ML17164A888
| ML17164A888 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1998 |
| From: | Kukielka C PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17164A884 | List: |
| References | |
| EC-RISK-1065, EC-RISK-1065-R, EC-RISK-1065-R00, NUDOCS 9811180050 | |
| Download: ML17164A888 (116) | |
Text
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING CALCULATION/ STUDY COVER SH/ET and NUCLEAR RECORDS TRANSMITTALSHEET File ¹ R2-1
- 1. Page1of Total Pages
~2. TYPE:
CALC D 3. NUMBER:
EC-RISK-1065
>4. REVISION:
0
- 5. TRANSMITTAL¹:
">6. UNIT:
3
>7. QUALITYCLASS:
N
'>8. DISCIPLiNE:
3
~9, DESCRIPTION:
Assessment of Common Cause Failure Probabilities for Use in the Susquehanna IPE.
SUPERSEDED BY:
EC-N/A
- 13. Application:
NA
'>14 Affected Systemsr
'fN/Athen line 15 is mandatory.
">15. NON-SYSTEM DESIGNATOR:
NA
- 10. Alternate Number:
NA 12: Computer Code or Model used:
NA RISK
- 11. Cycle:
NA Fiche Q
Disk g
Am't
-IfN/Athen line 14 is mandatory
- 16. Affected Documents:
- 17.
References:
Q SAR Change Req'd
- 18. Equipment / Component ¹:
- 19. DBD Number:
%20.
PREPARED BY Print Nam Signat r Casimir A.
kiel
>22. AP OVED BY/ ATE Print Name F. G.
utler Signature
>21. REVIEWED BY Print Name Eric Jebsen Signature
- 23. ACCEPTED BY PP8L/DATE Print Name Signature TO BE COMPLETED BY NUCLEAR RECORDS NR-DCS SIGNATURE/DATE ADDA NEW COVER PAGE FOR EACH REVISION FORM NEPM-QA-0221-1, Revision 2
'erified Fields
> REQUIRED FIELDS 98i'fi80050 'rr80709 t OR aOOCX OSOOOS87 P
l
TABLEOF CONTENTS TOPIC PAGE I.
Treatment ofCommon Cause Failure II Method for Estimating Common Cause Failures 111.1 Common Cause Failures ofDiesel Generators III.2 Common Cause Failures ofPumps.
III.3 Common Cause failure ofValves.
IV.
Common Cause Probabilities Assigned to Other Systems A.I Dies els A.2 Motor Driven Pumps A.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.
I.
Treatment ofCommon Cause Failure Common Cause Failures (CCF) ofsystems and components were treated in the Susquehanna IPE. The significant CCFs are summarized in Volume 6 ofthe IPE'.
Additionally, common failures ofECCS actuation instrumentation (RPV water level, RPV pressure and drywell pressure) were included in the study
. The treatment of common cause failure was re-examined in response to questions raised by the NRC in their SER concerning the treatment ofcommon cause failure. The re-examination consisted ofthree parts.
First, common cause failure ofmultiple instruments caused by Instrument and Control Technician was assessed at 10
. This estimate was re-examined.
The initial treatment of instrumentation was based upon GE analysis performed to extend Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) and Allowed Outage Times (AOTs). The GE work is based upon THERP analysis ofthe multiple instrumentation calibration. This work was re-evaluated by re-examining the Susquehanna calibration procedures and the management controls in place to identify systematic mis-calibration ofinstrumentation.
Surveillance records and instrument failure data was review to determine ifa common cause foot print was discernible in the data. Finally and independent THERP calculation was performed using the ASEP method. This work confirmed the original assessment ofthe instrument mis-calibration.
Second, a review was performed to determine ifgeneric common cause failure rates applied to Susquehanna based upon statistical evaluation.
This evaluation was limited to the station batteries.
Finally, an evaluation ofequipment which has experienced a large number ofmultiple demands and no multiple failures was examined.
This situation was treated in greater detail to obtain a more accurate estimate ofthe ofthe common cause failure probability.
The THERP analysis is addressed in a separate calculation. This calculation addresses the second and third items.
The followingprobabilities ofmultiple component failures are provided for the IPE.
II Method for Estimating Common Cause Failures The method used to develop the probability ofmultiple component failures due to a common cause is based upon the work in NUREG/CR-4780, Procedures for Treating Common Cause Failures in Safety and Reliability Studies
. The P factor method is applied to estimate the failure ofredundant components given failure ofthe first. The P factor is defined to be:
P = conditional probability that a cause of a component failure willbe shared by one or more additional components, given that a specific component has failed, or Qhl Q., +Qi Eq.
1
- Here, Q
is the probability ofmultiple failures Qi is the probability ofa single failure.
Q is computed using the followingequation; nhl Q =
'l hl Eq. 2 n
= the number oftimes m components ofinterest fail, N = the number oftesting episodes ofm components ofinterest.
Ifthe number ofdemands N is unknown, then it is estimated from the number oftest using the followingformula; non-staggered testing:
Eq. 3 staggered testing:
Nm = Ng+ (m-l)nm, Eq. 4
- Here, m = the number ofcomponents in the test episode.
k = the number ofsingle test episodes.
Ifthe number ofdemands is known then followingformula are used for computing Nm; non-staggered testing:
N =Num Eq. 5
staggered testing N =ND Eq. 6 In the case ofno failures, the binomial distribution'is used to estimate the median failure probability. Uncertainty bounds are assumed to be lognormally distributed with the upper bound being computed using the binomial distribution at 95% confidence.
The error factor is computed using the upper bound and the median.
The error factor is used to compute the lower bound.
These formula are applied to estimate the probability of multiple failure for the various components.
III.1 Common Cause Failures ofDiesel Generators.
Common cause ofdiesels generators was not included in the 1991 IPE. The diesel generator data were reexamined using the common cause failure model described above.
Two cases were considered: failure oftwo diesels and failure ofall 4 diesels.
The data for the diesel was obtained from the EC-RISK-0503 and subsequent data was obtained from diesel start records and from Condition Reports.
The start records and condition reports are included in Appendix A. This data is summarized in the following Table.
Table I Diesel Generator Starting and Failure Data Time Period Demands Single Failure Double Failures Triple Failures Quadruple Failures 6/82-12/89 1/90-12/92 1/93-6/97 7/97-3/98 Total 3006 288 430 72'796 72 2
1 75 11 0
0 0
0 0
S Estimated from 1/93 through 6/97. Thc arc 18 quarters bctwccn 1/93 through 6/97 inclusive. On thc avcragc there are 430 demands/18 quarters ~ 24 test /quarter. There arc 12 quarters between 1/90 & 12/92 inclusive or 12 x 24 288. Ther are 3 quarters bctwce 7/97 &3/98 inclusive or 24 x 3 72.
The diesels are tested under a staggered testing strategy per Technical Specifications. Ifa diesel fails, the other engines are started to verify that they are operable.
Therefore Equation 6 is used to determine the number ofsingle and multiple demands.
The number offailures is specific in Table I as well. In the case ofQuadruple failure no failures are reported. In this case the median failure probability is determined using the binomial distribution withNm = 3796 trials and zero failures. The results ofthese calculations are presented in Table II.
Table II Diesel Generator Failure Probabilities Lower Bound Median Mean Upper Bound Single Diesel 1.66E-02 1.99E-02 1.98E-02 2.39E-02 Double Failures 1.75E-03 2.90E-03 2.90E-03 4.80E-03 Quadruple Failures 4.24E-05 1.83E-04 2.72E-04 7.90E-04 Similar data has not been compiled for the Susquehanna batteries. Therefore the NUREG 1150 values were used for the batteries; III.2 Common Cause Failures ofPumps.
The ECCS systems and the systems that support their operation are tested periodically on a staggered basis per the plant Technical Specifications. Ifa pump failure occurs test of the remaining pumps is not strictly required per Technical Specifications.
Reviewing the data shows that the majority ofthe pump starts are in response to the need for suppression pool cooling. Should a pump fail to start, subsequent pumps would be started to satisfy the need for suppression pool cooling. Therefore the assumptions associated with the staggered test strategy are applied to the motor driven pump data.
The pump start and failure data is summarized in Table III.There were no cases of multiple pump failures. A double failure is assigned to the two pump failure case to conservatively account for a double pump failure precursor. A failure ofa single ESW pump occurred due to end bell erosion.
The erosion was cause by operating these pumps at very low flows. Inspection ofthe other pumps identified end bell erosion, though to a much less degree. In fact the pumps were still operable and passed the ASME test.
However a failure oftwo pumps is included to account for the precursor.
Table IVpresents run hours and failure to run data. Common cause failure to run is not treated due the implausibility oftwo pumps failing at the same time while operating, unless the failure is attributed to an external event.
Detailed information is provided in Appendix A.
Table III Pump Demand and Failure Data System RHR CS RHRSW ESW Total Total 3432 1553 3606 5422 14012 Single Double Multiple 0
0 0
0 0
0 1
0 19 1
Using this data, a failure probability was computed for each system's pumps and for the aggregate.
The results ofthese calculations are shown in Table IV, Table IV Failure Probability ofPumps Probability Lower Median Mean Upper Error Factor 5.7E-04 1.4E-03 1.7E-03 3.5E-03 2.5 ESW 9.6E-04 1.6E-03 1.7E-03 2.7E-03 1.7 RHRSW 1.4E-03 2.4E-03 2.5E-03 4.0E-03 1.7 Core Spray 1.0E-04 4.4E-04 6.6E-04 1.9E-03 4,4 Aggregate 9.9E-04 1.4E-03 1.4E-03 2.0E-03 1.4 With exception ofthe core spray pumps, the failure rates oftheses pumps are supriseingly close. Therefore all pumps willbe assigned the same aggregate failure probability.
Examining the mean and bounds ofthe core spray pumps one could conclude that they are from a more reliable statistical population. However they are being assigned the aggregate failure probability which is conservative.
The common cause failure probability for multiple pumps to start was computed using the assumptions associated with staggered testing and the above aggregated data. These results are reported in Table V. These values are treated as mean values for the single and double failures. The bound are estimated using the binominal distribution. This data is used to calculate the lognormal median and lower bound. There are no quadruple pump failures. Therefore the binomial distribution is used to estimate the median and bound.
These estimates are then used to estimate the mean assuming the lognormal distribution.
Table V Common Cause Failure Probabilities for Pumps Probability Single Double Quad Lower Median Mean Upper 8.2E-04 1.3E-03 1.4E-03 2.1E-03 2.6E-05 1.2E-04 7.1E-05 3.4E-04 3.8E-06 4.9E-05 7.3E-05 2.1E-04 Error Factor 1.6 2.8 44 Failure to run data values were also computed for the pumps identified above. The run time and failure data were taken &om the same data sources as the start data. This data is provided in Tables VITables VII.
Table VI Pump Run Hours System RHR CS RHRSW ESW Total Total 61650 28418 70774 130685 291527 Run Failures Table VII Failure to Run Probability Lower Median Mean Upper Error Factor 1.4E-06 8.1E-06 1.4E-05 4.9E-05 6.0 ESW 8.3E-06 2.6E-05 3.1E-05 7.8E-05 3.1 RHRSW 1.2E-06 7.1E-06 1.2E-05 4.2E-05 6.0 Core Spray 2.9E-06 1.8E-05 3.0E-05 1.1E-04 6.0 Aggregate 3.7E-06 1.1E-05 1.4E-05 3.5E-05 3.1
III.3 Common Cause failure ofValves.
Common cause failure probability for multiple valves is based staggered testing. The majority ofthe demands are for suppression pool cooling. Failure ofa valve to open would result in the inability to operate suppression pooling using this particular division.
Should this occure the operator would initiate the redundant loop ofRHR. The conditional probabilities were derived from RHR valve failure data. A review ofplant data, shows that the RHR valves were stroked about 11,400 times. Eighteen RHR valve failures were identified in the plant records. No multiple valve failure were identified.
Using this data the failure probability is computed with uncertainty bounds.
The bounds are derived &om the Poisson distribution. The median is computed by applying the mean and the bounds generated using the Poisson to the lognormal distribution.
lower = 9.4 x, median = 1.5 x 10 mean = 1.6 x 10 upper=2.5 x 10 Since no multiple failures ofthe valves were observed, 0.5 double failures are assigned to compute the conditional probability (two/one):
p(two/one) = 0.5/1 8 = 2.3 x 10 and the probability oftwo valves failing becomes:
lower = 1.2 x 10 median = 3.5 x 10 mean = 4.4 x 10 upper=1.1 x10 IV.
Common Cause Probabilities Assigned to Other Systems Common cause probabilities were assigned to other components.
The assignments were made based on either; other existing data or screening values.
These values are provided in Table VIII.
Table VIII Common Cause Failure Rates ofOther Components Event Name Description lower mean upper TSDV Failure oftwo scram discharge volumes. Single based 4.8E-8 upon NUREG 0460, P 0.01 based upon PP&L reports NPE-89-003 &RA-1-NA-006 1.8E-7 4.4E-7 SRV1 &
SRVII NADSSRV MCLPP CCFSLCP Failure ofsecond and third given first. P = 1.0 NUREG 2728 Failure of 10 non-ADS ASME code safety relief valves given failure offailure of6 ADS valves. P = 0.5 assumed.
Failure oflow pressure permissive circuit. NUREG 1150 value used.
Common cause failure ofSLCS pumps.
Assumed P =
0.05 based upon other pump data.
2.6E-6 0.13 1.4E-5 5.6E-6 1.1E-5 0.5 5.3E-4 1.8E-4 2.4E-5 10.
1.9E-3 5.6E-4 CCFTDP Common Cause failure ofHPCI &RCIC NPE-86-003
&NUREG/CR-2497 CCFCTV Failure ofboth divisions ofRHR/IQIRSW crosstie valves 0.0005 1.2E-5 1.9E-3 4.4E-5 0.0045 I.IEA
References
'usquehanna IPE Volume VISupplemental Information, Section 3. Deccmbcr 1991 2 Analysis ofComponent Outage and Failure Data for thc Susquehanna IPE.
EC-RISK@503, Rcv I Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (with Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation) Part I NEDE-30936P-A, Class Ill,Dec. 1988 4 Human Error Probability for Instrument Calibration Using ASEP Method, PP&L Recorded caclulation EC-RISK-1064 5 Procedures forTreating Common Cause Failures in Safety and Reliability Studies, NUREG/CR<780 Volumns I &2 6 EC-RISK-0503 Rcv. I; EC-RISK-1060, Acccptancc Numbers for Riks Significant System Structures and Components, Czysz and Kukielka; &SOORs
Appendix A Supporting Data A.1 Diesels A.2 Motor Driven Pumps A.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.
A.1 Diesel Generator Data
Kukielka, Casimir From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
D'Angelo, Violet R.
Kukielka, Casimir RE: Diesel Starts Monday, September 29, 1997 10:42AM For D/G A, 8, C, D 5 min at 1000 KW 10 min at 2000KW 10 min at 3000KW 210 min at 4000 KW 15 min at 500KW for cooldown before S/D For D/G E 5 min at 1375KW 10 min at 2750KW 220 min at 4000KW 15 min at 500KW for cooldown before S/D rg5 From: Kukielka, Casimir To: D'Angelo, Violet R.
Subject:
RE: Diesel Starts Date: Friday, September 26, 1997 4:33PM Ha Violet, When you guys have a load run. How Iong is the load run/
Thanks Cas From: D'Angelo, Violet R.
To: Kukielka, Casimir
Subject:
FW: Diesel Starts Date: Thursday, September 25, 1997 3:41PM See attached info.
From: Paley, Robert M.
To: D'Angelo, Violet R.
Subject:
FW:
Date: Thursday, September 25, 1997 3:22PM From: Kukielka, Casimir To: Paley, Robert M.
Date: Thursday, September 25, 1997 2:26PM
- Bob, I have diesel starts through 3rd quarter 96.
Do you guys have 4th quarter 96 to the presents If so could you please send it to me.
Page 1
1" Quarter 1993 I
I y(
~c.l
~pf
+4 1 ~
DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS JAN 93 - DEC 95 BYQUARTERS DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 5
4 3
4.
4 START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 5
3 3
3 LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
)PP 100%
1PP%
2nd Quarter 1993 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 3
5 5
3 7
START FAILURES 0
0 0
~
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 3
5 3
5 LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
)PP 100%
100%
100%
3rd Quarter 1993 DIESEL GENERATOR AB.
C D
E START ATI'EMPTS 6
3 3
3 4
I
~
1 START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 5
3 3
2 4
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
)PP 100%
100%
100%
START TTEMPTS
/7 4
8 A
B File Name: DQMRR 4
Quarter 1993 DIESEL QENERATOR A
START ~ LOAD-RUN E:0AD-RUN FAILURES
>ATTEMPTS + FAIDURES 5
iIo 4
'0'X Page 6 of )0 S ART RELIABILITY/')
00%
/ I'0 1000/
C 4/26/96
d ~
~
%AI
~ d&l bJV d
~
d 4'"
u rter 1993 (OCTOBER 1993 TO SEPTEMBER 1996)
ROLLING36 MONTHRELIABILITYDATA MAINTENANCERULE REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS DIESEL GENERATOR A
8 C
D E
1 at START ATTEMPTS 7
4 8
4 3
- J START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 5
4 6
4 3
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
1PP%
100%
1PP%
100%
DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 3
6 4
6 1
d'd'd START FAILURES
~
0 0
0 0
0 LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 3
4 3
4 1'OAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
DIESEL
'ENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 8
6 6
9 12 START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 4
5 4
5 8
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY
'00%
1O0%
100%tt 100%
IO0%
DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
ld START ATTEMPTS 3
4 2
4 5
li START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 3
32' 5
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
File Name:
98Q3REP.OOC d
page 8 of 10 7/14/98
4 a
r 1994 ROLL G 36 MONTHRELIABILITY ATA DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 5
3 4
3 6
a,l START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 5
3 3
3 6
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
1 M
e 5
DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 3
3 4
3 5
/5 START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 3
3 4
3 5
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 1PP 100%
100%
1P Popo 100%
~er 1995 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 2
6 6
6:/.
p 7 START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 2
4 4
5 LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100 10Q%
pp 100%
100%
3rd arter 199 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 4
5 5
3 3
START FAILURES 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 3
4 3
2 3
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
File Name: 96Q3REP.DOC Page 9 of 10
'/14/96
ROLLING36 MONTHREI IABILITYDATA I
4'"
uarter 1995 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 9
7 6
6 6
3Y START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN.
ATTEMPTS 7
6 4
5 6
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100%
100'l 1
uarter 1996 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 3
4 2
5 8
START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 3
3 2
4 6
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
1PP%
100%
1 ppo 2nd uarter 1996 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
D E
START ATTEMPTS 6
3 3
3 3
/$
START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 6
3 3
3 3
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100 lo 100%
3rd uarter 1996 DIESEL GENERATOR A
B C
E START ATTEMPTS 4
4 5
4 4
3.l START FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
LOAD-RUN ATTEMPTS 4
4 5
4 4
LOAD-RUN FAILURES 0
0 0
0 0
START RELIABILITY 100%
100%
100%
100%
100olo File Name: 08Q3REP,DOC Page 10 af 10
~ O)&c 7/14/96
MAINTENANCERULE REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABILITYRESULTS 4'" QUARTER 19g6
"""""'""""""""""""DIESEL':::::;.:I:::.::,';:";;<":""':":""::::: ';::I'gHOURSIOUT:::OF...'SERVICE(
0.26 Hrs 3.99 Hrs 2208 Hrs 2208 Hrs D
E SPARE 3.38 Hrs 0.90 Hrs 0.58 Hrs 2208 Hrs 2208 Hrs 2208 Hrs MAINTENANCERULE REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS 4 " QUARTER 1996
"'jgi', ~;::,':DIESEL~"'@:",-'":::@P':@@START"i~'""-': <"<."-4N,':,START": ""~~~ )4,"""L'OAD'-RUHR>Pk%'rgLPADWUN!.".";
'"'ka'i'GENERATOR!'Ki 5'i;~'ATTEMPTS'N';! ':iij'-')FAIL~URESI!~X 8;:iAT~TEMPTS4~5 MKFAILURESh:"';-".,"
A D
(1)
E SPARE) 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 (1)
On 12/10/96, the D/G E was aligned as a spare diesel and was NOT substituted for any diesel when the valid start failure occurred.
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 97Q1 MAINTENANCERULE REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABILITYRESULTS for 1 QUARTER 1997
'::;:"T$.-';,:::';p'~>Ri+<'.i:;DIESEL":;.+<j'":"'"'"4i'4g5lHOURSOUT:.OF'SERVICE%I 5P'(,::5,"~PDIESEL<HOURS!INN!i'i'-""'~
D A
11.95 Hrs 13.20 Hrs 14.37 Hrs 0.18 Hrs 2160 Hrs 2160 Hrs 2160 Hrs 2160 Hrs E SPARE 0.00 Hrs 2160 Hrs DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS for 1 QUARTER 1997 z
SPARE
~
9
.::~:..:g";;.:.DIESEL';:$~"--'i::<<j'::.;!j'.!NSTART,:g,:::",'>>';
k!'-"'.GENERATOR:,':.~~~'- ki%',ATTEMPTS"4:.
""j:,"::ii"'.;:"STARTjg~P<:,"~@,"<<:L'OADWUN;.'.;.""
0 0
0 0
0 Pk(L'OAD-'.RUN>".;;
0!.'FAIL'ORES 5~:
0 0
0 0
0
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION 97Q2 MAINTENANCERULE REPORT DIESEL GENERATOR AVAILABILITYRESULTS for 2"'UARTER 1997
,'r,'-'"".':::-:::.'::.',":.".:.".!::DIESEL'.,',.'::,'$'P'~V, j'":,ae:.":;
I.",".:;..::.,':~.:.'::;-:;".::.",:-"",-'.,
A B
D E SPARE j~s: HOURS,'.OUT':OF,SERVICE'j',:.'4.04 Hrs 0.88 Hrs 65.00 Hrs 8.02 Hrs 13.91 Hrs i('j""'~>>DIESEL':HOURS,
'IN,::,,"::,:~p.';,:.5'184 Hrs 2184 Hrs 2184 Hrs 2184 Hrs 2184 Hrs When substituted for D/G A, B, C or D DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITYRESULTS for 2"'UARTER 1997
- ~></,,;;
- ;.4~?;~ P-.;
- g:'";(Pig;<~'. (>gAL!IP':S TA'R A
B D
E SPARE)
'.+>>>>?(< jgQALID@q$?::p'.i 5:;:..'>>',FAIL?URES'5"'.::,'-','i 0
0 0
0 0
i% ATTEMPTS:"~44
~, ':>> LOAD-.RUN:~j~:-.:
@!;.';>> FAIL'URES;';"6'"'
0 0
~ 0 0
SSES SIGNIFICANT OP ERATING OCCURRENCE REr QRT EVENT CLOSURE FORM REPOAT NO./- fi(g(PAGE 1 OF SOOR Record Package psaE~OFm>
TITLE CLOSURE REPORT
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D CAI:SZ eF ZUZiT During the surveillanc>> start on 6/19/91
.'Iaintenance personnel vere pr'esent monitor key engine functions during the start.
