Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Limiting Condition for Operation for Overpressure Protection Sys & Relief Valves - Operating
	ML17329A000
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/16/1991
From:	; INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17328B022	List: ML17328B021; ML17329A000;
References
	NUDOCS 9104220178
	Download: ML17329A000 (30)
	v • d • e

Attachment 2 to AEP:NRC:1131A Proposed Technical Specification Changes 9i04220178 9'10416 PDR AQOCK 05000315 fr P PDR

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig, or

b. One power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig and the RHR safety valve with a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig.

APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 170 0 F, and Mode 6 when the head is on and fastened to the reactor vessel and the RCS is not vented through a 2-square-inch or larger vent, or through any single blocked open PORV.

ACTION:

With one of two PORVs required by item a above or either the PORV or RHR safety valve required by item b above inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, within a total of 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months . Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status.

b. With both PORVs and the RHR safety valve inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS thxough at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and the RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.

C. With the RCS vented per ACTION a or b above, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve(s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vents on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence'.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 4-31 AMENDMENT NO ~

v REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a ~ Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV required OPERABLE.

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d. Determining the emergency air tank OPERABLE by verifying:

1. At least once per 31 days, air tank pressure greater than or equal to 900 psig.

2. Air tank pressure instrumentation OPERABLE by performance of a:

(a) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and (b) CHANNEL CAL1BRAT10N at least once per 18 months, with the low pressure alarm setpoint > 900 psig.

4.4.9.3.2 The RHR safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the RHR system suction is aligned to the RCS loop with the valves in the flow path open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when the RHR safety valve is being used for overpressure protection, 4.4.9.3.3 The RHR safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by testing in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 1974 Edition through Summer 1975 Addenda, for Category C valves.. Test frequency, procedures and corrective action shall be pursuant to Subsection IWV-3410 and IWV-3510, respectively and shall be performed during COLD SHUTDOWN and REFUELING, respectively.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 4-32 AMENDMENT NO ~

REACTOR. COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES OPERATZNG LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 Three power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a ~ With one or more PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s);

otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Co With two PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORVs to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves; restore at least one of the inoperable PORVs to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With three PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

e. With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status, or place its associated PORV in manual control, or close the block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With two or three block valves inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months apply the provisions of ACTION e above to one of the block valves and, for the remaining inoperable block valve(s), either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or place the associated PORV(s) in manual control; restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour; restore at least two block valves to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNZT 1 3/4 4-35 AMENDMENT NO.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued ge With PORVs and block valves not in the same line inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore the valves to OPERABLE status or close and de-energize the associated block valve and place the associated PORV in manual control in each respective line. Apply the portions of ACTION c or d above, relating to the OPERATIONAL MODE, as appropriate for two or three lines unavailable.

h. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by performance-of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, excluding valve operation, and

b. At least once per 18 months by operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel during MODES 3 or 4, and

c. At least once per 18 months by operating solenoid air control valves and check valves in PORV control systems through one complete cycle of full travel, and

d. At least once per 18 months by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

4.4.11.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order,to meet the requirements of ACTION b, c, or d in Specif ication 3. 4. 11.

4.4.11.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are energized by the onsite diesel generators and the onsite plant batteries.

This testing can be performed in conjunction with the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.b and 4.8.2.3.2.d.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 3/4 4-36 AMENDMENT NO.

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The 12 EFPY heatup and cooldown curves were developed based on the following:

1. The core beltline weld material being the limiting material with a copper and phosphorus content of .31'4 and .017%.

2. The projected fluence values contained in Table XII of the Southwest Research Institute report, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for Donald C. Cook Unit No. 1, Analysis of Capsule Y," dated January 1984.

