ML18026A468
| ML18026A468 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1996 |
| From: | Birmingham G, Dacosta J, Valmonte L PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18026A281 | List: |
| References | |
| EC-013-0788, EC-013-0788-R02, EC-13-788, EC-13-788-R2, NUDOCS 9612160354 | |
| Download: ML18026A468 (52) | |
Text
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING File ¹ R2-1
~ ~ CAL'CULATION/ STUDY COVER SHEET and 1. Page1of NUCLEAR RECORDS TRANSMITTALSHEET 110 Total
- 2. TYPE: ~Stud >3. NUMBER: EC-013-0788 >4. REVISION: 2
- 5. TRANSMITTAL¹: . *>6.- UNIT: 3 ') 7. QUALITYCLASS: F *>8. DISCIPLINE: E
>9. DESCRIPTION: Inadvertent Reactor Vessel In'ection Resultin from S urious 0 eration of the HPCI or RCIC S stems SUPERSEDED BY: EC-
- 10. Alternate Number: SEA-EE-447 11. Cycle:
12: Computer Code or Model used: Fiche P Disks P Arnt
- 13. Application: A endix R Affected Systems:
'>14 013 013H
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15 is mandatory.
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'>15. NON-SYSTEM DESIGNATOR:
- 16. Affected Documents: EDR G10122
- 17.
References:
EDR G10122 EC-013-0873 EC-013-0859 EC-013-0965
- 18. Equipment / Component
>20. PREPARED BY %21. REVIEWED BY Print Name Lawrence H. Valmonte Print Name 'a S. Bir 'n ha Si nature Si nature
>22. APPROVED BY/ DATE 23. ACCEPTED BY PPBL/ DATE Print Name John DaCosta Print Name Thomas A. Gorman Si nature Si nature ~
TO BE COMPLETED BY NUCLEAR RECORDS u
7 NR-DCS SIGNATURE/DATE ADD A NEW COVER PAGE FOR EACH REVISION
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Page 1 a ENGINEERING'ALCULATIONSTUDY
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REVISION DESCRIPTION SHEET REVISION NO: 2 CALCULATIONNUMBER: EC-013-0788 This form shall be used to record the purpose or reason for the revision, indicate the revised. pages and / or affected sections and give a short description of the revision.
Check (x) the appropriate function to add, replace or remove the affected pages.
Affected A R R Description I Revised ~
d p Purpose of Revision Pages Sections d I v All All This revision replaces Revision 1 in its entirety. It incorporates the RCIC spurious initiation scenario and updates the HPCI spurious initiation scenario. Due to the significant level of revision of this calculation, the document is being reissued as a completely new document, and as such, no revision bars are provided. Place Revision 1 pages 1 through 4 into backup.
REVUS/ON ~ E: 0 SUPERSEDED BY CALCULATIONNUMBER EC (check one) H FULL REVISION 0 PAGE FOR PAGE FORM NEPM-QA-0221-2, Revision 1
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EC-013-0788 Page 2 Revision 2 e TABLE OF CONTENTS QE~CQN 1.0 OBJECTIVES 3
2.0 CONCLUSION
S 3.0 ASSUMPTIONS AND INPUTS 4.0 METHODS 5.0 RESULTS
6.0 REFERENCES
10 RCIC Components of Concern for Reactor Vessel Overfill 12 E
HPCI Components of Concern for Reactor Vessel Overfill 13 RCIC Spurious Cables 14 f
HPCI Spurious Cables 15 e dces A HPCI Cable Hit Matrix 16 RCIC Cable Hit Matrix 19 C HPCI Cable Routing 26 D RCIC Cable Routing 61
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EC-013-0788 Page 3 Revision 2
~o Objectives: .
This study provides the basis for the disposition of the HPCI inadvertent, initiation concern identified in EDR G10122. The RCIC System is also evaluated in this calculation since the system operates in a similar fashion and a similar scenario can'e postulated. Specifically, the concern is that a cable fault, resulting from a fire, could cause an inadvertent initiation of the HPCI or RCIC System, in conjunction with a fire-induced failure of the HPCI or RCIC fifty-four (54) inch trip logic.
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This study reflects the recent changes in the approach to*addressing the issue of spurious operation resulting from fires for, fire conditions inside and outside of the main control room. at SSES where safe shutdown is governed, by the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Paragraph III.G or L. The, spurious operation criteria used in this study is criteria transmitted to the NRC in PLA-4505.