An installed visicorder provided a rocd record cf important diesel generator parameters.
The monitoring conclusively identified che cause of the slav start as a fuel cil delivery problem.
This conclusion vas based on the folloving:
0 Fuel oil pressure vas observed to stay lov for an extended durat'on into the start instead of rising in 2 to 8 seconds as is normal.
0 The Fuel Control Rack remained fully open for the scart duration (normal operation) 0 Observed Air Start System operation vas normal.
0 Uislcorder traces shoved all generator parameters to be normal.
'c c' I
g
~ r44 4
N A4 REFERENCE DOCLIMENTATION:
- 1. REPORTING FORM
- 2. REPORTABILlTYASSESSMENT
- 3. RESOLUTION FORM NPRDS REPORTAGILITY DETERMINATION tram~: rHScJ~~
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AT 7~-Pi DATE SR. COMPLIANCE ENG.
OR DESIGNEE 7 9'i DATE PORC MEETING NO.
ASST. SUPT. OF PLAr&
DATE
gsES $ tGNIF[CANT OPERATING OCCURRENCE REPORT REPoRT NO.
CONTINUATION FORM
+'7/-/~c ATTACHMENTBEING USED FOR:
PAGE ~ OF~
CONTINUATION OF EVENT DESCRIP '"N CONTINUATIONOF IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS CONTINUATION OF ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY
NO-REPORTABLITY DETERMINATIC"'
CONTINUATION.OF EVENT CAUSE CONTINUATIONOF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS CONTINUATIONOF ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE
+ oTHER C a Based on che irvest'zation, the most probable cause of the 'C'DG slav start has been concluded to be excessive air ctapped in the fuel supplv header existing prior co che init'al survei'ance run on 6/19/91.
The cause of a'r e!.t.apnenc vi.thin the fuel supplv header is believed to be due to en in~eccicn pu"p 'laving 'en;..cdif'ccc'cn'vhich had been inplenenced or. rhe 'C'DC n
August 1990.
The flaving vent modificat'on had been installed to aLleviate an in!eccion pump overheat'ing probler. at idle or lov pover engine operation by draining excess fuel nil bac'k to the main fuel oil storage tanks.
The nev floving vents have been:ound ineffective in vencing air from the fuel header dur'ing scarcup.
This modification had been installed on EDCs 'A'hrough
'D'etveen August and October 1990.,
It should be noted that EDG 'E', vhich is a
f':th and spa.e EDC ac Susquehanna, is of a diffetent design and d'd noc require this modif icacicn.
'~'armer outside temperatures experienced recently have cade che problem -ore evident as decreased fuel oil viscosity results faster draining.
thus increas'ng the rate at vhich air enters che fuel header.
Prior to the 'C'G 6/19/91 slav start, a concetn for potential voiding c.'
'.uel supplv header had o):lv been surnised for the 'D'DC.
The 'D'DC had experienced a slov scarc on Iarch 25, 1991 during a maintenance troubleshooting run.
Although the root cause of rhe 'D'DG slov start could noc be conclusively determined, one pocencia) contributor vas identified as the modification to the fuel oil floving vent lines.
hs a result, the floving vert
nes vere te-modified to eliminate a potential fuel header voiding problem, Similat re-modifications vere developed ac thar. tine ta be implemented as a precautionary measure on the 'h', 'B'nd 'C'DCs during their next inspection oucagcs.
This event vas detetnined to be rcpot table pcr IOCFR50.73(a) (2)(vii) in thac a
single condition resulted in a porential for cvo or morc independent channels to become inoperable in a single support system designed to shut dovn the reactor
~ maintain ic in a safe shutdovn condition and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Namely, air encrapmenc in the fuel supply headers of che
- EDCs, identified as thc mosr. ptobcble cause of rhc 6/19/91 'C'DC slov start and caused by a modification performed on 'A'hrough 'D'DGs in 1990, could potentially result in start tines exceeding those required vhen thc engines are started once per 31 days in accordance vith the Technical Specifications.
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BOOR R cord Package PAG OFJ~O
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osES SIGNIFICANT OPERATING OCCURRENCE REPORT CONTINUATION FORM REPORT NO.
/-Pl~
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PA(it,~ wc
/
RCHMENT BEING USED FOR:
CONTINUATIONOF EVENT DESCRIPTION CONTINUATIONOF IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS CONTINUATIONOF EVENT CAUSE CONTINUATIONOF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS CONTINUATIONOF ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY
NO REPORTABLITYDETERMINATION CONTINUATION OF ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OTHER 'E K
C 4 i 'M)
CORRECTIVE ACTION'S Inspections immediately after the failure verified no fuel piping 1caks that could have lead co the slow scarc.
A manual Fuel Oil Booster Pump start vas initiated co determine if a pump or pressure regulator valve problem vas evident.
Fuel pressure rise vas normal and vithin 2 seconds, demonstrating proper operation of che Booster Pump and a completely "solid" (no air voiding) fuel supply header.
Fuel Control rack operation vas observed to be normal.
A troubleshooting scarc was perf or=ed and the 'C'DC start time vas 7.7 seconds.
The Booster Pump vas obsezved co scart immediately and stop a fev seconds lacer per ics design.
Fuel pressure vas observed to rise to raced pressure vichin 3 seconds.
~ ~
The monthly surveillance cesc vas repeaced.
Start time vas 7.6 seconds.
Proper fuel system operation vas again observed.
The 'C'DC vas started from ambient conditions at 0535 hours0.00619 days <br />0.149 hours <br />8.845899e-4 weeks <br />2.035675e-4 months <br /> on 6/20/91.
The purpose of this restart vas to verify that no ocher failure mechanism vas being aasked by the relatively short shutdovn times becveen the previous starts.
Folloving the successful start, the 'C'DC vas declazed OPERABLE.
The EDG
~as tested on" e every 7 days in accordance with Tech Spec z quirenents.
Additionally, start tests were immediately performed on the 'A'nd 'B'DGs.
As a prudent measure.
EDGs 'A'nd 'B'ere started once every l5 days until the flowing vent re-mod' ication was completed on thex.
The floving vent re-modification was completed on al)
EDGe by '7/27/91.
Results to-date have shown improvements in EDG start times.
This SOOR is recommended for closure.
&8'P~ Pi-cora W-W SOOR Record Package PP,GOOF~
SSES SIGNIFICANT OPERATING OCCURRENCE REPORT EVENT REPORTING FORM REPORT NO, 1 "91" 156 PAGE
- 1. OF 2
INITIATOR STA DATE WORK GROUP 8ARRY W
PALMER 06/ 19/9 1
UNIT SYSTEM NO.
0 24 BLDG.
LOCATION EVENT DATE A
E AND TIME 44 677 06/19/91 145 RX POWER/CONDITION U1 100 1
u2 100 1
PRIORITY I
EVENT DESCRIPTION IINITIALINVESTIGATION The 'C'iesel generator was declared inoperable when it failed to star t within 10 seconds dur ing per formance of the Diesel Generator Monthly gQ.V Operability Test.
While performing the Diesel Generator Monthly Operability Test, SO"024-001,"'he
'C'iesel generator failed.to start within the T equired 10 seconds.
The start times to reach rated frequency,
- speed, and voltage were 28, 24, 20.
1 seconds respectively.
The 'C'iesel generator was declar ed inoper able and LCO 3,8.1.1 was entered.
Electrical Maintenance was notified to investigate.
SOQi~ Pp~~--,t FAG~L,"-:~
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L ~ ~ I IMMEDIATECORRECTIVE ACTIONS Initiated investigation.
Entered LCO.
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Lt, StItlI CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT HO AGYERSE CONSEQUENCES AEACTOR 5IIUTOOYYH REGUCKQ PLANt CAPACITY IHCREASKQ OUTAQE TIME KOUtPLIEHT QAUAQKQ fHQIHEfREO SAPEGVAAO FEATURE ACTUATION
+ TECH SPEC ACTION STATELIKNTENTERKO tECH SPE C YOLAT:OH I'EASQHHEL INJURKO OR COHTAUIHATKO OTIIEA FVENT IDENTIFIED BY
~ OPERATIONS PERSOttHf L IAC PERSONNEL UAYHTKNAHCfPERSONNEL TECHNICAL STAPP PEASOHHEL HEALTH PtIYSC$ PEASONNEL SECURITY PERSQHHKL O'THEA.
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~ II EVENT DETECTED BY CONTROL ROQtt ALAAII 5+ittt~ TURHQYER ROUTINE RQUHQ5 VERtttCATIQHOP TASR OOSEAYATIQN OP CON SKOUE NCE5 LOCAL ALARU
~ SUAVEILLAHCEtf$ ttHG QQCUUfHTATIQH R'EVIEW CHAetCK OSSKAYATIQtt
'TIIER EVENT IS Q A REPEAT OCCURRENCE THE OIILY KNOWN OCCURRENCE SnelPJl tQ A PAST OCCVRRENCE RUT IIQT THE SAME th4V A~ OA ttt 5 ~
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COHSEQJE4=.S ASSESS~
~
There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event, oi iour diesel generators were available at all ticres meeting the minimum station backup emergency power supply design basis requirement.
The "C" Diese'enerator did star and would have been available as a pcM r supply if an event had occurred.
Once the diesel was started air was purged frcm the uel system.
Subsecuent s~s wiJoin - period of approximately two weeks would be ected to be less than the requiied ten second start time based on investigations o=
the problem.mQ~.+~K MI~)~
COPJKCTi~& ACTiGNS Corrective action is to install iXP 91-9013 C, Fuel Oil System Vent Line Modification.
Un"'l t"..e nadification can be installed the "C" Diesel Generator shall be started every seven days.
The reduced period between starts will maintain the fuel upply header purged of air.
Similarly, DCP 91-9013 A and B shall be installed on diese).s "A" and "B" to prevent a similar occurrence.
Although a slow start has not ocvuraR on either
'f these diesels they shall be started at an increased frequency of every 15 days as a precaution until the mxlification can be installed.
The uel Oil System Vent Line Mcdification was ccrrpleted on Diesel Generator "D" on 5/25/91.
AC1'ZONS 'IO PR~~Z RECURRENC" There are no 5 Her actions to prevent recun~ce.
PAST SOLAR SOORs 1-91-068 I ns or comprotri sa tn
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t-Mpyenosafet )cop'cocy
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so d't'l o f>ty ~c ~:.sul t of thj.s s to hec.ox~
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. re i ndepondent
-'.-~ye. able in a single suppor d'f:
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coactor.
maintain it in
~ safe s
did exist.
~itjr:ate the consequences of an accioen fun) cu'Qplv headers of EDGs start times y have r.
ph~c;e roqu ireful bv Tech Sp n
such this
~ven".
ctprt in
+n emergency rjtuatinn.
ns t,noted tn who Co~miss)qn ver 10'CFP50.7 3(a) <2}(vi I
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LICENSEE EVEN~ REPORT HLER)
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ADDITIONAL INFOR.'fATION This Licensee Event Report also ful ills the requirement for issuance of a Special Report per Technical Speciixcation 4.8.1.1.4 for all EDG failures, valid or non-valid.
Failed Component Identification:
None identified Previous Similar Events:
LER 90-015-00 reported a slov start on the A'DG 7/26/90.
Thlf cause of the slow start vas a
sheared 1" reducer on the air start header piping.
PLAS-455 {Special Report) described a slow start on the 'D'DG on 10/30/90.
No positive root cause was determined.
PLAS-428 {Special Report) described a slov start on the 'E'DG on 5/15/90.
This slov start vas attributed to air infiltration into the fuel oil piping as a result of a Fuel Oil Booster pump suction flange leak-.
5,
April 24, 1991 cc:
H.G. Stanley T.C. Dalpinz E.<". Figard 0'. Kuczynsk!
S.B.
Kuhn 8
~ R.
)Ie idnrn O'0 "'c II..I. I'nImcr SIISc)',E)IAY4A STF.,": EI.FCTR IC STATION DIESEI. GENERATOR A FAILl'RE DURING SF.-""'-107 APRIL -"",
1991 I'.IS-3 7 2 9>>
FII.F. R48-6 SF
'07,
'18
~ I nth Diesel Generatnr A and C (or E> Auto Start nnd ESS Buses nnd
.'.0 Fnc rgi;at inn nn Lnss nf Offsire Pnwcr with a I.OCA-Plant Shutdown",
pcrfnrms testing tn fulfill sevcrn1 Technical Spccificntinn surveillance renu!renents.
During the performance nf SE-224-107 on April 22, 1991. Diesr 1 Gencrntnr's "A" and "C" vere given n start signal via the SE orocedure.
The "A" D!rsr I fni I cc! tc nch'.eve rated speed.
As n result, rntec!
vc Itnge nnd frccucnrv vc!r nlsn nnt achieved and the Diesel did nnr enrrgi.".r the cmergcnc",
bus.
Subsequently.
the engine vns manually trippec!.
IInsed nn the prnpcr illuminntinr. c f test lights and the nrnn'e. start of the "C" Diesel, ve believe that the failure of the "A" Diesel tn prnperly start is associated with a problem with the "A" Diesel and nct with thc ESP. logic.
.Iaintenance is continuing its trouble shootinp,,investign'tion-w5:th-the "A" Diesel to better determine cause.
In the interim-the.following issues r.ust be addressed:
(I'I Substitution
- o. the "E" Diesel for the "A" Diese...
<<ased nn the isfn....atinn ve Lave. "e believe the failure ni the "A" Diesel is assnciated with the engine itself.
Therefor no additional surveillance testing, above and beyond what is normally dnne fnr subst'tuticn.
is, required.
',": I '.I.~tu<<.l SE-22>>-107.
Due tc the problem with the "A" Diesel the test could net be completed.
Although pnrtions nf the test were successfully cnrpleted. it is our intent to reperfnrm the surveillance, in its entirety, vhrn thc "A" Dirse1 is returned tn service.
II C
~pr
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('l1 0
< rabf1 ftv tncrfn. n( the "A" 1)f<snl A'4 lease<l.oo th<
in(nrmat ion
<:c have Mc h
'e the f'ail>>re o5 thc "A" Diesel assn<'fated
<:I th th<
rnpfn<
f rsr1 f a>><l not th<
FSF Io<;fc.
Rctcsr fnr, (or op< rah I 1 1 tv sh<in,d bc
<'F. A)<i AO <, rr,
< st
< nninc
< r<rrvr>>rv start I<iyI(
So-0"l<-001.
('
I~f < sr I eeneratnr valid/nonval id failure.
AI I fn<licat ion.n datr is that the "A" Dfcs<'1 rcccive<l a valid emergcncv start sirnal.
Therefore, its Eailur~'o adecuatclv start and achieve rated c<.rditions ~f thfn 10 seconds sl;:id be considcre<!
a valid failure.
" i')
T..a'.,'Ir rk'lant'nefneerfnc
.Supcrvfs< r jl,F. Rorh
<'enfnr Co<<<pliancc Fncfnccr
~
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Pennsylvania Power L Light Company Two North Ninth Street
~ Allentown, PA 18101
~ 215 I 770 5151 June lh, (990 bcc:
H.W. Keiser TW-16 A.M. Male A6-2 F.G. Butler A6-2 I'
Cc.
A6>>1 J.R. Miltenberger A6-1 Z.'N.'Z ~y A2-4 Nr. T.T. Hartin m ~~,
H.D. Wcxxhshick Spu.. Off1.ce-b.xwi Regional Administrator, Region I M.T, ~n Susq. 'I'raining Cen U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission R.J.
Prego SB-2 475 Allendale Road SRC(Attn:
W.R. Licht)
A6-1 King of Prussia, Pa.
19406 M.M. Golden SSES T.J. Nork SSES W.G. Hafner SB-1 iGHC Secretary SSES
'OC File SSES Dyckrttan - Allegheny Electric C~rati P.O. sax 1266 SURXJEtVBNA STEAM EZZCZRIC STATI(N Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266 SPECIAL REFORI'
'E'IESEL FAILURE 'Io J,D, Decker General ACHIEvE 60 HZ FREQUENCY WITHIN 10 SErXNDS 5 Highland Place
~- r28 FILE R41-2
Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Pkwy.
Docket No. 50-387 Atlanta GA, 30339 License LLo. NPF-14 Fearican Nuclear Insurers -
The Exchange Suite 270 Fazrt~pxn Ave.
Fartttington, CT 06(I32 Dear Mr. Martin Attn:
Librarian Ail Diesel Generator failures, valid or invalid, are to be reporttxt as required by Regulatory Guide 1.108, Section C.3.b and Technical Specificaticn 4.8.1.1.4.
On Nay 15, 1990 at, 2125 hours0.0246 days <br />0.59 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.085625e-4 months <br /> the 'E'iesel Gyrator (D/G) was start~A in accorda~ with surveillance test SO-024W01 following its substitution for the
'O'/G c&c m being renaved ~ service for maintenance.
D/G 'E's a
spare fi th D/G which can be substit~ for any of the four (A,B,C or D) D/G's at Susquehanna.
The 'E'/G failed to achieve generator. frc~mcy ~f 60 (+3.0,
-3,0)
Hz within 10 seccax1s as xmp~B by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirazant 4.8.1.1.2.a.
The.'E'/G was shutdown.
Limiting '.".yditica for Operation (M3) 3.8.1.1 was entered.
'Ihe 'D'/G was substituted back in for the 'E'/G.
Thus, four separate, independent D/G's were again OPERABLE as required by the Technical Specifications and IlD 3.8.1.1 was cleared.
Th s was the second observed abnormal start of the 'E'/G in a little mare than a one nenth period.
On April 10, 1990 the cbserved generator frequency did not meet its required value within 10 seconds during a start attarpt.
'Ibis start a tempt was classified as a ncnmalid test by Operaticas since it had followed rtaintenance activities wh'ch had beew perfoxmed on the 'E'/G.
Follcwing the 4-10-90 sluggish start the 'E'/G frequency meter circuit was enrrnined, along with the governor fuel rack, air start, speed sensing and other ccmponents and no abnormalities were found.
prior to the start, the air supply to the starting header had been conf~ t'o be rxrrmal at greater than or equal to 240 psig.
A second start attempt had been successful with the D/G attaining its required parrrmeters within the 10 second time limit.
The specific cause'f the 4-10-90 slow start could not be deterrruned at that time, however, the investigation did not identify any reason for the slow start to be classified as a valid test or failure.
A subsequent start atterrrpt on 4-12-90 at 1331 hours0.0154 days <br />0.37 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.064455e-4 months <br /> was also successful with the 0/G attaining all required parameters within the 10 second tine limit.
Following the 5-15-90 slow start, a second start attempt was made with the 0/G nrccessfully attaining its required parameters within the 10 second tire limit.
An investigation was then conducted and several air contml pressure rr gulator or shuttle valves were disassembled, inspected and tested along with starting relay logic circuitry.
No abnormalities were found.
Finally, the fuel oil system pipirrg was inspected and a loose suction flange on the DC Fuel Oil Booster Pump was found to be leaki;rg slowly and is believed to have been drawing air in, resulting in slower engine acceleration on fuel oil during initial start attempts.
ine Fuel Oil Booster ~ suction flange was properly tight~ and another successful start of the 'E'/G follcwed at 2040 hours0.0236 days <br />0.567 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.7622e-4 months <br /> on 5-17-90.
The loose suction flange, and resultant introduction of air to the fuel oil system, is believed to be the cause of the 5-15-9.0 surveillance test failure.
To prevent recurrence, the Maintenance Section willrranitor the integrity of this flange ard other fuel oil system connections to optimize the inspection pericds for these types of connections consistent with the D/G reliability program efforts.
As a result of review of the D/G 4-10-90 test run classification, performed subsequent to the 5-15-90 0/G slow start, PP&L is
~iewing its practice ccncerning when a diesel run is classified as a post maintenance test versus operabilirg test and wiU.. establish clear classification directions consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.108.
The loose pm'uction flange, discovered-after the 5-15-90 slow start, is new believed to be a potential cause of the 4-10-90 slur start, which would lend scrr credence to retroactive classification of the 4-10-90 slow start as a valid test failure.
In this case,
- however, PPRL feels that if bcrc i slow starts
" are attributed to this sarw'. cause, it would not be in the best interest of the 0/G reliability efforts to re-classify the 4-10-90 start attempt as a valid;.
test failure.
'Ihis would result in having two (2) failures in the last 20, valid tests and a test interval of one start at, least once per 7 days per Tech Spec Table 4.8.1.1.2-1, which PPr L feels would be an unneoessary burden on the
'E'/G and unjustifiable fran a reliability standpoint. due to a singular causal factor which was corrected.
As such the 4-10-90 slow start will remain classified as a ncamalid test.
This position was reviewed with the NRr Senior Resident Inspector.
D/G 'E'as unavailable for substitution use fran 2125
'I' 4 C ~ ~
~ '8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> on'5-15-90 to 2040 hours0.0236 days <br />0.567 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.7622e-4 months <br /> on 5-17-90.
'Ihe 5-15-90 'E'/G slew start tea is ccnsidered a valid test and valid failure.
The Diesel Generator Start Log indicates there is one (1) diesel failure in the last 20 valid tests.
The diesel test interval is one start at 1";~t once per 31 days per Technical Specification Table 4.8.1.1.2-1.
~sr'
~
.G. Stanley Superintenden of Plant Susquehanna RRH/mmmm cc: U.S Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Donxmnt Control Desk Washirx~n, DC 20555 Mr. G. S. Barber Sr. Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission P.O.
Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035
A.2 Motor Driven Pump Data RHR pumps Number Demands Failures thru 89 90-97" total thru 89@
90-97'otal 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D 408 268 676 303 256 559 173 199 372 198 215 413 99 257 356 128 274 402 86
'51 337 89 229 318 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
2 0
2 1
~ 0 1
1 2
3
,Total 1484 1948 3432 4
2 6
Q Data through 89 is obtained in Volurnc IIISection C.l ofthe IPE-199l it Demad data is obtained from EC-RISK-1060, Rev. 1. Failure data is obtained from reviews ofSOOR &CR summaries.