3. Figure 1, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1 The shift in RT NDT of the vessel material will be established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimen dosimetry installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel. The projected fluence values obtained will be used to calculate the change in RTNDT in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-5 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and cooldown and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs, or of one PORV and the RHR safety valve ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 170 0 F. Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the 0

secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50 F above the RCS cold leg .temperatures or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water solid RCS. Therefore, any one of the three blocked open PORVs constitutes an acceptable RCS vent to preclude APPLICABILITY of Specification 3.4.9.3.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-7 AMENDMENT NO.

REACTOR COOLANT SY EM BASES 3 4.4.11 RELIEF VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) may be operated manually to control reactor coolant system pressure for the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident,and for plant shutdown. During the recovery process for a SGTR event, availability of the PORVs to reduce primary pressure is assumed.

One PORV is sufficient for this purpose. Therefore, two of three PORVs are required to be OPERABLE with one valve assumed to fail and the other being available to depressurize the RCS. The PORVs also operate automatically to control reactor coolant syst'm pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves, thereby reducing challenges to these valves. Two of the three PORVs are equipped with backup air supplies which must be OPERABLE when these valves are being relied upon for low temperature overpressure protection per Specification 3.4,9.3. The PORVs have remote manually operated block valves which may be used to isolate a stuck-open PORV or a PORV with excessive seat leakage and to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of RCS pressure. The electrical power for both the PORVs and the block valves is supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to close this possible RCS leakage path to maintain the integrity of the reactor cool'ant pressure boundary.

3 4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM The Reactor Coolant Vent System is provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant System volume in one hour at system design pressure and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system. Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths. Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fail closed. This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very high radiation environment, In addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capability exists to perform this venting function.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor

,Coolant Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirement," November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Specification and not enter into an ACTION statement are one vent path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-13 AMENDMENT NO ~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a, Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 435 psig, or

b. One power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setting of less than or equaL to 435 psig and the RHR safety valve with a lift setting of Less than or equal to 450 psig, APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 152 0 F, and Node 6 when the head is on and fastened to the reactor vessel and the RCS is not vented thxough a 2-square-inch or larger vent or through any single blocked open PORV ~

ACTION:

With one of two PORVs required by item a above or either the PORV or RHR safety valve required by item b above inoperab1e, either (1) restore the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS thxough at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, within a total of 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months , Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status.

b. With both PORVs and the RHR safety valve inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and the RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.

C. With the RCS vented per ACTION a or b above, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve(s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

d. In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vents on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 4-29 AMENDMENT NO ~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.9 '.1 Each- =PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a ~ Performance of a CHANNEL,FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

c ~ Verifying the PORV isolation vaLve is open at least once 'per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d. Determining the emergency air tank OPERABLE by verifying:

1. At least once per 31 days, air tank pressure greater than or equal to 900 psig.

2. Air tank pressure instrumentation OPERABLE by performance of a

(a) CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and (b) CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months, with the low pressure alarm setpoint > to 900 psig.

4.4 '.3.2 The RHR safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying that the RHR system suction is aligned to the RCS loop with the valves in the flow path open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when the RHR safety valve is being used for overpressure protection.

b. Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements for ASME Category C valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 4-30 AMENDMENT NO.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 Three power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one or more PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s);

otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c With two PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the PORVs to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valvesg restore at least one of the inoperable PORVs to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With three PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

e. With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status, or place its associated PORV in manual control, or close the block valve and remove power from the block valveg otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With two or three block valves inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months apply the provisions of ACTION e above to one of the block valves and, for the remaining inoperable block valve(s), either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or place the associated PORV(s) in manual control; restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour; restore at least two block valves to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 4-32 AMENDMENT NO.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued go With PORVs and block valves not in the same line inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months restore the valves to OPERABLE status or close and de-energize the associated block valve and place the associated PORV in manual control in each respective line. Apply the portions of ACTION c or d above, relating to the OPERATIONAL MODE, as appropriate for two or three lines unavailable.

h. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11.1 ln addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a ~ At least once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, excluding valve operation, and

b. At least once per 18 months by operating the PORV through one complete cycle of full travel during MODES 3 or 4, and c~ At least once per 18 months by operating solenoid air control valves and check valves in PORV control systems through one complete cycle of full travel, and d0 At least once per 18 months by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

4.4.11.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order to meet 'the requirements of ACTZON b, c, or d in Specification 3. 4. 11.

