ML15293A549

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2015-10 Draft Outlines
ML15293A549
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 10/02/2015
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML15293A549 (81)


Text

ES-401 PWR RO Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2 Facility: STP Date of Exam:

RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

  • Total
1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 6 Emergency &

Abnormal Plant 2 2 2 2 N/A 1 1 N/A 1 9 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 5 5 5 4 4 4 27 10 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 28 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 10 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 4 3 3 38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 3 2 2 3 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X following concepts as 3.5 1 they apply to the small break LOCA:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.02 Use of steam tables RO 3.5/SRO 4.2 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 4.0 2 as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow)

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.22 RCP seal failure/malfunction RO 4.0/SRO4.2 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 Ability to determine and interpret the following 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat 3.4 3 Removal System:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.07 Pump cavitation RO 3.4/SRO 3.7 G 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X for systems operating parameters that are entry 3.9 4 Water / 8 level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

(CFR: 45.2 / 45.6)

RO 3.9/SRO 4.0 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer 2.8 5 System Malfunction / 3 Pressure Control Malfunctions:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.02 Expansion of liquids as temperature increases RO2.8/SRO 3.1

ES-401 3 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the and 000029 ATWS / 1 X the following an ATWS: 2.9 6 (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.06 Breakers, relays, and disconnects RO 2.9*/SRO 3.1*

Knowledge of the reasons for the following 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X responses as the apply to the SGTR: 4.4 7 (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.02 Prevention of secondary PORV cycling RO 4.4/SRO 4.5 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: 3.9 8 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.15 T-ave. protection indicators RO 3.9*/SRO 3.8*

Ability to determine and interpret the following 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater 4.1 9 Feedwater / 4 (MFW):

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.03 Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup RO 4.1/SRO 4.2 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and 4.6 10 immediate action steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

RO 4.6 / SRO 4.8 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X as they apply to 3.6 11 the Loss of Offsite Power:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.06 Safety injection pump RO 3.6*/SRO 3.6*

Knowledge of the reasons for the following 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X responses as they apply to 4.1 12 the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.01 Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus RO 4.1/SRO 4.4

ES-401 4 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 Knowledge of the reasons for the following 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X responses as they apply to 4.0 13 the Loss of DC Power:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.1)

AK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power RO 4.0/SRO 4.2 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X Ability to determine and interpet the following as 2.9 they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS):

CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 14 AA2.01 Location of leak in the SWS RO 2.9/SRO3.6 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X major system components and controls. 3.2 15 (CFR: 41.7)

RO 3.2/SRO 3.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant X following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of 16 Recirc. / 4 Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of 3.7 emergency systems.

RO 3.7/SRO 4.0 Knowledge of the interrelations between the BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat X (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following: 3.9 17 Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.2 Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

RO 3.9/SRO 4.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric X Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances 3.1 18 Grid Disturbances / 6 and the following:

(CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10/ 45.8)

AK 2.0 1 Motors RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 18/6

ES-401 5 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X 3.6 19 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.02 Guidance contained in EOP for loss of intermediate range instrumentation.

RO 3.6/SRO 3.9 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X 3.5 20 following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.03 Reactor building containment evacuation alarm enable switch.

RO 3.5/SRO 3.9 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X 3.8 21 following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.06 Main steam line rad monitor meters RO 3.8*/SRO 3.9*

Ability to determine and interpret the 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 3.9 22 following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.02 Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip.

RO 3.9/SRO 4.1 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 X 3.4 23 system limits and precautions.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)

RO 3.4/ SRO 3.8

ES-401 6 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 Knowledge of the operational 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X 2.5 24 implications of the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.02 Biological effects on humans of the various types of radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for personnel in a nuclear reactor power plant; the units used for radiation intensity measurements and for radiation exposure levels.

RO 2.5/SRO 3.1*

Knowledge of the interrelations between 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 X 2.5 25 the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)

System Alarms and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.01 Detectors at each ARM system location.

RO 2.5*/SRO 2.6*

000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X Knowledge of the operational 3.4 26 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SI Termination)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (SI Termination).

RO 3.4/SRO 3.9 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X Knowledge of the interrelations between 3.0 27 the (Steam Generator Overpressure) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.2 Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

RO 3.0/SRO 3.2 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5

ES-401 7 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 2 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 9/4

ES-401 8 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to predict and/or monitor 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.6 28 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

A1.03 RCP motor stator winding temperatures RO 2.6 /SRO 2.6 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 004 Chemical and Volume X malfunction on the following CVCS 4.4 29 Control components:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.17 Flow paths for emergency boration RO 4.4/SRO 4.6 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 005 Residual Heat Removal X following malfunctions or operations 2.7 30 on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 Failure modes for pressure, flow, pump motor amps, motor temperature, and tank level instrumentation RO 2.7/SRO 2.9*

Knowledge of the operational 006 Emergency Core Cooling X implications of the following concepts 2.5 31 as they apply to ECCS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.11 Basic heat transfer equation RO 2.5/SRO 2.4*

Ability to monitor automatic 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X operation of the PRTS, including: 2.7 32 Tank (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Components which discharge to the PRT.

RO 2.7*/SRO 2.9

ES-401 9 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to manually operate and/or 008 Component Cooling Water X monitor in the control room: 2.7 33 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A4.05 Normal CCW-header total flow rate and the flow rates to the components cooled by the CCWS.

RO 2.7*/ 2.5 Knowledge of bus power supplies to 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X the following: 3.0 34 (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Pressurizer Heaters RO 3.0/SRO 3.4 Knowledge of RPS design feature(s) 012 Reactor Protection X and/or interlock(s) which provide for 3.2 35 the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.06 Automatic or manual enable/disable of RPS trips RO 3.2/ SRO 3.5 Ability to monitor automatic 013 Engineered Safety Features X operation of the ESFAS including: 3.7 36 Actuation (CFR: 41.7/45.5)

A3.01 Input channels and logic RO 3.7*/SRO 3.9 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 022 Containment Cooling X malfunction of the CCS will have on 3.0 37 the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 Containment instrumentation readings.

RO 3.0/SRO 3.3 025 Ice Condenser

ES-401 10 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) 026 Containment Spray X and/or interlock(s) which provide for 4.1 38 the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.08 Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)

RO 4.1*/SRO 4.3*

Knowledge of the operational 039 Main and Reheat Steam X implications of the following concepts 2.7 39 as the apply to the MRSS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.05 Bases for RCS cooldown limits RO 2.7/SRO 3.1*

Ability to predict and/or monitor 059 Main Feedwater X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.7 40 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.03 Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves RO 2.7*/SRO 2.9*

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X following malfunctions or operations 3.4 41 Feedwater on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.07 Air or MOV failure.

RO 3.4/SRO 3.5 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident 062 AC Electrical Distribution X instrumentation. 3.7 42 (CFR: 41.6 / 45.4)

RO 3.7/SRO 3.9 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal 3.9 43 to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems.

RO 3.9/SRO 4.5

ES-401 11 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X malfunction of the following will have 3.2 44 on the ED/G system:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.08 Fuel oil storage tanks RO 3.2/ SRO 3.3 Knowledge of the physical connections 073 Process Radiation X and/or cause effect relationships 3.6 45 Monitoring between the PRM system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.01 Those systems served by PRMs RO 3.6/SRO 3.9 Ability to predict and/or monitor 076 Service Water X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.6 46 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.02 Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures RO 2.6*/SRO 2.6*

K3 Knowledge of the effect that a loss 078 Instrument Air X or malfunction of the IAS will have on 3.4 47 the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 Systems having pneumatic valves and controls.

RO 3.4/SRO 3.6 Knowledge of containment system 103 Containment X design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 3.1 48 which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.06 Containment isolation system.

RO 3.1/SRO 3.7

ES-401 12 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 2.2.42 Ability to recognize indications 008 Component Cooling Water X for system operating parameters 3.4 49 which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

(CFR: 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3)

RO 3.4/ SRO 4.0 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 026 Containment Spray X malfunction of the CSS will have on 4.2 50 the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 Recirculation spray system RO 4.2/SRO 4.3 Knowledge of the physical connections 063 DC Electrical Distribution X and/or cause/effect relationships 2.9 51 between the DC electrical system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.03 Battery charger and battery RO 2.9/SRO 3.5 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X following malfunctions or operations 2.7 52 on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.08 Consequences of opening/closing breaker between buses (VARS, out-of-phase, voltage).

RO 2.7/SRO 3.1 Ability to manually operate and/or 076 Service Water X monitor in the control room: 2.9 53 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 SWS pumps RO 2.9/ SRO 2.9

ES-401 13 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to monitor automatic 078 Instrument Air X operation of the IAS, including: 3.1 54 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Air Pressure.

RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 Knowledge of bus power supplies to 005 Residual Heat Removal X the following: 3.2 55 (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 RHR pumps RO 3.0/ SRO 3.2 K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 Group Point Total: 28/

5

ES-401 14 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control X Knowledge of bus power supplies to the 3.1 56 following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Charging pumps RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 014 Rod Position Indication Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X and/or interlock(s) provide for the 3.7 57 following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.07 Permissives RO 3.7/SRO 3.8 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 029 Containment Purge X following malfunctions or operations on 2.9 58 the Containment Purge System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 Maintenance or other activity taking place inside containment.

RO 2.9/SRO 3.6 Ability to monitor automatic operation 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 2.9 59 including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.02 Spent fuel leak or rupture RO 2.9/SRO 3.1 034 Fuel Handling Equipment

ES-401 15 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 035 Steam Generator X Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.6 60 malfunction on the following will have on the S/GS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.03 S/G level detector RO 2.6/SRO 3.0 041 Steam Dump/Turbine X Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.1 61 Bypass Control changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.02 Steam pressure RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 045 Main Turbine Generator X malfunction of the MT/G system will 2.9 62 have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.01 Remainder of the plant RO 2.9/SRO 3.2 055 Condenser Air Removal Knowledge of the physical connections 056 Condensate X and/or cause-effect relationships 2.6 63 between the Condensate System and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.03 MFW RO 2.6*/SRO 2.6 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring

ES-401 16 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 075 Circulating Water X following malfunctions or operations on 2.5 64 the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.02 Loss of circulating water pumps RO 2.5 / SRO 2.7 079 Station Air Ability to monitor automatic operation 086 Fire Protection X of the Fire Protection System including: 65 2.9 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps RO 2.9/SRO 3.3 K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 Group Point Total: 10/

3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) FORM ES-401-3 Facility: STP Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, 2.1. 3.6 66 records, status boards, and reports.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 1.

Conduct RO 3.6 SRO 3.8 of Operations 2.1.21 Ability to obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.

2.1. 3.1 67 (CFR: 45.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.1 SRO 3.2 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift turnover practices.

2.1. 3.0 68 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.0 SRO 3.4 Subtotal 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

2.2. 3.6 69 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.6 SRO 3.8

2. 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and 2.2. 3.4 70 Equipment safety limits.

Control (CFR: 43.2 / 45.2)

RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 Subtotal 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining 2.3. 3.2 71 to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

3.

Radiation Control (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and 2.3. 2.5 72 contamination control, including permissible levels in excess of those authorized.

(CFR: 43.4 / 45.10)

RO 2.5 SRO 3.1 Subtotal 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, 2.4. 3.6 73 records, status boards, and reports.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 4.

Emergency RO 3.6 SRO 3.8 Procedures / 2.4.16 Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and 2.4. 3.5 74 Plan coordination with other support procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

RO 3.5 SRO 4.4

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) FORM ES-401-3 Facility: STP Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.

2.4. 3.9 75 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 4.3 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 PWR SRO Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2 Facility: STP Date of Exam: 9/24/2015 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

  • Total
1. 1 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 N/A N/A 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 5 5 10 1 2 3 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#)

on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following as 4.2 they apply to a small break LOCA:

76 (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.34 Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following as 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X they apply to a Large Break LOCA: 4.7 (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 77 EA2.01 Actions to be taken, based on RCS temperature and pressure - saturated and superheated 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 EPE: 029 Anticipated Transient Without Scram 4.2 (ATWS)

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 78 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X APE: 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.2 (CFR 55.43.2, 55.41.5, 55.41.7) 79 G2.2.25 Knowledge of the basis in the Technical Specifications for limiting conditions and safety limits 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 APE: 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water 4.0 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 80 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

ES-401 3 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: 4.1 (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 81 AA2.05 When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 Group Point Total: 18/6

ES-401 4 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 X APE: 032 Loss of Source Range Nuclear 4.6 83 Instrumentation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and 4.6 82 logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

RO 4.0/SRO 4.6 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X 85 following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.02 Corrective actions required for high fission product activity in RCS. 3.4 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the 3.3 84 following as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

RO 2.9/SRO 3.3 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1

ES-401 5 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 Group Point Total: 9/4

ES-401 6 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X 4.1 86 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.7/SRO 4.1 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features X APE: 013 Engineered Safety Features 4.7 87 Actuation Actuation System (ESFAS) 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

RO 4.4 SRO 4.7 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 4.5 88 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

RO 3.6 / SRO 4.5 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X 3.8 89 Feedwater A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.04 pump failure or improper operation.

062 AC Electrical Distribution

ES-401 7 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water X A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 3.7 90 following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45/3 / 45/13)

A2.01 Loss of SWS 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 28/5

ES-401 8 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication X 014 Rod position Indication 3.9 91 A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.04 Misaligned rod 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 4.6 92 (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 3.2 93 A1 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Fuel Handling System controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.01 Load limits 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water

ES-401 9 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10/3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) FORM ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core 2.1. alterations. 4.1 94 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.7)

1. 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

Conduct 2.1. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 4.2 95 of Operations 2.1.

2.1.

Subtotal 2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance 2.2. activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, 3.9 96 work prioritization, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13))

2. 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to Equipment 2.2. procedures. 3.6 97 Control (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 2.2.

2.2.

Subtotal 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to 2.3. licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor 3.8 98 alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning

3. filters, etc.

Radiation (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Control 2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status 2.4. that must be reported to internal organizations or external 4.1 99 agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission

4. system operator.

Emergency (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Procedures / 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan 2.4. implementation. 4.5 100 Plan (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 2.4.

2.4.

Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As FORM ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/1 EK1.02 This was supposed to be a generic K/A, EK 1.02 mistakenly selected. Replace with Generic K/A 2.4.1 2/1 2.1.33 This K/A is not one of the topics for Tiers 1 and 2 Generic K/As. Replace with K/A 2.1.25 3/1 2.1.11 This K/A was moved with the release of Revision 2, Supplement 1 of NUREG 1021. Replace with K/A 2.1.18 3/3 2.3.1 This K/A was moved with the release of Revision 2, Supplement 1 of NUREG 1021. Replace with K/A 2.3.12 3/4 2.4.15 This K/A was moved with the release of Revision 2, Supplement 1 of NUREG 1021. Replace with K/A 2.4.17 1/1 000022 Loss of Rejected K/A as could not come up with a quality question.

Rx Coolant Replaced with 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4, AA1.22 RCP Makeup / 2 Seal failure/malfunction Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup:

AA1.07 Excess letdown containment isolation valve switches and indicators

ES-401 2 FORM ES-401-4 1/1 000057 Loss There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 of Vital AC Inst. with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Bus / 6 Replaced with AK3 of same system.

AK2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 1/1 000077 Generator Replaced with AK2 of same Emergency/Abnormal system to Voltage and even out the distribution of knowledge attributes Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 AK3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:

(CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8) 000033 Loss 1/1 There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 of Intermediate with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Range NI / 7 K2Knowledge of Replaced with AK3 of same system.

the interrelations between the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

ES-401 3 FORM ES-401-4 000065 Loss of 1/1 Instrument Air / 8 Resampled to due to excessive number of Instrument air questions on the exam.

Ability to determine and Replaced with 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water A2.02 interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

(CFR: 43.5 /

45.13)

AA2.08 Failure modes of air-operated equipment RO2.9*/SRO 3.3 026 Containment 2/1 Spray There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

K5 Knowledge of Replaced with a K4 of the same system operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2/1 039 Main There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 and Reheat with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Steam Replaced with a K5 of the same system Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the MRSS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

ES-401 4 FORM ES-401-4 2/ 1 008 Component There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Cooling Water with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of the Replaced with a K1 of the same system operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CCWS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2/1 026 Containment There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Spray with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or Replaced with a K3 of the same system malfunction of the following will have on the CSS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 045 Main Turbine 2/ 2 There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Generator with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of bus power supplies to Replaced with a K3 of the same system the following:

(CFR: 41.7) 2/2 056 Condensate There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Knowledge of with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Condensate Replaced with a K1 of the same system System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7) 079 Station Air 2/2 Knowledge of bus There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

power supplies to the following: Replaced with system 015 Nuclear Instrumentation K2 (CFR: 41.7)

ES-401 5 FORM ES-401-4 2/2 029 Containment There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Purge with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of the Replaced with a A2 of the same system operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Containment Purge System:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 3 2.4.22 Knowledge Difficulty writing a valid RO level question of the basis for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emerge ncy operations.

(CFR 41.7/43.5/41.10/4 5.12)

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As FORM ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 3/4 2.4.41 A question using this K/A could not be written without duplicating an Admin JPM. Replaced with 2.4.44

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: _____________

Examination Level: RO X SRO Operating Test Number: __________

Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as RA(6) N,R graphs, curves, tables, etc.

K/A Importance: 3.9 Perform an RWST blended makeup calculation Conduct of Operations 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

RA(7) D,R Verify an excore QPTR calculation.

K/A Importance: 4.6 Equipment Control 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

RA(8) N,R Using mechanical drawings determine the isolation K/A Importance: 3.5 boundaries for a leak on the RHR system.

Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under RA(9) M,R normal or emergency conditions.

K/A Importance: 3.2 Calculate stay time based on dose rates.

Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-1 RO A(6): The applicant will be required to calculate a blended makeup to the RWST.

The critical tasks include calculating total makeup volume and boric acid flowrate. The JPM should require the applicant to determine the total volume required to raise RWST level from 96% to 100%, the required boric acid flowrate, the required reactor makeup water flowrate, and the total volume of boric acid required.

RO A(7): The applicant will verify an excore QPTR calculation. This JPM is a bank JPM, and the values should be modified from those in the bank.