These summaries are provided in this Appendix RHR Pump Run Times The RHR pump run times and failures during operation were obtained from the IPR through 1/1/90 and estimated from the attached data through 12/31/97. The number of pump failures to run were obtained from SOOR &CR summaries.
The run hours for the pumps from 1/90 through 12/97 were estimated by multiplying the closed fraction reported on the HRPD output by the number ofhours between 1/90 through 12/97 (70140 hours). This was required because the HRPD data was queried only through 7/31/96.
RHR pumps to Run Number thru 89 fopen 90-97 total Failures thru 89 90-97 total 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D Total 5776 0.931 4837 10613 3029 0.934 4627 7656 3608 0.954 3225 6833 2596 0.952 3365 5961 2502 0.947 3716 6218 2704 0.918 5749 8453 2096 0.925 5258 7354 3235 0.924 5328 8563 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 25546 36104 61650 0
0 0
Emergency Service Water Pumps'ump Demands Number Failures Number Failures A
B C
D 1559 4
1472 1
1439 2
952 1
30247 1
42212 2
27191 1
31035 0
Total 5422 8
130685 4
The ESW pump demand data was obtained from EC-RISK-1060 Rev. 1. The failure data through 1989 was obtained from EC-RISK-0503. Rev. 1. Failures subsequent to 1989 were obtained from a review ofthe SSPI and Maintenance rule'records. No failures were reported subsequent to 1989.
Core Spray Pumps.
Data for the core spray pumps is derived from unit one data.
Core Starts Failures Run Failure Spray Hours 1A 1B 1C 1D 2A 2B 2C 2D Total 215 236 190 202 181 198 160 170 1553 3285 4553 1749 5925 3287 3613 2913 3092 0
28418 0
RHRSW The RHRSW starts and run hours were estimated from the attached HRPD data. The numbers were estimated since the data did not cover the entire sane ofthe data. Therefor it was assumed that the pumps were used at a similar frequency and duration during the periods where the data is absent as when the data is provided by HRPD. The ratio of known to estimated data is provided below.
RHRSW U1 4/30/98 7/1/83 7/1/83 9/10/82 14.8411 0.805479 0.94852 1/10/95 4/1/98 2/1/85 5/8/84 9.945205 13.90685
'0.71513 1A 1B 2A 2B Demand Operating Known Estimated Known Estimated 842 888 16902 17819 785 828 14531 15320 709 991 14483 20252 643 899 12431 17383 2979 3606 58347 70774
NDBH-71 UNIT
'1,PAGE 138 FOR HRPD DATA REPORT THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 ANO 23:59 ON 4/30/98 05/21/98 08:20:34 INTERVAL DURATION: 3003 1:59:59 POINT:
EKZ43
- - ESS BUS 1A TO CSPRY PP A
STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 1
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 202 TOTAL TIME OPEN 2
190'OTAL TIME CLOSED 14 622: 19: 18 CLOSED 26953:40:25 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.976 3078:19:34 15:09:51
ql NDBH-71 UNIT 1, PAGE 156 HRPD DATA REPORT FOR THE INTERVAI. BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/98
'5/21/98 08:20:34 INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59 POINT:
EKZ50 ESS BUS 18 TO 'CSPRY PP 8
STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 222 4
213 13 TOTAL TIME OPEN TOTAL TIME CLOSED 556:29:13 CLOSED 25766:03:42 4265:56:17 18:57:35 I
OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.967 I
I I
I I
x A Pi/ /cj. I ~~~ -
c f st~~
r~4/'/i/i s~~ ~ t4
= g3> stirp pow p~
y'poW/
f<LK P) )3
UNIT 1, PAGE 171 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON HRPD DATA REPORT 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/98 05/21/98 08:20:34 INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59 POINT:
EKZ57 ESS BUS 1C TO CSPRY PP C
STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 OPEN 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 179 TOTAL TIME OPEN 3
170 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 12 705:27:11 CLOSED 28392:27:56 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.987 1639:32:03 9:03:29
NDBH-71 UNIT 1,PAGE 187 FOR HRPD DATA REPORT THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/98 05/21/98 08:20:34 INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59 POINT:
EKZ63 ESS BUS 1D TO CSPRY PP 0
STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 OPEN 1
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 190 5
184 11 TOTAL TIME OPEN TOTAL TIME CLOSED 638:21:49 CLOSED I
24480:56: 18 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.957 5551:03:41 28:36:49
NOSH-71 UNIT 2,PAGE 17 HRPD DATA REPORT FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96 POINT:
EKZ71 ESS BUS 2A TO RHR PP A
STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 08/12/96 10: 31: 40 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:59 1
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 211 TOTAL TIME OPEN 3
172 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 42 255:21:45 CLOSED 54647:38:02 OUT OF SERVICE FRAG'TION:
0.947 3048:20:57 14: 18:41
NDBH-71 UNIT 2,PAGE 35 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON POINT:
EKZ77 ESS BUS 28 TO RHR PP 8
HRPD DATA REPORT 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96 STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 08/12/96 10: 3 I: 40 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:59 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 224 TOTAL TIME OPEN 4
174 TOTAL T'IME CLOSED 54 231: 41: 10 CLOSED 52824:27:15 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.916 4871: 31: 44 21:27:37
NDBH-71 UNIT 2,PAGE 52 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0: 01 ON POINT:
EKZ82 ESS BUS 2C TO RHR PP C
HRPD DATA REPORT 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96 STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 08/12/96 10: 31: 40 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695: 58: 59 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 203 TOTAL TIME OPEN 6
146 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 63 255:17:11 CLOSED 53354:53:21 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.925 4341:05:38 20:52:14
NDBH-71 UNIT 2, PAGE 67 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN HRPD DATA REPORT 0:01 ON 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96 POINT:
EKZ87 ESS BUS 2D TO RHR PP D
STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 OPEN 08/12/96 10:3'I:40 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:59 1
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 188 TOTAL TIME OPEN 3
158 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 33 278:59:02 CLOSED 53285:57:40 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.924 4410: 01: 19 23:12:38
POINT:
EKZ41 ESS BUS 1A TO RHR PP A
STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 OPEN NDBH-71 UNIT 1, PAGE 18 HRPD DATA REPORT FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96 08/12/96 10: 30: 46 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:59 1
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 220 TOTAL TIME OPEN 3
213 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 10 240:56:19 CLOSED 53729:21:40 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.931 3966:37:19 17:52:03
NDBH-71 UNIT 1,PAGE 35 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN HRPD DATA REPORT 0:01 ON I/01/90 ANO 23:59 ON 7/31/96 POINT:
EKZ48 ESS BUS 18 TO RHR PP 8
STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 08/12/96 10:30:46 INTERVAL DURATION: 5?695:58:59 CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 208 TOTAL TIME OPEN 5
203 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 10 252:52:38 CLOSED 53862:53:16 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.934 3833:05:43 18:04:50
NDBH-71 UNIT 1,PAGE 49 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON POINT:
EKZ55 ESS BUS 1C TO RHR PP C
HRPD DATA REPORT 1/01/90 AND 23:59 ON 7/31/96 STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 OPEN 08/12/96 10 30 46 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:59 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 163 TOTAL TIME OPEN 3
155 TOTAL TIME CLOSED ll 331:42:08 CLOSED 55062:36:01 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.954 2633:22:58 15:57:35
NDBH-7 1 UNIT 1, PAGE 64 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:01 ON POINT:
EKZ61 ESS BUS 1D TO RHR PP D
HRPD DATA REPORT 1/01/90 ANO 23:59 ON 7/31/96 STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 OPEN 08/12/96 10:30:46 INTERVAL DURATION: 57695:58:59 1 - CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CIOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 178 1
167 12 TOTAL TIME OPEN TOTAL TIME CLOSED 306:51:42 CLOSED 54928:15:02 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.952 2767:43:57 15:32:56
A.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.
'NDBtl-7 1 UNIT 1, PAGE 63 HRPD DATA REPORT FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 AND 23:59 ON 4/30/98 05/21/98 08:20:34 INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59 POINT:
BKR STATE DEFINITIONS: 0 -
OPEN 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 773 TOTAL TIME OPEN 69 824 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 18 134: 21: 29 CLOSED
$ 13129 l41:05 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
16902 l 18:54 ~
J~ gg 20:05:52 O. 870~i I
NDBH 71 UNIT 1,PAGE 122 I
HRPD DATA REPORT FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 0:00 ON 7/01/83 ANO 23:59 ON 4/30/98 05/21/98 08:20:34 INTERVAL DURATION: 30031:59:59 POINT:
AEZ50 RHR SW PUMP 8 'BKR STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 -
OPEN 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 735 TOTAL TiME OPEN 50 760 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 25 147:08:05 CLOSED 15500:55:43 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.888 14531:04:16 18:32:04
NDBH-71 UNIT 2, PAGE 53 FOR-THE INTERVAL BETWEEN PD DATA REPORT 0:00 ON 2/01/85 ANO 0:01 ON 1/01/95 05/21/98 08:24:05 INTERVAL DURATION: 86904:01:59 POINT:
AEZ49
- RHR-SW PUMP A
BKR STATE DEFIN IONS:
0 -
OPEN 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 645 TOTAL TIME OPEN 64 636 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 73 102:08:41 CLOSED 72420:45:
12 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.833 14483:16:47 20:27:23
NDBH-71 UNIT 2,PAGE 101 FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN POINT:
BKR 05/21/98 08:24:05 HRPD DATA REPORT 0:00 ON 2/01/85 AND 0:01 ON 1/01/95 INTERVAL DURATION: 86904:01:59 STATE DEFINITIONS:
0 OPEN 1 -
CLOSED TOTAL NUMBER OF OPEN TOTAL IMPLIED OPEN TOTAL NUMBER OF CLOSED TOTAL IMPLIED CLOSED AVG TIME INTERVALS IN OPEN 579 TOTAL TIME OPEN 64 612 TOTAL TIME CLOSED 31 115:49:13 CLOSED 74472:32:33 OUT OF SERVICE FRACTION:
0.857 12431:29:26 19: 21:49
A.3 Summary ofRHR SOORs and CRs.
UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UUUUUUUUUUUU UUUUUUUUUU SSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSSSS SS SS SS SSS SSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSS SSS SS SS SS SSSSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSS 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 777777777777 77777777777 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77.
00000 0000000000 00 0000'0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00:
00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 TTTTTTTTTTTT TTTTTTTTTTTT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT 11 111 1111 11 11 11 11 11 11 1111111111 1111111111 JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJ Jd JJJJJJ JJ JJ dJ Jd JdJJJJJJ JJJJJd 0000000000 000000000000 00 OO 00 00 OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO 000000000000 0000000000 BBBBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBBBBB BB BB BB BB BB BB BBBBBBBBBB 8888868886 88 86 88 86 BB 88 BBBBBBBBBBBB 88888888888 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 6666666666 666666666666 66 66 66 66 66666666666 666666666666 66 66 66 66 66 66 666666666666 6666666666 655556665565 555555655555 55 66 66 555565666 5565656'6666666 85 666655656666 65566666566 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00'0 00 '0 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 8888888888 888888888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 88888888 88888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 888888888888
-8888888888 i~//US070TI JOB 720588P
~
RJE WA RPT MAIL -
GARY BURNS, SYS ENG-2ND
!1 NOTIFY:
US07 JOB NAME: 'S070T1 USERID:
US07 SYSOUT CLASS:
A DESTINATION:
RJEBO e
~
PRINT TIME:
- 10. 49. 08 4 PRINT DATE:
02 OCT 95 PRINTER NAME: RJEBOPR1 0
PRINTER TYPE:
PRT t
~~START++~++START+++~+START+++START+++++START+++++START+>+*+START<++++ST*RT+++
UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU
. UU UUUUUUUUUUUU UUUUUUUUUU SSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSSSS SS SS SS SSS SSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSS SSS SS SS SS SSSSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSS 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00,00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 777777777777 77777777777 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 TTTTTTTTTTTT TTTTTTTTTTTT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT 11 111 1111 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1111111111 1111111111 JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJJJJJJJJJ JJ JJ JJ JJ JJJJJJJJ JJJJJJ 0000000000 000000000000 OO OO OO OO OO OO OO 00 OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO 000000000000 0000000000 BBBBBBB8888 BBBBBBBBBBBB BB 88 BB 88 BB BB BBBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBBB 88 BB BB BB BB BB BBBBBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBBBB 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 6666666666 666666666666 66 66 66 66 66666666666 666666666666 66 66 66 66 66 66 666666666666 6666666666 555555555555 555555555555 65 55 55 555555555 55555555555555 55 555555555555 55555555555 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00'0 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 8888888888 888888888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 88888888 88888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 888888888888 8888888888 44//US07071 JOB 720588'RJE WA RPT',
MAIL -
GARY BURNS'YS.ENG-2ND NOTIFY:
US07 JOB NAME:
US070T1 USERID:
US07 SYSOUT CLASS:
A DESTINATION:
RJEBO PRINT TIME:
10.49.08 PRINT DATE:
02 OCT 95 PRINTER NAME: RJEBOPR1 PRINTER TYPE:
PRT 4
++START+++++START++++START++e++START++eeeSTART+<+++START+++++START~~~
W 4r 4
<+START++++>
PMI S:
49 10/02/95 SUSQU ANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/
1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR
/I P
M I 5 PAGE 1
SYS SOOR Ii OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 84-081 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
64 49 86 225 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
54 49 87-395 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
51 49 88-140 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
50 52 49 1-89-339 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-91-089
/
OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-91-266 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
51 2/09/84 7/23/05 7/02/87 5/05/88 11/08/89 4/17/91 10/18/91 RHR PUMP SEAL WTR COOLERS ARE INADEQUATELY DESIGNED.
2/9/84 EVAL COM.
MTG.
RECOMMENDS 10CFR72
- REPORT, PLI-31058.
THE SEAL WATER COOLERS WERE REPLACED WITH NEW SHELLS MADE OF CAST STEEL VS.
NQA REVIEW REQ.
DELETED PER OPS -
5 R.S.
CI.QSED HR, ESW FLOW TRANSMITTERS COMPLETELY COVERED UNDER WATER.
AUSED~BY> GROUND WATER LEAKING BY SEALS IN MANHOLES.
WRAPS-0$ l53PWjtI TTEN TO DETERMINE REPAIR METHODS.
,EMPT./PM ISSUED TO PUMP DOWN MANHOLES.
WA S65301
& S73632 C)OS) P "SEALEP fEPPTRATIONS.
POST LOCA BYPASS LEAKAGE WATER SEAL BARRIER IS SUSPECT FOR. BRANCH'LINES CONNECTED TO RHR AND CORE SPRAY SYSTEMS.
LICENSING REVIEWED THE CONDITION AND DETERMINED THAT IT WAS NOT REPORTABLE.
REF.
NCR 87-0288 FOR FURTHER EVALUATION CLOSED POTENTIAL REPORTABILITY RE:
& RHR LIMITORQUE OPERATOR S.
NUCLEAR DESIGN CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNTING ARRANGEMENT WAS NOT ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED. LICENSING DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION IS NOT REPORTABLE PER PART 21.
REF NCR'5 88-110, 181, 182
& 267.
CLOSED CONTAINMENT BOUNDRY VALVE CAP FOUND REMOVED FROM 151077&251077 REF NCR 89-0697 AND 701.
REF EWR M00020 WHICH DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION DOES NOT VIOLATE PPL COMMITMENT TO GDC-56.
CLOSED RWCU BLOWDOWN MAY NOT BE A VIABLE METHOD OF HEAT REMOVAL FROM CONTAINMENT BELOW APPROX 450 PSI RX VESSEL PRESSURE.
ERT PERFORMED.
REF PLI 68259.
ROOT CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE TECHNICAL OPINION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUCLEAR FUELS, SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS.
THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ISOLATED OCCURRENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO WORK GROUPS.
CLOSED RHR AND CORE SPRAY VALVES SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE LOCKING ~
RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO DRILL A HOLE IN THE DISK OF EACH AFFECTED INJECTION VALVE. REF DCP 91 9080 THRU 9083
'CP 91"9080 AND 91-9082 CORRECTED FOR Ul DURING 6RIO.
DCP 91-9081 AND 91-9083 INSTALLED DURING U2 BRIO.
CLOSED TOTAL:
7
PMIS:EVR49 10/02/95 SUSQUEHANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE d SOOR tt P
M I S
PAGE 2
SYS SOOR tt 49 83-063
/)/~wc'.<
49 83 064 49, 85 088 49'3-129 49C
.83-155 49,v 83 334 49 83-370 49 83-373 49 84-057 49 84-O7O 49 84-138 49 84-204 49 84-298 OCCUR DATE 2/16/83 2/16/83 2/ 18/83 4/08/83 5/13/83 1 1/06/83 12/03/83 12/07/83 1/29/84 2/03/84 3/21/84 4/29/84 7/21/84 DESCRIPTION ALT EPA BKR TRIP CAUSED LOSS OF S/D COOLING.
ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY TO THE RPS IS NOT ISOLATED FROM THE PLANT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM AND TRIPS ON SMALL VOLTAGE OR FREQUENCY OSCILLATIONS.
DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.S.
CLOSED '
1 ALT'PA BKR. TRIP CAUSED LOSS OF RHR S/D COOLING ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY TO THE RPS IS NOT ISOLATED FROM THE PLANT ELECTRICALi S)STEM iTRIPS ON SMALL VOLTAGE OR FREQUENCY OSCILt:ATiONS.'"
~ 'tt A ttEVIEW REQ.
DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.B.
RHR" 'Bh INJ.
VALVE HIGH VIBRATION. (F017 VALVES)
THE OPERAiTit(GJPROCEDURES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED.
PgR 82"'051)'l('lSQ't)PFULE)
RELEASED 8/7/84.
"I NQ'4+REVIEW <REQ) 'DELETED PER OPS -
5 R.5.
pAO(
I'~>' it HHR Hf PISCHARGE VALVE 1F0038.
WOULD NOT OPEN.
T E PTOR WAS"tt'Ekg)L'CED. WA-S31070 NR
'REVIEW 'RP'Q.
DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.S.
C)OSPD"
5/D COOLING HIGH FLOW SWITCH WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE LIMITS.
BARTON MODEL 28IBA SETPOINT DRIFT ~
C CALIBRATION DATA IS BEING TRENDED-REF SOOR 2
BP P49 WHICH IS MASTER
'CLOSED.
RHR LOOP '8'ECLARED INOP - CHECK VALVE )F0318 WOULD NOT SEAT.
CAUSED'BY MIS"A).'1GNt(ENT"OF THE VALVE DISC AND A BENT HINGE PIN.
EWR')DSEA 60003'7 tPROVIDED CORRECTIVE ACTION.
PHR SYS"VLVS WEPE 'f(SPECTED/REPAIRED AS NEEDED.
t CLOSED>
I 8
W hi RHR VALVES FAILED TO MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.
THE ).EAKAGE PAST'RHR TESTABLE CHECK VALVES ( 1F050 A d 8)
AND E'QUA).12ING'VAKVESV'((F122A d 8)
WAS TOO GREAT TO BE MEASURED.
PERMANEN'P(CHANGE'MADE TO S0-100-019..
t CLOSED(DCC 1.8 I
RHR CONDUOTIVITY INSTRUMENT CR1.2351 INACCURATE.
EMOS WRI TTQMt TO S/A( S AND OPS ABOUT REPORTING WHEN CHEMISTRY gi'TAKENG 'SAtlPL'ES~.
CL6SED/DOCS(
1E CIRCUITS t(OT ISOLATED FOR RHR.
10CF(50.'65E AND )OCf R21 REPORTS WERE MADE ~
RPF'1 SOOR '-8/~0 ) 2:
CLOSED I
) V RHR PUMP.
TRIP.
QND VALVES F008 d F009 CLOSED WITH NO ALARMS.
PROBhBf.'E CAUSE FROM HIGH FLOW AS A RESULT OF VALVING OPERATIONS.
SYSeWAS t(E)klPNjEDiTO SERVICE WITHOUT INCIDENT a"- C'LOSP D'i.".4!r' 4'Pl t~
RHR SHUTDO tl COOLING ISOLATION ACTUATION, HIGH FLOW SUSPECTED SPURIOUSi A TUATION OF RHR DIFF.
PRESSURE SWITCHES CAUSED CLOSURE OF 'SH, TDOW tCOOLING INBOARD AND OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES. THIS WAS'iA I ACT A/ION'DF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE.
~
6 'EVE T'HA 'NOT 'RE-OCCURRED AS OF 10/6/86 NO FURTHER ACTIONS ARE PLA NEO. 'EF MASTER SOOR 2-86-171.
C,LOSEP'A'OOP RHR UNIT II INOP.
UNABLE TO COMPLETE S0-149-002.
CLOSEP RHR LOOP 'Bi TEST CHECK VALVE 1F0508 REC'D DUAL INDICATIONS ISI WAS PERFORMED AND ENG.
ANALYSIS WAS MADE THAT VLV.
FUNCTIO((S PROPERLY.
PMIS: E 49 10/02/95'USQUE SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR 11 P
M I S
SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 84 299 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 84-316 7/21/84 8/20/84 CLOSED RHR LOOP '8'QUALIZER VALVE 1F1228 DUAL INDICATION.
VLV. VERIFIED CLOSED BY VENTING UPSTREAM PIPING, NO PRESSURE OR FLOW WAS OBSERVED.
WA 544361 WILL REWORK THE POSITION SWITCH WHICH IS SUSPECT.
REQUIRES CONTAINMENT ENTRY.
CLOSED RHR "8 INOP DUE TO FAILED ISI.
SO'S WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE 96 HOUR EVALUATION STATED IN THE ASME CODE.
CLOSED
.OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 84-474 12/19/84-49j~'84-344 M
="
9/
'1 1/84
'A'HR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING FULL FLOW TEST VALVE INOP.
VALVE 1F024A.
ACTUATOR PINION GEAR KEY WAS MISSING.
WA 544663 REPLACED KEY AND RESTORED SYSTEM.
NQA REVIEW REQ.
DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.B.
CLOSED
'RHR F028A VLV. BINDING AND REPEATEDLY TRIPPING BREAKER.
INVESTIGATEO BY. MNT & PACKING 'WAS LUBED & ADJUSTED, VLV. THEN "OPERATED PROPERLY.
