ML20282A785
| ML20282A785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2020 |
| From: | Curry H South Texas |
| To: | Operations Branch IV |
| References | |
| NOC-AE-20003705, STI: 34972821 | |
| Download: ML20282A785 (48) | |
Text
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: STP Date of Exam: July 2020 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total 2 3 3 3 4 3 18 3 3 6
- 1. 1 Emergency and 2 1 2 1 2 1 9 2 2 4 Abnormal Plant 2 Evolutions 4 4 5 4 6 4 27 5 5 10 Tier Totals 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 28 2 3 5 1
- 2. 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 3 Plant 2 Systems 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 38 4 4 8 Tier Totals
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
G* Generic K/As
- These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
- These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401, Page 40 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
R EK1.06 Knowledge of the operational 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02) 3.7 Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 implications of the following concepts as they apply Reactor Trip: relationship of emergency feedwater flow to S/G and decay heat removal following reactor trip S AA2.26 Ability to determine or interpret the 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space 3.4 Accident / 3 following as they apply to a PZR Vapor Space accident: Probable PZR steam space leakage paths other than PORV or code safety R EK3.21 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 4.2 following responses as the apply to the Small Break LOCA: Actions contained in the EOPs for a small break LOCA R EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 2.6 between a Large Break LOCA and the following: Pumps R AA1.02 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump 2.8 Malfunctions / 4 following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC flow): RCP oil reservoir level and alarm indicators R 2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant 3.9 Makeup / 2 evaluate system or component status.
S 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat 4.6 Removal System / 4 level thresholds and classifications.
R AA1.05 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component 3.1 following as they apply to the Loss of Cooling Water / 8 Component Cooling Water: The CCWS Surge Tank, including level control and level alarms, and radiation alarms.
R AK3.03 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure 3.7 Control System Malfunction / 3 following responses as the apply to the PZR PCS Malfunction: Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction.
R EK2.06 Knowledge of the interrelations 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient 2.9*
Without Scram / 1 between an ATWS and the following:
Breakers, relays, and disconnects S 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube 4.2 Rupture / 3 Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits R 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) 4.6 Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat procedure steps.
Transfer / 4 R AA2.03 Ability to determine or interpret the 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main 4.1 Feedwater /4 following as they apply to a Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup R EK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 2.7 following responses as the apply to the SBO: Length of time for which battery capacity is designed ES-401, Page 41 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
R G2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 3.8 limits and precautions R AA1.04 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC 3.5 Instrument Bus / 6 following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: RWST and VCT valves R AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 3.3*
following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: 125V dc bus voltage, low/critical low, alarm R AA2.06 Ability to determine and interpret the 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service 2.8*
Water / 4 following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The length of time after the loss of SWS flow to a component before that component may be damaged R AA2.08 Ability to determine and interpret the 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 2.9*
following as they apply to the loss of instrument air: Failure modes of air-operated equipment R AK1.03 Knowledge of the operational 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and 3.3 Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Under-excitation AA2.05 Ability to determine or interpret the S following as they apply to Generator Voltage 3.8 and Electric Grid Disturbances: Operational status of offsite circuit R EK2.1 Knowledge of the interrelations between (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 3.5 the (LOCA outside Containment) and the following: Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features S EA2.1 Ability to determine or interpret the 4.2 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 following as they apply to Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency conditions S 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic 4.6 (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
2 3 3 3 4/3 3/3 K/A Category Totals: Group Point Total: 18/6 ES-401, Page 42 of 52
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 Not sampled 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 R AK3.08 Knowledge of the 3.1 reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Dropped Control Rod):
Criteria for inoperable control rods 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 Not sampled 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 R AA2.02 Ability to determine 3.9 and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: When use of manual boration valve is needed 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control R AA1.01 Ability to operate and / 3.8*
Malfunction / 2 or monitor the following as they apply to the PZR Level Control Malfunction: PZR level reactor protection bistables 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Not sampled Instrumentation / 7 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Not sampled Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 S AA2.03 Ability to determine 4.2*
and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Magnitude of potential release 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 R AK1.02 Knowledge of the 3.5 operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam generator Tube Leak: Leak rate versus pressure drop 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 Not sampled 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 S 2.4.30 Knowledge of events 4.1 related to system operation
/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission operator 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 Not sampled 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms Not sampled
/7 ES-401, Page 43 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 R AK3.04 Knowledge of the 3.3 reasons for the following responses as they apply to the plant fire on Site: Actions contained in EOP for plant fire on site 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 R AK2.01 Knowledge of the 3.9 interrelations between the control room evacuation and the following: Auxiliary shutdown panel layout 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 S AA2.01 Ability to determine 4.4 and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity:
Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling / Not sampled 4
000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 S 2.2.38 Knowledge of 4.5 conditions and limitations in the facility license.
000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 2.2.42 Ability to recognize 3.9 R system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 R E02 EK1.2 Knowledge of the 3.4 operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SI termination):
Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures associated with SI termination.
