ML17277B310

Control Room Design Review Program Plan

ML17277B310
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	02/29/1984
From:	Devalle R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
Shared Package
ML17277B308	List: ML17277B307 ML17277B309 ML17277B310
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-840229, NUDOCS 8402230232
Download: ML17277B310 (110)

Text

CONT ROL ROOM 0 ES I

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R EV I EH PROGRAM PLAN FEBRUARY.l984 NNP-2 HASHINGTON PUBLIC PONER SUPPLY SYSTEN 8402230232'00397 2 840217 pgR ADQC~

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CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM PLAN February l984 R.

G. DaValle, Task Force Coordinator Washington Public Power Supply System WNP-2

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CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW PROGRAM PLAN February 1984 R.

G. DaValle, Task Force Coordinator Washington Public Power Supply System WNP-2

TABLE. OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2. 0 OVERVIEW Section Pace 2-1 2.1 2.2 2.3 Purpose Objectives Description of CRDR Program 2-1 2-1 3.0 STAFFING AND QUALIFICATIONS OF REVIEW TEAM 3.1 Review Team Management and Organization 3.2 Review Team Composition 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND'OCUMENT CONTROL 4.1 Reference Documentation 4.2 Review Documentation 4.3 Document Control 5.0 REVIEW PHASE 5.1 Operating Experience and Operator Interviews 5.2 Function and Task Analysis 5.3 Control Room Inventory 5.4 Control Room Survey 5.5 Verification of Task Performance Capabilities 5.6 Validation of Control Room Functions 6.0 HED ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 6.1 Review Process 3-1 3-1 3-2 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 5-1 5-1 5-2 5-6 5-6 5-7 5-8 6-1 6-1 6.2 6.3 6.4 ATTACHMENTS A

8 C

Corrective Recommendations Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies Prioritization. and'mplementation CRDR Program Personnel Resume Briefs Task Force Review Documentation Samples Application of Function and Task Analysis to CRDR 6-2 6-2 6-3

1. 0 INTRODUCTION The Supply. System concurs with the intent of performing a Control Room gesign Review Program and has undertaken ai pro ram to complete a review of the NNP-2 control room in accordance with NUREG-0660 and NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.

The Supply System methodology has been to provide a dual program approach:

Participate as an active member in the Boiling Mater Reactor Owners'roup (BWROG) Control Room Design Review Program.

Establish a

WNP-2 Task Force for detailed assessment and resolution of control room human factor concerns and to provide configuration control for on-going changes to the WNP-2 control room.

This report constitutes the Control Room Design Review Program Plan as specified in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, for conduct of the WNP-2 Control Room Design Review (CRDR).

1-1

2. 0 OVERVIEW The following is a description of the purpose, objectives, and activities of the Control Room Design Review (CRDR}.

2.1

~PUr ose The purpose of the control room design review, as defined in the guidance in NUREG-0700, "Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews,"

is to:

Review and evaluate the control room workspace, instrumentation,

controls, and other equipment from a human factors engineering viewpoint, taking into account both system demands and operator capabilities.

To identify, assess, and implement control room design modifi-cations to correct inadequate or unsuitable items.

2.2

~Ob' The objectives for the control room design review are:

. Improve the ability of control'oom operators to function more effectively during normal and off-normal conditions by improving information. provided to them. arid strategically locating that information.

Identify any modifications of the control room configuration that would contribute to a significant reduction of risk and to enhance safety of operation.

2.3

'Descri tion 'of'CRDR'Pro ram The CRDR Program consists of four phases:

Planning Review Assessment and Implementation Reporting To achieve the objectives of the

CRDR, a number of activities must be completed within these phases.

The diversity of these 'activities requires a multidisciplinary review team.

A flow chart of these phases and activities is presented in Figure 2-1.

h A Project Action Plan for initiating a CRDR Program was approved in April 1980.

The Action Plan chartered a

MNP-2 Control Room Task Force to monitor various indus-trial approaches to the program, define the objectives of the control room design review, define the resources,

schedule, and methodolo'gy required to initiate the pro-

gram, and implement the program through to completion of corrective actions and reporting requirements.

The planning phase of the WNP-2 Control Room Task Force CRDR Program is represented in this Program Plan report.

2.3.2 Review Phase The review phase constitutes the investigative, data-.

gathering portion of the CRDR.

Six processes are defined for the review phase:

A review of operating experience and a survey of control room operators.

A review and analysis of system functions and control room operator tasks, to establish the instrumentation

'and equipment requirements for the tasks operators are expected to accomplish.

An inventory to identify existing instrumentation and equipment.

A survey in which the instrumentation,

controls, ambient conditions, and other features are checked against human engineering guidelines.

Verification of task performance capabilities, in which the instrument and equipment requirements derived from task analysis are compared to the items presently in the control room inventory.

Validation of the control room functions, in which the relationships and dependencies in operating crew activities and between the operators and plant processes are examined.

2.3.3

'ssessment'and'mplementation'Phase During the assessment and implementation phase, all discrepancies identified are analyzed, and the potential 2-2

impact of each discrepancy on plant operation is determined.

Discrepancies are classified according to their s'afety and reliability consequence.

Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED) are evaluated for significance and prioritized for corrective action.

Corrective resolution may use such methods as enhancement techniques, design modifications, procedure

changes, or training improvements.

Improvements that are introduced are coordinated with changes resulting from other improve-ment programs, such as new instrumentation (RG-1.97),

upgraded emergency procedures, and new Graphic Display Systems.

.4 ~h The reporting phase consists of two sections:

A Preliminary Control Room Design Reviews Report was submitted in April 1983 for licensing of MNP-2.

At the conclusion of the

CPDR, a summary report will be submitted to NRC in accordance with the NNP-2 Operating License, six months prior to the first refueling outage.

The summary report will include:

Significant changes made to the program plan, if any.

HEDs which were identified as requiring correction.

HEDs identified with safety significance that will not be corrected or only partially corrected and justification for doing so.

Proposed schedule for correcting HEDs.

2-3

FLOW CHART OF CRDR'ACTIVITIES Planning Phase

. Initiate Task Force

. Develop CRDR Program Plan Submit Program Plan Pre-Licensing Review Phase

. ~0 erator Interviews

. Control Room Inventory

. Contro1 Room Survey K

kA ly.

. Task Performance Verification/

Validation Assessment and Implementation Phase

. Assess HEDs and Categorize

. Develop Corrective Actions Develop Implementation Schedule Pre-Licensing Reporting

. Prepare Preliminary CRDR Report Submit Preliminary CRDR Report Post-Licensing Review Phase Complete Open Survey Items

. Function and Task Analysis

. Task Performan'ce Verification/

Vali dation Assessment and Implementation Phase

. Assess HEDs and Categorize

. Develop Corrective'Actions

. Develop Implementation Schedule i

8 Reporting

. Develop Summary

'CRDR Report Submit Summary CRDR Report Figurc'e 2-2

4

3.0 STAFFING AND UALIFICATIONS OF REVIEW TEAM

'.1 Review Team Mana ement and Or anization WNP-2 Management has retained responsibility and functional control of the CRDR Program to ensure overall=support to the control room review process and integration with other studies, design

changes, and related construction and plant modification activities.

A Control Room CRDR Task Coordinator was assigned to develop and implement the CRDR program, coordinate required control room changes, and monitor other control room affecting activities to ensure human factor integration.

A Task Force Review Team was formed to ensure integration of control room-related engineering design activities, plant operability, and construction.

To augment the Task Force, General Physics Corporation was contracted for human factors consultant services.

WNP-2 supoorts the BWROG Program.

The WNP-2 Task Force Coordinator is a member of the Owners'roup working committee and has partici-pated in the development of the Control Room Design Review Program and Survey Checklists.

WNP-2 Task Force members were trained on human factor concerns and the Owners'roup Program at an Owners'roup-sponsored workshop.

The Task Force has supported the program as members of Owners'roup Survey Teams at Nine-Mile Point, Peach Bottom 2/3, and Pilgram Nuclear Power Stations and 'was, in turn, surveyed by an Owners'roup Survey Team.

Project scheduling assigned full time personnel to develop and inte-grate control room engineering and construction schedules.

The Control Room Human Factors Program was integrated into the project schedule for visibility, management tracking. and integration with other control room activities.

Supply System Engineering and Startup organizations identified personnel to coordinate and manage control room activities.

A Project Control Room Program Manager was assigned to monitor, coordinate, and expedite engineering and construction management-related activities.

A Startup Control Room Coordinator was assigned to monitor, coordinate, and exoedite startup and construction acti-vities related to the control room.

These management levels provided direct management support for the CRDR Task Force, integration of activities affecting control room design reviews, ensured support from other organizations or person-nel as required and provided the review and approval authority for 3-1

Task Force Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) reports and corrective recommendations Lsee Figure 3-1, Management and Organization Structure].

t

3. 2 Review Team Com os ition The Task Force review team and the Owners'roup survey team provide for both an inhouse and an independent multidisciple team of individuals with the wide range of skills necessary to perform the design review.

Review team members consisted of personnel from the following companies:

Supply System General Electric (NSSS vendor)

Burns and Roe (Architect-Engineer)

General Physics Corporation (human factors)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (human factors)

Boston Edison Company Niagara Mohawk Company Yankee Atomic Electric Company During the course of the review, additional specialists required for specific tasks will be made available to the review team as needed.

Figures 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4 provide information as to Supply System Task Force and BWROG Survey Team composition and assignments and career experience levels.

Resume briefs are noted in Attachment A.

