f or closing
- d. Throttling control on valve s (8), and (9) , 10 will not be available in control roor; will required ranual action locally 4 Pattery B System a. Provides control Battery B a. AFW Pump (2) Meets single failure y (passive f ailure) power to pump System lost inoperative criteria (2) motor t. steam gen 2 a. Steam gen. 1 1 10
- b. Provides control and 3 will not surplied frce (1) l 1 power to valves te supplied by and (3) 1 10
( 10) , ( 11) , (12) , rump ( 2) b. Steam gen. 2 and 3 i
( 13) c. valves (10), supplied fror (3)
- c. Provides control ( 11) , ( 12) , (13) power to in- fail open let valve (4) ,
speed setter (5) 1 Arendment u-414 lg
TABLE 13.4-2 FAILUF E MODE At3ALYSIS ( EL ECTF ICAL) - AUX 1LI AF Y F EEDWAT EF SYSTEM EFFAK IN FEEDKATEF PIPE 70 FTEAM GENEFATCE NC.4* INSIDE CCNTAINMENT ANC SINGLE ELECTFICAL FAILUFE 1
(Sheet 3 of 3)
EdilMIf "
S criLij9.D ESDF.ti2D Eailurg & d_e Fffect of_ Failure Analygis 4 (con ' t) d. Valve ( 4) fails c. valves (6), and (7) 10
- e. Signal from speed closed f rom cont rcl set ter ( 5) lost room
- d. Throttling control i 1 on val ve s ( 10) , ( 11) , (12) l 10 and (13) will nct te I available in control room; will require manual action locally
- e. Pump ( 3) will run at highest speed of speed setter range.
5 Train A cable See failures See failures See failure 3 Meets single failure Syst er (passive 1 and 3 1 and 3 criteria failure) See failure 3 6 Train B cable See failures See failures ree failure 4 Meets single failure System 2 and 4 2 and 4 crit eria See failure 4 1
- Analysis and results for breaks on lines to generator 1, 2 or 3 will te ident ica l k-414 Anendment 10
GIPESSAF TABLE 10.4-3 AUXILIAFY F EEEKAIEP SYSTEM FEQUIFEME2iTS 5 C~E LES Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Number 2 later later Fequired Flow; gpm 550 later later Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Purp Number 1 later later Fequired Flow; 9Fr 1100 later later Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank Capacity gallons 290,000 later later Time allowed to deliver required flow followina the initiation signal; sec. 60 later later 1
W-414 An endment l)
GIBBSSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-2 (SHEET 1 of 4) l10 LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM DESIGN EFFLUENT RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS (uCi/gm)
(We stinghouse-414) 2 Low Activity Waste Laundry & Hot Shower Waste Isotope Sample Tank Ef fluent Holdup ,& Monitor Tank Ef fluent Normal Peak Normal Peak Peak Capacity Capacity Ca pacity Capacity capacity (R.O. unit nonopera-tional)
Br-83 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Br-84 Neg Neg Neg Nag Neg Br-85 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg I-129 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg I-130 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg I-131 6. 0 (-6) 1. 2 (-5) 1.1 (-7) 5. 4 (-7) 1. 6 (- 5)
I-132 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg I-133 3. 2 (-8) 1. 7 (- 6) Neg I-134 Neg
- 2. 5 (-8) 7. 2 (-7)
Neg Neg Neg Neg I-135 Neg 6.1 (-9) Neg Neg Rb-86 Neg
- 1. 5 (-8) 1. 8 (-8 ) 1.1 (-9 ) 2. 3 (-9) 6. 6 (-8)
Rb-88 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Rb-89 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Cs-134 6. 0 (-6) 6. 0 (-6) 8. 3 (-7F Cs-136 8. 3 (-7) 2. 4 (- 5) 5.2 (-6) 1. 0 (-5) 3.1 (-7) 8. 5(-7) 2. 5 (- 5) 10 Cs-137 3. 3 (-6) 3. 3 (-6)
Cs-138
- 4. 5 (-7) 4. 5(-7) 1. 3 (- 5)
Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg H-3 1.8 (-1) 1. 8 (- 1 ) 3. 5 (-5 F Cr-51 3. 5 (-5) 3. 5 (- 5)
- 1. 5 (-9) 1. 7 (-9) 6. 6 (-9). 1.1 (-8) 3. 2 (-8)
Mn-54 Neg Neg Neg Neg Mn-56 Neg 2. 8 (- 8)
Neg Neg Neg Neg Fe-55 N. A. N.A. N. A . N. A . N. A .
Fe-59 Neg Neg -
Neg Neg Co-58 1. 0 (- 8) 1.1 (-9) 1. 2 (- 9 ) Neg Neg 2. 3 (- 8)
Co-60 Neg Neg Neg Neg Sr-89 1. 0 (-8)
- 1. 7 (-9) 1. 8 (-9) Neg 1. 2 (-9) 3. 4 (- 8)
Sr-90 Neg Neg Neg Neg Sr-91 Neg 1.1 (- 9)
Neg Neg Neg Neg Sr-9 2 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Y-90 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Y-91m Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Y-91 Neg Neg Neg Neg Y-92 Neg
- 4. 6 (- 9)
Neg Neg Neg Neg Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g TABLE 11.2-2 W (SHEET 2 of 4)
LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM DESIGN EFFLUENT RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS (uCi/gm)
(Westinghouse-414)
Low Activity Waste Laundry & Hot Shower Waste Isotope Sample Tank Ef fluent Holdup S Monitor Tank Effluent Normal Peak Normal Peak Peak capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity (R.O. unit nonopera-tional)
Y-93 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Zr-95 Neg Neg Neg Neg 5. 3 (-9)
Nb-95 Neg Neg Neg Neg 5. 0 (-9) 10 Mo-99 4.6 (-8) 1. 6 (-7 ) Neg 6. 7 (-8) 1. 9 (- 6)
Tc-99m Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Fu-103 Neg Neg Neg Neg 4. 6 (- 9)
Fu-106 Neg Neg Neg Neg 1. 3 (-9)
Eh-103m Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Eh-106 Ag-110m Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg
- 9. 3 (-9) g Te-125m Neg Neg Neg Neg 2. 4 (- 9)
Te-127m 1. 2 (-9) 1. 3 (-9) Neg Neg 2. 5 (- 8)
Te-127 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Te-129m 6.8 (-9) 7. 5 (-9 ) 3. 4 (-9) 5. 0 (-9) 1.4(-7)
Te-129 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Te-131m Neg 2. 3 (-9) Neg Neq 1. 5 (- 8)
Te-131 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Te-132 2. 6 (-8) 7. 2 (-8) Neg 3. 2 (- 8) 9.1 (-7)
Te-134 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Ba-137m Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Ba-140 1.2 (-9) 1. 5 (- 9 ) Neg Neg 2. 7 (- 8)
La-140 Neg Neg Neg Neg 1. 4 (- 9)
Ce-141 Neg Neg Neg Neg 5. 0 (-9)
Ce-143 Neg Neg Neg Neg Neg Ce-144 Neg Neg Neg Neg 3. 4 (-9)
Pr-143 Neg Neg Neg Neg 4.2 (-9)
Pr-144 Neg Neg Neg Neg 3. 4 (- 9)
NEG S 10-10 uCi/gm Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-2 (SHEET 3 of 4)
LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM DESIGN EFFLUENT RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS (uci/gm)
(Westinghouse-414)
High Activity Waste Recycle Tank Effluent Isotope frua decay)
Br-83 9. 3 (-7)
Br-84 4. 7 (-7)
Br-85 6. 0 (-8)
I-129 3. 9 (- 12)
I-130 1. 4 (-7)
I-131 2. 4 (-4)
I-132 2. 8 (-4)
I-133 3. 8 (-4)
I-134 5. 7 (- 5)
I-135 2.1 (- 4)
Rb-86 4. 0 (-7)
Rb-88 2. 4 (-4) 10 Rb-89 1.1 (-5)
Cs-134 1. 2 (- 4)
Cs-136 1. 6 (-4)
Cs-137 6. 5 (- 5)
Cs-138 4. 9 (-5)
H-3 3.5(0)
Cr-51 3. 6 (-8)
Mn-54 2. 8 (-9)
Mn-56 9. 8 (-8)
Fe-55 N. A .
Fe-59 1.1 (-8)
Co-58 2. 4 (- 8)
Co-60 1. 0 (-8)
Sr-89 3. 7 (-8)
Sr-90 1.1 (-9)
Sr-91 5. 8 (-8)
Sr-92 1. 2 (- 8)
Y-90 2. 9 (- 10)
Y-91m 3. 6 (-8)
Y-91 4. 9 (-9)
Y-92 1.1 (-8)
Y-93 3. 5 (-9)
Zr-95 5. 6 (-9)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g TABLE 11.2-2 W (SHEET 4 of 4)
LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM DESIGN EFFLUENT RELEASE CONCENTRATIONS (uCi/gm)
(We stinghouse-414)
High Activity Waste Recycle Tank Ef fluent Isotope (no decav)
Nb-95 5. 6 (-9)
Mo-99 6. 6 (-6)
Tc-99m 6. 0 (-6)
Fu-103 5. 0 (-9)
Fu-106 1.3 (-9) 10 Rh-103m 5. 0 (-9)
Rh-106 1. 3 (-9)
Ag-110m 9. 4 (-9)
Te-125m 2. 5 (-9)
Te-127m 2. 6 (- 8)
Te-127 1.1 (-7)
Te-129m 1. 6 (-7)
Te-129 1. 6 (-7)
Te-131m 2. 3 (-7) llh Te-131 1. 2 (-7)
Te-132 2. 6 (- 6)
Te-134 3.0 (-7)
Ba-137m 1. 2 (-5)
Ba-140 3. 6 (-8)
La-140 1. 2 (- 8)
Ce-141 5. 5 (-9)
Ce-143 4. 5 (-9)
Cc-144 3. 4 (-9)
Pr-143 5. 5 (- 9)
Pr-144 3. 4 (-9)
NEG 5, 10-10 uCi/gm Amendment 10
2 GIBBSSAR TABLE 11. 2-3 (SHEET 1 of 4) l 10 LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING COMPONENT ISOTOPIC IINENTORIES (Ci) C13 (Westinghouse-414)
High Activity !!igh Activity Low Activity 2 Waste Collection Waste Waste Isotope Tank Recycle Tank Collection Tank Br-83 1. 8 (0) 1. 8 (-5) 1. 8 (- 1)
Br-84 8.9 (- 1) 8. 9 (-6) 9.1 (-2)
Br-85 1.1 (- 1) 1.1 (-6) 1.1 (- 2)
I-129 7. 4 ( 7) 1. 4 (- 11) 7. 6 (- 8)
I-130 2. 6 (- 2) 2. 6 (- 6) 2. 7 (-3)
I-131 4. 5 (1) 4. 5 (-3) 4. 5 (0)
I-132 5.3 (1) 5. 3 (-3) 5. 3 (0)
I-133 7. 2 (1) 7. 2 (- 3) 6. 8 (0)
I-134 1.1 ( 1) 1.1 (-3) 1.1 (0)
I-135 4. 0 (1) 4. 0 (-3) 4. 2 (0)
Pb-86 1. 5 (- 1) 7. 5 (-6) 1. 5 (- 2)
Rb-88 9.1 ( 1) 4. 5 (-3) 9.1 (0)
Eb-89 4. 2 (0) 2.1 (-4) 4. 2 (- 1)
,- Cs-134 4. 5 (1) 2. 3 (-3) 4. 5 (0) g ' Cs-136 6.1 (1) 3. 0 (-3) 1.1 (1)
Cs-137 2. 5 (1) 1. 2 (-3) 2.5(0)
Cs-138 1. 8 (1) 9. 3 (-4) 1. 9 (0)
H-3 6. 6 (1) 6. 6 (1) 6. 8 (0) 10 Cr-51 6.8 (- 2) 6. 8 (-7) 6. 8 (- 3)
Mn-54 5. 3 (- 3) 5. 3 (-8) 5. 3 (-4)
Mn-56 1. 9 (- 1) 1. 9 (-6) 1. 9 (- 2)
Fe-55 N.A. N. A . N.A.
Fe-59 2.1 (-2) 2.1 (-7) 2.1 (- 3)
Co-58 4. 5 (-2) 4. 5 (-7) 4. 5 (-3)
Co-60 1. 9 (- 2) 1. 9 (-7) 1. 9 (- 3)
Sr-89 7. 0 (- 2) 7. 0 (-7) 7. 2 (- 3)
Sr-90 2.1 (-3) 2.1 (- 8) 2.1 (-4)
St-91 1.1 (- 1) 1.1 (-6) 1.1 (-2)
Sr-92 2. 3 (- 2) 2. 3 (-7) 2. 3 (- 3)
Y-90 5. 5 (- 4) 5. 5 (-9) 5. 7 (-5)
Y-91m 6. 8 (-2) 6. 8 (-7) 6. 8 (-3)
Y-91 9. 3 (- 3) 9. 3 (-8) 9. 5 (-4)
Y-92 2.1 (- 2) 2.1 (-7) 2.1 (-3)
Y-93 6. 6 (-3) 6. 6 (-8) 6. 8 (- 4) zr-95 1.1 (- 2) 1.1 (-7) 1.1 (- 3)
Nb-95 1.1 (-2) 1.1 (-7) 1.1 (- 3)
Mo-99 1. 2 ( 1) 1. 2 (-4) 1. 2 (0)
Tc-99m 1.1 (1) 1.1 (-4) 1.1 (0 )
Pu-103 9. 5 (-3) 9. 5 (-8) 9. 5 (- 4)
Amendment 10
GISBSSAR 2W&
TABLE 11.2-3 (SHEET 2 of 4) l 10 LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING COMPONENT ISOTCPIC INVENTORIES (Ci) (t)
(Westinghouse-414) 2 High Activity High Activity Low Activity Waste Collection Waste Waste Isotope Tank Recycle Tank Collection Tank Fu-106 2. 5 (-3) 2. 5 (-8) 2. 5 (-4)
Fh-103m 9. 5 (- 3) 9. 5 (-8) 9. 5 (- 4)
Fh-106 2. 5 (-3) 2. 5 (-8) 2. 5 (- 4)
Ag-110m 1. 8 (-2) 1. 8 (-7) 1. 8 (-3)
Te-125m 4. 7 (-3) 4. 7 (-8) 4. 9 (- 4)
Te-127m 4.9 (-2) 4. 9 (-7) 4. 9 (- 5)
Te-127 2.1 (- 1) 2.1 (-6) 2.1 (-2)
Te-129m 3.0 (-1) 3. 0 (-6) 3. 0 (-2)
Te-129 3. 0 (-1) 3. 0 (-6) 3. 0 (- 2)
Te-131m 4. 4 (- 1) 4. 4 (-6) 4. 5 (-2)
Te-131 2. 3 (-1) 2. 3 (-6) 2. 3 (- 2) 10 Te-132 4. 9 (0) 4. 9 (-5) 4. 9 (- 1)
Te-134 5.7 (-1) 5. 7 (-6) 5.7 (- 2)
Da-137m 2.3 (1) 2. 3 (-4) 2. 3 ( 0)
Ba-140 6. 8 (- 2) 6. 8 (-7) 6. 8 (- 3)
La-140 2. 3 (-2) 2. 3 (-7) 2. 3 (- 3)
Co-141 1. 0 (-2) 1. 0 (-7) 1.1 ( - 3)
Ce-143 8. 5 (-3) 8. 5 (-8) 8. 7 (- 4)
Ce-144 6. 4 (-3) 6. 4 (-8) 6. 4 (- 4)
Pr-143 1. 0 (-2) 1. 0 (-7) 1.1 (-3)
Pr-144 6. 4 (-3) 6. 4 (-8) 6. 4 (- 4)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-3 (Sheet 3 of 4)
LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING COMPONENT ISOTOPIC INVENTORIES (Ci)
(Westinghouse-u14).