(W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 Not sampled (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 Not sampled (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 Not sampled (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 N/A for this design type (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 N/A for this design type (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 N/A for this design type (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 N/A for this design type (BW A07) Flooding / 8 N/A for this design type (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 N/A for this design type (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 R EA2.2 Ability to determine and 3.5 interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization):
Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 Not sampled ES-401, Page 44 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
(BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures N/A for this design type (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Not sampled Shock / 4 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 N/A for this design type (CE E09) Functional Recovery N/A for this design type (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 N/A for this design type K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 2 1 2/2 1/2 Group Point Total: 9/4 ES-401, Page 45 of 52
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
R A3.03 Ability to monitor automatic 3.2 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant operation of the RCP, including: Seal DP Pump R K4.01 Knowledge of CVCS design 2.8 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and feature(s) and/or interlock(s)
Volume Control which provide for the following: Oxygen control in the RCS A2.11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations R on the CVCS; and (b) based 3.6 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of IAS R A1.02 Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.3 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat changes in parameters (to prevent Removal exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHR controls including:
RHR Flow rate R K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS 3.9 will have on the following: RCS R K6.18 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency malfunction on the following will have on 3.6 Core Cooling the ECCS: Subcooling Margin indicators 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in S Technical Specifications for limiting 4.2 conditions for operations and safety limits R K5.02 Knowledge of the operational 3.1 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer implications of the following concepts Relief/Quench Tank as the apply to the PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR R K4.02 Knowledge of CCWS design 2.9 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which Water provide for the following: Operation of the surge tank, including the associated valves and controls R K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a loss 4.0 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer or malfunction of the PZR PCS Pressure Control will have on the following: RPS R K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies 3.3 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection to the following: RPS channels, components, and interconnections R G2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and 4.1 function of major system components and controls ES-401, Page 46 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
2.2.42 Ability to recognize system 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered R parameters that are entry-level conditions 3.9 Safety Features Actuation for Technical Specifications.
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations 4.7 S on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Rapid depressurization R K1.01 Knowledge of the physical 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling connections and/or cause-effect 3.5 relationships between the CCS and the following systems: SWS/cooling system A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or R monitor in the control room: Containment readings, of temperature, pressure, and 3.8 humidity.
N/A for this design 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser S A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray the following malfunctions or operations 3.6 on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of CS pump suction when in recirc mode, possibly caused by clogged sump screen, pump inlet high temperature exceeded cavitation, voiding, or sump level below cutoff (interlock) limit R 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 4.2 indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions R K1.02 Knowledge of the physical 3.3 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat connections and/or cause-effect Steam relationships between the MRSS and the following systems: atmospheric relief dump valves AA2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.4 R the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation monitors (during SGTR)
ES-401, Page 47 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
R K1.04 Knowledge of the physical 3.4 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems: S/Gs water level control system R K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss 4.4 061 (SF4S AFW) or malfunction of the AFW system Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater will have on the following: RCS A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic 4.0 R operation of the AFW, including: RCS cooldown during AFW operations R K4.10 Knowledge of ED AC design 3.1 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which Distribution provide for the following: Uninterruptible power sources.
R A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor 2.5 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical changes in parameters associated with Distribution operating the DC electrical system controls including: Battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate S 2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical 4.7 Specifications for a system R K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 2.7 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel malfunction on the following will have on Generator the EDG: Air receivers 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability S and/or availability of safety related 4.6 equipment R K5.03 Knowledge of the operational 2.9*
073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation implications as they apply to concepts for Monitoring the PRM system: Relationship between radiation intensity and exposure limits R A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 2.7 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Service water header pressure R K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies 2.7 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air to the following: Instrument air compressor R A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic 3.9 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment operation of the CNT system, including:
Containment isolation R A4.03 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: ESF slave 2.7 relays N/A for this Design 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 3/2 3 2 3/3 K/A Category Point Totals: Group Point Total: 28/5 ES-401, Page 48 of 52
ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive R K5.97, Knowledge of the following 3.3 operational implications as they apply to the CRDS: Relationship of Tave to Tref.
002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Not sampled Coolant 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer R A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Level Control the following malfunctions or operations 3.8 on the PZR LCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of PZR level 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position S 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance 4.1 Indication procedures 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Not sampled Instrumentation 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear R K1.12 Knowledge of the physical 3.5*
Instrumentation connections and/or cause effect relationships between the NNI system and the following systems: S/G 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature R A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or 3.8 Monitor monitor in the control room: Temperature values used to determine RCS/RCP operation during inadequate core cooling (i.e., if applicable, average of five highest values) 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Not sampled Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen R 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation 3.7 Recombiner and Purge Control strategies.
029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge Not sampled 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Not sampled Cooling 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling S A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Equipment the following malfunctions or operations 3.9 on the FHS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Dropped Fuel cask 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator R K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or 3.1 malfunction on the following will have on the S/GS: secondary porv 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam R K3.04 Knowledge of the effect that a loss 3.5 Dump/Turbine Bypass Control or malfunction of the SDS system will have on the following: Reactor Power 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Not sampled Generator 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Not sampled Removal ES-401, Page 49 of 52
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate Not sampled 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste S A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.3 the following malfunctions or operations on the LRS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of automatic isolation 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas R K4.04 Knowledge of the design features 2.9 Disposal and/or interlocks which provide for the following: Isolation of waste gas release tanks 072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation R A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic 2.9 Monitoring operation of the ARM system, including:
Changes in ventilation alignment 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water Not sampled 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air Not sampled 086 Fire Protection R A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.0 changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits associated with operating the Fire Protection System controls, including: Fire water storage tank level 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room N/A until rev3 of KA catalogs Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals: 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1/1 Group Point Total: 10/3 ES-401, Page 50 of 52
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:
Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-only IR # IR #
2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements. 2.8 3.5 2.1.21 Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy
- 1. Conduct of Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities 3.8 Operations 2.1.4 related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.
Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core 4.1 2.1.36 alterations Subtotal 2 2 2.2.3 Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational 3.8 differences between units 3.0 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to
- 2. Equipment procedures Control 2.9 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests 2.2.19 Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements 3.4 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability 4.1 requirements Subtotal 3 2 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed 2.9 2.3.5 radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements 3.5 2.3.7
- 3. Radiation during normal or abnormal conditions Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to 3.8 2.3.13 licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Subtotal 2 1 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. 3.7 2.4.6 Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident 3.8 2.4.9 (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.