3-2

MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

.WNP-2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROJECT CONTROL ROOM PROGRAM MANAGER CRDR TASK FORCE PROGRAM COORDINATOR STARTUP CONTROL ROOM PROGRAM COORDINATOR Monitor and

~

~

coordinate engineering and construction management activities Monitor and coordinate CRDR Program activities Monitor and coordinate startup and control room change activitses Ziguze 8-2

TEAM COMPOSITION AND ASSIGNMENT CRDR PROGRAM TASK FORCE COORDINATOR RG DaValle SUPPLY SYSTEM TASK FORCE MEMBERS BWROG SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS RG DaValle DC Burgy/RJ Little RE Green CH McGilton/RG DaValle BJ Van Erem/GJ Freeman/

DC Burgy Van Erem/RE Green CH McGilton/RG DaValle Administration Human Factors Engineer Nuclear Systems Engineer Nuclear Safety Assurance Systems Analysis Engineer IKC Engineer Reactor Operations Training Engineer W. Babcock MD Field RM Fairfield RG DaValle A. Miller/MD Field RM Fairfield/A. Miller/

W. Babcock/A. Vierling KC Ross/RM Fairfield/

RG DaValle KC Ross/RM Fairfield SUPPORT SPECIALISTS RA Call RJ Little RJ Little RJ Little Computer Communications Lighting Accoustic MD Field/KC Ross MD Field/RM Fairfield KC Ross KC Ross Ziguve 3-2

SUPPLY SYSTEM TASK'FORCE PERSONNEL CAREER EXPERIENCE LEVEL RG DaValle 17 years RE Green 19 years CH McGilton 20 years GJ Freeman 23 years BJ Van Erem 22 years DC Burgy 19 years RJ Little 17 years RA Call 21 years Total years of experience:

158 years Piguve 8-8

0

'BWROG SURVEY 'TEAt1'PERSONNEL CAREER EXPERIENCE'LEVEL W. Babcock 15 years A. Miller 15 years A. Vierling 7 years RM Fairfield 17 years KC Ross 9 years RG DaValle 17 years MD Field 28 years Total years of experience:

108 years Zigzue 3-4

4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL The Control Room Design Review Program involves the systematic use of a substantial number of existing documents and the preparation of new materials to record and document reviews.

Reference materials, review

reports, Human Engineering Deficiency (HED) forms, and other working documents are used.

These enable the Task Force to record review

results, provide a design data base, identify and track HEDs and resulting recommendations, and provide a document trail for traceability.

4.1 Reference'Documentation A data base reference library or access to reference material was established.

Material included those noted in NUREG-0700 and, in addition, industrial reports on Control Room Human Factor Studies, Preliminary Plant Control Room Human Factor Reviews and audit reports from other plants, WNP-2 outstanding design

changes, BWROG emergency procedure guidelines and procedures, standard technical specifications, and related NUREGs, regulatory guides, and TMI-related reports.

4.2 Review'Documentation Documents and forms are being prepared as each phase of the WNP-2 Control Room Review Program is identified and implemented.

Standard HED forms have been prepared to identify the location of discrepan-cies, describe their nature and priority, and provide a record of recommended corrective actions.

Initial'data base review report formats, prepared prior to HED Report preparation, vary depending on the review process and data requirements.

Attachment B provides representative samples of different review report formats and provides a sample of a standard HED report form.

BWROG Survey Team Program checklists, operator interview forms, task analysis and procedure walkthrough forms, and assessment methodology are not included in this document.

These are included in the BWROG Program Plan which was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on August 25, 1'981.

I 4.3 Document'Control Control and traceability of.HED Reports and their review and approval are maintained through Task Force HED correspondence, Supply System HED Directives to the A-E, and a Task Force-controlled HED Status and Tracking Log.

All correspondence is forwarded'to the WNP-2 Controlled Site Files, and a working file is maintained in the Task Force Coordinator's Office.'

5.0 REVIEW PHASE The Supply System methodology has been to provide a dual program approach:

Participate as an active member in the BWROG Control Room Design Review Program.

Establish a

WNP-2 Task Force for detailed assessment and resolution of control room human factor concerns and to provide configuration control for on-going changes to the WNP-2 control room.

The "review" phase is divided into six processes:

Oyer~etio experience and operator interviews Function and task anal.vsis, Control room inventory.

Control room survey.

Verification of task performance capabilities.

Validation of control room functions.

The BWROG Survey Program will be used to satisfy sections of the review phase requirements and/or augment or provide verification and validation for Task Force reviews.

The BWROG review methodology includes analysis of plant LERs and scram reports, operator interviews, checklist evaluations, task analyses, and walkthroughs of emergency procedures.

The LER and scram report analysis and operator interviews toqether correspond to Process 1 of NUREG-0700.

The task analyses and walkthroughs correspond to,Processes 2, 3, 5, and 6.

The survey checklist evaluations correspond to Process 4.

5.1 0 eratin Ex erience and Operator Interviews 5.1.1 Operating Experience Reviews WNP-2 has no operating history.

Therefore, a review of LERs and scram reports could not be performed under the BWROG Program.

However, during the WNP-2 Task Force reviews, considerable input was,obtained from experienced operators and from operational experience and'RDR reports from other plants.

Also, WNP-2 has established an onsite Nuclear Safety Assur ance Group (NSAG), as required by NUREG-0737 and WNP-2 Technical Specifications, to provide formal 5-1

operational experience reviews relative to WNP-2, which include LER and scram reports.

Two of the WNP-2 Human Factors Task Force members are part of the WNP-2 NSAG to ensure continuation of human factors input into WNP-2 plant operations.

Per plant technical specifications, NSAG is'responsible for maintaining surveillance of unit activities to provide independent verification that activities are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced as much as practical.

5.1.2 Operator Interviews Operator interviews were conducted by the BWROG survey team to obtain information concerning plant design directly from the user population.

Written questionnaires were adminis-tered to operators, including equipment operators, control room operators, shift supervisors, and shift managers.

In

'addition, oral interviews were conducted with approximately one-third of the total operating staff.

A representative group of operators was selected for the oral interviews covering a range of experience, education, ability, and physical size.

Interviews were conducted by utility personnel and'survey team members with background or experience in operations and engineering or design with a position conducive to a free flow of information.

Following the interviews, the survey team consolidated the information obtained and analyze it to help identify specific areas of concern for detailed analysis during the control room review.

5.2 Function and Task Anal sis NUREG-0737 Action Plan Item I.C.l requires reanalysis of transients and accidents and preparation of technical guidelines.

Technical guidelines are defined in NUREG-0899 as documents that identify the equipment or systems to be operated and list the steps necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents.and restore safety functions.

Technical guidelines represent the translation of engineering data derived from transient and accident analyses into information presented in such a way that it can be used to write,Ebs Generic Emergency Procedure Guidelines haye 4een

orgnared, bX. BWROG in response to Item I.C.1 of NUREG-0737.

These guidelines contain tech-nical information and guidance for dealing with unanticipated accidents.

The functionally oriented guidelines, along with support-ing information on their development, will be used as the starting point for the Function and Task Analysis.

5-2

Function and task analysis is used in the CRDR to accomplish the following objectives:

Define operator emergency response functions and tasks.

Establish operator control and information requirements.

Assess the adequacy of existing controls and instrumentation.

Cp Evaluate the effectiveness of the control room in supporting the integrated accomplishment of the emergency response functions.

'I The results of the function and task analysis will be organized to clearly present the following information:

The functions that need to be performed.

The systems to be used in performing those functions.

Tasks to be performed by the operator.

The information that must be available to the operators to carry out their tasks.

The control functions the operator will be required to perform.

The anticipated sequence of operator actions.

The specific events to be reviewed under Function and Task Analysis include the following emergency procedures:

RPV CONTROL PPM 5.1.1 PPM 5.1.2 PPM 5.1.3 RPV Level Control (RPV/L)

RPV Pressure Control (RPV/P)

Reactor Power Control (RPV/g)

CONTAINMENT CONTROL PPM 5.2.1 PPM 5.2.2 PPM 5.2.3 PPM 5.2.4 Suppression Pool Temperature Control (SP/T)

Drywell Temperature Control (DM/T)

Primary Containment Pressure Control (PC/P)

Suppression

'Pool Level Control (SP/L) 5-3

EMERGENCY PROCEDURE CONTINGENCIES PPM 5.3.1 PPM 5.3.2 PPM 5.3.3 PPM 5.3.4

",PPM 5.3.5 PPM 5.3.6 PPM 5.3.7 Level Restoration (Contingency)

Emergency RPV Depressurization (Contingency)

Steam Cooling (Contingency)

Core Cooling Without Level Restoration (Contingency)

Alternate Shutdown Cooling (Contingency)

RPV Flooding (Contingency)

Level/Power Control (Contingency)

The WNP-2 CRDR function and task analysis is being implemented in two phases.

First, a preliminary analysis was performed during the BWROG CRDR completed in January 1983.

Second, a more detailed analysis will be performed based upon the latest revision of the WNP-2 plant-specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP).

The methodology applied in each phase is outlined in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, below.

5.2.1 BWROG Task Analysis Program The BWROG Survey Program was implemented at WNP-2.

Function and Task Analysis was performed based on the BWROG Emergency Procedures Guidelines and draft WNP-2 Plant Specific Guide-'ines to augment the Task Force and BWROG Control Room Surveys, to provide input for the assessment of HEDs and development of corrective recommendations, and to help verify and validate control room modifications during the plant construction phase.

The BWROG function and task analysis included the following elements:

Operator emergency response functions and tasks were identified.

Control and instrumentation requirements were specified for each identified operator task.

The adequacy of existing and proposed controls and instrumentation was evaluated against the control and information requirements specified.

The validity of the task sequences and the overall effectiveness of the control room were evaluated using talk and walkthroughs.

Duririg the performance of elements third and fourth,

above, each task was analyzed in terms of the following considerations:

5-4

Is the task sequence valid and complete?

Is sufficient information immediately available to the operator to enable him to complete the task?

Do critical controls and displays identified for each task conform to human factor desizn criteria?

Is direct feedback used to verify control functions?

'Is available manpower adequate to perform the task?

The results of the BWROG Function and Task Analysis were

'forwarded to NRC in the WNP-2 Preliminary CRDR Report, April 1983.

5.2.2 Task Force Task Analysis Program WNP-2 plant specific emergency procedure guidelines and procedure generation package were forwarded to NRC in March 1983.

WNP-2 will perform a function and task analysis on the WNP-2 plant specific emergency procedure guidelines to satisfy the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 and the CRDR program.

This information will be used for verifi-cation of task performance capabilities and for validation of control room functions as noted in sections 5.5 and 5.6 of this Program Plan.

The methodology to be employed in the detailed function and task analysis is modeled upon the functional analysis of the BWROG EPGs performed for the Display/Procedures Integration Committee of the BWROG.

This process described in the Supply System submittal, Function and Task Analysis of the WNP-2 Emeraency Operating Procedures, February 1984, will identify aJ all operator control, decision, and action

. functions contained in the EOPs and b) control and informa-tion requirements to support these functions.

The method by which the functional analysis will be applied in the CRDR is detailed in Attachment C to this report.