Laundry & Hotc r >
Low Activity Laundry & Hot Shower Holdup Waste Sample Shower Waste and Monitor Isotope Tank Collection Tank Ta nk Br-83 8.9 (-7) 3. 5 (-5) 3. 5 (- 5)
Br-84 4. 5 (-7) 1. 8 (- 5) 1. 8 (- 5)
Br-85 5. 7 (-10) 2. 3 (-6) 2. 3 (-6)
I-129 Neg Neg Neg I- 130 1. 3 (-7) 5. 3 (-7) 5. 3 (-7)
I-125 2.3 (-4) 9.1 (-4) 9.1 (- 4)
I-132 2. 6 (-4) 1.1 (-3) 1.1 (- 3)
I-133 3. 4 (-4) 1. 4 (-3) 1. 4 (-3)
I-134 5. 5 (-5) 2. 2 (-4) 2. 2 (-4)
I-135 2.1 (- 4) 7. 9 (-4) 7. 9 (-4)
Rb-86 3.8 (-7) 3. 0 (-6) 3. 0 (- 6) 10 Rb-88 2. 3 (-4) 1. 8 (-3) 1. 8 (-3)
Rb-89 1. 0 (-5) 8. 3 (-5) 8. 3 (- 5)
Cs-134 1.1 (-4) 9.1 (-4) 9.1 (- 4)
Cs-136 1. 5 (-4) 1. 2 (-3) 1. 2 (-3)
Cs-137 6. 2 (-5) 4.9 (-4) 4. 9 (-4)
Cs-138 4.7 (-5) 3. 7 (-4) 3. 7 (- 4)
H-3 3. 4 (0) 1. 3 (-3) 1. 3 (-3)
Cr-51 3. 4 (-8) 1. 4 (-6) 1. 4 (- 6)
Mn-54 2. 6 (-9) 1.1 (-7) 1.1 (-7)
Mn-56 2.6 (-9) 3. 7 (-6) 3. 7 (-6 )
Fe-55 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Fe-59 9. 5 (-8) 4. 2 (-7) 4. 2 (-7)
Co-58 2. 3 (-8) 9.1 (-7) 9.1 (-7)
Co-60 9. 5 (-9) 3. 8 (-7) 3. 8 (-7)
Sr-89 3. 6 (-8) 1. 4 (-6) 1. 4 (-6)
Sr-90 1.1 (-9) 4. 2 (-8) 4. 2 (- 8)
Sr-91 5. 5 (- 8) 2. 2 (-6) 2. 2 (-6)
Sr-92 1.1 (-8) 4. 5 (-7) 4. 5 (-7)
Y-90 2. 8 (- 10) 1.1 (-8) 1.1 (- 8)
Y-91m 3.4 (-8) 1. 4 (-6) 1. 4 (- 6 )
Y-91 4.7 (-9) 1. 9 (-7) 1. 9 (-7)
Y-92 1.1 (- 8) 4.2 (-7) 4. 2 (-7)
Y-93 3.4 (-9) 1. 3 (-7) 1. 3 (-7)
Zr-95 5. 3 (-9) 2.1 (-7) 2.1 (-7)
N b-9 5 5. 3 (-9) 2.1 (-7) 2.1 (-7)
Mo-99 6.2 (-6) 2. 5 (-4) 2. 5 (- 4)
Tc-99m 5. 7 (-6) 2. 3 (-4) 2. 3 (-4)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-3 g
(Sheet 4 of 4)
LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING COMPONENT ISOTOPIC INVENTO.<IES (Ci)
(Westinghouse-414)
Laundry & Hot (r)
Low Activity Laundry & Hot Shower Holdup Waste Sample Shower Waste and Monitor Isotope Tank Collection Tank Tank Fu-103 4.7 (-9) 1. 9 (-7) 1. 9 (- 7)
Eu-106 1. 2 (- 9) 4. 9 (-8) 4. 9 (-8)
Fh-103m 4.7 (-9) 1. 9 (-7) 1. 9 (-7)
Ph-106 1.2 (-9) 4. 9 (-8) 4. 9 (- 8)
A g- 110 m 8. 9 (-9) 3. 6 (-7) 3. 6 (-7 )
Te-125m 2. 5 (-9) 9. 5 (-8) 9. 5 (- 8) 10 Te-127m 2. 5 (-8) 9. 8 (-7) 9. 8 (-7)
Te-127 1.1 (-7) 4. 2 (-6) 4. 2 (-6)
Te-129m 1.1 (-8) 6.1 (-6) 6.1 (-6)
Te-129 .5(-7) 6.1 (-6) 6.1 (- 6)
Te-131m 1.5(-7) 8. 7 (-6) 8. 7 (- 6)
Te-131 1.1 (-7) 4. 5 (-6) 4. 5 (-6)
Te-132 2. 5 (-6) 9. 8 (-5) 9. 8 (-5)
Te-134 2. 5 (-7) 1.1 ( -5) 1.1 (- 5) (l)
Ba-137m 1.1 (-5) 4. 5 (-4) 4. 5 (-4)
Ba-140 3. 4 (-8) 1. 4 (-6) 1. 4 (-6)
La-140 1.1 (-8) 4. 5 (-7) 4. 5 (-7)
Ce-141 5. 3 (-9) 2.1 (-7) 2,1 (-7 )
Ce-143 4.3 (-9) 1. 7 (-7) 1. 7 (- 7)
Ce-144 3. 2 (-9) 1. 3 (-7) 1. 3 (-7)
Pr-143 5.3 (-9) 2.1 (-7) 2.1 (-7)
Pr-144 3. 2 (-9) 1. 3 (-7) 1. 3 (-7)
(1) Zero decay credit 2
(2) No credit for R.O. processing 10 Amendment 10
2 GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 1 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety
[omponent DesiSD Clas_s_ Parameter Pumps
- 1. Feactor coolant drain mfgs. std. NNS 6 collection tank pumps Nunber 1 Type Canned Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm Pecirculation Mode 100 10 Process Mode 35 Design head, ft Pecirculation Mode 200 10 Process Mode 250 Material SS Amendment 10
G7 3BSSAR g
TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 2 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEFS Code Sa fe ty correnent DesiHD Class Parameter
- 2. High activity waste mfgs. std. NSS 10 collection pumps Nunter 1 Type Canned Design pressure, psig 150 De sign tenperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm Fecircul.' tion Mode 100 10 O
Frocess Mode 35 De sign head, ft Fecirculation Mode 200 10 Process Mode 250 Material SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR l2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 3 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEPS Code Safety component De sian parameter
_ Class _
- 3. High activity waste mfgs. std. NNS 6 recycle tank pump Nunter 1 Type Canned Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm Fecirculation Mode 100 10 Frocess Mode 35 Design head, ft Pecirculation Mode 200 10 Process Mode 250 Material SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 4 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEPS (Deleted) 0 2
Amendtnent 2
2 GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 5 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS (Deleted) 2 Arrendment 2
2 GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 6 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code safety COLnponent De sign Class Parameters 4 Laundry and hot shower mfgs. std. NNS 10 waste collection tank ;
pumps Nutrher 2 Type Centrifugal 2 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm l
g Pecirculation Mode 100 10 Process Mode 35 Design head, ft Fecirculation Mode 200 10 Frocess Mode 250 Material SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 7 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Compgnent DesigI) Class Parameters
- 5. Iow activity mfgM. std. NNS 6 waste collection tank pumps Munber 2 Type Centrifugal 2 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 De sign flow. gpm Fecirculation Mode 200 10 Frocess Mode 35 Design head, ft Fecirculation Mode 200 10 Process Mode 250 Material SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 8 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEFS Code Safety componen t; Design Class, Parameters
- 6. Low activity mfg. std. NNS 10 waste sample tank pumps Uurrter 2 Type Canned Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm g Recirculation Mode 100 10 Process Mode 35 Design head, ft Fecirculation Mode 200 10 Process Mode 250 Material SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 9 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Cgmponent Design Class Parameters
- 7. Laundry and hot shower holdup and monitor mfgs. std. NNS 6 tank pump Nurrter 1 Type Canned Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm Pecirculation Mode 100 Process Mode 10 35 De sign head, ft Pecirculation Mode 200 Frocess Mode 10 250 Material SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 10 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEFS Code Sa fe ty Component Design Class. Parameters Heat Exchangers Feactor coolant drain Tube side NNS 2 collection tank heat ASME VIII exchanger Shell side 2 ASME III Code Class 2 Nunter 1 Type U-tube g Est. UA, Btu /hr -F 70,000 Design pressure,(1 ) psig shell 150 tube 250 Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 11 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Comgoner.1 Design Class Parameter _s Lesign temperature, F shell 250 tube 250 Design flow, lb/hr shell 112,000 tube 44,600 Tenperature in, F shell 105 tube 180 Tenperature out, F shell 125 tube 130 Material shell CS tube SS (1) External design pressure - 60 psig Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR 2 g
TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 12 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEPS code Safety EgEponent _De_ s ign Class Parameteg Tanks
- 1. Feactor coolant ASME VIII NNS 2
drain collection tank Nutrher 1 Usable volume, gal 350 Type Horiz.
Design pressure, psig (1) 100 Design temperature, F 250 Material SS Diaphragm No Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 12a of 29) 2 EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Component
_ Design class Parameter
- 2. High activity API 620 NNS 6 waste collecton tanks Nutrte r 2 Usable volume, gal 5,000 (each)
Type Vert.
Design pressure Atmos.
Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm No (1) External design pressure - 60 psig Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR O
TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 13 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Com_ponent Design Class Parameter
- 3. High activity ASME VIII NNS 2 waste recycle tank Nutrber 1 Usable volume, gal 5000 Type Vert.
Design pressure Atmos.
Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm Yes Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR l2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 14 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Component _De sign
_ Class Pararreter (2
- 4. Laundry and hot shower API 620 NNS 16 tanks Nurrber 2 Usable volume, gal 10,000 (each)
Type Vert.
Design pressure Atmos.
Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Di aphragm No Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 15 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Com_ponen t pesign Class _ Parameter 12 API 620 NNS l10
- 5. Low activity waste collection tanks l2 Nurrber 10 Usable volume, gal 10,000 (each)
Type Vert.
Design pressure Atmos.
Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm No
Type Vert.
Design pressure Atmos.
Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm No Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 16 of 29)
EQUIPMENT FRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety CoJm enent pesign Class Paramete r
- 7. Feverse osmosis API 620 NNS l6 concentrates tank Nurober 1 Usable volume, gal 1000 Type Vert.
Design pressure Atmos.
Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm No
- 8. Evaporator ASME VIII NNS reagent tanks l6 Nurrber 2 Usable volume, gal 5 (each)
Type Vert.
Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm No Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR !
g TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 17 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Component Design Class Parameter
- 9. Laundry and hot shower l2 holdup and monitor tanks API 620 NNS l10 Number 2 Usable volume, gal 5000 (each)
Type Vert.
Design Pressure, psig Atmos.
Design Temperature, F 200 Material SS Diaphragm No Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR l2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 18 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS (Deleted) 2 1
Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11. 2-5 (Sheet 19 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Component Design Class Parameter Demineralizers NNS l2
- 1. High activity waste ASME VIII recycle demineralizer l10 Nunter 1 Type Flushable Design pressure, psig 150 De sign temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 35 Pesin volume, ft3 30 Material SS Fesi:' type IPN-150(1)
Design process decon-tamination factor 10
- 2. Low activity waste ASME VIII NNS 2
sampie demineralizer Nunter 1 Type Flushable Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 35 2
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR l TABLE 11. 2-5 (Sheet 20 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEFS Code Safety Component Design Class Parameter Fesin volume, ft3 30 2
Material SS Pesin type IRN-150(1)
De sign process decon-tamination factor 10 (1) Fohm and Haas Amberlite or equivalent Filters
- 1. High activity ASME VIII NNS 6
waste filter Nurber 1 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, opm 35 P at design flow, psi 5 Size of particles, 98 percent ret., microns (nominal) 25 Surface radiation level, R/hr 100 Materials Housing SS Filter Element EICF*
Amendment 6
GIBBSSAF TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 21 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS (Deleted)
O 2
Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 22 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS (Deleted) 2 Amendment 2
GIBBSSAR O
TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 23 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEFS code Safety Component Design Class Parameter
- 2. Laundry and hot shower ASME VIII NNS waste filter [ lo Number 1 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 resign flow, gpm 35 P at design flow, psi 5 Size of particles, 98 percent ret., microns (nominal) 25 Surface radiation level, mR/hr <100 Materials Fousing SS Filter Elenient EICF*
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP l2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 24 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Compcnent pesign Cl a s s __ Parameter
- 3. Low activity waste filter ASME VIII NNS (6
Nunber 1 12 Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 De sign flow, gpm 35 P at design flow, psi 0. 5 Size of particles, 98 percent ret., microns (nominal) 25 Materials Housing SS Filter Element EICF*
- EICF = Epoxy Impregnate Celluose Fiber l 10 Amendment 10
GIBESSAR 2 TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 25 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS (Deleted)
O 2
Amendment 2
l2 GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 26 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Component Design Class _ Parameters Strainers
- 1. Laundry and hot shower ASME VIII NNS (6 waste collection tank strainer 2 Nunter 1 Type Basket Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 200 Design flow, gpm 35 P at design flow, psi 0.5 Nominal rating, inch 0.0625 Surface radiation level Neg.
Materials SS Amendment 6
GIBBSSAF TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 27 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETEFS code Safety Gmpgnent Design Class Parameters
- 2. Low activity waste ASME VIII NNS l10 collection tank strainers l2 Nuater 2 Type Basket Design pressure, psig 150 De sign temperature, F 200 g
resign flow, gpm 35 P at design flow, psi Neg.
Nominal rating, in 1/16 Surf ace radiation level Neg.
Materials SS Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 28 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PARAMETERS Code Safety Component Design Class Parameters Evaporators High activity 2 waste evaporator Process side ASME VIII NNS l10 Steam side ASME VIII NNS l6 Number 1 Steam design pressure, psig 50 Design flow, gpm 15 Feed conc., ppm boron 10 - 2500 Bottoms conc., ppm boron 7000 -
