Text

301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML15201A558
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	07/16/2015
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Florida Power & Light Co
References
	Download: ML15201A558 (298)
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No. : HLC 22 NRG Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL. Reduce power to 45% to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from service due to an oil leak.

Turnover: 2A High Pressure Safety Injection pump is out of service to repair a motor oil leak. Taken out of service 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. B train protected , OLRM : Yellow, Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today. The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service.

Critical Tasks:

1) Close the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker during evaluation of the Maintenance of Vital Auxil iaries Safety Function in 2-EOP-01

2) Start 2B HPSI pump prior to RCS pressure lowering to <HPSI pump shutoff head (1200 psia)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 TS/SRO PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor fails high 2 R/RO, Reduce power to 45% to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump.

N/BOP, SRO 3 CIRO FCV-2210Y, Boric Acid Flow valve, fails closed - must open V2514 and cycle a BAM pump 4 I/RO Pressurizer level channel LT-111 OX fails as is. Requires swapping to the "Y" control channel.

TS/SRO 5 C/BOP 28 HPFRV-9021 fails to respond to downpower requiring manual feedwater control.

6 M/ALL V2515 fails closed followed by a Small Break LOCA. A manual trip will be required due to lowering Pzr level. Following the trip, a Loss of Offsite Power occurs.

7 C/BOP 2B Diesel Generator output breaker does not auto close on LOOP.

Manual closure required .

8 CIRO Following SIAS actuation , the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker opens but fails to auto close again . After the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker is manually reclosed , the 2B HPSI pump does not auto start. Requires manual start.

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1 Unit will be turned over at 100% power MOL. Directions are to reduce power to approximately 45% to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from service due to motor oil leak. Operations

Management has determined that the Rapid Downpower 2-AOP-22 .01 should be used for this evolution .

Prior to the downpower starting , Acoustic monitor for PORV 1474 will annunciate and fail high .

The crew will determine this failure is an instrument failure and not a leaking PORV. The SRO is to evaluate T.S. for accident monitoring .

When the RO aligns the CVCS system to begin the RCS boration , boric acid flow control valve FCV-2210Y fails closed . 2-AOP-02 .01 , "Boron Concentration Control Abnormal Operation" should be entered and step 4.2.1.4 (open V2514 and cycle a BAM pump) should be implemented to establish boric acid flow.

When the 2"d Charging pump is started for the down power, pressurizer level channel LT-111 OX fails as is. Because the level setpoint is failed as is and the reference setpoint starts lowering when power reaches -90% , this will result in increasing letdown flow when letdown should be decreasing for the power reduction. The only way to recognize the failure is to monitor LT-111 OX output - not changing. The crew should swap to Pressurizer level channel LT-111 OY to mitigate the failure per 2-AOP-01 .10, "Pressurizer Pressure and Level". The SRO should recognize and apply T.S. 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Table 3.3-10 and T.S .3.3 .3.5 Remote Shutdown System 3.3-9 due to this failure .

As the downpower progresses the 2B Main Feedwater reg . valve (MFRV) is not responding to the reduced steam flow. To control the 2B Steam Generator level the BOP must take manual control of the 2B MFRV.

Letdown isolation valve V2515 fails closed . Shortly after the letdown valve fails closed , RCS leakage will increase to greater than charging pump capacity due to the ruptured non-isolable letdown line. If the RO stops all running Charging pumps they must be restarted again due to lowering pressurizer level. The crew should manually trip the unit and enter 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions.

On the trip, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur with the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker failing to close. The BOP should manually close the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker. At this point, RCS pressure is still above SIAS setpoint, however later, when SIAS is reached , both Diesel Generator output breakers will open but the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker fails to re-close again (the 2A EOG output bkr re-closes as expected). After it is reclosed , the 2B HPSI pump does not auto start (with a SIAS signal present) and should be manually started by the RO. All other SIAS loads sequence on as designed . These are both critical tasks since the 2A HPSI was out of service initially. The crew should exit 2-EOP-01 and enter 2-EOP-03 , "LOCA".

Recommended termination is when both Diesel Generators are loaded on their busses, the 2B HPSI pump has been started and the crew is performing a controlled cooldown .

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 2 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1 Procedures Used

2-AOP-22 .01 Rapid Downpower

2-AOP-02 .01 , Boron Concentration Control Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

2-AOP-09.0 1, Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-02.03 Charg ing and Letdown

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident Technical Specifications Entered

TS 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Table 3.3-10 (Event 2 & 4)

TS 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System 3.3-9 (Event 4)

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 3 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0 -2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event #

-- - - - - - Page 4 of _1_9____. 1 Event Description : PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor Fails High Time I Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Restore IC #1 and OPEN NRC HLC 22 Lesson file then EXECUTE NRC Scenario 1 file.

Verify modification to IC set is triggered and verify equipment OOS .

Place placard for 'B' protected train and OLRM YELLOW.

Place clearance tag on 2A HPSI pp .

Place Green Mylar over annunciator Q40 .

Prior to the start of the downpower OR when directed by examiner, trigger Event 1, "PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor fails" Indications Available: Alarms

LC-1 PZR PORV/SAFETY OPEN Recognize that PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor is in alarm and SRO/RO/

investigate the conditions per annunciator LC-1 . Refer to BOP attached page 5.

