ML17262A320

LER 90-019-00:on 901221,reactor Tripped Due to Lo Lo Level in Steam Generator A.Caused by Main Feedwater Pump a Tripping Due to Feed Pump Seal Water Low Differential Pressure.Procedures Will Be revised.W/910121 Ltr

ML17262A320
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	01/21/1991
From:	Backus W, Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-019, LER-90-19, NUDOCS 9101290215
Download: ML17262A320 (14)

Text

A.CCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9101290215 DOC.DATE: 91/01/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BACKUS,W.H. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 90-019-00:on 901221,reactor tripped due to lo lo level in steam generator A.Caused by main feedwater pump A

-tripping due to feed pump seal water low differential pressure. Procedures will be revised.W/910121 ltr.

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), QInciden&Rpt, etc.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL I SIZE:

NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). I 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDl-3 LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 JOHNSONiA 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1. 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1,

NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/DS -LB8 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN1 FI-LE 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1

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NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 yvv p2 y qf9'yg I 5 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FOLL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

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~,~"~(!"kfL'i/i'/PF(7i1 'st.tc ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 69 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y. 14649-0001 ..'.

ROBERT C MECREDY TELEPHONE Vice Prerident AREACODETtB 546 2700 Ctnne Nucleer Production January 21, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 4

Subject:

LER 90-019, Lo Lo Level in "A" Steam Generator, During Plant Startup, Due to Main Feedwater Pump Trip, Causes a'Reactor Trip R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of, "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protec-tion System (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 90-019 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Ve truly yours, Robert C. Mecredy xc U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector (q(($

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SACILITY NAaal ill OOCXIT NVMSSh Ql R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0 0 OF Lo Lo Level in HAH Steam Generator, During Plant Startup, Due to Main Feedwat Tri Causes a Reactor Tri CVINT OATI Ill Llh NVMSlh ICI hlt01T OATS Ih OTHI1 SACILlrlllINVOLVCO QI YCA1 SSOVI>>TIAL YCAh SACILITT >>AMIS OOCXIT NVMIIAQI MONTH OAY YCAh aaVM ~ 11 ~MVMPS A MONTH CAY 0 5 0 0 0 1 2 219 090 0 19 000 21 9 1 0 6 0 0 0 Otl 1 ATINC THls hltohT II IUIMITTcotv1$ U*NT To THC 110UIAIUINTIOt 1scs1 $ : lcaaaa aaa aa aaara aa saa a>>aeasasa (ill aaOOI III $ 0.aollal X N.T $ 4)QI I iv) $ $ $ 1ihl

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j~igjPg ~r~+gaa(II:l x AHQIjj'~aiNI svttLIMINTAL1ltohT IxtccTIO llal MONTH CAY YIAh CxtlCTIO Wllallllola OATC 11 ~I Ycl os t<<. a>>Ht>>M cxtccrco Svsan$ $ao>> oxrcl NO akcTAAcr ILarut M 1aaO aaaa>>. lA, attraaaaaaa>>t ha>>aa>>atraataaa attaaat1>>a afaaal llll On December 21, 1990 at 1237 EST, with the reactor at approximately 16% full"A" power, a reactor trip occurred due to Lo Lo level (< 17%)

in the Steam Generator.

The Control Room operators immediately performed the appropriate actions of E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) and ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response). Both main steam isolation valves were subsequently closed to limit an RCS cooldown and the plant was stabilized in hot shutdown.

The intermediate cause of the event was the "A" main feedwater pump tripping due to feed pump seal water low differential pressure caused by a condensate low header pressure transient.

The underlying cause of the event was a deficiency in the op'crating philosophy for the proper number of condensate pumps running during low power conditions.

Corrective action will be to change the appropriate procedures involved, to be consistent with the new operating philosophy.

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MAC Sarm 099A U.9. IIUCLEAII lltQULATOAYCOAILIITSION (940 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION r ASSAOVEO OM9 HO SI$ 0W104 E)ISIA9$ , 9I3II49 SACILITY IIAM9 I'l OOCIIKT IIUIA9fllLTI LCII IILANlllIII SAO9 I3I NCAA 9 ~ QM!NTIAL AVIS ION MUM M A R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 0 1 9 0 0 0 2oF 06 TEXT IJI'eve Wot ~ reeve ~ odOSorW HSIC An@ ~ 9I l 1 Tl PRE-&TENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was in the process of starting up subsequent to the Dropped Rod Event of 12/20/90 (discussed in LER 90-018). The, reactor was at approximately 164, full power with the turbine latched and rolling to 600 RPM.

DESCRIPTION OF 2M9lT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAZOR OCCURRENCES:

o December 21, 1990, 1237 EST: Event Date and Time 0 December 21, 1990, 1237 EST: Discovery. Date and Time

\

0 December 21, 1990, 1237 EST: Control Room operators verify both reactor trip breakers open, and all control and shutdown rods inserted.