In

general, the evaluation will include the following elements:

Operator emergency response decision and action func-tions will be identified through functional analysis.

Each operator decision and action function will be subjected to task and decision analysis to identifv related control and information requirements.

5-5

II

Existing control room instrumentation will be assessed

~ against the identified control and information require-ments.

Each control and indication will be evaluated in terms of availability, usability, and location.

= The effectiveness of the control room in supporting the integrated accomplishment of the emergency response functions will be evaluated using talk and walkthroughs.

The results of the Function and Task Analysis will be reported in the MNP-2 CRDR Summary Report.

5.3 Control Room Inventor A reference set of data for control room instrumentation and controls is available on computerized instrument and equipment lists, panel arrangement and engraving drawings, and other reference documents, such as panel photographs, engineering dr awings, vendor files, and other inventory documents.

During the Control Room Survey

Phase, an independent inventory survey was conducted to identify controls, switches, alarms, displays, and components available to the control room operators.

The survey inventory was documented in Review Reports, as noted in Attachment B,

and compared with engineering

data, noted above, to assure consis-tency and accuracy of inventory data.

The control room panels, which had an inventory review performed, are noted in Table 5-1.

5.4 Control Room Surve The purpose of the Control Room Survey is to review and assess the adequacy of the arrangement and identification of important con-trols and displays, the usefulness of audio and visual alarm sys-tems, plant status information provided, procedures and training with respect to limitations of existing instrumentation, information recording and recall capability, the control room layout and environ-

ment, and other areas of human factor engineering that potentially impact operator effectiveness.

The ultimate objective is to identify potential modifications of the operator-control room interface which will reduce the potential for human error.

The control panels evaluated by both the WNP-2 Task Force and the BWROG survey team are listed in Table 5-1.

The Remote Shutdown panels were included in the scope of the review.

Figure 5-1 pro-vides a layout arrangement of the WNP-2 Control Room panels.

Table 5-2 provides a listing of the major survey areas with which human factor principles will be compared.

In performing the survey, particular attention was given to items 5-6

identified as potential problem areas noted in Operator Interviews, Audit Reports from other utilities, and industry human factor documents.

5.4.1 5.'4. 2 BMROG Survey Program A BWROG Survey Team'performed an independent survey of the WNP-2 Control Room.

The BWROG CRDR Program Plan and Survey Checklists are not documented within this report.

The BMROG program was submitted to NRC on August 25, 1981.

Deviations from the BHROG program consisted of not complet-ing the Licensee Event Report analysis section of the survey.

Rational and methodology for bringing this portion of the program into compliance are noted in section 5.1.1 of this Program Plan.

The results of the BWROG Survey were reported in the Pre-liminary Control Room Design Review Report submitted in April 1983 to NRC.

BWROG Survey checklist items not com-

pleted, due to the plant construction status, and the BMROG Supplemental Survey checklists will be completed during the plant operating phase by the HNP-2 Task Force and reported-in the WNP-2 CRDR Summary Report.

Supply System Task Force The Supply System MNP-2 Task Force survey included use of the BWROG Program Survey checklist and appropriate sections of NUREG-0700 and augmented by additional input from audits and findings from control room reviews performed in the industry and other human factor documents.

Task Force surveys were documented in accordance to section 4.0 of this Program Plan and was included in the WNP-2 Preliminary CRDR Report noted in section 5.4.1 of this Program Plan.

General Physics Corporation assisted the Task Force and

'ugmented the Task Force Survey by completing an indepen-dent survey of the HNP-2 control room using methodology and checklists developed by General Physics Corporation.

Included in their survey was a review of the HNP-2 Task Force program methodoloqy, documentation control and

methods, and HED Reports with recommended corrective actions.

5.5

'Verificat'ion.'of'Task Performance Capabilities Verification is accomplished by comparing the inventory of existing control room instrumentation and controls with the instrumentation 5-7

and control requirements identified in the Function and Task Analysis.

Specifically, the results of, this comparison identifies instrumentation and controls

~re uired by the control room operator for task performance but not provided in the control room.

Additionally, control room instrumentation and control design is evaluated to assure that selected design improvements, both individually, and collectively, adequately correct discrepancies and do not create other safety problems.

Verification is accom-plished by performing the following:

Comparison of the modified control room design with the control room human factors design conventions.

Comparison of the modified control room design with the instru-mentation and controls requirements identified during the Function and Task Analysis.

Comparison of the modified control room design with approved project design criteria (e.g., electrical separation criteria).

The BMROG Program was used to provide verification of control room instrumentation and control adequacy and provided information as to the need for control room improvements during plant construction.

[See section 5.2.1 of this Program Plan.]

Subsequent verification to be performed by the Supply System Task Force will be based on the results of Function and Task Analysis. performed per section 5.2.2 of this Program Plan.

5.6 Validation of Control Room Function The validation process will utilize the upgraded EOPs and the modified 'control room or simulator to verify, by talk and walk-throughs of event sequences selected, from those studied in the Function and Task Analysis, that the functions allocated to the control room operators can be accomplished in an effective manner.

The modified control room will include changes resulting from the CRDR and other improvement programs, such as SPDS and RG 1.97 Rev.

2.

Any potential HEDs resulting from the validation process will be processed as described in section 6.0, Assessment and Implementation.

5-8

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CONTROLROOM

'PANELS REVIEW

'Main 8enchboards P601 P800 P602 P820 P603 P840

'Remote Shutdown Panels

'001 P100 Vertical Panels P614 P672 P811 P812 P813 P814 P821 P824 P825 P826 P827 P831 P832 P851 Fire Control Panels Table 5-2

0

'CONTROL ROOM SURVEY SUBJECT AREAS INSTRUMENTATION AND HARDWARE Controllers Indicators Recorders Indicatinq lights Switches Emergency switches Key-lock switches ANNUNCIATORS Grouping Window design Visual alarm Audible alarm Acknowledgement Visual alarm Procedures Maintenance Nuisance alarms

'COMPUTERS Console Capability CRTs Typers TabZe

$-2 PANEL LAYOUT AND DESIGN Anthropometrics and control room layout Demarcation lines and mimics Control/display grouping Color codes Labels Temporary modifications Traffic patterns and panel arrangement E.

PROCEDURES Availabil ity Access and recognition Format Content References Revision Logkeeping F.

CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENT Communications Auditory, displays Lighting Heating and ventilation Fire control Emeraency situations G.

MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE Operator functions Jumpers and lifted leads Permanent modifications

.Tags Spare parts Procedures H.

TRAINING AND MANNING Training Control room manning Shift change

SQ HED ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION During the Assessment and Implementation phase, all discrepancies identified will be analyzed, and the potential impact of each discrepancy on safe plant 'operation will be determined.

Discrepancies will then be categorized according to their safety and reliability consequence.

Corrective recommendation will then be selected and a schedule for

'mplementation developed.

f The HEDs identified by the review process are considered potential HEDs until assessed and dispositioned according to this proqram.

6.1 Review 'Process A review report is'repared by the assigned Task Force member.

The review report identifies the area of review and concerns/problems noted.,during the review and provides selected corrective-recommenda-tions.

The review repor t is distributed to all Task Force members.,

Each Task Force member reviews the report to ensure completeness and accuracy in their area of exp'ertise.

The Task Force Coordinator overviews to ensure each area of review is adequate prior to prepa-ration of the HED Report.

Each member is free to review the reports in each others area of expertise as the need arises.

Human Factor affecting activities within the control room are reviewed by the Task Force to ensure configuration control and integration, between related'activities.

Specific design and layout reviews include such areas as RG-1.97, RG-1.47, Safety Parameter Display System, new 8'l<R Emergency procedure Guidelines and Procedures, TMI-rel'ated tasks, and other engineering changes.

A Task Force meeting is held to discuss the Review Reports and resulting concerns and recommendatfons.

Review Report changes, additions and deletions are agreed to, and the report subsequently revised.

All resulting concerns are reviewed against the HED Prioritization Criteria.

Prioritization coding requires the unanimous agreement by the Task Force Team for each item of concern.

All concerns are noted on the HED Report for document completeness and traceability.

The HED Report is prepared concurred with'y each Task Force member, and forwarded to Management.

Prior to plant licensing, Project Management has authorized the startup organization's Control Room Coordinator, responsible for coordinating control room startup and construction activities, to review and approve Task Force'HED Reports and corrective r'ecommenda-tions.

Upon review of the HED Report, the Startup Control Room

'E

Coordinator meets with the Task Force to'resolve areas of startup or construction impacting concern.

All changes from the HED Report are unanimously agreed to and documented by Project Manage-ment Directives to the Architect-Engineer for implementation Lsee Figures 6-1 and 6-2].

Upon plant licensing, the Plant Operating Comnittee provides the review and approval of CRDR corrective recommendations which affect safety.

Other CRDR corrective recommendations, such as panel enhancements, are implemented using plant administrative control procedures upon approval of the Task Force I.see Figure 6-33.

6.2 Corrective Recommendations H

Corrective reommendations are developed to bring the HEDs into agreement with acceptable human factors guidelines.

The specific corrective actions chosen may be enhancements,,

design modifica-

tions, improved training, revised procedures, or any of the above either individually or in combination.

The recommended corrective action is documented on the HED Report form.

Many potential HEDs are the result of minor human engineering violations or incongruent design efforts (e.g.,

improper abbrevia-tions and tagging, indicator wording and scale marking, system identifications) and can usually be corrected by enhancement.

Potential HEDs selected for correction by enhancement techniques do not require categorization relative to safety or reliability consequences.

However, the enhancements themselves are considered in the evaluation of aggregate HEDs as well as their effect on the entire control room.

Also, enhancements are not viewed as solu-tions to serious human factor design problems.

All HEDs not correctable by enhancement techniques are evaluated for design corrections.

6.3 Assessment of Human Enaineerin Discre ancies Each HED is assessed for its seriousness using the following considerations:

The extent or degree the HED deviates from the guidelines of the BMROG checklists, NUREG-0700, NUREG-0801, or other applic-able human engineering guidelines.

The impact of each HED on operator performance.

The probability that the HED will degrade operating crew per-

. formance, thereby increasing the potential for operator error.

6-2

0 0

Industry operational and design concerns as noted in operating

'xperience

reports, control room audits of other utilities, and other industry documents.

For each potential HED, the Task Force determines

1) the safety and/or reliability consequences that could result consistent with the seriousness of the deficiency and 2) the likelihood of operator error and/or the operator's opportunity to correct the el'ror.