'I 2.0, Conclusions 21 HPCI Inadvertent Reactor Vessel Injection In Fire Areas CS-'5, CS-28, CS-29, CS-30 and R-1B, the capability'o mitigate the spurious initiation of HPCI is available via operation of the HVE411(2)F002
'alve from the control room. In Fire Areas CS-31 and CS-33, the solenoid trip valve cabling is protected to ensure the capability to manually trip HPCI from the main Control Room. In Fire Areas CS-10 and R-1A, spurious cables are wrapped to prevent inadvertent and uncontrolled injection by HPCI
'I In Fire Area R-2B, valve HVE412F002 is available in all fire zones.except Fire Zone 2-5A-N. For the fire to cause spurious operation of the system, to damage the 54" trip and to damage the HVE412F002 valve, it must spread from elevation 683'-0" through the elevation 719'-1" concrete floor slab which is 2'-3" thick and, subsequently, through the elevation 749'-1" floor slab which, is 1.'-9" thick. Each of these floor slabs is constructed of reinforced concrete. All three elevations are protected by a smoke detection system which provides an early warning alarm in the Control Room for fire conditions. In addition, elevation 719'-1" and 749'-1" are protected with automatic sprinklers. This will limit the spread of fire between elevations. Therefore, fire spread between elevations 683'-0" and 749'-
1" will be limited and for all fires in Fire Area R-2B inadvertent HPCI irijection'will either be prevented or mitigated.
'I For the control room fire (Fire Area CS-9), a modification will,be performed to mitigate the effects of inadvertent HPCI initiation as a result of a Control Room fire . I
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EC-013-0788 Page 4 Revision 2 e I RCIC Inadvertent Reactor Vessel Injection In all instances, for fires outside of the main Control Room, the concern with spurious operation of RCIC can be mitigated by use of the protected Appendix R Safe Shutdown Path. The protected Appendix R Safe Shutdown Path for fires outside of the main Control Room involves depressurizing the RPV using ADS followed by supplying vessel make-up with Core Spray. Once the vessel is depressurized, any concern with inadvertent and uncontrolled injection by RCIC is relieved. This is true for two reasons: (1) Vessel overfill at low pressures is not a concern; (2) Motive steam for running RCIC is not available at low vessel pressures.
The timelines in the Appendix R Compliance Manual, EC-013-0843, show that the operator will depressurize using ADS at the latest when level reaches the top of active fuel. This is estimated to take approximately 40 minutes. Since
-inadvertent injection by RCIC will not present a problem for on the order of 20
<<minutes, sufficient time is available-for the operator to respond by depressurizing with ADS. Therefore, the normal shutdown path protected for Appendix R Safe Shutdown is sufficient to mitigate the effects of inadvertent RCIC injection.
As an alternative to this, however, the following approaches may be used rather than depressurizing the vessel using ADS. In path 3 Fire Areas CS-7, CS-10, CS-31, CS and CS-33, the ability to" mitigate the effects of. spurious RCIC initiation is available via operation of the HVE511(2)F007 valve from the control room. In path 1 Fire Areas CS-5, CS-28, CS-29 and CS-30, spurious RCIC mitigation is available via operation of the HVE511(2)F008 valve from the control room.
- In Fire Area CS-9, control of RCIC is transferred to the Remote Shutdown Panel.
Once this action has been accomplished, the spurious operation of RCIC may be terminated from the RSP. The impact of MOV "Hot Shorts" on the operation of RCIC as discussedin NRC IN 92-18 is addressed in Calculation EC-013-0859 Appendix C.
In Fire Areas R-1A and R-2A, spurious RCIC could be mitigated by operator action at the turbine to trip the turbine.
In Fire Areas R-1B and R-2B, the mechanical trip of the turbine may not be available. For these fire areas, the mitigation of spurious RCIC must be accomplished by using the ADS and CSS systems.
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EC-013-0788 Page 5 Revision 2, 3O Assumptions and Inputs I
The following assumptions/inputs were utilized in performing this evaluation:
3.1 Concurrent spurious operation of both the.RCIC and HPCI systems will not occur. Likewise, other high pressure injection systems (i.e., Feedwater and CRDS) will be, tripped as necessary and will not spuriously operate during the fire. This'is consistent with the Spurious Operation Criteria transmitted to the NRC in PLA-4505.
3.2 Reactor water level is assumed to be at 561.3" (+34" above instrument zero).
4.0 Method The following m'ethodology was used in the evaluation:
'.1 Cable routing reports (sorted by fire.a'rea/fire zone) were derived from ARCDMS and CARTS for all HPCI and RCIC components identified as safe shutdown components (refer to Appendices C and Drespectively).
4.2 A review of the PBIDs, operating procedures and design description manuals
'was performed to identify those components that would need to spuriously actuate to result in reactor vessel overfill. These components are termed "Spurious Components" or. "Initiating Components." Components that could fail reactor high water level trip were also identified.
'he In addition, those components that can mitigate against the spurious RCIC or HPCI initiation by isolating injection into the vessel or steam to the turbine were identified. These components are termed "Mitigating Components." Refer to
~ Tables 1 and 2 4.3 For each of the: initiating components', "spurious cables" were identified, in accordance with the criteria'established in Calculation EC-013-.0843 Section 7, from electrical schematics and were tabulated in Tables 3 and,4.
4A From a review'of Appendices C and D, a fire area/fire zone impact matrix (i.e.,
Cable Hit Matrix) was generated for the HPCI and RCIC systems showing which initiating and mitigating components are potentially affected for a fire in various fire areas. Initiating components that contain spUrious cables in the subject'fire zone/fire areas were denoted by an "S." All other cables hits were identified with an "X" for both non-spurious and spurious components. Refer to Appendices A and B.
