ML19256F625

Forwards Quantitative Repts Re Effects of Fire Water Piping Rupture on safety-related Equipment.Description of Water Curtain for Fire Areas 6 & 20 & Drawings Encl.Drawings Available in Central Files Only

ML19256F625
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/12/1979
From:	William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19211A480	List: ML19256F625
References
NUDOCS 7912190588
Download: ML19256F625 (13)

Text

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Omaha Public Power District 1623 HARNEY e OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102 m TELEPHONE 536 4000 AREA CODE 402 December 12, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTH: Mr. Robert W. Peid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. h U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Section 3.2.1 of the Fort Calhoun Station fire protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER), issued by the Com-mission on August 23, 1978, the Omaha Tublic Power District here-with submits five (5) copies of a quantitative report addressing the effects on safety related equipment of rupture of the fire water piping to be installed at the Fort Calhoun Station. This inform-ation supplements a qualitative report previously submitted by the District on June 29, 1979 Also submitted herewith is a description of a water curtain to be installed in the personnel corridor between Fire Areas 6 and 20 of the Fort Calhoun Station, as required by Section 3.1.28 of the SER.

Sincerely,

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W. C. ones Divisidn Manager Production Operations 7CJ/KJM/BJH:Jcm Enclosures cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

7912L90f88 1652 017 '

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4 Quantitative Report Effects of Fire Water Pipe Rupture on Safety Related Equipment at the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Station I. INTRODUCTION In accordance with Section 3.2.1 of the Fort Calhoun Station Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (SER) a quantitative pipe rutpure analysis has been performed on the fire water piping rela-tive to the effects on safety related equipment.

A qualitative report Attachment (1) was developed, which listed assumptions to be used to evaluate the effects or safety related systems and design considerations to be employed to mitigate the consequences of a pipe rupture.

II. SCOPE As a result of the quantitative analysis, seismic supports and spray shields have been developed as follows:

a) Pipe Supports Sufficient seismic pipe supports and restraints will be installed on the fire protection pipir.g immediately above and adjacent to safety related equipment to provide assurance that the fire protection piping will not fall and damage safety related equipment. The seismic supports and restraints will extend a minimum of two pipe supports beyond the safety related area. Horizontal and vertical piping accelerations and restraint loads will be conservatively calculated from the peak of the applicable amplified response spectra. Piping and support stresses will be within normal OBE allowables for conserva-tism. All drilled-in concrete anchor bol+.s and base plates will be designed in accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-02. A typical seismic pipe support is shown on Figure One.

b) Spray Shields Spray shields will be installed, where necessary, to prevent water spray from the fire protection piping from-impinging on or entering safety related electrical equipment. These will be in the form of source shields clamped to the piping at each victaulic coupling in the vicinity of safety related equipment and designed to deflect the spray and control water drainage.

A typical spray shield is shown in Figure Two.

W2AG3T 1652 018

III. PROTECTED AREAS: (See National Fire Sprinkler Corporation con-struction drawing - Sheet 1 thru 6 for piping arrangements).

a) Fire Area 29 (Elev.1025'0") HVAC Equipment:

The fire protection piping in this area is located directly over the component cooling water (CCW) pump - AC-3B (see National drawing sheet 5 and figure three). Seismic supports and spray shields will be provided to protect the pump, motors and associated electrical equipment.

b) Fire Area 35B (Elev. 1007'-0") - Diesel Generator No. 2:

The piping in this area is located on the wall directly oppo-site the control panel AI-1338 (see National drawing sheet 4 and figure four). Seismic supports and spray shields will provide the proper protection.

c) Fire Aret 6 - (Elev. 989'-0") Personnel Corridor:

The piping in this area runs overhead in the corridor adjacent to Motor Control Center (MCC) 3A2 and 4C2. (See National drawing sheet 2 and OPPD drawing 11405-E-61). Spray shield will be provided to protect the MCC's.

d) Fire Area 32 (Elev. 989'-0") Air Compressor:

The fire protection piping in this area runs overhead and adjacent to the electric driven auxiliary feed pump FW-6.

(See National drawing sheet 2 - col. C and 4A). Spray shields will provide the necessary protection in this area.

