ML19320A510
| ML19320A510 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi, Susquehanna, Columbia, LaSalle, Zimmer, Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1980 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17138B374 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8006250328 | |
| Download: ML19320A510 (14) | |
Text
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EM ME3 5/14/80 O
NTOL LICENSING RESOLUTION GROUP i.
i MEETING WITH NRC MAY 14, 1980 f,
9:00 A.M.**
PHILLIPS BUILDING BETHESDA, MARYLAND f
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AGENDA 5/14/80
- 1. -
REVIEW PURPOSE
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SUMMARY
OF MAY 1 MEETING ORGANIZATION INITIAL ASSESSEMENT-OF FEASIBILITY INITIAL NRC RESPONSE OBJE'TIVES OF MAY 14 M$ETING 2.
C
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e FINALIZE NRC/ UTILITY INTERFACE e
AFFIRMATION OF LEAD PLANT SER APPROACH JOINT REVIEW 0F ISSUES (CATEGORIZE /PRIORITIZE/ RESPOND)
COMMON CLOSURE BASES e
HOW IT SHOULD WORK!
(GROUP MECHANICS)
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FUTURE" ACTIONS 3.
e WORKING GROUP MEETINGS APPLY EXISTING CLOSURE BASES REVIEW REMAINING OPEN ISSUES RSB I & CB MARK II TMI GENERIC ISSUES OTHER BRANCH ISSUES e
'TMI SUPPLEMENT 4
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COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY LASALLE COUNTY - 1 CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY ZIMMER DETROIT EDISON COMPANY FERMI - 2 SHOREHAM-LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SUSQUEHANNA - 1 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP - 2 O
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NUMBER RESOLVED NUMBER FOR ON AT WHICH GENERIC FOTENTIAL-
. TYPE OF NUMBER.0F LEAST ONE RESOLUTION IS
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ISSUE ISSUES DOCKET FEASIBLE EXPANSION-EXAMPLES DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE CATEGORY 1
'2 DRAWING AND SCHEMATIC PLANT SPECIFIC 23 8
CONTRADICTIONS ISSUES RPS MG SET PROTECTION CATEGORY 2 BWR DESIGN GENERIC 40 10 29 11 ODYN REANALYSIS ISSUES ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS CATEGORY 3 WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)
UNRESOLVED GENERIC 15 4
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SAFETY ISSUES i
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COMPLETE SER's 1.
ZIMMER IS A COMPLETED MODEL 2.
EXCEPT FOR OPEN ITEMS; ALL PLANTS READY FOR BULK OF.SER 3.
FINISHOPENITEMSFORLEADNT0LPLANT-FILLIN COMMON ITEMS FOR OTHER 5 4.
TAKE EACH PLANT IN LINE BEYOND LEAD P NT A.
COMPLETE PLANT SER
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APPLY COMMON RESOLUTIONS TO REMAINING SER's 5.
LAST PLANT SHOULD HAVE MINIMUM UNIQUE ITEMS REMAINING AFTER 5 COMPLETED.
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EACH PLANT SUPPORTS THOSE BEFORE IT AND RECEIVES SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF ISSUES-e O
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_INITIALNRd~R$550N55 NRCMANAGEMENTISINFAVOROFOURAPPROACHBECAUSEOFi e
EISENHUT/ROSS REACTIONS TO NTOL LICENSING APPROACH DISCUSSED IN PH0ENIX (5/1/80)
ZIMMER SER (IS) ACCEPTABLE BASIS LEAD PLANT SER APPROACH IS FEASIBLE COMMON APPROACH TO RESOLVING ISSUES IS ENCOURAGED NO NEW ISSUES WITHOUT PRIOR SAFETY /
TECHNOLOGY DIVISION REVIEW.
o IDENTIFICATION OF NRC COORDINATOR TO WORK WITH UTILITY COORDINATOR e
OUR APPROACH CONSERVES RESOURCES EXPEDITES LICENSING PROCESS STABILIZES THE PROCESS l
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5 / 111/ 8 0 MECHANICS I.
REVIEW ISSUES - NTOL ACTION, NRC SUPPORT A.
IDENTIFY ISSUES '
UNRESOLVED COMMON B.
IDENTIFY CLOSURE STATUS EACH DOCKET FORMAL INFORMAL C.
APPLY CLOSURE STATUS EACH DOCKET WHEREVER POSSIBLE D.
RESOLVE' REMAINDER CONSENSUS POSITION WHEREVER POSSIBLE ADDRESS OTHERS AS PLANT UNIQUE II'.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES - NRC ACTION', NTOL SUPPORT A'.'
REVIEW CLOSURE BASES CONSENSUS POSITIONS B.
APPLICATION FORMAL CLOSURE BASES ALL DOCKETS C.