Enters 2-AOP-01 .10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level per the SRO guidance in the ARP for annunciator LC-1 .

Evaluates T.S . 3.3.3.6.a, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.

3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in TS Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to SRO OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Refer to attached page 6-7.

May refer to 2-0SP-100.17 , Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check. Refer to attached page 8.

Directs checking plant parameters to determine if PORV is open by 2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level by SRO checking PORV 1474 Position indicating light, Discharge line temperature and Quench Tank parameters. Refer to attached page 9.

Determines that only the PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor has SRO failed .

SRO Notifies SM and Ops Management SRO Conduct crew brief NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 4 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 4 CONTROLROOMPANELLCPACB~

PROCEDURE NO.: WINDOW:

2-ARP-01-LCOO ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 LC-1 (Page 1 of 1)

CAUSES: At least one of the PORVs or Pressurizer Safeties has lifted or has seat leakage causing the applicable acoustic monitor flow PZR device to alarm .

PORV/

SAFETY OPEN LC-1 DEVICE: SETPOINT: LOCATION :

74/84 Energized . PACB-2 ALARM CONFIRMATION

1. V1474 , PORV, OPEN position indicating light ON.

2. V1475, PORV, OPEN position indicating light ON .

3. H-20, PORV 1475 RELIEF LINE TEMP HIGH, in ALARM .

4. H-36, PORV 1474 RELIEF LINE TEMP HIGH, in ALARM .

5. H-11, PZR SAFETY V-1200 DISCH TEMP HIGH , in ALARM .

6. H-19, PZR SAFETY V-1201 DISCH TEMP HIGH, in ALARM.

7. H-27, PZR SAFETY V-1202 DISCH TEMP HIGH , in ALARM.

8. Acoustic Monitoring PORV & SFTY VLVS POSITION INDIC, red indicating lights ON .

OPERA TOR ACTIONS

1. GO TO 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

REFERENCES:

CWD 2998-8-327 SH 84 5 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10 ,

either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10 , either restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c.** With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken , the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

d. ** With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10 , either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:

1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory; and

2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event out-lining the action taken , the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status, and

3. Restore the Channel to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling .

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Action statements do not apply to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

- Action statements apply only to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System ,

Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-41 Amendment No . .:+9, 4-a, 159 6 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

TABLE 3.3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED NUMBER MINIMUM CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE

1. Containment Pressure 2 1

2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - T Hot 2 1 (Wide Range)

3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T Cold 2 1 (Wide Range)

4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range 2 1

5. Pressurizer Water Level 2 1

6. Steam Generator Pressure 2/steam generator 1/steam generator

7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range 1/steam generator 1/steam generator

8. Steam Generator Water Level -Wide Range 1/steam generator* 1/steam generator*

-...)

9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 2 1 S,

CJl

<O

10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate (Each pump) 1/pump* 1/pump*

11 . Reactor Cooling System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2 1

12. PORV Position/Flow Indicator 2/valve*** 1/valve**

13. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator 1/valve** 1/valve**

14. Safety Valve Position/Flow Indicator 1/valve*** 1/valve***

15. Containment Sump Water Level (Narrow Range) 1**** 1****

16. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 1

17. lncore Thermocouples 4/core quadrant 2/core quadrant

18. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System 2***** 1*****

These corresponding instruments may be substituted for each other.

I r

0 ** Not required if the PORV block valve is shut and power is removed from the operator.

(\.)

(\.) *** If not available, monitor the quench tank pressure, level and temperature, and each safety valve/PORV z

o discharge piping temperature at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

0 en **** The non-safety grade containment sump water level instrument may be substituted.

0 CD

J ***** Definition of OPERABLE: A channel consists of eight (8) sensors in a probe of which four (4) sensors

~

a* must be OPERABLE.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-42 Amendment No . J, .tQ, 109

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

11 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MONTHLY CHANNEL CHECK 26 of 37 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0SP-100.17 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.16 PORV Block Valve Position Indicator

1. VERIFY the status of PORV block valve position indicators by performing the following: (RTGB-203)

Component Functional Criteria Results Number (,I')

PORV block valve position indicators are ON V1476 AND D SAT D UNSAT indicate desired position PORV block valve position indicators are ON V1477 AND D SAT D UNSAT indicate desired position

2. VERIFY the following acceptance criteria are met:

Acceptance Criteria Results (,I')

1 position indicator per valve D SAT D UNSAT OPERABLE Performed By:

Print/Sign Initials Date 8 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISI ON NO.: PR OCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 10 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking NOTE One PORV is normally isolated in Modes 1, 2, or 3.

D 1. VERIFY any Pressurizer PORV or safety is OPEN or leaking using 1.1 IF PORV position indication status lights are NOT available, any of the following: THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 11 :

V1474 , PORV, status lights

V1474 , PORV

V1475 , PORV, status lights

V1475, PORV

Acoustic Monitor (PACB-2) 1.2 RETURN TO

PORV discharge Section 4.2 .1 Step 1.

temperature greater than 210°F:

TIA-1106, PORV LINE

TIA-1110, PORV LINE

Safety valve discharge temperature greater than 185°F OR rising greater than 1°F per hour:

TIA-1107 , SAFETY VALVE

TIA-1108, SAFETY VALVE

TIA-1109, SAFETY VALVE

Quench tank level ,

temperature and pressure 9 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : Scenario# Event# ~~~~~- Page 5 of 19 Event Description : PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor Fails High Time II Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Checks as directed plant parameters to determine if PORV is open by 2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level by RO checking PORV1474 Position indicating light, Discharge line temperature and Quench Tank parameters.