4.4.11.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are energized by the onsite diesel generators and the onsite plant batteries.

This testing can be performed in con)unction with the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.b and 4.8.2.3.2.d.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 3/4 4-33 AMENDMENT NO.

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The actual shift in the reference temperature of surveillance specimens and neutron fluence is established periodically by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens and dosimetry installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area.

The heatup and cooldown limit curves of Figures 3.4-2 and 3 '-3 include predicted adjustments for this shift in RTNDT at the end of 12 EFPY, as well as adjustments for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

The 12 EFPY heatup and cooldown curves were developed based on the following:

1. The projected fluence values established by specimen analysis.

2 ~ Intermediate shell plate C5556-2 being the limiting material as determined by Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, with a copper and nickel content of 0.15% and 0.57t, respectively.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and cooldown and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs, or of one PORV and the RHR safety valve ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR 0 Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 152 F. Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50 F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water solid RCS. Therefore, any one of the three blocked open PORVs constitutes an acceptable RCS vent to preclude APPLICABILITY of Specification 3.4,9.3.

3 4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. To the extent applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-10 AMENDMENT NO ~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3 4.4.11 RELIEF VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) may be operated manually to control reactor coolant system pressure for the steam generator tube rupture accident and for plant shutdown. During the recovery process for a SGTR event, availability of the PORVs to reduce primary pressure is assumed. One PORV is sufficient for this purpose. Therefore, two of three PORVs are required to be OPERABLE with one valve assumed to fail and the other being available to depressurize the RCS. The PORVs also operate automatically to control reactor coolant system pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves, thereby reducing challenges to these valves, Two of the three PORVs are equipped with backup air supplies which must be OPERABLE when these valves are being relied upon for low temperature overpressure protection per Specification 3.4.9.3. The PORVs have remote manually operated block valves which may be used to isolate a stuck-open PORV or a PORV with excessive seat leakage and to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of RCS pressure. The electrical power for both the PORVs and the block valves is supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to close this possible RCS leakage path to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3 4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM The Reactor Coolant Vent System is provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant System volume in one hour at system design pressure and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent syst: em. Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths. Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fail closed. This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very high radiation environment. In addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capability exists to perform this venting function.

The function, capabilities, and, testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirement," November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Specification and not enter into an ACTION statement are one vent path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-11 AMENDMENT NO ~

Attachment 3 to AEP:NRC:1131A Current Technical Specifications Pages Marked-up to Reflect Proposed Changes

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Po+V Jglodzel.

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.4,9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two po~er ooerated relief valves (PQRVs) with a lift setting of than or equal :o 4QO psig, or

b. One power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 4CQ psig and the RHR safety valve with a lift setting of less than or equal to a50 psig, Q e

and Qs74neg 4

~

APPLICABILITY: en the temper ature of RCS cold leg/'s less than or equal to 170 'F, i, 'd WEEcL+o C nub Viovtvvt be cn c ~~S ~ e.

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AQ7IOR ~ aivL @it IECS AS ov 2 CAC ss db. above Rye eA. ec e. oRQ Epr g Hg vMvc.

a. Wit. two PGRV+s vd >> 0Rso Jepe44LA4MM R. R n ventl'Fe u'

Rcs throu IIABLK h

<< i at leasta2 square inch vent v

ithin a Bg owe, intain the >n a vente cond>t>on until the

~

R inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE si+ '"""'gp,assss ~~ r

b. With both at leas+

PORVs inoperable, uar e inch vent ithin 8 the hoursqgaintain the RCS 'through RCS in

~ a vented condition until both PO Vs or one'PORV and the RHR safety va'Ive have been restored to OPERABLE status.