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I EC-013-0788
'age'6 Revision 2 An evaluation was performed to identify:
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- b. For those, fire areas identified in "a", where. at least one mitigating
- component is available to isolate inadvertent reactor vessel overfill.
4.6 For those situations in 4.5b for which no mitigating component is available, a determination was made whether credit for existing fire barrier wraps can assure a mitigating component operability or whether some other means of mitigation needed to be developed.
4.7 The results were documented in Appendices A and B and in Section 5 of this calculation.
5.0 Results
- This HPCI system spurious actuation scenario can occur in two ways: (1) A Hot Short on the start circuitry for the HPCI Aux. Oil Pump, 1/2P213, could open the HPCI Control and Stop valves. A Hot Short on the HPCI Steam- Admission'alve, 1/2F001, could open the Steam Admission Valve. A Hot Short on the HPCI Pump Discharge Valve, 1/2F006, could open the HPCI Pump Discharge valve. The combination of these'3 Hot Shorts could result in the inadvertent initiation of HPCI.; (2) A sirigle Hot Short on the DC control circuitry for HPCI initiation could result in the inadvertent initiation of HPCI. For this condition to be of concern, another fire-induced failure resulting in the loss of the HPCI high reactor water level isolation signal, which disables the automatic control of solenoid valve SV1(2)5661 to terminate HPCI injection must be postulated. This scenario results in an overfilling of the reactor vessel such that the main steam lines are flooded with high pressure water which introduces solid high pressure water or two phase flow through the SRV lines.
j As with the HPCI system, the RCIC system spurious actuation scenario involves similar fire-induced failures and resulting spurious operations. The steam inlet valve, HVE511(2)F045, and the RCIC pump discharge valve, HVE511(2)F013, both open either as a result of individual hot 'shorts or as a result of a single hot short in the DC control circuitry providing a flow path from the'ST into the reactor vessel. Additionally, it is postulated that the fire prevents closure of HVE511(2)F045 on reactor high water level.'n, Appendix R concern exists when automatic.HPCI and RCIC termination is disabled by fire-induced loss of the high-level trip in conjunction with the loss of the several valves (refer to Tables 1 and 2) that could be used to mitigate this scenario. The likelihood of such a scenario is quite remote; however, recent NRC interpretations of Appendix R and GL 86-10 require that such scenarios be
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EC-013-0788 Page 7 Revision 2 considered if cable damage is possible as a result of a fire in a particular fire area. The spurious operation criteria attached to PLA-4505 documents that the assumption of 3 independent hot shorts causing spurious operation of HPCI for a Control Room fire can be mitigated by an operator. action to depressurize the RPV upon assuming control at the RSP.. Tables, 1 and 2 summarize the failure combinations that would be required to precipitate th'ese scenarios.
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This overfill condition poses two concerns. The first concern is that when Path 3 or 3 is required for safe shutdown, water. in the steam lines, while the reactor is at high pressure, could jeopardize the operation or pressure integrity af the ADS/SRVs. The second concern is that when Path 2 is used to provide safe shutdown, water in the steam piping could jeopardize SRV and RCIC operation.
The Appendix R scenario begins with normal reactor level between +30" and
+39" with'espect to instrument zero. Feedwater coastdown will bring the level to,+34"; At this time HPCI'or RCIC spuriously initiates in conjunction with the fire-induced failure of their respective high, level trips at +54" (581.5".).
Calculation EC-013-0965 determined that in 3.05 minutes after HPCI initiation, the reactor vessel water level will reach the lower lip of the steam line. Using the lower flowrate of RCIC of approximately 600 gpm, a time to reach the lower lip of
. the steam line is approximately 20 minutes. It therefore needs to 'be demonstrated that either spurious actuation is not,possible based on the cable
-routings (and/or protection) for the HPCl,or RCIC initiation,component combinations or'that the respective mitigating components are available to isolate RCS injection within the time constraints identified above.
5.1 ~Fi I A ARCDMS and,CARTS provide the fire area routing for all the HPCI and RCIC F safe.sllutdown component cables. The routings are included as Appendices C and D. A review of P&IDs, operating procedures and the design description manuals identified all spurious and mitigating components.
A spurious component is a component(s) that due to one hot short could cause system operation by itself or in conjunction with one hot short on one or more
'ther spurious component(s).
F Each system's high level trip receives input from both divisions of relay logic.
Therefore, whenever the fire occurs where the fire area is not Path I and 3, the level trip is assumed lost. If the hot short occurs and one or more open 'igh circuits do not damage the manual trip from the control room, the manual trip of the system can be credited. Tables 1 and 2 provide a list components that have been analyzed to determine their availability to mitigate spurious injection. This
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.EC-013-0788 Page 8 Revision 2 list was derived from a review of P8IDs, operating procedures and design description manuals.
Each system's spurious component and mitigating component routings were derived from ARCDMS and are presented in a matrix in Appendices A (HPCI) and B (RCIC). If spurious cables are not routed in a fire area or if mitigating equipment cables are not affected, the fire area is deemed to be adequately configured to prevent spurious injection.