BOP Monitors balance of plant.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Due to subsequent Ops Policy changes, the Tech Spec may not be entered.

After the Tech Spec actions have been addressed, proceed to Event 2.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 10 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-530 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 0 Date 04/28/08 PRE-PLANNED POWER CHANGE GUIDANCE Page 1 of 1 NOTE The down power profiles are to be used for general guidance only. Modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will result in deviations from predictions. There is no substitute for operator knowledge, close monitoring of plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur.

This policy describes the use of pre-determined reactivity change guidance for plant maneuvering.

Profiles have been developed for several anticipated plant down power contingencies.

These profiles are based on specific rates of change in power with plant power level change and reactivity adjustments being made simultaneously. The down power profiles contain guidance for both the actual down power and for follow-up reactivity changes to provide for stabilization at the new power level.

The pre-planned down power profiles are updated periodically by Reactor Engineering and filed in the Plant Physics Curve Book. The profiles provided include:

Normal down power profiles based on a rate of 3 MW/min 0 100% to 92%

0 100% to 70%

0 100% to 45%

0 100% to 25%

Rapid down power profiles based on a rate of 10 MW/min 0 100% to 92%

0 100% to 45%

0 100% to 25%

Several assumptions were made in the development of the down power profiles; these assumptions include:

Constant rate maintained from initial to final power level

CEA insertion used as necessary to maintain sliding ESI curve

BAMT makeup @ 6000 ppm

CEAs initially @ ARO

Down powers to 25% are intended to remove the unit from service When the need for a plant down power is recognized , the Unit Supervisor should reference the pre-planned down power profile during the evolution brief and provide the profile to the reactor operator.

Approved : (Michael Page - Signature on File)

Assistant Operations Manager - St. Lucie Plant 11 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVI SION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 5 of 47 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS NOTE OPS-530 , Pre-Planned Power Change Guidance, delineates operations department policy for the use of pre-planned downpower profiles provided by the Plant Physics Curve Book.

4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. BEGIN boration per operator aid .

D 2. PREPARE turbine for load reduction per OPERATIONS HARD CARDS.

D 3. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature per operations hard cards .

12 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 6 of 47 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions

1. WHEN Tavg begins to lower, 1.1 IF manual turbine load reduction THEN TOUCH GO from RAMP is required, THEN PERFORM the INTERFACE group. (DEH display following :

5551)

A. TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.

B. PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up:

(DEH display 7079)

(1) TOUCH FUN CT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

(2) TOUCH desired rate from RATE SELECTION group.

(3) TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower

("T ") from CLOSE INTERFACE group .

13 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 7 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 2. NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows:

"Attention all personnel , Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower II due to (reason)

D 3. NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction.

D 4. PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 5, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

D 5. START additional charging pump as required per guidance from Attachment 4 , Charging Pump Guidance.

14 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 8 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE

O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control, provides additional guidance on ASI Control.

US may direct temporary operation outside of ASI limit.

6. MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index 6.1 IF operation outside ASI limit is

+/-0.5 of ESI using CEAs. unavoidable, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. NOTIFY US.

8. MAINTAIN ASI within RPS LPD pre-trip limits.

C. RESTORE ASI to within limits as soon as practical.

6.2 IF ASI CAN NOT be maintained within transient band due to the inoperability of CEA(s) ,

THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering to assist in determining the load reduction rate to minimize effects of operation outside of transient limits.

15 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 9 of 47 PR OCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

7. MAINTAIN Tref and T avg within 7.1 VERIFY boration flow path to 6.6°F. RCS .

7.2 ESTABLISH Tref and Tavg within 6.6 °F using any of the following :

RCS Boration Rate

CEA Position

Turbine Load 7.3 IF Tref and Tavg can NOT be maintained within 6.6 °F, THEN NOTIFY US AND :

A. TRIP reactor.

8. GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

D 8. VERIFY boration lineup per Attachment 1, RCS Boration Guidance D 9. IF reducing power by more than 20%, THEN NOTIFY SNPO to secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02 .26, Zinc Addition .