CLOSED 49 84-483 49 85-049 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
64 83 49 85-092 49 e
85-132 49 85-154 49 85-145 49 85-150 49 85-183 12/25/84 2/01/85 3/04/85 4/27/85 5/15/85 5/16/85 5/20/85 6/08/86
" HIGH PRESS ISOLATION OF RHR SD COOLING, HV151F009 WOULDN'T CLEAR NECESSARY TO ISOLATE/VENT PRESS SWITCH 831-N018A TO OPEN VALVE.
PMR 86-7026 WILL PROVIDE CORRECTIVE h1EASURES WHICH WILL BE TRACKED BY MASTER SOOR 2-85-032.
CLOSED EXCESS, FLOW CHECK VALVES FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST.
XV-821-F072C FAILED TO ISOLATE, XV-831-F057A FAILED TO REOPEN XV-831-F0038 FAILED TO ISOLATE.
WA S50048 REPLACED BLOWN FUSE.
CLOSED TO DCC RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE WOULD NOT RETRACT INTO IT'S HOLDER, DURING RHR 178 VALVE WELD INSPECTOIN.
++CANCELLED/DOC~~
BYPASS 1-85-046 REMOVED CAUSING LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING ISO VLV ROOT CAUSE WAS STATES LINKS WERE OPENED IN PNL.
1C201 TO IMPLEMENT PMR 82-434, AND THIS ACTION WAS NOT DOCUh1ENTED.
WA-551134 INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED.
REF.
MASTER SOOR 2 112 CLOSED.
RHR INIATION PERMISSIVE SETPOINT PS-831-1N0188 OUT OF TOL.
FOUND DURING SI 149-304, WAS RE-CAL'ED. SAT.
CAUSED BY INSTRUX1ENT DRIFT.
CLOSED RHR MIN FLOW VALVE TIME DELAY, FOR OPENING, DID NOT FUNCTION.
1F007A.
STATUS:
REF.
MASTER SOOR 1 150 CLOSED 1F007A OPENED TO SUPPRESSION POOL WHILE RUNNING 'A'HR PUMP FOP SHUTDOWN COOLING..
WA-551403 INVESTIGATED AND EVENT COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED NOR A
CAUSE DETERlhIPPD.'LOSED WATER HAMMER OCCURRED WHEN 'A'HR PUMP WAS STARTED.
DUE TO PIPING'EING DRAINED AND-OP-149-00'OT BEING PERFORMED PROPERLY.
)NVOI.VED OPERATION'S PERSONNEL WERE COUNSELED.
PMI6:
R49 10/02/95 SUSQUEHANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 4
SYS BOOR N
OCCUR
. DATE DESCRIPTION 49 85-218 49 85-277 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
59 49 86-009 49 86-031 49 86 055 49 86-062 49 86-065 49 86-080 49 86-101 7/12/85 9/10/85 1/08/86 1/31/86 2/19/86 2/28/86 3/01/86 3/16/86 3/31/86 ITEM IS ON OPS AGENDA 85-09.
CLOSED TO DCC RHR ROOT VALVES FOUND CLOSED'OL DID NOT INCLUDE THEM.
RV-1-FT1N013 6 RV-2-FT-1N013 FOR FI-1R607.
PCAF 1-85-0895 CORRECTED CONDITION.
CLOSED TO DCC RHR/HPCI VLV EXERCISE SURV SE 149-205 6 SE-152-201 NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED.
INADEQUATE REVIEW OF PMIS AND SCHEDULING ERRORS CAUSED THE SURV TO MISSED.
THIS IS MASTER SOOR FOR 1-85-276, 238 6 253.
OPS ISSUED 50-153-003; REVISED 50-013/113/213-009, REPLACED SE-111/211-201,465 WITH "SO" PROCEDURES CLOSED RHR FLOW RECORDER FR-E11-1R608 FOUND OUT OF TOL.
INSTRUMENT IS USED DURING 50-149 002, OPS INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT-RESULTS WERE NOT AFFECTED.
CLOSED FLOW IN SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY WAS NOTED, 1F0278 NOT SEATED'OLLOWING PERFORMANCE OF 50-149-005.
PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THAT THE HANDSWITCH WAS NOT HELD IN THE CLOSE" POSITION EVENT TO BE RE-VIEWED BY LICENSED PERSONNEL.
SO-149-005 REVISED.
CLOSED
'8'HR SWING BUS MG SET TRIPPED, WAS HOT WHEN TOUCHED BY OPERATOR INVESTIGATING EVENT.
LCO ENTERED.
NO PROBLEM WAS IDENTIFIED, NO FURTHER OCCURRENCES WERE EXPERIENCED'ND HEAT WAS DETERMINED TO BE NORMAL.
CLOSED JUMPERS INCORRECTLY PLACED PER SE-149-001 WHILE TESTING RHR BKRS JUMPER WAS PLACED ON THE WRONG SIDE OF A DROPPING RESISTOR.
WA-552586 INSPECTED FOR DAMAGE, NONE WAS FOUND.
INVOLVED PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT, AND PROCEDURAL WORDING HAS BEEN REVIEWED.
CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP OPERATED WITHOUT THRUST BEARING COOLING VALVED IN. VALVE 111-129A WAS CLOSED'UE TO IMPROPER TRACKING OF VALVE STATUS ON WA T53113 AND INCOMPLETE EQUIP.
CHECK BY'PS PRIOR TO STARTING.
REF.
HPES REPORT 86-010.
MAINT AND OPS PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT.
CLOSED RHR 'A'OOP MIN FLOW VALVE ACTUATION LOWERED VESSEL INVENTORY WHEN IT AUTO OPENED AND DID NOT RECLOSE COMPLETELY WITH HAND SWI.TCH OPERATION, HV"E11 F007A, DUE TO INADEQUATE SPRING-PAC PRESSURE.
WA 560484 REPLACED SPRING-PAC WITH ONE OF A HIGHER
- RANGE, AND ADJUSTED TORQUE SWITCH SETTING TO A HIGHER LEVEL.
CLOSED RHR 1F007A REPEATEDLY STROKED OPEN AFTER IT WAS CLOSED.
EVENT OCCURRED WHILE RESTORING ESS 18{ 1A202).
1F007A IS THE MIN FLOW VALVE TO SUPPRESSION POOL.
CAUSED BY OPENING SUPPLY BKRS.
FOR HV-1F00849.
PCAF 1-86-451 WRITTEN TO PROHIBIT OVERRIDING SYS/EQUIPMENT CONTROLS.
CLOSED
~c> A~~C 49A 86-270 7/15/86
~'"-49~'~>,87, 604'~/V'P~.""-"~-.-'-"'
"4/04/h7 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY PUMP SUCTION PI-E11 1R002C OUT OF TOL FOUND DURING PM 01850-01, INSTRUMENT IS USED DURING TECH SPEC 4.0.6 PUMP TESTING.
INSTRUMENT,WAS REPLACED 6 SO-149-002 WAS PERFORMED WITH RESULTS SAT.
CLOSED
- RHR'SHUTOFF VALVE.1FONBB WOULb
'NOT STROKE OPEN
~ f /
DURING ATTEMPT TO INITIATE SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING.'j
PMI5:
49 10/02/95 SUSQUE NA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 UNIT 0/
1 SORTED BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE & SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 5
SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 87-008 49 87-014 1/08/87 1/13/87 A HIGHER SET OF THERMAL OVERLOADS WERE INSTALLED VIA SETPOINT CHANGE.
MASTER SOOR FOR 1-87-008.
WA S73379 IUSPECTED VALVE WITHOUT ANY PROBLEMS FOUND.
CLOSED RHR F0288 VALVE THERMALS TRIPPING DURING SUPP POOL COOLING ATTEMPTS.
REF MASTER SOOR 1-87-004.
CLOSED RHR MIN FLOW CHECK VLVS 161F046A-D FAILED SO-149-002 DUE TO LACK OF INSTALLFD INDICATION ON FLOW PATH PCAF 1-87-0049 ISSUED FOR SO-149-002 TO CLARIFY INSTRUCTION TO TEST CHECK VALVE. PCAF 2 87 0064 ISSUED FOR SO"249-002.
CLOSED 49 87-075 49 87-100
~ <<49 <<g~j87-,144<<ij=. t&a,~., "w'Wn: ~%)~..
49<>~a187~46.3'
~
3/15/87 RHR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING VALVE 1F0248 FAILED TO FULLY CLOSF.
SYSTEM WAS SECURED BY CLOSING THE 1F0288 ISOLATION VALVE VALVE 1F0248 TORQUE SWITCH SETTING WAS INCREASED WHICH ALLOWED VALVE TO FULLY CLOSE AGAINST SYSTEM DP.
EWR M60727 WILL DETERMINE IF,A LARGER MOTOR/ACTUATOR SHOULD BE INSTALLED.
REF.
EWR MIS86-727 AND EWR M71 191 (KEN ANDERSON)
WA 570503 RAISED THE TORQUE SETTING FROM 2 1/4 TO 3 1/4 AND THE PROBLEM HAS NOT RE-OCCURRED.
. CLOSED 4/07/87 RHR HV 151-F0288 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BONNET LEAK FOLLOWING SE-159-076.
DUE TO MISALIGNMENT OF THE BONNET WHEN INSTALLED ON THE VALVE 60DY.
VALVE WAS REPAIRED AND PROPERLY ALIGNED. INVOLVED PERSONNEL RECEIVED TRAINING TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
CLOSED 4'l?
5/26/87 RHR HV-151-F028A WOULD NOT OPEN, ELECTRICALLY:.DURINQ~VAIVE~(ZINEUP fj
.TO INITIATE.SU)PRESSION'POOL<<: COOL'ING. "THERMAL OVERLDADS 'WERE
- FOUND.rTRIPPBO'!c'PCA'F
( 87. 0500 ISSUED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE
~
REF.
BOOR 1-87-153 CLOSED
~C~
6/11/87 RHR F028A VALVE FAILED TO OPEN DURING SUPPRESSION POOL
~~g M4 COOLING VALVE ALIGNMENT. WA S70085, S70633
& 695 INVESTIGATED f /
WITH NO PROBLEMS FOUND. PCAF<<1-87-0500
& EWR M79227 ISSUED.
REF.
MASTER SOOR 1-87"209.
CLOSED 49 " '.87 206..
~
49 87-209 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 87-248 49 87-252 8/03/87 8/04/87 9/ 13/87 9/17/87 RHR HV151F015A WOULD NOT OPEN ELECTRICALLY OR MANUALLY WA S74802 14(VESTIGATED WITH NO ABNORMALITIES FOUND.
A DEADMAN SWITCH WAS INSTALLED AND THE VALVE WAS STROKED SEVERAL TIMES WITH NO BINDING OR MISALIGNMENT OBSERVED.
THERMAL BINDING IS THE APPARENT CAUSE.
WA 563756 INSPECTED DURING 3RFIO.
F015A PERFORMED SAT DURING SE-149-001.
CLOSED RHR HV1F0288 FAILED TO OPEN, BKR THERMAL OVERLOADS TRIPPED PFR'5 SUBMITTED TO INSTALL LARGER VLV OPERATOR MOTORS.
OP-149-005 REVISED AS AN INTERIM MEASURE.
TO ALLOW VALVE OPENING UNDER STATIC CONDITIONS.
MASTER BOOR FOR 1-87-153.
N.
ACT: MAINT -
REPLACE RHR 28A&B VALVE ACTUATORS FOR UNIT 1&2.
MAINT.TO WRITE WA'S. (KVC ACTION 2/14/89).
(
NPE IS PERFORMING A DESIGN REVIEW OF MOV'S.
REF NRC GENERIC
'ETTER 89-10, RIEE 88-0269
& 0270.
CLOSED THE STARTING OF 'C'HR PUMP RESULTED IN A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ESF ACTUATION WHEN THE F008 VALVE CLOSED, APPARENTLY DUE TO THE PUMP SWAP BEING PERFORMED AT A HIGH FLOW CONDITION. PCAF'S 1-87-093 1
& 2-87-0275 ISSUED.
REF WA 578192.
CLOSED WIRING ERROR FOUND ON RHR RELAY 62AX-20409, TB 81-43 LINK DID NOT HAVE LEADS LANDED ON BOTH SIDES.
INVESTIGATION BY STAFF ENGINEERING FOUND THAT WIRING IS CORRECT.
MNT PLANNING GROUP ATTENDED AN OUT SESSION.
CLOSED
PMI5:
49 10/02/95 SUSQU NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTER BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR tt
'R th S
SYS BOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 87 317 49 87-331 49 87-285 49 87-294 49 87-.296'9 87-305 49 87-312 49 87-315 49 87-323 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
58 59 49 87-350 49A 88-009 10/09/87 10/09/87 10/13/87 10/16/87 10/19/87 10/22/87 10/27/87 10/28/87 1 1/01/87 11/17/87 1/1 1/88 RHR CUT IH PS-831-1N0188 SETPOINT WAS NOT REPEATABLE DURING SI-149-304.
WA 578145 REPLACEED SWITCH. SI-149 "304 SPCTIQN 6.2"WAS PERFORMED SAT.
CLOSED
'A'HR HEAT EXCHANGER SPILLED WATER DURING VALVE EXCHANGE.
CAUSED BY HV) 1216A LEAKING BY IT'S SEAT AND CHECK VALVE 112009 NOT CHECKING REVERSE FLOW.
REF.
NCR 86-0871.
SYS KEEPFILL INJECTS HIGHER PRESSURE ON THE LOW PRESSURE SIDE OF HV11215A, CAUSING LEAKAGE.
CLOSED INCORRECT RHR VALVE WAS DETERMINATED BY WORKERS,'WA S71080 HV 161 F0288 WAS DETERMED RATHER THAN HV-161 F028A AS SPECIFIED ON THE WA.
CAUSE WAS WORK GROUP OVERSIGHT.
WORK GROUP REVIEWED SOOR
& SAFETY MEMO AS 14.
HPES87-016 GENERATED.
MT GM-060 REVISED AND OJT WAS HELD.
CLOSED INCORRECT WIRING ON RHR F008 PRESSURE SWITCH WAS FOUND DURING ATTEMPT TO INITIATE SHUTDOWN COOLING; WA 578196, REWIRED STATES LINKS TO NORMAL CONFIG. PS-831-1N0188 REPLACED AND TESTED PER WA S78 146.
CLOSED AN OPDRV EXISTED WHEN RHR F004A WAS OPENED
& F006A MOV REMOVED.
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE F008
& F009 VALVES OPEN.
THE CONDITION WAS RECOGNIZED BY OPS IN A TIMELY MANNER & THE F004A&C VAI.VES WERE IMMEDIATELYCLOSED.
UNIT COORDINATION REVIEWED THE EVENT AND AD"QA-326 REQUIREMENTS.
CLOSED RHR HEAT EXCHANGER GASKFT LEAKED DURING TP-149-034
'YDRO OF RHR DIV I.
WA 573533 RETORQUED THE FLANGE STUDS AND SUBSEQUENT HYDRO TESTED SAT.
CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP BREAKER FAILED TO TRIP DURING SE-149-001.
A DETERMINATED CABLE WAS FOUND ON VALVE 151F006A.
CAUSED BY OVERSIGHT OF THE WORK GROUP.
INVOLVED PERSONNEL REVIEWED AD-QA-500 & 502 AND MT-GM-050 CLPSED INADVERTANT S/ART OF RHR PUMP 1A DURING SE-151-001 WHEN'-
JUMPER= INSTALLED PER THE TEST "POPPED" OFF AND APPARENTLY STRUC TERMINATION CCC3-15, STARTING THE PUMP.
INVOLVED PERgO NEL>REVIEWED THE EVENT.
4 CL'0 ED' f 1 AUX BUS POWER SWITCHING RESULTED IN 1/2 SCRAM & ESF ACTUATION VfHEttHE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED.
A ITttA CFER iOF THE 18250/18260 480 VAC LOAD CENTER WILL CAUSE PLOSU E
OF HV-151-1F008 WHEN RPS BUS "8" IS POWERED FROM ALT RNATE SUPPLY, PCAF'S 2-87"0318
& 1-87-1171 INITIATED TO ADD THIS PRECAUTION.
C)OSED'X RECIRC VLVS HV-143F031A
& 32A DID NOT CLOSE UPON RHR DIV I MANUAL INITIATION DURING PERFORMANCE OF SE-149-001.
THIS PROBLEM CAUSED FAILURE OF ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. APPARENT CAUSE WAS'UMPERS WERE INSALLED ON INCORRECT TERMINALS. A RETEST WAS PERFORMED SAT.
TESTING GROUP REVIEWED THE EVENT.
CLOSED RHR PUMP 8 SUCTION GAUGE PI-E11-1R002 FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING WA 586017 AND WAS RECALIBRATED. THIS INSTRUMENT IS USED FOR PERFORMANCE OF 50-149"002, OPS STATES ALL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA WAS COMPLETED SAT ON 1/16/88.
CLOSED
PMIS:
49 10/02/95 SUSQUE NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/
1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE d BOOR TT P
M I S
PAGE 7
SYS BOOR TT OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49A 88-139 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
83A 49 88-167 49 88-171 OTHER AFFECTED SYST 49 89 007 49 89-010 49 89-020 49 89-046 49 89-098 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 89-111 OTHER AFFECTED'YST 12E 49 89 114 49 89 134 49 89-129 49 89-135 5/04/88 6/01/88 6/02/88 1/07/89 1/07/89 1/13/89 2/ 10/89 3/31/89 4/06/89 4/09/89 4/12/89 4/ 1 6/89 4/21/89 POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE CONDITION RE:
SNUBBER FAILURE RATE DURING FUNCTIONAL TESTING..LICENSING EVALUATION DETERMINED THAT THE CONDITION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF PART 21 OR PART 50 CLOSED RHR LOOP 'A'LOW FT-Ell-1NOTBA FOUND OUT OF TOL DURING PM 81073 THIS INSTRUMENT IS USED DURING S0-024-007 AND SO-149-002.
SO-149-002 WAS COMPLETED SAT ON 7/15/88.
TECH EVALUATION DETERMINED THERE WAS NO EFFECT ON SE-124" 107.
'LOSED RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED DURING SYS INITATION PRESSURE TRANSIENTS AT PS-831-1NO IBA IS h SUSPECTED CAUSE
,REF PMR 89 9059 d 60.
ESF INSTTTTT REF MASTER BOOR 1-89-007, PLAS 323.
CLOSED RHR FOOB VALVE ISOLATED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING, C
PUMP TRIPPEO OPS WALKED DOWN THE SYS WITH NO APPARENT DAMAGE FOUND.
ENS.
OP-149-002 REVISED TO INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED IN REVIEW OF FILL AND VENT PROCEDURES.
PMR 89 9059 INSTALLED: ESF.
CLOSED INDICATION FOR RHR CHECK VALVE F0508 FAILED DURING S0-149-014.
EQUALIZING VALVE F1228 DID NOT. OPEN. '8'OOP OF RHR WAS DECLARED INOP.
WA S90048 REBUILT THE VALVE AIR CYLINDER. Wh S90050 REPLACED LIMIT SWI TCH ARLl CLOSED RX LEAKAGE HIGH PRESSURE MONITOR FAILED SI-149-210 CRITERIA WA S96106 REPLACED AN BROKEN TERMINAL SCREW IN PSH-E11-1N022A.
CANCELLED RHR PERMISSIVE PS-831-1N0188 FAILED TESTING PER SI-149-204.
INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE SWITCH DIAPHRAM HAD FAILED AND WAS REPLACED PER WA 596278.
CLOSED WHILE PLACING RHR IN SHUTDOWN COOLING THE 1F007A VALVE OPENED'IN FLOW VALVE TO THE SUPPRESSION POOl,,
WHICH CAUSED RX LEVEL TT7 DROP 5
INCHES.
REF MASTER SOOR I-89-007.
INSTllll CLOS/0 PRESSIOM POOL SPRAY SPARGERS WERE PRESSURIZED BREIFLY LOWING"VALVE MAM1PULATIONS FOR LLRT.
CONDITION
'WAS A'f4EAR MISS IN THAT WORKER WERE PREVIOUSLY IN AREAI">"I LO)EDl RHR INBOARD SAMPLE VALVE Ell-F079A ~
FAILED CLOSED h> BLOWN FUSE 1TAS'OUND IN 1C622, FUSE. 821-F 19.
ESF.
ENS.
FATIGUE -Of'-')lll g}lPE"IS THE APPARENT CAUSE.
RHR ~ HV151F0158 WAS FOUND OUT. OF POSITION DURING LLRT, SE-159-032 OPS. WAS 'SIC/ED Ofl; IN ~ ITS DESIGNATED POSITION.
CL)SEb;I I I"l~ 0'
~
PSV 151-F097 DEVELOPED A LEAK DURING RHR HYDRO, SE-149-311.
INVESTIGATION FOIIMD' GAG ON PSV 1151-F0558.
REF NCR 89-0224 WHICH ADDRESSES TH% POTENTIAL FOR OVER PRESSURIZATION OF HB8-120.
CLOSED PRESSURE BOUNDRY VALVE WAS STROKED DURING RHR '8'YDRO TEST, SE-149 311.
HV151F1048 WAS STROKED BY OPS FOR POST MOD TESTING.
THE DETERMINED CAUSE WAS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH STATUS CONTROL OF
PMI S:
49 10/02/95 SUSQU Na SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR P
M I 5
~
~
PAGE 8
SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 89-151 49 89-157 49 89-170 49A 89-183 49 89-182 49 89-188 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 89-195 49 89-261 49 1-89-362 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-021 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-075 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
4/28/89 4/29/89 6/09/89 5/14/89 6/16/89 5/ 15/89 5/21/89 7/21/89 12/04/89 2/02/90 3/08/90 THE AFFECTED RHR HYDRO VALVES. AD-QA-480 WAS REVISED CLOSED RHR HV161F0158 MOTOR TERMINATION IS NOT ENVIRONMENTALY QUALIFIED REF NCR 89-0293 FOR CORRECTIVE MEASURES.
THE CONDITION WAS DETERMINED TO NOT BE REPORTABLE.
CLOSED LEAD SHIELDING ON THE RHR 508 VALVE WAS NOT REMOVED AS REQUIRED PRIOR TO REFILLING THE SYSTEM FOR SE-149-202.
EWR ME-9095 WAS ISSUED TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT ON THE PIPING.
A PIPING SHEILDING DATA SHEET HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY MAINT P&S.