In fire areas where spurious component cables and mitigating component cables are affected, the spurious component cables were examined to verify whether spurious actuation was possible. If spurious actuation was not possible, no further research was performed.
For those fire areas where spurious actuation. could occur, the routing of spurious cables was determined to see if the subject cable can credit existing fire barrier wrap or a,deviation request. The, results are presented in Appendices A and B.
5.2 Fire Areas of Concern 5.2.1 'itigation of Spurious RCIC In general, sufficient time is available for the operator to use ADS and CS to mitigate the potential impacts associated with this scenario. Outlined below are additional options for mitigating the impacts of this scenario.
Fire Areas CS-10, CS-28, CS-29, CS-30, CS-31, CS-32, CS-33, CS-5, CS-7, CS-9, R-1A, R-2A, R-1 B and R-2B are the only fire areas where spurious RCIC initiation, resulting in inadvertent reactor vessel injection, could occur.
In all fire areas except for Fire Areas R-1B and R-2B, the mechanical trip of valve HV15012 (HV25012) can be accomplished. Additionally, operation of ADS and CSS is available to mitigate against spurious concerns.
In path 3 Fire Areas CS-10, CS-33 and -CS-7, the Division II valve HVE511F007 can be operated to mitigate spurious RCIC.
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~ In path 1. Fire Areas,CS-28 and CS-30, the Division I valve HVE511F008 can be operated to mitigate RCIC.
~ In path 3 Fire Areas CS-31 and CS-32, spurious.RCIC can be mitigated by using the Division II valve HVE512F007.
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EC-013-0788 Page 9 Revision 2
~ In path 1 Fire Areas CS-:5 and CS-29, spurious RCIC can be mitigated by using the Division I valve HVE512F008.
L In Fire Areas R-1A and R-2A, the mechanical trip of valve HV15012 (HV25012) can be accomplished. Approximately twenty (20) minutes is available before the overfill condition exists resulting in two (2) phase flow through the ADS/SRVs. In Fire Areas R-1A and R-2A, operation of,ADS and CSS systems is available to mitigate against the spurious concern.
~ In Fire Area CS-9, operation of the transfer switch at the Remote Shutdown Panel allows for control of the RCIC System. The controls available at the, RSP are sufficient to mitigate the potential impacts associated with this, scenario. The impacts to RCIC associated with the MOV "Hot Short" concern identified in NRC IN.92-18 is addressed in Calculation EC-013-0859.
5.2.2 Mitigation of Spurious HPCI Fire Areas CS-10, CS-28, CS-29, CS-30, CS-31, CS-33, CS-5, CS-9, R-1A; R-1B and R-2B are areas where'spurious HPCI initiation with inadvertent reactor vessel injection could occur.
~ In Fire Areas CS-28, CS-30 and R-1B, Division I valve HVE411F002 is available to mitigate spurious operation.
~ In Fire Area R-1A (Fire Zones 1-3A and 1-4A-S), spurious cables are wrapped for spurious components. Current compliance is achieved, by existing wraps on spurious component cables for HVE411F001, HVE411F006.and 1P213.
~ In Fire Area CS-10; the spurious cables for HPCI1'IICONTROL are wrapped to prevent spurious initiation.
In Fire Areas CS-29 and CS-5, Division I valve HVE412F002 is available to
'itigate against spurious operation.
~ In. Fire Area CS-31, a hot short on the HPCI2IICONTROL could initiate spurious HPCI. If a short to ground were to occur after the hot short, HPCI automatic control logic would de-energize, thereby allowing .control .of components HVE412F001, HVE412F006 and 2P213 in order to stop HPCI.
If the hot short to the HPCI2IICONTROL is maintained, the same fire could cause an open circuit to prevent the use of the manual trip using SV25661 if~
cable [FK2P0154A (2001/E41A-008 L/C 12)] is impacted by the fire. Since cable [FK2P0154A (2001/E41A-008 L/C 12)] for the manual trip is not
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EC-01 3-0788 Page10-Revision 2
~ J affected, and since all other cables for the solenoid trip valve SV25661 are protected in this fire area, the manual trip from the control room is available.
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~ In Fire Area CS-33,' hot short on the HPCI1IICONTROL could initiate spurious HPCI. If a short to ground were to occur after the hot short, HPCI automatic control logic would de-energize, thereby allowing control. of components HVE411F001, HVE411F006 and 1P213 in order to stop HPCI.'f the, hot short to the HPCI1IICONTROL is maintained, the same fire'ould cause an open circuit to prevent the use of the manual trip using SV1 5661 if cable [FK1PP2008 (2601/E41A-008 L/C 12)] is impacted by the fire. Since cable [FK1PP2008 (2001/E41A-008 L/C 12)] for the manual trip is not affected, and since all other cables for the solenoid trip valve SV15661 are protected in this fire area, the manual trip from the control room is available.