RO A(8): The initial condition for this JPM is that RHR is in its normal standby lineup.

The operator will be told that RHR Pump Discharge Valve is leaking. The operator will be directed to determine the valves that must be closed to stop the leak using station P&IDs. The operator will also be told to stop the leak while maintaining the "A" loop of RHR Containment Cooling and Sprays operational.

RO A(9): The applicant will calculate the allowed stay time to complete a described tagout without exceeding his yearly station administrative radiation dose limits. (This will likely be a modified bank question).

ES-301 1 Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: _____________

Examination Level: RO SRO X Operating Test Number: __________

Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

SA(1)

R, M JPM: Calculate SDM with a misaligned control rod and K/A Importance: 4.6 determine applicable Technical Specification Conduct of Operations 2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

SA(2)

JPM: Perform a Calorimetric Heat Balance and K/A Importance: 4.4 Evaluate Technical Specifications R, N Equipment Control 2.2.41, Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

SA(3)

R,N JPM: Using mechanical drawings determine the K/A Importance: 3.5 isolation boundaries for a leak on the RHR system.

Radiation Control 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

SA(4)

R, N K/A Importance: 3.8 JPM: approve a completed liquid waste release permit (alternate path actual release did not match the approved release limits)

Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

SA(5)

R,N JPM: Determine appropriate Emergency Plan EAL.

K/A Importance: 4.6 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-1 SRO A(1): Calculate SDM with a misaligned control rod and determine applicable Technical Specification. The calculated SDM will not meet the TS required SDM.

SRO A(2): Perform a manual heat balance calculation SRO A(3): The initial condition for this JPM is that RHR is in its normal standby lineup.

The operator will be told that RHR Pump Discharge Valve is leaking. The operator will be directed to determine the valves that must be closed to stop the leak using station P&IDs. The operator will also be told to stop the leak while maintaining the "A" loop of RHR Containment Cooling and Sprays operational.

SRO A(4): Approve a liquid waste release,the completed release paperwork shows that the actual release was in violation of the approved release rate/quantity SRO A(5): Determine the EAL call for a security event involving an explosion on site within the protected area resulting in a loss of offsite power.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __STP__ __________________ Date of Examination: _____________

Exam Level: RO X SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______________

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans N,A,S VI S2. Cross Connect AFW and Feed 2 SGs from same AFW pump N,E,S IV S3. Commence Emergency Boration N,E,S II S4. Re-establishing Letdown D,A,E,S I S5. Perform CCW valve operability testing N,S VIII S6. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation D,E,L,S III S7. Manual Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation N,A,E,S, EN V S8. Respond to a Radiation Monitor alarm D,A,E,S VII In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1. Locally close MSIVs/MSIBs D,L,E IV P2. Commence a liquid waste release, then a CCW pump trips N,A,R IX require the release to be secured per the contingency step 5.53 of 0POP02-WL-0100 P3. Place RWST on Recirculation D, E, EN II

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO (A)lternate path 4-6 (5)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (5)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature - (2)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (6)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0)

(R)CA 1 (1)

(S)imulator

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-2 S1 (NEW)

Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans The applicant is directed to place Isophase bus cooling fan 11 in service and Isophase bus fan 12 in standby.

Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP02-NN-0001, Isolated-Phase Bus and Duct Cooling and identifies that Section 8 is the required selection to be performed.

8.2 Switching from Fan 12(22) to Fan 11(21) 8.2.1 START "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)".

8.2.2 WHEN "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)" has reached rated speed, THEN STOP "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)".

8.2.3 IF "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" is to be placed in standby, THEN PLACE "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" control switch in AUTO.

When applicant completes step 8.2.2 both isophase bus cooling fans trip and will not restart Applicant will attempt to start either or both of the tripped fans (will not start)

Applicant will then inform the SRO SRO acknowledges and asks if there is any procedural guidance on what to do Applicant may reference alarm response guide or commence a turbine load reduction at 5% per min until < 18500 amps are read on gauge on CP007 as directed in Section 6 of the same procedure Critical task is to lower turbine load within limits specified in the procedure within 6 min of fans tripping off S2 (NEW)

Reactor has tripped and AFW pump for the A SG did not start and attempts to start the pump have been unsuccessful. You are directed to cross tie the AFW system and feed the A Steam Generator S3 (NEW)

Applicant responds to Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP04-CV-0003, Emergency Boration Applicant performs steps 1-3 Step 4 (no charging pumps are running performs the RNO actions (alternate path)

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-2 Step 5 when no BA pumps will start (alternate path)

Applicant directs field operator to make field alignments Applicant closes one of the VCT valves listed Applicant verifies 50 gpm charging flow Applicant verifies that PZr level is at or trending to required level After 2 min the Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" goes out Applicant reports that boration is no longer required End of JPM Critical Steps Starting a Charging pump S4 (BANK)

Pressurizer Level Channel 465 failed low. An inadvertent Reactor Trip/Safety Injection occurred before the actions of the 0POP04-RP-0002 were completed. We have transitioned from 0POP05-EO-EO00 to 0POP05-EO-ES11, and are currently at step 12.b. Charging is in service and Pressurizer Level is slowly rising. The bistables for LT-0465 have been tripped by I&C. The Unit Supervisor directs you to Re-Establish Letdown according to 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2.

Applicant will place letdown in service in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2. Alternate path should be step 2, which requires aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger.

Critical tasks are aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger, step2, and the opening of the individual letdown isolation valves, steps 7 through 10.

S5 (NEW)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to perform the Exercise and Isolation Time Test of MOV-0291, CCW Containment Isolation Valve, and Exercise and Isolation Time Test of MOV-0318, CCW Containment Isolation Valve, 0PSP03-CC-0010, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.

The applicant will perform exercise and isolation time test of MOV-0291 and MOV-0318.

The stroke time of MOV-0291 will be 12.25 seconds, which is an unsatisfactory stroke time.

While performing the test for MOV-0318, the applicant receives a CCW Surge Tank Low Level Alarm. The applicant should IMMEDIATELY stop the test and open MOV-0318.

Critical tasks include closing the two valves while timing the stroke, acknowledging the CCW Surge Tank Low Level Alarm, and opening MOV-0318.

ES-301 4 Form ES-301-2 S6 (BANK)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to transfer to hot leg recirculation on SI Train A then Train B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

The applicant will align hot leg recirc for the A HHSI pump, followed by the A LHSI pump, the B HHSI pump, and the B LHSI pump. The critical tasks will be the opening of the loop hot leg injection valves (steps 2.a.1 through 2.a.3; 2.b.2 through 2.b.4; 3.a.1 through 3.a.3; and 3.b.2 through 3.b.4).

S7 (NEW)

The Plant has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection from full power. The crew is performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. The CRS has assigned you to perform Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00.

The main focus of this task is for the applicant to recognize that Phase A Containment Isolation has not actuated, and after manual actuation, recognize that two valves did not close and manually close them. The two valves should be outboard containment isolation valve MOV-0025, and discharge outboard containment isolation valve FV-7800.

These tasks make up the critical tasks for this JPM.

S8 (BANK)

The Plant is at approximately 70% power. RCB Supplementary Purge is in progress in preparation for making a containment entry. You have just received a radiation alarm on the RM-11. The CRS directs you to investigate the alarm and take any action necessary.

The applicant should recognize that RT-8013 is above the high setpoint, and RT-8012 is above the alert setpoint. The applicant should use 0POP04-RA-001, Addendum 3.

While performing Addendum 3, the applicant should determine that containment ventilation actuation did not occur and manually closes the supplementary containment purge and RCB Atmosphere Radiation Monitor valves (steps 2.d and 2.e of Addendum 3), which make up the JPM critical tasks.

P1 (BANK)

STP T82044, Respond to a Loss of All AC Power. Respond to a Loss of All AC Power in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of All AC Power, The unit has just experienced a loss of all AC power, and procedure 0POP05-EO-EC00, LOSS OF ALL AC, is being performed. The crew is currently at step 10 a. RNO, and determines the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) for 1(2) A Steam Generator did not shut and cannot

ES-301 5 Form ES-301-2 be shut manually from the Control Room. The applicant is directed to locally close Steam Generator 1(2) A MSIV by performing Addendum 3, Failing Air to MSIVs and MSIBs.

P2 Commence a liquid waste release at step 5.40 of 0POP02-WL-0100, OC flow is aligned through the MAB Chiller, all equipment is working properly after discharge is established have the control room notify the operator that 1 CCW pump has tripped, Alternate path the operator must take that actions of step 5.53 to secure the release P3 (BANK)

Unit is at 100% power, steady state conditions. Maintenance has been recently completed on the Refueling Water Purification Pump (RWPP) and it is time to return it to service. The Unit Supervisor directs you to place the RWST on purification recirculation using the RWPP through SFP demineralizer 1A (2A) in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. Prerequisites of this procedure have been verified. SFP Purification is aligned through SFP Demin 1B(2B). The Radwaste Operator is standing by in the FHB to assist.

Critical tasks will be the opening of "SFP purification loop return to RWST isolation valve", FC-0046B (Step 7.4.4), and throttling refueling water purification pump discharge throttle valve, FC-0042 (Step 7.4.6).

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __STP__ __________________ Date of Examination: _____________

Exam Level: RO SRO-I X SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______________

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans N,A,S VI S2. Cross Connect AFW and Feed 2 SGs from same AFW pump N,E,S IV S3. Commence Emergency Boration N,E,S II S4. Re-establishing Letdown D,A,E,S I S6. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation D,E,L,S III S7. Manual Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation N,A,E,S V S8. Respond to a Radiation Monitor alarm D,A,E,S VII In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1. Locally close MSIVs/MSIBs D,L,E IV P2. Commence a liquid waste release, then a CCW pump trips N,A,R IX require the release to be secured per the contingency step 5.53 of 0POP02-WL-0100 P3. Place RWST on Recirculation D, E, EN II

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for SRO-I (A)lternate path 4-6 (5)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 8 (5)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature -

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (5)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0)

(R)CA 1 (1)

(S)imulator

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-2 S1 (NEW)

Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans The applicant is directed to place Isophase bus cooling fan 11 in service and Isophase bus fan 12 in standby.

Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP02-NN-0001, Isolated-Phase Bus and Duct Cooling and identifies that Section 8 is the required selection to be performed.

8.2 Switching from Fan 12(22) to Fan 11(21) 8.2.1 START "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)".

8.2.2 WHEN "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)" has reached rated speed, THEN STOP "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)".

8.2.3 IF "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" is to be placed in standby, THEN PLACE "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" control switch in AUTO.

When applicant completes step 8.2.2 both isophase bus cooling fans trip and will not restart Applicant will attempt to start either or both of the tripped fans (will not start)

Applicant will then inform the SRO SRO acknowledges and asks if there is any procedural guidance on what to do Applicant may reference alarm response guide or commence a turbine load reduction at 5% per min until < 18500 amps are read on gauge on CP007 as directed in Section 6 of the same procedure Critical task is to lower turbine load within limits specified in the procedure within 6 min of fans tripping off S2 (NEW)

Reactor has tripped and AFW pump for the A SG did not start and attempts to start the pump have been unsuccessful. You are directed to cross tie the AFW system and feed the A Steam Generator S3 (NEW)

Applicant responds to Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP04-CV-0003, Emergency Boration Applicant performs steps 1-3 Step 4 (no charging pumps are running performs the RNO actions (alternate path)

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-2 Step 5 when no BA pumps will start (alternate path)

Applicant directs field operator to make field alignments Applicant closes one of the VCT valves listed Applicant verifies 50 gpm charging flow Applicant verifies that PZr level is at or trending to required level After 2 min the Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" goes out Applicant reports that boration is no longer required End of JPM Critical Steps Starting a Charging pump S4 (BANK)

Pressurizer Level Channel 465 failed low. An inadvertent Reactor Trip/Safety Injection occurred before the actions of the 0POP04-RP-0002 were completed. We have transitioned from 0POP05-EO-EO00 to 0POP05-EO-ES11, and are currently at step 12.b. Charging is in service and Pressurizer Level is slowly rising. The bistables for LT-0465 have been tripped by I&C. The Unit Supervisor directs you to Re-Establish Letdown according to 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2.

Applicant will place letdown in service in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2. Alternate path should be step 2, which requires aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger.

Critical tasks are aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger, step2, and the opening of the individual letdown isolation valves, steps 7 through 10.

S6 (BANK)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to transfer to hot leg recirculation on SI Train A then Train B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

The applicant will align hot leg recirc for the A HHSI pump, followed by the A LHSI pump, the B HHSI pump, and the B LHSI pump. The critical tasks will be the opening of the loop hot leg injection valves (steps 2.a.1 through 2.a.3; 2.b.2 through 2.b.4; 3.a.1 through 3.a.3; and 3.b.2 through 3.b.4).

S7 (NEW)

The Plant has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection from full power. The crew is performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. The CRS has assigned you to perform Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00.

ES-301 4 Form ES-301-2 The main focus of this task is for the applicant to recognize that Phase A Containment Isolation has not actuated, and after manual actuation, recognize that two valves did not close and manually close them. The two valves should be outboard containment isolation valve MOV-0025, and discharge outboard containment isolation valve FV-7800.

These tasks make up the critical tasks for this JPM.

S8 (BANK)

The Plant is at approximately 70% power. RCB Supplementary Purge is in progress in preparation for making a containment entry. You have just received a radiation alarm on the RM-11. The CRS directs you to investigate the alarm and take any action necessary.

The applicant should recognize that RT-8013 is above the high setpoint, and RT-8012 is above the alert setpoint. The applicant should use 0POP04-RA-001, Addendum 3.

While performing Addendum 3, the applicant should determine that containment ventilation actuation did not occur and manually closes the supplementary containment purge and RCB Atmosphere Radiation Monitor valves (steps 2.d and 2.e of Addendum 3), which make up the JPM critical tasks.

P1 (BANK)

STP T82044, Respond to a Loss of All AC Power. Respond to a Loss of All AC Power in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of All AC Power, The unit has just experienced a loss of all AC power, and procedure 0POP05-EO-EC00, LOSS OF ALL AC, is being performed. The crew is currently at step 10 a. RNO, and determines the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) for 1(2) A Steam Generator did not shut and cannot be shut manually from the Control Room. The applicant is directed to locally close Steam Generator 1(2) A MSIV by performing Addendum 3, Failing Air to MSIVs and MSIBs.

P2 Commence a liquid waste release at step 5.40 of 0POP02-WL-0100, OC flow is aligned through the MAB Chiller, all equipment is working properly after discharge is established have the control room notify the operator that 1 CCW pump has tripped, Alternate path the operator must take that actions of step 5.53 to secure the release P3 (BANK)

Unit is at 100% power, steady state conditions. Maintenance has been recently completed on the Refueling Water Purification Pump (RWPP) and it is time to return it to service. The Unit Supervisor directs you to place the RWST on purification recirculation

ES-301 5 Form ES-301-2 using the RWPP through SFP demineralizer 1A (2A) in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. Prerequisites of this procedure have been verified. SFP Purification is aligned through SFP Demin 1B(2B). The Radwaste Operator is standing by in the FHB to assist.

Critical tasks will be the opening of "SFP purification loop return to RWST isolation valve", FC-0046B (Step 7.4.4), and throttling refueling water purification pump discharge throttle valve, FC-0042 (Step 7.4.6).

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __STP__ __________________ Date of Examination: _____________

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U X Operating Test No.: ______________

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans N,A,S VI S6. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation D,E,L,S III S7. Manual Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation N,A,E,S, EN V In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P2. Commence a liquid waste release, then a CCW pump trips N,A,R IX require the release to be secured per the contingency step 5.53 of 0POP02-WL-0100 P3. Place RWST on Recirculation D, E, EN II

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for SRO-U (A)lternate path 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 4 (2)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (control room system) (1)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 1 (3)

(P)revious 2 exams 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (2)

(S)imulator

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-2 S1 (NEW)

Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans The applicant is directed to place Isophase bus cooling fan 11 in service and Isophase bus fan 12 in standby.

Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP02-NN-0001, Isolated-Phase Bus and Duct Cooling and identifies that Section 8 is the required selection to be performed.

8.2 Switching from Fan 12(22) to Fan 11(21) 8.2.1 START "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)".

8.2.2 WHEN "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)" has reached rated speed, THEN STOP "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)".

8.2.3 IF "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" is to be placed in standby, THEN PLACE "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" control switch in AUTO.

When applicant completes step 8.2.2 both isophase bus cooling fans trip and will not restart Applicant will attempt to start either or both of the tripped fans (will not start)

Applicant will then inform the SRO SRO acknowledges and asks if there is any procedural guidance on what to do Applicant may reference alarm response guide or commence a turbine load reduction at 5% per min until < 18500 amps are read on gauge on CP007 as directed in Section 6 of the same procedure Critical task is to lower turbine load within limits specified in the procedure within 6 min of fans tripping off S6 (BANK)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to transfer to hot leg recirculation on SI Train A then Train B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

The applicant will align hot leg recirc for the A HHSI pump, followed by the A LHSI pump, the B HHSI pump, and the B LHSI pump. The critical tasks will be the opening of the loop hot leg injection valves (steps 2.a.1 through 2.a.3; 2.b.2 through 2.b.4; 3.a.1 through 3.a.3; and 3.b.2 through 3.b.4).

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-2 S7 (NEW)

The Plant has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection from full power. The crew is performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. The CRS has assigned you to perform Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00.

The main focus of this task is for the applicant to recognize that Phase A Containment Isolation has not actuated, and after manual actuation, recognize that two valves did not close and manually close them. The two valves should be outboard containment isolation valve MOV-0025, and discharge outboard containment isolation valve FV-7800.

These tasks make up the critical tasks for this JPM.

P2 Commence a liquid waste release at step 5.40 of 0POP02-WL-0100, OC flow is aligned through the MAB Chiller, all equipment is working properly after discharge is established have the control room notify the operator that 1 CCW pump has tripped, Alternate path the operator must take that actions of step 5.53 to secure the release P3 (BANK)

Unit is at 100% power, steady state conditions. Maintenance has been recently completed on the Refueling Water Purification Pump (RWPP) and it is time to return it to service. The Unit Supervisor directs you to place the RWST on purification recirculation using the RWPP through SFP demineralizer 1A (2A) in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. Prerequisites of this procedure have been verified. SFP Purification is aligned through SFP Demin 1B(2B). The Radwaste Operator is standing by in the FHB to assist.