C. JMSB~

Gl vt". In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to SpeCifiCatiOn 6.9.2 within 30 dayS. The repOr t Shall deSCribe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or

.vent(s) on the transient and any correc ive action necessary to prevent recurrence.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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Three power operaced relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OP~LE.

NODES 1, 2, and 3.

8KZQE:

il. g rich ~ PaPC PLCrrt PoRvsinoperableggcassse g,sane within 1 houd eicher restore ehe POR@to OprRABLE scacus or close cha assooiacad block va'lvegacsC wi4k f~ fH+aklCLV~ ge.6/~ Ira/ye(gp; oeherwisa least HOT STANDBY wichin che next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and'~050 HdT ge in ac SHUTDOWN within che following P( hours.

h. VS ever QR t" g 4 C> ul,ch s~ ~ej within PORVs 1

inoperable> cence hour either'restore che associated block valves and remove power from ehe bi.ock valves; restore ae lease one of cha inoperabje PORVs eo OPEtABLE status within ehe following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . or be in HOT STANDBY within qhe next 6. hours a~ +, ~SHUTD04J

~~04~~ ~ ~

within the following 38'ours.

With ~gg PORVs inoperable~ c4+C- Q s~M.~~.t within 1 hour blither restor'e ae least. one, .PORVp( eo OPERABLZ scatus or close b ock valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within che next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in GHEB SHUTDOWN".t within che following hours. Ao7" rich PIP block valve inoPerable, sr~geR 'Ping)

~ aoorclfoRg vichin l hour eiche PQ restore c e oc va ve co OPERABLE status, or power from the block valv

~ cl e che block valve and remove otherwise, be in ac lease HOT STANDBY within "he next

..ours and

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-: UNIT' ceo'4vc,a8RR R.pP~ 3/4 4-35 = ANENDMEVE'O.~

'EAC70R CCOLAHT SYSTEM n

BASES The 12 rPY heatup and ccoldown curves were developed based on the following:

lhe core beltl>ne weld ra er~al being the 1>m>t>ng mater>al with a copper and "ncspncrus content of .31" and .017~.

2. The projected fluence values contained in Table XII of the Southwest Researcn institute report, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program ,or Oonald C. Cook Unit No. 1, Analysis of Capsule Y," dated January 1984.

3. Figure 1, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1 The shift in RTN of the vessel material will be established periodically during a/ration by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimen dosimetry installed near the inside wall, of the reactor vessel. The projected fluence values obtained will be used to calculate the change in RTNDT in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision l.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Fig re 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrosta'ic tes:ing have been provided to assure comoliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and .he frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are prov ded in Table 4.4-5 to assur e compliance wi th the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Par . 50.

The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatuo and cooldown and spray water temoerature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within tne design cri teria assumed for The fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code re u ents.

The OPERABILITY of two POR', one PGRV and the RHR safety valve,~~

ensures that tne RCS will be prOteCted fram preSSure tranSientS wniCh COuld eXCeed the limi:S of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to ltgcF. Either FORV or RHR safety valve nas acequate relieving Capability tO prnteCt the RCS frOm OVerpreSSuriZatiOn when the tranSient iS

~

limited to either (1) the s art of an idle RGP with the secondary water empera-ture of the steam generator less than or equal to 50 F above tne PCS cold leg

'emoeratures or (2) :ne start o; a charoi.rg pump and its injection into a uater solid Rcs.

acccfc~(

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B 3/4 4-7 Amendmen. No. 88 CeotC h) OaJPHR P~T