16 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Power Profile 6 Page 1of2 Rapid Downpower 100% to 45% @10 MW/min St. Lucie Unit 2 Cycle 21 5000 EFPH Initial Power 100% 45% Final Power Rate 10 MW/min Downpower phase Time Reactor Tcold (deg Group 5 Cumulative Cumulative Boration Dilution Rate (min) Power(%) F) CEA (in) Boron (gal) Water (gal) Rate (gpm) (gpm}

0 100% 550.5 135 0 0 0 0 11 89% 548.5 130 240 0 22 0 22 78% 546.4 123 443 0 18 0 33 67% 544.4 116 615 0 16 0 44 56% 542.4 113 785 0 15 0 55 45% 540.3 109 936 0 14 0 Stabilization phase (t O = time power level achieved)

Time Reactor Tcold (deg Group 5 Cumulative Cumulative Boration Dilution Rate (min} Power(%} F) CEA (in) Boron (gal) Water (gal) Rate (gpm) (gpm) 0 45% 540.3 109 0 0 0 0 24 45% 540.3 108 0 681 0 28 54 45% 540.3 106 0 1463 0 26 84 45% 540.3 104 0 2077 0 20 114 45% 540.3 104 0 2547 0 16 144 45% 540.3 103 0 2956 0 14 174 45% 540.3 103 0 3234 0 9 194 45% 540.3 103 0 3363 0 6 214 45% 540.3 103 0 3479 0 6 234 45% 540.3 103 0 3566 0 4 264 45% 540.3 103 0 3655 0 3 CAUTION Results are to be used for general guidance only. Modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will result in deviations from predictions. This guidance is NOT to be used as a substitute for operator knowledge, close monitoring of plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur.

17 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Power Profile 6 Page 2 of2 Assumptions for downpower model a) Constant rate downpower from Initial Power to Final Power at specified rate.

b) CEA insertion as necessary to maintain within the transient band (+ 0.1) of the sliding ESI curve (E.3) c) RCS 810 atom% at 19.9%

d) BAMT makeup assumed to be 6000 ppm at 19.9 atom%

e) Group 5 CEAs initially at 135" f) Downpowers to 25% assume the unit will be removed from service.

NOTE BEACON simulations indicate that it should be possible to maintain ASI within the Steady-State band

(+/- 0.5 RPSu of the sliding ESI scale in Figure E.3) without challenging the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit (LTSSIL). In accordance with O-NOP-100.02, the Steady-State band is only applicable above 50% power. Below 50% power, the simulation shows that maintaining CEAs above the LTSSIL will not challenge the +/- 5.0 LPD Trip. If it is required to insert the CEAs below the LTSSIL, log the time that it occurred in the RCO chronological logs and notify Reactor Engineering to ensure compliance with TS 3.1.3.6.

Performed by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (RE)

Verified by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ (RE)

Model Input File depl_to5000_01 Calibration File pp~_5000 Power Profile File to45_10r5 Output File u2_5000_p6 18 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page _6_ of _1_9---;

-- 1 Event

Description:

Reduce Power to 45% to Remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from Service Time ! Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Prepare the Unit for load reduction using Ops Policy 530, "Pre-SRO Planned Power Change Guidance Refer to attached page 12 Directs actions IAW 2-AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power step 4.1, SRO Immediate Operator Actions AND step 4.2.1.1 thru 9, Subsequent Operator Actions. Refer to attached page 13-17.

SRO/

Notify System Dispatcher of downpower BOP Refer to the power profile for the load reduction (100% to 45% ,

RO/BOP 10 MW/Min) . Refer to attached page 18-19.

PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, step 4.1, Immediate Operator Actions:

1. BEGIN boration per operator aid .

SRO/RO

2. PREPARE the turbine for the desired load reduction rate per

/BOP OPERATIONS HARD CARDS.

3. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature per operations hard cards.

Communicating with RO, WHEN Tavg begins to lower, BOP THEN TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (DEH display 5551)

PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per 2-AOP-22.01 ,

RO Attachment 5, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines when directed by SRO.

START additional Charging pump per guidance from 2-AOP-RO 22.01 , Attachment 4, Charging Pump Guidance when directed by the SRO.

RO MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index +/-0.5 of ESI using CEAs.

NOTIFY plant personnel using Gaitronics and boost BOP function that a rapid downpower has commenced BOP NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction .

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The next event has FCV-2210Y, Boric Acid Flow Control valve, failing closed. Pre-view the event at this point to note when the malfunction should be triggered.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 19 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

_19_~

Op Test No.:

-- Scenario# Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page _7_ of 1

Event Description : Reduce Power to 45% to Remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from Service Time ~ Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: When directed to secure zinc injection, report completion 10 minutes later.

BOP/RO MAINTAIN Tref and Tavg within 6.6°F.

VERIFY boration lineup per 2-AOP-22.01 Attachment 1, RCS BOP/RO Boration Guidance when directed by the SRO IF reducing power by more than 20% , THEN NOTIFY SNPO to BOP/RO secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02.26, Zinc Addition .

Perform the remainder of the subsequent operation action SRO/RO steps (4.2.1 .10 thru 19) as the downpower progresses. Refer

/BOP to attached pages 21-32.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 20 of 59 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 10 of 47 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE Condenser back pressure is provided on DEH displays 5559, TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY AND CONDENSER VACUUM and 5605, CONDENSER VACUUM MONITORING. The condenser back pressure trip and alarm setpoints are variables that are dependent on power level.

10. VERIFY Condenser Back 10.1 IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has Pressure less than 8.859 inHgA. been automatically bypassed as indicated by both of the following :

At least 3 out of 4 RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11%

Annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD I LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED , IN ALARM THEN TRIP Turbine. -

10.2 IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has NOT been automatically bypassed , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TRIP reactor.

8. GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

21 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 11 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE DEH displays 5559 , TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY AND CONDENSER VACUUM and5605, CONDENSER VACUUM MONITORING , indicate time remaining before an automatic Turbine Trip is initiated by DEH , when operating in the Restricted Operating Region.