Critical tasks will be the opening of "SFP purification loop return to RWST isolation valve", FC-0046B (Step 7.4.4), and throttling refueling water purification pump discharge throttle valve, FC-0042 (Step 7.4.6).

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew A Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-1 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-1 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-1 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew B Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-2 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-2 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-2 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew C Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-3 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-3 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-3 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew D Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-4 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO-4 RX 1 1 0 X NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-5 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-5 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-4 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-6 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew F Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-6 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-5 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-7 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-8 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __STP_____________ Scenario No.: ____1____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: IC-XXXX, Unit is at 95% MOL, Turnover: Raise RX power to 100% using control rods.

EDG A is removed from service for maintenance and will not be available for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks:

1. Start HPCI pump prior to exit E-0
2. Depressurize S/G to less than 1000 psig within 45 min of SBLOCA Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description RO (R) Raise RX power to 100% using control rods per XXXXXX 1

BOP (N) Shift control room ventilation from A train to B train 2

SRO(TS) Report from field that while removing scaffold the bubbler for CSP B has 3 been broken and oil has spilled all over the floor RO (I) PZR Pressure Channel PT-457 fails high 4 Entry into OP0P04-RP-0001 Loss of Automatic Pressure Control SRO(TS)

BOP (C) IA system leak, Standby IA compressor 12 fails to auto start IA pressure 5 will stabilize at 114 psig Entry into OP0P04-IA-0001 Loss of Instrument Air ALL (C) A ES 4160V bus lockout 6 Entry into 0POP04-AE-0001 First Response to Loss of Any or All 13.8 SRO(TS)

KV or 4.16 KV Bus ALL (M) Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident, pressure will lower to below HPCI 7 discharge pressure CT: Depressurize S/G to less than 1000 psig in 45 min of SBLOCA ALL (C) 4 control rods fail to insert on the Reactor trip (Emergency Boration is 8 Required)

ALL (C) B HPCI pump fails to start 9 CT: Identify and start pump using hand switch

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
3. Major transients (1-2) 1
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Narrative of Scenario 1

1. Crew receives turnover and is directed to raise power to100% using control rods.

Actions: SRO directs the OAC to commence a power increase to 100% power using control rods.

2. From turnover sheet the SRO will direct the BOP operator to swap the running control room ventilation Actions: SRO will direct the BOP to swap the running control room ventilation fans in accordance with station procedures
3. Booth notification: My crew was moving scaffold poles and one of my guys accidently broke a glass bubbler on CSP B, all of the oil has spilled on to the floor. I called facilities and they are going to clean up the oil.

Actions: SRO enters ITS associated with the CSP and takes actions to ensure that the pump will not start

4. As soon as the control room ventilation fans have been swapped and TS addressed, the controlling range RCS pressure instrument fails high. 0POP04-RP-0001 Loss of Automatic Pressure Control Write-in CT (Operators need to take action to ensure the RCS low pressure trip set point is not reached resulting in a reactor trip)

Actions: OAC will recognize the failure take actions necessary per the abnormal procedure

5. IA leak, a substantial leak in the instrument air system will occur and the standby IA compressor will fail to auto start. Once the standby IAP has been started IA header will stabilize at ~ 95 psig. The leak should be big enough to see a steady lowering of IA header pressure but allow the operators an opportunity to find and start the standby IA pump. 0POP04-IA-0001 Loss of Instrument Air Actions: Identify the failure of the standby IA pump. If not started, IA header pressure will continue to lower until second backup compressor starts and then slowly continue to lower. It should take a significant amount of time to reach any trip criteria this will allow entry into the Off-Normal procedure for loss of IA and take required actions in that procedures. Once the Standby IA compressor is started IA header pressure will rise to 95psig and remain stable. [5-10] min after starting the standby IAP the control room will receive a phone call saying that the leak has been identified and isolated by closing a valve, IA header recovers fully after that action.
6. A loss of the A ES 4160 volt bus occurs (cannot be re-energized)

Actions: Crew takes actions necessary in the abnormal procedure to ensure that required equipment for operation is restarted and the SRO should enter TS associated with the distribution system.

7. Small Break loss of coolant accident inside containment Actions: Reactor is tripped and required actions taken.

Critical: Operators must take action to lower S/G pressure to < 1000psig within 45 min of leak

8. 4 control rods fail to insert.

Actions: Emergency Boration is required

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1

9. When ES actuates the control board operator identifies that the B high pressure injection pump fails to start and starts the pump from the control room switch. When the B High pressure injection pump has started the RCS pressure stabilizes at a pressure above the actuation of the Low Pressure injection actuation point.

Critical: Start HPCI pump prior to exit E-0 [or agreed-upon criteria]

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Depressurize S/G to less than 1000psig within 45 min of Establish Charging from at least 1 HPCI pump prior to transition from E-0 SBLOCA EVENT 7 9 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- This operator action is SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually start at least one significance necessary to ensure the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.46 Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) under the postulated (specifically the ECCS acceptance criteria for peak cladding conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which temperature < 2200°F) is met. Refer to correspondence NOC the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

AE000151 (13), NOCAE000159 (14), and NOCAE capacity. In this case, at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump 000545 (15). for LP plants) can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) also represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate the following abilities:

  • Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
  • Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition. The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analysis of a small-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow rate values assumed for minimum pumped injection are based on operation of one each of the following ECCS pumps:

Charging/SI pump (HP plants only), high-head SI pump, and low-head SI pump. Operation of this minimum required complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum safeguards are actuated. For both the minimum and maximum cases specified in Comment 1 of this critical task worksheet and for all cases in between, failure to perform the critical task means that the plant is needlessly left in an unanalyzed condition. Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to perform the critical task (under the postulated plant conditions) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Cueing o PZR level and indications of a small break

  • Indication and/or annunciation that Charging/SI pump (high-head SI loss of coolant accident pump for LP plants)injection is required o SI actuation

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-1 o RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants)

AND

  • Indication and/or annunciation that no Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) is injecting into the core o Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for both Charging/SI pumps (high-head SI pumps for LP plants) are open o All Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) discharge pressure indicators read zero o All flow rate indicators for Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) injection read zero Performance Manipulation of controls as required to adjust secondary Manipulation of controls as required to establish flow from at least one indicator pressure Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants)
  • Control switch indication that the circuit breaker or contactor for at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) is closed Performance S/G pressure and valve position indication
  • Indication and/or annunciation that at least one Charging/SI pump feedback (high-head SI pumpfor LP plants) is injecting
  • Flow rate indication of injection from at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants)

Justification This operator action is necessary to ensure the acceptance Failure to manually start at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for the chosen criteria of 10CFR50.46 (specifically the ECCS acceptance for LP plants) under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or performance criteria for peak cladding temperature < 2200°F) is met incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded limit emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.

PWR Owners STPEGS EOPT-o3.07 Rev 22 CT-6, ESTABLISH FLOW FROM AT LEAST ONE CHARGING/SI PUMP Group (HIGH-HEAD SI PUMP FOR LP PLANTS)

Appendix References 0POP04-RP-0001 Loss of Automatic Pressure Control 0POP04-TM-0005 Fast Load Rejection 0POP04-IA-0001 Loss of Instrument Air

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __STP_____________ Scenario No.: ___2_____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions:

100% Rx power, MOL Turnover:

100% Rx Power EOL, Crew has been directed to swap running EHC pumps, one charging pump is tagged out of service for oil change Critical Tasks:

1. Isolate ruptured SG within [establish agreed-upon criteria]
2. Manually initiate AFW prior to reaching dryout conditions on any steam generator.

[NRC Note: Scenario is event-heavy before major. Evaluate removing one of the I/C malfunctions]

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description BOP (N) Swap Running CALCW pumps 1

BOP (C) Charging Pump Overcurrent Trip.

2 SRO (TS)

ALL (C) Stator Water cooling low flow alarm. Start Standby pump.

3 OAC (R) Rod Control Malfunction: continuous rod insertion.

4 SRO (C)

BOP (C) Condensate pump Trip, entry into 0POP04-CD-0001 5

SRO (C)

OAC (I) Power Range C NI fails low 6

SRO (TS)

ALL (M) C Steam Generator Tube rupture ramps in over a 5 min until trip 7

setpoint reached.

All (C) C SG safety fails to close.

8 All (C) AFW fails to auto start 9

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 5
3. Major transients (1-2) 1
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Narrative of Scenario 2:

1. Swap running CALCW pumps, Action: Normal evolution SRO directs the BOP operator to swap the running CALCW pumps in accordance with station procedures
2. Charging Pump Trips on overcurrent Actions: Operators respond to the loss of the running charging pump and perform the actions required to start the available standby pump ITS call for SRO
3. Stator water cooling demineralizer D/P is high resulting in a low flow condition, Temperatures begin to rise and action to start the standby pump or bypass/swap demineralizers are successful Actions: Operators will receive alarm of stator cooling d/p reference the alarm response procedure and take appropriate actions
4. Controlling control rod group begins to continuously insert Actions: Operators identify the issue with the control rod system and take manual control to maintain Tave (possible ITS call)
5. Condensate Pump Trips Actions: Alarms in control room are received indicating that one condensate has tripped off line.

Immediate actions are taken in accordance with 0POP04-CD-0001. Once standby pump is started the plant is stabilized

6. Power Range C NI fails low Actions: SRO enters 0POP04-NI-000 and takes appropriate actions, ITS call for SRO
7. Major: SGTR in the C steam generator Actions: tube rupture will start small and gradually increase from a tube leak of 15 gpm to 250 gpm. It will take [5 to 10] min to reach the point that a reactor trip is required. The operator will trip the reactor when required by procedure.
8. When the Unit trips one control rod does not fully insert but the plant is shut down. An SG safety valve on the C steam generator fails to reseat, action is required to lower steam pressure to attempt to reseat the valve.

Actions: Operators take appropriate actions per their procedures and identify that the steam generator safety has failed to seat. Operators take action to lower pressure to attempt to reseat the valve (this is unsuccessful valve will remain open throughout the rest of scenario)

9. AFW pumps fail to start automatically. When manually aligned the AFW pump aligned to the B steam generator has a sheared shaft.

Actions: Operators identify that AFW failed to auto start and manually start AFW. Operator identifies sheared shaft on AFW Pump to the B steam generator and uses procedural guidance to either cross tie the feed to that generator or isolate it.

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks CT-18, Isolate ruptured steam generator [within agreed-upon Establish the [minimum required AFW flow rate] to the SGs [before transition criteria] out of E-0 or other agreed-to criteria] unless the transition is to FR-H.1, in which case the task must be [initiated before RCPs are manually tripped] in accordance with Step 4 of generic guideline FR-H.1 EVENT 7 9 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to isolate the ruptured SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to establish the minimum required AFW significance SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, results in adverse SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the crew allows the consequence or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then plant. In this case, the minimum required AFW flow rate can be established forced to transition to a contingency ERG constitutes an by performing the appropriate manual action. Therefore, failure to manually incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking establish the minimum required AFW flow rate also represents a failure by the compensating action that would complicate the event crew todemonstrate the following abilities:

mitigation strategy....

  • Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
  • Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Cueing
  • Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG
  • Indication and/or annunciation that SI is actuated o Increasing SG water level AND o Radiation
  • Indication and/or annunciation that the AFW flow rate is less than the AND minimum required
  • Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip o Total AFW flow rate indicates less than the minimum AND required
  • Indication and/or annunciation of SI o Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for the motor-driven AFW pumps are open o Control switch indication that the steam supply valves to the turbine-driven AFW pump are closed o AFW valve position indication that a flow path is not established to at least one SG Performance Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the ruptured Manipulation of controls in the control room as required to establish the indicator SG minimum required AFW
  • Main steam isolation bypass valve position lamps indicate closed
  • PORV setpoint adjusted to ERG Footnote O.03

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1

  • Blowdown isolation valve position lamps indicate closed Steam isolation valve to TDAFW pump position lamps indicate closed
  • AFW valve position lamps and/or indicators indicate closed
  • Feedwater isolation valve position lamps indicate closed]2 Performance
  • Indication of stable or increasing pressure in the
  • Indication that at least the minimum required AFW flow rate is being feedback ruptured SG delivered to the SGs
  • Indication of decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate
  • SG levels increasing in the ruptured SG Justification
  • An incorrect action that necessitates the crew to Given the postulated plant conditions, the adverse consequences that can arise for the chosen take compensating actions that would complicate the from failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate are challenges performance event mitigation to the following:

limit AND

  • A significant reduction of safety margin beyond
  • Core cooling CSF that irreparably introduced by the scenario
  • Fuel matrix/clad fission product barrier PWR Owners CT-18, Isolate ruptured SG CT-4, Establish AFW flow to SGs Group Appendix

Appendix D 1 Form ES-D-1 Facility: __STP_____________ Scenario No.: ____3____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is just below POAH, MOL. Unit 2 is at 100%. The B Safety Injection Pump and the D Condenser Circulating Water Pump are tagged out for preventative maintenance.

Turnover: Unit 1 is just below POAH, MOL. Unit 2 is at 100%. B Safety Injection Pump and the D Condenser Circulating Water Pump are tagged out for preventative maintenance. The crew is to increase power to1% by withdrawing control rods. LCO 3.0.4.(b) has been assessed for the B Safety Injection Pump inoperability and Mode change has been authorized. The Startup SG Feed Pump is running with one Main Feed Pump being warmed up but not yet at idle.

Critial Tasks:

1. Stop the RCP within 5 min of reaching loss of SCM setpoint.
2. Manually start SW pumps for safeguards equipment cooling prior to Plant specific critreria Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RO (R) Withdraw control rods to increase reactor power to 1%

2 RO (I) 1D S/G W/R signal fails low. Feed reg. bypass valve opens. Loss of S/G level Control 0POP4-FW-0001 SRO (I) 3 BOP (C) One loops essential cooling water pump shaft seizes and will require the operator to start an additional Essential cooling water SRO (C,TS) pump. This will require a Technical specification call for one loop Essential Cooling water loop being OOS (3.7.4) 4 BOP (C) Running Feed Pump trips will require entry into 0POP04-FW-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip. 1 AFW Pump will not SRO (C,TS) start requiring a Technical Specification call (3.7.1.2) 5 ALL (M) PZR PORV fails open. Manual closure attempt is unsuccessful.

Manual block valve will not close. (Requires a Rx trip)

SBLOCA due to PORV (RCP must be secured) (CRITICAL) 6 ALL (C) Phase A Train B fails to auto actuate with CV-MOV-0023 failed open 7 ALL (C) Required number of service water pumps fail to start requiring manual pump start (CRITICAL) 8 ALL (M) After RCP have been secure or 5 min after trip a Large break LOCA resulting in a loss of Sub-Cooling Margin

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
3. Major transients (1-2) 2
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Narrative for Scenario 1
1. Raise reactor power to 1%. Crew will use rods since unit is below POAH. Once POAH is reached trigger next event at lead examiners discretion.
2. 1D S/G W/R level signal fails LOW; associated Feed Reg. Bypass Valve opens. RO takes manual control to stabilize and restore 1D S/G level. (Loss of SG Level control). This failure is internal and does not indicate on the W/R level board indication.
3. One loops essential cooling water pump shaft seizes and will require the operator to start an additional Essential cooling water pump. This will require a Technical specification call for one loop Essential Cooling water loop being OOS (3.7.4).
4. Operating Start Up Feedwater Pump trips, no other feedwater pump is idle at this point and the operators are expected to work their way to starting AFW to stabilize S/G level. When attempting to start one of the AFW pumps it will not start and the SRO will need to cross connect the aux feed water and evaluate TS 3.7.1.2 once SG levels are stable notify the control room that the SU Feedwater pump is ready to start and allow crew to transition back to normal feedwater
5. (PZR PORV) fails open. RO attempts manual closure of the PORV. This will not be successful.

(Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies) entry. This is the major event because the PZR PORV cannot be closed, nor will the manual block isolation close. Recognizing a SBLOCA, the crew will determine that the reactor must be tripped. The operators will need to recognize that a loss of sub-cooling margin has occurred and secure the RCPs within 5 min (CRITICAL)

6. Phase A (Train B) fails to auto actuate, and CV-MOV-0023 fails open, causing a loss of containment isolation, until operator action corrects the situation.
7. SW pumps are either tripped or fail to start and require the crew to start as necessary they will start form the control room. (Critical)
8. When Reactor Trips a large depressurization occurs due to a LBLOCA and sub-cooling margin is lost. No ES systems automatically actuate. All ECCS components will start if manually started from the control room. The operators will need to recognize that a loss of sub-cooling margin has occurred and secure the RCPs within 5 min (CRITICAL)

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Critical Task 2 - Trip NC pumps on loss of subcooling with Manually start SW pumps for safeguards equipment cooling S/I flow verified per E-0 within 5 minutes of criteria met.

EVENT 5 7 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to trip the RCPs under SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually start at least the significance the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to minimum required number of SW pumps in an operating fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the safeguards train represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate limit specified in the [ECCS acceptance criteria].9 Thus, the following abilities:

failure to perform the task represents misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew has failed to Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature prevent degradation of...{the fuel cladding} ...barrier to (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of fission product release and which leads to violation of the safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the facility license condition. The analysis presented in the scenario FSAR for a SBLOCA typically assumes that the RCPs trip because of a loss of offsite power that coincides with the Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an reactor trip. However, during a SBLOCA, offsite power ESF system or component might remain available and RCPs might continue to run for some period of time. Following the accident at TMI-2, the Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to NRC expressed concern about RCP operation during a manually start at least the minimum required number of SW SBLOCA. In response, the WOG sponsored analyses to determine when the RCPs must be if power remains pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility available. It was determined that manually tripping the RCPs license condition.

before RCS inventory is depleted to less than the critical inventory results in a peak cladding temperature about the same as the PCT in the FSAR analysis. Manually tripping the RCPs before depletion below the critical inventory conservatively ensures that PCT remains below 2200°F.