@JAN I'

nraC n COO g~~ gg power operated rel e va ves ORVs) operate pressure he setting of the pressurizer ety valves. These relief valves have rem crate valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should e come inoperable. The electrical power oth the relief valves and t valves is supplie ~ an emergency power source to ensure the abilit eal e RC e 3/4.4 12 R< C OR COOLANT VEN S STE The Reactor Coolant Vent System is provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant, System volume in one hour at system design pressure and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system. Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths. Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fail closed. This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a si'ngle failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically-designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a verv environment,. In addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel high'adiation head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capabili.ty exists to perform this venting function.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the R'eactor Coolant Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirement," November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Specification and not enter into an action statement are one vent path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-13 'AMENDMENT NO. 5J', 120

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3 4.4. 11 RELIEF VALVES ~EEL~ sn ~ious ~e The power operated relief valves (PORVs) may be operated manually to control reactor coolant system pressure for the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident and for plant shutdown. During the recovery process for a SGTR event availability of the PORVs to reduce primary pressure is assumed.

.7 two of three PORVs are One PORV is sufficient for this purpose. Therefore, required to be OpERABLE with one valve assumed to fail and the other being available to depressurize the RCS. The PORVs also operate automatically to control reactor coolant system pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves, thereby reducing challenges to these valves. Two of the three PORVs are equipped with backup air supplies which must be OpERABLE when these valves are being relied upon for low temperature overpressure protection per Spec ification 3. 4. 9. 3 The PORVs have remote manually

~

operated block valves which may be used to isolate a stuck-open PORV or a pORV with excessive seat leakage and to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of RCS pressure. The electrical power for both the pORVs and the block valves is supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to close this possible RCS leakage path to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3 4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM The Reactor Coolant Vent System is provided to exhaust the primary system that could inhibit natural noncondensible'ases and/or steam from circulation core cooling. It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant System volume in one hour at system design pressure and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system. Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths. Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fail closed. This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very high radiation environment. Zn addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will .ensure that the capability exists to perform this venting function.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item ZI.B.I of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMZ Action Plan Requirement," November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Specification and not enter into an ACTION statement are one vent path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-13 AMENDMENT NOB

Uag Si+e.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Fo OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEHS LIMITING CQNOITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9;3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERASLE:

a. Two power operated relief valves (PORYs) with a lift settfng of less than or equal to 435 psig, or (PQRV) with a lift setting of 1ess One power operated relfef valve than or equal to 435 psig and the RHR safety valve with lift a

setting of less than or equal to 450 psi e8

+n ches: sad +~ed APPLICA8ILITY: 'n the temper ature of RC .cola leg( fs 2

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~~~"~~+~ven &

I I 2288281/ 1181 MPH e RCS throu h at least~2 s uare inch vent wfthfn~cAhal 84 6' a nta n the n a vente con ntil the lnoperahle PQRV or RHR saPety valve has teen restored to QPKRARLE CetaarRR ~~Acagikc~ kt4c

b. fifth both at lea PORVs inoperable, uare inoh ven ithin the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months sogaintain the RCS RCS ~rough in

~ a vented condition unt o Vs or one PQRV and the RHR safety valve have~een restored to QPERA8LE status.

C. Pjuggag cf p. In the event efther the PQRVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are usect to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submit~ to the Commission pursuant to Specificatfon 6;9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the.

circumstances fnitiatfng the transient, the effect of the PORVs or.

vent(s) on the transient and any correctfve ac ion necessary to prevent recurrence.

The provisions of Specificatfon 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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REACTOR CQQUAT SYPiB 3.4.10 STRUCTttRAL M <mm A~ CQQE CLASS 1 2 and 3 CQHPOH&TS LIMITING CQNITXOH FOR OPERATIQH 3.4,10.1 The.structural integrity of'E Code Class 1, 2 and 3 ccmaonenu shall be mafntafned in accor~ca with Specfficatfon 4.4. 10. 1.