11. VERIFY Condenser Back 11.1 IF condenser back pressure within Pressure below alarm limits Restricted Operating Region ,

Acceptable Operating Region : THEN EXIT Restricted Operating Region within 300 seconds OR

Attachment 6, Condenser REMOVE Turbine from service as Pressure Limitations . follows :

OR A. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has been automatically

DEH display 5605, bypassed as indicated by CONDENSER VACUUM both of the following :

MONITORING.

At least 3 out of 4 RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11 %

Annunciator L-29 ,

LOSS OF LOAD I LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED , IN ALARM THEN TRIP Turbine .

22 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 12 of 47 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

11. (continued)

B. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has NOT been automatically bypassed ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) TRIP reactor.

(2) GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions.

11.2 REDUCE load as necessary until Condenser Back Pressure is below alarm limits of Acceptable Operating Region .

23 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 13 of 47 PR OCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 12. VERIFY CONDENSER 12.1 REDUCE load as necessary until DIFFERENTIAL pressure less Condenser Differential Pressure is than 2.0 inHgA. (OVATION less than 2.0 inHgA.

display 5559 OR 5605) 12.2 IF CONDENSER DIFFERENTIAL pressure CAN NOT be maintained less than 2.5 inHgA, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has been automatically bypassed as indicated by both of the following:

At least 3 out of 4 RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11%

Annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD I LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED , IN ALARM THEN TRIP Turbine .

B. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has NOT been automatically bypassed ,

THEN PERFORM the following:

(1) TRIP Reactor.

(2) GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

24 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISI ON NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 14 of 47 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

13. VERIFY parameters listed on 13.1 EVALUATE out of limit parameter Attachment 3, Rapid Downpower with respect to :

Parameters, are within limits.

Trip criteria

Plant conditions

Potential consequences

Load reduction rate NOTE Rapid Downpower may result in Pressu rizer Pressure dropping below DNBR Limit.

14. MAINTAIN PZR pressure 14.1 VERIFY pressurizer spray, between 2225 and 2275 psia . proportional and back-up heaters are operating properly in automatic.

14.2 REFER to 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

NOTE A large rate of change in T avg may cause transient level variance .

15. MAINTAIN PZR level between 15.1 ENSURE backup charging pump 27% and 68%. starts.

15.2 Manually CONTROL Letdown as required .

25 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 15 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 16. WHEN Final power level is achieved ,

THEN GO TO Section 4.2, Step 35 to STABILIZE the unit.

NOTE The 2A or 28 Heater Drain Pump may be stopped first.

CAUTION Heater Drain Pump minimum flow is 1500 gpm. Flows less than 1500 gpm can cause pump damage.

0 17. WHEN any of the following conditions are met:

Power level is less than 50%

2A Heater Drain Pump discharge flow is less than 1500 GPM as indicated on FIS-11-4A, HTR ORN PUMP 2A DISCH FLOW (TGB/22/N-31 /E-B)

28 Heater Drain Pump discharge flow is less than 1500 GPM as indicated on FIS-11-48 , HTR ORN PUMP 28 DISCH FLOW

{TGB/22/N-31 /E-B)

THEN STOP both Heater Drain Pumps as follows :

26 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAG E:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 16 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

17. (continued)

A. STOP 2A Heater Drain A.1 IF Main Feed Pump suction is Pump. NOT being maintained greater than OR equal to 375 PSIG ,

ENSURE THEN START Heater Drain Pump LCV-11 -18A, 4A LP and EVALUATE problem.

HTR ALT DRAIN ,

OPENS to control level in 4A Heater.

(TGB/33/S-24/W-G)

VERIFY Main Feed Pump Suction pressure is being maintained greater than or equal to 375 PSIG as indicated on P1219 A FW PP SUCTION HOR PRESS 27 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 17 of 47 I PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I -

4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

17. (continued) 0 B. STOP 28 Heater Drain Pump.

8.1 IF Main Feed Pump suction is NOT being maintained greater than OR equal to 375 PSIG,

ENSURE THEN START Heater Drain Pump LCV-11-188, 48 LP and EVALUATE problem.

HTR ALT DRAIN, OPENS to control level in 48 Heater.

(T G 8/33/S-30M/-G)

VERIFY Main Feed Pump Suction pressure is being maintained greater than or equal to 375 PSIG as indicated on P1219 A FW PP SUCTION HOR PRESS 28 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 18 of 47 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 18. WHEN power level is approximately 45% ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY flow is within the A.1 CONTINUE power reduction until capacity of one MFW all conditions are satisfied .

pump , as indicated by:

Pump amps low.

Feed regulating valves are almost CLOSED to maintain Steam Generator levels.

Total feedwater flow is less than 15,500 GPM .

B. REMOVE the PSS from service as follows:

(1) PLACE the PSS control switch to OFF.

(2) VERIFY the green PSS "out of service" light is ON .

29 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 19 of 47 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

18. B. (continued)

(3) RECORD time the PSS is "out of service" in RCO Chronological Log.

NOTE The System Load Dispatcher shall be notified as soon as practical, but within 30 minutes of a change in status of the Power System Stabilizer (PSS).