The concept of critical inventory is used to determine RCP trip criteria for SBLOCAs in which the RCPs do not trip at the time of reactor trip. However, the critical inventory is defined in terms of the original FSAR analysis in which RCP trip coincides with reactor trip. The critical inventory is the amount of inventory remaining in the RCS when the break completely uncovers and the break flow changes from a mixture of liquid and steam to all steam. Continued RCP operation after the RCS is depleted to the critical inventory results in more mass being lost through the break than would otherwise be the case. More mass is lost because RCP operation causes liquid to continue to flow from the break, whereas, in an RCS depleted to the critical inventory, liquid

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 loss from the break stops when RCPs are stopped. The WOG provided guidance for its members to convert this event (RCS depletion to the critical inventory) into useful control room indications, called the RCP trip criteria. Upon receipt of the plant-specific conditions that the RCP trip criteria are met, the crew must trip the RCPs. Failure to do so results in more liquid inventory being lost through the break than would be the case if the RCPs were tripped. The WOG studied the effects of delaying RCP trip beyond the time that the RCP trip criteria are met (that is, beyond the time that the RCS is depleted to the critical inventory). The Analysis of Delayed Reactor Coolant Pump Trip during Small Loss of Coolant Accidents for Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (WCAP-9584, 1979) examined cold-leg breaks of 2, 3, and 4 inches for the bounding plant type, which is a 3-loop plant. The analysis showed that, for the bounding plant type (which is a 3-loop plant), delayed RCP trip can cause adverse consequence for the 2- and 3-inch breaks, meaning that PCT exceeds 2200°F. WCAP-9584 also demonstrated that similar windows for adverse consequence exist for 2- and 4-loop plants, [although for slightly different break-size ranges].10 The adverse consequence arises when RCP trip occurs within a specific window of time. As break size increases, the window for adverse consequence shortens and begins sooner.

For the 2-inch break (three loop, cold leg), the window begins at about 33 minutes and lasts for such a long time that the analysis was stopped before the window ended (it is assumed that the window would eventually end). For the 3-inch break (three loop, cold leg), the window begins at about 8 minutes and ends at 12 minutes. The 4-inch break (three loop, cold leg) has no window, meaning PCT remains below 2200°F regardless of RCP trip delay. The window for adverse consequence is caused by the fact that the drop in the core mixture level that occurs when RCPs are tripped has two competing effects. First, delaying RCP trip results in faster depletion of RCS inventory so that, when the RCPs finally trip, core uncover can occur almost instantaneously. If the RCPs are tripped soon after the trip criteria are met, little or no core uncovery occurs and PCT remains below 2200°F. As RCP trip is delayed beyond the trip criteria, core

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-1 uncovery (when the RCPs finally do trip) is much deeper and PCT exceeds 2200°F. Second, and competing with core uncovery, is accumulator injection. The analysis shows that very deep core uncovery causes a rapid RCS depressurization. Less decay heat is transferred to the core fluid, causing RCS temperature and pressure to drop. The rapid RCS depressurization causes the accumulators to inject sooner and faster, re-covering the core and mitigating the rise in PCT.

Cueing

  • Indication and/or annunciation that SI is actuated AND
  • AND
  • Indication and/or annunciation of safety injection
  • Indication [and/or annunciation]9 that less than the minimum AND required number of SW pumps is running
  • Indication and/or annunciation that only one train of - Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or

[safety injection pumps]4 actuates contactors for all SW pumps are open AND - SW pump discharge pressure indicator reads zero

  • Indication that the RCP trip criteria are met - SW flow indicator reads zero

- SW pump trouble alarm Performance Manipulation of controls as required to trip all RCPs Manipulation of controls as required to start at least the minimum required indicator

  • RCP breaker position lights indicate breaker open number of SW pumps in an operating safeguards train
  • Control switch indication that the appropriate circuit breaker(s) or contactor(s) are closed Performance
  • Indication that all RCPs are stopped Indication and/or annunciation that at least the minimum required number of feedback o RCP breaker position lights SW pumps is o RCP flow decreasing running in an operating safeguards train o RCP motor amps decreasing
  • SW low flow condition clear; indication of flow
  • SW low pressure condition clear; indication of pressure Justification The analysis based on Appendix K conditions shows that, for Failure to manually start minimum number of SW pumps will take the for the chosen the bounding plant type (which again is a 3-loop plant), required safety pumps cooled by SW out of service that are required for the performance delayed RCP trip causes PCT to exceed 2200°F [for a range safety function.

limit of cold leg break sizes, up to 4.5 inches].11 The minimum response time for the operating crew is 5 minutes, which is for the 4.5 inch break. If the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT remains below 2200°F. If the RCPs are tripped later than 5 minutes after meeting the trip criteria, PCT exceeds 2200°F.

PWR Owners CT-16, Manually trip RCPs CT-9, Manually start [at least the minimum required number of SW pumps]1 Group [in an operating safeguards train]2 [before plant- and scenario-specific criteria

Appendix D 6 Form ES-D-1 Appendix are exceeded]

References Loss of Circulating Water Flow, 0POP4-CW-0001 Loss of S/G level Control, 0POP4-FW-0001 Loss of Circulating Water Flow, 0POP4-CW-0001 Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip, 0POP04-FW-0002 EOPs

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __________________ Scenario No.: ___4____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: IC-XXXX, Unit is at 65% MOL, Turnover: Reduce Reactor Power to 60% to remove the B main feed pump from service for maintenance. Circ water pump #13 is OOS for maintenance Critical Tasks:

1. Close MSIV prior to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first.
2. Isolate Feed to the B steam generator prior to [establish criteria]

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R (RO) SRO directs RO to lower power to 60%

2 N (BOP) Secure B main feed pump 3 I (RO) Turbine impulse pressure (PT-506) transmitter fails low causing rod insertion. Enters OP0P04-TM-0004 TS (SRO) 4 C (BOP) Gland seal regulator fails high Operator action required to take manual control 5 C (RO) COLD LEG TE-420B FAILS HIGH TS (SRO) Requires entry into 0POP04-RP-0004 6 M (All) B S/G steamline break upstream of B MSIV 7 C (BOP) B MSIV fails to close C (BOP) AFW pump switch fails to secure the B AFW pump and the valves must 8 be closed to isolate

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
3. Major transients (1-2) 1
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Narrative of Scenario 4

1. Crew receives turnover and is directed to reduce power to 60% using control rods. SRO directs the OAC to commence a power reduction to 60% power using control rods to secure the A MFP for maintenance.

Power reduction is successful to ~ 60%.

2. Following the power reduction, the crew is directed to secure the A MFP.
3. Once the feed pump is secure, a turbine impulse pressure instrument will fail low causing rod insertion.

The OAC will take manual control of the rods, and the BOP operator will select out the failed channel.

4. Gland seal regulator fails high and manual control is needed to control gland seal pressure
5. Cold leg RTD TE-420B fails high. Crew enters 0POP04-RP-0004, FAILURE OF RCS LOOP RTD PROTECTION CHANNEL.
6. The major event will be a main steam line break upstream of the B MSIV.
7. The BOP operator should also note that the B MSIV failed to close, and take manual action to close the MSIV. (CT - Manually close the B MSIV before an orange path challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first)
8. AFW will not isolate to the B S/G normally (either in automatic or manual), causing continued feed to the faulted steam line until manual isolation of the AFW to the B SG is done either by securing pump or closing an isolation valve. (CT - Isolate AFW to faulted SG)

The scenario should be terminated when B SG is dry and control of subsequent heat up is established.

CT-17 of owners group document: Critical task to isolate all feed sources to the B S/G prior to [need to establish criteria]

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Manually close MSIV prior to Orange path CSF EVENT 9 8 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to isolate a faulted SG SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated significance that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a constitutes a failure by the crew to demonstrate (the ability to) recognize a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component, failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system and to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant or component. safety.

In the typical FSAR, the analysis for a large steamline break assumes Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the steamline isolation within a short time frame, on the order of seconds. The following CSFs: analysis typically assumes a steam system piping failure in which a single SG

  • Integrity blows down completely. That is, the analysis assumes a fault that can be
  • Subcriticality isolated from all but one SG.
  • Containment However, in the plant conditions postulated for this critical task, the break is located downstream of the MSIVs. Thus, closure of all MSIVs would Failure to isolate the faulted SG such that multiple SGs are terminate all uncontrolled blowdown. In this case, there is no reason for even a allowed to blow down for an extended time can significantly single SG to completely depressurize. If the crew allows all MSIVs to remain worsen the power excursion. Similarly, failure to isolate all open, then all SGs depressurize uncontrollably and unnecessarily.

feedwater flow, including AFW, to the faulted SG such that it Uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs causes an excessive rate of RCS continues to blow down for an extended time can cooldown, well beyond the conditions typically analyzed in the FSAR. The significantly worsen the power excursion. excessive cooldown rate creates large thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and causes rapid insertion of a large amount of positive reactivity.

Thus, failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated conditions can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

  • Integrity
  • Subcriticality The LOFTRAN analyses for uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs presented in the ERG Background Document for ECA-2.1 are based upon best-estimate assumptions rather than upon conservative FSAR assumptions.

They do not address subcriticality. However, they do show that RCS cold leg temperature can drop by more than 250°F in less than 3 minutes for a large steamline break involving uncontrolled depressurization of multiple SGs.

Additionally, the ERG Background Document for ECA-2.1 specifically states the following:

It should be noted that this event (with an extensive cooldown and subsequent repressurization) may result in a challenge to the Integrity Critical Safety Function. In this case the Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree may direct the operator to FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION, for further actions.

For some plants, the analysis for a large steamline break shows a return to reactor criticality caused by the large and rapid RCS cooldown, even though only a single SG is assumed to blow down completely. Failure to isolate the SGs from the steamline break such that all SGs are allowed to blow down uncontrollably significantly worsens the power excursion. This worsening of the power excursion is unnecessary; it could be prevented simply by closing the MSIVs.

Cueing Both of the following: Indication that main steamline isolation is required

- Steam pressure and flow rate indications that make it possible to identify a single SG as faulted AND AND

- Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues Indication that main steamline isolation has not actuated automatically to be delivered to the faulted SG

  • Indication of uncontrolled depressurization of one steam generator Performance Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the faulted SG Manipulation of controls as required to manually actuate steamline isolation indicator
  • MSIVs undergo fast-closure
  • Indication of feedline isolation

- Feedwater control valves indicate closed

- Feedline isolation valves indicate closed

- Main feed pumps indicate tripped

  • Indication that AFW flow to the faulted SG is stopped
  • AFW flow control valves for faulted SG indicate closed Performance Any depressurization of intact SGs stops
  • Steam flow indication from all SGs decreases to zero feedback
  • Steam flow indication from faulted SG decreases to zero
  • All SGs stop depressurizing
  • RCS cooldown stops
  • RCS cooldown stops
  • AFW flow rate indication to faulted SG of zero Justification Failure to isolate the AFW to the faulted SG will result in Failure to close the MSIV causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably for the chosen severe overcooling and challenge the CSFs introduced by the steamline break. Additionally, such an omission constitutes performance a failure by the crew to demonstrate (the ability to) recognize a failure or an limit incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component, and to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

PWR Owners CT-17, Isolate Faulted SG CT-12, Manually actuate main steamline isolation Group Appendix

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-1 References OP0P04-TM-0004, Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter 0POP04-RP-0004, FAILURE OF RCS LOOP RTD PROTECTION CHANNEL.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __________________ Scenario No.: ___5____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: IC-XXXX, Unit is at 75% power, Condensate pump 13 is tagged out for maintenance, Crew is directed to raise power to 100 %, Thunderstorms in the area, SU Feed water pump is tagged out for oil replacement.

Turnover: Increase power to 100%

Critical Tasks:

1. Establish the [minimum required AFW flow rate]1 to the SGs [before transition out of E-0],2 unless the transition is to FR-H.1, in which case the task must be [initiated before RCPs are manually tripped]2 in accordance with Step 4 of generic guideline FR-H.1
2. Manually trip the main turbine [before a severe (ORANGE path) challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF]1 or [before transition to ECA-2.1]2, whichever happens first (need values or hard plant specific points for items in red)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RO (R) Rod withdrawl and power increase to 100% power 2 BOP C Circulating Water Traveling Screen High Differential Pressure, requires entry into Loss of Circulating Water Flow 0POP4-CW-0001 3 RO (I) Controlling Pressurizer level transmitter fails low (PT-465) will require entry into OP0P04-RP-0002 4 BOP (I) Loss of B S/G Steam Flow instrument signal, required entry into OP0P04-FW-0001 5 ALL (C) Loss of 480v LC E1B1 entry into 0POP04-AE-0001 6 ALL (M) Main Generator Output Breaker Trips Open, Load rejection requiring a reactor trip. (PT-557 fails at same time to ensure that SG level lower rapidly so FRH1 entry is met) 7 ALL (C) Main Turbine Fails to trip with reactor trip (Manual Trip required) 8 ALL (C) AFWP-14 starts but fails to inject due to issue with governor and recirc valve being open, (crossover valves will not open), AFW pumps 12 and 13 trip on overcurrent on start

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
7. EOP Based Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Narrative of Scenario 5
1. Crew receives turnover and is directed to increase power to 100%. SRO directs the OAC and BOP to commence a power ascension to 100% power using control rods and turbine load.
2. After power has been increase by approximately 5% power, a report form the field saying the CW traveling screen D/P is high. The will require the crew to enter 0POP04-CW-0001, eventually leading to securing one of the 4 running CW pumps.
3. Once one of the CW pumps is secured PT -465 fails low resulting in a loss of normal letdown and entry into 0POP04-RP-0002 addendum 3 witch will place excess letdown in service.
4. B Steam Flow instrument will fail requiring the crew to take manual control to prevent a reactor trip.

OP0P04-FW-0001

5. Loss of 480 v LC E1B1 entry into 0POP04-AE-0001
6. Major: Main Generator Output breaker trips open coincident with PT-557) failing to ensure s/g lowers.

Requiring a reactor trip

7. Main Turbine does not trip when reactor trips must manually trip the main turbine
8. AFWP-14 starts but fails to inject due to issue with governor and recirc valve being open, (crossover valves will not open), AFW pumps 12 and 13 trip on overcurrent on start. The crew can either take manual control of AFW pump 14 and raise discharge pressure in field and close the recirc valve from control room and establish required AFW flow. (Would the crews go to forced safety injection cooling in this situation?)

Scenario will conclude after the operators have received word from the crew that AFW pump 14 can be controlled and the recirc valve is closed and feed to the S/G has been restored.

Critical Tasks:

1. CT-4, Establish Flow to the S/Gs
2. CT-13, Manually Trip the Main Turbine

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Establish the [minimum required AFW flow rate]1 to Manually trip the main turbine [before a severe (ORANGE path) challenge the SGs [before transition out of E-0],2 develops to either the unless the transition is to FR-H.1, in which case subcriticality or the integrity CSF]1 or [before transition to ECA-2.1]2, the task must be [initiated before RCPs are whichever happens first manually tripped]2 in accordance with Step 4 of generic guideline FR-H.1 EVENT 8 7 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to establish the SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to trip the main turbine under the significance minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated plant postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those conditions, results in adverse consequence or a significant irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In this Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the crew to case, the minimum required AFW flow rate can be demonstrate the ability totake one or more actions that would prevent a established by performing the appropriate manual action. challenge to plant safety.

Therefore, failure to manually establish the minimum required AFW flow rate also represents a failure by the crew Thus, failure to manually trip the main turbine under the postulated conditions to demonstrate the following abilities: can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

  • Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety
  • Integrity feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded
  • Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
  • Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Cueing
  • Indication and/or annunciation that SI is actuated
  • Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip AND o Rod bottom lamps illuminated
  • Indication and/or annunciation that the AFW flow o Reactor trip and bypass breakers status lamps indicate breakers rate is less than the minimum required open
  • Total AFW flow rate indicates less than the o Excore nuclear instruments show reactor power decreasing minimum required through the intermediate range
  • Control switch indication that the circuit AND breakers or contactors for the motor-driven
  • Indication that the main turbine has not automatically tripped AFW pumps are open o Stop valves indicate open
  • Control switch indication that the steam o Control valves indicate at their full-load position supply valves to the turbine-driven AFW o Indication of uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs pump are closed
  • AFW valve position indication that a flow path is not established to at least one SG Performance Manipulation of controls in the control room as required to Manipulation of controls as required to manually trip the main turbine

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 indicator establish the minimum required AFW flow rate to the SGs

  • Stop valves indicate closed Performance
  • Indication that at least the minimum required AFW flow
  • Steam flow indication from all SGs decreases to zero feedback rate is being delivered to the SGs
  • All SGs stop depressurizing
  • SG levels increasing
  • RCS cooldown stops Justification Given the postulated plant conditions, the adverse Thus, failure to manually trip the main turbine under the postulated conditions for the chosen consequences that can arise from failure to establish the can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

performance minimum required AFW flow rate are challenges to the

  • Integrity limit following:
  • Subcriticality
  • Core cooling CSF
  • Fuel matrix/clad fission product barrier PWR Owners CT-4, Establish AFW flow to SGs CT-13, Manually trip the turbine Group Appendix References

ES-401 PWR RO Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2 Facility: STP Date of Exam:

RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

  • Total
1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 6 Emergency &

Abnormal Plant 2 2 2 2 N/A 1 1 N/A 1 9 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 5 5 5 4 4 4 27 10 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 28 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 10 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 5 4 3 3 38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 3 2 2 3 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X following concepts as 3.5 1 they apply to the small break LOCA:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.02 Use of steam tables RO 3.5/SRO 4.2 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 4.0 2 as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow)

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.22 RCP seal failure/malfunction RO 4.0/SRO4.2 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 Ability to determine and interpret the following 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat 3.4 3 Removal System:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.07 Pump cavitation RO 3.4/SRO 3.7 G 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X for systems operating parameters that are entry 3.9 4 Water / 8 level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

(CFR: 45.2 / 45.6)

RO 3.9/SRO 4.0 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer 2.8 5 System Malfunction / 3 Pressure Control Malfunctions:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.02 Expansion of liquids as temperature increases RO2.8/SRO 3.1

ES-401 3 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the and 000029 ATWS / 1 X the following an ATWS: 2.9 6 (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.06 Breakers, relays, and disconnects RO 2.9*/SRO 3.1*

Knowledge of the reasons for the following 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X responses as the apply to the SGTR: 4.4 7 (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

EK3.02 Prevention of secondary PORV cycling RO 4.4/SRO 4.5 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: 3.9 8 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.15 T-ave. protection indicators RO 3.9*/SRO 3.8*

Ability to determine and interpret the following 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater 4.1 9 Feedwater / 4 (MFW):

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.03 Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup RO 4.1/SRO 4.2 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and 4.6 10 immediate action steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

RO 4.6 / SRO 4.8 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X as they apply to 3.6 11 the Loss of Offsite Power:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.06 Safety injection pump RO 3.6*/SRO 3.6*

Knowledge of the reasons for the following 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X responses as they apply to 4.1 12 the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.01 Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus RO 4.1/SRO 4.4

ES-401 4 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 Knowledge of the reasons for the following 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X responses as they apply to 4.0 13 the Loss of DC Power:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.1)

AK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power RO 4.0/SRO 4.2 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X Ability to determine and interpet the following as 2.9 they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS):

CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 14 AA2.01 Location of leak in the SWS RO 2.9/SRO3.6 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and function of W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X major system components and controls. 3.2 15 (CFR: 41.7)

RO 3.2/SRO 3.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant X following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of 16 Recirc. / 4 Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EK1.1 Components, capacity, and function of 3.7 emergency systems.