21,000 Shell material Inconel 625 l10 Tube material Titanium Low activity waste evaporator 2 Process side ASME VII NNS 6
Steam side ASME VIII NNS Amendment 10
l2 GIBBSSAR O
TABLE 11.2-5 (Sheet 29 of 29)
EQUIPMENT PRINCIPAL DESIGN PAPAMETEFS Code Safety Componen_t Design Class Parameters Number 1 Steam design pressure, psig 50 Design flow, gpm 15 Shell material Inconel 625 l10 Tube material Titanium l2 Laundry reverse osmosis ASME VIII NNS system l10 Number 1 De sign flow, gal / day 15,000 Percent rejection (solids) ,
ninimum 90 Percent recovery, minimum 97 2
Amendment 10
GIDPSSAP TADI E 11.2-6 (Eheet 1 of 2)
DESIGN LIQUID EFFLUENT PELEASFS (Ci /yr)
(WFSTINGHOUSE-414)
Pri mary Syst em( * )(5 )
LE21202 iWPS 19It1D2_E'3!1diDS_DIalDSi'l SGPPS ContI211td PeJease(3) Wa t er _ Ba la nce Total Br-83 neg 6.6 (-6) 6.6 (-6) 1. 6 (-4) 1. 7 (-4 )
Pr-84 neg 1. 8 (-6 ) 1. 8 (-6) 8. 0 (-5) 8. 4 (-5)
Er-85 neg 3. 3 (- 8) 3. 3 (-8) 1. 0 (-5) 1. 0 (- 5)
I-129 3.1 (- 10) 3. 4 (-11) 3.4 (-11) 6. 6 (- 10) 1. 0 (-9)
I-130 1. 2 (- 8) 1. 2 (-6) 1. 2 (- 6) 2. 4 (-5) 2. 6 (-5) 1-131 1.3(-2) 2.1 (-3) 2.1 (- 3) 4.1 (- 2) 5. 8 (-2) 10 I-132 neg 1. 8 (-3) 1. 8 (- 3) 4. 8 (-2) 5.2(-2) 1-133 3. 5 (-4) 3. 2 (-3) 3. 2 (- 3) 6. 5 (- 2) 7. 2 (-2)
I-134 neg 2. 6 (-4 ) 2. 6 (- 4) 9. 7 (-3) 1. 0 (-2)
I-135 5.6 (-7) 1. 7 (-3) 1.7 (- 3) 3. 6 ( -2) 3. 9 (- 2)
Rb-86 3. 7 (- 5) 7. 7 (-6 ) 7. 7 (-6) 6. 8 (-5) 1. 2 (-4)
Pb-88 neg 1. 2 (- 3 ) 1. 2 (- 3) 4.1 (- 2) 4. 3 (- 2)
Pb-89 neg 4. 9 (-5) 4. 9 (- 5) 1. 9 (-3) 2. 0 (-3)
Cs-134 1. 4 (-2) 2. 3 (-3) 2. 3 (- 3) 2. 0 (-2) 3. 9 (-2)
Cs-136 1. 3 (-2) 3.1 (-3) 3.1 (-3) 2. 7 (- 2) 4. 6 (-2)
Cs-137 1. 0 (- 2) 1.2(-3) 1. 2 (- 3) 1.1 (- 2) 2. 3 (-2 )
Cs-138 neq 3. 7 (- 4) 3. 7 (-4) 8. 3 (-3) 9. 0 (-3)
H-3 2. 7 ( 2) 6.1 (1) 6.1 ( 1) 6. 0 ( 2) 9. 9 (2)
Cr-51 1. 3 (-5) 3. 4 (-7) 3. 4 (-7) 6.1 (- 6) 2. 0 (-5)
Mn-5 4 5. 5 (-6) 2. 7 (- 8) 2.7(-8) 4.8(-7) 6. 0 (-6)
Mn-56 neg 7. 2 (-7) 7. 2 (-7) 1. 7 (- 5) 1. 8 (- 5)
Fe-55 NA NA NA NA NA Fe-59 2. 7 (-6) 1.1 (- 7 ) 1.1 (-7) 1. 9 (- 6) 4. 8 (-6)
Co-58 6.1(-6) 2. 3 (-7) 2. 3 (-7) 4.1 (-6) 1.1 (- 5)
Co- 6 0 3.1 (-6) 9. 6 (- 8) 9. 6 (-8) 1. 7 (- 6) 5.0(-6)
Sr-89 1. 0 (-5) 3. 5 (-7) 3. 5 (-7) 6. 3 (-6) 1. 7 (-5)
Sr-90 2.1 (- 6) 1.1 (-8) 1.1 (- 8) 1. 9 (- 7) 2.3(-6)
Sr-91 1.6(-9) 5.1 (-7) 5.1 (- 7) 9.9(-6) 1.1 ( -5)
Sr-92 neg 9. 0 (- 8) 9. 0 (-8) 2. 0 (-6) 2. 2 (-6)
Y-90 3. 2 (-9) 2. 8 (-9) 2. 8 (-9) 4.9(-8) 5. 9 (-8)
Y-91m neg 1.7(-7) 1. 7 (-7) 6.1 (-6) 6. 4 (-6)
Y-91 1. 2 (- 6) 4. 7 (-8) 4.7 (- 8) 8. 3 (-7) 2.1 (-6)
Y-92 nog 8.4 (-8) 8.4 (-8) 1. 9 (-6) 2.1 (-6)
Y-93 1. 0 (- 10) 3.1 (- 8) 3.1 (- 8) 6. 0 (-7) 6. 6 (-7)
Zr-95 1. 4 (-6) 5. 4 (-8) 5. 4 (-8) 9. 5 (-7) 2. 6 (-6)
Nb-9 5 1. 3 (- 6) 5. 4 (-8) 5. 4 (-8) 9. 5 (-7) 2. 4 (-6)
Amendment 10
GIPPS3AP TABLE 11.2-6 (Sheet 2 of 2)
DESIGN LIQUID EFFLUENT PELEASES (Ci/yr)
(WESTINGHOUSE-414) +
Primary Systemt e > < s )
Total 15019D0 LEPS(8) IMID1DC_22ildiDg Drainsill SGfPS Controlled Peleasetan Wat er Palance_
Mo-99 6. 0 (-5) 6. 0 (-5) 1.1 (- 3) 1. 7 (-3) 4.5(-4)
Tc-9 9m 6. 0 (-9) 5.1 (- 5 ) 5.1 (- 5) 1. 0 (- 3) 1.1 (- 3)
Pu-103 1.2(-6) 4.8(-8) 4. 8 (- 8) 8. 5 (-7) 2.1(-6)
Pu-106 5. 9 (-7) 1. 2 (-8) 1. 2 (- 8) 2.2(-7) 8. 3 (- 7)
Ph-103m neg 2.6 (-8) 2.6(-8) 8.5 (-7) 9.1 (-7)
Ph-106 neg 1. 2 (- 10) 1. 2 (- 10) 2. 2 (-7) 2.2(-7)
Ag-110m 2. 5 (-6) 9. 0 (- 8) 9. 0 (- 8) 1. 6 (-6) 4. 3 (-6)
- 2. 4 (-8) 2. 4 (- 8) 4. 3 (-7) 1.1 (- 6 )
Te-125m 6. 3 (-7) 4.4 (-6) 9.9(-6) 10 Te-127m 5.0(-6) 2. 5 (-7) 2. 5 (-7)
Te-127 2. 3 (- 9) 9. 6 (-7) 9.6(-7) 1. 9 (-5) 2.1 (-5)
Te-129m 4. 0 (- 5) 1. 6 (-6) 1. 6 (-6) . 7(-5) 7. 0 (- 5)
Te-129 neg 9. 0 (-7) 9. 0 (-7) 2. 7 (- 5) 2. 9 (-5)
Te-131m 3. 2 (-5) 2. 2 (-6) 2. 2 (-6) 3. 9 (-5) 7. 5 (-5)
Te-131 neg 3.9 (-7) 3. 9 (-7) 2. 0 (-5) 2.1 (- 5)
- 2. 5 (-5) 2. 5 (- 5) 4. 4 (-5) 7. 2 (-4 )
Te-132 2. 3 (-4) 5. 4 (-5)
Te-134 neg 1. 3 (-6) 1. 3 (- 6) 5.1 (- 5)
Pa-137m neg 5. 9 (-6) 5.9(-6) 2. 0 (- 3) 2. 0 (- 3)
Pa-140 6.9 (-E) 3. 5 (-7) 3. 5 (- 7) 6.1 (- 6) 1. 4 (- 5) 1.1 (-7) 1.1 (- 7 ) 2. 0 (- 6) 2. 5 (-6)
La-140 3.1 (-7) 2.3(-6)
Ce-141 1. 3 (- 6 ) 5. 3 (-8) 5. 3 (- 8) 4. 4 (-7)
Ce-143 1.1 (- 8) 4. 2 (-8) 4. 2 (-8) 7. 7 (-7) 8. 7 (-7)
Cc-144 9.1 (-7) 3.2(-8) 3. 2 (- 8) 5. 8 (-7) 1. 6 (-6)
Pr-143 1.1 (-6) 5. 3 (- 8) 5. 3 (- 8) 9. 4 (-7) 2.1 (-6 )
- 3. 2 (- 8) 3. 2 (- 8) 5. 8 (-7) 1. 6 (- 6)
Pr-144 9.1 (-7)
Total Excluding H-3 4.0(-1)
(1) 2. 3 (9) cc/yr (Drain Channel E)
(2) 5. 5 ( 9) cc/yr (3) 5. 5 (9) cc/yr controlled release allowance for operational flexibility (4) 1.7 ( 8) cc/yr (Drain Channel A)
( 5) Zero holdup time assumed (6) Neg <10-10 Amendment 10 8 9 e
GI P ESS AR TABLE 11.3-3 (Sheet 1 of 3) 2 GASEOUS WASTE PFOCESSING SYSTEM - PROCESS PARAMETEFS (Westinghouse-414)
Temperature Pressure Flow N2 H2 I+em ( F) insigt_ (scfmL Percert ESISfD1 Gas Stregm DesEI1EL19D2 1 volume control tank purge 130 15 0.7 0 100 2 Gas decay tank discharge to comprescor AMB* .0 40 99.9 0.1 3 Compressor suction AMB 0.5 40.7 98.3 1.7 4 compressor discharge to recombiner 140 <130 40.7 98.3 1.7 5 Recomtiner discharge to gas decay tanks 140 <120 40 99.9 0.1 6 Misec11aneous vents (e va po rators, reactor coolant drain tanks, recycle holdup tank vent eductor) VAR ** 0.5 neg. 0 100 7 Recombiner oxygen supply AMB 50 0.35 0 0 8 Fecombiner calitrating gas AMB 15 0.004 94 6 9 Recombiner calibrating gas AMB ATM*** 0.004 94 6 10 Recombiner nitrogen supply AMB 100 0 100 0 11 NSSS nitrogen supply AMB 100 0 100 0 12 Nitrogen relief to plant vent AMB 100 0 100 0 13 NSSS hydrogen supply AMB 100 0.7 0 100 Ame ndment 2
GIEESSAP TABLE 11.3-2 DESIGN ANNUAL RELEASE Ib CURIES CF EADICACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENTS (Ci/yr)
(We sting bou se- 414)
Puildino Ventilation Condenser i4 Isotope GWPC1 Feactor auxilia ry Turbine Sir Eiector Total 0.0 2.5E01 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5E Of Ar-41 7.8E-02 Fr-85m 7.8E-02 ---
7.5E01 1.7E01 0.0 0.0 9.2E01 Kr-85m 6.7E-01 0.00 2.8E04 Kr-85 2.8E04 5.0E01 0.0 0.0 1.5E-01 1.7E01 8.3E00 0.0 0.0 2.5E01 Kr-87 2.5E01 1.6E02 Fr-88 8. 4 E- 01 9.2E01 4.2E01 0.0 6.7E-04 --- --- --- --- 6.7E-04 Kr-89 2.0E01 1.0E02 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2E02 10 Xe- 13 t ra 8.3E00 4.4E02 Xe- 13 3m 3.3E01 3.6E02 1.7E01 0.0 1.1E03 2.4E04 8.3E02 C.0 5.3E02 2.6E04 Xe-133 0.0 1.3E-02 Xe-135m 1.3E-02 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2E00 4.0E02 5.8E01 0.0 3.3E01 4.9E02 Xe-135 --- --- --- 3.3E-03 Xe-137 1.3E-03 ---
1.7E-02 0.0 8.3E00 0.0 0.0 8.aE00 Xe-138 1.3E-05 I- 12'i 1.3E-05 --- ---
2.4E-05 I-130 2.4E-05 ---
3.3E-02 9.2E-04 1.9E-02 8.3E-01 I-131 6.5E-01 1.3E-01
--- --- --- 8. 9 E -0 3 1-132 8. 9 E- 0 3 8.2E-02 4.9E-02 1.4E-03 3.1E-02 2.7E-01 I-133 1.1E-01 7.0E-04 --- --- --- --- 7.0E-04 I-134 --- --- ---
1.7E-02 I-135 1.7E-02 (1) 100 scfy leakage at 40 yr boldup 2 Amendment 10
- G e
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-1 ANTICIPATED TOTAL SOLID WASTE GENERATED PER YEAR (Westinghouse-414) l2 Item Quantity Spent resins 280 ft3 Evaporator bottoms 2835 ft3 Chemical drain tank effluents 390 ft3 Condensate demineralizer resin 802 ft3*
2 Spent filter cartridge assenblies 21 Stean generator blowdown resins 600ft3**
FO system concentrates 1000 ft3 Dry compacted waste 2500 ft3***
- No condenser leakage 110 lb/ day primary to secondary leak
- Based on USNBC WASH 1258 The yearly estimated total number of 50-ft3 solid-waste containers is 100, and the number of 55 gallon solid-waste drums is 4C0.
Amendment 2
GIBBSSAP TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 1 of 15)
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414) 2
- 1. Chemical Waste Chemical Drain Isotope ui ; j,'gm Ci/yr Ci-Tank Inventory Br-83 9.3 (-2) 1. 0 ( 0) 2.1 (- 1)
Br-84 4. 7 (-2) 5. 2 (- 1) 1.1 (- 1)
Er-85 6. 0 (-3) 6. 6 (-2) 1. 4 (-2)
I-129 3. 9 (-8) 4. 3 (-7) 8. 9 (-8)
I-130 1. 4 (-3) 1. 5 (- 2) 3. 2 (-3)
I- 131 2.4 (0) 2. 7 ( 1) 5. 5 ( 0)
I- 132 2. 8 (0) 3.1 ( 1) 6. 4 (0)
I-133 3. 8 ( 0) 4. 2 ( 1) 8. 6 ( 0)
I- 134 5. 7 (- 1) 6.3 (0) 1. 3 (0)
I- 135 2.1(0) 2.3 ( 1) 4. 8 (0)
Rb-86 8. 0 (-3) 8. 8 (-2) 1. 8 (- 2)
Pb-88 Pb-89
- 4. 8 (0)
- 2. 2 (- 1)
- 5. 3 (1)
- 2. 4 ( 0) 1.1 ( 1)
- 5. 0 (- 1) lll Cs- 134 2. 4 ( 0) 2. 7 ( 1) 5. 5 ( 0)
Cs- 136 3. 2 ( 0) 3. 5 ( 1) 7. 3 ( 0)
Cs- 137 1. 3 (0) 1. 4 ( 1) 3. 0 ( 0)
Cs-138 9.7 (- 1) 1.1 ( 1) 2. 2 (0)
H-3 10
- 3. 5 ( 0) 3.9 ( 1) 7. 9 ( 0)
Cr-51 3. 6 (-3) 4. 0 (- 2) 8. 2 (-3)
Mn-54 2. 8 (-4) 3.1 (-3) 6. 4 (-4)
Mn-56 9. 8 (-3) 1.1 (- 1) 2. 2 (- 2)
Fe-55 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Fe-59 1.1 (- 3) 1. 2 (-2) 2. 5 (-3)
Co-58 2. 4 (-3) 2.7 (-2) 5. 5 (-3)
Co-60 1. 0 (-3) 1.1 (-2) 2. 3 (-3)
Sr-89 3. 7 (-3) 4.1 (-2) 8. 4 (-3)
Sr-90 1.1 (- 4) 1. 2 (-3) 2. 5 (-4)
Sr-91 5. 8 (-3) 6.4 (-2) 1. 3 (-2)
Sr-92 1. 2 (-3) 1. 3 (-2) 2. 7 (-3)
Y-90 2. 9 (-5) 3. 2 (-4) 6. 6 (-5)
Y- 91m 3. 6 (-3) 4.0 (-2) 8. 2 (-3)
Y-91 4. 9 (-4) 5.4 (-3) 1.1 (- 3)
Y-92 1.1 (-3) 1. 2 (-2) 2. 5 (-3)
Y-93 3. 5 (-4) 3. 9 (-3) 7. 9 (-4)
Zr-95 5. 6 (-4) 6. 2 (-3) 1. 3 (-3)
Nb-95 5. 6 (-4) 6. 2 (-3) 1. 3 (-3)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 2
TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 4 of 15)
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Kestinghouse-414)
Isotgre uci/qs Ci/Yr Ci-Ro Cone Tk Tc-99m 1. 5 (- 4) 3. 3 (-3) 5. 5 (-4)
Ru- 103 1. 2 (-7) 2. 8 (-6) 4. 6 (-7)
Ru- 106 3.1 (- 8) 7.1 (- 7) 1. 2 (-7)
Rh- 103m 1. 2 (-7) 2. 8 (-6) 4. 6 (-7)
Rh- 106 3.1 (- 8) 7.1 (-7) 1. 2 (-7)
Ag- 110m 2. 3 (-7) 5. 2 (-6) 8. 6 (-7)
Te- 125m 6.1 (- 8) 1. 4 (-6) 2. 3 ( -7)
Te- 127m 6. 3 (-7) 1. 4 (- 5) 2. 4 (-6)
Te-127 2. 7 (- 6) 6. 0 (-5) 1. 0 (- 5)
Te- 129m 3. 9 (-6) 8. 8 (-5) 1. 5 ( - 5)
Te-129 3. 9 (- 6) 8. 8 (-5) 1. 5 (- 5)
Te- 131m 10
- 5. 6 (-6) 1. 3 (-4) 2.1 (- 5)
Te- 131 2. 9 (-6) 6. 6 (- 5) 1.1 (- 5)
Te-132 6. 3 (- 5) 1. 4 (-3) 2. 4 (- 4)
Te-134 1. 9 (- 5) 4.4 (-4) 7. 3 (- 5)
Ba-137m 2. 9 (- 4) 6. 6 (-3) 1.1 (-3)
Ba- 140 8. 7 (-7) 2. 0 (- 5) 3. 3 (-6)
La-140 2. 7 (-6) 6. 2 (-5) 1. 0 (-5)
Ce-141 1. 3 (- 7) 3. 0 (- 6) 5. 0 (-7)
Ce-143 1.1 (-7) 2. 5 (-6) 4.1 (-7)
Ce- 144 8. 2 (-8) 1. 9 (-6) 3.1 (-7)
Pr-143 1. 3 (- 7) 3. 0 (- 6) 5. 0 (-7)
Pr- 14 4 8.2 (-8) 1. 9 (-6) 3.1 (-7)
Easis: 1. No decay credit
- 2. R.O. Conc Tank Usable Vol, Gal = 1000
- 3. 1% Failed Fuel 2
- 4. DF = 30
- 5. 150,000 gallons /Yr processed at 0.96 recovery Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 5 of 15) 2 SCLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414)
- 3. Liquid Waste Processing System Evaporator Concentrates High Act. L.A.W. Conc.
Waste Concs Concs Waste Tank Concentrate Isorgee uCi/am uCi/gg_ 22 000_ gal Ci Ci/Yr Br-83 9.3 (- 1) 9. 3 (-2) 7.1 (0) 2. 8 (1)
Er-84 4. 7 (- 1) 4. 7 (- 2) 3. 6 (0) 1. 4 ( 1)
Er- 85 6. 0 (-2) 6. 0 (-3) 4. 6 (-1) 1. 8 (0)
I- 129 3. 9 (-7) 3. 9 (-8) 3. 0 (-6) 1. 2 (-5)
I- 130 1. 4 (- 2) 1. 4 (- 3) 1.1 (- 1) 4. 2 (- 1)
I- 131 2. 4 (1) 2. 4 (0) 1. 8 (2) 7. 2 (2)
I- 132 2. 8 (1) 2. 8 (0) 2.1(2) 8. 4 (2) 1- 133 3. 8 (1) 3. 8 (0) 2. 9 (2) 1.1 (3)
I- 134 5. 7 ( 0) 5. 7 (- 1) 4. 3 (1) 1. 7 (2)
I- 135 2.1 ( 1) 2.1 (0) 1. 6 (2) 6. 3 ( 2)
Pb-86 Pb-88
- 8. 0 (-2)
- 4. 8 (1)
- 8. 0 (- 3)
- 4. 8 (0) 6.1 (- 1)
- 3. 6 (2)
- 2. 4 (0)
- 1. 4 (3)
(l)
Pb-89 2. 2 (0) 2. 2 (- 1) 1. 7 (1) 6. 6 (1)
Cs- 134 2. 4 (1) 2. 4 (0) 1. 8 (2) 7.2 (2)
Cs- 136 3. 2 ( 1) 3. 2 (0) 2. 4 (2) 9. 6 ( 2)
Cs- 137 1. 3 (1) 1. 3 ( 0) 9. 9 (1) 3. 9 (2)
- 2. 9 (2) 10 Cs- 13 8 9.7 (0) 9. 7 (- 1) 7. 4 (1)
H-3 3.5(0) 3.5(0) 2. 7 ( 1) 1.1 (3)
Cr-51 3. 6 (- 2) 3. 6 (-3) 2. 7 (- 1) 1.1 (0)
Mn-54 2. 8 (-3) 2. 8 (-4) 2.1 (-2) 8. 4 (- 2)
Mn-56 9. 8 (-2) 9. 8 (-3) 7. 4 (- 1) 2. 9 ( 0)
Fe-55 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Fe-59 1.1 (- 2) 1.1 (-3) 8. 4 (-2) 3. 3 (- 1)
Co-58 2. 4 (-2) 2. 4 (-3) 1. 8 (- 1) 7. 2 (- 1)
Co-60 1. 0 (- 2) 1. 0 (- 3) 7. 6 (-2) 3. 0 (- 1)
Sr-89 3. 7 (- 2) 3. 7 (-3) 2. 8 (-1) 1.1 (0)
Sr-90 1.1 (-3) 1.1 (- 4) 8. 4 (-3) 3. 3 (-2)
Sr- 91 5. 8 (- 2) 5. 8 (-3) 4. 4 (-1) 1. 7 (0)
Sr-92 1. 2 (- 2) 1. 2 (-3) 9.1 (-2) 3. 6 (- 1)
Y-90 2. 9 (-4) 2. 9 (- 5) 2. 2 (-3) 8. 7 (-3)
Y-91m 3. 6 (- 2) 3. 6 (-3) 2.7 (-1) 1.1 (0)
Y-91 4. 9 (-3) 4. 9 (-4) 3. 7 (-2) 1. 5 (- 1)
Y-92 1.1 (-2) 1.1 (- 3) 8. 4 (-2) 3.3 (- 1)
Y-93 3. 5 (-3) 3. 5 (-4) 2. 7 (-2) 1.1 (- 1)
Zr-95 5. 6 (-3) 5. 6 (-4) 4. 3 (-2) 1. 7 (- 1)
An.endment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 6 of 15)
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES 2 (Westinghouse-414)
High Act. L.A.K. Conc.
Waste Concs Concs Kaste Tank Concentrate Tsotope _ uCi/am uCi/am_ 2,000 cal Ci Ci/Yr Nb-95 5. 6 (-3) 5. 6 (-4) 4. 3 (- 2) 1. 7 (- 1)
Mo-99 6.6 (0) 6. 6 (- 1) 5.0(1) 2.0(2)
Tc-99m 6.0(0) 6. 0 (- 1) 4. 6 (1) 1. 8 ( 2)
Ru-103 5. 0 (-3) 5. 0 (- 4) 3. 8 (- 2) 1. 5 (- 1)
Ru-106 1.3 (-3) 1. 3 (-4) 9. 9 (-3) 3. 9 (-2)
Eh-103m 5. 0 (-3) 5. 0 (-4) 3. 8 (-2) 1. 5 (- 1)
Rh- 106 1. 3 (-3) 1. 3 (- 4) 9. 9 (-3) 3. 9 (-2)
Ag- 110m 9. 4 (-3) 9. 4 (-4) 7.1 (-2) 2. 8 (- 1)
Te-125m 2. 5 (-3) 2. 5 (-4) 1. 9 (-2) 7. 5 (- 2)
Te- 127m 2. 6 (- 2) 2. 6 (-3) 2. 0 (- 1) 7. 8 (- 1)
Te-127 1.1 (- 1) 1.1 (-2) 8. 4 (-1) 3. 3 (0)
Te- 129m 1. 6 (- 1) 1. 6 (- 2) 1. 2 (0) 4.8(0)
Te- 129 1. 6 (- 1) 1. 6 (-2) 1. 2 (0) 10
- 4. 8 (0)
Te- 131m 2.3 (- 1) 2. 3 (-2) 1. 7 (0) 6. 9 (0)
Te- 131 1. 2 (- 1) 1. 2 (- 2) 9.1 (- 1) 3. 6 (0)
Te- 13 2 2.6 (0) 2. 6 (- 1) 2.0(1) 7. 8 (1)
Te- 13 4 3. 0 (- 1) 3. 0 (- 2) 2.3 (0) 9.0(0)
Ea- 137m 1. 2 ( 1) 1. 2 (0) 9.1 (1) 3. 6 (2)
Ba- 140 3. 6 (- 2) 3. 6 (-3) 2. 7 (- 1) 1.1 (0)
La- 14 0 1. 2 (- 2) 1. 2 (-3) 9.1 (- 2) 3. 6 (- 1)
Ce-141 5. 5 (-3) 5. 5 (- 4) 4. 2 (-2) 1. 7 (- 1)
Ce- 14 3 4.5 (-3) 4. 5 (-4) 3. 4 (-2) 1. 4 (- 1)
Ce- 14 4 3. 4 (-3) 3. 4 (-4) 2. 6 (-2) 1. 0 (- 1)
Pr- 14 3 5. 5 (-3) 5. 5 (- 4) 4. 2 (-2) 1. 7 (- 1)
Pr- 14 4 3.4 (-3) 3. 4 (-4) 2. 6 (-2) 1. 0 (- 1)
Basis: 1. No decay credit
- 2. H.A.K. concentrated to 12% boric acid 2
- 3. Conc. Wst tank inventory at 100% H.A.W. concentrates
- 4. H.A.W., gal /Yr = 6,000 1 10
- 5. L.A.W., gal /Yr - 20,368
- 6. 1% Failed Fuel 2
Amendment 10
J
- r. .