(4) NOTIFY the System Load Dispatcher that the PSS has been removed from service.

(Section 6.2, Commit ment 1 D 19. Prior to either Main Feed Pump suction flow reaching 5,000 gpm, STOP ONE Main Feed Pump as follows:

A. VERIFY FIC-12-1, A.1 ADJUST FIC-12-1, CONDENSATE HOR CONDENSATE HOR RECIRC TO RECIRC TO CNDSR, set to CNDSR, to 10,000 GPM.

10,000 GPM.

(TGB/24/N-25/W-D) 30 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 20 of 47 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

19. (continued)

B. PLACE MFW pump to be stopped in RECIRC.

(RTGB-202)

C. VERIFY associated Main Feed Pump Recirculation Valve automatically opens:

FCV-09-1A2, 2A FW PUMP RECIRC TO CNDSR

FCV-09-182 , 28 FW PUMP RECIRC TO CNDSR D. VERIFY the following :

Main Feed Pump suction pressure greater than 355 psig .

Steam Generators are being maintained between 55% and 75% narrow range level 31 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 21 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

19. (continued)

E. STOP the selected MFW pump.

F. VERIFY auxiliary oil pump of secured MFW pump starts.

G. VERIFY Steam Generators G.1 RESTART the MFW pump.

are being maintained within 55% to 75% narrow range level GJ 20. WHEN power level is approximately 40%,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. STOP the Condensate Pump operating on the same electrical train as the secured Main Feed Pump.

B. VERIFY FIC-12-1 , MAIN 8.1 EVALUATE operation of CONDENSATE RECIRC FCV-12-1, CONDENSATE HOR REGULATOR , flow greater RECIRC TO CONDSR .

than or equal to 10,000 gpm.

32 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 8 19

-- of Event Description : Boric Acid Flow Control Valve FCV-2210Y Fails Closed Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: This failure should be inserted after the down power is started and when power is approximately 97-95%. Trigger Event 3, "FCV-2210Y fails closed".

When directed as SNPO to investigate failure of FCV 2210Y respond in 5 minutes that valve is closed, no flow sounds and no other indications.

When requested by l&C to investigate failure of FCV 221 OY respond they will investigate. Response after investigation, valve diaphragm has failed resulting in the valve being unable to open.

Control Room Indications Available: Boric acid flow goes to off-scale low, indicating lights for FCV-2210Y goes from dual to green. Annunciator N-40, Boric Acid Flow High/Low, MAY come in.

RO Recognizes closed indication on FCV-2210Y and notifies SRO.

BOP Sends SNPO to investigate FCV-2210Y.

SRO Directs BOP to go to HOLD on turbine .

Directs RO actions in accordance with 2-AOP-02.01 Boron SRO Concentration Control (SCCS) Abnormal Operations.

Procedure steps 4.2.1.4. Refer to attached page 34.

SRO Ensures Boric Acid pump 2A OR 28 is running SRO Directs OPENING V2514, Emergency Borate SRO Directs Placing Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL Directs cycling the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control SRO boric acid addition rate and rate of power change SRO Monitor Tavg for abnormal changes Notifies Shift Manager of FCV-221 OY failure and entry into 2-SRO AOP-02 .01 Boron Concentration Control. Notifies l&C.

Direct continuation of down power with alternate Boration SRO flowpath .

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The Boric Acid Makeup pump should be cycled for approximately 15 seconds every minute (with 2 Charging pumps running).

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 33 of59 HLC 22 Scenario 1

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

3 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM (BCCS)

ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 13 of 31 PROCEDU RE NO.:

2-AOP-02.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)

3. (continued)

C. IF VCT level continues to rise ,

THEN STOP the following :

Primary water pumps

Boric acid makeup pumps D. ADJUST RCS boron concentration to maintain steady state RCS conditions.

CAUTION Prolonged use of V2514 , EMERGENCY BORATE, can lead to uncontrolled power reduction rates. Boric acid flow rate is equal to the charging pump flow rate when using the emergency borate valve .

D 4. IF FCV-2210Y, BORIC ACID VALVE , fails to OPEN AND boration is required, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. START boric acid pump .

8. OPEN V2514 ,

EMERGENCY BORATE.

34 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _3__________ Page 9 of 19 Event

Description:

Boric Acid Flow Control Valve FCV-211 OY Fails Closed Time II Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: None Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator M-42 , "Emergency Borate V2514 OPEN/OVLD/SS lsol" will alarm when it is opened .

RO Starts 2A OR 2B Boric Acid pump if not already running .

Secures from previous lineup (close V2525, to suction of RO Charging pumps)

RO OPENS V2514, Emergency Borate RO Places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL.

Cycles the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid RO addition rate and rate of power change Monitors for any abnormal change in T-avg . (Tave-Tref. Within RO 6.6°F)

BOP Puts turbine on HOLD as directed.

BOP Monitors plant parameters while event in progress.

BOP Continues Turbine down power when directed .

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 35 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 10 of 19 Event

Description:

Pressurizer level channel LT-1100X fails as is Time II Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Event 4, "L T-111 OX fails as is" when directed by examiner.

Control Room Indications Available: Letdown flow not lowering as expected for downpower. A Pressurizer level deviation from setpoint occurs as the downpower progresses.