APPLICABILITY: ALL DOGES ACTIONS ai fifth the st, ac.ural integrity, of any ASNE Code Class 1 component(s) not conforming to the above requfrenen~w, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to wfthfn fts lfmft or fsolata the affect c~onent{s) prfor to increasing Pe Reactor Coolant System temperature more required by NOT consider t~ 504F above atfons.

tN minimum tamperature

b. fifth the struc.ural fntagrfty of any ASME Code C1ass 2 c~onent(s) not conforming to the abave requirements, restore the struc ural integrity of .the af ectad component(s) to within .fts limit ot iso1ate the affec~ c~onent(s) prfor,to.fncreasfrg the Reactor Coolan

,System temperature above 2004F.

c. Wth Ne struc:ural intag, ity o any AGEE Code Cliss 3 c~onant(s) not conformfng to Ne above requfriments, restore t.",e s ructural intagrity of the affected c"mponent(s) to withfn fts limit cr fsolaw the affac ad component(s) fr.m servfca.

d., The.provfsfons of Specfffcation 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEZLLAHCE REQUIRE/EATS 4.4.10.1 In addftfon to the raqufrenents of Specification 4.0.5, each reactor coolant pep flywheel shall be inspecA per "".e recwenda fons of'Regula-"rj Posf.fon C.4.h of Regulatory Guide 1.14,.Revision 1, Augus- 1975.

O.C. CQQK UNT 2 3/4 S-H aaendment No 3>

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ffo7 5'iivlNoeoei om'ifeha+4c fdllooh nn 6 REACTOR COOIAHT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued With block valves inoperable, Within 1 hour i asar/- a eas~Q~hmk ove opr a e.

With Csu.aes within PORV 1

~hour~~~)

a b o k va ves not estesomvm in the same line Inoperable//f oftie restore the valves to OPERABLE status or close and de-energize the other valve in each l~ . Apply the A

portions of ACTION~ or ~above, relating to~PERATIONAL MODE, as appropriate for two or three unavailable.

/x The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, SURVEILLANCE UIR 2h ~6 4.4.11.1 gach of the three PORVs shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, excluding valve operation, and P.

alS'Pk I ' <pf.&F7 @

At least ones oer IB months b performanoe of a CHANNEL CALIBRATIONpe once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel

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~ccrc HC 4.4.1 .3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and &lock valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are energized by the onsite diesel generators and onsite plant batteries. This testing can be performed in con]unction with the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.c and 4.8.2.3.2.d.

0

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aeP~

UNIT 2 3/4 4-33 AMENDMENT NO.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The actual shift in the reference temperature of surve ance specimens and neutzon fluence is established periodically by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens and dosimetry arear'he installed near the inside vali of the reactor vessel in the core heatup and cooldovn limi.t curves of Figures 3,4-2 and 3 4-3 include predicted adjustments foz this shift in RT.NDT at the end of 12 EFPY, as vali as ad)ustments foz possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

The 12 EFPY heatup and cooldovn curves vere developed based on th>>

folloving:

1. The pro)ected fluence values established by specimen analysts,

2. Intermediate shell plate C5556-2 being the limiting material as determined by Posit'on 1 of Regulatory Cuide 1 99, Revision 2, vith a copper and nickel content of 0.154 and 0.51%, respectively.

The pressure-tempe.ature limit lines shovn on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticali.ty and for inservice leak and hydzostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance vith the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix C to 10 CFR 50, The number of reactor vessel irradiation su . ieillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these spec'..-. ns are provided in Table 4,4-5 to assure compliance vith the zequi.zements of A"" ndix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50.

The li"itations imposed on pressurizer heat p and cooldovn and spray vater temperature differential are provided co assure that th>>censures pressuriier is operated vithin the design cziterfa assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance vith the Code requirements.