- GIBBSSAR g TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 7 of 15) 2 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414)
- 4. IEMS High Activity Kaste Resin Isotope Ci/Yr uCi/qm (Resint Br-83 1. 9 (- 3) 2. 2 (-3)
Br-84 9. 4 (-4) 1. 2 (-3)
Er-85 1. 2 (-4) 1. 5 (- 4)
I-129 7. 8 (-9) 9. 4 (-9)
I- 130 2. 8 (-4) 3. 4 (-4)
I-131 4. 8 (- 1) 5. 8 (- 1)
I- 132 5. 6 (- 1) 6.7 (- 1)
I- 133 7. 6 (- 1) 9.1 (- 1)
I-134 1.1 (- 1) 1. 4 (- 1)
I- 135 4. 2 (- 1) 5. 0 (- 1)
Eb-86 8. 9 (-5) 1.1 (- 4)
Eb-88 5. 3 (-2) 6. 4 (- 2)
Rb-89 Cs-134
- 2. 4 (-3) 2.7 (-2)
- 2. 9 (-3)
- 3. 2 (- 2) llI Cs-136 3. 6 (-2) 4. 3 (- 2)
Cs-137 1. 4 (- 2) 1. 7 (- 2)
Cs-138 1.1 (- 2) 1. 3 (- 2)
Cr-51 7. 2 (- 4) 8. 6 (-4)
Mn-54 5. 6 (-6) 6. 7 (-6) yg Mn-56 2. 0 (- 4) 2. 4 (- 4)
Fe-55 N.A. N.A. .
Fe-59 2,2 (-5) 2. 6 (-5)
Co-58 4. 8 (- 5) 5. 8 (- 5)
Co-60 2. 0 (-5) 2. 4 (-5)
Sr-89 7. 4 (-5) 8. 9 (-5)
Sr-90 2. 2 (-6) 2. 6 (-6)
Sr-91 1. 2 (-4) 1. 4 (-4)
Sr-92 2. 4 (-5) 2. 9 (- 5)
Y-90 5.8(-7) 7. 0 (-7)
Y- 91m 7. 2 (-5) 8. 6 (-5)
Y-91 9. 3 (- 6) 1. 2 (- 5)
Y-92 2. 2 (- 5) 2. 6 (- 5)
Y-93 7. 0 (- 6) 8. 4 (-6)
Zr-95 1.1 (- 5) 1. 3 (-5)
Nb-95 1.1 (- 5) 1. 3 (- 5)
Mo-99 1. 3 (- 2) 1. 6 (-2)
Tc-99m 1. 2 (-2) 1. 4 (- 2)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 2
TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 8 of 15)
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414)
Isotope Ci/Yr uCi/om (Fesint Ru-103 1. 0 (- 5) 1. 2 (- 5)
Ru- 106 2. 6 (-6) 3.1 (-6)
Rh-103m 1. 0 (-5) 1. 2 (-5)
Ph- 106 2. 6 (-6) 3.1 (- 6)
Ag-110m 1. 9 (- 5) 2. 3 (-5)
Te-125m 5.0(-6) 6. 0 (-6)
Te- 127m 5. 2 (-5) 6. 2 (- 5)
Te-127 2. 2 (-4) 2. 6 (-4)
Te- 129m 3. 2 (-4) 3. 8 (-4)
Te- 129 3. 2 (-4) 3. 8 (- 4)
Te-131m 4.6(-4) 5. 5 (-4) 10 Te-131 2. 4 (- 4) 2. 9 (- 4)
Te- 132 5. 2 (-3) 6. 2 (-3)
Te- 134 6. 0 (-4) 7. 2 (-4)
Ba- 137m 2. 4 (- 2) 2. 9 (-2)
Ba- 140 7. 2 (-5) 8. 6 (-5)
La-140 2. 4 (-5)
Ce- 141
- 2. 9 (-5) 1.1 (- 5) 1. 3 (-5)
Ce- 14 3 9. 0 (-6) 1.1 (- 5)
Ce-144 6. 8 (-6) 8. 2 (-6)
Pr- 14 3 1.1 (- 5) 1.3 (-5)
Pr- 14 4 6. 8 (-6) 8. 2 (-6)
Basis: 1. No. decay credit l2
- 2. DF = 10 for all isotope except Cs, Rb = 2 110
- 3. 1% Failed Fuel
- 4. 30 ft3 resin charge ,2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 9 of 15) 2 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-413)
- 5. _LEM S Low Activity Easte Resin Isotore Ci/Yr uCi/om (Resin)
Br-83 5.5(-3) 6. 6 (-3)
Br-84 3. 2 (- 4) 3. 8 (-4)
Br-85 4. 1 (- 51 4. 9 (-5)
I-129 2. 6 (-9) 3. 2 (-9)
I- 130 9. 6 (- 5; 1. 2 (-4)
I-131 1. 6 (- 1) 2. 0 (-1)
I- 132 1. 9 (- 1) 2. 3 (-1)
I-133 2. 6 (- 1) 3.1 (- 1)
I- 134 3. 8 (-2) 4. 5 (-2)
I- 135 1. 4 (- 1) 1. 7 (- 1)
Rb-86 3.1 (- 5) 3. 7 (-5)
R b- 8 8 1. 8 (- 2) 2. 2 (-2)
Rb-89 Cs-134
- 8. 2 (-4)
- 7. 3 (- 2)
- 9. 9 (-4 )
- 8. 7 (-2) lll Cs-136 1. 2 (-2) 1. 4 (-2)
Cs- 137 4. 8 (-3) 5. 8 (-3)
Cs-138 3. 8 (-3) 4. 5 (-3) 10 Cr-51 2. 5 (-4) 3. 0 (-4)
Mn-54 1. 9 (-6) 1. 9 (- 6 )
Mn-56 6. 9 (- 5) 8. 2 (-5)
Fe-55 N.A. N.A.
Fe-59 7. 5 (-6) 9. 0 (-6)
Co-58 1. 6 (-5) 2. 0 (-5)
Co-60 6. 9 (- 6) 8. 2 (-6)
Sr-89 2. 5 (-5) 3.0 (-5)
Sr-90 7. 5 (-7) 9.1 (-7)
Sr-91 4.1 (- 5) 4. 9 (-5)
Sr-92 8. 2 (-6) 9.9 (-6)
Y-90 2. 0 (-7) 2. 4 (-7)
Y-91m 2. 5 (- 5) 3. 0 (-5)
Y-91 3. 4 (-6) 4. 0 (-6)
Y-92 7. 5 (-6) 9.1 (-6)
Y-93 2. 4 (-6) 2. 9 (-6)
Zr-95 3. 8 (-6) 4. 5 (-6)
Nb-95 3. 8 (-6) 4. 5 (-6)
Mo-99 4. 5 (-3) 5. 3 (-3)
Tc-99m 4.1 (- 3 ) 4. 9 (-3)
Amet.dment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 2 (Sheet 10 of 15)
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414)
Isotope Ci/Yr uCi/qm (Resin 1 Ru-103 3. 4 (-6) 4.1 (-6)
Ru- 106 8. 9 (-7) 1.1 (-6)
Rh-103m 3. 4 (-6) 4.1 (-6)
Rh- 106 8. 9 (-7) 1.1 (-6)
Ag- 110m 6. 5 (-6) 7. 8 (-6)
Te-125m 1. 7 (-6) 2.1 (-6)
Te- 127m 1. 8 (- 5) 2.1 (-5)
Te-127 7. 5 (- 5) 9.1 (-5)
Te-129m 1.1 (-4) 1. 3 (-4)
Te- 129 1.1 (-4) 1. 3 (-4) 10 Te- 131m 1. 6 (-4) 1. 9 (-4 )
Te- 131 8. 2 (-5) 9. 9 (-5)
Te- 13 2 1. 8 (-3) 2.1 (-3)
Te-134 2.1 (-4) 2. 5 (-4)
Ba- 137m 8. 2 (-3) 9. 9 (-3)
Ba-140 2. 5 (-5) 3. 0 (-5)
La- 14 0 8. 2 (-6) 9. 9 (-6)
Ce- 141 3. 8 (- 6) 4.5(-6)
Ce-143 3.1 (- 6) 3. 7 (-6)
Ce- 14 4 2. 3 (-6) 2. 8 (-6)
Pr-143 3. 8 (-6) 4. 5 (-6)
Pr-144 2. 3 (- 6) 2. 8 (-6)
Basis: 1. No decay credit
- 2. DF = 10 for all nuclides except Cs, Rb = 1
- 3. 1% Failed Fuel 2
- 4. 30 ft3 resin charge Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 11 of 15) 2 SOLID WASTE PRCCESSING SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414)
- 6. Steam Generator Blowdown Resin (a) Mixed bed demineralizer Isotore Ci/Yr uCi/qm Br-83 3. 3 (0) 1. 7 (0)
Br-84 9. 0 (- 1) 4. 5 (-1)
Br-85 1. 7 (-2) 8. 4 (-3)
I- 129 1. 9 (-6) 9. 3 (-7)
I- 130 6.3 (-2) 3. 2 (-2)
I-131 1.1 (2) 5.7 (1)
I- 132 9. 9 ( 1) 5. 0 (1)
I-133 1. 8 (2) 8. 9 (1)
I- 134 1. 4 ( 1) 7. 2 (0)
I-135 9. 0 ( 1) 4.5(1)
Rb-86 Rb-88
- 2. 0 (- 1)
- 3. 2 (1)
- 1. 0 (- 1)
- 1. 6 (1)
(l)
Eb-89 1. 2 (0) 6. 0 (-1)
Cs- 13 4 5. 9 (0) 2. 9 (0)
Cs- 136 7. 7 (1) 3.8 (1) ,
Cs-137 1. 6 (1) 10
- 3. 2 (1)
Cs- 138 9. 3 (0) 4. 7 (0)
Cr-51 1. 7 (- 1) 8. 7 (-2)
Mn-54 1. 4 (-2) 7. 0 (-3)
Mn-56 3. 6 (- 1) 1. 8 (- 1)
Fe-55 N.A. N.A.
Fe-59 5. 4 (-2) 2.7 (-2)
Co-58 1.1 (- 1) 5. 7 (-2)
Co-60 4. 8 (-2) 2. 4 (-2)
Sr-89 1. 8 (- 1) 8. 9 (- 2)
Sr-90 5. 4 (-3) 2. 7 (-3)
Sr-91 2. 6 (- 1) 1. 8 (- 1)
Sr-92 4. 5 (-2) 2. 3 (-2)
Y-90 1. 4 (- 3) 7. 0 (-4)
Y-91m 8. 7 (-2) 4. 4 (-2)
Y-91 2. 3 (-2) 1. 2 (-2)
Y-92 4. 2 (- 2) 2.1 (-2)
Y-93 1. 6 (- 2) 8. 0 (-3) 2r-95 2. 7 (-2) 1. 4 (- 2)
Nb-SS 2. 7 (-2) 1. 4 (-2)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 2 (Sheet 12 of 15)
SOLID WASTE FRCCESSING SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Westinghouse-414)
Isotope Ci/Yr uCi/am Mo-99 3. 0 ( 1) 1. 5 (1)
Tc-99m 2. 6 (1) 1. 3 (1)
Bu-103 2. 4 (-2) 1. 2 (-2)
Fu-106 6. 3 (- 3)
Rh- 103m
- 2. 7 (-3)
- 1. 3 (-2) 6. 0 (-3)
Ph-106 6. 3 (-5) 3. 2 (-5)
Ag-110m 4. 5 (-2)
Te- 125m
- 2. 3 (-2)
- 1. 2 (-2) 6. 0 (-3)
Te-127m 1. 3 (- 1) 6. 3 (-2)
Te-127 4. 8 (- 1)
Te- 129m 2.4 (-1)
- 7. 8 (-1) 3. 9 (- 1)
Te-129 4. 5 (-1) 10
- 2. 3 (- 1)
Te- 131m 1.1 (- 2)
Te-131 5. 4 (-3)
- 2. 0 (-1) 1. 0 (-1)
Te- 13 2 1. 2 ( 1)
Te-134 6.2 (0)
- 6. 6 (- 1) 3. 3 (- 1)
Ea-137m 2. 9 (0) 1. 7 (- 1)
Ea- 140 1. 7 (- 1)
La-140
- 8. 7 (-2)
- 5. 7 (-2) 2. 9 (-2)
Ce-141 2. 6 (-2) 1. 3 (-2)
Ce-143 2.1 (-2)
Ce- 14 4 1.1 (- 2)
- 1. 6 (-2) 8. 0 (-3)
Pr- 143 2. 6 (- 2) 1. 3 (-2)
Pr- 14 4 1. 6 (- 2) 8. 0 (-3)
Easis: 1. 750 gpm blowdown rate l2
- 2. 1% Failed Fuel 10
- 3. 1.440 lb/ day primary leakage
- 4. DF = 102 for all isotopes except Co, Rb = 2
- 5. No decay credit 2
- 6. 1st series mixed bed - only
- 7. 75 ft3 resin charge 110 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 13 of 15) 2 SOLID EASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Kestinghouse-414)
(b) Cation Demineralizer Isotone gi/Yr uCi/om Rb-86 1. 8 (- 2) 8. 8 (-3)
Bb-88 2. 8 (0) 1.4 (0)
Pt-89 1.1 (- 1) 5. 6 (-2)
- 2. 6 (0) 10 Cs- 13 4 5. 3 ( 0)
Cs-136 6. 9 (0) 3.5(0)
Cs-137 2. 8 (0) 1. 4 (0)
Cs-138 8. 4 (-1) 4. 2 (- 1) 2 Total 2. 6 6 (- 1)
Basis: 1. 1% Failed Fuel 10
- 2. 1440 lbs/ day primary leakage
- 3. No decay credit 2 q
- 4. 75 gpm flow rate 11 0
- 5. 75 ft3 resin charge
- 6. DF = 10 l2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 (Sheet 14 of 15)
SCLID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Kestinghouse-414)
- 7. Condensate CleaDup_gystem Resin Isotcre C1/Yr uCi/qm Er-83 3. 7 (- 4) 1. 7 (-5)
Br-84 2. 3 (- 5) 1. 0 (-6)
Er-85 4. 0 (-8) 1,8 (-9)
I-129 NEG NEG I- 130 1. 0 (- 7) 4. 5 (-9)
I- 131 2.1 (-3) 9. 5 (-5)
I-132 2. 8 (-5) 1. 3 (-6)
I-133 4. 6 (-4)
I- 134 2.1 (- 5)
- 1. 6 (-6) 7. 3 (-8)
I- 135 7. 4 (-5) 3.4 (-6)
Cr-51 5. 6 (-3) 2. 5 (-4)
Mn-54 4. 5 (-3) 2. 0 (-4)
En-56 4. 5 (-5) 2. 0 (-6)
Fe-55 N.A. N.A.
'Fe-59 2. 9 (-3) 1. 3 (-4)
Co-58 8. 8 (-3) 4. 0 (-4 ) 10 co-60 1.1 (-7)
Sr-89
- 5. 0 (-9)
- 1. 0 (-2) 4. 5 (-4)
Sr-90 1. 2 (- 8) 5. 5 (- 10)
Sr-91 1. 2 (-4)
Sr-92
- 5. 5 (-6)
- 5. 8 (-6) 2. 6 (-7)
Y ^0 4. 2 (-6) 1. 9 (-7)
Y- 91m 3. 5 (-6) 1. 6 (-7)
Y-91 1. 6 (-3)
Y-92
- 7. 3 (-5)
- 7. 3 (-6) 3. 3 (-7)
Y-93 7. 8 (-6)
Zr-95
- 3. 5 (-7)
- 2. 0 (- 3) 9.1 (-5)
Nb-95 1.1 (-3) 5. 0 (-5)
Mo-99 9. 6 (-2) 4. 4 (-3)
Tc-99m 7. 3 (-3) 3. 3 (-4)
Ru- 103 1.1 (-3) 5. 0 (-5)
Bu- 106 1. 4 (- 8) 5. 0 (-5)
Rh-103m 5. 9 (-7) 2. 7 (-8)
Rh- 10 6 2. 4 (-11)
Ag- 110m 1.1 (- 12)
- 3. 8 (- 9) 1. 7 (- 10)
Te-125m 3. 4 (-4) 1. 5 (-5)
Te-127m 7. 2 (-3) 3. 3 (-4)
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 11.4-2 2
(Sheet 15 of 15)
SCLID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM EXPECTED ACTIVITIES (Kestinghouse-414)
Isotope Ci/Yr uCi/qm Te- 127 3. 7 (-4) 1. 7 (-5)
Te-129m 5. 2 (-2) 2. 4 (-3)
Te-129 4. 7 (-9) 2.1 (- 10)
Te- 131m 2. 7 (-7) 1. 2 (-8)
Te-131 6. 8 (-6) 3.1 (-7)
Te- 13 2 8. 2 (-2) 3. 7 (-3) 10 Te-134 3. 9 (-5) 1. 8 (-6)
Ea-137m 1.1 (- 5) 5.0(-7)
Ba-140 5. 8 (-4) 2. 6 (-5)
La-140 1. 9 (-4) 8. 6 (-6)
Ce- 141 1. 8 (-3) 8. 2 (-5)
Ce-143 5. 9 (- 5) 2. 7 (-6)
Ce- 14 4 4. 8 (-3) 2. 2 (-4)
Pr- 143 7.1 (- 4) 3. 2 (-5)
Pr-144 3. 3 (-3) 1. 5 (-4) (gg Basis: 1. 1% Failed Fuel 10
- 2. 1440 lb/ day primary leakage
- 3. No decay credit 2
- 4. DF = 10 all isotopes except Cs, Rb = 1
- 5. 800 ft3 powdered resin l10 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TAELE 11.4-3 EXPFCTED ACTIVITIES OF EXPENDED FILTEF CAFTPIDGE ASSEMBLIES (13 (23 (be stinghouse -414 ) 2 ISG152rr actlyJty rn Cartridae (fidyr1 bah Filter LEHS Filter Mo-99 1.3 (2) 4.5 (-3)
Mn-54 5.7 (-2) 1.9 (-6)
Mn-56 2.0 (0) 6.7 (-5)
Co-58 4.9 (-1) 1.6 (-5) 10 Co-60 2.0 (-1) 6.8 (-6)
Fe-59 2.2 (-1) 7.5 (-6)
Cr-51 7.4 (-1) 2.5 (-5)
Basis: 1. EAW filter processing 60,000 gal /yr at 1.0 reactor coolan't fraction
- 2. L&HS filter processing 200,000 gal /yr
- 3. DF=10, NO DECAY
- 4. 11 failed fuel 2
Notes: (1) For NSSS supply filters see NSSS SAR.