- 4. Emergency Procedures/Plan Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant 4.2 2.4.46 conditions.
Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan 4.5 2.4.4 implementation.
Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, 4.3 2.4.20 cautions, and notes.
Subtotal 3 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 10 7 7 ES-401, Page 51 of 52
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier/Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected K/A 1/1 APE 26 AA1.03 This KA tests the ability to operate and / or monitor the RO following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: SWS as a backup to the CCWS. Essential Cooling Water does not act as a backup to Component Cooling Water at STP. Therefore, this KA was replaced with APE 26 AA1.05.
1/1 APE 27 AK3.01 This KA tests the knowledge of the reasons for the following RO responses as they apply to the PZR PCS Malfunction:
Isolation of PZR spray following loss of PZR heaters. This is neither an automatic feature nor an operator response if this occurs. Therefore, this KA was replaced with APE 27 AK3.03.
2/1 004 A2.20 This KA tests the ability to (a) predict the impacts of the RO following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or predations: Shifting demineralizer while the divert valve is lined up to VCT. When shifting demineralizers at STP, flushing to the RHUT is always accomplished first. There is no guidance when this is not done correctly. Therefore, this KA was replaced with 004 A2.11.
2/1 022 A4.03 This KA tests the ability to manually operate and/or monitor in RO the control room: Dampers in the CCS. We do not operate any RCFC dampers in the control room. Therefore, this KA was replaced with 022 A4.05.
2/1 062 K4.03 This KA tests the knowledge of ED AC design feature(s) and/or RO interlock(s) which provide for the following: Interlocks between automatic bus transfer and breakers. STP does not use automatic bus transfer devices. Therefore, this KA was replaced with 062 K4.10.
2/2 001 K5.12 This KA tests the knowledge of the following operational RO implications as they apply to the CRDS: Effects on power of inserting axial shaping rods. STP does not use axial shaping rods. Therefore, this KA was replaced with 001 K5.97.
2 / 1 RO 006 K3.02 Changed to system 005 K3.01 because of oversampling in one system to include RO and SRO topics.
2 / 1 RO 013 K1.18 Changed to system 022 K1.01 because of oversampling in one system to include RO and SRO topics.
2 / 1 SRO 061 G2.2.40 Changed to system 062 G2.2.40 because of oversampling in one system to include RO and SRO topics.
ES-401, Page 52 of 52
Rev. 0 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 7-13-20 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: LOT 24 NRC Administrative Topic (see Type Describe activity to be performed Note) Code*
Conduct of Operations 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
A1 D,R Determine Reactor Vessel Water Level K/A Importance: 4.6 Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as A2 graphs, curves, tables, etc.
D,R Calculate RCS refill volume (without vacuum)
K/A Importance: 3.9 Equipment Control 2.2.13 Knowledge of Tagging and Clearance Procedures.
A3 M,R Prepare ECO for SFP Cooling Pump 1A K/A Importance: 4.1 Radiation Control 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit A4 D,P,R requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.
K/A Importance: 3.5 Determine RWP Requirements for Work in RRA (SFP)
Emergency Plan N/A N/A 0B NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol Room, (S)imulator, Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
Rev. 0 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 7-13-20 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: LOT 24 NRC Administrative Topic (see Type Describe activity to be performed Note) Code*
Conduct of Operations 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief practices.
A5 D,R Review Control Room Logs K/A Importance: 3.9 Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as A6 graphs, curves, tables, etc.
D,R Determine Actions for Abnormal RCS Activity K/A Importance: 4.2 Equipment Control 2.2.13 Knowledge of Tagging and Clearance Procedures.
A7 M,R Review Faulted ECO for SFP Cooling Pump 1A K/A Importance: 4.3 Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under A8 D,P,R normal or emergency conditions.
K/A Importance: 3.7 Determine Personnel Exposure Limits (E-Plan)
Emergency Plan 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level 1B A9 M,R thresholds and classifications.
Determine EAL K/A Importance: 4.6 NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol Room, (S)imulator, Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
Rev. 0 STP LOT-24 NRC Admin JPM Description RO (A1) Determine Reactor Vessel Level Demonstrate the ability to perform procedure steps to determine Reactor Vessel level in accordance with 0POP02-II-0002, RVWL Monitoring System, when QDPS is not displaying RVWL level.
(A2) Calculate RCS Refill Volume (Without Vacuum)
Demonstrate the ability to calculate the volume needed to fill the RCS from the given conditions.
(A3) Prepare ECO for SFP Cooling Pump 1A Demonstrate the ability to prepare an ECO for equipment maintenance.
(A4) Determine RWP Requirements for Work in RRA (SFP)
Demonstrate the ability to extract necessary information from survey maps and RWP to perform work in the RRA.
SRO (A5) Review Control Room Logs Demonstrate the ability to review and approve Control Room Operator Logs from 0PSP03-ZQ-0028, Operator Logs, for any adverse trends and the appropriate corrective actions that would need to be taken in accordance with 0POP01-ZQ-0022, Plant Operations Shift Routines.
(A6) Determine Actions for Abnormal RCS Activity.
Determine required Tech Spec actions based on given RCS activity. TS 3.4.8 and figure 3.4-1.
(A7) Review faulted ECO for SFP Cooling Pump 1A Demonstrate the ability perform a technical review of an ECO for equipment maintenance.
(A8) Determine Personnel Exposure Limits (E-Plan)
Demonstrate the ability to determine personnel exposure margins during an emergency.
(A9) Determine Appropriate Emergency Plan Action Levels Demonstrate the ability to correctly determine an Emergency Plan Action Level for a given condition requiring entry into the STPNOC Emergency Action Plan in accordance with 0ERP01-ZV-IN01, Emergency Classification.