A ranking factor. Category I (highest) through Category V

(lowest), is assigned to each potential HED.

The Task Force also reviews the potential HED based on industry assessment of the specific deficiency type irrespective of the WNP-2 design.

A risk factor is assigned based on deviation significance from human factor guidelines, operating experience information from other utilities, control room audit reports from other utilities, and other applicable documents.

A risk factor of high, medium, or minimal is assigned.

6e4 Prioritization and Im lementation:

The need to correct an identified HED is based on its assigned assessment category and licensing risk category.

The Prioritiza-tion Guideline Table, noted below, provides guidance for the Task Force i'n determihing HED corrective priority and impl.ementation schedule.

Deviations from the guideline table may occur based on individual assessment.

Prioritization Guidel.ine'Table

~Cate or Safety I Safety II Reliability III Reliability IY Neither V

~Hi h

2 ol 3

Risk Medium 2 ol' 20l' Low 1 or 2 1 or 2

2ol 3

~3 6-3

Priorit Ratin Schedule Prompt/Prior to Fuel Load Near Term/After Fuel Load Correction Optional HEDs, identified for "prompt" or "near term" correction, are evaluated against system completion, contractor turnover, and plant operating schedules to determine the exact timing for the correction.

In general, the corrections necessary are formed as 'soon as practical to allow for subsequent

training, procedures, verification, and validation.

The actual schedule for corrections depends on availability of instrumentation, procurement scheduling, status of procedures, training and retraining, and other related concerns.

6-4

PROJECT CONSTRUCTION PHASE SUPPLY SYSTEM TASK FORCE REVIEl< PROCESS Task Force Member Perform Review Pr epare Review Report Assess Human Factor Concerns; Develop Recommendations Task Force Team Review Report Findings Assess Review Complete-ness; Assess Operational Impact; Assess Engineer-ing Impact Task Force Team Pr epare HED Report Assess HED Discrepancies; Prioritize HEDs; Approve HED Corrective Recom-mendations Startup Control oom Coordinator Review HED Report Assess HED Recommenda-tions; Assess Construc-tion/Star tup Impact Task Force Team/

Startup Control Room Coordinator Resolve Conflicts Startup Control Room Coordinator Project Directive to the A-E Architect-Engineer (A-E)

Prepare Detail Design Changes Zigure 6-2

PROJECT CONSTRUCTION 'PHASE BWR OWNERS'ROUP 'SURVEY REVIEW PROCESS BWR Owners'roup Survey Team Perform Review Prepare Review Report Assess Human Factor Concerns; Develop Recommendations (Supply System)

Task Force Team Task Force Team

.Review Report Findings Prepare HED Report Assess Review Complete-ness;.Assess Operatidnal Impact; Assess Engineer.-

ing Impact Assess HED Discrepancies; Prioritize HEDs; Approve HED Corrective Recom-mendations Startup Control om Coordinator Review HED Report Assess HED Recommenda-tions; Assess Construc-tion/Startup Impact Task'orce Team/

Startup Control Room Coordinator Resolve Conflicts Startup Control Room Coordinator Project Directive to the A-E Architect-Engineer (A-E)

Prepare Detail Design Changes Ziguze 6-2

PLANT OPERATION PHASE SUPPLY SYSTEM REVIEW PROCESS Reviewer Perform Review Prepare'Review Report Assess Human Factor Concerns; Develop Recommendations Task Force Team Review Report Findings Assess Review Complete-ness; Assess Operational Impact; Assess Engineer-ing Impact Task Force Team Prepare HED Report Assess HED Discrepancies; Prioritize HEDs; Approve HED Corrective Recom-mendations Safety Affecting no yes POC Members Plant Operating Committee Review Assess Safety Affecting Recommendations Task Force Members Initiate Corrective Recommendation Initiate Recommendation per Plant Procedure Figuz'e 6-3

HED PRIORITIZATION'CRITERIA 'STANDARD 1)

Cate orization'Code Category

. I - Safety Related, Minimum Opportunity to Correct Error Category II - Safety Related, Some Opportunity to Correct Error Category III - Reliability Related, Minimum Opportunity to Correct Error Category IV - Reliability Related, Some Opportunity to Correct Error Category V -

No Impact on Safety or Reliability In Terms of Need:

Category I - To enhance safe operation.

the change should be made.

Remove or mitigate discrepanCy Provide error feedback to the operator Increase time to respond to error Category II - To enhance safe operation, the change should be made.

Category III - To enhance reliable operation,,the change may be desirable.

Remove or mitigate discrepancy Provide error feedback to the operator Increase time to respond to error Category IV - To enhance reliabl,e operation, the change may be desirable.

Category V - Change may improve operations.

2)

Risk Assessment a.

High b.

Medium c.

Minimal Risk Assignment Based on:

- Guidance in draft NUREG-1580,. 0659, and 0700

- Audits of other control rooms BWR Owners'roup decisions

- Operating Experience Reports 3)

Prioritization/Schedul e to Com 1 ete 1.

Prior to fuel load/prompt 2.

After 'fuel load/near term 3.

Correction optional Fige'e 6-4

0

ATTACHMENT A CRDR PROGRAM PERSONNEL RESUME BRIEFS Supp1y System Task Force BHROG Survey Team

~Pa e

A-1 A-5

SUPPLY SYSTEM TASK'FORCE R.

G. DaValle, Task Force Coordinator Bachelor of-Science in General Engineering.

Experience includes seventeen years in the nuclear industry:

Five years as a certified control room supervisor, three years in project design engineering of FFTF, and ten years with the Supply System in plant operations holding positions of Senior Operation Engineer, Supervisor Generation Administrative Services, and Nuclear Safety Specialist.

Member of BWROG Committee on Control Room Design Review Program.

Attended ten-day Owners'roup Human Factors Workshop Program.

Participated in the Owners'roup Survey of the Peach Bottom 2 and 3 Nuclear Power Station Control Rooms.

C.

H.

Responsibility to WNP-2 Program Management for NUREG-0660, Item I.D.l/

NUREG-0700 Program Implementation.

Provide administrative and document control for the program; maintain working files and HED Log; ensure ade-quacy of Control Room reviews; coordinate license and A-E engineering changes affecting the control room; perform assigned areas of review; and provide detailed overviews of Review Reports and HED Reports.

McGilton, Plant 0 erations'Re r esentative Bachelor of Science in Metallurgical Engineering, Graduate of Oak Ridge School of'eactor Technology, and NRC Licensed Senior Reactor Operator.

Experience includes twenty years in the nuclear industry:

Four years with the U.S.

AEC, three years as Shift Supervisor in the U.S.

Navy Nuclear

Program, two years in engineering assignments involving BWR startup, operation, and refueling, and ten years at WNP-2, consisting of seven years as WNP-2 Plant Operations Superv sor and presently as Manager of the WNP-2 Nucl:ear Safety Assurance Group.

B. J.

Attended ten-day Owners'roup Human Factors Workshop Program.

Responsible for performing assigned areas of Control Room Reviews, provid-ing operational reviews of Review Reports and HED Reports against available operational procedures and technical specification, interfaces with experi-enced plant operation personnel, and integrates human factors input into plant operations organization.

Van Erem Architect En ineer Reor'esentative Graduate of U.S.

Naval Nuclear Power School, Westinghouse Reactor Design

School, and U.S.

Navy Electronics and Advanced Electronics Schools.

A-1

a

<<l 1

4 0

Experience includes twenty-two years in the nuclear field:

Eight years in the U.S.

Navy either aboard nuclear submarines or at naval nuclear test facilities, five years with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as Senior Inspector, Naval Reactors Division, two years as Assistant Chief Nuclear Fueling Engineer with Morrison-Knudsen

Company, one year with Burns 5 Roe, Inc., as Senior Operations/Test Engineer on Nuclear and Fossil Station Test Programs, four years as Senior A-E Construction Superintendent at WNP-2, one year as Engineering Manager for the WNP-1 Instrumentation Contractor, and presently Senior Instrumentation and Control Engineer for the WNP-2 Architect-Engineer, Burns and Roe, Inc.

Participated in the Owners'roup Control Room Survey of Nine-Mile Point Nuclear Power Station.

R.

E.

Responsible for performing assigned areas of control room reviews, inte-grating ongoing engineering changes between the Task Force and the A-E and providing detailed engineering reviews of Review Reports and HED Reports against plant design and engineering criteria.

Green NSSS Vendor En ineerinq'Representative Bachelor of Ants in Business Administration and Bachelor of Science in Industrial Technology'.

Experience includes nineteen years in the nuclear industry:

Two years as a Journeyman Electrician with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, nine years with General Electric Company as an Instru-mentation and Control Safety System Design Engineer, which included design work on the WNP-2 Control Room panels, and eight years with the Supply System as a-Project Instrumentation Design Engineer and Senior Instrumen-tation Engineer.

N Attended ten-day Owners'roup Human Factors Workshop Program.

Partici-pated in Owners'roup Survey of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Control Room.

G. J.

Responsible for performing assigned areas of control room reviews, provid-ing NSSS design and instrumentation review of Review Reports and HED Reports and interfacing with licensee's engineering staff and integrating engineering changes with the task force reviews.

Freeman,'tartu Control 'Room 'Pro r'am 'Coordinator Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering.

Experience includes six-teen years in the nuclear industry and twenty-one years in Industrial Control Systems.

Experience includes checkout, startup, and operating assistance on complex instrument and electrical control systems, such as Recirculation and Feedwater

Systems, BWR NSSS experience with General Electric as a troubleshooting specialist in instrument and electrical control systems, and presently Startup Control Room Manager responsible A-2

D.

C.

for coordinating WNP-2 Control Room-related Startup and Construction activities.

Holds professional license in Control Systems.

Authorized by Project Management to review and approve Task Force HED corrective recommendations.

Provides Startup and Construction Impact Reviews and Design Coordination.

Bur Human Factors 'Consultant

Manager, Human Factors Engineering, General Physics Corporation; Ph.D Candidate, Applied Experimental Psycholoqy.

Nineteen years 'of experi-ence in Human Factors Engineering and Man-Machine System Design and Evaluation.

Areas of human factors expertise include systems

analysis, information processing, man-computer interactions, performance evalua-tion, training systems, and speech/nonspeech communications.