RO 3.7/SRO 4.0 Knowledge of the interrelations between the BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat X (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following: 3.9 17 Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.2 Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

RO 3.9/SRO 4.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric X Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances 3.1 18 Grid Disturbances / 6 and the following:

(CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10/ 45.8)

AK 2.0 1 Motors RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 18/6

ES-401 5 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X 3.6 19 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK3.02 Guidance contained in EOP for loss of intermediate range instrumentation.

RO 3.6/SRO 3.9 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X 3.5 20 following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.03 Reactor building containment evacuation alarm enable switch.

RO 3.5/SRO 3.9 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X 3.8 21 following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA1.06 Main steam line rad monitor meters RO 3.8*/SRO 3.9*

Ability to determine and interpret the 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 3.9 22 following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.02 Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip.

RO 3.9/SRO 4.1 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 X 3.4 23 system limits and precautions.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)

RO 3.4/ SRO 3.8

ES-401 6 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 Knowledge of the operational 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X 2.5 24 implications of the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AK1.02 Biological effects on humans of the various types of radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for personnel in a nuclear reactor power plant; the units used for radiation intensity measurements and for radiation exposure levels.

RO 2.5/SRO 3.1*

Knowledge of the interrelations between 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 X 2.5 25 the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)

System Alarms and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

AK2.01 Detectors at each ARM system location.

RO 2.5*/SRO 2.6*

000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X Knowledge of the operational 3.4 26 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SI Termination)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (SI Termination).

RO 3.4/SRO 3.9 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X Knowledge of the interrelations between 3.0 27 the (Steam Generator Overpressure) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

EK2.2 Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

RO 3.0/SRO 3.2 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5

ES-401 7 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 2 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 9/4

ES-401 8 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to predict and/or monitor 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.6 28 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

A1.03 RCP motor stator winding temperatures RO 2.6 /SRO 2.6 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 004 Chemical and Volume X malfunction on the following CVCS 4.4 29 Control components:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.17 Flow paths for emergency boration RO 4.4/SRO 4.6 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 005 Residual Heat Removal X following malfunctions or operations 2.7 30 on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 Failure modes for pressure, flow, pump motor amps, motor temperature, and tank level instrumentation RO 2.7/SRO 2.9*

Knowledge of the operational 006 Emergency Core Cooling X implications of the following concepts 2.5 31 as they apply to ECCS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.11 Basic heat transfer equation RO 2.5/SRO 2.4*

Ability to monitor automatic 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X operation of the PRTS, including: 2.7 32 Tank (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Components which discharge to the PRT.

RO 2.7*/SRO 2.9

ES-401 9 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to manually operate and/or 008 Component Cooling Water X monitor in the control room: 2.7 33 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A4.05 Normal CCW-header total flow rate and the flow rates to the components cooled by the CCWS.

RO 2.7*/ 2.5 Knowledge of bus power supplies to 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X the following: 3.0 34 (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Pressurizer Heaters RO 3.0/SRO 3.4 Knowledge of RPS design feature(s) 012 Reactor Protection X and/or interlock(s) which provide for 3.2 35 the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.06 Automatic or manual enable/disable of RPS trips RO 3.2/ SRO 3.5 Ability to monitor automatic 013 Engineered Safety Features X operation of the ESFAS including: 3.7 36 Actuation (CFR: 41.7/45.5)

A3.01 Input channels and logic RO 3.7*/SRO 3.9 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 022 Containment Cooling X malfunction of the CCS will have on 3.0 37 the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 Containment instrumentation readings.

RO 3.0/SRO 3.3 025 Ice Condenser

ES-401 10 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) 026 Containment Spray X and/or interlock(s) which provide for 4.1 38 the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.08 Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)

RO 4.1*/SRO 4.3*

Knowledge of the operational 039 Main and Reheat Steam X implications of the following concepts 2.7 39 as the apply to the MRSS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

K5.05 Bases for RCS cooldown limits RO 2.7/SRO 3.1*

Ability to predict and/or monitor 059 Main Feedwater X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.7 40 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.03 Power level restrictions for operation of MFW pumps and valves RO 2.7*/SRO 2.9*

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X following malfunctions or operations 3.4 41 Feedwater on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.07 Air or MOV failure.

RO 3.4/SRO 3.5 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident 062 AC Electrical Distribution X instrumentation. 3.7 42 (CFR: 41.6 / 45.4)

RO 3.7/SRO 3.9 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 2.2.39 Knowledge of less than or equal 3.9 43 to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems.

RO 3.9/SRO 4.5

ES-401 11 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X malfunction of the following will have 3.2 44 on the ED/G system:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.08 Fuel oil storage tanks RO 3.2/ SRO 3.3 Knowledge of the physical connections 073 Process Radiation X and/or cause effect relationships 3.6 45 Monitoring between the PRM system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.01 Those systems served by PRMs RO 3.6/SRO 3.9 Ability to predict and/or monitor 076 Service Water X changes in parameters (to prevent 2.6 46 exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.02 Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures RO 2.6*/SRO 2.6*

K3 Knowledge of the effect that a loss 078 Instrument Air X or malfunction of the IAS will have on 3.4 47 the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 Systems having pneumatic valves and controls.

RO 3.4/SRO 3.6 Knowledge of containment system 103 Containment X design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 3.1 48 which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.06 Containment isolation system.

RO 3.1/SRO 3.7

ES-401 12 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 2.2.42 Ability to recognize indications 008 Component Cooling Water X for system operating parameters 3.4 49 which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

(CFR: 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3)

RO 3.4/ SRO 4.0 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 026 Containment Spray X malfunction of the CSS will have on 4.2 50 the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 Recirculation spray system RO 4.2/SRO 4.3 Knowledge of the physical connections 063 DC Electrical Distribution X and/or cause/effect relationships 2.9 51 between the DC electrical system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.03 Battery charger and battery RO 2.9/SRO 3.5 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X following malfunctions or operations 2.7 52 on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.08 Consequences of opening/closing breaker between buses (VARS, out-of-phase, voltage).

RO 2.7/SRO 3.1 Ability to manually operate and/or 076 Service Water X monitor in the control room: 2.9 53 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 SWS pumps RO 2.9/ SRO 2.9

ES-401 13 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to monitor automatic 078 Instrument Air X operation of the IAS, including: 3.1 54 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Air Pressure.

RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 Knowledge of bus power supplies to 005 Residual Heat Removal X the following: 3.2 55 (CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 RHR pumps RO 3.0/ SRO 3.2 K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 Group Point Total: 28/

5

ES-401 14 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control X Knowledge of bus power supplies to the 3.1 56 following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K2.01 Charging pumps RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 014 Rod Position Indication Knowledge of NIS design feature(s) 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X and/or interlock(s) provide for the 3.7 57 following:

(CFR: 41.7)

K4.07 Permissives RO 3.7/SRO 3.8 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 029 Containment Purge X following malfunctions or operations on 2.9 58 the Containment Purge System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.01 Maintenance or other activity taking place inside containment.

RO 2.9/SRO 3.6 Ability to monitor automatic operation 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 2.9 59 including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.02 Spent fuel leak or rupture RO 2.9/SRO 3.1 034 Fuel Handling Equipment

ES-401 15 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 035 Steam Generator X Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.6 60 malfunction on the following will have on the S/GS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.03 S/G level detector RO 2.6/SRO 3.0 041 Steam Dump/Turbine X Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.1 61 Bypass Control changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.02 Steam pressure RO 3.1/SRO 3.2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or 045 Main Turbine Generator X malfunction of the MT/G system will 2.9 62 have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.01 Remainder of the plant RO 2.9/SRO 3.2 055 Condenser Air Removal Knowledge of the physical connections 056 Condensate X and/or cause-effect relationships 2.6 63 between the Condensate System and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.03 MFW RO 2.6*/SRO 2.6 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring

ES-401 16 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K1 K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 075 Circulating Water X following malfunctions or operations on 2.5 64 the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.02 Loss of circulating water pumps RO 2.5 / SRO 2.7 079 Station Air Ability to monitor automatic operation 086 Fire Protection X of the Fire Protection System including: 65 2.9 (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

A3.01 Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps RO 2.9/SRO 3.3 K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 Group Point Total: 10/

3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) FORM ES-401-3 Facility: STP Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, 2.1. 3.6 66 records, status boards, and reports.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 1.

Conduct RO 3.6 SRO 3.8 of Operations 2.1.21 Ability to obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.

2.1. 3.1 67 (CFR: 45.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.1 SRO 3.2 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift turnover practices.

2.1. 3.0 68 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.0 SRO 3.4 Subtotal 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

2.2. 3.6 69 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.6 SRO 3.8

2. 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and 2.2. 3.4 70 Equipment safety limits.

Control (CFR: 43.2 / 45.2)

RO 3.4 SRO 4.1 Subtotal 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining 2.3. 3.2 71 to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

3.

Radiation Control (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 SRO 3.7 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and 2.3. 2.5 72 contamination control, including permissible levels in excess of those authorized.

(CFR: 43.4 / 45.10)

RO 2.5 SRO 3.1 Subtotal 2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, 2.4. 3.6 73 records, status boards, and reports.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 4.

Emergency RO 3.6 SRO 3.8 Procedures / 2.4.16 Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and 2.4. 3.5 74 Plan coordination with other support procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

RO 3.5 SRO 4.4

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) FORM ES-401-3 Facility: STP Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions.

2.4. 3.9 75 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 SRO 4.3 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 PWR SRO Examination Outline FORM ES-401-2 Facility: STP Date of Exam: 9/24/2015 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

  • Total
1. 1 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 N/A N/A 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 5 5 10 1 2 3 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#)

on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401 2 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following as 4.2 they apply to a small break LOCA:

76 (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.34 Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following as 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X they apply to a Large Break LOCA: 4.7 (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 77 EA2.01 Actions to be taken, based on RCS temperature and pressure - saturated and superheated 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 EPE: 029 Anticipated Transient Without Scram 4.2 (ATWS)

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 78 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X APE: 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.2 (CFR 55.43.2, 55.41.5, 55.41.7) 79 G2.2.25 Knowledge of the basis in the Technical Specifications for limiting conditions and safety limits 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 APE: 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water 4.0 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 80 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

ES-401 3 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: 4.1 (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 81 AA2.05 When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 Group Point Total: 18/6

ES-401 4 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 X APE: 032 Loss of Source Range Nuclear 4.6 83 Instrumentation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and 4.6 82 logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

RO 4.0/SRO 4.6 AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X 85 following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.02 Corrective actions required for high fission product activity in RCS. 3.4 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 X EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the 3.3 84 following as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

RO 2.9/SRO 3.3 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1

ES-401 5 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 Group Point Total: 9/4

ES-401 6 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X 4.1 86 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

RO 3.7/SRO 4.1 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features X APE: 013 Engineered Safety Features 4.7 87 Actuation Actuation System (ESFAS) 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

RO 4.4 SRO 4.7 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 4.5 88 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

RO 3.6 / SRO 4.5 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X 3.8 89 Feedwater A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.04 pump failure or improper operation.

062 AC Electrical Distribution

ES-401 7 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water X A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the 3.7 90 following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45/3 / 45/13)

A2.01 Loss of SWS 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 28/5

ES-401 8 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication X 014 Rod position Indication 3.9 91 A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.04 Misaligned rod 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 4.6 92 (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 3.2 93 A1 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Fuel Handling System controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.01 Load limits 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water

ES-401 9 FORM ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10/3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) FORM ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:

Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core 2.1. alterations. 4.1 94 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.7)

1. 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

Conduct 2.1. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 4.2 95 of Operations 2.1.

2.1.

Subtotal 2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance 2.2. activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, 3.9 96 work prioritization, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13))

2. 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to Equipment 2.2. procedures. 3.6 97 Control (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13) 2.2.

2.2.

Subtotal 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to 2.3. licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor 3.8 98 alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning

3. filters, etc.

Radiation (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Control 2.3.

2.3.

Subtotal 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status 2.4. that must be reported to internal organizations or external 4.1 99 agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission

4. system operator.

Emergency (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Procedures / 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan 2.4. implementation. 4.5 100 Plan (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 2.4.

2.4.

Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As FORM ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/1 EK1.02 This was supposed to be a generic K/A, EK 1.02 mistakenly selected. Replace with Generic K/A 2.4.1 2/1 2.1.33 This K/A is not one of the topics for Tiers 1 and 2 Generic K/As. Replace with K/A 2.1.25 3/1 2.1.11 This K/A was moved with the release of Revision 2, Supplement 1 of NUREG 1021. Replace with K/A 2.1.18 3/3 2.3.1 This K/A was moved with the release of Revision 2, Supplement 1 of NUREG 1021. Replace with K/A 2.3.12 3/4 2.4.15 This K/A was moved with the release of Revision 2, Supplement 1 of NUREG 1021. Replace with K/A 2.4.17 1/1 000022 Loss of Rejected K/A as could not come up with a quality question.

Rx Coolant Replaced with 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4, AA1.22 RCP Makeup / 2 Seal failure/malfunction Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup:

AA1.07 Excess letdown containment isolation valve switches and indicators

ES-401 2 FORM ES-401-4 1/1 000057 Loss There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 of Vital AC Inst. with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Bus / 6 Replaced with AK3 of same system.

AK2 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 1/1 000077 Generator Replaced with AK2 of same Emergency/Abnormal system to Voltage and even out the distribution of knowledge attributes Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 AK3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:

(CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8) 000033 Loss 1/1 There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 of Intermediate with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Range NI / 7 K2Knowledge of Replaced with AK3 of same system.

the interrelations between the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

ES-401 3 FORM ES-401-4 000065 Loss of 1/1 Instrument Air / 8 Resampled to due to excessive number of Instrument air questions on the exam.

Ability to determine and Replaced with 062 Loss of Nuclear Service Water A2.02 interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

(CFR: 43.5 /

45.13)

AA2.08 Failure modes of air-operated equipment RO2.9*/SRO 3.3 026 Containment 2/1 Spray There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

K5 Knowledge of Replaced with a K4 of the same system operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CSS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2/1 039 Main There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 and Reheat with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Steam Replaced with a K5 of the same system Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the MRSS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

ES-401 4 FORM ES-401-4 2/ 1 008 Component There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Cooling Water with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of the Replaced with a K1 of the same system operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CCWS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2/1 026 Containment There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Spray with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or Replaced with a K3 of the same system malfunction of the following will have on the CSS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 045 Main Turbine 2/ 2 There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Generator with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of bus power supplies to Replaced with a K3 of the same system the following:

(CFR: 41.7) 2/2 056 Condensate There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Knowledge of with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Condensate Replaced with a K1 of the same system System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7) 079 Station Air 2/2 Knowledge of bus There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

power supplies to the following: Replaced with system 015 Nuclear Instrumentation K2 (CFR: 41.7)

ES-401 5 FORM ES-401-4 2/2 029 Containment There are no Knowledge factors listed in NUREG 1122 Rev 2 Purge with an importance factor of greater than 2.5.

Knowledge of the Replaced with a A2 of the same system operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Containment Purge System:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 3 2.4.22 Knowledge Difficulty writing a valid RO level question of the basis for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emerge ncy operations.

(CFR 41.7/43.5/41.10/4 5.12)

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As FORM ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 3/4 2.4.41 A question using this K/A could not be written without duplicating an Admin JPM. Replaced with 2.4.44

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: _____________

Examination Level: RO X SRO Operating Test Number: __________

Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as RA(6) N,R graphs, curves, tables, etc.

K/A Importance: 3.9 Perform an RWST blended makeup calculation Conduct of Operations 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

RA(7) D,R Verify an excore QPTR calculation.

K/A Importance: 4.6 Equipment Control 2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

RA(8) N,R Using mechanical drawings determine the isolation K/A Importance: 3.5 boundaries for a leak on the RHR system.

Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under RA(9) M,R normal or emergency conditions.

K/A Importance: 3.2 Calculate stay time based on dose rates.

Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-1 RO A(6): The applicant will be required to calculate a blended makeup to the RWST.

The critical tasks include calculating total makeup volume and boric acid flowrate. The JPM should require the applicant to determine the total volume required to raise RWST level from 96% to 100%, the required boric acid flowrate, the required reactor makeup water flowrate, and the total volume of boric acid required.

RO A(7): The applicant will verify an excore QPTR calculation. This JPM is a bank JPM, and the values should be modified from those in the bank.

RO A(8): The initial condition for this JPM is that RHR is in its normal standby lineup.

The operator will be told that RHR Pump Discharge Valve is leaking. The operator will be directed to determine the valves that must be closed to stop the leak using station P&IDs. The operator will also be told to stop the leak while maintaining the "A" loop of RHR Containment Cooling and Sprays operational.