EWR M90529 DETERMINED THAT NO OVERLOADING OF THE PIPING OR SUPPORTS OCCURRED.
AD-QA-546 REV 2 PROVIDES CONTROL OF LEAD LEAD SHEILDING.
CLOSED INDICATION ON 1C692 WAS REVERSED FOR XV-15109A 6 8 CONDITION WAS NOTED DURING SI-199-211 ON 4-28-89.
WA 596728 CORRECTED THE WIRING.
CLOSED
'O'HR PUMP PI,-E11-1R002C WAS FOUND INDICATION A VACUUM WITH THE PUMP OUT OF SERVICE.
WA 596789 REGAL'ED THE INSTRUMENT.
THE AS FOUND CONDITION WAS IN THE CONSERVATIVE DIRECTION, NOT AFFECTING SURV REQUIREMNETS.
CLOSED RHR HV-151-F0248 DID NOT CLOSE ON LPCI MANUAL INITIATION DURING SE-149-002, DUE TO CONTACTS ON THE K688 RELAY NOT MAKING UP.
WA'S 590741,
- 590470, 6 593981 ISSUED TO MAKE REPAIRS.
CLOSED INCORRECT DIVISION DESIGNATED ON ERF 90754 FOR WA 593938 THE PLANNER AND SCHEDULER WERE COUNSELED AND REVIEWED THE SOOR.
UNIT COORDINATION AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT STAFF ALSO REVIEWED THE SOOR RE:
REVIEW OF ERF'S.
CLOSED JUMPER SHORTED ACROSS A TERMINAL ON RELAY K89 DURING SE-159-200 RESULTED IN AN ESF ACTUATION WHEN POWER WAS LOST TO THE K29 RELAY CAUSING THE RHR 1F009 VALVE TO ISOLATE AND THE 'A'UMP TO TRIP.
BANANA JACKS WERE INSTALLED ON TERMINATIONS USED IN SE-159-200.
CLOSED CONDUCTIVITY RECORDER CR 12351 FOR RHR HAD A MISSING COMPONENT.
THE CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING ROUTINE MAINT. THE COMPONENTS WERE INSTALLED AND THE INSTRUMENT WAS TESTED SAT.
A REVIEW BY CHEM REVEALED THAT NO TECH SPEC LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED.
CLSOED RHR MANUAL INJECTION VALVE 151-F060A HAD DUAL INDICATION.
WA ISSUED TO REPAIR.
CLOSED RHR SUCTION RELIEF VALVES LIFTED WHILE ALIGNING FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING PER OP-149-002.
THE RESULTING SPILL CONTAMINATED THE
'A'HR ROOM.
A TP IS BEING DEVELOPED TO MONITOR SYS PARAMETERS DURING FILL AND VENT OPERATIONS TO ID WHEN THE LIFT OCCURS.
REF PMR 90-9081 AND 90-9082 WHICH WILL REPLACE TYPE OF PSV.
REF MASTER SOOR 1-90-259.
CLOSED
'A'HR SYSTEM FLOW FT-E11-1N015A WAS FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING A CAL CHECK AND WAS REGAL'ED WITHIN FINAL TOLERANCE.
CLOSED
PMIS: E 49 10/02/95 SUSQUE NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 9
SYS SOOR N
49 1-90 152 OTHER AFFECTED SYS1 49 1-90-259 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-267 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-269 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-279 OTHER AFFECTED SYSQ 49 1-90-31 1
OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90 324 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-341 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-90-366 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
54 49 1-90-245 OCCUR DATE 6/07/90 9/06/90 9/13/90 9/16/90 9/17/90 9/21/90 10/14/90 10/21/90 10/31/90 11/09/90 DESCRIPTION UNIT 1
SHUTDOWN DUE TO POTENTIAL FAILURE OF RHR MOTOR COOLERS.
THIS SOOR WILL DOCUMENT THE U-1 SHUTDOWN, ACTION ITEMS AND SHUTDOWN REPORT.
THE DIRECT CAUSE OF THE RHR PUMP MOTOR COOLING PROBLEM AND LER SUBMITTAL WILL PER PERSUED VIA SOOR 2-90-076 WHICH IDENTIFIES A COOLER FAILURE ON UNIT 2.
REF SHUTDOWN REPORT 1-90 02, PLIS 36009.
CLOSED HANGER HBB-1104-H15 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A LOOSE BOLT DURING ISI OF THE RHR SYSTEM.
THE HANGER IS ON THE SUCTION PIPING FOR THE
'D'HR PUMP.
WA S04927 MADE CORRECTIONS.
REF NCR 90-0194 CLOSED
'O'HR PUMP SUCTION RELIEF VALVE, PSV-151-F030C.
LIFTED AND REMAINED OPEN WHILE PLACING THE 'A'OOP OF RHR INTO SHUTDOWN COOLING.
UNIT 2 COMPLETE.
RHR PSV 151F030A,B,C6D REPLACED PER WA 513428 6 513429.
CLOSED SNUBBER SPGBB 114H2001 REMOVAL WAS SCOPED IN INCORRECT DIVISION.
THE SNUBBER WAS ACTUALLY IN DIV Ii RATHER THAN DIV I AS INDICATED ON.ERF A93209.
WA.Y90358 WAS CORRECTED.
REMAINING WORK DOCUMENTS WERE REVIEWED. EACH SNUBBER CLASSIF,ICATION WILL BE REVIEWED.
CLOSED SNUBBER GBB-107-H1A MOTION INHIBITED BY AN INSULATION BLANKET.
REF NCR 90-0213 WHICH WILL TRACK CORRECTIVE MEASURES.
CLOSED DIV 2 SNUBBER REMOVED FOR TESTING WHEN DIV WAS REQUIRED=.OPERABLE SEIS DATA WAS FOUND TO BE INCORRECT.
THE SNUBBER WAS REPLACED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE SPARE.
SNUBBER CLASSIFICATIONS WILL BE REVIEWED AND VALIDATED.
MAINT COMPLETED h REVIEW OF SNUBBER DATA IN SEIS FOR ACCURACY.
CLOSED RHR FLOW VERIFICATION FAILEO '50-149-002 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THE INSTRUMENT SENSING LINE HAD NOT BEEN BACKFILLED FOLLOWING OUTAGE WORK.
WA 507687 CORRECTED.
OPS TO REVISE PROCEDURES WHICH CONTAIN FILL AND VENT SECTIONS TO NOTIFY 16C TO FILL INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES.
CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP SUCTION RELIEF PSV-151-F030A LIFTED.
WA 505278 DISASSEMBLED THE VALVE AND PERFORMED INSPECTION.
NO COMPONENT DEFICIENCIES WERE NOTED. THEREFORE'HE LIFTING OF THE PSV IS ATTRIBUTED TO OVER PRESSURIZATION OF THE SYSTEMS CLOSED
'8'OOP OF RHR KEEPFILL VALVE 151-'F0928 WAS FOUND CLOSED VS:
OPEN.
INVESTIGATION COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW THE VALVE BECAME CLOSED.
OPS PERSONNEL WILL HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT DURING HOT BOX TRAINING 90-66.
CLOSED I
PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN STROKE TESTING RHR FOSOA/8 CHECK VALVE, DUAL INDICATION WAS OBSERVED WHEN STROKE WAS ATTEMPTED.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS AIR TRAPPED UNDER THE CHECK VALVE DISC-CLOSED 3
PMI5: E 49 10/02/95 SUSQUEHANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 10 SYS BOOR N
49 1-90-372 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-91 087 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-91-090 OTHER AFFECTED SY~
49 1 91-091 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1
91 148 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-91-170 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1 188 OCCUR DATE 1 1/13/90 4/16/91 4/17/91 4/18/91 6/17/91 7/12/91 8/01/91 DESCRIPTION ERF WAS NOT ISSUED TO PERFORM WORK ON 'A'HR HV-151-F003A CAUSE WAS THE ASSIST FOREMAN NOT KNOWING THE VALVE WAS A 'STROKE TIME'ALVE. OPS WAS NOTIFIED OF THE CONDITION AND SO 149-005 WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE STROKE TIME WAS ACCEPTABLE.
MNT TRAINED PERSONNEL RE AD-QA-423 REQUIREMENTS AND UPDATED SEIS TO REFLECT-FUNCTIONAL TESTING AND TECH SPEC REQ'MNT CLOSED RHR FS"E11 1N0218 CONTACTS HAD HIGH RESISTANCE VALUE WHEN TESTED DURING SURV.
THE CONTACTS WERE REPLACED VIA WA P04886 AND REGAL'ED.
REF BOOR 1-91-090 CLOSED RHR FS-E11-1N021A SWITCH CONTACTS HAO HI RESISTANCE DURING CALi THE SWITCH CONTACTS WERE REPLACED AND CAL'ED PER PM P04885.
REF BOOR 1-91-087
,CLOSED
'A'HR LOOPFAILED ITS QUARTERLY FLOW CRITERIA PER S0-149-002 DUE TO PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE NOT CLOSING.
THE VALVE WAS MANUALLY CLOSED AND A RETEST WAS SAT.
CLOSED ALARM 74 RELAY FAILED FOR RHR HV-151-F049 RESULTING IN ALARM
,BURNED OUT RELAY COIL REPLACED.
CLOSED
'O'HR PUMP MOTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTION FOUND DISCONNECTED.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS PERSONNEL ERROR IN NOT PROPERLY TIGHTENING A STATES LINK IN 1A20402.
REF.,
WA 510696.
CLOSED RX PRESSURE DROPPED BELOW RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING PERMISSIVE WITHOUT ONE LOOP IN OPERATION.
THE UNIT WAS BROUGHT TO A STABLE DEPRESSURIZED CONDITION UNTIL RWCU COULD BE RESTORED'EF PLAS 502.
TSAT WAS INCORP'ED INTO SO-100/200-011 REV 7.
THE USE OF TSAT WAS APPROVED WITH NRC CLOSURE OF 387/89-01-02 IN INSPECTION REPORT 387/91-18.
CLOSED 2
OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1
91 206 8/15/91 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
~ 4 AP lgjl4fl I idvvA1 ty tggr rl ).8/
1 RHR 'A'OOP PRESSURIZED GREATER THAN KEEPFILL PRESSURE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.
LEAKAGE INTO RHR IS LESS THAN 1
GPM.
MONITORING OF THE PRESSURIZATION RATE HAS BEEN EXTABLISHED VIA
.. - PCAF TO. OP.-149-001 AND THE LOGGING IN THE PCO LOG BOOK ~
PENETRATION 'TESTING DURING.6RIO DETERMINED NO SYSDEGREDATION EXISTS.--
CLOSED 49 1-91-291 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-92-088 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-92 099 1 1/08/91 3/07/92 3/ 16/92 HV-151-F0288 WOULD NOT STROKE ELECTRICALLY FROM CONTROL ROOM DETERMINED CAUSE WAS LACK OF LUBRICATION ON THE VALVE STEM WHICH WAS CORRECTED.
FURTHER TESTING PERFORMED PER WA S00598.
CLOSED RHR PSV-151-F030A LIFTED WHEN S/D COOLING HV-151-,F008 OPENED.
SYS ENG CONCLUDED THAT LONERGAN RELIEF VALVES'ARE UNRELIABLE AND HAS ISSUED RIE 90-272 TO REPLACE THEM WITH ANDERSON-GREENWOOD VALVES PER WA 513428 AND 513429.
REF SOOR 1-90-259 WHICH WILL TRACK VALVE REPLACEMENT.
CLOSED SPILL, 80 SQ.FT, OCCURRED IN.RHR ROOM DURING RHR DRAIN PROCESS.
BEF ACR 92-016.
DE'1ERMINED CAUSE WAS LACK OF ATTENTION TO DETAIL 2
PMIS.
49 10/02/95 SUSQU ANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N
P M I S
SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1 92-107 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
61.
49 1-92" 134 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-92-139 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1 148 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1 165 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-92-268 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1-92-302 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 1 92 311 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49A 1-92-336 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
3/20/92 4/03/92 4/03/92 4/ 10/92 4/23/92 7/21/92 8/24/92 9/ 1 2/9'2 10/13/92 AND A NON QUESTIONING ATTITUDE. INVOLVED OPS PERSONNEL WERE COUNSELED ON THE EVENT.
CLOSED BKR 18216114, 18226062 8
18216053 ARE NOT EQ
~
REF NCR 92-049.
ERF'S AND WA WRITTEN.
THE BREAKERS WERE REPLACED.
EQAR-023 AND EQDF-48 IS BEING REVISE TO SPECIFY THE REQUIRED SUPPLIER OF WESTINGHOUSE MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
CLOSED RHR F009 CLOSED ON SPURIOUS SIGNAL WHILE FILLING SYSTEM.
THE. ACTUATING PRESSURE SWITCHES WERE ISOLATED AND THE VALVE RECLOSED.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THE PROCEDURE STEPS WERE PERFORMED OUT OF SEQUENCE NOT STEP BY STEPS TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED RE:
REQ OF NDAP-QA-400, PCAF'S ISSUED TO ASSOCIATED SE'S ADDING A CAUTION STATEMENT.
CLOSED PERMIT 1-92-2004 DIDN'7 PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR WA 513999-THE WORK SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED ON PERMIT 1 92-2882.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS LACK OF ATTENTION TO DETAIL..ALL E*S PERSONNEL WILL REVIEW THE EVENT.
~
MAINT REVIEWED THIS EVENT WITH E65 PERSONNEL.
CLOSED RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION RELEIF VLV PSV-151-F029 LIFTED WHEN KEEPF ILL WAS OPENED TO THE RHR SYSTEM FOR FILLING.
WA 523703 INVESTIGATED AND DETERMINED THE PSV AS FOUND LIFT PRESSURE TO BE LOWER THAN REQUIRED SETPOINT.
CLOSED RX COOLANT SAMPLES WERE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF ACTUAL COOLANT AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC'5 DURING THE PERIOD OF 4/20 THRU 4/23.
THE SAMPLE WAS TAKEN FROM STAGNENT WATER IN THE HEAT EXCHANGER DUE TO BYPASS BEING OPEN.
CHEM REVISEO SC-176/276-101 AND 106 TO ENSURE RHR HX IN SERVICE PRIOR TO OBTAINING SAMPLE.
CLOSED RHR PUMP PI-E11-1R002C FOUND OUT'F TOLERANCE.
THE INDICATOR WAS CALIBRATED AND FINAL DATA WAS WITHIN FINAL TOLERANCE.
CLOSED USER CONTROLLED PROCEDURE ISSUED WITH A NON-EFFECTIVE PCAF, 50-149-005 WITH PCAF 1-92-0237 WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DELETED BY PCAF 1-92-0254.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS PERSONNEL ERROR BY THE CLERK ISSUING THE PROCEDURE.
HAND WRITTEN NOTE WAS USED INSTEAD OF A COMPUTER. GENERATED TRANSMITTAL. THE PROCEDURE MASTER FILE HAS BEEN INCLUDED INTO SPMS AS A DISTRIBUTION LOCATION. INVOLVED PERSONNEL WERE INSTRUCTEO ON PROPER PROCESS.
CLOSED PSH-Et 1-1N018 FOUND ISOLATED DURING PERFORMANCE OF SI-149-209.
INVESTIGATION BY A STATUS CONTROL TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE A CAUSE.
CLOSED RHR SYS LEAKAGE PSH-Ett-1N0228 HOUSING SEAL FOUND DAMAGED DURING SI"149-210.
WA 527483 ISSUED TO REPLACE THE SWITCH, CLOSED
PMIS:EVR49 10/02/95 SUSQUEHANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 0/1 SORTED BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE 5 SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 12 SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 93-338 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
51 49 93-341 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 93-377 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-034 OTHER AFFECTED SYQ,:
49 6, 94 035 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-059 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-180 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
80 49 94-580 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
10/17/93 10/25/93 1 1/13/93 1/1 1/94 1/1 1/94 1/18/94 3/16/94 11/29/94 CHAIN HOIST WAS FOUND HANGING FROM A CONDUIT UNISTRUT SUPPORT IN THE 705'QUIPMENT SPACE.
INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THE HOIST WAS PLACE THERE BY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL.
THE CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR WAS GIVEN A=- DETAILED REVIEW OF STATION RIGGING PRACTICES.
A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE SUPPORT BY ISI PERSONNEL DID NOT REVEAL ANY DAMAGE.
EWR M30719 DOCUMENTS THE EVALUATION.
CLOSED RHR SDC SAMPLE VLV FOBOA AUTO CLOSED DURING MT-159-004.
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TEST DIRECTOR AND THE UNIT SUPV FAILED TO INITIATE ACTION TO CLOSE THE VALVE PRIOR TO TEST COMMENCEMENT. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE COMMUNICATION. MT-159-004 WAS REVISED.
CLOSED RHR DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE, 1F031A
~
DID NOT SEAT WHICH PREVENTED THE 'A'OOP OF RHR FROM MAINTAININGADEQUATE KEEP-FILL PRESSURE.
INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE VALVE DISK HAN AN INTERFERENCE WITH A 'CASTING BUMP'N THE VALVE BODY.
DCP 93-3093A '6 8 AND 93-3092A 5 8 ARE PLANNED.
REF EWR M30762 AND DCN 93-1658 RE:
ADDITION OF A SPACER ON THE DISK SHAFT.
CLOSED RHR SD COOLING SUCTION LINE INOP DUE TO F008 VLV PACKING LEAK.
THE PACKING ON HV-151-F008 WAS RETORQUEO.
.CLOSED RHR HV-151-F0248 WOULD NOT FULLY CLOSE DURING TP" 149-054.
THE VALVE WAS REBUILT AND TESTED PRIOR TO STARTUP-SEVERE WEAR OF THE ANT.I-ROTATION GUIDE RIB IS THE PROBABLE CAUSE
'AINT TECHNOLOGY WILL PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING A REVIEW REF MEMO VLV-622.RE:
LOAD SENSITIVE BEHAVIOR OF MOV'S.
CI.OSED HV 151F017A MODIFIED VIA DCP 93-9068A ACTUATOR SWITCHES NOT SET UP AFTER THE MOD WAS PERFORMED.
WHEN VOTES TESTED THE VALVE MOTORED ONTO THE BACKSEAT. DETERMINED CAUSE WAS OMMISION OF A PROCEDURE STEP BY THE WORK CREW.
THE FOREMAN AND WORK CREW WERE COUNSELED ON THE EVENT.
NON ROUTINE TRAINING IS PLANNED.
MAINT/EAS ELECTRICIANS WHO ARE MOV QUALIFIEDREVIEWED THE EVENT.
CLOSED
'8'OOP OF LPCI INOP, PIS-821-1N021D OUT OF TOLERANCE.
CONDITION FOUND DURING SI-180-301.
THE SWITCH WAS CALIBRATED TO WITHIN TOLERANCE PER THE SURV AND THE LCO WAS CLEARED.
CLOSED
'8'HR PP SUCTION VLV THERMAL OVERLOAD JUMPER LOOSE.
18226013.
THE F0048 VALVE WAS CLOSED'HE JUMPER CORRECTED'ND THE VALVE WAS RE-OPENED.
CLOSED TOTAL:
119
PM I5:
49 10/02/95 SUSQU ANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTEO BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 8 SOOR
)1 P
M I S
PAGE 13 SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 2-84-039 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
54 49 2-84 040 49 2-84-075 49 2-84-097 49 2 84-098 3/28/84 3/28/84 5/04/84 6/21/84 5/21/84 ESW VLV NOT FULLY OPEN; CAUSING HI BEARING TEMP ON RHR PUMP A.
THROTTLE VLV TO 'A'OTOR COOLER WAS IN INTERMEDIATE POSITION, OP-54 001-5 INDICATED VLV LOCKED OPEN.
GULF OIL ANALYSIS STATES LOWER BEARING OIL IS SAT ~
UPPER BEARING OIL HAS HIGH VISCOSITY.
CLOSED RHR 'A 6 O'ECLARED INOP.
SURV.
DETERMINATED TO BE INCORRECT.
SRI TEST RESULTS CONTRIDICTED THE SURVEILLENCE DATA. ALSO, AIR WAS DISCOVERED IN BOTH INSTRUMENT LOOPS.
WA-V46538 RECALIBRATED THE FLOW INDICATORS FOR BOTH LOOPS.
CLOSED RHR O.O.S.
FOR MORE THAN 2 HOURS'OTH LOOPS.
'8'AS REMOVED FOR A PIPING VIBRATION TEST.
IBC WAS PERFORMING A SURVEILLANCE ON F008 6 F009 AND CHEh1 WAS PERFORMING A LOOP
'A'LUSH.
CLOSED PRI CONT ISO 6 CK VALVES DUAL INDICATION WHEN CLOSURE ATTEMPTED.
SV251228 (TESTABLE CHECK VALVE F 1228)
SV251508 (TESTABLE CHECK VALVE F0508 ACTUATOR)
REF1 SOOR'S 2 84 098>> 101'07 8
114-
++CLOSED*+
'8'PCI INJECTION VLV CLOSED TO COMPLY WITH T.S. 3.5. 1.83.
49 2 101 49 2 84 107 49 2 1 14 49 2-84-216 OTHER AFFECTEOQYS:
83 49 2-84-251 49 2-84-283 49 2-84-313 5/21/84 5/24/84 5/28/84 8/09/84 9/19/84 10/16/84 11/03/84 REF 1
SOOR 2-84-097
<iCLOSEDi+
2F0158 INJECTION VALVE LEAKING, DUAL INDICATION DISPLAYED.
THE VALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED, REPAIREO AND RETURNED TO SERVICE.
REF:
BOOR 2-84-097 CLOSED LEAKAGE h(EASUREMENT OF RHR LOOP '8'SO VLVS EXCEEDED LIMITS.
RHR VALVE HV-2F0158 WAS DISASSEMBLED AND REBUILT.
LLRT AND A HYDRO WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE.
REF:
SOOR 2 84 097.
CLOSED RX SHUTDOWN TO COMPLY WITH'.S.
THE N 1 TBV HUNG OPEN.
WHEN THE VALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED A CHIPPING HAMMER WAS FOUND IN THE VALVE.
REF1 SOOR'S 2-84--097 8 107.
NQA REVIEW REQ.
DELETED PER OPS - 5 R.B.
~ CLOSED SURV SI-249-203 WAS COMPLETED ONE DAY PAST VIOLATION DATE.
PERSONNEL ERROR WAS CAUSE
~
16C HAS CHANGED ROUTING OF COMPLETED SURVEILLANCES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
CLOSED RHR "D" PUMP FAILED TO START ON MANUAL ACTUATION, DUE TO 52LS CONTACTS N~FUHCTIONING PROPERLY.