Applied research background includes an emphasis in experimental design and methods, multivariate statistical analysis. mini/micro computer appli-

cations, and software psychology.

Experience in nuclear power plant control room reviews includes onsite field evaluations at North Anna, Surry, Zion, LaSalle.

Susquehanna (Advanced Control Room Design),

and Zimmer Stations; Evaluations have included the application of current NRC Human Factors Guidelines and existing military standards to control room designs as well as field and laboratory experimentation to validate criteria used in design tradeoff analyses.

Little "'Human 'Factors 'onsul tant Staff Scientist, General Physics Corporation; M.S., Industrial Engineer-ing and Operations Research.

Seventeen years of experience included conducting and teaching human factors seminars, Lead Human Factors Engineer for review of Georgia Power Company's Plant Vogtle Control Room, and Project Manager of the Human Factors Review for Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

Responsible for the review of assigned control room areas, review WNP-2 Program Methodology and Documentation Control, and review Task Force Review Reports and HED Reports for adequacy of human factor concerns and 'recommended corrective action.

R. A:'Call;'Com uter Sup ort'S ecialist A.A. Degree in Electronics Engineering Technology.

Experience includes twenty-one years in the nuclear industry:

Thirteen years as Operations Staff Specialist with Argonne National Laboratory, eight years as Senior Instrument and Control Engineer and Senior Computer Engineer, and A-3

0

presently Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Assurance.

Past experience includes responsibility for plant computer design criteria and speci-f cations, instrument rack and control board specifications, and security system design requirements.

Participated in the Supply System CRDR review of HNP-3/5 Control Room.

Responsible for providing support and performing reviews in the area of MNP-2 computer design and operability.

BWROG'SURVEY TEAM Warran Babcock "Boston Edison Compan WNP-2 BWROG Survey Team Leader.

Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering.

Experience includes fifteen years in the nuclear industry, four years with Boston Edison Company as a Senior Electronics

Engineer, two years with Burns and Roe as a Senior Instrumentation and Control 'Engineer, two years with Ebasco as a Senior Instrumentation and Control Engineer, three years with Stone and Webster as a Control Engineer, and four years with Babcox and'ilcox as a Plant El.ectrical Engineer.

Experience includes control board design and layout with several of the above companies.

Member of the BWROG Committee'on Control Room Design Review Program.

Attended,ten-day Owners'roup Human Factors Workshop Program and a

two-week MIT course 'on Control Room Improvements.

Team Leader for BWROG surveys of Limerick 1

and 2; Peach Bottom 2/3, Pilgrim, Nine-Mile Point 1 and 2, Brown's Ferry 1/2/3, Duane Arnold, and, WNP-2 nuclear power stations.

Art.Vierlin,'ia ara Mohawk'Company Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering.

Experience includes seven years in the nuclear industry with Niagara Mohawk, two years as a

Site quality Control Engineer, and five years as an Instrumentation arid Control Engineer.

Experience includes three years at Nine-Mile Point 1

nuclear power station.

Presently Lead PGCC Engineer responsible for the preliminary testing, startup, and human factors review of the Nine-Mile Point 2 nuclear power stations control room Power Generation Control Complex (PGCC).

Member of the BWROG Committee on the Control Room Design Review Program, member of the INPO Committee on Control Room Design Review, attended ten-day Owners,'roup Human Factors Workshop Program, attended three-day Stone and Webster Control Room Human Factors

seminar, coordinated the BWROG survey of Nine-Mile Point 1, and participated as a member of the BWROG survey team for Brown's Ferry 1, 2, and 3, Nine-Mile Point 2, and WNP-2 nuclear power stations.

'Al Miller'.Yankee'Atomic'Electric Com an Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering.

Experience includes fifteen years.in the nuclear industry with Yankee Atomic Electric Company A-5

and eight years with Foxburrow, Inc., in instrumentation and panel design.

Experience includes new plant design and design backfitting at Main Yankee, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee Rowe nuclear power stations and presently Senior Instrumentation and Control, Engineer in the Human Factors Engineering section at Yankee Atomic Electric Company.

Attended two-week MIT course on control room improvements and several

seminars, member of utilities Human Factors Engineering section, and parti-cipated as a member of thw BWROG survey team at Seabrook and WNP nuclear power stations.

R. M.Fairfield'eneral Electric Compan K.

C; Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Professional

Engineer, Nuclear Engineering.

Experience includes seventeen years in the nuclear industry:

One year'in control and instrumentation, eight years in startup and operations, two years as an operator certification instructor at the Morris, Illinois, simulator, and six years in program management.

Member of BWROG survey team for three plants and author of two Control Room Design Review Summary Reports.

Ross,'General'Electric

'Com an Experience includes nine years in the nuclear industry:

Four years as an instructor in the U.S.

Navy nuclear power program, two years as an instruc-tor at the Morr is, Illinois, simulator, and three years as a Program Manager for General Electric in the BWROG Control Room Improvements program.

Holds Senior Reactor Operators license and certified by NRC to teach all'hases of BWR operation.

Program Manager for the BWROG Control Room Design Review Program.

Provided management support for eighteen BWR control room reviews, principal author of nine Control Room Design Review Summary Reports, coauthor of an addi-tional seven.

Developed, organized, and presented the BWROG Control Room Survey Program Workshop. attended MIT summer program on human factors engineering, and INPO workshop on control room evaluations.

Coauthor of BWROG Emergency Procedure Guideline Training appendices.

Dr. Melvin'D;'Field, Ma'ssachusetts Institute'of'Technolo Human'Factors Consultant Degree in Electrical. Engineering, with professional engineers license.

Twenty-eight years experience in Systems Engineering, analysis, and design.

communications technology and information science, computer program planning and management, man-machine interfaces, and graphic displays.

Member of the BWROG survey team for WNP-2 nuclear power station.

A-6

ATTACHMENT 8 TASK FORCE REVIEW DOCUMENTATION SAMPLES Panel Layout Design Review Report Annunciator Panel Review Report Indicating Light Review Report

Labels, Controls and Visual Displays Review Report HED Report

~Pa e

8-1 8-5 8-13 8-15 8-:18

CONTROL ROOM PANEL LAYOUT DESIGN REVIEW PANEL P602 RWCU and RRC Control Panel Concern Panel P602 provides controls for the Reactor Water Cleanup

{RWCU) and Reactor Recirculation Control (RRC) systems, with several miscellaneous groupings of Main Steam Line (MSL) drain valves, radwaste equipment drains, and Reactor Feedwater (RFW) isolation valves.

Except for the lack of contrast between systems or groups of controls, which in general.

applies to all the control room panels, specific concerns noted are:

1.

The RFW isolation valves are not grouped with the feedwater system con-trols on P840, and are essential equipment whose controls are located on a non-essential panel.

No functional need exists for the controls on

~

P602.

2.

The MSL drain grouping of controls can be arranged into four basic flow paths or control groupings; RPV head vent.

MSL drains, and drains from main steam isolation valves MS-V-28 (A, B.

C,

0) and from MS-V-22 (A, B',

C. 0).

There is a lack of contrast between the four groups, and some controls are not arranged with their respective drain groups or consis-tent in operating sequence.

Specific conserns noted are:

a)

MO-V-73 drain control is not grouped with its respective bypass valve or operationally sequenced with the other main steam line drain controls, and is mixed with the MS-V-28 isolation valve drain controls.

b)

MD-V-60 drain control for isolation valves MS-V-28 (A, B, C, 0) is not grouped with the respective bypass valve, and is mixed with the main steam line drain controls.

c)

MS-V-21 and MS-V-156 drain controls for isolation valves MS-V-22 (A, B.

C,

0) are not consistent in arrangement with the other drain groups.

This section of P602 has the drain controls arranged in a

horizontal

sequence, except for these two controls, which are in a vertical sequence.

3.

The RWCU system lack visibility as to flow path or operating sequence.

The arrangement requires increased operator knowledge and awareness of the system flow path to function.

Specific concerns noted are:

a)

The RPV vessel reject controller is separated from its respective valve controls, and should be grouped together to facilitate operation.

B-l Rev.

1, 12/8/81

el

b)

The RWCU system controls are not arranged to facilitate ease of ope-ration.

The two system bypass valve controls are not grouped to-

gether, the system suction controls are reverse of normal sequence convention (BA rather than AB) and control operating sequence jumps both vertically and horizontally rather than a smooth sequence from left to right.

c)

RWCU-V-40 is an essential control valve whose control is located on

P602, a non-essential panel.

Per engineering, RWCU-V-40 should be moved off of P602.

d)

The two RWCU system conductivity recorders are reverse of normal convention (outlet before inlet).

4.

RRC system reviews noted the following concerns:

a)

RRC Loop A and 8 isolation valve controls blend too well into the panel arrangement.

Contrast is needed to improve their visibility

'for access and to prevent inadvertent operation.

b)

RRC two pen recorders R650 and R614 are inconsistent in use of pen color code.

R650 has Loop A and B temperatures as red and black, respectively, while R614 has Loop A and 8 flows as black and red, respectively.

Color coding is not consistent.

c)

A design change (FDI-TCHI) has located controls and indicating lamps for the flux discriminator master controller (located on P603) with RRC Loop B displays on P602.

This needs to be reviewed with respect to system grouping and demarcation application before installation.

d)

Flow control valves RRC-V-60 (A, B) are hydraulically operated.

PED 218-E-5079 specifies that the hydraulic system isolation valve con-trols HY-V-17, 18, 19, 20 (A/B) be located on P602.

Per engineer-ing, the PED must be changed to relocate the essential hydraulic isolation valve controls from P602, which is a "non-essential" panel.

A new location is required.

5.

Two CRT's will be used for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).

A location is required for the CRT's.

Recommendations 1.

Relocate RFW-V-32 (A, B) and RFW-V-65 (A, B) to Panel P840.

The four feedwater controls are for manually isolating the RFW system.

Since these are not automatic isolation valves, placing them on P601 NS4 area would be inconsistent with the present controls at the NS4 area.

The RFW controls were therefore, relocated to P840 and grouped with the other RFW system controls.

See P840 for details.

Rev.

1, 12/8/81

'earrange the NSL drain controls to improve grouping and visibility of the four groups of drain controls.

The air operated valve controls were located to the right of their respective bypass controls for consistency of arrangement, and demarcation lines applied to provide contrast.

3.