~O The OPERABILITY of tvo PORVs, one PORV and the RHR safecy valve,~~

that the RCS vill be protected from pressure tzansiencs vhich could 'exceed the limits of Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 50 vhen one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 152 F. Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate reli,eving capability to protect the RCS fzom ovezpzessurisation vhen the transient is limited to either (1) the start, of an idle RCP vith

~

the secondary vater temperature of the steam generator less than oz equal to 50 0 F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of a charging lL~~g g pump an/,f.t injectio into a vater solid RCS. 7A M~4-fEuea k(OCTA Clan QQLS Cmc43tl~

3 4 4, 10 RTRCCTLTLAL TRTTCRZTY

~~PLICBCl4lTP SPC~fcahbN The inspection and testing programs for ASNE Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components vi>1- be

=aintained at an accepcable level throughout the life of the plant. To the extent applicable, the i.nspection program for these 'components is in compliance vith Section XI of the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

COOK NUCLcCR PLANT . UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-10 AHENmENT NO. )9,123

he power operated relief ralves (PORVs) operate to rel'eve RCS press be the have remo setting of the should thh relief valve, opera p essurizer k lv perable.

ro 'xtive code sa=ety va'ves.

e e e valves shutoff capab'lity

-~caL ower for both the relief valves . e block valves 's supplied from an er ergenc r source to ens e abili=y to sea1. th's possible RCS Leakage path.

The Reactor Coolan" Vent Svs "em is provided to exhaust noncondensibie gases and/or steam from t"..e primary system that could inh bj.t natural c rcula==on core cooling.

" has been cesi ..ed to vent a volu=e of H-drog .".

approximately ecual to one-ha = o" the Reac-or Coolant System volume in one

~

hour at system design p essure and temperatu"e.

The Reactor Coolant Vent Svstem 's compt'sed o= "he Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system. Each of these subsystems consists of a sin-Le line conta'..'..g a co@ on manual isolation val.ve inside containmenc, spl'tt'ng into two parallel flow paths. Each flow pa"h provides the design oasis vent'ng capacj.ty and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid iso ~

a='on valves, which -ill:ail cl.osed. This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The pressur'zer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very hj.gh radiation environment. In addition, the OP~RPZTLITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capabj.lity exfsts to perform this venting unc" ion.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Vent System are consistent wich the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TNI Acti.on Plan Requirement," November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Speci ication and not enter into an action statement are one vent path from the Reacto" Vessel head and one vent pach from the Pressurizer steam space.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 2 3 3i4 4-11 M~NZVr NO. 82

REACTOR COOLANT TEM BASES 3 4.4. 11 RELIEF VALVES f /A@1 ~ ~ ~SiB~ ~~

The power operated relief valves (PORVs) may be operated manually to control reactor coolant system pressure for the steam generator tube rupture accident and for plant shutdown. During the recovery process for a SGTR event~availability of the pORVs to reduce primary pressure is assumed. One pORV is sufficient for this purpose. Therefore, two of three PORVs are required to be OpERABLE with one valve assumed to fail and the other bei.ng available to depressurize the RCS.'he PORVs also operate automatically to control reactor coolant system pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves, thereby reducing challenges to these valves. Two of the three PORVs are equipped with backup air supplies which must be OPERABLE when these valves are being relied upon for low temperature overpressure protection per Specification 3.4.9.3. The PORVs have remote manually operated block valves which may be used to isolate a stuck-open PORV or a pORV with excessive seat leakage and to unblock an isolated PORV to allow i.t to be used for manual control of RCS pressure. The electrical power for both the pORVs and the block valves is supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to close this possible RCS leakage path to maintai.n the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3 4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM The Reactor Coolant Vent System i.s provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could i.nhibit natural circulation core cooling. It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant System volume in one hour at system design pressure,and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system. Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths. Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity. and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fail closed. This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or'rreversible actuation whi.le ensuring that a single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very high radi.ation environment. Zn addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capability exists to perform this venting function.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item ZZ.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarifi.cation of TMI Action Plan Requirement," November 1980.

The minimum requ'i.red systems to meet the Speci.fication and not enter into an ACTION statement are one vent. path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-11 AMENDMENT NO

ML17329A000

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