IR 05000321/2019002
| ML19219A494 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, 07200036  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2019 |
| From: | Alan Blamey NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Dean E Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| Geanette D | |
| References | |
| IR 2019001, IR 2019002 | |
| Download: ML19219A494 (19) | |
Text
August 6, 2019
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2019002, 05000366/2019002 AND 07200036/2019001
Dear Mr. Dean:
On June 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant. On July 26, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Daniel Komm and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hatch.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Hatch. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000321, 05000366, and 07200036 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000321/2019002,
05000366/2019002 and 07200036/2019001
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000321, 05000366 and 07200036
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000321/2019002, 05000366/2019002 and 07200036/2019001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-002-0028 and I-2019-001-0128
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.
Facility:
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Location:
Baxley, GA
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2019 to June 30, 2019
Inspectors:
J. Hickman, Resident Inspector
C. Jones, Senior Resident Inspector
N. Peterka, Fuel Facility Inspector
J. Viera, Operations Engineer
Approved By:
Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report sections: 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Unit 2 Inadvertent Electrical Bus De-Energization and Equipment Damage Due to the New 2C Startup Transformer (SUT) Being Wired Out of Phase Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green Non-Cited Violation (NCV)05000366/2019002-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.19 The inspectors documented a Green, self-revealing, NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to ensure that activities affecting quality shall be described by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, the failure to follow work order instruction SNC904209, "Install Conduits, Cables and Terminate potential transformers (PTs)," on SUT 2C to verify the correct wiring of the PT resulted in the station experiencing an inadvertent electric bus de-energization on Unit 2 (Mode 5), damage to the 2C emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatic voltage regulator (AVR), and tripping the Unit 1 (Mode 1) 1C SUT offline.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000366/2019-001-
Licensee Event Report (LER)2019-001-00 for Edwin I.
Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2,
Emergency Diesel Generator Valid Actuation Signal Due to Inadvertent Electrical Bus De-Energization.
71111.19 Closed LER 05000366/2019-002-
LER 2019-002-00 for Edwin I.
Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2,
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to a Lack of Hydraulic Oil Pressure by the Auxiliary Oil Pump.
71153 Closed LER 05000366/2019-003-
LER 2019-003-00 for Edwin I.
Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2,
Manual Reactor Scram from 25 Percent Power Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On May 1, 2019, the unit was taken offline to repair issues with the Moisture Separator/Reheater (MSR)system. On May 8, 2019, the unit returned to 100 percent RTP and operated there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On June 29, 2019, the unit was reduced to 70 percent RTP due to a drifting feedwater flow controller. At the end of the inspection period on June 30, 2019, the unit was at approximately 73 percent RTP and ascending in power.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 - B EDG alignment was verified after a minor maintenance package was completed on April 5, 2019.
- (2) Unit 2 - 'B residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system alignment was verified after check valve repairs on May 29, 2019.
- (3) Unit 2-Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system alignment was verified after operation from the remote shutdown panel on June 28, 2019.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Unit 1, SE Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Core Spray (CS) Rooms, Fire Zone 1203B on April 4, 2019.
- (2) Unit 1, High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) Pump room, Fire Zone 1205Z on April 18, 2019.
- (3) Unit 1 and 2, Control Room Roof, Fire Zone 0031 on April 18, 2019.
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room, Fire Zone 0024 C/D on May 5, 2019.
- (5) Unit 1 and Unit 2, LPCI Converter Room, Fire Zone 0028 on June 24, 2019.
- (6) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Transformer Rooms, Fire Zones 1019 and 2019 on June 25, 2019.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during performance of Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) transmitter channel calibration, HPCI operability testing, operation of RCIC from the remote shutdown panel, and main generator real and reactive power capability testing on April 15, 2019, June 19, 2019, and June 27, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator requalification training on June 17, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Quality Control (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance activities:
- (1) Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) flexible hoses procured as non-safety.
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Unit 2 RCIC pump cooling water valve failed to open on May 22, 2019.
- (2) Unit 2 RHRSW check valve stuck open on June 21, 2019.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 2 elevated risk due to '2B' CS motor maintenance, on April 17, 2019.