Rev. 0 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 7-13-20 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- a. (S1) Recover a Mis-Aligned Control Rod KA: 001 A4.06 (2.9/3.2) M,D,S 1
- b. (S2) Manually Load an ESF Bus KA: 064 A2.01 (3.1/3.3) A,E,EN,M,S 6
- d. (S4) Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm KA: 072 A3.01 A,D,EN,L,S 7 (2.9/3.1)
- e. (S5) Containment Spray Pump Performance Test KA: 026 A,D,P,S 5 A2.08 (3.2/3.7)
- g. (S7) Start a CCW Pump KA: 008 A4.01 (3.3/3.1) D,S 8
- h. (S8) Lower SI Accumulator Level KA: 006 A1.13 (3.5/3.7) D,EN,S 2 In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- i. (P1) MCC Power Restoration per EC31 Add. 1 KA: 062 A4.04 E,L,N 6 (2.6/2.7)
- k. (P3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B KA: 103 A2.03 D,E,L,R 5 (3.5/3.8)
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate Path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from Bank 9/ 8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/1 (EN) gineered Safety Features 1/ 1 / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/1 (S)imulator Page 1 of 5
Rev. 0 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 7-13-20 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- a. (S1) Recover a Mis-Aligned Control Rod KA: 001 A4.06 (2.9/3.2) M,D,S 1
- b. (S2) Manually Load an ESF Bus KA: 064 A2.01 (3.1/3.3) A,E,EN,M,S 6
- d. (S4) Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm KA: 072 A3.01 A,D,EN,L,S 7 (2.9/3.1)
- e. (S5) Containment Spray Pump Performance Test KA: 026 A,D,P,S 5 A2.08 (3.2/3.7)
- g. (S7) Start a CCW Pump KA: 008 A4.01 (3.3/3.1) D,S 8 h.
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- i. (P1) MCC Power Restoration per EC31 Add. 1 KA: 062 A4.04 E,L,N 6 (2.6/2.7)
- k. (P3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B KA: 103 A2.03 D,E,L,R 5 (3.5/3.8)
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate Path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from Bank 9/ 8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/1 (EN) gineered Safety Features 1/ 1 / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/1 (S)imulator Page 2 of 5
Rev. 0 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Examination: 7-13-20 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- a. (S1) Recover a Mis-Aligned Control Rod KA: 001 A4.06 (2.9/3.2) M,D,S 1
- b. (S2) Manually Load an ESF Bus KA: 064 A2.01 (3.1/3.3) A,E,EN,M,S 6
e.
f.
g.
h.
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U i.
- k. (P3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B KA: 103 A2.03 D,E,L,R 5 (3.5/3.8)
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate Path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol Room (D)irect from Bank 9/ 8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/1 (EN) gineered Safety Features 1/ 1 / 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/1 (S)imulator Page 3 of 5
Rev. 0 STP LOT-24 NRC Systems JPM Description Control Room Systems JPMs (S1) Recover a Mis-Aligned Control Rod Demonstrate the ability to control reactor core reactivity while recovering a mis-aligned control rod in accordance with 0POP04-RS-0001, Control Rod Malfunction.
(S2) Manually Load an ESF Bus Demonstrate the ability to ensure equipment has properly loaded on to an ESF 4.16KV Bus in accordance with 0POP04-AE-0001, First Response to Loss of any or all 13.8KV or 4.16KV Bus. This is an Alternate Path JPM.
(S3) Depress RCS During SGTR Demonstrate the ability to depress the RCS after a SGTR in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EO30, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. This is an Alternate Path JPM.
(S4) Respond to FHB Rad Monitor Alarm Demonstrate the ability to operate the FHB HVAC System after a Radiation Monitor failure in accordance with 0POP04-RA-0001, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response. This is an Alternate Path JPM.
(S5) Containment Spray Pump Performance Test Demonstrate the ability to operate the Containment Spray Pumps in accordance with 0POP07-CS-0001, Containment Spray Pump 1A(2A) Functional Test. This is an Alternate Path JPM. This is an Alternate Path JPM.
(S6) Transfer MFW Control from LPFRV to MFRV Demonstrate the ability to operate Main Feedwater control valves in accordance with 0POP03-ZG-0005, Plant Startup to 100%.
(S7) Start a CCW Pump Demonstrate the ability to start a 2nd CCW Pump and monitor system flow and pressure in accordance with 0POP02-CC-0001, Component Cooling Water.
(S8) Lower Safety Injection Accumulator Level Demonstrate the ability lower Safety Injection Accumulator level in accordance with 0POP02-SI-0001, Safety Injection Accumulators.
NOTE: All Control Room JPMs will be performed dynamically in the Simulator. JPMs will be performed in pairs; S1 & S2 together, S3 & S4 together, S5 & S6 together and S7 & S8 together.
Page 4 of 5
Rev. 0 STP LOT-24 NRC Systems JPM Description In Plant Systems JPMs (P1) MCC Power Restoration per EC31 Addendum 1 Demonstrate the ability to restore power to vital MCCs after a Safety Injection in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EC31, SGTR with loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recover Desired.
(P2) Place RWST on Recirc followed by an Safety Injection Demonstrate the ability to monitor the Safety Injection System alignments in order to prevent equipment damage in accordance with 0POP02-FC-0001, Spent Fool Pool Cooling and Cleanup System. This is an Alternate Path JPM.
(P3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B Demonstrate the ability to locally close Component Cooling Water valves associated with Containment Isolation Phase B in accordance with 0POP05-EO-EC00, Loss of all AC Power.
Page 5 of 5
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Critical Tasks:
- Mode 1 at 100% Power
- Event 5 - Manually Trip Main Turbine Turnover:
- Event 6 - Establish RCS Bleed and Feed
- AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1
(0 min) RO (N) Start CCP 1B and secure CCP 1A.