~ In Fire Area R-2B, valve HVE412F002 is available in all fire zones except Fire Zone 2-5A-N. For the fire to cause spurious operation of the system, to damage the 54" trip and to damage'he F002 valve, it must spread from
'levation 683'-0 through the'levation 719'-1 concrete floor, slab which is 2'-3
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thick (reference drawing C-306) and, subsequently, through the elevation floor slab which is 1'-9 thick (reference drawing C-308). Each of these '49'-1 floor slabs is constructed of reinforced concrete. All three elevations are by a smoke detection system which provides an early warning 'rotected alarm in the Control Room for fire conditions. The response to a detection-alarm is an= investigation of the condition and the activation of the Fire Brigade to take any necessary manual fire suppression action. In addition, elevation 719'-1 and 749'-1 are p'rotected with automatic sprinklers. This will.
limit the spread of fire between elevations. Therefore, fire spread between elevations 683'-0 and 749'-1 will be limited and for all fires in Fire Area R-2B inadvertent HPCI injection will either be prevented or mitigated. Refer to drawings C-1730, C-1731 and C-1732 Sh. 3 and 4 for the suppression and detection provided in these areas.
~ In Fire Area CS-9, a modification will be performed to prevent HPCI from impacting safe shutdown as a result of inadvertent initiation during a Control Room fire,(Ref. PLA-4505 Att. B).
6.0 References /
I The following references were used in performing this evaluation:
1 EC-013-0965, Revision 0, "Reactor Water. Level Versus Time for a Fire Induced HPCI Start with a Failure of the High Level Trip" 2 EC-013-0859,=Revision 3, "Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis for a Control Room Fire"
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- 3. EC-013-0843, Revision 1, "SSES 10CFR50 Appendix R Compliance Manual"
- 4. EC-013-0873, Revision 1, "Evaluation to Ensure Isolation of RCS Flow Diversion in the Event of a Plant Fire"
- 6. ARCDMS database
- 7. CARTS database
- 8. M-142, Sheet 2, Revision 8, "Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrumentation"
- 9. M-149, Sheet 1, Revision 38, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling"
- 10. M-150, Sheet 1, Revision 22, "R.C.I.C. Turbine-Pump"
- 11. M-155, Sheet 1, Revision 37, "High Pressure Coolant Injection"
- 12. M-156, Sheet 1, Revision 29, "H.P.C.I. Turbine-Pump"
- 13. M-156, Sheet 2, Revision 6, "HPCI Lubricating and Control Oil"
- 14. M-2142, Sheet 2, Revision 10, "Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrumentation"
- 15. M-2149, Sheet 1, Revision 25, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling"
- 16. M-2150, Sheet 1, Rev'ision 18, "R.C.I.C. Turbine-Pump"
- 17. M-2155, Sheet 1, Revision 31, "High Pressure Coolant Injection"
- 18. M-2156, Sheet 1, Revision 21, "H.P.C.I. Turbine-Pump"
- 19. M-2156, Sheet 2, Revision 7, "HPCI Lubricating and Control Oil"
- 20. OP-150-001, Revision 16, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System"
- 21. OP-250-001, Revision 16, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System"
'2. OP-'152-001, Revision 22, "High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System"
- 23. OP-252-001, Revision 22, "High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System"
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- 24. Design Description Manual, Chapter 5, Revision A, "Primary Containment and Suppression System"
- 25. Design Description Manual, Chapter 8, Revision A, "High Pressure Coolant Injection System"
- 26. Design Description Manual, Chapter 12, Revision A, "Reactor Core, Isolation Cooling System"
- 27. E152, Sheet 22, Revision 9
- 28. E152, Sheet 23, Revision 12
- 29. E152, Sheet.27, Revision 14
- 30. E152," Sheet 4, Revision 11
- 31. E152, Sheet 5, Revision16-32 E152, Sheet 9, Revision 14
- 33. E154, Sheet 18, Revision 13
- 34. E154,*Sheet 24, Revision 12
- 35. E154, Sheet 24A, Revision 0 36 E154, Sheet 26, Revision 14 37 E154; Sheet 37, Revision 14 38 E154, Sheet 5, Revision 14 39 E154, Sheet 5A, Revision 0
- 40. E154, Sheet 7, Revision 18
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Revision 2
- 41. M1-E41-59, Sheet 4, Revision 19
- 42. M1-E41-59, Sheet 5, Revision 18
- 43. M1-E41-69, Sheet 4, Revision 10
- 44. M1-E41-69, Sheet 5, Revision 13
- 45. M1-E51-90, Sheet 203, Revision 10
- 46. M1-E51-90, Sheet 3, Revision 21
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PP&L , DOCUMENT REVIEW REVIEWERS (See Note Below)'.E.Davis-Site Fire Protection Engr 1 NOTE: Review cate o a ears in,O: desi nates reviewer s res onsible for QADR.
- 2. DATE SENTB 10/29/96 'RETURN BY:, . 10/30/96
- RETURN TO: T.A. Gorman A6-3 220-7762 NAME LOCATION ETN NO.