WA V41160 REPLACED RELAY AND RESTORED SYSTEM.
CLOSED
'A'HR LOOP DECLARED INOP WHEN ISI CRITERIA FAILEO.
INSTRUMENTS HAVE GREATER CAL TOLERANCE ~THEN ISI CRITERIA SURV.
PROCEDURE AD-QA-423 WAS REVISED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
CLOSED SNUBBER DCA-210-H11 ON '8'OOP OF RHR IS SUSPECT, PER RESULTS OF ST 17.7 PER TER 90.
WA V43859 REPLACED SNUBBER.
NCR 85-0130 VERIFIED PROPER OPERATION PER WA V63915 DURING FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE.
CLOSED
PMI5:
49 10/02/95 SUSQU NA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE d SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 14 SYS BOOR 'N OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 2 84-334 49 2-85-032 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
12/10/84 1/29/85 IMPROPER FUSE POSITION LABELING IN TB 0631 PANEL.
WA-V41612 ISSUED FOR FUSE LABELING.
AD-QA-324'/BE ISSUED T/PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PLT LABELING PROG.
BOOR 2-84-31 1 IS SIMILAR.
CLOSED
, RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION ISOLATION VLV 2F008 DID NOT ISOLATE (OUTBOARD).
INBOARD VALVE 2F009 ISOLATED AT 74 PSIG RX PRESSURE.
PS-831-N018A (BARTON 288A)
WAS RE"CAL'D PER WA-V50092 d V56224
~
RFM'S WRITTEN 1/30/86.
THE ISOLATION WAS AN ESF ACTUATION.
PMR 86-7026 ALSO PROVIDES CORRECTIVE MEASURES FOR BOOR 1-84-483.
CLOSED 49 2-85-061 3/13/85 RHR ROOM COOLER VLV 211-127A WAS PERMIT TAGGED OPEN VICE CLOSED THIS VLV HAS LEFTHAND THREADS WHICH CONTRIBUTED.TO THE ERRORS EWR PE-1622 WRITTEN TO ID ALL VLVS. OF THIS TYPE.
OPS LABELED THOSE VALVES WHICH WERE READILY KNOWN TO BE REVERSE ACTING.
TECH COMPLETED A REVIEW OF PLANT VALVES TO ID ANY REMAINING ONES REQUIRING LABELS.
PMR 87-9048 ISSUED BY NPE 1/26/88.
LABELING COMPLETED PER LRF 87-177-239 d 88-277-017.
WA V83845 RELOCATED HANDWHEEL 180 DEG. / CLOSED 49 2-85-121 49 2 123 49 2-85;287 49H 2-86-023 49 2-86-079 49 2-86-092 49 2-86-1 13 49 2-86-120 49.
2 86-129 4/27/86 4/27/85 12/20/85 1/31/86 6/ 18/86 6/ 18/86 8/06/86 8/17/86 8/24/86 WATER HAMMER OCCURRED'LACING RHR '8'OOP IN SHUTDOWN COOLING APPARENT CAUSE WAS PIPING BEING FILLED WHEN BYPASS VLV. WAS OPENED.
REF.
MASTER SOOR 2-85-123.
CLOSED.
SHUTDOWN COOLING VLVS ISOLATED AFTER RHR 'O'UMP WAS STARTED.
APPARENT CAUSE WAS STEAM POC'KETS IN PIPING WHICH COLLAPSED AND CAUSES EXCESSIVE FLOW SIGNAL. MASTER BOOR FOR 2-85 121.
EVENT HAS NOT RE-OCCURRED AS OF 10/6/86.
REF EWR IREIR 101171 THE ISOLATION CONSTITUTED AN ESF ACTUATION.
CLOSED
- RHR, SHUTDOWN COOLING PRESSURE PERMISSIVES FOUND OUT OF TOL.
DURING SI-249-304.
~ P IS-831-2N018A
~ PS-831-2ND(88, DUE TO SETPOINT DRIFT AND WERE RE-CAL'ED PER SA A54425.
CLOSED RHR/DRYWELL SPRAY FT-251208 WAS FOUND OUT OF TOL.
DURING PM WA P60122
.AND WAS RE CAL'ED'ER IC-DC-100, REV. 5.
OPS REVIEW HAS,DETERMINED THAT SURV.
RESULTS WERE NOT AFFECTED SINCE THIS INSTRUMENT IS NOT USED IN ANY "SO'5".
CLOSED CONSEQUENCES OF ERF'S INOP'ED 8 CS, 8 LPCI d SGTS.
REF.
ERF A51508,
- A53440, A53968 d A54445.
THE REQUIRED ECCS SYSTEM EQUIPMENT WAS RESTORED TO OPERABLE STATUS d LCO'S WERE CLEARED. PNSS/OPS/IdC ADDRESSED.
WA V66623 ERF PREP FAILED TO NOTE RHR ISOLATION SWITCH.
CLOSED RHR INITIATION PERMISSIVE PS-831-2N0188 FOUND OUT OF TOL.
DURING SI-249"304, WHICH WAS THEN RE-CAL'ED ~
CALIBRATION DRIFT WAS THE DETERMINED CAUSE.
CLOSED
'8'OOP OF RHR INOP DUE TO FAILURE OF ISI TESTING.
VENDOR WELD NGBB-204-4-2-C IS SUSPECT.
NCR 86-0424 DETERMINED CAUSE TO BE MANUFACTURING DISCONTINUITIES, WA V64274 CORRECTED NRPDS COMPLETE.
CLOSED SPILL OF APPROX 30 GAL.
OF WATER DURING LLRT OF RHR THRU DISASSEMBLED HV-251-F017A.
NO PERSONNEL WERE CONTAMINATED OR INJURED.
SUPT.
MEMO PROVIDES GUIDELINES FOR LLRT DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE U2 FRO.
(PLIS 23922)
CLOSED CONTAMINATED'OIL DRIPPED FROM RHR VLV 558 WHILE BEING MOVED
PMIS.
49 10/02/95 SUSQU NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT. 2 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR N
P M I 5 PAGE 15 SYS BOOR N
OCCUR DATE I'ESCRIPTION 49 2-86-132 49 2 136 49 2 139 49 2-86-147 49 2 153 49 2-86" 169 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
34 49 2 17 1
49 2-86-239 49 2 181 49 2-86-207 8/25/86 9/05/86 9/07/86 9/18/86 9/25/86 10/08/86 10/12/86 10/13/86 10/24/86 1 1/20/86 FROM RX BLDG 683'O THE DECON SHOP.
13 INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION REPORTS WERE WRITTEN AS A RESULT.
A TRANSFER CART SUITED FOR VAI,VES HAS BEEN FABRICATEO.
CLOSED SPILL OF APPROX 100 GAL CONTAMINATED WATER DURING WORK ON RHR PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW ORIFICE REPLACEMENT.
ONE PERSON WAS CONTAMINATED AND WAS DECONNED ~
AS WAS THE WORK AREA. ORIGIN OF THE WATER COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.
CLOSED RADIOGRAPHY OF RHR 178 VALVE CAUSED VENDOR TO RECEIVE 170 MR WHOLE BODY EXPOSURE.
CAUSED BY A FAULTY CAMERA MECHANISM COMBINED WITH A NON-FUNCTIONING SURVEY METER, (OWNED BY U.S.
TESTiNG). HP-HI-048 ISSUED TO ASSIST IN PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE CLOSED RHR 'D'UMP SEAL WATER COOLER SPOOL PIECE MISSING A REVIEW OF WORK DOCUMENTS COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW SPOOL WAS REMOVED.
SYSTEM WAS RESTORED.
MAINT SUPERVISORS REVIEWED EVENT, REF PLIS 2495 1.
CLOSED RHR LPCI PUMP PRESSURE HI
~
PS-E11-2N020A FOUND OUT OF TOL DURING SI-249-303, CAUSED BY SETPOINT, DRIFT, AND WERE RE-CAL'ED REF SA A63204 CLOSED HPCI STEAM SUPPLY PIPING BECAME PRESSURIZED DURING RHR TESTING RHR VALVES 2F051A 6 52A WERE VERIFIEO IN THE CLOSED POSITION BUT ARE SUSPECTED OF LEAKING.
REF:
PMR 86 7033 6 34 CLOSED SWITCH GEAR ROOM COOLING INOP CAUSING ALL ECCS TO BE INOP
'A'
'8'X UNIT OUT OF SERVICE FAN 2V2228 WOULD NOT START.
ELEC MAINT INVESTIGATED PER WA V61096 ~
-WHEN DX UNIT WAS RESET A CONTROL ROOM PANEL, THE '8'AN STARTED. SI-251-401 AND SI 280 403 REVISED TO ALERT SHIFT SUPERVISION OF OX AUTO START LOGIC.
CLOSED RHR 2F008 VALVE CLOSED WHEN SWAPPING SHUTDOWN COOLING PUMPS.
(MASTER SOOR FOR 1-84-138)
A PARTIAL SYS DRAIN DOWN OCCURRED RESULTING IN A WATER HAMMER UPON RESTART.
THE ISOLATION CONSTITUTED AN ESF ACTUATION. OPS PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT.
CLOSED RHR HV-251-F015A REWORKED W/0 STROKE TIME TESTING PERFORMED.
WA V64549 6 WA V63141.
AD-QA-302 REVISED BY OPS.
TO USE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES TO INSURE APPLICABLE VALVES ARE TESTED FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE. OPS HOT BOX TRAINING 87-07 REVIEWED THE EVENT.
PCAF 1-87-0584 ISSUED TO AD-QA-502 TO PROVIDE CONTROLS FOR REPACKEO VALVES.
CLOSED RHR PIPING HANGER DAMAGED FROM WATERHAMMER WHICH OCCURRED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO SEAT A CHECK VALVE.
OPS TO REVIEW EVENT AND CONTACT TECH PRIOR TO ATTEMPTING A SIMILAR ACTION OF SEATING VALVES. PCAF'S INITIATED FOR GO-100/200-002.
REF NSAG REPORT 1 87.
OPERATOR TRAINING ON WATERHAMMER, SC038 HAS BEEN DEVELOPED.
CLOSED
'8'HR PMP FAILED TO iSTART WHILE ALIGNING '8'OOP RHR IN SUPP POOL COOLING NIUVI= FDR UPCOMING RCIC RUN.
4KV BKR WAS NOT RACKED COMPLETELY INTO PLACE.
WA V61285 INVESTIGATED. THE BKR WAS RACKED OUT THEN BACK IN. '8'HR PUMP THEN STARTED PROPERLY.
SAFTY RELATED 4KV BKR LOADS TO BE TESTED FOLLOWING BKR RACK IN" CLOSED
PMIS: E 49 10/02/95 SUSQUE NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE d SOOR N
P M I S
SYS SOOR N
49 2-87-036 49 2 87 045 49 2-87-092 49 2-87-107 49 2-87 161 OCCUR DATE 3/08/87 DESCRIPTION 12/17/87 RHR FLOW Fi-25105 FAILED TO INDICATE DURING 50-200-001 CAUSED BY A LOOSE WIRE ON TERMINAL 14 OF SRU03, WA V76326 CORRECTED.
CLOSED 3/23/87
'8'HR PUMP FAILED TO START DURING 50-249"002, (2P20281 DUE TO OPEN BREAKER CONTACTS CAUSED BY STICKY OIL RESIDUE ON THE OPERATING LINKAGE. WA V70163 CORRECTED.
MT-GE-006 REVISED TO ELIMINATE LUBRICANTS.
CLOSED
~ q 6/21/87 RHR F024A WOULtI NOT ELECTRICALLY, OPEN FULLY DURING SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING LINEUP DUE TO FAILURE OF THE MOTOR PINION GEAR.
WA V70299 REPAIRED.
CLOSED
> a~ i. "~ <<~p~q eye g~~~~~ ;~ ~ ivi..
~-
~"
~ a" -.'".':,~ r V
.: <~..p.=<<qp, 7/13/87 RHR '8'ULL FLOW TEST VALVE 2F0248 INOPERATIVE CAUSED BY A LOOSE STEM ANTI-ROTATION DEVICE.WA V73632 CORRECTED.
A REVIEW WAS MADE OF NCR'S82-911 d 82-1071 WHICH HAD ID'D ADDITIONAL VALVES TO BE INSPECTED FOR THIS CONDITION d WA'S HAVE BEEN ISSUED.
NPE ISSUED EWR M79457 WHICH LISTS VALVES SUBJECT TO THIS PROBLEM.
PM'S HAVE BEEN GENERATED FOR ALL APPLICABLE VALVES CLOSED RHR HV2F0288 TRIPPED OVERLOADS ON TWO.ATTEMPTS TO OPEN TO PERFORM 50-249-002.
WA V70827 INVESTIGATED AND FOUND THE VALVE MOTOR TO BE INOPERABLE AND REPLACED IT,.
CLOSED-j~ g 4'~
= ~
49 2"88-036 49 2-88-069 49 2-88-079 49 2-88-086 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-88-096 49 2-88-097 49 2~88-098
~t I'/05/88 3/
1 9/88 3/29/88 4/08/88 4/19/88 4/19/88 4/19/88 AUTO CLOSURE OF THE RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVE F009 OCCURRED DURING OP-249-002.
Idc INVESTIGATION FOUND PDIS-E11-2N019A INOP AND RE-CAL'ED PER WA A80992.
CLOSED RHR MIN FLOW VALVE F007A CONTROL CIRCUIT DIDN'T OPERATE PROPERLY IN THAT IT OPENED IMMEDIATELY, RATHER THAN AFTER A TIME DELAY.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS FAULTY OPERATION OF RELAY E11-K84A WHICH WAS REPLACED PER WA V80280.
THIS IS MASTER BOOR FOR 2 144 WA V80363 INSPECTED RELAY E11-K84A WITH NO DRIFT NOTED.
CLOSED FUSE F 168 WAS FOUND INSTALLED IN 20612 WITH A RED TAG HANGING ON THE FUSE HOLDER.
FUSE WAS INSTALLED AND VERFIED ON 3-21-88 TO CLOSE PERMIT 2-88-720 WHILE ANOTHER PERMIT, 2-88 738 WAS STILL IN EFFECT WITH IT'S RED TAG HANGING ON THE FUSE HOLDER.
THE EVENT WAS REVIEWED DURING OPS SOA 88-05.
CLOSED WORKERS NOTICED THAT A JUMPER WAS DISCONNECTED IN PANEL 20617.
INVESTIGATE FOUND THAT THE JUMPER WAS INSTALLED FOR USE DURING A LLRT TEST.
IT COULD NOT BE DETERMINED IF THE JUMPER HAD BEEN
'BUMPED'FF BY THE WORKER OR IF IT WAS OFF PRIOR TO THEIR WORK.
ENG..
SUPPORT USE'S" WILL BE REVISED TO UTILIZE BANANA JACKS.
TECH REVIEWED ALL PENS SURV'S AND ISSUED WA'S TO INSTALL BANANA JACKS.
CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP DID NOT START AS EXPECTED DURING SE-249-001.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS IMPROPER LIMIT SWITCH SET-UP IN HV26 1F004A.
WA V80366 CORRECTED.
CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP UNEXPECTED START DURING SE-249-001.
THE TEST WAS STOPPED TO ADJUST VALVE LIMIT SWITCH FOR HV-251F004A.
THIS CAUSED INITIATION LOGIC TO SEAL IN AND WAS NOT RESET PRIOR TO RESTARTING THE TEST.
~ C/'
CLOSED RHR 2F024A VALVE PINION'ECAME DISCONNECTEDFROQ THE MOTOR SHAFT AND MECHANICAL DAMAGE RESULTED.
CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING PER-FORMANCE OF SE-249-001.
WA V83644 AND V80409 REPAIRED.
PMI S: E R49 10/02/95 SUSQUE ANNA SES BOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE & SOOR P
M I S
PAGE 17 SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 2 88 099 49 2-88-102 OTHER AFFECTED SYS1 49 2 107 49 2-88-109 49 2-88-112 49 2-88-125 49 2-88-144 49 2-88-156
~
49 2-88-201 49 2-88-216 49 2-89-023 49 2-89-031 4/20/88 4/22/88 4/22/88 4/25/88 4/27/88 5/16/88 6/11/88 6/21/88 8/
1 2/88 9/07/88 2/28/89 3/04/89 CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP INADVERTENT START DURING SE-251-001.
APPARENT CAUSE WAS DURING JUMPER INSTALLATION, WHEN TERMINATION CCC3-7 WAS CONTACTED, ENERGIZING RELAYS E118 AND K2018.
A GUIDELINE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR JUMPER INSTALLATION DURING TP'S AND SE'S.
CLOSED RHR SERVICE WATER '8'OOP RAD MONITOR LOST
- POWER, CALIBRATION VALUES WERE LOST.
CONDITION WAS FOUND AT THE START
-OF SC-216-104.
MONITOR IS POWERED BY 2Y219 CIRCUIT 28, ANY INTERUPTION WILL CAUSE THE SETPOINT VALUES TO BE LOST.
RHR WAS NOT IN SERVICE THEREFORE MONITORS WERE NOT REQUIRED.
POWER WAS RESTORED AND SETPOINTS WERE ENTERED.
CLOSED INCORRECT WIRE TERMINATION ON RHR LOGIC RELAY K958, SUSPECT PMR 87-9092A WHICH HAD BEEN WORKED DURING THE 2RFIO.
CWO C804 18 CORRECTED THE WIRING ERROR.
INVOLVED PERSONNEL REVIEWED THE EVENT.
CLOSED RHR 'A'ONDUCTIVITY RECORDER WAS DISABLED DUE TO BREAKER OUTAGE FOR CLEANING'X260. OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT WITH PERSONNEL DURING AGENDA 88-03.
CLOSED RHR RELAY E11A-K11A CONTACTS 3 6 4 DID NOT CLOSE DURING SURV SE-249-002, (RHR DIV 2 LSFT).
INVESTIGATION FOUND THE RELAY WAS ENERGIZED, HOWEVER CONTACTS 3 8 4 WOULD NOT MAKE-UP.
WA V80393 CLEANED= AND INSPECTED CONTACTS.
CLOSED REATOR PRESSURE PS-821-2N018 FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SURV SI-249-304 AND WAS RE CALIBRATED PER THE SURVEILLANCE.
THE CONDITION WAS CAUSED BY SETPOINT DRIFT.
PMR 86 7027 WILL REPLACE THE SWITCHES'LOSED RHR MIN FLOW F007A OPENED IMMEDIATELY DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING INITIATION. WA V80280 REPLACED SUSPECT RELAY E11-K84A.
WA V80363 WILL TEST.
WA V80558 INSTALLED.MONITORING EQUIPMENT PER TECH ENG REF:
MASTER SOOR 2-88-069 CLOSED 2D RHR PUMP WAS RUN 4 HOURS WITHOUT ESW COOLING WATER ALIGNED.
THE '8'SW PUMP WAS STARTED RATHER THAN THE 'A'R 'O'S REQUIRED BY OP-249-005.
RHR UPPER BEARINGS REACHED TEMPS IN EXCESS OF 200 F.
OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT DURING SOA 88 04.
CLOSED RHR PIS-831-2N018A SW 111 FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SURV SI-249-304 AND WAS RECALIBRATED PER THE SURVEILLANCE.
CLOSED SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PMR 87-9092A MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE REVIEW REF NCR 88-0610 WHICH CONCLUDED THAT UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS DO NOT EXIST.
REF PLI 57015 AND 54445.
CLOSED RHR MIN FLOW VALVE F007A OPENED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING INITIAT-ION.
REF SOOR 2-89-037 FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.
CLOSED TERMINATIONS E203062A-.8 8
WERE NOT PROPERLY LANDED IN 28216022 THE CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING INVESTIGATION FOR WA V90105.
THE TERMINATIONS WERE INCORRECT AS A RESULT OF PMR 87-30258.
THE MOD WAS CANCELLED AND AS A RESULT SCHEME CHECKS WERE NOT ISSUED.
WA V90105 CORRECTED THE CONDITION.
PMIS.
49 10/02/95 SUSQ NA SES BOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE d SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 18 SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2 89 037 49 2 128 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-89-139 49 2 165 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2 89 171 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
83G 76D 49 2 89-173 OTHER AFFECTED SYS 49 2 "89-177 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
. 49 2 186 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
51 49 2-89-197 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-89-207 3/15/89 9/18/89 9/22/89 10/16/89 1 0/2 1/89 10/23/89 10/25/89 10/31/89 11/06/89 1 1/18/89 CLOSED F007A MIN FLOW VALVE OPENED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING ALIGNMENT.
APPARENT CAUSE IS TS-E11-1N021A OPENING ON INCREASING FLOW ~
PMR 89-9069 d 60 WERE INITIATED.
REF MASTER BOOR 1-89-007 CLOSED PSV251F030D FAILEO TO LIFT AT DESIRED PRESSURE VALVE WAS DISASSEMBLED TO DETERMINE CAUSE OF FAILURE, VLV STEM FOUND DAMAGED, POSSIBLY DUE TO IMPROPER GAGGING OF PSV.
DURING WA F91676 PSV 251F029 WAS FOUND TO HAVE A BENT STEM.
REF MASTER SOOR 2-89-197 CLOSED RELIEF VALVE PSV251068 GAGGED INCORRECTLY DURING WA V8427 1 REF LLRT 101, SE 249-311.
INADEQUATE WORK CONTROL AND PROCEDURES WAS THE DETERMINED CAUSE.
SE-250-310 AND 311 WERE REVISED TO PROVIDE PROPER DIRECTION.
REF MASTER BOOR 2-89-197 CLOSED SMALL CONTAMINATED SPILL DURING RHR LOGIC FUNCTIONAL SE-249-001 DUE TO VENT 261 077 BEING OPEN FOR LLRT INVESTIGATION OF LEAKAGE PAST THE 2F016A.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS A LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE TEST.
OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT DURING SOA 90-01.
CLOSED RHR TSH-E11"2N6008 WAS FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SURV SI-249-306 AND-WAS RECAL'ED PER-THE SURVEILLANCE.
CLOSED
'8'ND 'D'HR SUCTION RELIEF VALVES WERE FOUND LIFTED FOLLOWING INITIATION OF SHUTDOWN COOLING.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THE LIFTING DISC CONTACTING THE MANUAL ACTUALTION SHAFT.