RO A(9): The applicant will calculate the allowed stay time to complete a described tagout without exceeding his yearly station administrative radiation dose limits. (This will likely be a modified bank question).

ES-301 1 Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: _____________

Examination Level: RO SRO X Operating Test Number: __________

Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

SA(1)

R, M JPM: Calculate SDM with a misaligned control rod and K/A Importance: 4.6 determine applicable Technical Specification Conduct of Operations 2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

SA(2)

JPM: Perform a Calorimetric Heat Balance and K/A Importance: 4.4 Evaluate Technical Specifications R, N Equipment Control 2.2.41, Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

SA(3)

R,N JPM: Using mechanical drawings determine the K/A Importance: 3.5 isolation boundaries for a leak on the RHR system.

Radiation Control 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

SA(4)

R, N K/A Importance: 3.8 JPM: approve a completed liquid waste release permit (alternate path actual release did not match the approved release limits)

Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

SA(5)

R,N JPM: Determine appropriate Emergency Plan EAL.

K/A Importance: 4.6 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-1 SRO A(1): Calculate SDM with a misaligned control rod and determine applicable Technical Specification. The calculated SDM will not meet the TS required SDM.

SRO A(2): Perform a manual heat balance calculation SRO A(3): The initial condition for this JPM is that RHR is in its normal standby lineup.

The operator will be told that RHR Pump Discharge Valve is leaking. The operator will be directed to determine the valves that must be closed to stop the leak using station P&IDs. The operator will also be told to stop the leak while maintaining the "A" loop of RHR Containment Cooling and Sprays operational.

SRO A(4): Approve a liquid waste release,the completed release paperwork shows that the actual release was in violation of the approved release rate/quantity SRO A(5): Determine the EAL call for a security event involving an explosion on site within the protected area resulting in a loss of offsite power.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __STP__ __________________ Date of Examination: _____________

Exam Level: RO X SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______________

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans N,A,S VI S2. Cross Connect AFW and Feed 2 SGs from same AFW pump N,E,S IV S3. Commence Emergency Boration N,E,S II S4. Re-establishing Letdown D,A,E,S I S5. Perform CCW valve operability testing N,S VIII S6. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation D,E,L,S III S7. Manual Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation N,A,E,S, EN V S8. Respond to a Radiation Monitor alarm D,A,E,S VII In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1. Locally close MSIVs/MSIBs D,L,E IV P2. Commence a liquid waste release, then a CCW pump trips N,A,R IX require the release to be secured per the contingency step 5.53 of 0POP02-WL-0100 P3. Place RWST on Recirculation D, E, EN II

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO (A)lternate path 4-6 (5)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (5)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature - (2)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (6)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0)

(R)CA 1 (1)

(S)imulator

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-2 S1 (NEW)

Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans The applicant is directed to place Isophase bus cooling fan 11 in service and Isophase bus fan 12 in standby.

Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP02-NN-0001, Isolated-Phase Bus and Duct Cooling and identifies that Section 8 is the required selection to be performed.

8.2 Switching from Fan 12(22) to Fan 11(21) 8.2.1 START "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)".

8.2.2 WHEN "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)" has reached rated speed, THEN STOP "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)".

8.2.3 IF "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" is to be placed in standby, THEN PLACE "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" control switch in AUTO.

When applicant completes step 8.2.2 both isophase bus cooling fans trip and will not restart Applicant will attempt to start either or both of the tripped fans (will not start)

Applicant will then inform the SRO SRO acknowledges and asks if there is any procedural guidance on what to do Applicant may reference alarm response guide or commence a turbine load reduction at 5% per min until < 18500 amps are read on gauge on CP007 as directed in Section 6 of the same procedure Critical task is to lower turbine load within limits specified in the procedure within 6 min of fans tripping off S2 (NEW)

Reactor has tripped and AFW pump for the A SG did not start and attempts to start the pump have been unsuccessful. You are directed to cross tie the AFW system and feed the A Steam Generator S3 (NEW)

Applicant responds to Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP04-CV-0003, Emergency Boration Applicant performs steps 1-3 Step 4 (no charging pumps are running performs the RNO actions (alternate path)

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-2 Step 5 when no BA pumps will start (alternate path)

Applicant directs field operator to make field alignments Applicant closes one of the VCT valves listed Applicant verifies 50 gpm charging flow Applicant verifies that PZr level is at or trending to required level After 2 min the Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" goes out Applicant reports that boration is no longer required End of JPM Critical Steps Starting a Charging pump S4 (BANK)

Pressurizer Level Channel 465 failed low. An inadvertent Reactor Trip/Safety Injection occurred before the actions of the 0POP04-RP-0002 were completed. We have transitioned from 0POP05-EO-EO00 to 0POP05-EO-ES11, and are currently at step 12.b. Charging is in service and Pressurizer Level is slowly rising. The bistables for LT-0465 have been tripped by I&C. The Unit Supervisor directs you to Re-Establish Letdown according to 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2.

Applicant will place letdown in service in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2. Alternate path should be step 2, which requires aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger.

Critical tasks are aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger, step2, and the opening of the individual letdown isolation valves, steps 7 through 10.

S5 (NEW)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to perform the Exercise and Isolation Time Test of MOV-0291, CCW Containment Isolation Valve, and Exercise and Isolation Time Test of MOV-0318, CCW Containment Isolation Valve, 0PSP03-CC-0010, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.

The applicant will perform exercise and isolation time test of MOV-0291 and MOV-0318.

The stroke time of MOV-0291 will be 12.25 seconds, which is an unsatisfactory stroke time.

While performing the test for MOV-0318, the applicant receives a CCW Surge Tank Low Level Alarm. The applicant should IMMEDIATELY stop the test and open MOV-0318.

Critical tasks include closing the two valves while timing the stroke, acknowledging the CCW Surge Tank Low Level Alarm, and opening MOV-0318.

ES-301 4 Form ES-301-2 S6 (BANK)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to transfer to hot leg recirculation on SI Train A then Train B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

The applicant will align hot leg recirc for the A HHSI pump, followed by the A LHSI pump, the B HHSI pump, and the B LHSI pump. The critical tasks will be the opening of the loop hot leg injection valves (steps 2.a.1 through 2.a.3; 2.b.2 through 2.b.4; 3.a.1 through 3.a.3; and 3.b.2 through 3.b.4).

S7 (NEW)

The Plant has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection from full power. The crew is performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. The CRS has assigned you to perform Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00.

The main focus of this task is for the applicant to recognize that Phase A Containment Isolation has not actuated, and after manual actuation, recognize that two valves did not close and manually close them. The two valves should be outboard containment isolation valve MOV-0025, and discharge outboard containment isolation valve FV-7800.

These tasks make up the critical tasks for this JPM.

S8 (BANK)

The Plant is at approximately 70% power. RCB Supplementary Purge is in progress in preparation for making a containment entry. You have just received a radiation alarm on the RM-11. The CRS directs you to investigate the alarm and take any action necessary.

The applicant should recognize that RT-8013 is above the high setpoint, and RT-8012 is above the alert setpoint. The applicant should use 0POP04-RA-001, Addendum 3.

While performing Addendum 3, the applicant should determine that containment ventilation actuation did not occur and manually closes the supplementary containment purge and RCB Atmosphere Radiation Monitor valves (steps 2.d and 2.e of Addendum 3), which make up the JPM critical tasks.

P1 (BANK)

STP T82044, Respond to a Loss of All AC Power. Respond to a Loss of All AC Power in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of All AC Power, The unit has just experienced a loss of all AC power, and procedure 0POP05-EO-EC00, LOSS OF ALL AC, is being performed. The crew is currently at step 10 a. RNO, and determines the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) for 1(2) A Steam Generator did not shut and cannot

ES-301 5 Form ES-301-2 be shut manually from the Control Room. The applicant is directed to locally close Steam Generator 1(2) A MSIV by performing Addendum 3, Failing Air to MSIVs and MSIBs.

P2 Commence a liquid waste release at step 5.40 of 0POP02-WL-0100, OC flow is aligned through the MAB Chiller, all equipment is working properly after discharge is established have the control room notify the operator that 1 CCW pump has tripped, Alternate path the operator must take that actions of step 5.53 to secure the release P3 (BANK)

Unit is at 100% power, steady state conditions. Maintenance has been recently completed on the Refueling Water Purification Pump (RWPP) and it is time to return it to service. The Unit Supervisor directs you to place the RWST on purification recirculation using the RWPP through SFP demineralizer 1A (2A) in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. Prerequisites of this procedure have been verified. SFP Purification is aligned through SFP Demin 1B(2B). The Radwaste Operator is standing by in the FHB to assist.

Critical tasks will be the opening of "SFP purification loop return to RWST isolation valve", FC-0046B (Step 7.4.4), and throttling refueling water purification pump discharge throttle valve, FC-0042 (Step 7.4.6).

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __STP__ __________________ Date of Examination: _____________

Exam Level: RO SRO-I X SRO-U Operating Test No.: ______________

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans N,A,S VI S2. Cross Connect AFW and Feed 2 SGs from same AFW pump N,E,S IV S3. Commence Emergency Boration N,E,S II S4. Re-establishing Letdown D,A,E,S I S6. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation D,E,L,S III S7. Manual Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation N,A,E,S V S8. Respond to a Radiation Monitor alarm D,A,E,S VII In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1. Locally close MSIVs/MSIBs D,L,E IV P2. Commence a liquid waste release, then a CCW pump trips N,A,R IX require the release to be secured per the contingency step 5.53 of 0POP02-WL-0100 P3. Place RWST on Recirculation D, E, EN II

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for SRO-I (A)lternate path 4-6 (5)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 8 (5)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature -

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (5)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (0)

(R)CA 1 (1)

(S)imulator

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-2 S1 (NEW)

Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans The applicant is directed to place Isophase bus cooling fan 11 in service and Isophase bus fan 12 in standby.

Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP02-NN-0001, Isolated-Phase Bus and Duct Cooling and identifies that Section 8 is the required selection to be performed.

8.2 Switching from Fan 12(22) to Fan 11(21) 8.2.1 START "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)".

8.2.2 WHEN "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)" has reached rated speed, THEN STOP "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)".

8.2.3 IF "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" is to be placed in standby, THEN PLACE "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" control switch in AUTO.

When applicant completes step 8.2.2 both isophase bus cooling fans trip and will not restart Applicant will attempt to start either or both of the tripped fans (will not start)

Applicant will then inform the SRO SRO acknowledges and asks if there is any procedural guidance on what to do Applicant may reference alarm response guide or commence a turbine load reduction at 5% per min until < 18500 amps are read on gauge on CP007 as directed in Section 6 of the same procedure Critical task is to lower turbine load within limits specified in the procedure within 6 min of fans tripping off S2 (NEW)

Reactor has tripped and AFW pump for the A SG did not start and attempts to start the pump have been unsuccessful. You are directed to cross tie the AFW system and feed the A Steam Generator S3 (NEW)

Applicant responds to Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP04-CV-0003, Emergency Boration Applicant performs steps 1-3 Step 4 (no charging pumps are running performs the RNO actions (alternate path)

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-2 Step 5 when no BA pumps will start (alternate path)

Applicant directs field operator to make field alignments Applicant closes one of the VCT valves listed Applicant verifies 50 gpm charging flow Applicant verifies that PZr level is at or trending to required level After 2 min the Window E-4 "BANK INSRT LO-LO" goes out Applicant reports that boration is no longer required End of JPM Critical Steps Starting a Charging pump S4 (BANK)

Pressurizer Level Channel 465 failed low. An inadvertent Reactor Trip/Safety Injection occurred before the actions of the 0POP04-RP-0002 were completed. We have transitioned from 0POP05-EO-EO00 to 0POP05-EO-ES11, and are currently at step 12.b. Charging is in service and Pressurizer Level is slowly rising. The bistables for LT-0465 have been tripped by I&C. The Unit Supervisor directs you to Re-Establish Letdown according to 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2.

Applicant will place letdown in service in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI TERMINATION, Addendum 2. Alternate path should be step 2, which requires aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger.

Critical tasks are aligning CCW to the letdown heat exchanger, step2, and the opening of the individual letdown isolation valves, steps 7 through 10.

S6 (BANK)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to transfer to hot leg recirculation on SI Train A then Train B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

The applicant will align hot leg recirc for the A HHSI pump, followed by the A LHSI pump, the B HHSI pump, and the B LHSI pump. The critical tasks will be the opening of the loop hot leg injection valves (steps 2.a.1 through 2.a.3; 2.b.2 through 2.b.4; 3.a.1 through 3.a.3; and 3.b.2 through 3.b.4).

S7 (NEW)

The Plant has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection from full power. The crew is performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. The CRS has assigned you to perform Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00.

ES-301 4 Form ES-301-2 The main focus of this task is for the applicant to recognize that Phase A Containment Isolation has not actuated, and after manual actuation, recognize that two valves did not close and manually close them. The two valves should be outboard containment isolation valve MOV-0025, and discharge outboard containment isolation valve FV-7800.

These tasks make up the critical tasks for this JPM.

S8 (BANK)

The Plant is at approximately 70% power. RCB Supplementary Purge is in progress in preparation for making a containment entry. You have just received a radiation alarm on the RM-11. The CRS directs you to investigate the alarm and take any action necessary.

The applicant should recognize that RT-8013 is above the high setpoint, and RT-8012 is above the alert setpoint. The applicant should use 0POP04-RA-001, Addendum 3.

While performing Addendum 3, the applicant should determine that containment ventilation actuation did not occur and manually closes the supplementary containment purge and RCB Atmosphere Radiation Monitor valves (steps 2.d and 2.e of Addendum 3), which make up the JPM critical tasks.

P1 (BANK)

STP T82044, Respond to a Loss of All AC Power. Respond to a Loss of All AC Power in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of All AC Power, The unit has just experienced a loss of all AC power, and procedure 0POP05-EO-EC00, LOSS OF ALL AC, is being performed. The crew is currently at step 10 a. RNO, and determines the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) for 1(2) A Steam Generator did not shut and cannot be shut manually from the Control Room. The applicant is directed to locally close Steam Generator 1(2) A MSIV by performing Addendum 3, Failing Air to MSIVs and MSIBs.

P2 Commence a liquid waste release at step 5.40 of 0POP02-WL-0100, OC flow is aligned through the MAB Chiller, all equipment is working properly after discharge is established have the control room notify the operator that 1 CCW pump has tripped, Alternate path the operator must take that actions of step 5.53 to secure the release P3 (BANK)

Unit is at 100% power, steady state conditions. Maintenance has been recently completed on the Refueling Water Purification Pump (RWPP) and it is time to return it to service. The Unit Supervisor directs you to place the RWST on purification recirculation

ES-301 5 Form ES-301-2 using the RWPP through SFP demineralizer 1A (2A) in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. Prerequisites of this procedure have been verified. SFP Purification is aligned through SFP Demin 1B(2B). The Radwaste Operator is standing by in the FHB to assist.

Critical tasks will be the opening of "SFP purification loop return to RWST isolation valve", FC-0046B (Step 7.4.4), and throttling refueling water purification pump discharge throttle valve, FC-0042 (Step 7.4.6).

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: __STP__ __________________ Date of Examination: _____________

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U X Operating Test No.: ______________

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans N,A,S VI S6. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation D,E,L,S III S7. Manual Containment Isolation Phase A Actuation N,A,E,S, EN V In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P2. Commence a liquid waste release, then a CCW pump trips N,A,R IX require the release to be secured per the contingency step 5.53 of 0POP02-WL-0100 P3. Place RWST on Recirculation D, E, EN II

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for SRO-U (A)lternate path 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 4 (2)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (control room system) (1)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 1 (3)

(P)revious 2 exams 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (2)

(S)imulator

ES-301 2 Form ES-301-2 S1 (NEW)

Swap Running Isophase Bus Cooling Fans The applicant is directed to place Isophase bus cooling fan 11 in service and Isophase bus fan 12 in standby.

Applicant obtains a copy of 0POP02-NN-0001, Isolated-Phase Bus and Duct Cooling and identifies that Section 8 is the required selection to be performed.

8.2 Switching from Fan 12(22) to Fan 11(21) 8.2.1 START "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)".

8.2.2 WHEN "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 11(21)" has reached rated speed, THEN STOP "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)".

8.2.3 IF "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" is to be placed in standby, THEN PLACE "ISOPHASE BUS COOLING FAN 12(22)" control switch in AUTO.

When applicant completes step 8.2.2 both isophase bus cooling fans trip and will not restart Applicant will attempt to start either or both of the tripped fans (will not start)

Applicant will then inform the SRO SRO acknowledges and asks if there is any procedural guidance on what to do Applicant may reference alarm response guide or commence a turbine load reduction at 5% per min until < 18500 amps are read on gauge on CP007 as directed in Section 6 of the same procedure Critical task is to lower turbine load within limits specified in the procedure within 6 min of fans tripping off S6 (BANK)

The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to transfer to hot leg recirculation on SI Train A then Train B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-ES14, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation.

The applicant will align hot leg recirc for the A HHSI pump, followed by the A LHSI pump, the B HHSI pump, and the B LHSI pump. The critical tasks will be the opening of the loop hot leg injection valves (steps 2.a.1 through 2.a.3; 2.b.2 through 2.b.4; 3.a.1 through 3.a.3; and 3.b.2 through 3.b.4).

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-2 S7 (NEW)

The Plant has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection from full power. The crew is performing 0POP05-EO-EO00. The CRS has assigned you to perform Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00.

The main focus of this task is for the applicant to recognize that Phase A Containment Isolation has not actuated, and after manual actuation, recognize that two valves did not close and manually close them. The two valves should be outboard containment isolation valve MOV-0025, and discharge outboard containment isolation valve FV-7800.

These tasks make up the critical tasks for this JPM.