DOCUMENTATION ISSUE LEAD PLANT SER DOCUMENT OTHER NT0L DOCKETS
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5/114/80 REVIEW 0F ISSUES e
NEED FOR DOCUMENTS (NRC ACTION)
ZIMMER SER SUPPLEMENT LA SALLE SER DRAFT TMI NT0L REQUIRMENTS FOR OL e
NEED FOR LIST OF ISSUES (NRC ACTION)
UNRESOLVED ISSUES LIST BY PLANT e
STATUS OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES (NTOL ACTION)
DEFINE COMMON ISSUES ESTABLISH BASIS FOR RESOLUTION EXISTING' CLOSURE BASIS CONSENSUS POSITION PLANT UNIQUE 4
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[jgggg [gp ggg,gg Emaraency Core Cooling System The applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report states that the emergency core
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cooling system includes the following subsystems: (1) high pressure core spray system, (2) autcmatic depressurization system, (3) low pressure core spray system, and (4) low pressure coolant injection code of the residual heat removal system.
1 The purpose of emergency core cooling system instrumentation and controls is to
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initiate appropriate responses from the system to ensure that the fuel is i
adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident. The cooling provided by the system restricts the release of radioactive materials from the fuel by preventing or limiting the extent of fuel damage following situations in which 1
reactor coolant is lost from the nuclear system. The emergency core cooling j
. system instrumentation is, designed to detect a need for core cooling systems operation, and to initiate the apprcpriate actions. Successful core cooling for a specified line break accident is depicted in Figure 7.3-1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report for small line breaks: (1) the depressurization phase is i
accotaplished by the high, pressure core spray system, automatic depressurization l
system A or automatic depressurization system B, and (2) the low pressure core cooling phase is accomplished by low pressure core spray system, any two residual heat removal system pumps or the high pressure core spray system.
, y Similarly, the large break model uses the low pressure care spray system, the high pressure core spray system or'the three residual heat remova'l system pumps for successful core cooling.
As a result of the response to acceptance review Request 222.14 and in accordance
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with the assumptions and results of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix B 4
and Chapter 15, it is our position that the reactor core isoiation cooling system is also an engineered safety feature because it is required to be redundant to the p
high pressure core spray system to provide early core cooling in the event of a control rod drop accident at power. The reactor core isolation cooling system did ~
not have a seismic Category I water source..The applicant did not agree with our position; however, the design was modified to provide automatic. transfer to the suppression pool. This design change results in a reactor core isolation cooling i
systen which satisfies our acceptance criteria.
2 Fill Pumps 1
Each subsysten of the emergency core cooling system, with the exception of the automatic depressurization system, is provided with a fill pump to keep the pump discharge piping full. The design basis for the fill systen is to prevent water hammer when an cmergency core cooling system pump is started. The fill pumps are powered from the same division as their respective emergency core cooling system pumps. System pressure monitoring is provided to alert the operator as to fill 7-9 E
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QUESTTON 212.74
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"In analyzing anticipated operational transients, the applicanc has taken credit for plant operating equipment which has not been shown ro be reliabic as required by General Design Criterion 29.
The staff has discussed the application of this equipmenc generically with General Electric.
Based on these discussions, it is the staff's understanding that the most limiting transient that takes credit for this equipment is the excess feedwater event.
Further, it is the staff's understanding that the only plant operating equipment that plays a significant role in citigating this event is the turbine bypass system and the Level 8 high water level trip (closes turbine stop valves).
"In or$er to assure an acceptable level of performance, it is the staff's position that th'is equipment be identificil in the plant Technical Specifications eith regard to availability, set points, and surveillance testing. The applicant must submit his plan for implemehti'ng this requirement along with any system r.odifications that may be required to fulfill the requirements."
RESPONSE
In discussions between CE and the NRC on November 20 and 21,1978, GE q
reported on the results of transient analysis when performed to V
design-basis cccident conditions assu:ptions, and ' equipment avail-abilities, that failure to give credit to the L8 Turbine Trip and the Main Turbine By-Pass system could respectively result in ACPR's of 0.02 and 0.08.
In no manner could these postulated accident events res' ult in unacceptable impacts on the health and safety of the public as CDC criteria,,No. 29 requires.
4 L8 Tech Spec
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The L8 instrumentation is already subject to technical specifications requirements associated with the HPCS.
Since the NRC issues the fa-cility tech specs such a requirement can be acccc::'odated by the present design.
Main Turbine By-Pass System Tech Spec The turbine bypass sys'em and stop valves 3re furnished'with the main t
turbine generator by Westinghouse and have' exhibited high reliability on existing nuclear and fossil fueled operati6n units.
Normal CG&E operating procedures require that the valves be func-tionally exercised weekly.
This will ensure valve operability and provide adequate. assurance -that the valves.will operate when required.
The feedwater LSD uill be submitted in Revicion 58.
This drawing will 57 indicate the testability of the control circuits for the turbine bypass.
valves.
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