Rearrange the RWCU system.

a)

The RPV vessel reject controls were grouped together in an opera-tional sequence, and the RWCU system flow path arranged in a smooth operating sequence from left to right.

With the addition of mimi-cing demarcation lines and a system flow diagram legend plate, oper-ability of the system is significantly enhanced.

b)

Retain the control for RWCU-V-40 on P602.

On review of RWCU-V-40 isolation valve control, a more appropriate operational location could not be identified than with the RMCU system on P602.

Upgrade Panel P602 to an "essential" panel.

4.

The RRC system arrangement was found to be satisfactorily arranged and grouped by Loop A and Loop B.

The concerns noted ear lier were resolved as follows:

a)

Install mimicing on RRC Loop A and B per the configuration drawing.

The added mimicing provides contrast and visibility as to the rela-tionship between the isolation valves, flow control valve control-

ler, and pump controls.

b)

I'1odify recorders R650 and R614 such that the red pen in each record-er is used for Loop A readout.

This is consistent with other two pen recorders.

c)

Relocate controls S122 and

S123, and lamps FEL-l, 2, and 3 per the configuration drawing.

This removes the controls from the RRC Loop B area of the panel, placing them in a general area close to its associated master flux controller on P603.

d)

Retain the HYD-V-17, 18, 19, 20 (A/B) hydraulic line isolation valve controls on Panel P602.

Lockup of the RRC loop flow control valves is required under certain operational conditions.

Access near the flow valve controllers is needed.

The hydraulic isolation valves were therefore kept on P602.

Upgrade Panel P602 to an "essential" panel.

5.

Locate tHe two SPOS CRT's on P601 and P602.

Tentative locations have been identified and r served for the CRT's.

The planned location on P602 appears to provide ready access and clear visibility to the operator from the feedwate.

and reactivity control area of the control room.

final layout approval is pending engineering

design, hardware selection and operational review of the Emergency Procedures.

B-3 Rev.

1, 12/8/81

EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY RECOMMENDATIONS RWCU ANO=RRC PANEL.- P602 A.

RFW System 1.

Remove to Panel P840:

RFW-V-32A RFW-V-32B B.

Main Steam Line Drain System RFW-V-65A RFW-V-65B 1.

Rearrange per configuration drawing:

MS-V-20 MS-V-21 MS-V-69 MS-V-156 MS-V-71 MS-V-72 MS-V-73 C.

RWCU System 1.

Rearrange per configu. ation drawing:

O.

RRC System RWCU-V-31 RWCU-V-34 RWCU-V-lA RWCU-V-1B RWCU-V-40 RWCU-V-42 RWCU-V-'44 RWCU-V-100 RWCU-V-104 RWCU-V-106 1.

Modify recorders R614 and R650 such that the red pens are used for Loop A, and black pens for Loop B.

2.

Modify FOI-TCHI rearrangement per configuration drawing:

B35-S122 B35-S123 FEL-1 FEL-2 FEL-3 3.

Change PEO 218-E-5079 to locate HY-V-17, 18, 19, 20 (A/B) controls on Panel P602 per recommendations.

E.

SPOS I.

Install SPOS CRT per configuration drawin9.

B 4 Rev.

1, 12/8/81

0 I

I

WNP-2 CONTROL ROOM PANEL ANNUNCIATOR REVIEW PANEL P602 October 30, 1981 Rev.:

1 I.

PURPOSE The purpose of this review was to evaluate the annunciators on P602 for the following:

Annunciator Grouping Annunciator Window (Tile) Color Prioritization Annunciator Window Wording Annunciators that have multiple actuation inputs which are independent and can exist at the'same time.

Need for Addition and/or Deletion of Annunciators II.

SCDPE Z1Z.

The scope covers all the annunciators for the systems controlled from P602.

There are no R.G.-1.47 changes to the P602 annunciators FINDINGS A.

Annunciator Grouping 1.

Annunciator grouping on panel P602 is good.

The only discre-pancy noted was that the Radwaste System annunciators were un-th necessarily on both annunciators A5 and A13 Att hm 4

is review shows the existing P602 annunciator grouping.

B.

Annunciator Window Color Prioritization 1.

In general, the window color prioritization is good.

Some in-consistancies were, however, noted and are detailed in Attach-ment 1 of this review.

2.

Th There are eight (8) windows on annunciator A13 which are white.

GE drawing 761E791AD specifies amber color for these windows.

See Attachment 5 of this review for the specific windows.

C.

Annunciator Window Wording l.

Annunciator window wording on panel P602 is ood.

discre c

s goo Some minor iscrepancies were noted,

however, and are detailed in Attach-ment 2 of this review.

B-5 Page 1

of 3

I I

Rev.

1 D.

Annunciators Having Multiple Actuation Inputs l.

Eight (8) annunciators have multiple actuation inputs which are independent and can exist at the same time, which prevents the operator of being alerted to additional alarm conditions after one alarm comes in and remains in the alarm state.

Attach-ment 3 contains a listing of the above annunciators.

Annuncia-tors with multiple inputs from redundant channels monitoring the same parameter are not listed in Attachment 3.

E.

Need for Addition and/or Deletion of Annunciators 1.

There are four (4) RHR/RCIC annunciators on P602 which should be relocated to P601.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS Annunciator Grouping 1.

Relocate three (3) annunciator windows as shown in Attachment 5.

Attachment 4 shows "as-is" grouping.

The proposed grouping lo-cates all RadWaste system windows on annunciator A13.,

2.

Correct GE drawing 807E174TC, Rev.

9 to show that annunciator A13-1.2 is actually installed in A13-1.1.

NOTE:

Proposed Annunciator Wording Changes are not shown in.

B.

Annunciator Window Color Prioritization 1.

Make annunciator window color changes proposed in Attachment l.

Justification is stated in Attachment l.

Attachment 5 also shows the proposed colors.

2.

Change the color of eight (8) windows on annunciator A13 from white to amber to conform to GE drawing 761E791AD.

See Attach-ment 5 for specific annunciator windows.

C.

Annunciator Window Wording 1.

Review annunciator window wording as shown in Attachment 2.

2. 'll acronyms and abbreviations shall be in accordance with the "WNP-2 Standard List of Acronyms and Abbreviations for Control Room Labels and Legend Plates".

3.

Correct any wrong spelling.

4.

Change all GE MPL Numbers to B&R Tag. Number.

8-6 Page 2

of 3

Rev.

1 D.

Annunciators Having Multiple Actuation Inputs l.

A determination should be made concerning th'e need for an annun-ciator "Reflash" capability or an acceptable alternative, such

'as administrative procedures.

Attachment 3 lists the annunciators having multiple and independent actuation inputs.

E.

Need for Addition or Deletion of Annunciators 1., Relocate the four (4) RHR/RCIC annunciators on annunciator A13 to P601.

See Panel P601 annunciator review for the specific locations on P601.

2 To allow room on P603 Annunciator Panel A7, relocate P603 annunciator A7-4.8 to P602 annunciator A13-6.1.

ATTACHMENTS Proposed Annunciator Window Color Changes 2.

Proposed Annunciator Window Wording Changes Annunciators Having Multiple Inputs As Is Annunciator Arrangement (Grouping)

Proposed Annunciator Color Prioritization Page 3

of 3

B-7

E C

0 k

P 0

WNP-2 CONTROL ROOM PROPOSED ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW COLOR CHANGES Attachment t.

Panel P602 dow Number Window Wording Color Change Basis for Change A5-2. 2 MS Line Monitors Downscale Amber to White To be consistent with all other "Downscale" annunciators which are white.

A5-3. 3 Off Gas High-High Amber to Radiation Red Both the Off Gas "High-High" Radiation and the Off Gas "High" Radiation windows are presently amber.

This change will also match the light colors on P604.

A5-3. 4 Off Gas Vent Pipe Amber to High-High Radia-Red tion Both the "High-High" and the "High windows for this parameter are presently amber.

This change will also match the light colors on P604.

Off Gas Post-Treatment High-High Radiation Amber to Red Same as above.

A5-1. 5 Reactor Building Vent High Radia-tion Red to Amber Both the "High-High" and the "High" windows for this parameter are presently red.

A5-2. 5 Reactor Building Vent Monitors Downscale Amber to White To be consistent with all other "Downscale" annunciators which are white.

6-5.1 Recirc Drywell High Press Switc A In Test Amber to White Is an operator information annunciator.

6-3.4 Flow Cont Valve A Hyd Power Unit Standby Hyd Pump Operating Amber to White

'Is an operator information annunciator.

PROPOSED ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW WORDING CHANGES.

dow Number Existing Wording Proposed Wording 3%7 Reac Water Cleanup Pump Flow High/Low Reac Water Cleanup Pump Flow Low.

xisting A5-1.8 roposed A13-4.2 Radwaste Controller 1 Trouble Radwaste Logic Controller 1 Trouble.

Existing A5-2.8 roposed A13-5.2 Radwaste Controller 2 Trouble Radwaste Logic Controller 2 Trouble.

isting

.8 sed 6.2 Radwaste Controller 3 Trouble Radwaste Logic Controller 3 Trouble.

6-4. 1 ecirc Motor A Lockout Bus Under Volt-ge Recirc Motor A Breaker Aux. Trip Cir-cuit Under Voltage.

6-4.5 ecirc Motor B Lockout Bus Under Volt-ge Recirc Motor B Breaker Aux. Trip Cir-cuit Under Voltage.

6-5.5 ecirc Drywell High Press Switch In

est, Recirc Drywell High Press Switch B In Test.

B-9

r, t

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0

WNP-2 CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR REVXEW.

Panel/

Annunciator Annunciator Meaning Remarks P602 A5-4.7 Reactor Water Cleanup Pump Cooling Water High Temperature Actuated by high temperature on either RWCU pump.

P602 Reactor Building High Radiation Actuated by any 1 of 13 ARM'.

A5-3.1 A5-4. 1 Turbine Building High Radiation Actuated by any 1

of 5 AM's.

P602 Radwaste Building High Radiation Actuated by any 1 of 9 ARM'.

A5-5.1 P602 Area Radiation Monitors Downscale Actuated by any 1 of 30 ARM'.