REF MASTER SOOR 2 197 CLOSED
'O'HR PUMP WOULD NOT RESTART DURING PERFORMANCE OF SE-224-002 WHEN THE 4KV BREAKER WAS RACKED OUT AND THEN BACK IN, THE PUMP
-STARTED.
CLOSED 7 VALVES HAD PACKING TIGHTENED W/0 ERF'S SUBMITTED PRIOR TO WORK
= THIS RESULTED IN DECLARING 3 OUT OF 7 AVAILABLE LOW PRESSURE ECCS SYSTEMS INOP DUE TO STROKE TIMES BEING UNKNOWN-THE CAUSE WAS A FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE ACTIVITY WORKPLAN.
MAINT REVIEWED THE EVENT DURING VALVE TEAM TRAINING.
PENS REVISED SE-100/200-002 TO ENSURE MNT COMPLIES WITH AD-QA-306 PRIOR TO WORKING ANY COMPONENTS.
PORC ACTION ITEM INITATED, BOOR CLOSED.
'8'HR PUMP SUCTION RELIEF VALVE LIFTED DURING SYS ALIGNMENT.
REPEAT OCCURRENCE, REF SOOR 2-.89-173.
THE LIFTING DISC AND CASTLE NUT WERE FOUND NOT PROPERLY JAMMED ALLOWING THE DISC TO VIBRATE DOWN THE SHAFT THREADS.
MNT ADJUSTED PSV PROGRAM PROCED.
CLOSED CORE SPRAY AND RHR TESTABLE CHECK VALVES FAILED TEST REQUIREMENT FOR LEAKAGE. THE TEST WAS REPEATED AND SATISFACTORY RESULTS WERE OBTAINED. GO-100(200)-002 CHANGED>
REF.
PCAF'S 1 90-0450 d
2"90-0 193
PMIS:
49 10/02/95 SUSQU NA SES BOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE & SOOR ll PM I.S SYS BOOR ll OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
51 49 2-90.-019 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-90-021 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-90-076 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
54 49 2 165 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-91-009
.OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-91-024 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2 91 049 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-91-062 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-91-091 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-91-112 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
2/06/90 2/1 1/90 8/29/90 12/18/90 1/08/91 2/07/91 3/10/91 3/10/91 4/1 2/9 1'/23/9 1
CLOSED RHR CROSSTIE RELIEF VALVE PSV-25193 LIFTED AND WOULD NOT RESEAT DURING ATTEMPTS TO FLUSH RHR PIPING.
THE VALVE WAS REWORKED PER WA V03106.
REF MASTER BOOR 2 197.
CLOSED RHR TESTABLE CHECK VALVE HV-251-F0508 INDICATION NOT FULL OPEN DURING 50-249-014.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS WORN SEALS ON THE AIR OPERATOR UNEE PAC SEALS AND THE UPPER SEALS.
WA V03223 REPLACED THE SEALS.
CLOSED ESW LEAK FOUND AT THE 'O'HR PUMP MOTOR OIL COOLER.
CAUSED BY HOLE IN COPPER TUBING ATTRIBUTED TO UNDER-DEPOSIT LOCAL PITTING, NOT BY AS FIRST IMPLICATED. MICROBIOLOGICALLY INFLUENCED CORROSION WHICH SHUTDOWN UNIT DUE.TO GENERIC IMPLICATIONS. ALL RHR PUMPS HAD THEIR COOLERS REPLACED.
OTHER SAFETY RELATED HEAT EXCHANGES WERE INSPECTED FOR SIMILAR CONDITIONS.
NO PROBLEMS WERE FOUND.
REF SPEC H-1004 AND PLAS 432 REF NCR 90-0114.
CLOSED RHR TSH-E11-2N600A WAS FOUND OUT OF TOLERANCE DURING SI-249-306.
THE SWITCH WAS REPLACED PER THE SURVEILLANCE.
CLOSED INADVERTENT ISOLATION OCCURRED TO RHR SDC INBOARD ISO VALVE DURING 16C WORK ACTIVITIES TO REPLACE PERMISSIVE PRESS SWITCH PIS-821-2N018A.
REF.
WA V16020 PLANNERS GUIDE WAS REVIEWED BY I6C ASSIST FOREMAN.
EXTENSION TO POST CYC25 APPROVED BY PORC 92-168.
ECO 93-6041 INSTALLED WIRING IN T8-2000682.
CLOSED POSITION INDICATION FOR 'O'HR PUMP BREAKER WAS LOST.
WA V10119 INVESTIGATED AND FOUND A SPRING CLIP HAD FALLEN FROM THE BREAKER LINKAGE AND ALLOWED THE LINKAGE TO SEPARATE.
A CLIP WAS INSTALLED AND THE BREAKER STROKED SAT.
CLOSED PSV-251-F030C LIFTED SEVERAL TIMES WHILE FILLING AND VENT OF THE 'A'OOP IN PREPARATION FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.
REF MASTER SOOR 1"90-259 CLOSED BOTH LOOPS OF LPCI WERE INOP AT THE SAME TIME WHILE PLACING RHR INTO SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE.
CLOSED SNUBBER NOT ISTALLED ON 'A'ECIRC PIPING AS REQUIRED.
RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING DIV I WAS REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE.
THE SNUBBER WAS REMOVED VIA WA Y00350 AND TO BE RE-INSTALLED PER WA Y00155 WHICH WAS CLOSED WITHOUT INSTALLING THE SNUBBER.
THE SNUBBER WAS REPLACED PER WA Y00294.
CLOSED RHR DISCHARGE RELIEF PSV-251-F025A FOUND LIFTED.
INVESTIGATION COULD NOT DETERMINE A CAUSE.
REF WA V13549.
CLOSED
PMI 49 10/02/95
~
SUSQ NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTEO BY UNIT ~
ISSUE DATE & SOOR II P
M I S
PAGE 20 SYS SOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION 49 2-91-159 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-91-171 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-92-007 OTHER AFFECTED SYS1 49 2-92"020 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-92-032 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-92-033 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-92-026 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
64 49 2-92-095 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2 108 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:~
49 2-92-118 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
6/13/91 7/09/91 1/21/92 2/24/92 3/19/92 3/19/92 3/23/92 9/13/92 9/26/92 10/07/92 RHR SUCTION PRESSURE GAUGE ROOT VALVES WERE FOUND CLOSED.
THE VALVE WERE PLACED IN THEIR PROPER POSITION.
INVESTIGATION COULD NOT DETERMINE HOW THE VALVES GOT CLOSED.
LRF 91-249-231 WAS ISSUED'EF DCN 91-2331.
CLOSED ROOT VLV OP1-PI-2R0038 WAS FOUND CLOSED VS:
OPEN AS REQUIRED BY CL-249-0015.
FOUND DURING SO 249-002.
ROOT CAUSE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.
THE VALVE WAS RESTORED TO THE OPEN POSITION.
OPS AND I&C REVIEWED THE EVENT.
CLOSED RHR SI-249-306 FOUND TE-E11-2N009A DEFECTIVE d 2N600A OUT OF CAL WA V26047 REPLACED THE METER MODULE IN TH1; INDICATION CIRCUIT,.
WA V26025 REGAL'ED TSH-E11-2NBOOA.
CLOSED WORKER NOTICED THAT 2 BOLTS WERE MISSING FROM RHR FLANGE WHERE FLOW ORIFACE FO-E11-20001-82 WAS CONNECTED.
MAINT WAS CONTACTED AND THE MISSING BOLTS WERE INSTALLED PER WA V23106 NO CAUSE COULD 'BE DETERMINED FOR THE ABSENSE OF THE BOLTS.
CLOSED.
PSV-251-F029 LIFTED DURING LINE UP FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.
VALVE RESPONDED PER DESIGN TO OVER PRESSURE CONDITION LIKELY CAUSED BY ACCOUSTIC HYDRAULIC EXCITATION.
REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVE IS PLANNED AS PART OF THE RELIEF VLV UPGRADE PROGRAM.
CLOSED PSV-251-F025A APPARENTLY LIFTED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING.
WA V23161 INVESTIGATED, THE VALVE BODY WAS LIGHTLY TAPPED AND THE VALVE RESEATED.
CLOSED BKR 28226062,
ERF'S AND WAIS WRITTEN.
THE BREAKERS IN CUBICLES 28216053 AND 28226062 WERE REPLACED.
EQAR-023 AND EQDF-48 IS BEING REVISED TO SPECIFY THE REQUIRED SUPPLIER OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
CLOSED FLOW THRU RHR CHECK VLV F031A/F046A LIFTED 'A'UCTION RELIEF PSV-251-F030A.
THE 'A'HR PUMP AND ASSOCIATED LPCI FLOW PATH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DECLARED INOP DUE TO THE NEED TO, ISOLATE A POTENTIAL RX VESSEL DRAIN PATH.
REF WA V20523.
MNT REPAIRED F046A PER WA P23099.
CLOSED ESF ACTUATION'WHEN RHR OUTBOARD ISOLATION HV-251-F008 CLOSED DURING SHUTDOWN COOLING. '8'HR PUMP HAD TRIPPED.
REF PLA 541.
DEFECTIVE RELAY BASE ON 821H K94 WAS REPLACED BY WA V20623.
CLOSED
'A'HR PUMP FAILED T~~T DURING SYSTEM RESTORATION FOLLOWING OUTAGE ACTIVITIES. AT BREAKER 2A20101, A FLAG WAS UP ON THE 'A'HASE 50/51 RELAY. DETERMINED CAUSE OF THIS EVENT WAS AN IMPROPERLY ADJUSTED LIMIT SWITCH FOR HV251F004A, RHR PUMP SUCTION.
THE ACTUATOR WAS INSPECTED/ADJUSTED PER MT-GM-050.
THE VALVE WAS TESTED SAT.
MT-GM-050 REVISED TO ENSURE CORRECT 4
TRAIN LIMIT SWITCH POSITION.
CLOSED 2.
PMIS.
49 10/02/95 SUSQ NNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N
P M I S
PAGE 21 SYS SOOR N
49 2-92-126 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 2-92 132 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
69 49 2-92-133 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
5 49 93 460 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 93-458 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 93-461 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 93-467 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-175 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-241 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-240 OCCUR DATE 10/15/92 10/26/92 10/26/92 12/1 1/93 1 2/ 19/93 12/21/93 12/21/93 3/15/94 4/02/94 4/07/94 DESCRIPTION RELIEF VALVE ON TEST PUMP BLEW OFF DURING SE-249-202.
PRESSURE WAS AT 800 PSI.
WORKER WAS DRENCHED WITH WATER BUT NOT CONTAMINATED. THE TEST SKID WILL BE REWORKED TO ELIMINATE COMPRESSION FITTINGS ON RELIEF VALVES.
CLOSED LOOSE TERMINATION ON TERMINAL 81 OF RELAY 821H-K59 CAUSED THE RELAY TO DE-ENERGIZE.
OCCURRED DURING PCIS TESTING UNDER SE-269-200 FOR DCP 92-9006.
CLOSED.
SHUTDOWN COOLING VALVES ISOLATED DUE TO GROUNDED LEAD, ESF ACTUATION. HV-261F009 AND HV-251F015A CLOSED.
ERT REQUIRED ~
DETERMINED CAUSES WERE:
1)LEAD WAS NOT TERMINEATED. 2)
INVOLVED PERSONNEL DID NOT PLAN FOR EVERY POSSIBLE FAILURE. 3)
TIGHT WORK SPACE/PHSICALLY DIFFICULT. REF PLAS 648.
CLOSED RHR HV-251-F0038 FAILED TO OPEN FOLLOWING CLOSURE WHILE IN SDC.
Si THE VALVE WAS CLOSED BECAUSE COOLDOWN RATE WAS TOO HIGH.
OPS INVESTIGATION FOUND THE VLV BREAKER THERMALS HAD TRIPPED.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS THERMAL BINDING'P-149/249-002 WERE REVISED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
CLOSED VACUUM SUCKED VLV BONNET FOR HV-261F0038 BACK ON TO VLV BODY DURING WA V33836 BREACH AND DISASSEMBLY ON THE RHR SYSTEM.
THE BONNET WAS RE-INSTALLED TO TERMINATE THE VACUUM LEAKAGE.
ERT REQUIRED.
NDAP-QA-0302 REV 3 ISSUED.
OPS REVIEWED THE EVENT.
MAINT REVIEWED THIS EVENT WITH MAINT PLANNERS.
CLOSED RHR RAD WASTE VENT VLV 261-811 FOUND UNCAPPED CONTRARY TO CL WHICH REQUIRES IT TO BE CAPPED, CL-249-0018.
PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DURING FILL AND VENT EVOLUTION. OPS WILL REVIEW THIS EVENT.
MOA TRAINING CYCLE 94-1 COMPLETE.
CLOSED POTENTIAL STATUS CONTROL EVENT WHEN WRONG DIV RHR CL IMPLEMENTED ROOT CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS OPERATOR ERROR.
AN INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION WAS PERFORMED.
MOA 94-1 REVIEWED THIS EVENTS SOOR 93-201 WILL ADDRESS VALVE LOCKING POLICY/METHODS'LOSED HANDWHEEL FOR RHR LOOP A INBOARD INJECTION TEST VLV OFF OF STEMS FOUND ON GRATING. VLV 251063.
CONDITION WAS FOUND DURING INITIAL DRYWELL ENTRY FOLLOWING SHUTDOWN.
INVESTIGATION FOUND THE VALVE STEM HAD FAILED DUE TO HIGH STRESS LOADING AND POOR DESIGNS THE VALVE WAS REPLACED WITH A DIFFERENT DESIGN PER WA V43319 RIE 94 0081.
CLOSED MATERIAL CUT FROM PIPE HANGER CLAMP W/0 WORK INSTRUCTIONS OR ENGIN ERING ANALYSIS. HANGER GBB-205-H89
~
WA V43467.
HE DETERMINED CAUSE WAS MIS-INTERPRETATION OF THE WORK PLAN BY T
GROUP FOREMAN.
NCR 94-079, CAL EC-049-1007 'SE-AS-IS DISPO.
MAINT CONDUCTED TRAINING ON THE EVENT.
CLOSED SCAFFOLDING INTERFERED WITH '8'HR DISCH CHECK VALVE CLOSING.
SCAFFOLDING BUILT NEAR THE '8'UMP DID NOT ALLOW THE CHECK VALVE HANDLE TO SWING FULLY IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED FOR THE 'DRAIN'REWS.
PMIS:EVR49 10/02/95 SUSQUEHANNA SES SOOR
SUMMARY
REPORT FOR SYS 49 - UNIT 2 SORTED BY UNIT, ISSUE DATE 6 SOOR N
P M I 5 PAGE 22 SYS BOOR N
OCCUR DATE DESCRIPTION OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94 245 OTHER AFFECTED SYS: 60, 62 49 94-249 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-254 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-266 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-283 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-356 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
49 94-366 OTHER AFFECTED SYS:
4/08/94 4/10/94 4/ 10/94 4/17/94 4/29/94 5/29/94 6/04/94 CLOSED FLOOR DRAINS BACKED UP WHILE DRAINING DIV Ii RHR USING FLOOR DRAINS IN THR RHR PIPE WAY. HPCI AND RCIC ROOMS WERE CONTAMINATED'00 SQ
- FEET, LVL WAS BK WET.
REF ACR 94-10.
THE DRAIN BLOCKAGE WAS CLEARED. 01-AD-055 REV 8 INCLUDES DIRECTION TO MONITOR FLOOR DRAINS DURING DRAINING EVOLUTIONS.
CLOSED WATER LEAKED FROM RHR HV"251-F050A PRESSURE SEAL RESULTING IN DRYWELL AREA CONTAMINATION. 400 SQ
- FEET, LEVELS WERE 20,000 DPM WET.
REF ACR 94 011.
DETERMINED CAUSE WAS WHEN THE VALVE BONNET WAS RAISED UNEVENLY IN THE INITIAL RE-INSTALLATION, RESULTING IN IT BEING COCKED 1/4 INCH.
PROPER ADJUSTMENT WAS MADE,.
CLOSED DURING LLRT DRAIN VLV 251018 WAS FOUND OPEN VS:
CLOSED AS REQUIRED BY THE LLRT LINE UP.
THE VALVE WAS OPENED-BY OPS TO SUPPORT DRAINING OF THE RHR SYSTEM.
THE LLRT TAG WAS NOT NOTICED BY THE OPERATOR.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TRACKED UNDER SOOR 94-245.
CLOSED POTENTIAL EXISTED FOR HIGH FLOW ISOLATION FOLLOWING SE-249-203 DUE TO VALVE CONFIGURATION ON INSTRUMENTATION. THE SUPPLY VLVS TO THE SWITCHES WERE OPENED PRIOR TO THE ROOT VALVES BEING OPENED.
PCAF'5 WERE ISSUED TO THE APPROPRIATE
'SE'ROCEDURES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
CLOSED AMBER LIGHT FOR HV-251-F049 BLEW WHEN HSS-25111A WAS PLACED
. IN THE EMERGENCY POSITION DURING TP-200-'010.
THE BULB WAS REPLACED AND THE EVENT WAS REPEATED.
TP WAS HALTED AND INVESTIGATION INITIATED.
DMG UPDATED RSP SCHEMATICS TO REFLECT CORRECT RESISTANCE VALUES.
CLOSED
.8 6 D
RHR PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVES NOT SEATING TO MAINTAIN KEEPFILL PRESSURE:
CONDITION FOUND DURING RESTORATION OF SE-224-207 'HE A 6 C
RHR CHECK VALVES WERE FOUND NOT CLOSED DURING PREPARTION FOR THE VESSEL HYDRO.
INVESTIGATION FOUND THE VALVE DISK STOPS WERE TOO SHORT, VENDOR ERROR.
PORC 94-136 REVIEWED RESO.
REF PLI 78723.
ACT:
TRNG -
INCLUDE THIS EVENT IN ENGR CONTINUING TRAINING MNT SAI E06393.
TRNG SAI E06395
~
REVIEW RIE PROCEDURES.
RHR KEEPFILL ISOLATED WITHOUT TAXING PUMP 4XV MOTOR BKRS OOS, RESULTING IN CONFIG WITH POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER.
THE DC KNIFE SWITCHES WERE OPENED AND YELLOW TAGGED TO PREVENT PUMP START.
PCAF 1-95-1016 REVISED NDAP-QA-0323 N.
ACT:
CMPL - CLOSURE r
2 2
TOTAL:
105
UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UU UUUUUUUUUUUU UUUUUUUUUU SSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSSSS SS SS SS SSS SSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSS SSS SS SS SS SSSSSSSSSSSS SSSSSSSSSS 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
.00
'00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 777777777777 77777777777 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 '00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 oq 00 00 0000 00 oqo 'o
'POQ0000000 PQOOPQPO TTTTTTTTTTTT TTTTTTTTTTTT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT TT 11 111 1111 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11111111 11 1111111111 JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJJJJJJJ JJ JJJJJJJJJJ JJ JJ JJ JJ JJJJJJJJ JJJJJJ OOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO
- OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OOOOOOOOOOOO 0000000000 BBBBBBBBBBB 888888888888 Be Be BB BB Be ee 8888888888 8888688888 88 88 88 Be 88 88 BBBBBBBBBBBB 88888888888 00000000 0000000000
'0 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 00 0000000000 00000000 6666666666 666lg66666666 66 66 66 66 66666666666 666666666666 66 66 66 66 66 66 666666666666 6666666666 555555555555 SSBSSSSSSSSS 55 55 55 556555555 66656566585555 55 555555555555 55555555555 00000000 0000000000 00 0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
~ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0000 00 000 '0 0000000000 00000000 8888888888 888888888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 88888888 88888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 888888888888 8888888888 JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJJJJJJJ JJJJJJJJJJJJ JJ JJ JJ JJ JJJJJJJJ JJJJJJ OOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOO 00 '0 OO
~
OO OO OO OO OO OO OO GO OO OO OO OO OO 000000000000 0000000000 BBBBBBBBBBB 888888888888 Be 88 BB 88 88 88 BBBBBBBBBB 8888888888 88 BB Be BB Be BB BBBBBBBBBBBB BBBBBBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEE EEEEEEEEEEEE EE EE EE EEEEEEEE EEEEEEEE EE EE EE EEEEEEEEEEEE EEEEEEEEEEEE NN NN NNN NN NNNN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NN'N NN NN NN NN NN NN NN NNNN NN NNN NN
~
NN NN N
ODDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDDD DD DD DD iDD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DD DDDDDDDDDD DDDDDOOOD
e 0
Open and Closed Condition Report Data by Selected System 27-"Feb-96 Search on System Number:
49 For Information Only CR NO.
UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
95-0051 1
49 3/28/95 YES NO NO 2
RCA THE BREAKERMAGNETICTRIP SETPOINT, 300 AMP SPECIFIED INE-612, SH 7, REV. 7 FOR BREAKER IB246-021 IS BEYOND BREAKERTRIP RANGE OF 90-270 AMP. BREAKER.TRIP SETPOINT OF 300 MAYNOT BE ACHIEVABLE.
==
Description:==
SIMILARPROBLEM WAS IDENTIFIEDFOR 250 VDC MCC BREAKERS PER EDR 094-041. THEREFORE, SITE ENGINEERS WERE MAKINGSURE THATSIMILARPROBLEM DOES.NOT EXIST FOR 480 VACMCC BREAKERS. DURING INSTALLATIONOF SEISMIC CLIPS FOR 480 VACMCC BREAKER IB246-021, THIS PROBLEM WAS DETECTED.
References:
1 Equip Nost IB246-02 I 954069 1
49 4/265 YES NO NO DURINGPERFORMANCE OF TP-059-001, ITWAS NOTED THATSEVERALNUTS ON THE BOTTOMSUCTION STRAINERS FOR RHR WERE NOT PROPERLY TORQUED.
Description:
DURINGTHE COURSE OF TP-059-001 (SUPPRESSION POOL DEBRIS/SUCTION STRAINER INSPECTION), A NUTON A BOTTOMRHR SUCTION STRAINER WAS FOUND NOT PROPERLY TORQUED. WHEN THE DIVER ROTATED THE NUT, BOTHNUTS ANDTHESTUD WERE FREE TO ROTATE. OTHER NUTS ON THE STRAINER WERE CHECKED ANDATOTALOF FIVE WERE FOUND ON THE 'A'OWER STRAINER.
References:
, WA S53415 Equip Nos:
IF407 B IF409B IF4IOB RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC2 OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
NO I
95-9 2 '9
.'-'vP~
THE 2D RHR PUMP TRIPPED DUE TO ANAPPARENT MOTOR BURNUP.