(2) Balance of plant filter cartridge assemtlies are expected to vary tetween the activities of RAW and LCMS filters.
Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF TABLE 11.4-4 SPENT EESIN VCLUME Fesin Volume Eeplacement Item E ucl eg {ach. Ft3 LIf9MfDEYfli CVCS mixed bed demineralizer 2 75 .5 CVCS Cation bed demineralizer 2 75 .5 Fecycle evaporator feed 2 75
- decir.o ralize r Recycle evaporator condensate 1 30
- demineralizer Thernal regeneration 5 74.3 1 demineralizer 30
- 2 liigh activity waste recycle 1 derineralize r 30
- low ctivity waste sample 1 condensate demineralizer 75
- Spent f uel pit demineralizer 2 280 ft3
- Estimated replacement depends largely on plant ope ration Amendrent 2 8 9 e
GIBBSSAR 4 The battery charger will supply at least (U/A FS AR) amperes at (U/A FSAR) volts for at least 10 (U/A FS AR) hours.
3/4 8-9a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- d. At least once per 18 months, d uring shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual emergency loads for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the battery is 10 subjected to a battery service test.
- e. At least once per 60 months, d uring shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. This performance discharge test shall be performed subsequent to the satisfactory completion of the required battery service test.
A 3/4 8-10 Amendme nt 10
GIBBSSAR SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.3.1 Each D. C. bus train shall be determined OPERABLE at least and energized at least orce per 7 days by verifying correct circuit breaker alignment and 10 indicated power availability.
3/4 8-8a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 4.8.2.3.2 Each 12 5- volt battery bank and charger shall bei demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
- 1. The electorlyte level of each pilct cell is between the minimum and maximum level indication marks,
- 2. The pilot cell specific gravity, corrected to 770F, and full electrolyte level is 2 (U/A FSAR) 10
- 3. The pilot cell voltage is 2 (U/ A FS AR) volts, and
- 4. The overall battery voltage is 2 125 volts,
- b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that:
- 1. The voltage of each connected cell is 2 (U/A FSAR) volts under float charge and has not decreased more than (U/A FSAR) volts from the value observed during the original acceptance test, 10
- 2. The specif ic gravity, corrected to 770F, and full electrolyte level, of each connected cell is 2 (U/A FSAR) and has not decreased more th an (U/A FS AR) from the value observed during the previous test, and
- 3. The electrolyte level of each connected cell is between the minimum and maximum level indication marks.
- c. At least once per 18 months by verif yirg that:
- 1. The cells, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.
- 2. The cell- to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anti-corrosion material, 10
- 3. The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is 5 0.01 chms.
3/48-9 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUIDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPER ATION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following A. C. electrical busses shall be OPERABLE and energized from sources of power other than a diesel generator but aligned to an OPERABLE diesel generator.
1 -
(6900) volt Emergency Bus 1- (480) volt Emergency Bus 2- (118) volt A. C. Vital Busses A PPLIC A BILITY: MODES 5 and 6.
ACTION:
With less than the above complement of A. C. busses OPERABLE and energized, establish CONT AINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 The specified A. C. busses shall be de~. ermined OPER ABLE and energized from A. C. Sources other than the diesel generators at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated power availability.
3/4 8-7
GIBBSSAR g ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS D.C. DISTRIBTUION - OPER ATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.3 The following D. C. busses shall be energized and OPERABLE:
TRAIN "A" (Channel I) consisting of 125-volt D.C.
bus No. 1ED1, 125-volt D.C. battery bank No. BTIED1 and a full capacity charger either EC1ED1-1 or BC1ED1-2 TR AIN "B" (Channel II) consisting of 125-volt D.C.
bus No. 1ED2, 125-volt D.C. battery bank No. bT1ED2 and a full ca pacity charger either BC1ED2-1 or BC 1 ED2- 2 10 Channel III consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus No. 1ED3, 125-volt D.C. battery bank BT1ED3 and a full capacity charger either BC1EC3-1 or BC1ED3-2 Channel IV consisting of 125-volt D.C. bus O No. 1ED4, 125-volt D.C. battery bank BT1ED4 and a full capacity charger either BC1ED4-1 or BC1ED4-2 APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
- a. With one 125-volt D. C. bus inoperable, restore the inoperable bus to OPER ABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
10
- b. With one 125-volt D.C. battery and/or both of its chargers inoperable, restore the inoperable battery and/or one charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the f ollowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
3/4 8-8 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 10. Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:
a) Synchronize vith the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power, b) Transfer its loads to the of fsite power source, and c) Proceed through its shutdown sequence.
- 11. Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test mode (connected to its bus) , simulated safety injection signal overrides the test mod e by (1) returning the diesel genera tor to standby operation and (2) automatically energizes the emergency loads with offsite power.
- 12. Verifying tha t the fuel transfer pump transfers fuel from each fuel storage tank to the day and 10 engine-mounted tank of each diesel via the installed cross connection lines,
- d. At least once per 10 yea rs or af ter any modifications which could affect diesel generator interde pend ence by starting both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both diesel generators accelerate to at least (Utility Applicant's FS AR) rpm in 5 10 seconds.
4.8.1.1.3 Re port s -
All diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, shall be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1. If the number of f ailures in the last 100 valid tests (on a per nuclear unit basis) is 2 7, the report shall be supplemented to include the additional inf ormation recommend ed in Regula tory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.
3/ 4 8-4b Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR TABLE 4.8-1 DIESEL GENER A TOP TEST SCHEDULE Number of Failures In Iast 100 Valid Tests
- Test Frequency 5 1 At least once per 31 days 2 At least once per 14 days 3 At least once per 7 days 2 4 At least once per 3 days 10
- criteria for determining number of f ailures and nuu6er of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C. 2. e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, where the last 100 tests are determined on a per nuclear unit basis. For the purposes of this test schedule, only valid tests conducted af ter the OL issuance date shall be included in the computation of the "last 100 valid tests." Entry into this test schedule shall be made at the 31 day test frequency.
3/4 8-4c Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
- 1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in con j unction with its manuf acturer's recommendations for this class of standby service,
- 2. Verif ying the generator capability to reject a load of 2 (largest single emergency load) kW while maintaining voltage at i volts (Utility Applicant's FSAR) and frequency at i Hz (Utility Applicant's FSAR)
- 3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load (continuous rating) (U/A FSAR) kW without exceeding 75 percent of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15 percent above nominal, whichever is lower.
- 4. Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:
a) Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and load shedding from the emergency busses.
b) Verying the diesel starts f rom ambient condition on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently 10 connected loads, that the load chedding is automatically blocked during the sequencing cycle and is automatically reinstated at the completion of the sequencing cycle, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencer and operates for 2 5 minutes while its ge nerator is load ed with the shutdown loads.
S. Verifying that on an ESF actuation test signal (without loss of offsite power) the diesel generator starts on the auto- start signal and operates on standby for 2 5 minutes.
- 6. Verifying tha t on a simulated loss of the diesel generator (with offsite power not available) , the loads are shed from the energency busses and that subsequent loading of the diesel generator is in accordance with design requirements.
3/48-4 Amendment 10
GIDBSSAR h
- 7. Simulating a loss of of f site power in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, and: l 10 a) Verifying de-energization of the emergency bussou and load shedding from the emergency busses.
b) Verif ying the diesel s ta rt s from ambient condition en the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected (accident) loads through the load sequencer, that the load shedding is automaticalli i> locked during the sequencing cycle and is automatically reinstated at the 10 completion of the sequencing cycle and ope ra tes for 2 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads.
c) verif ying that all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed and generator differential, are automatically bypassed upon loss of voltage op the emergency bus concurrent signal.
with safety injection actuation lll
- 8. Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 ho ur s . During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel genera tor shall be loaded to 2 (2-hour rating) (Utility Applicant's FSAR) kW and during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 2 (continuous 10 ra ting) (U tility Applicant's FSAF) kW. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test, repea t Specifiation 4. 8.1.1. 2. c. 4.
- 9. Verifying that the auto-connec ted loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of (Utility Applicant's FS AF) kW.
3/4 8-4a Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 4.8.1.1.1 Each of the abov e require inde pendent circuits between the of fsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E 10 distribution system shall be:
- a. Determined OPERA BLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alig nme nt s, indicated power availability, and
- b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during sh"tdown by transferring (manually a nd automatically) unit powe r supply from the normal circuit to the alternate circuit.
4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. In accordance with the frequency specified in table 4.8- 10 1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:
- 1. Verif ying the fuel level in the day and engine-mounted f uel ta nk ,
- 2. Verifying the f uel level in the fuel storage tank, 3.' Verifying the f uel transfer pump can be startad and 10 transfers fuel from the storage system to the day and engine-mounted tank.
4 Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition, and accelerates to at least (Utility Applicant's FSAF) rpm in $10 seconds,
- 5. Verify 2ng the generator is synchronized, loaded to 10 (continuous rating) in 560 seconds, and operates for 260 minutes,
- 6. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency busses, and
- 7. Verifying that the automatic load sequence timer is 10 OPERABLE with the interval between each load block within 110 percent of its design interval.
3/4 8-3 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- b. Fuel oil samples from supply tank shall be periodically analyzed (at least once every 3 months) to verify that the fuel oil meet specified quality limits. The fuel oil analysis shall be conducted in accordance with ASTM-D2274-70. The fuel oil impurity level shall be maintained below 2 mg of insolubles per 100 ml or the limit specified by the diesel-generator manauf acturers if more restrictive. 10 These requirements shall be supplemented by the requirements of ASTM-D27 0-6 5 (1975) " Standard Method of Sampling Petroleum and Petroleum Products", ASTM-D97 5-7 4
" Standard Specification for Diesel Fuel Oils" and the
" Cloud Point" requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.137 Position C.2.b.
O 3/4 8- 3 a A mendment 10
GIBBSSAR 3/4.8 ELECTRIC AL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPER ATION 3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A. C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Two physically independent circuits between the of fsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and
- b. Two separate and independent diesel generators each with:
1 Separate day and engine-mounted fuel tanks containing a minimum of 1600 gallcns of fuel, l 10
- 2. A se para te fuel storage system containing a minimum of 90,000 gallons of fuel, and l 10
- 3. A separate fuel transf er pump.
APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
- a. With either an of fsite circuit or diesel generator of the above required A. C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A. C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4. 8.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereaf ter; restore at least two offsite circuit and two diesel generators 10 to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- b. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator of the above required A. C. electrical power sources inopera ble , demonstrate the OPEFABILITY of the remaining A. C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a and 4. 8.1.1. 2. a. 4 within one l 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore 3/4 8- 1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR $
at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or be in at lea st HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore at least two offsite circuits and two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from the time of initial loss or be in 10 at least HOT STANDBY within.the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 3 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
- c. With two of the above required of fsite A. C. circuits inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two diesel generators by performing Surveillance Fequirement 4.8.1.1. 2.a. 4 within one hour and at least l 10 once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter, unle ss the diesel generators are already operating; restore at least one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT ST ANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. With only one offsite source restored, restore at least two of f site circuits to OPERABLE status l10 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from time of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the f ollowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- d. With two of the above required diesel generators O
inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A. C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1. a within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereaf ter; restore at least one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the f ollowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore the two diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> f rom time of initial loss or be in at least HOT ST ANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
3/4 8-2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 010.1_9_ J 3. 6) (PSPL The design of your main steam and feedwater systems includes an 80 ft break exclusion area in the tunnel between containment and the turbine building. The surrounding areas (adjacent and below) contain safety related equipment of systems such as auxiliary feed water, component cooling water, residual heat removal, and safety injection. Separation should be the primary means of protecting safety related equipment from the effects of pipe breaks. It is our position that in your present design, adequate separation be tween your main steam and feedwater lines and equipment necessary to bring the plant to a sa fe cold shutdown does not exist.
Fevise the SAR to show the new plant layout and arrangcment resulting from our meeting in October, 1977, and subsequent telephone conversations with regards to protection of safety related equipment in the auxiliary building from the effects of a 6 main steam or feedwater line break outside containment. Include a discussion of the protection provided, in addition to the new plant layout and arrangement drawings.
Pesponse 010.19 Fevised general arrangements to provide greater separation between high energy lines and safety related equipment are shown in amended Figures 1.2-3 through 1.2-10. In summary the following changes were made to meet this objective.
- 1. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps were relocated from the floor below the feedwater piping tunnel to below grade Elevation 72'6".
- 2. Both safety related cableways had been located at the same elevation on the floor below the feedwater t unel .
These cableways have been rearranged so that one cableway is below the other. In addition, separation between safety related cableways and the high energy piping in the turbine building has been provided.
- 3. An additional barrier at floor Elevation 14086", has been provided between the mainsteam and feedwater tunnels and the RHR heat exchangers.
The environment effects of cracks between the containnent and the moment restrains outboard of the isolation valves in the main steam and feedwater tunnels 0 010-22 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR 6 are in accordance with the requirements of NRC BTF i 10 APCSB 3-1 as stated in Section 3.6. Provisions for venting the main steam and feedwater tunnels are shown 6 on the general arrangement drawings.
Design provisions will be made to protect both the upper and lower safety cableway from the dynamic effects of a 10 break in the feedwater piping. l6 0
0 010-23 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 010.30 (9.1.4)
Section 9.1.4 of your PSAR includes a description of the fuel 6 cask handling crane. Provide a description and evaluation of other fuel handling equipment and facilities that are outside the scope of PESAR-414, and within the scope of GIBBSSAP.
Pesponse 010.30 Description of the Containment polar crane and decontamination equipment is included in GIBBSSAR Section 9.1.4.2. For design data of fuel handling equipment in GSH scope see Table 9.1-6.
Q 010-34 Amendment 6
GIBBSSAR h
Guestion 010.31 ( 9.1. 4) (R SP)
The evaluation of the RESAR-414 reactor vessel head drop analysis topical report has not been approved for reference by utilities referencing the RESAR-414 docket. It is our position that you commit to a single f ailure proof containment overhead crane for handling the RESAR-414 vessel head pending acceptance of the 6 topical report. This crane should be designed, tested, and inspected in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.104. Indicate your intent to comply with this position.
EeSE9Dse 010.31 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.104 for the design, testing and inspection of the containment polar crane is discussed in revised GIBBSSAR Sections 9.1.4 and 9.1.5. 10 Design data for the crane are in new Table 9.1-6, 6
O Amendment 10 O
Q 010-35
GIBBSSAR guestion 010.78 (a) Correct the following discrepancies i., Table 1.8-1: Table 1.8-1 lists the emergency boration system to be within the design scope of PESAR-414. This system has been deleted from the RESAR-414 scope of design. Revise Table 1.8-1 and your PSAR as necessary.
(b) Fevise Table 1.8-1 to include the design responsibility of 10 the containtrent overhead handling crane in the GIBBSSAR scope.
(c) Fevise Table 1.8-1 to identify that the Utility-Applicant will be responsible for the design of the new f uel storage racks as you have specified in Section 9.1.1 and in response to our request 010.27.
Fesponse 010.78 See Fevised Table 1. 8- 1, Sheets 4, 9, and 11.
0010-82 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 010.79 Table 3. 2-1 does not include the classification of the spent fuel pool and fuel pool liners. It is our position that the fuel pool and its line r plate be designed to seismic Category I requirements, or that you demonstrate that a failure of the linear as a result of an SSE will not cause any of the following:
( 1) Significant releases of radioactivity due to mechanical damage to the fuel; (2) Significant loss of water from the pool which could uncover the fuel and lead to release of radioactivity due to heat-up; 10
( 3) loss of ability to cool the fuel due to flow blockage caused by a portion, or one complete section of the linear plate falling on top of the fuel racks;
( 4) Damage to safety related equipment as a result of pool leakage; and (5) Uncontrolled release of significant quantities of radioactive fluids to the environs.
Eespgnse 010.79 Table 3. 2- 1 provides the classification of components and systems, but does not include structures. Section 3.2.1.1 has been revised to include the spent fuel pool and fuel pool liners.
Q010-83 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 010.80 Your response to our request 010.17 is not complete. In addition to the tornado missile protection of the diesel generator ventilation opening s , describe the tornado missile protection provided for all other safety related ventilation openings.
Pesponse 010.80 10 The tornado missile protection of the ventilation openings for the control room and the uncontrolled access area will be shown on Figures 1. 2- 4 and 1. 2- 7, issued for Anendment 4 There are two seperate air intakes, each providing sufficient makeup air for one control room unit and one uncontrolled access area unit of the same electrical Class 1E Bus. One of these openings is located in a penthouse on the roof of the auxiliary building. It consists of a vertical opening with bird screen and rain protection and a tornado-missile-proof concrete labyrinth which will prevent a tornado generated missile from entering the ventilation duct. The other opening is in the wall of the auxiliary building and the same type of protection is provided.
A tornado generated missile will be stopped by a wall, floor or ceiling slab of a concrete plen um chamber interna l to the opening. Diesel generator ventilation openings are shown in Figure 9.4-19. The other ventilation equipnent requiring ventilation openings in the auxiliary building exterior is non-nuclear safety related and does not neea tornado protection.
Howe ver , these openings will be constructed in the same manner as discussed above to prevent a tornado generated missile from entering the building, and will be shown on Figure 1.2-6 issued for Arendment 4.
Q010-84 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 010.81 In your response to our request 010.19 you state that the two safety related cable chases below the feewater tunnel have been rearranged so that one safety related chase is below the other.
You also state that provisions will be made to protect the lower cable chase from the dynamic effects of a break in the feedwater piping. It is our position that if the main feedwater piping in the area above the cable chases does not meet the "superpipe" criteria, then both safety related cable chases must be protected from the dynamic effects of a feedwater pipe break since a single active failure in equipment served by the remaining cable chase would prevent safe cold shutdown. Verify that your design meets our position and clarify exactly where in the main feedwater system the "superpipe" ends. Also revise the figures in Section 10 3.6 to make them consistent with the new arrangements identified in Section 1. 2, Amendment 6, and identify postulated break locations in the main feedwater system.
Fesponse 010.81 Both safety related cableways will be protected from the dynamic effects of a feedwater pipe break. See the revised response to Question 010.19. The "superpipe" portion of the feedwater system ends at the upstream side of the bending and torsion limiting lll (moment) restraints. Figures 3. 6- 1 A and 3. 6-1B have been revised to make them consistent with the general arrangement drawings.
Postulated break locations are shown on Figures 3.6-1A and 3.6-1E.
0010-85 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 010.82 Figures 3.6-10 and 11, Amendment 6, show AFW discharge piping runs in the area of the component cooling water system piping and the PHR system piping. It is our position that a pipe break in the auxiliary feedwater system piping should not danage either train of the CCW or RHR system, since a single active failure in the remaining CCW or RIIR train would prevent safe cold shutdown.