2 (10 min) SRO (TS SG 1A Main Steam Radiation Monitor RT-8046 failure.
ONLY) 3 BOP (I) SG 1B Level Channel LT-0572 fails high.
(25 min) SRO (I & TS) 4 (30 min) BOP (C) LPHD Pump #11 Trip SRO (C) 5 Main Generator Output Breaker trips open, Main Turbine fails to auto (40 min) All (M) trip and inadvertent FWI.
(Critical Task) 6 Loss of Heat Sink and entry into FRH1.
(N/A) All (M)
(Critical Task)
(Multiple AFW Failures Integrated into Scenario) 7 (N/A) RO (C) Train B 4160V bus lockout. (On Reactor Trip)
SRO (C)
Lot* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 2
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 1
- 6. Preidentified critical tasks (>2) 2 Page 1 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #1 Description Initial Conditions: Mode 1 with Reactor Power at 100%. AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event 1: The crew will start CCP 1B and Secure CCP 1A using 0POP02-CV-0004, Chemical and Volume Control System Subsystem.
Event 2: After stabilizing pressurizer level, SG 1A Main Steam Radiation Monitor RT-8046 will fail. The crew will respond using 0POP04-RA-0001, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 3: SG 1B Level Channel, LT-0572, fails high. The crew will respond using 0POP04-FW-0001, Loss of Steam Generator Level Control. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 4: LPHD Pump #11 will trip. The crew will respond using 0POP04-CD-0001, Loss of Condensate Flow.
Event 5: The Main Generator Output breaker will trip open, the Main Turbine will fail to automatically trip and Feedwater will inadvertently actuate. The crew will respond using 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 0POP05-EO-ES01, Reactor Trip Response OR the crew will stay in 0POP05-EO-EO00 if a Safety Injection actuates.
(Critical Task - 13)
Event 6: During performance of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, the crew will notice that AFW Pump #13 has tripped on overcurrent and AFW Pump #14 has tripped on overspeed. In addition AFW Pump #11 is already OOS and AFW Pump
- 12 has no power due to Event 7. When appropriate, the crew will respond using 0POP05-EO-FRH1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. (Critical Task - 46)
Event 7: On the Reactor Trip, a fault will occur on 4.16KV ESF Bus E1B. Resources permitting, the crew will respond using 0POP04-AE-0001, First Response to Loss of any or all 13.8KV or 4.16KV.
Page 2 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #1 Description Termination: When the Crew has properly aligned Feed and Bleed to the RCS per 0POP05-EO-FRH1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
Critical Tasks:
- CT - 13; Manually trip the main turbine before a severe (Orange Path) challenge develops to either the Subcriticality or Integrity CSF OR before transition to 0POP05-EO-EC21, whichever happens first.
- CT - 46; Initiate RCS Bleed and Feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for HHSI pump injection to occur prior to CET temperature reaching 1200ºF or a Red Path on Core Cooling.
Source: New Page 3 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Critical Tasks:
- Reactor power is at 95%. Currently on
- Event 4 - Block PZR PORV prior to RX Trip step 7.62 of 0POP03-ZG-0005, Plant
- Event 5 - Isolate SG 1A Startup to 100%.
Turnover:
- AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 POSBBAR SRO (TS Loss of control power to CVCS Letdown Isolation ICIV CV-MOV-(0 min) B30983TC ONLY) 0023.
C True 1 2
RO (I) VCT Level Transmitter LT-0112 fails high.
(10 min) SRO (I) 3 06 RO (R) Loss of load. GV #1 fails closed.
(25 min) 01 BOP (R) 0.0 SRO (R) 4 (30 min) 50-HV- RO (C) Pressurizer Pressure Controller perturbation causes PZR PORV 01 SRO (C, TS) PCV-655A to open and then stick partially open.
(Critical Task) 0.25 5
08 All (M) SG 1A Loss of Feedwater inside containment.
(40 min) (Critical Task) 01 0.5 6
(N/A)
N/A RO (C) Main Steam to Deaerator Supply Valve, MS-PV-7174, partially opens SRO (C) on the reactor trip. (Occurs on the Rx Trip) 7 SG 1A FWIV FV-7141 fails to auto close on Rx Trip. (Integral)
(N/A)
N/A BOP (C)
SRO (C) (Part of Critical Task for isolating SG 1A)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 0
- 6. Preidentified critical tasks (>2) 2 Page 4 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #2 Description Initial Conditions: Reactor Power is at 95%. The Crew is currently on step 7.62 of 0POP03-ZG-0005, Plant Startup to 100%, and it has been determined that the Crew can start raising Reactor Power in 50 minutes. AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event 1: A loss of control power will occur on CVCS Letdown Isolation ICIV CV-MOV-0023. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 2: VCT Level Transmitter LT-0112 will fail high causing VCT Divert, LCV-0112A to open to the RHTs. The crew will respond using 0POP09-AN-04M8, Window E-2, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.
Event 3: Main Turbine Governor Valve #1 fails closed causing a reduction of power.
The crew will respond using 0POP04-TM-0001, Turbine Load Rejection.
Event 4: A Pressurizer Pressure Controller perturbation causes PZR PORV PCV-655A to open and then stick partially open. The crew will respond using 0POP09-AN-04M8, Window E-5, PRZR PORV OPEN COMMAND and/or 0POP04-RP-0001, Loss of Automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
(Critical Task - 10)
Event 5: A feedwater line break will occur inside containment on SG 1A. The crew will respond using 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and 0POP05-EO-EO20, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. (Critical Task - 17)
Event 6: On the reactor trip Main Steam to Deaerator Supply Valve, MS-PV-7174, will partially open. The crew will have to manually close this valve.