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (2) Unit 1 HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve operability due to a crack in the stellite seating surface on May 3, 2019.
- (3) Unit 2 RBCCW Flex hose containment isolation operability due to failure of the Unit 1 RBCCW flex hose on May 4, 2019.
- (4) Unit 2 RHRSW operability due to 2B discharge check valve stuck open on May 29, 2019.
- (5) Unit 2 RCIC pump operability because the pump failed to develop minimum discharge pressure during surveillance on June 11, 2019.
- (6) Unit 1 Plant Service Water (PSW) discharge check valve operability due to corroded disc stud threads on June 13, 2019.
- (7) Unit 1 HPCI pump operability due to unsatisfactory surveillance on June 20, 2019.
- (8) Unit 1 HPCI room cooler operability due to PSW ASME code Class 3 boundary leak on June 28, 2019.
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) DCP SNC1029777, Jumper across broken link BB-65, Rev. 0
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
(1)34SO-E11-010-1, Venting RHR Loop A (B) Piping, Version 44.16 and pump run following 3/4" Pump Bowl Drain Line Repair on 1A RHR on April 9, 2019.
(2)34GO-OPS-001-2, Plant Startup Attachment 4, Welded Contacts Check, Version 51.3 following replacement of two select buttons on the Unit 2 Control Rod Select Matrix on April 10, 2019.
(3)34SV-E21-001-1, Core Spray Pump Operability, Version 23.2 following Unit 1 1B Core Spray system outage on April 18, 2019.
(4)34SV-E41-001-1, HPCI Valve Operability, Version 19.3 following Unit 1 HPCI valve (1E41F001) stem replacement on May 6, 2019.
(5)34SV-E11-004-2, RHR Service Water Pump Operability, Version 17.2 following Unit 2 2B RHRSW check valve repairs on May 24, 2019.
(6)34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability, Version 32.3 following Unit 1 HPCI tachometer calibration on June 18, 2019.
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 1 forced outage due to MSR repairs from May 1, 2019 to May 5, 2019.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02)
FL60KW6M-H, 60KW Generator Functional Test and Inspection Work Instructions on May 31, 2019.
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)34SV-C41-002-1, Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test, Version 17.3 on May 14, 2019.
(2)34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability, Version 32.3 and work order SNC 982996, U1 HPCI Pump and turbine oil sampling on June 13, 2019.
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
(1)34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability, Version 32.1 on April 4, 2019.
(2)34SV-X43-001-1, Fire Pump Test, Version 3.6 on April 8, 2019.
(3)34SV-T22-001-0, Secondary Containment Test, Version 20.1 on April 11, 2019.
(4)34SV-P41-001-2, Plant Service Water Pump Operability, Version 15 on April 15, 2019.
(5)57SV-CAL-003-1, Analog Transmitter Trip System Transmitter Calibration, Version 22.1 on April 23, 2019.
- (6) OPS-1359 - Unit 1, One Rod Out Interlock and RPIS Functional Test, Version 7.0 on May 2, 2019.
(7)34SV-E51-002-1, RCIC Pump Operability, Version 28.3 on May 9, 2019.
(8)34SV-SUV-019-1, Surveillance Checks (Unidentified Leak-rate Calculation), Version 37.29 on June 24, 2019.
(9)64CH-SAM-025-0, Reactor Coolant Sampling and Analysis, Version 45.3 on June 27, 2019.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a simulator based emergency scenario on June 18,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10)===
- (1) Unit 1 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019.
- (2) Unit 2 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019.
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019.
- (2) Unit 2 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019.
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 2, 2B Residual Heat Removal Service Water Check Valve Stuck Open, Condition Report (CR) 10612665.
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000366/2019-001-00, Emergency Diesel Generator Valid Actuation Signal Due to Inadvertent Electrical Bus De-Energization (ADAMS accession:
ML19113A264). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the results section for IP 71111.19.
- (2) LER 05000366/2019-002-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to a Lack of Hydraulic Oil Pressure by the Auxiliary Oil Pump (ADAMS accession: ML19136A388). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements occurred.