Examiners note: The applicant should recognize that letdown flow should be substantially lower than charging flow due to the downpower (Pzr level tends to "shrink" as the RCS is cooled down). As the downpower progresses Pressurizer level will deviate low from setpoint. H17, "PZR CHANNEL X LEVEL HIGH/LOW" will eventually alarm due to the malfunction.

Identifies and communicates abnormal Pressurizer level RO indications and letdown flow indicates maximum .

Directs Immediate Operator Actions IAW 2-AOP-01 .10, SRO

'Pressurizer Pressure and level' . Refer to attached page 37 Performs Immediate Operator Actions IAW 2-AOP-01 .10,

'Pressurizer Pressure and level ' by:

Step 4.1 .4 VERFIY selected Pressurizer level control channel RO LIC-1110X, LEVEL, NORMAL Step 4.1.4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector to non-affected control channel.

3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown system transfer switches, control and instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-9 (item 5) shall be OPERABLE.

TS a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown channels SRO less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-9, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Refer to attached pages 38-39 3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE. (Item 5)

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring TS channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in SRO Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Refer to attached page 40-41.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 36 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF at Normal Operating Pressure, THEN VERIFY PIC-11 OOX(Y),

1.1 IF Pressurizer pressure less than 2300 psia PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND PORV leakage is indicated stable. or PORV has failed OPEN, THEN PLACE affected PORV in OVERRIDE and CLOSE associated block valve:

V1474, PORV, and V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE

V1475 , PORV, and V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE D 2. VERIFY selected Pressurizer pressure control channel 2.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to PIC-11 OOX(Y), PRESSURE , non-affected pressure control NORMAL. channel.

D 3. VERIFY selected RRS channel Pressurizer level setpoint 3.1 PLACE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM selector switch to NORMAL as indicated on non-affected RRS channel.

LR-1110 , PRESSURIZER LEVEL.

D 4. VERIFY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-111 OX(Y),

4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to LEVEL , NORMAL. non-affected level control channel.

37 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.5 The remote shutdown system transfer switches, control and instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-9, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-9 , either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6.

4.3.3.5.2 Each remote shutdown system instrumentation transfer switch and control circuit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying its capability to perform its intended function(s) at least once per 18 months.

ST. LUC IE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-38 38 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

TABLE 3.3-9 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED MINIMUM READOUT CHANNELS NUMBER OF CHANNELS INSTRUMENT LOCATION RANGE CHANNELS OPERABLE

1. Power Range Neutron Flux Hot Shutdown Panel 2 x 10"8 % - 200% 2 1

2. Reactor Trip Breaker Reactor Tri~ OPEN-CLOSE 1/trip breaker 1/trip breaker Indication Switch Gear ( B)

3. Reactor Coolant Hot Shutdown Panel 0°F - 600°F 2 1 Temperature - T Cold

4. Pressurizer Pressure Hot Shutdown Panel 0 - 3000 psia 2 1

5. Pressurizer Level Hot Shutdown Panel 0 - 100% level 2 1

6. Steam Generator Pressure Hot Shutdown Panel O - 1200 psia 1/steam generator 1/steam generator

7. Steam Generator Level Hot Shutdown Panel 0 - 100% level 2/steam generator 1/steam generator

8. Shutdown Cooling Flow Hot Shutdown Panel 0 - 5000 gpm 2 1 Ul Rate

<D

£. 9. Shutdown Cooling Hot Shutdown Panel 0°F - 350°F 2 1 U1 Temperature

<D

10. Diesel Generator Voltage Hot Shutdown Panel 0 - 5250 v 1/diesel generator 1/diesel generator 11 . Diesel Generator Power Hot Shutdown Panel 0 - 5000 kW 1/diesel generator 1/diesel generator

12. Atmos~heric Dump Hot Shutdown Panel O - 1200 psig 1/steam generator 1/steam generator Valve ressure

13. Charging Flow/Pressure Hot Shutdown Panel O - 150 gpm/ 2 O - 3000 psia CONTROLS/ISOLATE SWITCHES

1. Atmospheric Stm Dump Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A. 2/steam generator 1/steam generator Controllers

2. Aux. Spray Valves Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A 2

3. Charging Pump Controls Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A 3 2 I 4. Letdown lsol Valve Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A r 3 2 0

N 5. AFW PumpNalve Controls Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A 3 2 N

z

o

6. AFW Pump Steam Inlet Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A 2 1 0 Valve en 0 7. Pzr Heater Controls Hot Shutdown Panel/ RAB431 N.A 6 3 CD

J

~

Ci"

~

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-39 Amendment No. 25

INSTRUMENTATION ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3 .6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10 ,

either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.* With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10 , either restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT ST AND BY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c.** With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken , the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

d.** With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:

1. Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory; and

2. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event out-lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status, and

3. Restore the Channel to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling .

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Action statements do not apply to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

- Action statements apply only to Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System, Containment Sump Water Level (narrow range) and Containment Sump Water Level (wide range) instruments.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-41 Amendment No. W , 4-a, 159 40 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

TABLE 3.3-10 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REQUIRED NUMBER MINIMUM CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE

1. Containment Pressure 2 1

2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - T Hot 2 1 (Wide Range)

3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - T cold 2 1 (Wide Range)

4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range 2 1

5. Pressurizer Water Level 2 1

6. Steam Generator Pressure 2/steam generator 1/steam generator

7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range 1/steam generator 1/steam generator

8. Steam Generator Water Level -Wide Range 1/steam generator* 1/steam generator*

!: 9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level 2 1

£.