P2 Commence a liquid waste release at step 5.40 of 0POP02-WL-0100, OC flow is aligned through the MAB Chiller, all equipment is working properly after discharge is established have the control room notify the operator that 1 CCW pump has tripped, Alternate path the operator must take that actions of step 5.53 to secure the release P3 (BANK)

Unit is at 100% power, steady state conditions. Maintenance has been recently completed on the Refueling Water Purification Pump (RWPP) and it is time to return it to service. The Unit Supervisor directs you to place the RWST on purification recirculation using the RWPP through SFP demineralizer 1A (2A) in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. Prerequisites of this procedure have been verified. SFP Purification is aligned through SFP Demin 1B(2B). The Radwaste Operator is standing by in the FHB to assist.

Critical tasks will be the opening of "SFP purification loop return to RWST isolation valve", FC-0046B (Step 7.4.4), and throttling refueling water purification pump discharge throttle valve, FC-0042 (Step 7.4.6).

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew A Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-1 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-1 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-1 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew B Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-2 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-2 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-2 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew C Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-3 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-3 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-3 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew D Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-4 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO-4 RX 1 1 0 X NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-5 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-5 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-4 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-6 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Crew F Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T POSITION I

C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L R T O R T O R T O R T O U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U-6 MAJ 2 2 1 X

TS 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I-5 X I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-7 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RO-8 RX 1 1 0 X

SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __STP_____________ Scenario No.: ____1____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: IC-XXXX, Unit is at 95% MOL, Turnover: Raise RX power to 100% using control rods.

EDG A is removed from service for maintenance and will not be available for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Critical Tasks:

1. Start HPCI pump prior to exit E-0
2. Depressurize S/G to less than 1000 psig within 45 min of SBLOCA Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description RO (R) Raise RX power to 100% using control rods per XXXXXX 1

BOP (N) Shift control room ventilation from A train to B train 2

SRO(TS) Report from field that while removing scaffold the bubbler for CSP B has 3 been broken and oil has spilled all over the floor RO (I) PZR Pressure Channel PT-457 fails high 4 Entry into OP0P04-RP-0001 Loss of Automatic Pressure Control SRO(TS)

BOP (C) IA system leak, Standby IA compressor 12 fails to auto start IA pressure 5 will stabilize at 114 psig Entry into OP0P04-IA-0001 Loss of Instrument Air ALL (C) A ES 4160V bus lockout 6 Entry into 0POP04-AE-0001 First Response to Loss of Any or All 13.8 SRO(TS)

KV or 4.16 KV Bus ALL (M) Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident, pressure will lower to below HPCI 7 discharge pressure CT: Depressurize S/G to less than 1000 psig in 45 min of SBLOCA ALL (C) 4 control rods fail to insert on the Reactor trip (Emergency Boration is 8 Required)

ALL (C) B HPCI pump fails to start 9 CT: Identify and start pump using hand switch

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
3. Major transients (1-2) 1
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Narrative of Scenario 1

1. Crew receives turnover and is directed to raise power to100% using control rods.

Actions: SRO directs the OAC to commence a power increase to 100% power using control rods.

2. From turnover sheet the SRO will direct the BOP operator to swap the running control room ventilation Actions: SRO will direct the BOP to swap the running control room ventilation fans in accordance with station procedures
3. Booth notification: My crew was moving scaffold poles and one of my guys accidently broke a glass bubbler on CSP B, all of the oil has spilled on to the floor. I called facilities and they are going to clean up the oil.

Actions: SRO enters ITS associated with the CSP and takes actions to ensure that the pump will not start

4. As soon as the control room ventilation fans have been swapped and TS addressed, the controlling range RCS pressure instrument fails high. 0POP04-RP-0001 Loss of Automatic Pressure Control Write-in CT (Operators need to take action to ensure the RCS low pressure trip set point is not reached resulting in a reactor trip)

Actions: OAC will recognize the failure take actions necessary per the abnormal procedure

5. IA leak, a substantial leak in the instrument air system will occur and the standby IA compressor will fail to auto start. Once the standby IAP has been started IA header will stabilize at ~ 95 psig. The leak should be big enough to see a steady lowering of IA header pressure but allow the operators an opportunity to find and start the standby IA pump. 0POP04-IA-0001 Loss of Instrument Air Actions: Identify the failure of the standby IA pump. If not started, IA header pressure will continue to lower until second backup compressor starts and then slowly continue to lower. It should take a significant amount of time to reach any trip criteria this will allow entry into the Off-Normal procedure for loss of IA and take required actions in that procedures. Once the Standby IA compressor is started IA header pressure will rise to 95psig and remain stable. [5-10] min after starting the standby IAP the control room will receive a phone call saying that the leak has been identified and isolated by closing a valve, IA header recovers fully after that action.
6. A loss of the A ES 4160 volt bus occurs (cannot be re-energized)

Actions: Crew takes actions necessary in the abnormal procedure to ensure that required equipment for operation is restarted and the SRO should enter TS associated with the distribution system.

7. Small Break loss of coolant accident inside containment Actions: Reactor is tripped and required actions taken.

Critical: Operators must take action to lower S/G pressure to < 1000psig within 45 min of leak

8. 4 control rods fail to insert.

Actions: Emergency Boration is required

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1

9. When ES actuates the control board operator identifies that the B high pressure injection pump fails to start and starts the pump from the control room switch. When the B High pressure injection pump has started the RCS pressure stabilizes at a pressure above the actuation of the Low Pressure injection actuation point.

Critical: Start HPCI pump prior to exit E-0 [or agreed-upon criteria]

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Depressurize S/G to less than 1000psig within 45 min of Establish Charging from at least 1 HPCI pump prior to transition from E-0 SBLOCA EVENT 7 9 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- This operator action is SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually start at least one significance necessary to ensure the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.46 Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) under the postulated (specifically the ECCS acceptance criteria for peak cladding conditions constitutes misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which temperature < 2200°F) is met. Refer to correspondence NOC the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

AE000151 (13), NOCAE000159 (14), and NOCAE capacity. In this case, at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump 000545 (15). for LP plants) can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) also represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate the following abilities:

  • Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario
  • Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition. The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analysis of a small-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow rate values assumed for minimum pumped injection are based on operation of one each of the following ECCS pumps:

Charging/SI pump (HP plants only), high-head SI pump, and low-head SI pump. Operation of this minimum required complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum safeguards are actuated. For both the minimum and maximum cases specified in Comment 1 of this critical task worksheet and for all cases in between, failure to perform the critical task means that the plant is needlessly left in an unanalyzed condition. Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to perform the critical task (under the postulated plant conditions) constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Cueing o PZR level and indications of a small break

  • Indication and/or annunciation that Charging/SI pump (high-head SI loss of coolant accident pump for LP plants)injection is required o SI actuation

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-1 o RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants)

AND

  • Indication and/or annunciation that no Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) is injecting into the core o Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for both Charging/SI pumps (high-head SI pumps for LP plants) are open o All Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) discharge pressure indicators read zero o All flow rate indicators for Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) injection read zero Performance Manipulation of controls as required to adjust secondary Manipulation of controls as required to establish flow from at least one indicator pressure Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants)
  • Control switch indication that the circuit breaker or contactor for at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants) is closed Performance S/G pressure and valve position indication
  • Indication and/or annunciation that at least one Charging/SI pump feedback (high-head SI pumpfor LP plants) is injecting
  • Flow rate indication of injection from at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for LP plants)

Justification This operator action is necessary to ensure the acceptance Failure to manually start at least one Charging/SI pump (high-head SI pump for the chosen criteria of 10CFR50.46 (specifically the ECCS acceptance for LP plants) under the postulated conditions constitutes misoperation or performance criteria for peak cladding temperature < 2200°F) is met incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded limit emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity.

PWR Owners STPEGS EOPT-o3.07 Rev 22 CT-6, ESTABLISH FLOW FROM AT LEAST ONE CHARGING/SI PUMP Group (HIGH-HEAD SI PUMP FOR LP PLANTS)

Appendix References 0POP04-RP-0001 Loss of Automatic Pressure Control 0POP04-TM-0005 Fast Load Rejection 0POP04-IA-0001 Loss of Instrument Air

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __STP_____________ Scenario No.: ___2_____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions:

100% Rx power, MOL Turnover:

100% Rx Power EOL, Crew has been directed to swap running EHC pumps, one charging pump is tagged out of service for oil change Critical Tasks:

1. Isolate ruptured SG within [establish agreed-upon criteria]
2. Manually initiate AFW prior to reaching dryout conditions on any steam generator.

[NRC Note: Scenario is event-heavy before major. Evaluate removing one of the I/C malfunctions]

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description BOP (N) Swap Running CALCW pumps 1

BOP (C) Charging Pump Overcurrent Trip.

2 SRO (TS)

ALL (C) Stator Water cooling low flow alarm. Start Standby pump.

3 OAC (R) Rod Control Malfunction: continuous rod insertion.

4 SRO (C)

BOP (C) Condensate pump Trip, entry into 0POP04-CD-0001 5

SRO (C)

OAC (I) Power Range C NI fails low 6

SRO (TS)

ALL (M) C Steam Generator Tube rupture ramps in over a 5 min until trip 7

setpoint reached.

All (C) C SG safety fails to close.

8 All (C) AFW fails to auto start 9

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 5
3. Major transients (1-2) 1
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Narrative of Scenario 2:

1. Swap running CALCW pumps, Action: Normal evolution SRO directs the BOP operator to swap the running CALCW pumps in accordance with station procedures
2. Charging Pump Trips on overcurrent Actions: Operators respond to the loss of the running charging pump and perform the actions required to start the available standby pump ITS call for SRO
3. Stator water cooling demineralizer D/P is high resulting in a low flow condition, Temperatures begin to rise and action to start the standby pump or bypass/swap demineralizers are successful Actions: Operators will receive alarm of stator cooling d/p reference the alarm response procedure and take appropriate actions
4. Controlling control rod group begins to continuously insert Actions: Operators identify the issue with the control rod system and take manual control to maintain Tave (possible ITS call)
5. Condensate Pump Trips Actions: Alarms in control room are received indicating that one condensate has tripped off line.

Immediate actions are taken in accordance with 0POP04-CD-0001. Once standby pump is started the plant is stabilized

6. Power Range C NI fails low Actions: SRO enters 0POP04-NI-000 and takes appropriate actions, ITS call for SRO
7. Major: SGTR in the C steam generator Actions: tube rupture will start small and gradually increase from a tube leak of 15 gpm to 250 gpm. It will take [5 to 10] min to reach the point that a reactor trip is required. The operator will trip the reactor when required by procedure.
8. When the Unit trips one control rod does not fully insert but the plant is shut down. An SG safety valve on the C steam generator fails to reseat, action is required to lower steam pressure to attempt to reseat the valve.

Actions: Operators take appropriate actions per their procedures and identify that the steam generator safety has failed to seat. Operators take action to lower pressure to attempt to reseat the valve (this is unsuccessful valve will remain open throughout the rest of scenario)

9. AFW pumps fail to start automatically. When manually aligned the AFW pump aligned to the B steam generator has a sheared shaft.

Actions: Operators identify that AFW failed to auto start and manually start AFW. Operator identifies sheared shaft on AFW Pump to the B steam generator and uses procedural guidance to either cross tie the feed to that generator or isolate it.

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks CT-18, Isolate ruptured steam generator [within agreed-upon Establish the [minimum required AFW flow rate] to the SGs [before transition criteria] out of E-0 or other agreed-to criteria] unless the transition is to FR-H.1, in which case the task must be [initiated before RCPs are manually tripped] in accordance with Step 4 of generic guideline FR-H.1 EVENT 7 9 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to isolate the ruptured SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to establish the minimum required AFW significance SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, results in adverse SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the crew allows the consequence or a significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then plant. In this case, the minimum required AFW flow rate can be established forced to transition to a contingency ERG constitutes an by performing the appropriate manual action. Therefore, failure to manually incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking establish the minimum required AFW flow rate also represents a failure by the compensating action that would complicate the event crew todemonstrate the following abilities:

mitigation strategy....

  • Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
  • Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Cueing
  • Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG
  • Indication and/or annunciation that SI is actuated o Increasing SG water level AND o Radiation
  • Indication and/or annunciation that the AFW flow rate is less than the AND minimum required
  • Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip o Total AFW flow rate indicates less than the minimum AND required
  • Indication and/or annunciation of SI o Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or contactors for the motor-driven AFW pumps are open o Control switch indication that the steam supply valves to the turbine-driven AFW pump are closed o AFW valve position indication that a flow path is not established to at least one SG Performance Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the ruptured Manipulation of controls in the control room as required to establish the indicator SG minimum required AFW
  • Main steam isolation bypass valve position lamps indicate closed
  • PORV setpoint adjusted to ERG Footnote O.03

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1

  • Blowdown isolation valve position lamps indicate closed Steam isolation valve to TDAFW pump position lamps indicate closed
  • AFW valve position lamps and/or indicators indicate closed
  • Feedwater isolation valve position lamps indicate closed]2 Performance
  • Indication of stable or increasing pressure in the
  • Indication that at least the minimum required AFW flow rate is being feedback ruptured SG delivered to the SGs
  • Indication of decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate
  • SG levels increasing in the ruptured SG Justification
  • An incorrect action that necessitates the crew to Given the postulated plant conditions, the adverse consequences that can arise for the chosen take compensating actions that would complicate the from failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow rate are challenges performance event mitigation to the following:

limit AND

  • A significant reduction of safety margin beyond
  • Core cooling CSF that irreparably introduced by the scenario
  • Fuel matrix/clad fission product barrier PWR Owners CT-18, Isolate ruptured SG CT-4, Establish AFW flow to SGs Group Appendix

Appendix D 1 Form ES-D-1 Facility: __STP_____________ Scenario No.: ____3____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is just below POAH, MOL. Unit 2 is at 100%. The B Safety Injection Pump and the D Condenser Circulating Water Pump are tagged out for preventative maintenance.

Turnover: Unit 1 is just below POAH, MOL. Unit 2 is at 100%. B Safety Injection Pump and the D Condenser Circulating Water Pump are tagged out for preventative maintenance. The crew is to increase power to1% by withdrawing control rods. LCO 3.0.4.(b) has been assessed for the B Safety Injection Pump inoperability and Mode change has been authorized. The Startup SG Feed Pump is running with one Main Feed Pump being warmed up but not yet at idle.

Critial Tasks:

1. Stop the RCP within 5 min of reaching loss of SCM setpoint.
2. Manually start SW pumps for safeguards equipment cooling prior to Plant specific critreria Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RO (R) Withdraw control rods to increase reactor power to 1%

2 RO (I) 1D S/G W/R signal fails low. Feed reg. bypass valve opens. Loss of S/G level Control 0POP4-FW-0001 SRO (I) 3 BOP (C) One loops essential cooling water pump shaft seizes and will require the operator to start an additional Essential cooling water SRO (C,TS) pump. This will require a Technical specification call for one loop Essential Cooling water loop being OOS (3.7.4) 4 BOP (C) Running Feed Pump trips will require entry into 0POP04-FW-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip. 1 AFW Pump will not SRO (C,TS) start requiring a Technical Specification call (3.7.1.2) 5 ALL (M) PZR PORV fails open. Manual closure attempt is unsuccessful.

Manual block valve will not close. (Requires a Rx trip)

SBLOCA due to PORV (RCP must be secured) (CRITICAL) 6 ALL (C) Phase A Train B fails to auto actuate with CV-MOV-0023 failed open 7 ALL (C) Required number of service water pumps fail to start requiring manual pump start (CRITICAL) 8 ALL (M) After RCP have been secure or 5 min after trip a Large break LOCA resulting in a loss of Sub-Cooling Margin

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
3. Major transients (1-2) 2
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Narrative for Scenario 1
1. Raise reactor power to 1%. Crew will use rods since unit is below POAH. Once POAH is reached trigger next event at lead examiners discretion.
2. 1D S/G W/R level signal fails LOW; associated Feed Reg. Bypass Valve opens. RO takes manual control to stabilize and restore 1D S/G level. (Loss of SG Level control). This failure is internal and does not indicate on the W/R level board indication.
3. One loops essential cooling water pump shaft seizes and will require the operator to start an additional Essential cooling water pump. This will require a Technical specification call for one loop Essential Cooling water loop being OOS (3.7.4).
4. Operating Start Up Feedwater Pump trips, no other feedwater pump is idle at this point and the operators are expected to work their way to starting AFW to stabilize S/G level. When attempting to start one of the AFW pumps it will not start and the SRO will need to cross connect the aux feed water and evaluate TS 3.7.1.2 once SG levels are stable notify the control room that the SU Feedwater pump is ready to start and allow crew to transition back to normal feedwater
5. (PZR PORV) fails open. RO attempts manual closure of the PORV. This will not be successful.

(Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies) entry. This is the major event because the PZR PORV cannot be closed, nor will the manual block isolation close. Recognizing a SBLOCA, the crew will determine that the reactor must be tripped. The operators will need to recognize that a loss of sub-cooling margin has occurred and secure the RCPs within 5 min (CRITICAL)

6. Phase A (Train B) fails to auto actuate, and CV-MOV-0023 fails open, causing a loss of containment isolation, until operator action corrects the situation.
7. SW pumps are either tripped or fail to start and require the crew to start as necessary they will start form the control room. (Critical)
8. When Reactor Trips a large depressurization occurs due to a LBLOCA and sub-cooling margin is lost. No ES systems automatically actuate. All ECCS components will start if manually started from the control room. The operators will need to recognize that a loss of sub-cooling margin has occurred and secure the RCPs within 5 min (CRITICAL)

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Critical Task 2 - Trip NC pumps on loss of subcooling with Manually start SW pumps for safeguards equipment cooling S/I flow verified per E-0 within 5 minutes of criteria met.

EVENT 5 7 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to trip the RCPs under SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to manually start at least the significance the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to minimum required number of SW pumps in an operating fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the safeguards train represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate limit specified in the [ECCS acceptance criteria].9 Thus, the following abilities:

failure to perform the task represents misoperation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew has failed to Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature prevent degradation of...{the fuel cladding} ...barrier to (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of fission product release and which leads to violation of the safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the facility license condition. The analysis presented in the scenario FSAR for a SBLOCA typically assumes that the RCPs trip because of a loss of offsite power that coincides with the Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an reactor trip. However, during a SBLOCA, offsite power ESF system or component might remain available and RCPs might continue to run for some period of time. Following the accident at TMI-2, the Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to NRC expressed concern about RCP operation during a manually start at least the minimum required number of SW SBLOCA. In response, the WOG sponsored analyses to determine when the RCPs must be if power remains pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility available. It was determined that manually tripping the RCPs license condition.

before RCS inventory is depleted to less than the critical inventory results in a peak cladding temperature about the same as the PCT in the FSAR analysis. Manually tripping the RCPs before depletion below the critical inventory conservatively ensures that PCT remains below 2200°F.