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Qualitative Report Effects of Fire Water Pipe Rupture on Safety Related Equipment at the Fort Calhoun Unit I Nuclear power Station I. The new auxiliary building fire hose system for Fort Calhoun Unit I will operate at ambient temperature and at a pressure of 125 psig and is, therefore, classified as moderate energy piping in Branch Technical Position MES 3-1.

Pioing cracks shall be postulated in the Fort Calhoun Unit 1 auxiliary building fire hose moderate energy fluid system, which during normal plant conditions, will be either in operation or maintained pressurized (above atmospheric pressure) under condi-tions where both of the following are . net:

maximum operating temperature is 200 F or less, and ,

maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less Fluid flow from a crack shall be based on a circular opening of area equal to that of a rectangle one-half pipe diameter in length and one-half pipe wall thickness in width. The flow from the crack shall be assumed to result in an environment that wets all unpro-tected components within the compartment, with consequent flooding in the compartment and communicating compartments. Flooding effects will be determined on the basis of a conservatively esti-mated time period required to effect' corrective action.

II. Through-wall leakage cracks will be postulated for the Fort Calhoun Unit 1 auxiliary building fire hose moderate energy piping system in accordance with the following criteria: '

1. Cracks will be. postulated at locations that are isolated or physically remote from essential systems and components.

2. Cracks will not be postulated in pipes of nominal pipe size of 1 in. and less.

3. Cracks will be postulated to occur individually, at locations that result in the maximum effects from fluid spraying and flooding. . Only environ, ment'al effects that develop from these cracks shall be considered.

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II. (Continued)

Cracks shall be postulated in the fire lines and only environmental effects (flooding, spray, etc.) shall be considered for protection of safety-related componer;ts. The flow from a crack is assumed to result in al environment that wets all unprotected components within the compartment, with consequent flooding in the compartment and communicating compartments.

III. The following steps shall be taken during piping design and instal-lation to protect against the effects of pipe cracks:

1. Essential

• instruments and components shall be sealed or otherwise capable of operating in a wet environment.

2. Adequate drains, flood barriers, or bulkheads shall be provided to prevent flooding of essential equipment.

3. EssentiaP instruments and components shall be elevated to minimize the potential for flood damage , as appropriate.

4. The fire protection piping will be located remote from safety-related equipment to the greatest extent possible.

5. Where the piping must be located adjacent to safety-related equipment, the piping and its supports will be seismically designed.

6. Adequate spray shields will be provided where necessary to prevent entrance of spray into existing safety-related electrical panels. s

7. Piping will be routed so as to take maximum advantage of existing structura, conduits and cable trays to break-up and disperse spraj.

• Equipment necessary to safely shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. .

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References

1. NRC Standard Reviev Plan, Section 3.6.1, March 1975, entitled " Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failu es in Fluid Systems Outside Containment", containing Branch Technical Position APCS 3 3-1.

2. NRC Standa-d Review Plan, Section 3.6.2, March 1975, entitled " Deter-

=ination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated With the Postulated Rupture of Piping", containing Branch Technical Position ME3 3-1.

3 Letter frcn A. Gia=busso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects, to NUSCO President, December 1972, requiring censideration of piping system break outside the contain=ent.

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Water Curtain Description FIRE PROTECTION - CORRIDOR 6 AND 20 Scope This technical description covers the installation of the detection /

actuation systems and associated controls and alarms for the deluge system in the stairvell and hatch opening between corridors 6 and 20.

Detection / Actuation During a fire, ionization detectors in each protected area provide a signal to a solenoid valve on each deluge system.

The detect:rs' 120 AC power originates in AI-5hA off the load side of the existing throw-over switch, which supplies AI-54A/B for the existing high-voltage detection system. The detector is self con-tained and generates the necessary internal DC voltage and annunci-ation circuits for fire alarm and trouble supervision.

To preclude inadvertent actuation of the deluge system in the radi-aticn area, the detectors are crossed-zoned; that is, each zone vould have to go into alarm before the deluge system actuated.

Each solenoid valve receives 125V DC control power from AI-ShA, which is fed from AI h1A.

Alarm Once a deluge system is actuated, a pressure switch on each system provides indication annunciation to the Control Room.

Miscellaneous A reset switch is provided at each detector module. However, a re-note reset shall be provided, which can be operated from a conve-nient location.

In addition, each del _va system can be manually actuated at the valve.

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