- 3. DOCUMENT (TITLE/NUMBER/REV.): 'C4I134788 Rev.2
- 4. ORIGINATOR: X PP&L ,
0 OTHER 5. FILE NO.:
REFERENCES ATTACHED:
COMMENT: 9., 'ESOLUTION:
2.1 - Second Para - Second sentence - you may want to add 1. This information is contained in Appendices A and B.
some information in this sentence to describe what will be damaged on 683'nd 749'. It is not clear what is on 683',
719', or 749'.
r 2.1 - Second Para - Second sentence - A smoke detection 2. This information has been included in paragraphs 2.1 or system is installed on elevations 683', 719', and 749'hich 5.2.2. Paragraph 2.1 has.been adjusted to include summary provides an early warning alarm in the Control Room for fire information. Paragraph 5.2.2 has been adjusted to include all conditions. Response to a detection alarm is investigation of the required details including specific drawing references for of the condition and activation of the Fire Brigade to take each piece of information.
any necessary manual fire suppression actions.
CS-9 . 3. This typo has been corrected 5.2.2 - seventh bulldot - same comments as 2.1 above. 4. See response 2 abov'e.
6.0- Add references to C-1700 series drawings for 5. As stated in response 2 above the required references have sprinklers and detection, and appropriate civil drawings for floor, construction. in the reference sectiori.'I been added in the text. These references will not be included
- 8. S.E. Davis 10/29/96 ,10., Thomas A. Gorman I/ Ai 10/30/96 SUBMITTED DATE RESOLVED DATE II PAGE1OF 1 Form NDAP-QA4101-1, Rev. 1
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PP8cL DOCUMENT REVIEW jZ r-6'g S'r e~
REVIEWERS (See Note Below)
S.E.Davis-Site Fire Protection Engr 1 NOTE: Review cate o appears in; desi nates reviewer'(s) responsible for QADR.
- 2. DATE SENT: 10/29/96 RETURN BY: . 10/30/96 RETURN TO: T.A. Gorman A6-3 220-7762
'AME LOCATION ETN NO.
- 3. 'OCUMENT (TITLE/NUMBER/REV.): EC-013%788 Rev. 2
- 4. ORIGINATOR: X 'P&L C3 OTHER 5. FILE NO.:
r REFERENCES ATTACHED:
- 7. COMMENT: 9. RESOLUTION:
- you may want to add some information in this sentence to describe what will be damaged on 683'nd 749'. It is not clear what is on 683',
719', or 749'.
- A smoke detection system is installed on elevations 683', 719', and 749'hich provides an early warning alarm in the Control Room for fire conditions. Response to a detection alarm is investigation of the condition and activation of the Fire Brigade to take any necessary manual fire suppression actions.
- change "Fire Areas CS-9 to 'Fire Area CS-9".
same comments as 2.1- above.
g}-Add references to C-1700 series drawings for sprinklers and detection, and appropriate civil drawings for floor, construction.
- 8. S.E. Davis 10/29/96 10.
SUBMITTED DATE RESOLVED 'DATE PAGE 1 OF 1 Form NDAP-QA-0101-1, Rev, 1
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EC-013-0788 Page 12 Revision 2 TABLE 1 RClC Components of Concern for Reactor Vessel Overfill Iu e ri u CC t C m Unit 1 Failure Unit 2 RCIC1ICONTROL Hot Short RCIC2ICONTROL of or HVE511 F045 Hot Short HVE512F045 and and
. HVE511F013 Hot Short HVE512F013
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RC C ati C on Unit 1 Unit 2 HVE511F007 HVE512F007 of OI'VE512 HVE511 F008 F008 or or HVE511 F059 HVE512F059 or OI'VE511F012 HVE512F012 of or HVE511F031 HVE512F031 and and HVE511F010 HVE512F010 OI' of HV15012 HV25012 or Mechanical trip of OI'echanical trip of HV1 5012 HV25012
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EC-013-0788 Page 13
, Revision 2 TABLE 2 HPCI Components of Concern for Reactor Vessel Overfill Fa eRe S s C ta In tn C Unit1 Failure Unit 2 HPCI1IICONTROL Hot Short HPCI2II CONTROL or or HVE411 F001 Hot Short HVE412F001 and I and HVE411F006 Hot Short HVE412F006 and and 1P213 Hot Short 2P213 C C "Unit 1 Unit 2 ~,
" HVE411F002 HVE412 F002 or or HVE411F003 HVE412F 003 or
" HVE411F066 OI'VE412F066 of or SV1 5661 SV25661
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'C-013-0788 Page 14 Revision 2 TABLE 3
'RCIC Spurious Cables QabLm HVE511F013 EK1E51005 9221/E51A-005 E154/7.