The concept of critical inventory is used to determine RCP trip criteria for SBLOCAs in which the RCPs do not trip at the time of reactor trip. However, the critical inventory is defined in terms of the original FSAR analysis in which RCP trip coincides with reactor trip. The critical inventory is the amount of inventory remaining in the RCS when the break completely uncovers and the break flow changes from a mixture of liquid and steam to all steam. Continued RCP operation after the RCS is depleted to the critical inventory results in more mass being lost through the break than would otherwise be the case. More mass is lost because RCP operation causes liquid to continue to flow from the break, whereas, in an RCS depleted to the critical inventory, liquid

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 loss from the break stops when RCPs are stopped. The WOG provided guidance for its members to convert this event (RCS depletion to the critical inventory) into useful control room indications, called the RCP trip criteria. Upon receipt of the plant-specific conditions that the RCP trip criteria are met, the crew must trip the RCPs. Failure to do so results in more liquid inventory being lost through the break than would be the case if the RCPs were tripped. The WOG studied the effects of delaying RCP trip beyond the time that the RCP trip criteria are met (that is, beyond the time that the RCS is depleted to the critical inventory). The Analysis of Delayed Reactor Coolant Pump Trip during Small Loss of Coolant Accidents for Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (WCAP-9584, 1979) examined cold-leg breaks of 2, 3, and 4 inches for the bounding plant type, which is a 3-loop plant. The analysis showed that, for the bounding plant type (which is a 3-loop plant), delayed RCP trip can cause adverse consequence for the 2- and 3-inch breaks, meaning that PCT exceeds 2200°F. WCAP-9584 also demonstrated that similar windows for adverse consequence exist for 2- and 4-loop plants, [although for slightly different break-size ranges].10 The adverse consequence arises when RCP trip occurs within a specific window of time. As break size increases, the window for adverse consequence shortens and begins sooner.

For the 2-inch break (three loop, cold leg), the window begins at about 33 minutes and lasts for such a long time that the analysis was stopped before the window ended (it is assumed that the window would eventually end). For the 3-inch break (three loop, cold leg), the window begins at about 8 minutes and ends at 12 minutes. The 4-inch break (three loop, cold leg) has no window, meaning PCT remains below 2200°F regardless of RCP trip delay. The window for adverse consequence is caused by the fact that the drop in the core mixture level that occurs when RCPs are tripped has two competing effects. First, delaying RCP trip results in faster depletion of RCS inventory so that, when the RCPs finally trip, core uncover can occur almost instantaneously. If the RCPs are tripped soon after the trip criteria are met, little or no core uncovery occurs and PCT remains below 2200°F. As RCP trip is delayed beyond the trip criteria, core

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-1 uncovery (when the RCPs finally do trip) is much deeper and PCT exceeds 2200°F. Second, and competing with core uncovery, is accumulator injection. The analysis shows that very deep core uncovery causes a rapid RCS depressurization. Less decay heat is transferred to the core fluid, causing RCS temperature and pressure to drop. The rapid RCS depressurization causes the accumulators to inject sooner and faster, re-covering the core and mitigating the rise in PCT.

Cueing

  • Indication and/or annunciation that SI is actuated AND
  • AND
  • Indication and/or annunciation of safety injection
  • Indication [and/or annunciation]9 that less than the minimum AND required number of SW pumps is running
  • Indication and/or annunciation that only one train of - Control switch indication that the circuit breakers or

[safety injection pumps]4 actuates contactors for all SW pumps are open AND - SW pump discharge pressure indicator reads zero

  • Indication that the RCP trip criteria are met - SW flow indicator reads zero

- SW pump trouble alarm Performance Manipulation of controls as required to trip all RCPs Manipulation of controls as required to start at least the minimum required indicator

  • RCP breaker position lights indicate breaker open number of SW pumps in an operating safeguards train
  • Control switch indication that the appropriate circuit breaker(s) or contactor(s) are closed Performance
  • Indication that all RCPs are stopped Indication and/or annunciation that at least the minimum required number of feedback o RCP breaker position lights SW pumps is o RCP flow decreasing running in an operating safeguards train o RCP motor amps decreasing
  • SW low flow condition clear; indication of flow
  • SW low pressure condition clear; indication of pressure Justification The analysis based on Appendix K conditions shows that, for Failure to manually start minimum number of SW pumps will take the for the chosen the bounding plant type (which again is a 3-loop plant), required safety pumps cooled by SW out of service that are required for the performance delayed RCP trip causes PCT to exceed 2200°F [for a range safety function.

limit of cold leg break sizes, up to 4.5 inches].11 The minimum response time for the operating crew is 5 minutes, which is for the 4.5 inch break. If the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT remains below 2200°F. If the RCPs are tripped later than 5 minutes after meeting the trip criteria, PCT exceeds 2200°F.

PWR Owners CT-16, Manually trip RCPs CT-9, Manually start [at least the minimum required number of SW pumps]1 Group [in an operating safeguards train]2 [before plant- and scenario-specific criteria

Appendix D 6 Form ES-D-1 Appendix are exceeded]

References Loss of Circulating Water Flow, 0POP4-CW-0001 Loss of S/G level Control, 0POP4-FW-0001 Loss of Circulating Water Flow, 0POP4-CW-0001 Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip, 0POP04-FW-0002 EOPs

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __________________ Scenario No.: ___4____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: IC-XXXX, Unit is at 65% MOL, Turnover: Reduce Reactor Power to 60% to remove the B main feed pump from service for maintenance. Circ water pump #13 is OOS for maintenance Critical Tasks:

1. Close MSIV prior to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first.
2. Isolate Feed to the B steam generator prior to [establish criteria]

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R (RO) SRO directs RO to lower power to 60%

2 N (BOP) Secure B main feed pump 3 I (RO) Turbine impulse pressure (PT-506) transmitter fails low causing rod insertion. Enters OP0P04-TM-0004 TS (SRO) 4 C (BOP) Gland seal regulator fails high Operator action required to take manual control 5 C (RO) COLD LEG TE-420B FAILS HIGH TS (SRO) Requires entry into 0POP04-RP-0004 6 M (All) B S/G steamline break upstream of B MSIV 7 C (BOP) B MSIV fails to close C (BOP) AFW pump switch fails to secure the B AFW pump and the valves must 8 be closed to isolate

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
3. Major transients (1-2) 1
4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
6. EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Narrative of Scenario 4

1. Crew receives turnover and is directed to reduce power to 60% using control rods. SRO directs the OAC to commence a power reduction to 60% power using control rods to secure the A MFP for maintenance.

Power reduction is successful to ~ 60%.

2. Following the power reduction, the crew is directed to secure the A MFP.
3. Once the feed pump is secure, a turbine impulse pressure instrument will fail low causing rod insertion.

The OAC will take manual control of the rods, and the BOP operator will select out the failed channel.

4. Gland seal regulator fails high and manual control is needed to control gland seal pressure
5. Cold leg RTD TE-420B fails high. Crew enters 0POP04-RP-0004, FAILURE OF RCS LOOP RTD PROTECTION CHANNEL.
6. The major event will be a main steam line break upstream of the B MSIV.
7. The BOP operator should also note that the B MSIV failed to close, and take manual action to close the MSIV. (CT - Manually close the B MSIV before an orange path challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF or before transition to ECA-2.1, whichever happens first)
8. AFW will not isolate to the B S/G normally (either in automatic or manual), causing continued feed to the faulted steam line until manual isolation of the AFW to the B SG is done either by securing pump or closing an isolation valve. (CT - Isolate AFW to faulted SG)

The scenario should be terminated when B SG is dry and control of subsequent heat up is established.

CT-17 of owners group document: Critical task to isolate all feed sources to the B S/G prior to [need to establish criteria]

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Isolate Faulted Steam Generator Manually close MSIV prior to Orange path CSF EVENT 9 8 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to isolate a faulted SG SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated significance that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a constitutes a failure by the crew to demonstrate (the ability to) recognize a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component, failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system and to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant or component. safety.

In the typical FSAR, the analysis for a large steamline break assumes Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the steamline isolation within a short time frame, on the order of seconds. The following CSFs: analysis typically assumes a steam system piping failure in which a single SG

  • Integrity blows down completely. That is, the analysis assumes a fault that can be
  • Subcriticality isolated from all but one SG.
  • Containment However, in the plant conditions postulated for this critical task, the break is located downstream of the MSIVs. Thus, closure of all MSIVs would Failure to isolate the faulted SG such that multiple SGs are terminate all uncontrolled blowdown. In this case, there is no reason for even a allowed to blow down for an extended time can significantly single SG to completely depressurize. If the crew allows all MSIVs to remain worsen the power excursion. Similarly, failure to isolate all open, then all SGs depressurize uncontrollably and unnecessarily.

feedwater flow, including AFW, to the faulted SG such that it Uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs causes an excessive rate of RCS continues to blow down for an extended time can cooldown, well beyond the conditions typically analyzed in the FSAR. The significantly worsen the power excursion. excessive cooldown rate creates large thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and causes rapid insertion of a large amount of positive reactivity.

Thus, failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated conditions can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

  • Integrity
  • Subcriticality The LOFTRAN analyses for uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs presented in the ERG Background Document for ECA-2.1 are based upon best-estimate assumptions rather than upon conservative FSAR assumptions.

They do not address subcriticality. However, they do show that RCS cold leg temperature can drop by more than 250°F in less than 3 minutes for a large steamline break involving uncontrolled depressurization of multiple SGs.

Additionally, the ERG Background Document for ECA-2.1 specifically states the following:

It should be noted that this event (with an extensive cooldown and subsequent repressurization) may result in a challenge to the Integrity Critical Safety Function. In this case the Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree may direct the operator to FR-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION, for further actions.

For some plants, the analysis for a large steamline break shows a return to reactor criticality caused by the large and rapid RCS cooldown, even though only a single SG is assumed to blow down completely. Failure to isolate the SGs from the steamline break such that all SGs are allowed to blow down uncontrollably significantly worsens the power excursion. This worsening of the power excursion is unnecessary; it could be prevented simply by closing the MSIVs.

Cueing Both of the following: Indication that main steamline isolation is required

- Steam pressure and flow rate indications that make it possible to identify a single SG as faulted AND AND

- Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues Indication that main steamline isolation has not actuated automatically to be delivered to the faulted SG

  • Indication of uncontrolled depressurization of one steam generator Performance Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the faulted SG Manipulation of controls as required to manually actuate steamline isolation indicator
  • MSIVs undergo fast-closure
  • Indication of feedline isolation

- Feedwater control valves indicate closed

- Feedline isolation valves indicate closed

- Main feed pumps indicate tripped

  • Indication that AFW flow to the faulted SG is stopped
  • AFW flow control valves for faulted SG indicate closed Performance Any depressurization of intact SGs stops
  • Steam flow indication from all SGs decreases to zero feedback
  • Steam flow indication from faulted SG decreases to zero
  • All SGs stop depressurizing
  • RCS cooldown stops
  • RCS cooldown stops
  • AFW flow rate indication to faulted SG of zero Justification Failure to isolate the AFW to the faulted SG will result in Failure to close the MSIV causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably for the chosen severe overcooling and challenge the CSFs introduced by the steamline break. Additionally, such an omission constitutes performance a failure by the crew to demonstrate (the ability to) recognize a failure or an limit incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component, and to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

PWR Owners CT-17, Isolate Faulted SG CT-12, Manually actuate main steamline isolation Group Appendix

Appendix D 5 Form ES-D-1 References OP0P04-TM-0004, Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter 0POP04-RP-0004, FAILURE OF RCS LOOP RTD PROTECTION CHANNEL.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: __________________ Scenario No.: ___5____ Op-Test No.: _______

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Initial Conditions: IC-XXXX, Unit is at 75% power, Condensate pump 13 is tagged out for maintenance, Crew is directed to raise power to 100 %, Thunderstorms in the area, SU Feed water pump is tagged out for oil replacement.

Turnover: Increase power to 100%

Critical Tasks:

1. Establish the [minimum required AFW flow rate]1 to the SGs [before transition out of E-0],2 unless the transition is to FR-H.1, in which case the task must be [initiated before RCPs are manually tripped]2 in accordance with Step 4 of generic guideline FR-H.1
2. Manually trip the main turbine [before a severe (ORANGE path) challenge develops to either the subcriticality or the integrity CSF]1 or [before transition to ECA-2.1]2, whichever happens first (need values or hard plant specific points for items in red)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RO (R) Rod withdrawl and power increase to 100% power 2 BOP C Circulating Water Traveling Screen High Differential Pressure, requires entry into Loss of Circulating Water Flow 0POP4-CW-0001 3 RO (I) Controlling Pressurizer level transmitter fails low (PT-465) will require entry into OP0P04-RP-0002 4 BOP (I) Loss of B S/G Steam Flow instrument signal, required entry into OP0P04-FW-0001 5 ALL (C) Loss of 480v LC E1B1 entry into 0POP04-AE-0001 6 ALL (M) Main Generator Output Breaker Trips Open, Load rejection requiring a reactor trip. (PT-557 fails at same time to ensure that SG level lower rapidly so FRH1 entry is met) 7 ALL (C) Main Turbine Fails to trip with reactor trip (Manual Trip required) 8 ALL (C) AFWP-14 starts but fails to inject due to issue with governor and recirc valve being open, (crossover valves will not open), AFW pumps 12 and 13 trip on overcurrent on start

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D 2 Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
4. Major transients (1-2) 1
5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
7. EOP Based Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Narrative of Scenario 5
1. Crew receives turnover and is directed to increase power to 100%. SRO directs the OAC and BOP to commence a power ascension to 100% power using control rods and turbine load.
2. After power has been increase by approximately 5% power, a report form the field saying the CW traveling screen D/P is high. The will require the crew to enter 0POP04-CW-0001, eventually leading to securing one of the 4 running CW pumps.
3. Once one of the CW pumps is secured PT -465 fails low resulting in a loss of normal letdown and entry into 0POP04-RP-0002 addendum 3 witch will place excess letdown in service.
4. B Steam Flow instrument will fail requiring the crew to take manual control to prevent a reactor trip.

OP0P04-FW-0001

5. Loss of 480 v LC E1B1 entry into 0POP04-AE-0001
6. Major: Main Generator Output breaker trips open coincident with PT-557) failing to ensure s/g lowers.

Requiring a reactor trip

7. Main Turbine does not trip when reactor trips must manually trip the main turbine
8. AFWP-14 starts but fails to inject due to issue with governor and recirc valve being open, (crossover valves will not open), AFW pumps 12 and 13 trip on overcurrent on start. The crew can either take manual control of AFW pump 14 and raise discharge pressure in field and close the recirc valve from control room and establish required AFW flow. (Would the crews go to forced safety injection cooling in this situation?)

Scenario will conclude after the operators have received word from the crew that AFW pump 14 can be controlled and the recirc valve is closed and feed to the S/G has been restored.

Critical Tasks:

1. CT-4, Establish Flow to the S/Gs
2. CT-13, Manually Trip the Main Turbine

Appendix D 3 Form ES-D-1 Critical Tasks Establish the [minimum required AFW flow rate]1 to Manually trip the main turbine [before a severe (ORANGE path) challenge the SGs [before transition out of E-0],2 develops to either the unless the transition is to FR-H.1, in which case subcriticality or the integrity CSF]1 or [before transition to ECA-2.1]2, the task must be [initiated before RCPs are whichever happens first manually tripped]2 in accordance with Step 4 of generic guideline FR-H.1 EVENT 8 7 Safety SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to establish the SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE -- Failure to trip the main turbine under the significance minimum required AFW flow rate, under the postulated plant postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those conditions, results in adverse consequence or a significant irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In this Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the crew to case, the minimum required AFW flow rate can be demonstrate the ability totake one or more actions that would prevent a established by performing the appropriate manual action. challenge to plant safety.

Therefore, failure to manually establish the minimum required AFW flow rate also represents a failure by the crew Thus, failure to manually trip the main turbine under the postulated conditions to demonstrate the following abilities: can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

  • Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety
  • Integrity feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded
  • Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
  • Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Cueing
  • Indication and/or annunciation that SI is actuated
  • Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip AND o Rod bottom lamps illuminated
  • Indication and/or annunciation that the AFW flow o Reactor trip and bypass breakers status lamps indicate breakers rate is less than the minimum required open
  • Total AFW flow rate indicates less than the o Excore nuclear instruments show reactor power decreasing minimum required through the intermediate range
  • Control switch indication that the circuit AND breakers or contactors for the motor-driven
  • Indication that the main turbine has not automatically tripped AFW pumps are open o Stop valves indicate open
  • Control switch indication that the steam o Control valves indicate at their full-load position supply valves to the turbine-driven AFW o Indication of uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs pump are closed
  • AFW valve position indication that a flow path is not established to at least one SG Performance Manipulation of controls in the control room as required to Manipulation of controls as required to manually trip the main turbine

Appendix D 4 Form ES-D-1 indicator establish the minimum required AFW flow rate to the SGs

  • Stop valves indicate closed Performance
  • Indication that at least the minimum required AFW flow
  • Steam flow indication from all SGs decreases to zero feedback rate is being delivered to the SGs
  • All SGs stop depressurizing
  • SG levels increasing
  • RCS cooldown stops Justification Given the postulated plant conditions, the adverse Thus, failure to manually trip the main turbine under the postulated conditions for the chosen consequences that can arise from failure to establish the can result in challenges to the following CSFs:

performance minimum required AFW flow rate are challenges to the

  • Integrity limit following:
  • Subcriticality
  • Core cooling CSF
  • Fuel matrix/clad fission product barrier PWR Owners CT-4, Establish AFW flow to SGs CT-13, Manually trip the turbine Group Appendix References