- (3) LER 05000366/2019-003-00, Manual Reactor Scram from 25 percent Power Due to Loss of Condenser Vacuum (ADAMS accession: ML19142A351). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements occurred.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation cask loadings from April 22, 2019 to June 21, 2019 including 3 casks. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities;
- Fuel selection and fuel loading
- Heavy load movement of the multi purpose container (MPC), Hi-TRAC Transfer Overpack, and the Hi-Storm Overpack
- Drying and backfill evolutions
- Closure welding and non-destructive weld evaluations
- Transfer and transport evolutions
- Radiological field surveys
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unit 2 Inadvertent Electrical Bus De-Energization and Equipment Damage Due to the New 2C SUT Being Wired Out of Phase Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000366/2019002-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.19 The inspectors documented a Green, self-revealing, NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to ensure that activities affecting quality shall be described by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, the failure to follow work order instruction SNC904209, "Install Conduits, Cables and Terminate PTs," on SUT 2C to verify the correct wiring of the PT resulted in the station experiencing an inadvertent electric bus de-energization on Unit 2 (Mode 5), damage to the 2C EDG AVR, and tripping the Unit 1 (Mode 1) 1C SUT offline.
Description:
On February 23, 2019, a post maintenance test was performed on the 2C SUT and associated wiring. While attempting to parallel the 2C SUT (offsite power) to the 2G emergency bus, which was energized by the 2C EDG, the operators attempted to close the alternate supply breaker as required by the Logic System Functional Test (LSFT) procedure.
Immediately upon closing the alternate supply breaker, both the alternate supply breaker and 2C EDG output breaker tripped open. Additionally, the power circuit breakers (PCBs)supplying power to the 1C SUT and 2C SUT also tripped open. The cause of the PCBs and output breakers tripping open was later determined to be a 120 degree out of phase condition due to the PTs (which are connected to the synchro scope in the Control Room) being improperly wired during the installation of the new 2C SUT. This resulted in damage to the AVR circuit of the 2C EDG and Unit 1 entering Technical Specification 3.8.1. A, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown action, for one required offsite circuit inoperable.
A second example of work not performed in accordance with work instructions, occurred on February 26, 2019, when the station experienced a trip of the 230KV feed for both the 1C and 2C SUTs. This trip occurred during testing of the 2C SUT Current Transformers (CTs), as part of the recovery of the February 23, 2019 LSFT event. This also resulted in Unit 1 entering Technical Specification 3.8.1. A, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> shutdown action, for one required offsite circuit inoperable. The cause for the trip was due to a lead not being lifted, as required by work order instruction SNC1001346, "GPC to Perform CT Testing," prior to injecting a signal.
The 2C SUT replacement was performed under a major plant modification (Degraded Grid Project) which required the coordination between Southern Nuclear Company, Georgia Power, and Day and Zimmermann (DZ).
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered these issues in their corrective action program and corrective actions were taken to correct the wiring. Phase rotation checks along with independent and concurrent verifications were immediately put into place for ongoing Degraded Grid Modification electrical work.
Corrective Action References: CRs 10585063, 10585783 and 10585867, corrective action report (CAR) 275824, Cause Determination Report, Version 1.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to verify the wiring of the PTs for the 2C SUT was performed in accordance with work order instruction SNC904209, "Install Conduits, Cables and Terminate PTs" on SUT 2C, is a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was of very low safety significance (i.e. Green) because the performance deficiency did not result in an actual loss of safety system function, and it did not represent a loss of function of one or more than one train for more than its TS allowed outage time of greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This was also evaluated per Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, where it also screened to Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. The finding was assigned a cross cutting aspect of Work Management, because the licensee did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Additionally, the work process of independent and redline verifications did not included the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups. (H.5)
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to ensure that activities affecting quality shall be described by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to follow written instructions, procedures, or drawings to verify that the wiring of the PTs for the 2C SUT was done in accordance with work order instruction SNC904209, "Install Conduits, Cables and Terminate PTs" on SUT 2C.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: 10 CFR 26.4(a)(4), states in part, All persons who are granted unescorted access to nuclear power reactor protected areas and perform maintenance or onsite directing of maintenance of SSCs that a risk informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety shall be subject to a Fitness for Duty (FFD) program that meets all of the requirements of this part.