1 HVE511F013 EK1PQ2107 2101/E51A-007 .. E154/7 1 HVE511F013 EP1Q1306A E154/7 1 HVE511F013 EK1Q1306C E154/7 HVE511 F013 EK1Q1306F E154/7 HVE511F013, EK1Q1306G E154/7 1 HVE511 F045. EKI E51011 '221/E51A-011 E154/5 1, HVE511 F045 EK1 PQ2103 2101/E51A-003, E154/5 1' HVE511 F045 EP,1Q1304A E154/5A HVE511 F045 . EK1Q1304C E154/5A 1 HVE511 F045 EK1Q1304F E154/5A 1 HVE511F045 , EK1Q1304G E154/5A HVE51.1F045 EK1Q1304H E154/5A HVE511F045 EK1Q1304J E154/5A HVE511F045 'EK1Q1304K E154/5A RCIC.1 ICONTROL EK1PQ2109 2101/E51A-009 L/C 1 M1-E51-90/3 RCIC1!CONTROL EK1PQD102
'2118/E51A-002 L/C 3 M1-E51-90/3 RCIC1I CONTROL EK1E51007 9221/E51A-007 UC 2 M1-E51-90/3 RCIC1ICONTROL EK1Q1315D E154/18 2 HVE512F013 EK2P0167A i2101/E51A-007 E154/26
',2 HVE512F013 EP2Q1306A E154/26 2 HVE512F013 EK2Q1306C E154/26 2 HVE512F013 EK2Q1306F E154/26 2, HVE512F013 EK2Q1306G E154/26 2' HVE512F01 3 EM2E51005 9221/E51A-005 E154/26 HVE512F 045 EK2E51006. 9221/E51A-011 E154/24 2 HVE512F045 EK2P0163A 2101/E51A-003 E154/24 2 HVE512F045 EP2Q1304A E154/24A .
' HVE512F045 EK2Q1304C E154/24A 2 HVE512 F045, EK2Q1304F E154/24A 2 HVE512F045 EK2Q13'04G E154/24A 2 HVE512F045 'K2Q1304H E154/24A 2 HVE512F045 EK2Q1304J. E154/24A HVE512 F045 EK2Q1304K E154/24A RCIC2ICONTROL EK2E51 002 9221/E51A-007 UC 2 M1-E51-90/203 RCIC2I CONTROL EK2P0169A 2101/E51A-009 UC 1 M1-E51-90/203 RCIC2ICONTROL EK2P0175A ~ 2118/E51A-002 UC 3 M1-E51-90/203.
'RCIC2ICONTROL EK2Q1315D E154/37
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EC-013-0788 Page 15 Revision 2 TABLE 4 HPCI Spurious Cables Gpurima GaII 1P213 FK1PP2009 2001/E41A-009 UC 72 E152/4 1P213 FK1Q4003C E152/4 1P213 FK1Q4003D E152/4 1P213 FP1Q4003A E152/4 HPCI1 I ICONTROL FK1PN2622
. 2620/E41A-002 L/C 167 M1-E41-69/4 HPCI1IICONTROL FK1PN2621 2620/E41A-001 L/C 166 Ml-E41-69/5 HPCI1I I CONTROL FK1PP2809 2001/E41A-009 L/C 6 M1-E41-69/4 HVE411 F001 FK1PP2007 2001/E41A-007 L/C 139 - ~ '152/5 HVE411 F001 FK1E41002 L/C 123 '420/E41A-011 E152/5 ~
HVE411F001 FK1Q4004F. E152/5 HVE411 F001 FK1Q4004G E152/5 HVE411F001 FP1Q4004A E152/5 HVE411F006 FK1E41 004 9420/E41A-002 L/C 135 E152/9 HVE411F006 FK1PP2012 2001/E41A-012 UC 134 E152/9 HVE411 F006 ; FK1Q4008E '152/9 HVE411F006 , FP1Q4008A E152/9 2P213 FK2P0155A 2001/E41A-009 L/C 72 E152/22 2P213 FK2Q4003C'K2Q4003D E152/22 2 2P213 E152/22 2 2P213 FP2Q4003A E152/22 2 HPCI2IICONTROL FK2P0155A 2001/E41A-009 L/C 6 M1-E41-59/4 HPCI2IICONTROL FK2P0223 J 2620/E41A-002 L/C 167 M1-E41-59/5 HPCI2IICONTROL FK2P0223K 2620/E41A-001 L/C 166 M1-E41-59/4.
2 HVE412F001 FK2P0153A 2001/E41A-007 UC 139 E152/23 2 HVE412 F001 FK2E41011 9420/E41A-011 L/C 123 E152/23 2 HVE412F001 FK2Q4004F E152/23 2 HVE412F001 FK2Q4004G E152/23 2, HVE412F001 FP2Q4004A E152/23'152/27.