Event 7: On the reactor trip SG 1A FWIV FV-7141 fails to auto close. The crew will have to manually close this valve. (Part of Critical Task for isolating SG 1A - Critical Task - 17)
Page 5 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT 24 NRC Scenario #2 Description Termination: The scenario will terminate after the crew isolates SG 1A and transitions to 0POP05-EO-EO10, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or 0POP05-EO-ES11, SI Termination, whichever is appropriate.
Critical Tasks:
- CT - 10; Manually close block valve for a partially stuck open PZR PORV 655A such that a manual or automatic Reactor Trip does not unintentionally occur.
- CT - 17; Isolate a Faulted Steam Generator before transitioning out of 0POP05-EO-EO20, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
Source: New Page 6 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Critical Tasks:
- Mode 1 at 75% Power
- Event 4 - Isolate the faulted SG.
Turnover:
- Event 4 - Begin Cooldown of RCS.
- AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 02-20-01 RO (I) 1 PZR level channel LT-0465 fails high.
(0 min) 1.0 SRO (I, TS)
BOP (I) 2 1A SG PORV pressure transmitter (PT-7411) fails high.
(15 min) SRO (I, TS) 3 BOP (C) Condensate Pump #12 Trips (25 min) SRO (C) 4 RO (R) Main Generator Stator Cooling DT Alarm due to high DT across (35 min) BOP (R) Stator Bars 36B and 36T. Including GCM alarm that leads to fast load SRO (R) reduction.
5 ALL (M) Faulted and Ruptured SG 1B. Faulted on MS Line in IVC.
(N/A) (2 Critical Tasks) 6 RO (C) Loss of power to ESF 4.16KV E1C. When re-energized, OUTP BKR, (N/A) SRO (C) E1C/2A to LC E1C2, fails to Auto Close.
(Integral to Scenario)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 1
- 6. Preidentified critical tasks (>2) 2 Page 7 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #3 Description Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 1 at 75% power. The Crew is currently on step 7.56 of 0POP03-ZG-0005, Plant Startup to 100%, and it has been determined that the Crew can start raising Reactor Power in 50 minutes. AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event 1: Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-0465, fails high. The crew will respond using 0POP04-RP-0002, Loss of Automatic Pressurizer Level Control. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 2: 1A SG PORV pressure transmitter (PT-7411) fails high. The crew will respond using 0POP04-MS-0001, Excessive Steam Demand. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 3: Condensate Pump #12 trips. The crew will respond using 0POP04-CD-0001, Loss of Condensate Flow.
Event 4: Main Generator Stator Cooling DT Alarm due to high DT across Stator Bars 36B and 36T. Including GCM alarm that leads to fast load reduction. The Main Generator will trip offline at about 68% power which will lead to the next event.
Event 5: On the Reactor trip, SG 1B will have a tube rupture and a main steam line leak in the IVC. After completing 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, the crew will enter 0POP05-EO-EO20, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, 0POP05-EO-EO30, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and then transition to 0POP05-EO-EC31, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired. (Critical Tasks - 17 &
34)
Event 6: On the Reactor Trip, a loss of power to ESF 4.16KV E1C will occur. When re-energized, OUTP BKR, E1C/2A to LC E1C2, fails to Auto Close. The crew will have to manually close the breaker to fully restore power to ESF 4.16KV E1C Switchgear.
Page 8 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #3 Description Termination: Begin an RCS cooldown and at step 20 of 0POP05-EO-EC31, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recover Desired, evaluate RWST and Containment Sump levels.
Critical Tasks:
- CT - 17; Isolate a faulted Steam Generator before transitioning to 0POP05-EO-EO20, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
- CT - 34; Begin an RCS cooldown to cold shutdown to preclude a transition to 0POP05-EO-EC32, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Saturated Recover Desired.
Source: New Page 9 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Critical Tasks:
- Mode 1 at 100% Power
- Event 5 - Manually Actuate SI Turnover:
- Event 6 - Manually Align Cold Leg Recirc
- AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 BOP (N)
(0 min) N/A Start EHC Pump #12 and secure EHC Pump #11.
2 (10 min) SRO Loss of Starting Air ESF DG #12 - TS 3.8.1.1.b & d (TS Only) 3 RO (C)
(20 min) One Dropped Control Rod. Control Rod D-12 SRO (C, TS) 4 BOP (C)
(N/A) SG 1C MFRV Stuck in current position.
SRO (C) (Inserted with Dropped Control Rod Malfunction) 5 LBLOCA. (Integral to Scenario)
(40 min) ALL (M)
(Critical Task) 6 BOP (C) Failure of Train B Essential Chiller to start - (Integral to scenario)
(N/A) SRO (C) 7 RO (C) The auto swap over to cold leg recirculation will fail and the crew will (N/A) SRO (C) have to manually align. (Integral to Scenario)
(Critical Task)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 2 Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 0
- 6. Preidentified critical tasks (>2) 2 Page 13 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #5 Description Initial Conditions: Mode 1 100% power. AFW Pump #11 is out of service. The Crew will start EHC Pump #12 and secure EHC Pump #11.
Event 1: The Crew will start EHC Pump #12 and secure EHC Pump #11 using 0POP02-EH-0001, Main Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control System.
Event 2: An air leak in the Starting Air system for ESF DG #12 will require the SRO to declared ESF DG #12 Inoperable. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 3: Control Rod D-12 will fully drop. The crew will respond using 0POP04-RS-0001, Control Rod Malfunction. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 4: SG 1C MFRV will become stuck in its current position. This event will be inserted with Event 3. Changing primary temperatures and pressures will cause Steam Generator flows to change and with SG 1C MFRV stuck, its level will start to lower. The crew will respond using 0POP04-FW-0001, Loss of Steam Generator Level Control.