Contrary to the above, on February 25, 2019, the licensees failure to follow Southern Company procedure Fatigue Management Program, NMP-AD-016, Ver. 10.1, step 4.6, by not performing a Fatigue Assessment prior to allowing Georgia Power employees to perform work on the 2C SUT resulted in the inadvertent trip of the Unit 1C SUT. The SUTs on both unit 1 and unit 2 are classified as risk significant SSCs in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). This condition was discovered during the root cause determination performed on two separate events that occurred during post installation testing of the degraded grid modification.
Significance: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, dated July 1, 2012. The inspectors concluded this violation is of very low safety significance (Green) based on the results of IMC 0609, Appendix A, Initiating Events Screening Questions. Specifically, when the Unit 1C SUT was tripped offline it resulted in the loss of one required offsite circuit and an entry into Technical Specification 3.8.1.a, it did not cause a partial or complete loss of offsite power to the operating unit. (IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1 Question C.b).
Corrective Action References: Condition report 10599312 and CAR
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 26, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr.
Daniel Komm and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Operation with Degraded System Voltage
5.0
Procedures
NMP-OS-020
Station Response to Southern Company Alert Conditions
1.2
Drawings
H-21039
48.0
Procedures
Residual Heat Removal System
43.0
Procedures
RCIC System
28.1
Procedures
Diesel Generator Standby AC System, Attachment 9
28.1
Procedures
Operations of RCIC From The Remote Shutdown Panel
0.11
71111.05Q Drawings
A-43965 Sh. 50B
Control Room Roof, Fire Zone 0031
71111.05Q Drawings
A-43965, Sh. 31
and 40
Transformer Rooms, Fire Zones 1019 and 2019
6.0
71111.05Q Drawings
A-43965, Sh. 47
LPCI Converter Room, Fire Zone 0028
5.0
71111.05Q Drawings
A-43965, Sh. 48B
Control Room, Fire Zone 0024 C, D
6.0
71111.05Q Drawings
A-43965, Sh. 51B
SE RHR and Core Spray Room, Fire Zone 1203B
71111.05Q Drawings
A-43965, Sh. 55B
HPCI Pump Room, Fire Zone 1205Z
71111.05Q Miscellaneous
Fire Protection Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA)
36.0
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
H-LR-AF-CPE003 LORP Scenario, Loss of Vacuum, Scram, Loss of HP Feed,
RCIC Steam Line Break, RCIC Failed to Isolate, and
Emergency Depress
05/02/2019
71111.11Q Procedures
HPCI Operability
38.3
71111.11Q Procedures
Operations of RCIC From The Remote Shutdown Panel
Ver. 0.11
71111.11Q Procedures
Verification and Data Reporting of Main Generator Real and
Reactive Capability
1.1
71111.11Q Procedures
ATTS Transmitter Channel Calibration
28.1
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10594968
RCIC Pump Tripped on Overload
03/25/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10604132
MR Functional Failure - U2 RCIC Cooling Water Valve
Failed to Open
04/23/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10607734
Unit 1 RBCCW flex hose
05/04/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10619830
MPFF Declared on U2 'B' RHRSW Discharge Check Valve
06/13/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
Procedures
NMP -AD-006
Infrequently Performed Tests and Evolutions
2.8
Procedures
NMP-ES-027
10.0
Procedures
Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
4A
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR10622983
NRC Identified Protected Equipment Signs Not Hung
06/24/2019
Miscellaneous
Equipment Out of Service Calculations
06/27/2019
Miscellaneous
Equipment Out of Service Calculations
04/17/2019
Procedures
NMP-DP-001
Operational Risk Awareness
16.0
Procedures
NMP-OS-010-002 Hatch Protected Equipment Logs
11.0
Work Orders
SNC 1012240
1B EDG Generator Heater Breaker Found Tripped
06/24/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10617950
PSW pump discharge check valve repair
6/7/2019
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Technical Specifications
Amendment
294
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Technical Specifications
Amendment
239
Operability
Evaluations
CR10601514
While performing WO SNC724707 on motor heater megger,
the acceptance criteria was not met.