2 HVE412F006 FK2E41002 . 9420/E41A-002 UC135 2 'VE412F006 FK2P0157A 2001/E41A-012 UC134 E152/27 2 HVE412F006 FK2Q4008E E152/27 2 HVE412F006 FP2Q4008A E152/27
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EC-013-0788 Page 16 Revision'2
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Appendix A HPCI Cable Hit Matrix 4
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'ate: 10I28198 APPENDN A EC<1 34788 HPCI Cable Hit Matrix Paga 17 I
'evision 2 HVFA11F001 HVR411FOOC 1P21$ (powar aV1 CCC1 HPCI1ICOHTROL HPClt IICOHTROL HVE411F002 HVFA11F00$ HVK411FOCC (powar 1D2C4 (powar 1D2C4 1D274 path (powar1DC24 (powar1DC14 (powar1DC24 path (powar 182$ 7 (powor 1D2C4 (power 1D274 F RP th 2$ H 2$ HR th 2$ th 12 th1 th 2$ HR th 2$ H CS-10 0-2 CS-20 ~ I CS- 4 2 I
-2 24 a
-29 0-2 0-24G 26 26I 26 041B
-1A 1 A
-1 A-1 1Q W 13 1-1 C 1
13 1<A41 2-1 2-2A 2<AS
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-1A 2-1 2-2B 2%A A '1
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Date: 112198 APPENDlX A E~1 34788 HPCI Cable Hit Matrix Page 18 Revision 2 vo n on HVE41 2F001 HVE412F006 2P213 (powor SV26661 HPCI2ICONTROL HPCI2IICONTROL HVE412F 002 HVE412F003 HVE412F066 (powor 2D264 (powor 2D264 2D274 path (powor 2D624 (powor 2D614 (powor 2D624 path (powor 2B237 (powor 2D264 (powor 2D274 th 23HR 23HR . 23H th 23 12 23 th 12 th 23HR 23H CS-10 CS-20 0-28A-II 3 CS-24 0-8 I 3 CS-28 24D 1 29 0-25 A 1 CSSO 0-24G =-
1 0-26 26H 2 8 26 I 2 0-26P 2 0-26R 2
$ 41A 1 2A 13A 3 3
1<A 1 AS 13
-1B 1-1C 1-1D 1-2 1
13 1CC44 1 1 W 1 1&A4I 1 14B 1 1~ 1 1 A44 1
-2A 2-1 2-2A 2QA 3 2AAS 2 A
-2A-2B 2S W 13 2SC-W 13 2-1D 2-1 2-2 24A44 A 1
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EC-013-0788 Page 19 Revision 2 L
Appendix B .
RCIC Cable Hit Matrix
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Dat /96 Ap ixB -0788 RCIC Cable Hit Matrix Page 20 Revision 2 Spurious Components RCIC RCIC Mitigating functions Solenoid trip valve Mechanical E511C002 to trip of close FA FZ RP RCIC1ICONTROL HVE511F045 HVE511F013 HV15012 HV15012 HVE511F031 and HVE511F010 HVE511F012 HVE511F007 HVE511 F008 HVE511F059 A-1 0-00 13 CS-10 0-27C 3 S CS-11 0-28A-I 1 CS-15 0-28H 1 .X CS-20 0-28A-II 3 CS-23 0-28F 3 CS-24 0-28B-II 3 CS-28 0-24D 1 CS-29 0-25A 1 CS-30 0-25E 1 S .
CS-31 0-27A 3 CS-32 0-27B 3 CS-33 0-27E 3 S ~
CS-5 0-24G 1 CS-7 0-26C 3 0-26D 3 0-26T 3 S 0-26V 3 ~
0-27G 3 S 0-27H 3 S CS-9 0-26G 2 0-26H 2 S S 0-26I 2 0-26M 2 0-26N 2 0-26P 2 0-26R 2 0-41A 3
&41B 1 DQ 041C 3 R-1A 1-1A 1-1F 1-1G 1-2A 13A 3 S 1-3C-S 3 14A-S 3 S-1-SA-S 3 S S ~ S X R-1A-1B 1 3B-W 13 14C-W 13 S 1 4A-W 13 16D 13 R-1B 1-1C
0 Oat ge A ixB -0788 RCIC Cable Hit Matrix . Page21 Revision 2 Spurious Components RCIC RCIC Mitigating functions Solenoid trip valve Mechanical E511C002 to trip of close FA FZ RP RCIC1ICONTROL HVE511F045 HVE511F013 HV1 5012 HV1 5012 HVE511F031 and HVE511F010 HVE511F01 2 HVE511F 007 HVE511F 008 HVE511F 059 1-1D S 1-1E 1-28 S S X 1-2D S S 1-38-N S 1-3C-N 1-4A-N 148 S 144G , S R-1C 144F NIA R-1D 1-58 1R R-1E 144C R-1H 1-5G R-2A 2-18 2-1F 2-1G 2-2A 2-3A 2-384 13 2-3C-S 2-4AM 2AG 2-SAC 2-5C 2-SE R-2A-28 2-38-W 13 2-3C-W 13 24A-W 13 2-SA-W 13 AD 13 R-28 2r1A 2-1C 2-1D 2-1E 2-28 2-38-N 2-3C-N 24A-N 2-5A-N AC R-2C 24F R-2D 2-58 1R R-2E 2RC
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Dat~/96 Ap ixB -0788 RCIC Cable Hit Matrix Page 22 Revision 2 Spurious Components RCIC RCIC Mitigating functions Solenoid trip valve Mechanical E511C002 to trip of close FA FZ RP RCIC1ICONTROL HVE511F045 HVE511F013 HV1 5012 HV15012 HVE511F031 and HVE511F010 HVE511F012 HVE511F007 HVE511F 008 HVE511 F059 R-2F 240 3 R-2H 2-5G T-1 0-TB 13 S
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