A5-6.1 B-10

AtlHIAICIAT

- BINAD P602 F loo>'4'ea IIIgh Aadl at lo>>

tlew fuel Storage h>'ea Iligh adlatlon A>.actor Building Illgh A ad l a t lou furblnc Building I lgh Iadiatlon adwaste Building IIIgh Radiation /f Area Iadlatlon Monitors Ilownsca le iI/

Line Illgh Radiation AP Hain Steam Line Honltors Downscale Off Gas Post Treatment IIIgh-IIIgh Rad lat Ion Of( Gas Post Treatment lllgh Aadlatlon Off Gas Post Treatment F low IIIgh/Low Off Gas Honl tors Downscale or lnope'rat l ve Off 7ias Post Treat>>lent illqh-illgh-IIIgh Aad Iat Ion Reactor Building Vent Sample Flow IIIgh/Low Off Gas Illgh-illgh Radla t Ion Off Gas Illgh Radlat lon RIIA Illgh Radiation Off Gas Post Treatment Honltors Downscale w

Reactor Building Vent IIIgh-IIIgh Radlat lon g Carbon Bed Vault Illgh Aadlat ion Off Gas Vent Pipe Illgh-IIIgh Radiation Off Gas Vent Pipe Illgh IIadlatlon

- y Carbon Bed Vault Honltors Downscale ul Off Gas Vent Pipe Honltors Downscale Reactor Building Vent illgh Aadlat lon Reactor Building Vent Honl tors Downscale g

Off Gas Vent Pipe Sample FLow

'llgh/Low Off Gas Sample Flow illgh/Low RIIA Honl tars Downscale Or inoperative Reactor Building CC Mater Honl tors Downscale or inoperative Remote S>ut own Transfer Switch ln Emergency Posl t ion Aadwaste Effluent Illgh R ad la tion Service Mater Effluent Illgh Aadl atlon-Aeactor Building CC Mater Illgh Radiation.

Service Mater Effluent Honltors Inoperative Inoperative Aadwaste Effluent Honltors Downscale or inoperative W

In( lucnt Conduct Iv Ity Illgl/Lo Filter Dcmln Effluent Conduc t Iv Ity IIIgh/Low Reac Mater Cleanup Pump Flow Illgh/Low Reac Mater Cleanup Pump Cooling Mater Illgh Temp Reac Mater Clean>>p Pump Oisch Pressure Iilgh/Low Cleanup Fllter Oemin Fa I lure And>>as Ic Cuntrol lcr I T> uuhle Aadwaste Controller 2

Trouble Aadwaste Controller 3 Trouble SP/>AC SreiE Cleanup F liter Inlet Illgh Temp V>l W White-A Amber R Red

'"AS IS" ARRANGEMENT

hA!illACI

- BOhAO P602 I loor hrea IIIgli Adtllot IUu Mew Fuel Storage hrea illgh aillatlon A Line lllgh A adl at Ion Hain Steam Llne flonltars Downscale Ofr Gas Post Treatment IIIqh-IIIgh-IIIgh A ail I at Ion Reactor Aulldlng Vent Sample Flow Illgh/Low Aeactor Oul lillug Ve>>t IIIgh-IIIgh Aad liltIon Carbon Deil Vault Illgh Radlatlon Aeactar Aulldlng Vent IIIgh A ad 1 at Ion Reactor Bulldlng Vent Honl tors Downscale emte sliuMowa Transfer Swltcli ln Eaiergency Posl t Ion Aadwaste Fffluent Illgh Aadlat Ion Fl tor Ocmln Influont Condiict I v Ity Illgh/Low F I Iter Oemln Effluent Conductlvlty SPARE SPARE Reactor Dul 1 ding IIIOil Aadlatlan A

Iurb Inc Au I 1 ilIn g IIl gled I ail la t lan A

Aadwaste Dul 1 ding IIIgh Aadlatlon A

Off Gas Post Treatment IIIgh-IIIgh Radl at lan A

Off Gas Post Treatment Illgh Aadl at Ion A

Off Gas Post Treatment F low High/Low RIIA III(gh Radlat lon Carbon Ded Vault Honl tors Downscale Off Gas Off Gas IIIgh-IIIgh Vent Pipe Radlatlon IIIgh-IIIgh.

A Radiation Off Gas Orr Gas Illgh

~

Vent Pipe Radl at lon 'llgh A

Bad la t Ion A

RIIA Honl tors Downscale Or Inopera tlve W

Service Mater Effluent Honltor Inoperative lnopera t Ive Reac Hater Cleanup Pump Olsch Pressure Illgh/Low Off Gas Service Mater Aeac Mater Vent: P lpe E(f luent Cleanup Pump Sainp le FLaw IIIgh F low lllgli/Law A Aadlat Ion A

Illgh/Low W

Off Gas Aeactor Reac Hater Sample Flow Building CC Cleanup Puiap A IIIgh/l.aw Mater Illgh Cool lng Mater A Aadlat1 on.

A Illgh Temp (2)W SPARE Reac Water Cleanup Pump B

Cooling Water gh 4'ex~~

Sphnt brea I 'Id I a t lOll Non I tors Downscale W

Off Gas Honltors Downscale ar Inoperative Of( Gas Off Gas Past Treatment Vent Pipe Honl tors Howltars Downscale W

Downscale Reactor BulIdlng CC Mater Honl tars Oownscale or Inoperative Iladwaste Effluen Cleanup Fliter Honltors Oemln Downscale ar Failure Inoperative W

Cleanup F I Iter Inlet Illgh Teinp W

Hotess (1)

(2)

W White A Amber R Red Relocated to annunciator A13-F602 Existing annunciator A5-4.7 split into two (2) annunciators.

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT AND'COLOR'PRIORITIZATION

')

f

WNP-2 CONTROL ROOM INDICATING LIGHT REVIEW Panel H13-P602 Date: 12/8/81 Rev:

0 E.

PURPOSE The purpose of this review was to evaluate the indicating lights on H13-P602 for the following:

- Color conformance to WNP-2 Control Room Indicating Light Color Code Standard

- Purpose of Indicat.ng L.'ght Illuminated to Indicate Implied Condition II.

SCOPE This review covers all the indicating lights on H13-P602.

III.

FINDINGS A.

Indicatin Li ht Color 1.

The color of ten (10) indicating lights on H13-P602 is not in com-pliance with the "WNP-2 Control Room Indicating Light Color Code Standard".

B.

Pur ose of Indicatin Li hts 1.

The indicating lights above spare switches S110A and S110B serve no purpose and should be removed.

A PED to add control switches for the Hydraulic Isolation Valves will utilize these switches and replace the indicating lights.

2.

White light FEL-1 above the Flux Estimater Bypass switch (S122) is lighted when the Flux Estimater bypass switch is in "normal" and goes out when the switch is placed in "Bypass".

C.

Illumination Status

l. All H13-P602 indicating lights are lighted to indicate the im-plied status.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS A.

Indicatin Li ht Color 1.

Make the indicating light color change's proposed in Attachment l.

B.

Pu ose of Indicatin Li hts 1.

Modify the Flux Estimater bypass circuit to have light FEL-1 light when the Normal-Bypass switch (S122) is placed ih the "Bypass" po-sition and change the color of FEL-1 to amber.

ATTACHMENT 1.

Proposed Indicating Light Color Changes 8-13

t'

Attachment l.

WNP-2 CONTROL ROOM INDICATING.LIGHT REVIEW PANEL H13-P602

/

LIGHT COLOR MEANING Color Chan e

Justification Lights (1 ea.)

above FW pump trip interlock reset switches S106A and S106B.

White Lighted-Indicates "Rx vessel White to Amber low,water level and feedwater flow below minimum" interlock sealed in. Interlock initia-Abnormal condition.

tes flow control valve part-ial closure.

Lights (1 ea.)

above total FW low flow interlock re-set switches S107A and S107B.

White Lighted-Indicates "low total White to Amber FW flow and RRC-V-60A(B) less than 18% open" interlocks are sealed in. Interlock initia-Abnormal condition.

tes RRC pump transfer to slow speed.

Lights (1 ea.)

above Main Steam Line/

Pump Suction Low&T inter-lock reset switches S108A and S108B.

White Lighted-Indicates "main steam White to Amber line/RRC pump suction lowDT" interlock sealed in. Inter-lock initiates RRC pump trans Abnormal condition.

fer to slow speed.

Lights (1 ea.)

above Rx ves-sel low water level inter-lock reset switches S113A and S113B.

White Lighted-Indicates "Rx vessel White to Amber low water level" interlock sealed in. Interlock initia-tes RRC pump transfer to slow Abnormal condition.

speed.

Light FEL-2 above switch S122 (Flux Estimater al-I arm reset switch).

White Lighted-Indicates Flux Esti-White to Amber mater needs maintenance.

Abnormal condition.

Light FEL-3 above switch S123 (Flux Estimater Al-arm reset switch).

White Lighted-Indicates Flux Esti-White to Amber mater failure.

Abnormal condition.

I

~i P

a

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MNP-2 CONTROL ROOM LABELS AND VISUAL DISPLAY REVIEW I

Panel H13-P602 Date: > 6-28 82

'URPOSE The purpose of this review was to review the labels and visual displays on Panel H13-P602 for compliance to the requirements of NUREG 0700.,

'E.

SCOPE The scope of this review is as follows:

Attachment 1

NUREG 0700 Sections 6.6.1.1, 6.6.1.2.a.3, 6.6.1.2.a.4, 6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.3, 6.6.2.4.a-c, 6.6.3.1, 6.6.3.2, 6.6.3.3.b, 6.6.3.4, 6.6.3.5, 6.6.3.6, 6.6.3.8, and 6.9.1.2.

In addition, derived vs direct signals for indicating lights is included in Attachment 1.

Attachment 2

NUREG 0700 Sections 6.5.1.1.e(l), 6.5.l.l.f, 6.5.1.2.a-e, 6.5.1.4.a-'d, 6.5.1.4.f, 6.5.1.5.a, 6.5.1.5.c-f, 6.5.2.1, 6.5.2.4, 6.5.4.2.a, 6.5.4.2.b(2),

and 6.5.4.2.b(4).

III.

FINDINGS The findings are specified in Attachments 1 and 2.

ATTACHMENTS 1.

Legend Plate, Escutcheon Plate and Derived Signal Review 2.

Indicator, Controller and Recorder Review

IP e

J

Panel LEGEND PLATE, ESCUTCHEON-PLATE-AND-.DERIVED SIGNAL REVIEH Item No.