Show how your design will meet this position or revise your 10 design as necessary.
Pengonse 010.82 A pipe break in the auxiliary feedwater system piping will not damage either train of the CCW or RER system. See revised Section 3.6.1.1.
~
0010-86 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 010.83 Figure 9.1-3, Amendment 6, showe the seismic I re f ueling water storage tank connected to the 1.'nseismic refueling water puri fication pump. It is our position that two seismic Category I, Quality Group B, normally closed valves in series be used to isolate the re fueling water storage tank from the refueling water purification pump. These valves should also signal in the event of a LOCA in 10 receive an automatic closure order to meet the single active failure criteria. Fevise your design as necessary to meet this position. Figure 9.1-3 also shows isolation valve RV-SF-002 to fail in the open position.
Since this valve separates a safety from non-safety system, it should fail in the closed position.
Fesponse 010.83 See revised Figure 9.1-3.
O Q010-87 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 010.84 Sect ion 9.1.3.1, item f, lists the Regulatory Gudes and General Design Criteria to which your spent fuel pool cooling system will be designed. General Design Criterion 44, " Cooling Water," als applies in part to the spent fuel pool cooling system. 10 Verfiy that your system will meet the applicable requirement of General Design Criterion 44.
Fe sponse_010. 8 4 See revised Section 9.1.3.1.
0010-88 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 010.85 Your responses to our requests 010.29 and 010.31 indicate that you may misunderstand the intent of proposed Regulatory Guide 1.104. Your fuel building overhead crane does not have to comply with the positions of proposed Regulatory Guides 1.104 since your analysis shows that a cask drop will not result in damage to the fuel pool or its contents and will not prevent safe plant shutdown. Ho we ver, since we have not completed our review of the Westinghouse Topical Report analyzing the consequences of a reactor vessel head drop, it is our position that the containment polar crane be single failure proof and meet the guidelines of our Branch Technical Position 9-1 or proposed 10 Fegulatory Guide 1.104. If the topical report is found acceptable, then the polar crane inside containment will no longer need to be designed in accordance with our BTP 9-1 or proposed Pegulatory Guide 1.104.
Provide a conmitment that the containnent polar crane will meet the guidelines of our BTP 9-1 or proposed Regulatory Guide 1.104 if the Westinghouse topical report regarding a vessel head drop is found acceptable.
F sponse J 010.85 h The single failure-proof concept is followed for the fuel building overhead crane to prevent damage to the building and slabs, as discussed in Section 9.1. 2. 3f.
See the revised response to Question 010.31 and revised Sections 9.1.4.1 and 9.1.4.4 for a discussion of the containment pola r crane design.
0010-89 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 010.86 In Section 9.1.5 of your SAR, you state that the detailed specifications of cranes and vendors compliance with Regulatory Guid e 1.104 will be provided at the time of the Utility-Applicant's SAR. It is our position that you provide for GIBBSSAR PDA the design codes and standards that will be used in the design of these cranes. It is out position that the detailed specification and vendors compliance with BTP 9-1 or Pegulatory Guide 1.104 be addressed in your Final Design Report and not in 10 the Utility-Applicant's SAR. Revise your SAR to include the nece ssary information.
Pesponse 010.86 The design codes and standards that will be used in the design of these cranes are listed in revised Section 9.1.5. The detailed specifications and vendor's compliance with the intent of Pegulatory Guide 1.104 will be addressed in the Utility Applicants Final Safety Analysis Report as stated in Sect ion 9.1. 5.
0010-90 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cuestion_010.87 In your response to our request 010.32 you state that the details of certain areas of the GIBBSSAR fuel handling layout are contingent upon the Utility-Applicant's FSAR. Specify which areas you refer to and verify that the location of safety-related equipment below the cask handling or containment polar cranes will not te involved. Also identify any interface requirements imposed upon the Utility-Applicant for these areas.
Eespcnse 010.87 10 The areas in the fuel handling layout contingent upon the Utility Applicants FSAR are:
a) Decontamination Equipment Area - See Section 9.1.4.2.c b) New Fuel Storage Packs -
See Table 9.1-1, for interface requirements.
c) Manipulator Crane Layout -
See Table 9.1-5 and RESAF 414 Appendix 9A-7 for interface requirements. The location of Safety-Related equipment below the cask landing or containment polar cranes will not be involved. ggg Q010-91 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cues t ion 010.88 Your response to our position 010.38 is unacceptable. You state that the reactor coolant pumps are within Westinghouse sco,e and GIBBSSAR CCW will follow interface criteria imposed by RESAR-414.
The PESAR-414 Safety Evaluation Report imposes further 10 requirements on the balance-o f-plant designer of the component cooling water system to the RCP's. It is our position that your design meet these requirements as set forth in the RESAF-414 SER and cur position 010.38. Revise your design as necessary to meet this position.
Response 010.88 A response will be provided later.
Q010-92 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Question 010.89 In Section 9.2 you indicate that alternate designs of the service water system cooling water system and chilled water system may be used at sites where the quality and temperature of the service wate r system allow. It is our position that you provide PGID's of your alternate SWS design for sites where the chilled water systems are to be cooled by service water rather than the component cooling water system, and that you provide the PSID's of your alternate CCW design for sites where the component 10 cooling water system will be used to cool the diesel generators and the CVCS chiller. These drawings should be clearly identified as to which site envelopes they apply. Also, provide the design parameters of the heat exchangers for the engineered sa fe ty features chilled water system that will be used in place of the chiller units at sites where SWS or CCW system temperature is below 90 F.
The description and PSID's of each alternate system design along with their respective interface requirements should be clearly identified. Utility applicants referencing GIBBSSAR will be required to identify which system designs they intend to use for their application and will be reviewed its applicability on a case-by-case basis. lll Pesponse 010.89 A response will be provided later.
Q010-93 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 010.90 Table 9.2-10 of your PSAR regarding component cooling water interfaces is not complete. RESAR-414 also has interface requirements for the CCW to the RCP's identified in Section SA of FESAF-414. Verify that your CCW design meets these requirements. 10 Also discuss how your design meets the safety related interface requirements in RESAR-414, Section SA, regarding protection against a pressurizer relief tank rupture disc missile.
Pesponse 010.90 A response will be provided later.
Q010-94 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g guestion 010.91 In your response to our request 010.43 you state that the reactor makeup water storage tank and associated safety related piping and pumps will be designed to seismic Category I requirement, but will be non-nuclear safety class. It is our position that those portions of the reactor water makeup system that are used as a seismic Category I makeup source be designed to Quality Group C requirements as shown on Figures 9.2-5 and 9.2-6. Fevise your design Section 9.2.3 and Figure 9.1-3 as necessary. Also revise Table 3. 2- 1 to include the piping and valves of the reactor makeup water system that provide makeup to the spent fuel pool. 10 Pesognse 010.91 The seismic Category I makeup source has been changed from the Peactor Makeup Water System to the Fire Pr(tection System.
Consequently, the Reactor Makeup Water System has been classified as non-nuclear safety related. The fire protection booster pumps and the system piping and valves used as the seismic Category I makeup source will be designed to Safety Class 3 and seismic Category I requirements. See Section 9.2.3.2, revised Sect ions 9.1. 2. 2, 9.5.1.1, 9.5.1.2, and 9.5.1.6.5, revised Table 3.2-1, and revised Figures 9.1-3, 9.2-1,
- 9. 4- 5, and 9.5-1B.
9.2-2, 9.2-6, lll Q010-95 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cuestion 010.92 Figure 9.2.6, Amendment 2 has the following discrepancies:
(a) Make-up connection to the emergency boration surge tank.
This system has been deleted from the FESAP-414 scope.
(b) Fon-nuclear safety class identification on the makeup lines 10 to the chilled water expansions tank and the WPS low activity waste evaporator package is directly connected to a safety class 3 line without acceptable isolation.
Fevise Figure 9. 2-6 as necessary.
Pespgnse 010.92 The makeup connection to the emergency boration surge tank was deleted in Anendnent 9. See revised Figures 9.2-6 and 9.4-5.
0010-96 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF h
Question 010.93 In Section 9.3.3 you state that if ruptures of tanks or cracks in large piping occur, total flooding of the auxiliary building is prevented by operator action and your arrangement of floor drains. It is our position that no credit for operator action be taken for at least 30 minutes following an alarm which notifies the operator in the control room that operator action is 10 required. Verify that in the event of a tank rupture or pipe crack (break in non-seismic lines) , safety related equipment will not be affected for at least 30 minutes following an alarm which notifies the operator of a potential flooding in the auxiliary building.
Eesponse 010.93 See revised Sections 9.3.3.2 and 9.3.3.3.
O 0010-97 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 010.9_4 Your response to our request 010.50 regarding the RESAR-414 CVCS interf ace requirements in Section 9 A is not complete. Section 9A of FESAR-414 also requires t hat CVCS valves 110B.111B, 8339, 8355, and 8361 to be locked shut during refueling operations. 10 Verify that you will comply with this interface.
Fesponse 010.93 GIBBSSAP will comply with this interface. See revised Tables 9. 3-6 and 9.1- 5.
Q010-98 Amendment 10
GIBBFSAP Quest _ ion 010.95 Your response to our request 010.55 states that the Figure 9.4-4
" Main Steam and Feedwater Area Ventilation Flow Diagram," will be provided later. Verify that none of the equipment located in this area is necessary to bring the plant to a safe cold shutdown and that the ventilation system is not required to be safety grade.
Fesponse 010.95 Figure 9.4-4 has been deleted. The main steam and feedwater area 10 ventilation is shown on revised Figure 9.4-7. The main steam and feedwater area ventilation system is not required to be safety grade. The equipment located in this area is not required to bring the plant to a cold shutdown if offsite power is available and the condenser is available. If offsite power is not available or the condenser is not available, then the power operated relief valves, which are located in this area, would be used. They would operate in conjunction with Auxiliary Feedwater System to remove residual heat during the first stage of the cooldown. The power operated relief valves are equipped with handwheels so that they can be operated locally. See the response to Question 010.66.
0010-99 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Oues_ tion 010.96 Your response to our request 010.58 regarding the automatic start of safety related auxiliary air cooling units refers to Section 9.4.5.1 where you state that the auxiliary cooling units will start simultaneously with the equipment they serve. Section 9.2.9.3 states that during an emergency nod e , both the containment spray pump room coils and safety injection pump room 10 coils automatically receive chilled water through the opening of the ESF chilled water valves that control flow to these coils.
It is our position that all the other safety related cooling units also automatically receive chilled water to their coils.
Verify that the other safety related pump room auxiliary cooling units will automatically receive chilled water to their coils when the equipment in the rooms that they serve are automatically started.
Eepponse_010.96 All the safety related pump rooms will automatically receive chilled water to the coils whenever the equipnent is started or upon receipt of an "S" singal. See Sections 9. 2. 9. 3 and 9. 4. 5.1 and Figure 9.4-5.
Q 010- 100 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Question 010.97 Your response to our request 010.66 regarding the safety related main steam power operated relief valves states that a response will be provided later. It is our position that the power operated relief valves, valve actuators, power supplies, instrumentation and controls all be designed to seismic Category I requirements and be operable from the control room. 10 Fevise your design to neet this position and show that safe cold shutdown can be accomplished from the control room using only safety grade equipment, with or without offsite power. (See Peactor Systems Branch request 212.35 regarding cold shutdown using only safety grade equipment.)
Pesponse 010.97 The response to NRC Question 010.66 was provided in Amendment 7.
Section 10.3.3.2 describes the methods of valve actuation.
O 0010-101 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR QLies tion 010.98 Your recponse to our request 010.6B states that flooding of safety related equipment in the auxiliary building cannot occur from a failure in the circulating water system since access to the auxiliary building from the turbine building is through watertight doors. It is our position that these watertight doors be alarmed and indicated in the control room. Also provide the following information regarding the watertight doors and flooding in the turbine building.
a) Eiscuss the qualifications of the watertight doors and their testing and inspectian requirements.
b) Identify the number of watertight doors between the turbine and auxiliary buildings and their elevations.
10 c) Ceccribe how other penetrations between the two buildings will be qualified to maintain their integrity during flooding in the turbine building, and d) Cescribe the indications that will be provided in the control room to notify the operator of flooding in the turbine building.
Pgsponse 010.98 As stated in revised section 10.4.5.3, there is no direct access to t he auxiliary building f rom the turbine building. Access to the auxiliary building is from the electrical building through an enclosed corridor as shown in Figure 1.2-4 There are no piping or electrical penetrations between the auxiliary building and the turbine building below the water level that would result from a failure in the circulalting water system. This level is dependent on the circulating water system flow rate, and will be presented in the Utility Applicants SAR. Flooding in the turbine building is alarm in the control room by level switches in the turbine building sumps.
Q010-102 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Cpestion 010.99 Your response to our request 010.69 states that the feedwater isolation signal is utilized to automatically close all the feedwater isolation valves. It is our position that your feedwater regulating valves and bypass valves also receive 10 sign al s to close from the feedwater isolation signal. Verify that your design meets this position.
ESEDgnse 010.99 As shown in RESAR 414, Figures 7.3-2 and 7.2-1, the feedwater control valves and bypass control valves close on receipt of a feedwater isolation signal. Also see revised section 10.4.7.2.
O 0010-103 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 010,100 Your response to our request 010.71 regarding a main steam line break in the common line to the turbine driven pump did not consider a single active failure. If one of the motor driven pumps f ails to start the remaining motor driven pump will be feeding only one intact steam generator and one of the generators that is blowing down via the broken steam line to the turbine driven pump. It is our position that as a result of any single active failure considered that your design must meet the minimum 10 PESAP-414 requirements which include minimum auxiliary feedwater flow to two effective steam generators. Revise your design as necessary to meet this position. An acceptable method of meeting this position would include normally closed steam isolation valves to the turbine driven pump, rather than normally open.
Fespcnse 010.100 The steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump has teen vented. The supply isolation va lve s will be autonatically dosed on a loss of pressure signal caused by steam blowdown through a postulated line break.
The isolation valves are normally open to keep the steam supply headers under pressure to minimize the occurrence of a steam hammer in the lines. See revised Sections 10.3..l.6 and 10.4.9.3 and revised Figure 10.3-1.
Q010-104 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
C2CEti9D_0j0.101 In Section 10.4.9.3 you state that in the event of a feedwater line break inside containment, either the capacity of the turbine driven pump or the unaffected motor-driven pump is sufficient to deliver the minimum flow to the operable steam generators during the event where all of the flow from one motor driven pump and pa rt of the flow from the turbine driven pump are lost until the 10 break can be isolated. You have not considered a single active f ailure in this analysis and, therefore, the design does not meet our pipe break concurrent with a single active failure criteria.
It is our position that the minimum flow to the two steam generators (as required in RESAR-414) be automatically delivered following a feedwater line break inside containment and a single active failure of any AFW pump. Revise your design as necessary to meet this position.
Erfpgnse_ 010,101 As stated in Section 10.4.9.3, either the capacity of the turbine driven pump or the unaf fected motor driven pump is sufficient to deliver the minimum flow to two effective steam generators. If the unaffected motor driven pump is assumed to be inoperable because of a single active failure, then the capacity of turbine driven pump alone (where part of the lll flow from this pump is lost to the break) is sufficient to fulfill the minimum safety requirements of the system. See revised Sections 10.4.9.2 and 10.4.9.3.
Q010-105 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP guentign_010.102 Your response to our request 010.12 regarding feedwater hammer is not complete. It is our position that you commit to meet the FESAF-414 interface requirement in Section 10.2 of NUREG 0491 dated November 1978 which will require tests at nuclear power 10 plants to verify that damaging water hammer will not occur in the model H steam generator.
Penggnse_010.102 A response will be provided later.
Q010-106 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cuention_010.103 In response to our request 010.59 regarding the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room ventilation system, you state that auxiliary cooling units are unnecessary since the turbine exterior logging temperature will reach 165 F and the room equilibrium temperature will be 114 F. Verify that all safety related equipment such as valves, controls and instruments will te environmentally qualified for continuous operation at the lo worst expected temperature and humidity.
Pesponse 010.103 The safety related equipment associated with the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will be environmentally qualified for continuous operation at the worst expected temperature and humidity. See revised Table 3.11-4.
O 0010-107 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR POWER SYSTEMS BPANCH Question 040.01 General Comments Gibbs & Hill, Inc., should provide in this balance of plant SAR:
- a. As complete a description as possible for each system at this stage of design to address concerns in the corresponding Standard Review Plans.
- b. A tabulation of interface requirements for each system designed by GCH which interface with other systems (or compone nts) provided by the utility applicant, and
- c. A tabulation of systems and major components provided by the utility applicant. In each of these areas GCH should provide in this SAP as much typical description as possible (including drawings) for each system or component at this stage of design to address as many concerns as possible contained in the corresponding Standard Review Plans and in each case conclude your description with a statement to the affect "a complete of this system (or component) will be provided in the utility applicant's SAR."
Some examples:
- 1. The diesel generator unit and auxiliary systems, i.e., 10 diesel generator, diesel generator fuel oil system, cooling system, lubrication system, starting air system and air intake and exhaust system.
- 2. Turbine generator
- 4. Turbine Bypass system
- 5. Others Fesponse 040.01 GIBBSSAF provides as complete a description as possible for each system at this stage of design. The concerns in the corresponding Standard Review plans have been considered during the course of preparation of these descriptions.
Q040-1 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Section 1.8 discusses the interface criteria. Table 1.8-1 defines the design responsibility interfaces; Table 1.8-2 presents fluid system interfaces; Table 1.8-3 presents the inte rfaces for the Utility-Applicant for SAR inputs.
For those systems and major components that will be provided by the Utility-Applicant, GIBBSSAR provides as much typical description as possible (including drawings) for each system or 10 component at this stage of design, addressing as many concerns as possible contained in the corresponding Standard Feview Plans.
O Q040-2 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040.2 (Table 1.1-11 Exceptions taken to RESAR-414.
This table states that the motors listed in RESAR-414 rated for 4000V are furnished rated for 6600V in accordance wit h the GIBBSSAP designed AC distribution system. It is noted that the motors involved are f urnished by PESAP-414. (Tables 1.7-1 and 8.3-2 of RESAR 414). Concurrence from RESAP-414 should be 10 obtained and Table 1.8. GIBBSSAR revised to reflect the procurement responsibility of all major components including the motors addressed in the Table 1.1-1 exception.
Pesponse 040.2 A response will be provided later.
0040-3 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
GLuestion 040.3 (3.1.131 General Design Criterion (GDC) 13, Instrumentation and Control.
The discussion pertaining to GDC 13 should reference Chapter 8 10 equipment as well as Chapter 7 in order to indicate the degree of compliance for all equipment involved with engineering safeguards systems to GDC 13.
Ee s_ponse 040.3 See revised Section 3.1.1.
O Q040-4 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.4 (3.1.17)
General Design Criterion 17. Electric Power Systems.