04/15/2019
Operability
Evaluations
CR10607334
1E41-F001 Crack discovered in upstream disc stellite
seating surface
05/03/2019
Operability
Evaluations
CR10607756
CR10607734 extent of condition (U2 RBCCW flex hoses)
05/04/2019
Operability
Evaluations
CR10610257
2D RHRSW pump did not perform satisfactory during
surveillance
05/13/2019
Operability
Evaluations
CR10612665
2B RHRSW discharge check valve stuck open
05/21/2019
Operability
Evaluations
CR10617483
Unit 2 RCIC failed to develop minimum discharge pressure
06/05/2019
Operability
Evaluations
CR10619538
Unit 1 HPCI declared inoperable due to unsatisfactory CPT
surveillance
06/12/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operability
Evaluations
CR10623922
Unit 1 HPCI room cooler has a PSW Class 3 Boundary leak
06/26/2019
Procedures
NMP-AD-012
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
3.0
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10622604
While performing 34SV-C71-001-2, in panel 2H11-P609A,
link BB-65 will not tighten when in the closed position as it
should. Need to replace link.
6/23/2019
Engineering
Changes
SNC1029777
Jumper across broken link BB-65
Procedures
34GO-OPS-001-2 Plant Startup Att. 4, Welded Contacts Check
51.3
Procedures
Residual Heat Removal System Att. 10, Venting RHR Loop
A Piping
44.16
Procedures
RHR Service Water Pump Operability
17.2
Procedures
Core Spray Pump Operability
23.2
Procedures
HPCI Valve Operability
19.3
Procedures
HPCI Pump Operability
2.3
Procedures
NMP-MA-014
Post Maintenance Testing/Post Modification Testing
2.1
Procedures
NMP-MA-014-001 Post Maintenance Testing Guidance
5.2
Work Orders
SNC 1012822
U1 HPCI Valve (1E41F001) Stem Replacement
05/06/2019
Work Orders
SNC1010827
Repair 1/4" Pump Bowl Drain Line on RHR 1A
04/07/2019
Work Orders
SNC1019268
Insect/Repair 2B RHRSW discharge check valve
05/26/2019
Procedures
34GO-OPS-001-1 Plant Startup
45.3
Procedures
34GO-OPS-013-1 Normal Plant Shutdown
2.1
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10610562
Procedure Enhancement Needed
05/14/2019
Procedures
Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test
17.3
Procedures
HPCI Pump Operability
2.1
Procedures
HPCI Pump Operability-IST
2.3
Procedures
RCIC Pump Operability
28.3
Procedures
Plant Service Water Pump Operability
Procedures
34SV-SUV-019-1 Surveillance Checks (Unidentified Leak rate Calculation)
37.29
Procedures
20.1
Procedures
Fire Pump Test
3.6
Procedures
Analog Transmitter Trip System Transmitter Calibration
2.1
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Reactor Coolant Sampling and Analysis
45.3
Procedures
FL60KW6M-H
60KW Generator Functional Test and Inspection Work
Instructions (FLEX Testing)
05/30/2019
Procedures
OPS-1359
One Rod Out Interlock and RPIS Functional Test
7.0
Work Orders
SNC 982996
U1 HPCI Pump and turbine oil sampling
06/12/2019
Miscellaneous
H-LR-AF-
CPE003
LORP Scenario, Loss of Vacuum, Scram, Loss of HP Feed,
RCIC Steam Line Break, RCIC Failed to Isolate, and
Emergency Depress
05/02/2019
71151
Miscellaneous
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
71151
Procedures
NMP-AD-029
Preparation and Reporting of Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator
Data and the Monthly Operating Report
1.1
Corrective Action
Documents
CR10612665
Unit 2, 2B RHR Service Water Check Valve Stuck Open
05/21/2019
Procedures
NMP-AD-029
Preparation and Reporting of Regulatory Assessment
Performance Indicator Data and the Monthly Operating
Report
1.1
Procedures
NMP-GM-002
Corrective Action Program
15.1
Procedures
NMP-GM-002-
2
Effectiveness Review Instructions
5.2