496 497 443 491 492 Function of Device Hain steam lines (A-D) downstream drain to main f conden er isolation valve 222-F071 (5$-V-71) control SW1tch e

ffain Steam lines (A-D) downstream drain.to main

'- condenser start up drain valve 822-F072 (1$-V-72) control switch. Bypasses 5$-V-73 and restruction orfice during startup.

ffain steam lines (A-D) downstream drain to main condenser low power drain valve 822-F073 (fS-V-73) control switch. Will clos at 5 50% when in "Auto".

Hain steam line A down-stream drain to main con-denser isolation valve 822-F070A (fS-V-70A) con-trol switch.

Hain steam line 8 down-stream drain to main con-denser isolation valve 822-F0708 (HD-V-708) con-trol switch.

Existing Wording Le end STEAH LINE DOWNSTREAM DRAIN HOV 822-F071 Escutcheon NOR CLOSE f

OpEN Le end STEAM LINE DOWNSTREAM DRAIN Escutcheon NOR CLOSE

~

OPEN Le end STEAM LINE OUTBOARD DRAIN SO 822- 073 Escutcheon A)TO CLOSE OPEN

/

Le end STEAH LINE DOWNSTREAM DRAIN HOV 822-F070A Escutcheon NOR

CLOSE, f

OpEN r

Le end INE DOWNSTREAM DRAIN HOV 822-F0708 Escutcheon NOR CLOSE f

OpEN Revised Wording Le end MAIN TEAM LINES DOWNSTREAM DRAIN 1$-V-71 MC-1A Escutcheon Le end HAIN STEAM LINES STARTUP DRAIN TH fiD-V-72 MC-2C Escutcheon Le end HAIN STEAM LINES LOW POWER DRAIN

-V-3 Escutcheon Le end tfAIN STEAM LINE A DOWNSTREAM DRAIN MD-V-70A MC-lA Escutcheon Le end TEAM LINE 8 DOWNSTREAM DRAIN kS-V-708 MC-2C Escutcheon Direct Signal (yes or no)

Yes Yes No (See Remarks)

Yes Yes Spring Return Switch To Normal To Normal No To Normal To Normal Remarks

1) Add "NOR" to Authorized List of Abbre>>e viations. Applies to 20 switches on panel.

1) Throttle valve.

1) Indication only indicates solenoid pilot valve is energized or de-ener-gized.

C+

C+

0

Panel IIU-P602 INDICATOR

- CO ROLLER--ND-RECORDER=REVIE

-RWCU-SECTIOH

=

I Rev.~

item Ho.

Tag Nc.

(MPl. No.)

Function Range Chart Paper Range Chart Paper Type Recorder Ink Color Failure Apparent Range Adequate Scale Adequate Remarks 448 MCU-FI-RWCU discharge to main 02 condenser or Radwaste (G33-R602)

System flow indicator.

0-300 gpm NA NA NA Yes Yes Yes 749 WCU-RMC-RllCU ow own ow 606 controller.

G33-R606) et t

0-100%

Demand 0-100%

HA NA NA Yes Yes See Remarks l)Need to identify as "Deman

'ontroller (6.5.1.l.e.l).

2)No unit of measurement on setpoint scale, deviation scale or demand scale.

No un s on deviation scale (6.5.2.4.a) 413 414 (G33-R603)

RMCU demineralizer out let conductivity re-corder.

(G33-R601)

RMCU demineralizer in-let conductivity re-corder.

0-1. 0 umho/c 0-10.0 umho/c 0-1. 0 0-10.0 Bailey 6025K50-751 Bailey 6050K60-854 Red-Filter Demin A Outlet Black-Filter Demin B

Red-RRC Loop B Black-RWCU Fil-ter Demin Inlet No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

1) FDDR-KKI-718 installs hi/1 alarm off each pen.

)Units stated as umicromhosu ice "micromhos/cm" (6.5.1.2.

l)FDDR-KKI-718 insta s

iZ o

alarm off each pen.

)Units stated as "micromhos" ice "micromhos/cmu (6.5.1.2.

403 RWCU-TI-607 (G33-R607)

RWCU sys temp indica-tor.

Reads any 1 of 5 sys temp as selected by switch below indi-cator.

0-600 F

NA HA Yes Yes Yes 404 RWCU-FI-RWCU pumps suction 609 line flow indicator.

(G33-R609) 0-400 gp lil HA NA NA Yes Yes Yes 405 WCU-FI-RWCU demineralizer A

(left 05A effluent flow indica-item)

(G33-R605A tor.

0-150 gpm NA NA NA Yes Marginal-See Full flow Remarks is 134gp l)14 graduations separate numerals (6.5.1.5.a).

2)Unit graduations are 30, 60 90 etc. (6.5.1.5.c).

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ATTACHMENT C APPLICATION OF FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS TO CRDR General

'cope Supporting Documentation and Information Functional Analysis of the EOPs Establishing Control and Information Requirements Defining Instrumentation Requirements Evaluating the Adequacy of Existing Controls and Instrumentation

~Pa e

C-1 C-1 C-1 C-2 C-2 C-2 C-3 Evaluating Table C-l, and Validating the Control Room Design Control and Instrumentation Evaluation Criteria C-3 Table C-2, Talk and Malkthrough Evaluation Criteria

O.

>f

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I

APPLICATION OF FUNCTION AND TASK ANALYSIS TO THE CRDR 1.0 GENERAL The objective of the function and task analysis phase of the CRDR is to assess the effectiveness of the control room in supporting the integrated accomplishment of operator emergency response functions.

This objective is achieved by evaluating existing controls and displays against the control and information requirements identified using the analysis methodology described in the Supply System submittal Function and Task Analysis of the WNP-2 Emergency Operating Procedures, February 1984.

The evaluation will'be performed in the following steps:

Operator emergency response functi'ons will be identified through analysis of the WNP-2 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP).

Control and information requirements will be established through task and decision analyses of the functions identified in the first step, above.

Instrumentation requirements associated with each information requirement will be defined.

The adequacy of existing controls and= instrumentation will be evalu-ated against the control, information, and.instrumentation require-ments established in the second and third steps, above.

The effectiveness of the control room in supporting the integrated accomplishment of the. emergency response functions will be evaluated through talk and walkthroughs.

Each of the above steps is discussed in greater detail in sections 4.0 through 8.0, below.

2.0 SCOPE In accordance with Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Section 5, paragraph

b. (ii).

and the BWROG CRDR Generic Program Plan, the function and task analysis is to emphasize emergency operations.

Therefore, the analysis will be based upon the latest revision of the WNP-2 EOPs and related Generic Emergency Procedure Guidelines.

3.0 SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION During the function and task analysis, the following supporting documents and information will be consulted, as appropriate, to assist in the identification of control, information, and instrumentation requirements:

C-1

System operating procedures 1

Alarm response

'procedures Training manuals System descriptions System drawings Technical Specifications Operator interviews Data from BWROG CRDR task analysis Data from generic BWROG EPG functional analysis 4.0 FUNCTIONAL'ANALYSIS'OF'THE 'OPs The functional analysis of the EOPs will be performed in accordance with the methodology described in the Supply System submittal Function and Task Analysis of the WNP-2 Emergency Operating Procedures.

This analysis will identify the operator decision and action functions contained in the EOPs.

5.0 ESTABLISHING"CONTROL AND'INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS The operator functions identified in the functional analysis, described above, will be subjected to task and decision analysis to identify con-trol and information requirements.

The references listed in section 3.0, above, will be consulted as appropriate.

6,0 DEFINING INSTRUMENTATION'RE UIREMENTS During the performance of the task and decision analyses, specific instru-mentation requirements associated with each control and information requirement will be derived through examination of the related EOP step, system requirements, information type, and relationships to other tasks.

The references listed in section 3.0, above, will be consulted as appro-priate.

Consideration will be given to the following:

Definition of specifi'c parameters Instrument ranqes Instrument accuracy Alarm setpoints C-2

r

Display format Control type and characteristics Control and display location and organization 7.0 EVALUATING THE ADE UACY OF'EXISTING'CONTROLS AND INSTRUMENTATION The existing controls and indications will be, evaluated against the control, information, and instrumentation requirements established during the task and decision analyses.

The following will be considered:

The effectiveness of existing instrumentation in satisfyinq information requirements.

The effectiveness of existing controls in satisfying control requirements.

The conformance of controls and indications to accepted human factor s engineering design criteria.

The criteria used in effecting these evaluations are listed in Table C-l.

8.0 EVALUATING'ND VALIDATING 'HE CONTROL ROOM DESIGN The effectiveness of the overall control room design in supporting integrated plant operations will be evaluated by talk and walkthroughs.

The methodology used in performing and evaluating these walkthroughs will be in accordance with that described in the BMROG CRDR Generic Program Plan.

Evaluation criteria are listed in Table C-2.

CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION EVALUATION.CRITERIA The following evaluation criteria will be used to assess the adequacy of existing controls and instrumentation:

General Consideration Evaluation Criteria Is the identified information requirement satisfied by existing instrumentation?

1.

Is the required instrumentation

.available in the control room?

2.

Does the instrumentation provide direct rather than inferential information?

3.

Is the instrumentation readily interpreted?

4.

Is the instrumentation reliable?

Is the identified control

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requirement adequately sat isfied by exi st ing control s?

Are the available controls and indications-in conformance with accepted human factors engineer-ing design criteria?

(cont'd) 5.

Is the information presented in the optimum format'?

6.

Are associated limits readily identifiable?

hl 1.

Is the control available in the control room?

2.

Is the control of the appropriate design?

3.

Is sufficient feedback information provided?

1.

Can the controls and indications be easily identified?

2.

Are the instruments properly scaled and easily readable?

3.

Are the instrument scales of the appropriate range and accuracy?

4.

Do the controls possess the necessary sensitivity?

2'able C-2

0,

General Consideration Are the controls and indications optimal 1 y located?

Evaluation Cr iteria l.

Are the controls and indications convenient to related componentsl 2.

Are the controls and indications effectively grouped and logically organized2

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TALK AND WALKTHROUGH EVALUATION"CRITERIA The following criteria will.be used in evaluating the effectiveness of the control room in supporting the integrated accomplishment of operator emergency response functions during the talk and walkthroughs:

Is the task sequence valid and complete?

Is the available manpower sufficient to accomplish the required tasks're communications adequate'F Are traffic patterns unobstructive7 Are controls and indications conveniently located' Is the control room environment compatible with the accomplishment of operator functionsT

0