Para graph four (4) of the " Discussion" pertaining to GDC 17 states, in part, "During a postulated LOCA, both diesel generators start automatically and connect to their respective buses. Safety-related loads are sequentially loaded onto the ESF buses if there is a loss of offsite power."
Regarding the first sentence quoted above concerning connecting the diesel generators to the ESF buses, the SAR should be 10 clarified to indicate that off-site power must be unavailable before connecting the diesel generators to their respective buses (see section 8.3-2 of PESAR-414) . Regarding the second sentence quoted above concerning load sequencing, it is inferred that the loads are not sequenced if off-site power is available. Section 8.1.17 should be revised to clarify the above items.
EfE2onse 040.4 See revised Section 3.1.17 Q040-5 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.5 (8.1.4)
Regulatory Guide 1.62 should be included in the documents listed 10 in the design criteria.
Response 040.5 See revised Section 8.1.4.
O C040-6 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.6J8.1.51 Address Regulatory Guides 1.40, 1.47, 1.53, 1. 6 2 and 1.73 and the 10 compliance thereto.
Fesponse 040.6 See revised Section 8.1.5.
0040-7 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Quegtion 040.7 (8.1.2, 8.3.1.11 Load Break Switch.
Provide the logic for operation of the load-break switch in the areas of closing, tripping during startup, normal operation, 10 shutdown, loss of preferred power and turbine trip, including interlocks with other bus supply breakers. Address the le vel of design qualification and reliability.
Fesponse 04 0.7 See revised Section 8.3.1.1.a.
O 0040-8 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR O
Jestion 040.8 (8. 2.R Include the power requirements (KVA ratings) for station service, unit auxiliary and main transformers and the corresponding input voltage requirements as interface requirements for the utility 10 applicant.
Eesponse 040.8 Input voltage requirements as interface requirements for the utility applicant are described in revised Section 8.2.1.
Transformer ratings will be provided later.
Q040-9 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cuestion 040.9 (8.3.1.1.a)
Section 8.3.1.1.a discusses tripping the reactor coolant pump breakers in the eve nt of a decrease-frequency condition.
RESAR-414 interface requirements of Section 7A indicates that reactor coolant pump speed sensors provide a reactor trip on pump underspeed but does not trip the RCP breakers on power frequency 10 decay rates of 5 Hz/second. Since Section 8.2.1 of GIBBSSAR specifies a frequency decay rate of 5 Hz/sec or less, it appears from the discussion in section 8.3.1.1.a that an inconsistency exists between the information presented in Section 8.3.1.1.a and that contained in Section 7A of RESAR-414.
Pesponse 040.9 See revised Sections 8.2.1 and 8.3.1.1.a O
0040-10 Amadment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.10 (8.3.1.1.a)
Provide a listing of all switchgear (by bus nomenclature) within the design and specifically address the source or cont rol power to each. This is needed to facilitate an independent review of 10 how your emergency power system design meets the single failure criterion and to determine the extent of loss due to postulated failures.
Response 040.10 ree revised Section 8. 3. 2.1 and Table 8. 3- 8.
0040-11 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.11 ( 8. 3.1. _1_ . b f 811 The discussion pertaining to automatic loading and stripping of buses should be expanded to provide more detail in the areas of load shedding and sequential loading of the diesel generator buses. Any residual loads on the emergency buses should be addressed. Figure 8.3-2 should be revised to depict both modes of sequencing (1- loss of preferred power and 2- a safety injection actuation signal) . Figure 8.3-2 should show the load 10 blocks in accordance with the appropriate tables (8.3-1, 8. 3- 2) .
Refer to 040.22 on staff position regarding diesel generator bus shedding.
Fesponse_040 2 11 See revised Section 8. 3.1.1,b (8) and Figure 8. 3-2. Figure 8. 3- 2 currently shows both modes of sequencing. The intent of this diagram is to show the major 6.9 kV loads and the logic of the sequencing system. A complete detailed de scription of the various load blocks is contained in Tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2, which are referenced in Figure 8. 3-2. The figure is modified to include the load shedding interlock during sequencing and the additional Bus 1EA1 voltage system.
O 0040-12 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040._12 (8.3.1.1.b.111 The discussion on relay protection should be expanded to specif y the location of the alarm and indication monitors.
Fecent experience with Nuclear Power Plant Claus IE electrical system equipment protective relay applications ha s e stablished 10 that relay trip setpoint drifts with conventional type relays have resulted in premature trips of redundant sa fety related system pump motors when the safety system was required to be operative. While the basic need for prope r protection for feeders / equipment against permanent faults is recognized, it is the staff's position that total non-availability of red undant safety systems due to spurious trips in protective relays is not acceptable.
Provide a description of your circuit protection criteria for safety systems / equipment to avoid the above referred protective relay trip set point drift problems.
Fesponse 040.12 Fesponse to this question is provided in revised Sect ion 8.3.1.1. b.11.
e Q040-13 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Queytion 040.13 ( 8. 3.1.1. b.12},
Diesel generator testing, paragraph 16.3/4.8.1.1.2 should be expanded to consider RG 1.108 and the following:
a) Verifying that on loss of offsite power the diesel generators start on the autostart signal, the emergency buses are energized with permanently connected loads, the 10 auto-connected shutdown loads are energized through the load sequencer, and the system operates for five minutes while the generators are loaded with the shutdown loads.
b) Verifying that on a safety features actuation signal (without loss of offsite power) the diesel generators start on the autostart signal and operate on standby for five minutes.
The above tests should be performed at least once per 18 months.
Fesponse 040._13 See revised Section 16.3/4.8.1.
O Q040-14 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.14 (8.3.1.2.6L Provide a listing of the following for the containment electrical penetrations by voltage Class: I2t ratings, ma ximum predicted fault currents, identification of maximizing faults, protective equipment setpoints, and expected clearing times.
Pesppnse 040.14 The selection of electrical penetrations is described in Section 8.3.1.2.6, " Compliance with Fegulatory Guide 1.63".
Detail information concerning the design of the electrical penetration assembly will be provided in the Utility Applicant's 10 FSAF when the detailed design data become available.
0040-15 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR 9
Ouestion 040.15 ( 8. 3 .1. 4. 2. 5)
The type of barrier employed on the crossover trays should be specified.
Fesponse 040.15 Discussion of barrier has been deleted from Section 8.3.1.4.2.5.
See revised Section 9.5.1.6.4, General Plant Guidlines for design barrier used will be 10 criteria. The design of the type of included in the Utility Applicant's FSAP.
O 0040-16 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR pues tion 04 0.16 J8. 3.1. 4. 3)
The seismic category of the trays and supports carrying non-Class IE circuits, that could jeopardize the integrity of 10 Class IE circuits, should be specified.
Eesponse 040.16 See revised Section 3.10.1 9
Q040-17 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.17 ( 8. 3 .1.1. cMU 8. 3 .1.1. e110R Specif y the "other manual control alarms" associa ted with inhibiting automatic operation discussed in 8. 3.1.1. e (10) .
Specif y the location of all a la rms. Provide additional information on the diesel generator trouble alarm discussed in this paragraph. The alarms should be in accordance with the following:
Diesel generator alarms in the control room: A review of malfunction reports of diesel gene rators at operating nuclear plants has uncovered that in some cases the information available to the control room operator to indicate the operational status lo of the diesel generator may be imprecise and could lead to misir'wrpretation. This can be caused by the sharing of a single annurciator station to alarm conditions that render a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal and to also alarm abnormal, but not disabling, conditions.
Another cause can be the use of wording of an annunciator window that does not specifically say that a diesel generator is inoperable (i.e., unable at the time to respond to an automatic emergency start signal) when in fact it is inoperable for the purpose.
Review and evaluate the alarm and control circuitry for the O
diesel generators at your facility to determine how each condition that renders a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal is alarmed in the control room.
These conditions include not only the trips that lock out the diesel generator start and requirc manual reset, but also control switch or mode switch positions that block automatic start, loss of control voltage, insufficient starting air pressure or battery voltage, etc. This review should consider all aspects of possible diesel generator operational conditions, for example test conditions and operation f rom local control stations. One area of particular concern is the unreset condition following a manual stop at the local station which terminate s a diesel gene rato r test and prior to reseting the diesel generator controls for enabling subsequent automatic operation.
Provide the details of your evaluation, the re sults and conclusions, and a tabulation of the following information:
(a) all conditions that render the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signa l for each operating mode as discussed above; Q040-18 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR (b) the wording on the annunciator window in the control room that is alarmed for each of the conditions identified in (a) ;
(c) any other alarm signals not included in (a) above that also cause the same annunciator to alarm; 10 (d) any condition that renders the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal which is not alarmed in the control room; and (e) any proposed modifications resulting from this evaluation.
Pospgnse 040.17 See revised section 8.3.1.1.c.
Q040-19 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion_040.18 (8.3z 2 1.bt Provide the basis for establishing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as the time required to restore the battery from minimum charge to fully charged state, while supplying its normal steady state loads.
Fesponse 040.18 Section 8.3.2.1.b has been revised to reflect the change of charging period from 24 to 12 houis.
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> has been established as the time required to restore the battery from designed minimum charge to f ully charged state. The 12-hour pe riod has been selected to reflect manufacturer's 10 recommended optimal charging period for the battery.
Each Class 1E 125-V battery system is serviced by two redundant battery chargers to permit charger maintenance without degrading system integrity. Each charger may be supplied from either one of two Class 19 480V MCC's. With this flexibility of design it is extremely unlikely that the Class 1E, 125-V battery will be discharged to its designed minimum charge state during any normal or emergency mode of operation. Consequently, the 12-hour charging period is unlikely to be f ully utilized. ggg 0040-20 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.19 ( 8. 3_. 2.1.c)
DC System testing.
The DC testing delineated in 16.3/4.8.2.32 should include a resistance measurement cell-to-cell and terminal connections at 10 least once each 18 months.
R_esEonse 040.19 See revised Section 16.3/4.8.2.3.2.
0040-21 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP gue.Ls tion 04 0. 20 (8.3.2.3L Pegulatory Guide 1.40, 1.62 and 1.108 should be added to the list of references (per 040. 6, 040,13).
Desponse 040.20 10 See revised Section 8.1.4. It is assumed that the Question number identified in the Question should be 040.5 and 040.12.
O 0040-22 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.21 ( 8. 3.1.1. bs jt_ Fig. 8.3-2 Paragraph 8.3.1.1.b.8 and Figure 8.3-2 indicate that a second level of voltage protection is provided with a time delay in order to protect the onsite power system f rom any adverse ef fects that could result from a substained degraded voltage condition on the offsite power system. Provide the design details of both protection systems. The design shall satisfy the following criteria:
a) The selection of voltage and time set points shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the safety-related loads at all onsite system distribution levels; b) The voltage protection shall include coincidence logic to preclude spurious trips of the of fsite power source; c) The time delay selected shall be based on the following conditions:
(1) The allowable time delay, including margin, shall not exceed the maximum time delay that is assumed in the 10 FS AR accident analyses; (2) The time delay shall minimize the effect of short duration disturbances from reducing the availability of the of fsite power source (s) ; and (3) The allowable time duration of a degraded voltage condition at all distribution system levels shall not result in failure of safety systems or components; d) The voltage sensors shall automatically initiate the disconnection of of fsite power sources whenever the voltage set point and time delay limits have been exceeded; e) The voltage sensors shall be designed to sa tis f y the following requirements:
- 1) Class 1E equipment s hall be utilized and shall be physically located at and electrically connected to the emergency switchgear.
- 2) An independent scheme shall be provided for each division of energency power.
0040-23 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR
- 3) Capability for test and calibration during power operation shall be provided.
- 4) Annunciation must be provided in the control room for any bypasses incorporated into the design; and f) The Technical Specifications shall include limiting condition for operation, surveillance requirements, trip set points with minimum and maximum limits , and allowable values for the second level voltage protection sensors and associated time delay devices.
Response 040.21 See revised Sections 8. 3.1.1.b (8) , 8. 3.1.1. b ( 12) and 16.3/4.8.1.
10 The limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements of the 6.9 kV Class 1E bus under-voltage and degraded voltage protection systems are part of the load shedding requirements described in Section 16.3/4.8.1.
The trip set points and tolerances for these systems will be provided bi the Utility Applicant's FSAR.
O Q040-24 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040.22 We require that when the diesel generator is supplying power to the energency bus, the design shall automatically prevent load shedding of the emergency bus during the sequencing cycle. The design shall also include the capability of the load shedding feature to be automatically reinstated at the completion of the sequencing cycle.
Provide the details of your design and state your intent to comply with this position or provide justification for any exceptions taken.
We further require that the Technical Specifications include a test requirement to demonstrate the full functional operability of the bypass and reinstatement feature at lea st once per 10 18 months during shutdown. Proper operation shall be determined by:
Verifying that on interruption of the onsite sources the loads are shed from the emergency buses in accordance with design requirements and that subsequent loading of the onsite sources is through the load sequencer.
Fesponse 040.22 See revision of Sections 8. 3.1.1, b ( 8) , 8. 3.1.1, b ( 12) and 16.3/4.8.1 Q040-25 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP Ouestion 040.23 The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the full load and minimum load conditions that are e xpe cted throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations 10 of the of fsite power source by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening transformers. We require that the adequacy of the design in this regard be ve rified by actual measurement.
Provide a description of the method for making this verification.
Provide the documentation required to establish that this verification will be accomplished.
Fesponse 040.23 See revised section 8.3.1.1.b.
O 0040-26 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.24 Provide a description of the physical arrangement utilized in your design to connect the field cables inside containment to the containment penetrations, e.g. connectors, splices, or terminal blocks. Provide supportive documentation that these physical interfaces are qualified to withstand a LOCA or steam line break environment.
Responsa 040.24 Connectors, termination lugs, and terminal blocks will all be utilized in connecting the field cables inside the containment to the electrical penetrations. Connectors will be used on coax and triax cables, termination lugs be used on large power cables, and terminal blocks located in terminal boxes will be utilized by all other cables.
10 All Class 1E connections between field cable and electrical penetrations inside the containment will be qualified to withstand the environmental conditions resulting f rom a LOCA or stean line break. After the penetration vendor has been selected, and the detailed design finalized, the supportive docunentation will be provided in the Utility Applicant's FSAR.
Q040-27 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.25 Provide a listing of all motor operated valves within your design that require power lock out in order to meet the single failure criterion and provide the details of your design that accomplish this requirement.
Fesponse 040.25 Motor operated valves which are required to have a power lockout feature are listed below. These valves are not required to open or close in various safety system operational sequences, but are 10 manually controlled and are operable from the control room.
Valvc No. Valve Functions Valve Position 9011 A/B normal cooldown closed 9013 A/B normal cooldown closed 9016 A/B PHP/HL Pecirc closed 8807 HHS1/HL Recirc closed To accomplish the power lockout design, a disconnecting device will be added in the power circuit of each valve after the thermal overload elements. This disconnecting device will be located in the motor control center. Control room indications of the positions of each motor operated valve and the positions of the disconnect device will be provided.
An administrative operating procedure will be followed to manually open the above mentioned disconnecting device in the corresponding motor control center, after the valve operation is completed. The position indications of the valve in the control room is still operational since the starter control transformer remains energized.
The re-energizing of the valve motor can only be accomplished by manually closing the disconnect device and operating the control switch located in the control room.
Q040-28 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF guestion 040.26 Provide a description of the capability of the emergency power syster battery chargers to properly function and remain stable upon the disconnection of the battery. Include in the 10 description any foreseen modes of operation that would require battery disconnection such as when applying an equalizing charge.
Response 040.26 See revised Section 8.3.2.1.a Q040-29 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR O
Ouestion 040.27 Provide the details of your design of the DC power system that assures equipment will be protected from damaging ove rvoltage s 10 from the battery chargers that may occur due to faulty regulation or operator error.
Response 040.27 See revised Section 8.3.2.1.b.
O Q040-30 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Cuestion 040.28 Provide the results of a review of your operating, maintenance, and testing procedures to determine the ( xtent of usage of jumpers or other temporary forms of bypassing f unctions for operating, testing, or maintaining of safety related systems.
Identify and justify any cases where the use of the above methods cannot be avoided. Provide the criteria for any use of jumpers for testing.
Pesconse 040.28 At the operating license review stage, a review of operating, maintenance, and testing procedures will be made to determine the extent of usage of jumpers or other temporary forms of bypassing 10 functions for ope rating , testing, or maintaining of safety related systems results of this review will be provided in the Utility Applicant's FSAR.
The criteria for the use of jumpers in testing is in comformance with Fegulatory Guide 1.118.
0040-31 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.29 We request that you perform a review of the electrical control circuits for all safety related equipment, so as to assure that disabling of one component doe s not, through incorporation in other interlocking or s equencing controls, render other components inoperable. All modes of test, operation, and failure should be considered. Describe and state the results of your review.
Fesponse 040.29 The electrical control circuits for all BOP safety related equipment are designed to assure that the disabling of one lo component does not, through incorporation of interlocking or sequencing controls, render other components inoperable. In the cases where this condition can not be avoided, administrative procedure will be provided to assure the operating personnel's awareness of the system constraint during all modes of operation.
These control circuits will be reviewed and the results discussed in the Utility Applicant's FSAR.
O 0040-32 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.30 The information regarding the onsite communications system (Section 9. 5. 2) does not adequately cover the system capabilities during transients and accidents. Provide the following information:
a) Identify all working stations on the plant site where it may te necessary for plant personnel to communicate with the control room or the emergency shutdown panel during and/or following transients and/or accidents (including fires) in order to mitigate the consequences of the event and to attain a safe cold plant shutdown.
b) Indicate the maximum sound levels that could exist at each of the above identified working stations for all transients and accident conditions, c) Indicate the types of communication systems available at each of the above identified working stations.
d) Indicate the maximum background noise level that could exist at each working station and yet reliably expect effective 10 communication with the control room using:
- 1. the page party communications system, and
- 2. any other additional communication system provided that working station.
e) Describe the performance requirements and tests that the above onsite working stations communication systems will be required to pass in order to be assured that effective communication with the control room or emergency shutdown panel is possible under all conditions, f) Identify and describe the power source (s) provided for each of the communications systems.
g) Discuss the protective measures taken to assure a functionally operable onsite communication system. The discussion should include the considerations given to component failures, loss of power, and the severing of a communication line or trunk as a result of an accident or fire.
Q040-33 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Pesponse 040.30 10 A response will be provided later.
O 0040-34 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.31 (Fig. 8. 3- 1)
This figure should be revised to indicate input transformer ratings and major bus voltages (see 040. 7) .
Eesponse 040.31 10 Major bus voltages are shown in Figure 8.3-1. Transformer ratings will be provided later.