Event 5: A LBLOCA will occur with a failure of Safety Injection to auto actuate. The crew will manually actuate SI and respond using 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 0POP05-EO-EO10, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
(Critical Task - 2)
Event 6: Essential Chiller 12B will fail to start on the Safety Injection. The crew will have to secure EAB HVAC on Train B using Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Event 7: ECCS will fail to automatically swap to Cold Leg Recirculation on low RWST level. The Crew will manually align Cold Leg Recirculation using 0POP05-EO-ES13, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. (Critical Task - 36)
Page 14 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #5 Description Termination: Terminate scenario when the Crew manually aligns ECCS to cold leg recirculation.
Critical tasks:
- CT - 2; Manually actuate at least one train of SI-actuated safeguards before transitioning past Step 4 of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip of Safety Injection.
Note: Step 4 is considered completed after performing the immediate actions AND the read through of the step.
- CT - 36; Manually align Safety Injection for Cold Leg Recirculation prior to RWST level lowering to 32,500 gallons (6% - RWST EMPTY Alarm) OR if RWST level lowers to 32,500 gallons, then stop all pumps taking suction from the RWST, manually align for Cold Leg Recirculation and re-establish ECCS recirculation flow.
Source: New Page 15 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: South Texas Project Scenario No.: 6 Op-Test No.: LOT 24 NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Critical Tasks:
- Mode 1 at 100% Power
- Event 5 - Trip RCPs Turnover:
- Event 7 - Manually Isolate RCB
- AFW Pump #11 is out of service. Penetration Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1
(0 min) N/A SRO Oil sight glass broken on Containment Spray Pump 1B (TS Only) 2 BOP (C)
(10 min) CRDM Vent Fan 11A Trouble SRO (C) 3 RO (I)
(20 min) Pressurizer PT-0457 fails low.
SRO (I, TS) 4 RO (R) SGFPT #13 Trips and SGFP #14 fails to start. Crew will down (N/A) BOP (R) power to 80%.
SRO (R) 5 Ejected Control Rod - H8 (40 min) ALL (M)
(Critical Task) 6 RO (C)
(N/A) Failure of Phase A to automatically actuate. Manual switches work.
SRO (C) (Integral to scenario) 7 BOP (C) When Phase A is manually actuated, Train B does not respond with (N/A) SRO (C) ED-FV-7800 stuck open. ED-MOV-0064 has to be manually closed.
(Critical Task)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specification Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 2 Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions (>1 per scenario set) 0
- 6. Preidentified critical tasks (>2) 2 Page 16 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #6 Description Initial Conditions: Mode 1 100% power. AFW Pump #11 is out of service.
Event 1: A Plant Operator will call in and report a significant oil leak due to a broken sight glass on the motor for Containment Spray Pump 1B. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 2: There will be a trouble alarm on CRDM Vent Fan 11A. The Crew will start the standby CRDM Vent Fan using 0POP09-AN-22M1, F-2, CRDM VENT FAN TRBL.
Event 3: Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, PT-0457, will fail low. The crew will respond using 0POP04-RP-0001, Loss of Automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control. The SRO will address Tech Spec implications.
Event 4: SGFPT #13 Trips and SGFP #14 fails to start. The Crew will start a down power to about 80% using 0POP04-FW-0002, Steam Generator Feed Pump Trip.
Event 5: During the down power Control Rod H8 will eject from the Reactor Head causing a loss of reactor coolant. The crew will respond using 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 0POP05-EO-EO10, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. (Critical Task - 16)
Event 6: When Safety Injection is actuated, Phase A will fail to automatically actuate.
The crew will manually actuate Phase A using Addendum 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Event 7: When Phase A is manually actuated, Train B will fail to actuate. On the containment sump discharge penetration, ED-FV-7800, will be stuck open. ED-MOV-0064, a Train B powered MOV, will have to be manually closed to isolate the containment penetration. The Crew will respond using Addendum 1 and 5 of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. (Critical Task - 11)
Page 17 of 18
Rev. 0 Highlighted events are those that have not been used on the last two NRC exams.
STP LOT-24 NRC Scenario #6 Description Termination: Terminate scenario when Critical Tasks are complete or when Crew completes Step 3 of 0POP05-EO-EO10, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, whichever occurs last.
Critical tasks:
> 707°F) does not occur when forced circulation in the RCS stops.
- CT - 11; Manually close containment isolation valves, ED-MOV-0064, such that at least one valve is closed on each Phase A containment penetration prior to completion of 0POP05-EO-EO00, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Addendum 5.
Source: New Page 18 of 18
Scenario 4 was the low power scenario on the draft outline submittal. Later the licensee shifted the scenario numbers and this scenario became scenario 3 when renumbered. In both cases it was removed from the Adams upload since it was designated as the spare and was not used.