0, December 21, 1990, 1243 EST: Control Room operators close both main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to limit a reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown.

o December 21, 1990, 1257 EST: Plant stabilized at hot,shutdown.

B. EXTENT:

On December 21, 1990 at 1237 EST, with the reactor at approximately 16% full power, the reactor tripped'due to lo lo level (< 174) in the "A" Steam Generator (S/G) ~

The Control Room operators immediately performed the immediate actions of Emergency Operating Procedure E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) and transitioned to ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response) when that safety injection was it not actuated or required.

was verified Both MSIVs were subsequently closed at 1243 EST to limit an RCS cooldown. The closing of both MSIVs mitigated the RCS cooldown and the plant was sub-sequently stabilized in hot shutdown.

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<<IIC Awry AOA V.E. IIVCLEAR REOULATORY COMMIEEIOII I0431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION J ASSROVEO OME IIO 5150&11M EIISIAES. EI51/$ 5 SACILITY IIAME 111 DOCKET IIVMEER IEI I,EA IIUMEEA Ill ~ AOE IEI YEAR 5 E 4 V E IIT I A L REV<<IOII II M ER ~ IVM E1 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT llfIROIS <<WCe << ~. MM sSA<<OIMI rVRC SSJIII ~511171 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 0 019 0 0 03OF 06 The Control Room operators notified higher supervision and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the event.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE 1WE2PZ:

None.

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

'one.

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

The event was immediately apparent due to alarms.and indications in the Control Room.

OPERATOR ACTION:

Subsequent to the reactor trip, the Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions of Emergency Operating Procedures E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) and ES-O.l (Reactor Trip Response) to stabilize the plant. The MSIVs were closed approximately six (6) minutes after the trip to prevent further plant cooldown.

G SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

None.

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~ !VM II MUM eA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant T5xT I1seeee ewe M!!eeeees we A4aeoneI NIIc se!ee ~'eI IITI 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 9 0 019 0 0 04oF 06 III CAUSE OF WHIZ A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The reactor trip occurred due to a lo lo level (< 174) in the "A" S/G.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The lo lo level (< 17%) in the "A" S/G was due to the tripping of the "A" main feedwater pump.

The "A" main feedwater pump tripped due to feed pump seal water low differential pressure.

The feed pump seal water low differential pressure was due to a secondary'ide condensate header low pressure transient caused by 'the condensate header rejecting high hotwell level to the storage tanks with only one condensate pump running.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the event was a deficiency in the operating philoso'phy, in that procedural guidance did not require two (2) condensate pumps in operation during the initial increase in power and turbine roll.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv),, which requires reporting of "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)," in that the reactor trip from lo lo level in the "A" S/G was an automatic actuation of the RPS.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implication of this event with the following results and conclusions:

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I' NIIC Farm EEEA V.E. NVCLEAII 1EOVLATOIIYCOMMISSION 19431 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AFFIIOVEO OME NO 3150MI04 EKFIIIEE. EITIrEE FACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NVMEEII IEI LEII NVMEEII Ill ~ AOE IEI SEQUENTIAL rl E v IS lO rr NVM E1 rr M Err R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT W mare Nraaa ~ raarraaK ~ aaaaraaI 1YAC Farrrr ~ 9 I I I TI 0500024490 019 0 0 05 oF0 6 o The two reactor trip breakers opened as required.

o All control and shutdown rods inserted to shut the reactor down as designed.

o The plant was quickly stabilized in hot shutdown.

The transient was compared to the assumptions of 'he accidents evaluated in Section 15 of the Ginna Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR). No assumptions specified in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR were violated during this event.

A slow cooldown resulted during the 'post trip recovery period. Tavg decreased to approximately 537 F and the MSIVs were closed. This cooldown is bounded by the plant accident analysis and does not exceed the technical specification limit of 100 F per hour. Additional protection was provided by closure of the MSIVs.

Based on the above, it health and safety was assured at all times.

can be concluded that the public's V. CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

0 During a subsequent startup, interim guidance was provided, to place the second condensate pump in service prior to starting a main feedwater pump. This guidance produced appropriate results.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURMXCE:

0 The new operating philosophy endorses the interim guidance discussed above. Appropriate startup procedures will be changed to direct the placing in service of the second condensate pump prior to starting a main feedwater pump.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 90 Ol 00 06 TKXT IP ~ <<ece <<<<eweeL we <<Aeeeval <<AC Ane ~'el 1171 o s o o o 2 4 4 9 oF 0 6 VX ADDXTXONAL XNPORMATXON A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event. historical search was conducted with the following results. No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause could be identified. However, LER 85-009 was a similar event.

with a different root cause.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None.

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