ML18102A435
| ML18102A435 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1996 |
| From: | Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Eliason L Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18102A436 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-96-344, NUDOCS 9610070156 | |
| Download: ML18102A435 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1996014
Text
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September 30, 1996
EA 96-344
Mr. Leon R. Eliason
Chief Nuclear Officer & President
Nuclear Business Unit
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
P. 0. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-272/96-14, 50-311 /96-14 AND
50-354/96-08
Dear Mr. Eliason:
This refers to the inspection conducted August 15 - September 3, 1996, at the
Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generation Station. The purpose of that inspection was to
review the implementation of your Physical Security Program. At the conclusion of th~
inspection, an exit meeting was conducted at our King of Prussia,* Pennsylvania office and
the findings were discussed with Mr. L. Storz and other members of your staff.
Areas exa,mined during the inspection are identified in the attached report. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative
records, interviews with personnel and observations by the inspectors.
Based on the results of this inspection, six apparent violations were identified and are
being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the '~General
Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions." (Enforcement Policy),
(60 FR 34381 ); (June 30, 1995). The apparent violations involved: 1) the failure to
control photo badge key cards; 2) the failure to properly search an individual prior to
granting access to the protected area; 3) the failure to notify the nuclear shift supervisor of
a potential threat event; 4) the failure to deactivate photo badge key cards for individuals
who no longer required site access; 5) the failure to complete training for security
supervisors prior to assigning them supervisory duties; and 6) the failure to test an
intrusion detection system in accordance with procedures. The NRC is seriously concerned
about the implementation of the security program, particularly the access control function,
since three of the apparent violations were in that area.
At the exit meetiri-g on September 3, 1996, members of your staff provided specific short-
term corrective actions that had already been implemented for the apparent violations
pending completion and review of investigations being conducted by Public Service Gas &
Electric Company and the Wackenhut Company, the security contractor. Your staff also
committed to meet with us in the future to discuss the results of the investigations. The
hand-out provided by your staff at that meeting is enclosed with the inspection report.
'}
9610070156 960930
ADOCK 05000272
G
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Mr. Leon R. Eliason
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Because specific corrective actions were provided at that meeting, it may not be necessary
to conduct a predecisional enforcement conference in order to enable the NRC to make an
enforcement decision. However, a Notice of Violation is not presently being issued for
these inspection findings.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to
either: ( 1 ) respond to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within
30 days of the date of this letter, or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference. If
you choose not to provide a response and would prefer participating in a predecisional ,
enforcement conference, please contact Mr. L. Nicholson of this office at (610) 337-5128
within 7 days of the date of this letter.
,
Your response should be clearly marked as a "Response to Apparent Violations in
Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/96-14, 50-311/96-14 and 50-354/96-08 and should
include for each apparent violation (1) the reason for the apparent violation, or, if
contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation, (2) the corrective steps that have
been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid
further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response
should be submitted under oath or affirmation and may reference or include previous
docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required,
response. If an adequate response is not received within the time,specified or an extension
of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement
decision or schedule a predecisional enforcement conference.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations
for the events described in. the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further
NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our
deliberations on this matter.
Based on our review of the information provided to us during the exit meeting, we find that
the additional interim measures implemented by your staff to address the performance
issues in this report are appropriate. Those interim measures, if implemented well, provide
assurance that the safety objectives of the security program are being achieved for the
Salem/Hope Creek Station. From the discussions during the exit meeting, we understand
that your staff agreed not to make substantive changes to those interim measures prior to
contacting us. If this understanding is incorrect, please notify us immediately.
Nonetheless, the NRC will remain concerned about security area performance until your
staff implements comprehensive, durable corrective actions responsive to the root causes
of problems found. Consequently, NRC considers closeout of concerns in the security
program to be a restart item for Salem.
Mr. Leon R. Eliason
3
In accordance with 10 CFR 2. 790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
its enclosure(s), and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be placed in the NRG
Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include
any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the
PDR without redaction.
Docket Nos. 50-272; 50-311; 50-354
License Nos. DPR-70, DPR-75, NPF-57
Enclosures:
Sin~erely,
James T. Wiggins, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
1. Inspection Report 50-272;96-14, 50-311 /96-14 and 50-354/96-08
2. Handout provided by licensee at exit meeting
cc w/encl:
L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations
E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering
E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Support
C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
D. Garchow, General Manager - Salem Operations
J. Benjamin, Director - Quality Assurance & Nuclear Safety Review
D. Powell, Manager, Licensing and Regulation
R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs
A .. Tapert, Program Administrator
R. Fryling, Jr.,. Esquire
M. Wetterhahn, Esquire
M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations
P. MacFarland Goelz, Manager, Joint Generation
Atlantic Electric
. Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate
William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township
Public Service Commission of Maryland
State of New Jersey
State of Delaware
. *
Mr. Leon R. Eliason
Distribution w/encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences}
Kay Gallagher, DRP
G. Smith
R. Keimig
L. Nicholson, DRP
S. Barber, DRP
G. Kelly, DRS
N. Della Greca, DRS
D. Screnci, PAO
NRC Resident Inspector
PUBLIC
Distribution w/encl: (Via E-Mail}
L. Olshan, NRR
W. Dean, OEDO
J. Stolz, PDl-2, NRR
M. Callahan, OCA
D. Jaffee, Project Manager, NRR
Inspection* Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
L. Cunningham, NRR
4
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Station
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-272/96-14,
50-311 /96-14 and 50-354/96-08
An inspection of the physical security program was conducted during the period of
August 15-September 3, 1996. Areas inspected included: protected area detection
equipment; alarm stations and communications; testing maintenance and compensatory
measures; access control of personnel; training and qualification; management support;
audits; and fitness-for-duty. The purpose of this inspection was to determine if the
security program, as implemented, met the licensee's commitments and NRC regulatory
requirements.
Six apparent violations were identified during the inspection. The violations included: 1)
the .failure to control photo badge key cards; 2) the failure to properly search an individual
prior to granting access to the protected area; 3) the failure to notify the nuclear shift
supervisor of a potential threat event; 4) the failure to deactivate photo badge key cards
for individuals who no longer required site access; 5) the failure to complete training for
security supervisors prior to assigning them supervisory duties; and 6) the failure to test an
intrusion detection system in accordance with procedures.
The exit meeting for the inspection was held in the NRC's Region I office, in King of
Prussia, PA on September 3, 1996. Senior management from the licensee's organization
and from Region I were in attendance. The scope and findings of the inspection were
discussed. The licensee presented some preliminary information from its investigation and
the investigation by its contractor which were initiated shortly after events occurred on
August 14 and 19. Those events brought into question the performance of several
security force members. The licensee also present short-term corrective measures for the
apparent violations 1, 2, 4, and 5 identified above. Apparent violations 3 and 6 were
identified subsequent to the inspection and brought to the licensee's attention on
September 25, 1996, via a telephone call.
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