5/8/95 YES YES RCA 2/8/96
==
Description:==
WHEN THE 2D RHR PUMP, 2P202D, WAS STARTED FOR SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING, A PLANTOPERATOR MONITORINGTHE PUMP FROM A SAFE DISTANCE OBSERVED SPARKS ANDFLAMES COMING FROM THE MOTORVENTLOUVERS. HE IMMEDIATELYRADIOEDTHE CONTROL ROOM PCO ANDHADTHE PUMP SHUTDOWN. PUMP OPERATING PARAMETERS AS VIEWEDFROM THE CONTROL ROOM APPEARED TO BE NORMALDURINGTHE PERIOD FOLLOWINGTHE MOTOR START. INITIALINVESTIGATIONHAS IDENTIFIEDDAMAGETO THE MOTOR WINDINGS. OILWAS SEEN TO BE DRIPPING INSIDETHE MOTOR CASING ONTO THE ROTOR ANDA FILMEXISTED ON THE VENTLOUVERS. OILWAS ALSO DRIPPING FROM THE MOTOR CASING ONTO THE FLOOR. ADDITIONALLY,PUMP GROUND OVERCURRENT RELAY TARGET 50AG HADTRIPPED DURINGTHE EVENT.
YES
References:
SPEC EI107 WA V50299 Equip Nos:
2P202D FLAMES EMANATINGFROM THE PUMP MOTOR, PRESENT FOR ONLYA FEW SECONDS, DIDNOT REQUIRE ANYMANUALINTERVENTIONBEFORE DYINGOUT ON THEIR OWN.
THE CONTROL ANDTRIP DC KNIFESWITCH WAS OPENED TO PREVENT START OF THE PUMP.
954206 2
49 5/11/95 NO NO p'p lt p~
POSSIBLE PUMP SEAL DAMAGEON 2D RHR.
==
Description:==
NO INVEST 0/10/95
References:
Equip Nos:
2D RHR PUMP MOTOR WAS REMOVED PER MT-049-002. MT-049-001 RHR PUMP DISASSEMBLY/REASSEMBLYSTEP-BY-STEP CONDITIONALWAS NOT REFERENCED AND STEPS 5.1.1P AND 5.1.1D WERE NOT PERFORMED AS REQUIRED.
2 RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR,NO UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?.
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
NO INVEST 0/10/95 954268 2
49 6/20/95 NO YES 4@"%
pA(c 6 AS FOUND VOTES TEST OF BV=251F0278 DATED6/20/95 RESULTED INFINALMEASURED.THRUST 35781 LBS EXCEEDING ALLOWABLELIMITOF 19340 LBS PER DRAWINGM-1395. SEE EWR ATTACHED..
==
Description:==
AN ELECTRICALCALIBRATIONWAS PERFORMED INANAS FOUND CONFIGURATION. MEASURED THRUST SEEN WAS 35781 BLS. THE VOTES TEST IMMEDIATELYFOLLOWED WITHA MAXIMUMTHRUST OF 34129 LBS. (EQUIPMENTERROR NOT INCLUDED). THE ALLOWABLELIMITOF 19340 LBS IS BASED ON EXTENDEDACTUATORTHRUST RATING.
References:
EWR M58023 Equip Nos:
IIV251F027B 3
RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS It EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF.
FF.
MPFF?
MPFF7 95-0344 1
49 S/1185 YES NO NO 2
RCA 0/12/95 5gI,'f t w(o'c
~U gY,=,IS,IF02'P MAYBE INA DEGRADED CONDITIONBECAUSE OF POTENTIALSIGNIFICANTOVERTHRUST RESULTING FROM ITTIPPING ITS THERMALOVERLOADS (REFERENCE WA S21676 DATED 11/25/92). IN ADDITION,TORQUE SWITCH REPLACEMENT WAS PERFORfvKD AS PART OF INVESTIGATIONANDNO POST MAINTENANCEVOTES TEST WAS DONE. THIS IS INVIOLA@ON QF AD-QA-531, THE PROCEDURE IN EFFECT ATTHE TIME.
==
Description:==
DURINGA REVIEW OF HV-151F027B VALVEMAINTENANCEHISTORY, ITWAS DISCOVERED THATTHE MOVTRIPPED ITS THERMALOVERLOADS TWICE (REFERENCE WAS21676 DATED 11/25/92), INDICATING THATPOTENTIALSIGNIFICANTOVERTHRUST ANDOVERTiORQUE @AS OCCURRED. INAN INVESTIGATION,A DEFECTIVE TORQUE SWITCH WAS FOUND. TfgWADOCUMENTEDTORQUE SWITCH REPLACEMENT WAS PERFORMED; HOWEVER, THERE WAgQO EVIDENCE OF A POST-MAINTENANCE VOTES TEST. THE DATE OF THE LATESTVOTES TEST PEQ~ORMED Og ~IS MOVIS 4/18/92 (WA S10396).
a TWO CONCERNS EXIST
- 1. THE MOV)MAYBE INA DEGRADED CONDITIONPECAN:.SE OF THE SIGNIFICANT OVERTHRUST AND OVERTORQUE RESULTING FR(/II 'f@PPIhP ITS PfEQUAL OVERLOADS.-
References:
WA P34011 WA S51119 WA S51144 Equip Nos:
HVISlF027B
- 2. NOT PERFORMING A POST-MAINTENANCEVOTES TEST FOLLOWINGTORQUE SWITCH REPLACEMENT IS IN VIOLATIONOF AD-QA-531, REV. 0, ATTACHMENTB SECTION 1.9 WHICHWAS INEFFECT ATTHATTIME.
RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
NO NO 95-0400 2
49 2/23/96 A
NO U'A /0'~
g,~~~~
MOVDATADETAILDRAWING M-l404 FOR VALVETAG NO. EV2/lIF102R CONTAINS THE INCORRECT STEM MATERIAL(ASTMA-582 GR 416 VERSUS THE ACTUALMATERIALSA-564 GR-630.)
==
Description:==
DURING REVISION OF THE MOVDATADETAIL,LIMITSWITCH SETTING ANDTORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS FOR HV251F103A (CALCULATIONNO. EC-049-0552), THE INCORRECT STEM'MATERIALWAS NOTED.
THIS INCORRECT STEM MATERIALIS INPUT TO THE VOTES SOFTWARE FOR VOTES TESTING.
THEREFORE, BASED ON THE INCORRECT STEM MATERIAL,THE VOTES THRUST DATAFOR THIS VALVE IS OFFSET.
References:
CR 95-0447 WA V-50869 Equip Nos:
HV251FI03A 95-0437 2
49 9/18/95 NO NO NO 2
RCA FOREIGN POTENTIALREVIEWWAS NOT PERFORMED PRIOR TO PERFORMING SE-259-100, TEST 2.
==
Description:==
WHILEPERFORMING REVIEWFOLOWING COMPLETION OF SE-259-100, ITWAS NOTICED THATTHE PREREQUISITES INCLUDETHE FOREIGN POTENTIALREVIEW. ATTHE TIMESE-259-100, TEST 2 WAS PRESSURIZED, PERMIT2-95-2001 WAS ACTIVE. THE SYSTEM PERMIT SUPERVISOR WAS THE ONLYSIGN-
- ON ON THE 2001 PERMIT. THE PREREQUISITES WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO PERFORMANCE OF TEST 1
ON 9/14/95. ATTHATTIMEFOREIGN POTENTIALREVIEW WAS NO.
References:
Equip Nos:
RptSysteut
Search on System Number: 49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS ¹ EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
954472 2
49 912885 NO NO NO 2
INVEST NO RHR COMMONPIPING CONTAINEDWATERALTHOUGHITWAS THOUGHTTO BE COMPI.ETELYDRAINED.
==
Description:==
AR206 A5 (LIQUIDRW COLLECTPANEL 2C209 SYSTEM TROUBLE)UNEXPECTEDLYALARMEDINTHE CONTROL ROOM ON 2C651 ANDMOMENTS LATERAR207 (DW FLOOR DRN SUMP A HI-HILVL)ON IC601 ALSO ALARMED.RECORDER LR-26102A INDICATEDLEVELINTHE'A'UMPINCREASING. THE UNIT2 PCO CONTACTED THE WORK CONTROL CENTER TO SEE IF ANYONGOING ACTIVITYWAS CAUSING THE INCREASED SUMP LEVEL. THE WORK CONTROL CENTER SUSPECTED A PSV (PSV251F126) REWORK THAT WAS INPROGRESS SO ANOPERATOR WAS DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE. THE CONTROL ROOM PCO CONTACTED THE DRYWELLCOORDINATORTO INVESTIGATE. THE DW COORDINATORREPORTED TO THE CONTROL ROOM THATTHE SUMP LEVELLOCALINDICATIONON EL. 719 WAS SHOWING 97%. HE THEN WENT INTOTHE DRYWELLANDFOUND THE SUMP FILLEDANDSLIGHTLYOVERFLOWING. THE TEMPORARY SUMP PUMP CORD WAS FOUND UNPLUGGED. THE PUMP WAS PLUGGED INANDTHE PIPING DRAINWAS REDIRECTED INTOA DOWNCOMMER.
References:
Equip Nost MECHANICALMAINTENANCEWAS SIGNED ONTO ANDWORKINGWITHINTHE BOUNDARIES OF SYSTEM PERMIT 2-95-2000. THE SUBJECT PIPING WAS PREVIOUSLY DRAINEDTO SUPPORT ANLLRT(SE-259-030).
RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC7 OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLET LEVEL RESO
'LOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
95-0517 2
49 10/9/95 NO NO NO 2
INVEST NO HANGER DRAW1NG DCA-210-H1, REV. 3 DOES NOT REFLECT THE ACTUALPLANTINSTALLATIONOF DCA-210-HI
==
Description:==
WHILEPERFORMING A VT3 INSPECTION ON DCA-210-H1, ITWAS NOTED THATTHE HANGER DRAWING SHOWS ITEM¹5 TO BE A SIZE 20 SPRING CAN, HOWEVER, A SIZE 19 SPRING CAN IS ACTUALLY INSTALLED. FURTHER INSPECTIONS REVEALEDTHATGEMS ¹3,$,6,),S THATARE ACTUALYINSTALLED IN THE PLANTARE DIFFERENT THANWHATIS SPECIFIEP QQ Tfg~GOD DRAWINGBILLOF MATERIAL. THE DRAWINGSPECIFIES THESE PARTS TO PE PPR P 2.5'i %PLOP PRACKET THEYARE ACTUALLYFOR A2.25" WELDEDBRACKET. THE WELDDE'JAP. Og TgE QQ~G SPECIFIES A FLARE BEVELWELD ON TWO SIDES WITHAFILLETWELD ON TPE'PVvq OPPOSE SP)gS, THE ACTUALFIELD INSTALLATIONDOES NOT HAVETHE FLAREBEVELWELDS PfSg+LED. D/SCU)SION'S WITHSITE SYSTEM ENGINEERING ANDTHROUGH THEIRINVESTjGQTlqN6g THE$$QVEOPTED DRAWING DISCREPANCIES IS WAS CONCLUDED THATA SUPERSEQPD( ID'AS+COgPgPATED INTO REV. 3 OF DCA-'210-HI.
,I.
f t
References:
Equip Nos:
RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS tt EVENTDATE NCT OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO
~ 'LOSED REPEAT-REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF.
MPFF?
954539 2
49 10/1485 NO NO 1
RCA NO DURING PERFORMANCE OF SE-200-002 "ASMECLASS I BOUNDARYSYSTEM LEAKAGE/HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TESTING" RHR HEAD SPRAY IB SHUTOFF HV-251F022 AUTO CLOSED. ESF ACTUATION
==
Description:==
STEP 6.1.8 OF SE-200-002, OPENS RHR HEAD SPRAY IB SHUTOFF HV-251F022. DURING RPV PRESSURIZATION, ITWAS NOTICED THATTHE F022 VALVEHADCLOSED. THIS OCCURRED DURINGTHE 2 PERFORMANCES OF SE-200-002 ON 10/13/95 AND 10/14/95 WHEN PRESSURE WAS ABOVE98 PSIG. ATNO TIMEINTHIS PROCEDURE IS THIS VALVECLOSED, INTERLOCKDEFEATED OR IDENTIFIEDTHATTHIS VALVEWOULDAUTO CLOSE.
t NSE/PNSS WAS NOTIFIED OF THESE OCCURRENCES ANDCONCLUDEDTHATTHE VALVEWOULDAUTO CLOSE, IF OPENED, WHEN RPV PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN98 PSIG VIARELAYB21H-K82 IN PANEL 2C622 (REF. 8856-Ml-B21-101(10)). STEP 6.1.15 WOULDHAVEPREVENTED THIS ISOLATIONTO OCCUR, BUT THIS STEP IS ONLYPERFORMED DURINGTHE "HYDRO"NOT THE "SYSTEM LEAKAGE"PRESSURE TEST.
(ON THESE DATES SE-200-002 SYSTEM LEAKAGETEST WAS BEING PERFORMED NOT THE HYDRO.)
References:
LER 388/95-013 Equip Nos:
HV25IF022 10 RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTAIILE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT
'EPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF~
95-0664 2
49 11/16/95 NO NO 2
RCA NO INCORRECT THERMALLOAD.CASE WAS USED TO QUALIFYTHE NEW SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES FOR PSV251F055A &B VALVESREPLACEMENT. THE THERMALLOADCASE USED WAS UNCONSERVATIVE.
==
Description:==
DURINGTHE PREPARATION OF THE UNIT I CALCULATIONSFOR THE PSV151F055A &B VALVE REPLACEMENTS, THE UNIT2 CALCULATIONEC-PIPE-6027 WAS REVIEWED TO DETERMINEIF THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES SMILARTO THE UNIT2 MODIFICATIONCOULD BE USED INTHE UNIT2 MODIFICATIONCOULD BE USED INTHE UNITI DCP. THE FOLLOWINGDISCREPANCY WAS FOUND:
References:
Equip Nos:
UNIT2 RHR PSV251F055A &B VALVESWERE REPLACED WITHTHE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES PER DCP 94-9083.. THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES WERE DESIGNED TO SIMULATETHE REMOVED VALVESIN WEIGHT ANDCENTER OF GRAVITY(CALCULATIONEC-PIPE-6027, REV. 0). THEREFORE, THE RERUN OF ME101 COMPUTER. PIPING ANALYSISWAS NOT REQUIRED. HOWEVER, WEIGHT, THERMALANDSEISMIC LOADINGWAS EXTRACTEDANDUSED TO QUALIFYTHE NEW SURROGATES FOR THE RHR VALVES.
'HE UNIT2 CALCULATIONEC-PIPE-6027, USED INCORRECT THERMALLOAD'CASETO QUALIFYTHE WELDS BETWEEN THE 8" AND6" BLINDFLANGES ON THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLIES. THERE ARE SEVEN (7) THERMALLOADCASES INTHE EXISTINGMEIOI COMPUTER PIPING ANALYSIS,WHICHARE LOCATED IN CALCULATIONSPLS-2643 (EC-PIPE-0621) &PLS-2646 (EC-PIPE-0677). THE THERMALLOADCASES ARE DEFINED BELOW:
THRM01 - MINIMUMFLOW BYPASS MODE PUMP "D"RUNNING THRM02-MINIMUMFLOW BYPASS MODE PUMP "B"RUNNING II Il THRM03 - POST-ACCIDENT CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMPS B &D RUNNING THRM04 - NORMALSHUTDOWN AFTER BLOWDOWNTO MAINCONDENSER, PUMP "D"RUNNING THRM05 - NORMALSHUTDOWN AFTER BLOWDOWNTO MAINCONDENSER, PUMP "B"RUNNING I
THRM06 - SYSTEM ON STANDBY,NO PUMPS RUNNING RpISystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS tt EVENTDATE NCT OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
THRMFA-FAULTEDTHERMALLOADCASE (POST-LOCA TEMPERATURE) WITHMAXIMUM TEMPERATURE USED TO QUALIFYFOR NOZZLEAND SUPPORT LOADS (SEE NOTE BELOW)
THE LOADCASETHRM01 - THRM06 SHOULD HAVEBEEN USED TO QUALIFYTHE 8" AND6" BLIND FLANGES ON THE UNIT2 MODIFICATION. HOWEVER, ONLYTHRMOI WAS CONSIDERED IN THE QUALIFICATIONOF THE SURROGATE ASSEMBLY. THIS, RESULTED INUNCONSERVATIVERESULTS.
NOTE: POST-LOCA ENVIORNMENTALTEMPERATURE RISE IS A FAULTED CONDITIONANDANYEXPANSION STRESS RESULTING FROM THIS CONDITIONIS CLASSIFIED AS SECONDARY. CODE EVALUATIONClF PIPING STRESSES/PIPE SUPPORT MEMBERS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS FAULTEDCONDITIONPER BLP 25976, DATED I/23/84.
12 RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO.
UNIT SYS 0 EVENTDATE NC?
OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
66 1
49 11/17/95 NO C
NO 1D RHR PUMP FAILEDSURVEILLANCEACCEPTANCE CRITERIA REGARDING DPVELOPED DIFFERENTIAL
~ PRESSURE.
==
Description:==
C WHILEPERFORMING SO-149-002 ANDESTABLISHED PHP. FLGW OF i0 I~GPM TiIROUGHTHE HEAT EXCHANGERAS READ ON THE FLOW RECORDER, 'PIE ID P IBP Dl I<<;ERE1f'GALPRESSURE WAS DETERMINEDTO BE 247 PSID. THE ACCEPTANCE CRI POP.TI EIDIFIERPNjIALPRESSURE BETWEEN 248 AND272 PSID. THE IBRHR PUMP PASSEYlTHEI(CCEPTA4QCE CRITERIA, HOWEVER, WITH NO MARGIN(I.E, RECORDED DP OF 250 WITHACCEPT 'CE'IA~AZ.250-27tIPSID).-
i. ii'~'
h4 ii/ LPf<%'t'i",t it.'BSERVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FR ANDFl VAQUERO LEAPTQ (UPlECT THE RECORDER'S ACCURACY.
THE RECORDER'S INDICATIONAPPEARTS TO BE LOWER~Q /tI.CT'PPL, I&6:P$S CONTACTED TO INVESTIGATE.
1&C DETERMINEDTHE FR INDICATIONOUT OF CALIBRATION.LOWP'PROXMATELYI KGPM AND RECALIBRATIONWAS PERFORMED UNDER WA S7212. THE B ANDD PUMPS WERE RETESTED SATISFACTORILYWITHDIFFERENTIALPRESSURES OF 273 PSID (250-274 ACCEPTABLE)AND267 PSID (248-272 ACCEPTABLE).
References:
Equip Nos:
FRElllR608 13 RptSystem
Search on System Number:
49 CR NO UNIT SYS //
EVENTDATE NC.
OP AFFECIED? REPORTABLE?
LEVEL RESO CLOSED REPEAT REPEAT FF?
FF?
MPFF?
MPFF?
96-0111 I
49 I/30/96 NO NO 2
CLOSURE 2/2/96 CONTAINMENTSPARY OP'S CHANGED AND CONFLICTWITHSTATEMENTIN FSAR.
==
Description:==
ON 11/21/95, PCAFS WERE PREPARED TO ALLOW,.CONCURRENT USE OF LPCI ANDDRYWELLSPRAY. THIS CHANGE PROVIDED MORE FLEXIBILITYIN RESPONDING TO POSTULATED TRANSIENTS THATCAUSE AN INCREASE TO PRIMARYCONTAINMENTPRESSURE.
PFACS 1-95-1157 AND2-95-0520 WERE APPROVED ANDDISTRIBUTED.
References:
Equip Nos:
A LATERREVIEWOF THE FSAR INDICATEDTHE FOLLOWINGEXCERPT FROM SECTION 6.2.2.2-IF THE OPERATOR CHOOSES TO USE THE CONTAINMENTSPARY, HE MUSTOPEN THE SPARY VALVESAND CLOSE THE LPCI INJECTION VALVE.
CONTRARYTO THE FSAR STATEMENTABOVE,THE PCAFS PERMITTED LINE-UPOF BOTH LPCI INJECTION ANDDRYWELLSPRAY ATTHE SAMETIME.
96-0138 2
49
.2/7/96 NO NO 2
CLOSURE 2/9/96 NO DURING PERFORMANCE.OF SI-249-309 (18 MONTHCAL. OF REACTOR COOLANTSYSTEM LEAKAGEHI PRESSURE) PSH-E11-2N018 (SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION HEADER HIGH PRESSURE) FOUND PSH-E11-2N01& OUT OF ALLOWABLEVALUE.
==
Description:==
FOUND AS FOUND VALVEON PSH-E11-2N018 AT 155.6 PSIG. ALLOWABLEVALUEIS LES THANOR EQUAL
~ TO 142 PSIG (148.7 HEAD CORRECTED).
References:
Equip Nos:
PS HEl l2N018 14 RptSystem
CR NO.
UNIT LEADGRP OP AFFECTED? REPORTABLE? LVL RESO TYPE 974121 NO NO 3
CLOSURE Equip Nos:
SYSTEM:
LEVELSWITCH LIS-821-2N024D FAILEDTO MEET ACCEPTANCE CI:ITERIASTEP 6.2.15 OF SI-280-311 (A63867)
Evcnl Date:
Itrsu
(:I<<sure I/24/97 Schedule Actual LISD212N024D 80
')7-0 I "2 hIN'I'<)
NO 3
( l.t)SI <lti I'.quip N SY!< I'I:hl:
INAI)VI!I(I I'.N I'/O SCRAhl WAS I(l;CEIVI.Dl)URI(iNTI II'ERFORMANCE OF SI-280-311.
I'.vrnt l)atr:
It<'<<<
Ctu<<irr 1/24/97
<:rhi <Intr A<'tu:il I".iil2I?N<< 31) nn 97-0123 hIVI' COIIIII.CfCOi4l)ITION Equip Nus:
8YS'I I'.hI:
HAIR PIN CLIP MISSING ON OA510-005 CUBB SHUTTER ACTUATION LEVER HINGE PIN.
Schedule Actual OAS IO Event Date:
I/21/97 Rcsu Clos<<re 3/2<//97 974124 NUCT NO NO DEGRADED COND. DEMIN.RESIN PERFORMANCE.
2 CAUSE DETERMINATION Schedule Actual Event Date:
I/24/97 Res o 5/30/97 Closure Equip Nos:
SYSTEM:
39 RptLIkePMIS'
t