0040-35 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.32 (Tables 8.3-1, 8. 3- 2)
Some of the component nomenclature and ratings of tables 8.3-1 and 8.3-2 do not correspond with those listed in RESAR 414, tables 8.3-1, 8.3-2. (Examples: Station Service Water Pumps vs. 10 Essential Service Water Pumps, 450 HP rating for PHR Pumps vs.
500 HP.)
Review the PESAR-414/GIBBSSAR Tables 8.3-1, 8.3-2 and revise the listing as necessary to resolve the dif ferences.
Fesponse 040.32 A response will be provided later.
O 0040-36 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.33 Address the degree of compliance with Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 regarding the capacity of the battery operated lighting units in the essential lighting system. Additionally clarify the 10 description regarding fixed self-contained lighting and portable hand lighting in view of the ASB 9.5-1 requirements.
Fesponse 040.33 For a discussion of the capacity of the battery operated lighting units in the essential lighting system, and the discriptions of the fixed self-contained and portable hand held lighting units, see subsection 9.5.1.6.4.e and Section 9.5.3.
0040-37 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.34 (3.2)_J3.6L In tables 3.2-1 sheet 7, and 3. 6- 1, sheet 1, the Main Steam System is listed for classification. The description states:
" Piping and valves (within t he containment, from the steam generator nozzle up to an including the main steam stop valves) . "
- a. Clarify the above and explicitly describe the " main steam stop valves".
- b. Are the main steam stop valves what are normally called the main steam isolation valves and are they located inside the 10 containment as stated?
Fesponse 040.34 The main steam stop valves are the main steam isolation valves which are explicity described in Section 10.3.3.3.
These valves are located outsid e the containment as shown on Figure 10.3-1. Table 3.2-1 sheet 7 has been revised to clarify the classification.
O 0040-38 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.35 Discuss your conformance to R.G. 1.137 and ANSI N135 relative to the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel oil Storage a nd Transfe r System (EDGFOSTS) . 10 Feponse 040.35 A response will be provided later.
Q 04 0- 3 9 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Quejition 040.36 Section 9.5.4.1 indicates that the diesel separator day tanks are sized for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of operation whereas Table 9.5-2 indicates 10 that the capacity of the tanks is sufficient for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of operation. Correct this discrepancy.
Pesponse 040.36 A response will be provided later.
O Q040-40 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.37 Table 9. 5- 1, sheet 1, indicates that the fuel oil day tank for each diesel generator has a capacity of 1790 gallons. Branch 10 technical position ASB 9.5-1 and Regulatory Guide 1.120 limits the total capacity of day tanks in the diesel generator area to not more than 1100 gallons. Revise your PSAR to conform to the above requirements.
Pe spons e 040. 37 A response will be provided later.
s 0040-41 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g Ouestion 040.38 Discuss your conformance to regulatory guides 1.36, 1.39, 1.68, 1.102, and 1.117, relative to the diesel generator a uxiliary systems.
Fesponse 040.38 Conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.26 and 1.29, related to quality group classification and seismic design classification, respectively, is discussed in revised Sections 9.5.4 through
- 9. 5. 8.
Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.68, related to preoperational and initial startup te st programs is discussed in revised 10 Sections 9. 5. 4 through 9.5. 8 and Chapter 16.
Conformance to Regulatory Guides 1.102 and 1.117, related to flood protection and tornado design classification, respectively, is achieved by locating the diesel generator auxiliary systems of in the seismic Category I Auxiliary Building, with the exception the fuel oil storage tanks, which are located underground, as discussed in revised Sections 9.5.4 through 9.5.8.
O Q040-42 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.39 (9.5.41 Provide a table with a listing of information that all the provided later by the utility applicant (U-A) to sa tisf y and complete the requirements stated in Standard Peview Plan 8. 5. 4
" Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System". For example:
Table 9.5-1, sheet 2, has notes #1 and #3 and which state 10 that the information is dependent on the selections of the diesel generator manufacturer. Therefore the requested listing should show that the required information will be included in the Applicant's SAR when the diesel generator is selected. (See General notes.)
Pesponse 040.39 See Table 9.5.-12.
Q040-43 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guegtion 040.40 In reference to Fig. 9. 5-2, Diesel Fuel Oil System
- 1. There is a note on the fuel oil storage tank that the 4" vents have a flame arrestor. Provide a similar note for the vents on the day tanks. 10
- 2. There is an indication that the storage tanks are Seismic Cat. I, Class 3. Provide the classification of the day tanks.
Fesponse 040.40 A response will be provided later.
O 0040-44 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.41 The day tank associated with each diesel generator set should be provided with an overflow line to return excess fuel oil 10 delivered by the transfer pump back to the fuel oil storage tanks. Show this on Fig. 9.5-2 (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item Sd) .
Response 040.41 A response will be provided later.
0040-45 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.42 Identify any high energy piping system (s) in the diesel engine room areas and indicate what means are provided to protect the following diesel engine systems from the effects of a f ailure of high energy piping:
- a. fuel oil systems
- t. cooling water system
- c. air starting system 10
- d. lubrication system
- e. combustion air intake and exhaust system (ERP 9.5.4 Part III, Item 8; SRP 9.5.5, Part III, Item 4; SRP 9.5.6, Part III, Item 5; SRP 9.5.7, Part III, Item 3; SRP 9.5.8, Part III, Item 6c) .
Pesponse 040.42 A response will be provided later.
Q040-46 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.43 Figure 9. 5-2, Flow Diagram Diesel Fuel Oil System, shows a filter in one line from the fuel oil storage tank but does not show a differential pressure switch for monitoring for cleanliness. 10 Indicate the means for monitoring the filter for cleanliness and also if there will be alarms locally and in the control room (SRP 9.5.4, Part III, Item 1) .
Pesponse 040.43 A response will be provided later.
O Q040-47 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.44 Figure 9.5-2 does not show and section 9.5.4 does not discuss any instrumentation for measuring flow rate for the emergency diesel 10 generator fuel oil system. Provide information showing the means for monitoring flow rate and any alarms provided (SRP 9. 5. 4, Part III, Item 1) .
Response 040.44 A re sponse will be provided later.
t 0040-48 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Qtu estion 040.45 Figures 9.5-2 and 9.5-3 show a fill connection and vent in the underground fuel oil storage tank. Indicate the height of the vent and fill connection relative to the FNF flood level (SRP 10 9.5.4, Part III, Item Sa) .
Eesponse 040.45 A response will be provided later.
Q040-49 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.44 Figure 9.5-2 does not show and section 9.5.4 does not discuss any instrumentation for measuring flow rate for the emergency diesel 10 generator fuel oil system. Provide information showing the means for monitoring flow rate and any alarms provided (SRP 9. 5. 4, Part III, Item 1) .
Response 040.44 A response will be provided later.
O Q04 0-4 8 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR gugstion 040.47 In section 9.5.5 discuss the external source of water supply for cooling the diesel generator cooling system. Include in the SAR;
- 1) the G6H interface requirements and 2) a statement that the cooling water system description will be in the U-A SAR if this is the case.
Fesponse 040.47 10 As shown in Figure 9.5-4, the external source of water supply for cooling the diesel generator cooling system is the service water system, which is described in Section 9.2.1.
The design responsibility is indicated in Table 1.8-1.
The cooling water system description is included in GIBBSSAR.
See revised Section 9.5.5.2.
Q040-51 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Mestion 040.48 Figure 9.5-4, nr.ergency Diesel Generator Cooling Water System, 10 shows triangles with a numerical value of 6. Indicate the significance of these symbols.
P_esponse 040.48 The symbol denotes changes made to the Figure for Amendment 6.
See revised Figure 9.5-4.
O 0040-52 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040.49 Figure 9.5-4 shows a surge tank (standpipe in the diesel) generator cooling water system. The surge tank will provide a reserve to compensate for system changes in volume and any minor leaks during operation. The surge tank will also maintain the required NPSH on the system circulating pump. Demonstrate that the surge tank size will be adequate to maintain the required NPSH and makeup water for seven days continuous operation of the diesel generator at maximum rated load, or provide a seismic Category 1, quality group makeup water supply to the surge tank.
Posponse 040.49 10 The surge tank will contain a sufficent volume of water and will he located to raintain the NPSH required by the pump for se ven days of coninuous operation of the diesel generator at maximum rated load. The evaporation of water from the surge tank will be aininal, and loss of function of the jacket cooling water loop because of evaporation is not considered likely. See re vised section 9.5.5.2.
@ 0040-53 Amendrent 10
GIBBSSAR Cuestion 040.50 In sections 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.5.7 and 9.5.8 you state that "when a compenent is commercially unavailable as ACME Class 3 design, the component will be of the highest commercial quality available from the chosen man uf ac turer. " Indicate what pa rticula r describe what is your 10 components these statements refer to interpretation of "the highest commercial quality available", and will these particular components be seismically qualified either by analysis or test to assure availability of the diesel gene rators under all normal and accident conditions.
F_espgnse 040.50 See 'Iable 9. 5- 10.
O 0040-54 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.51 Section 9.5.5 states that instrumentation and controls for the diesel generator cooling water system are outlined in s ubsection 8.3.1.1.c. However, this subsection does not include the desired 10 info rmation, it indicates that instrumentation and alarms for the diesel generator cooling system are discussed in Section 9.5.
Provide this information. (See general comments.)
Eenngnse 040.51 A response will be provided later.
Q040-55 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040.52 Figure 9.5-4 shows temperature and pressure instrumentation in one diesel generator cooling system. Provide information in Section 9. 5.5 to indicate if there will be alarms locally and in 10 the control room if the cooling water temperature or pressure are above or below the recommended limits.
Fesponse 040.52 See revised Sections 9. 5. 5. 2 and 9. 5. 5. 3.
O 0040-56 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040.53 Provide a discussion of the measures that will be taken in the design of the standby diesel generator air starting system to preclude the fouling of the starting air valve or filter with contaminants such as water, oil carryover and rust (SRP 9. 5. 6, Part III, Item 1) .
Pesponse 040.53 Strainers have been provided between the air receiver outlet and the solenoid valve to preclude fouling of the valve. See revised 10 Section 9. 5. 6. 2 and Figure 9. 5-5.
In addition, each air receiver is equipped with a drain which can be opened periodically to remove accumulated moisture.
e 0040-57 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouest_ ion 040.54 In reference to Figure 9.5-5, Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System:
- 1. Indicate if the filters shown will have means for monitoring for cleanliness and also have alarms for alerting operators. 10
- 2. Indicate if the air receivers will have alarms to alert operators if the pre ssure falls below the minimum allowable value.
Pesponse 040.54 See revised Section 9.5.6.2 and revised Figure 9.5-5.
G Amendment 10 k 0040-58
GIBBSSAR
-1 puestion 040.55 section 9.5.6 indicates that information on instrumentation and monitoring of the diesel generatcr air starting system is provided in subsection 7.3.1.1.g. However, the subsection is entitled " Control Room Air-Conditioning System". Provide the 10 information and the proper reference. (See general comments.)
Eesnonse 040.55 Info rmation on instrumentation and monitoring has been included in revised Section 9.5.6.2.
/-
0 0040-59 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR question 040.56 section 9.5.7 provide a typical lubrication PSID that In indicates the basic components and instrumentation for a diesel gene rator lubrication system. Discuss the parameters that will 10 be monitored and if a method for keeping the crankcase oil heated above a minimum value during the standby mode will be used. (See general comments.) (SEP 9.5.7, Part III, Item 1. )
Pesponse 040 356 See revised Section 9. 5.7 and Figure 9.5-9.
e Q040-60 Amendment 10
GIPBSSAR Qug tion 040.57 Sect ion 9.5.8 refers to Figure 9.5-6 as showing the combustion air and exhaust system components. This is in error, it should reference Figure 9.5-8. Correct this discrepancy.
10 PJ gonse 040.57 The discrepancy has been corrected. Revised Section 9.5.8 refers to Figure 9.5-8 0 Q040-61 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAF guestion_040.58 The combustion air intake and exhaust system description contained in section 9.5.8.2 is inadequate. Provide a more 10 deta iled description of the system, its coa.ponen t s , their arrangement and instrumentation employed in its design. (See general comments.)
Eesponse 040.58 A detailed system description is provided in revised Sect ion 9.5.8. 2. A detailed arrangement is shown in revised Figure 9.5-8.
O Q040-62 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.59 General arrancar.citt plan views of the diesel generator building are shown in F.gures 1.2-4, 1. 2-5 and 1. 2-6 and an elevation view 10 in Figure 1.2 10. Provide larger and more detailed plans and elevation views of the diesel generator building with sectional views that clearly show the details of the diesel generator arrangement.
P_esponse 040.59 See figure 9.4-19.
0040-63 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP guestion 040.60 Provide a discussion to explain how the diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system is protected from: 1) possible clogging during operation, including standby, from atmospheric 10 conditions (heavy rain, freezing rain, dust storms, ice, and snow) ; 2) damage by tornado missiles that could prevent operation of the diesel generator on demand (SRP 9.5.8, Part III, Item 4 and 6t) .
Pespcnse 040.60 See revised Section 9.5.8.3.
G Q040-64 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Question 040.61 Expand the discussion on safety evaluation in section 9.5.8 to include possibility of the accidental release of any of the stored gases mentioned in section 9.5.9 (carbon dioxide and 10 nitrogen for the main generator) and the possible effects on diesel generator operation.
Eesponse 040.61 Accidental release of any stored gases has no effect on diesel generator operation. See revised Section 9. 5. 8. 3.
Q040-65 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Oyclition 040.62 Table 10.1-1 is not complete as it states that information on description for the General Electric Co. Turbine Generator will 10 be provided later. This is not acceptable. Provide this information. (See general comments.)
Fes2cnse 040.62 See revised Table 10.1-1 and Figure 10.1-7.
9 Q040-66 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR question 040.63 Expand the discussion of the (Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers, and General Electric) turbine overspeed protection systems. For the turbine speed control system include explanation of the turbine and generator electrical load following capability. Tabulate the individual overspeed protection devices (normal, emergency and back up) , the design speed (or percent of rated speed) tha t the operation performs its safeguard function and specify the valves or other components which are subsequently activated to complete 10 the turbine trip. Provide the results of a failure mode and effects analysis for each of the overspeed protection systems.
Show that a single valve failure cannot disable the turbine overspeed trip functions (SRP 10. 2 Part III, Items 1 and 2) . If this information cannot be furnished by GSH at this time, indicate that the utility applicant will provide the detailed information in his SAR.
Pespgnse 040.63 This information will be provided in the Utility-Applicant's SAR.
0040-67 Amendment 10
GIBESSAP guention 040.64 For each turbine generator manufacturer (Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers and General Electric) provide a PND of the main Steam supply lines s howing all the valves from the steam generator outlet to the turbine stop and control valves and all other steam loads supplied between the MSIV's and turbine stop valvcs. Also provide a typical PSID for each turbine generator 10 manufacturer showing extraction steam lines including the extraction heater non-return valves and reheat steam stop and inte rcept valves. Provide the closure times for all the turbine, reheat and extraction steam valves and show that stable turbine operation will result after a turbine trip (SPP 10.2, Part III, Item 4) .
Pesponse 040.64 This information will be provided in the Utility-Applicant's SAP.
O Q040-68 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ouestion 040.65 Provide a discussion on the inservice inspection procram for the turbine, turbine stop and control valves, intermediate reheat stop main and intercept valves and extraction heater non-return 10 valves and also on the capability for periodic testing while operating at rated load (SRP 10.2, Part III, Items 5 and 6) .
Pesponse 040.65 See revised section 10.2.3.6.
O Q04 0-6 9 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR g Ouestion 040.66 Describe with the aid of drawings, the bulk hydrogen storage facility including its location and distribution system.
10 Ee_Eggnse 040.66 The bulk hydrogen storage facility, if selected, will be located provided in the in the plant yard. 'Ihe exact location will be Utility- Applicant ' s SAR. The distribution system is shown in Figu re 9. 5- 7.,
4 0040-70 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guestion 040.67 Discuss the ef fects of a high and moderate energy piping f ailure or f ailure of the connection from the 1;Tw pressure turbine to condenser on nearby safety related equii2{3nt or systems. Discuss what protection will be provided for the turbine overspeed control system equipment, electrical wiring and hydraulic lines 10 from the ef fects of a high or moderate energy pipe failure so that the turbine overspeed protection system will not be damaged to preclude its safety function (SRP 10.2, Part III, It em 8) .
Fespgnse 040.67 A response will be provided later.
0 0040-71 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Ques tion 04 0.68 Discuss the trea sures taken to prevent corrosion / erosion of condenser tubes and components (SRP 10.4.1, Pa rt III, Item 1) . 10 Fespgpse 040.68 A response will te provided later.
t 0040-72 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR Oues119D_040.69 Discuss the means for detecting controlling leakage (SRP 10.4.1, 10 Part III, Item 2) .
Fesponse 040.69 See revised Section 10. 4.1. S., a.
0040-73 Amendment 10
GIEBSSAP Qties t ion _ 04 0. 7 0 Indicate what design provisions have been made to preclude failures of condenser tubes or components from turbine bypass 10 blowdown (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 3) .
Pespggse 040.70 A response will be provided later.
0040-74 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP Ouestign 040.71_ (10._4.11 Discuss the effect of main condenser degradation (leakage, Part III, 10 vacuum, loss) on reactor operation (SRP 10.4.1, Item 1) .
Fesponse 040.71 Condenser air leakage would cause a gradual loss of condenser vaccum and an increase in turbine back pressure. See Sections 10.4.1.3 and 10.4.2.5. Condenser vaccunn loss is discussed in Sections 10.4.1.3 and 15.2.5.
P Q040-75 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAP guention 040.72 Discuss the possible mechanisms for hydrogen production in the secondary side water and provide the expected production rate of 10 hydrogen in SFCM. Discuss the effectiveness of the means to prevent hydrogen buildup (SRP 10.4.1, Part III, Item 1) .
Ecsponse 040.72 A re sponse will be provided later.
0040-76 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR guentioLO40.73 Assure that a high energy line failure of the turbine bypass system (TPS) will not have an adverse effect or preclude 10 operation of any safety related components or systems located close to the TBS (SRP 10.4.4; Part III, Item 4) .
Eesppnse 040.73 There are no safety related components or systems located close to the turbine bypass system.
Q040-77 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Cuention_040.74 Provide additional description (with the aid of drawings) of the turbine bypass valves and associated controls. In your discussion include the number, size, principle of operations, construction, set points, and capacity of each va lve total 10 turbine bypass capacity and the malfunctions and/or modes of failure considered in the design of the turbine bypa ss system (FRP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 1) .
Penngnse 040.74 A response will be provided later.
Q040-78 Amendment 10
GIBBSSAR h
Ouestion 040.75 Provide the results of a failure mode and ef fects analysis to determine the ef fect of malfunctions of the turbine bypass system 10 on the operation of the reactor and main turbine generator unit (SPP 10.4.4, Part III, Item 4) .
Fesponse 040.75 A response will be provided later.
t
& 0040-79 Amendment 10
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