Rev. 0 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 1 2 3 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 7B A 10B B S 13B A 16B B S 19B A 22B B S 26B A 29B B R I U R 8B T 11B O R 14B T 17B O R 20B T 23B O R 27B T 30B O 0B Crew A O 9B C 12B P O 15B C 18B P O 21B C 24B P O 28B C 31B P 3 1 1 1 0 RO-1 RX 1 1 1 NOR 0 SRO-I 3,4, 2,4, 6 4 4 2 SRO-U I/C 189B 7 6 5,6 5 3 2 2 1 MAJ TS 0 0 2 2 3 4 2 1 1 0 RX RO 1 1 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I1 7 2,4, 1,2, 9 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U 6,7 3,6 5,6 5 5 4 2 2 1 MAJ TS 1,4 1,2 4 0 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I 3,4, 7 4 4 4 2 I/C 190B SRO- 7 U1 MAJ 5,6 5 3 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
Rev. 0 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 1 2 4 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 33B A 36B B S 39B A 42B B S 45B A 48B B S 52B A 55B B R I U R 34B T 37B O R 40B T 43B O R 46B T 49B O R 53B T 56B O 1B Crew B O 35B C 38B P O 41B C 44B P O 47B C 50B P O 54B C 57B P 3 1 2 1 1 0 RX 0 1 1 1 RO-2 NOR 3,4, 7 2,6 6 4 4 2 SRO-I I/C 191B 7
SRO-U 5,6 5 4,5 5 2 2 1 MAJ TS 0 0 2 2 3 1 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I2 3,4, 2,4, 3,7 8 4 4 2 I/C 192B 7 6 SRO-U 5,6 5 4,5 5 2 2 1 MAJ TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 0 RX RO-2 1 1 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I3 7 2,4, 2,3, 9 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U 6,7 6,7 5,6 5 4,5 5 2 2 1 MAJ TS 1,4 2,3 4 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
Rev. 0 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 1 2 4 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 59B A 62B B S 65B A 68B B S 71B A 74B B S 78B A 81B B R I U R 60B T 63B O R 66B T 69B O R 72B T 75B O R 79B T 82B O 2B Crew C O 61B C 64B P O 67B C 70B P O 73B C 76B P O 80B C 83B P 3 1 2 1 0 RX 0 1 1 RO-3 NOR 3,4, 7 2,6 6 4 2 SRO-I I/C 193B 7
SRO-U 5,6 5 4,5 5 2 1 MAJ TS 0 2 2 3 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 NOR SRO-I4 3,4, 2,4, 3,7 8 4 2 I/C 194B 7 6 SRO-U 5,6 5 4,5 5 2 1 MAJ TS 2,3 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 0 RX RO 1 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I5 7 2,4, 2,3, 9 4 2 I/C 6,7 6,7 SRO-U 5,6 4,5 5 2 1 MAJ 5 TS 1,4 2,3 4 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
Rev. 0 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 1 3 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 85B A 88B B S 91B A 94B B S 97B A 100B B S 104B A 107B B R I U R 86B T 89B O R 92B T 95B O R 98B T 101B O R 105B T 108B O 3B Crew D O 87B C 90B P O 93B C 96B P O 99B C 102B P O 106B C 109B P 4 1 1 1 0 RO-4 RX 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I 3,4, 1,6 5 4 4 2 SRO-U I/C 195B 7
5,6 5 3 2 2 1 MAJ TS 0 0 2 2 4 1 1 1 0 RX RO 1 1 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I6 7 1,2, 5 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U 3,6 5,6 5 3 2 2 1 MAJ TS 1,2 2 0 2 2 4 1 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I 3,4, 2,3 5 4 4 2 I/C 196B SRO- 7 U2 5,6 5 3 2 2 1 MAJ TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
Rev. 0 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 3 5 2 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 111B A 114B B S 117B A 120B B S 123B A 126B B S 130B A 133B B R I U R 112B T 115B O R 118B T 121B O R 124B T 127B O R 131B T 134B O 4B Crew E O 113B C 116B P O 119B C 122B P O 125B C 128B P O 132B C 135B P 4 3 2 1 1 0 RO-5 RX 1 1 1 NOR 0 SRO-I 2,3 3,7 7 5 4 4 2 SRO-U I/C 5 5 5 3 2 2 1 MAJ TS 0 0 2 2 4 1 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I7 1,6 3,4, 6 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U 6,7 5 5 2 2 2 1 MAJ TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 4 1 2 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I 1,2, 4,6 6 4 4 2 I/C SRO- 3,6 U3 5 5 2 2 2 1 MAJ TS 1,2 2 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
Rev. 0 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 3 4 5 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 137B A 140B B S 143B A 146B B S 149B A 152B B S 156B A 159B B R I U R 138B T 141B O R 144B T 147B O R 150B T 153B O R 157B T 160B O 5B Crew F O 139B C 142B P O 145B C 148B P O 151B C 154B P O 158B C 161B P 4 1 1 3 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I8 1,2, 2,6 4,6 8 4 4 2 I/C 3,6 SRO-U 4,5 4 2 2 1 MAJ 5 5 TS 1,2 2 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO- I/C 1,6 3,7 3,4, 8 4 4 2 I9 6,7 SRO-U MAJ 5 4,5 5 4 2 2 1 TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 4 1 2 1 1 0 RX RO 0 1 1 1 NOR SRO- 2,3 2,3, 3,7 8 4 4 2 I/C 6,7 I10 MAJ 5 4,5 5 3 2 2 1 SRO-U TS 2,3 2 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
- 4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
Rev. 0 Facility: South Texas Project Date of Exam: 7-13-20 Operating Test No.: LOT 24 Scenarios A E P V 2 3 T M P E O I L N T N I T C
A I A T L M N Y U T P M(*)
E CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW CREW POSITION POSITION S 163B A 166B B S 169B A 172B B S 175B A 178B B S 182B A 185B B R I U R 164B T 167B O R 170B T 173B O R 176B T 179B O R 183B T 186B O 6B Crew G O 165B C 168B P O 171B C 174B P O 177B C 180B P O 184B C 187B P 3 4 2 1 1 0 RX 0 1 1 1 RO-6 NOR 2,4, 2,3 5 4 4 2 SRO-I I/C 6
SRO-U 5 2 2 2 1 MAJ 5 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 3 4 2 1 1 0 RO NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO- I/C 2,4, 1,6 6 4 4 2 I11 6,7 SRO-U MAJ 5 5 2 2 2 1 TS 1,4 2 0 2 2 1 1 0 RX RO 1 1 1 NOR SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U 2 2 1 MAJ TS 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 5. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 6. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
- 7. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.