U1 (0

10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate (Each pump) 1/pump* 1/pump*

11. Reactor Cooling System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2 1

12. PORV Position/Flow Indicator 2/valve*** 1/valve**

13. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator 1/valve** 1/valve**

14. Safety Valve Position/Flow Indicator 1/valve*** 1/valve***

15. Containment Sump Water Level (Narrow Range) 1**** 1****

16. Containment Water Level (Wide Range) 2 1

17. lncore Thermocouples 4/core quadrant 2/core quadrant

18. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System 2***** 1*****

I

These corresponding instruments may be substituted for each other.

r 0 ** Not required if the PORV block valve is shut and power is removed from the operator.

N N *** If not available , monitor the quench tank pressure, level and temperature , and each safety valve/PORV z

o discharge piping temperature at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

0 en **** The non-safety grade containment sump water level instrument may be substituted .

0 CD

J ***** Definition of OPERABLE: A channel consists of eight (8) sensors in a probe of which four (4) sensors

~

Ci" must be OPERABLE.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-42 Amendment No. d, +9, 109

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# 4

--- Page 11 of 19 Event Description : Pressurizer level channel LT-11 OOX fails as is Time ~ Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO/RO Re-start the down power with LT-111 OY in service.

/BOP EXAMINER'S NOTE: If necessary, prompt SRO to continue downpower with a report from the NWE that the 2A Main Feedwater pump oil leak is getting worse.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 42 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

- - Scenario# Event#

- - - Page 12 of 19 Event Description : 28 High Power Feed Reg valve Fails As-ls Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: During the downpower, Trigger Event 5, "2B HPFRV-9021 Fails As-ls" Control Room Indications Available: 2B SG level rising as downpower progresses. Steam flow Feed flow mismatch. 28 High SG level alarm (G-1) if not noticed in a timely manner.

Recognize that 2B SG level is slowly rising and does not match BOP 2A SG level NOTE: manual trip criteria is SG level s 50% and ~ 75% narrow range.

Direct that IOA from 2-AOP-09.01, Feedwater Control System SRO Abnormal Operations, step 4.1.1 . Refer to attached pages 44 IOA from 2-AOP-09.01 , Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operations, If SG levels are not between 60-70% NR and not BOP stable, take manual control of feed flow and stabilize SG levels to 60-70% NR.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The immediate operator actions require that the controller for the 28 High Power valve be taken to manual to control 28 SG level. The SRO should continue in 2-AOP-09.01 to step 4.2.1 which references a table for actions to take. Specifically, section 4.2.2 step 2 should be used to position both the High Power AND Low Power Feed Reg valves for this condition.

Direct the BOP to operate the 2B MFW control system IAW 2-SRO AOP-09.01 steps 4.2.2.2.1 through 2.5. Refer to attached page 45 Operate the 2B MFW control system IAW 2-AOP-09.01 steps 4.2.2.2.1 through 2.5. by placing the High Power Feed Reg BOP valve in manual and closing it until the Low Power Feed Reg valve opens 20 to 50% in Auto .

When 2B SG level in manual control and controlling within RO/BOP band continue with downpower as directed by SRO.

SRO Notify SM and Operations Management of failure of HPFRV SRO Conduct shift brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 43 of59 HLC 22 Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

1. VERIFY S/G levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable. malfunctioning, THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE S/G levels to 60% to 70% NR.

CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high S/G level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent SIG overfill.

2. VERIFY S/G levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.

than 50% NR.

2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open ,

THEN CLOSE it.

2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions 44 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 SIG Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies 0 1. PERFORM applicable step(s) in any order per Table 2.

Table 2 Level or Feedwater Control Malfunctions Suspected Malfunction Step HPFRV Section 4.2.2, Step 2 MFW pump recirculation valve Section 4.2.2 , Step 3 FCV-12-1 , Condensate Hdr Recirc To Cndsr Section 4.2.2, Step 4 DCS FW inputs Section 4.2.2, Step 5 LPFRV Section 4.2.2 , Step 6 NOTE The HPFRV and its associated LPFRV have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in an attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

D 2. VERIFY HPFRV controllers are controlling SIG levels in normal 2.1 ENSURE affected LOW PWR MIA STA is in A (auto) .

band :

2.2 PLACE affected HIGH PWR MIA

FIC-9011, SIG 2A FLOW STA in M (manual).

CNTL (HPFRV 2A) 2.3 CLOSE affected HPFRV using

FIC-9021, SIG 28 FLOW HIGH PWR MIA STA until LPFRV CNTL (HPFRV 28) is 20% to 50% open.

2.4 MAINTAIN SIG level in normal band.

2.5 MAINTAIN LPFRV between 20%

to 50% open by adjusting HPFRV as required.

45 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _6_ _ _ _ _ Page .!l_ of _19_~

Event

Description:

Letdown Isolation valve V2515 fails closed . Letdown line leak.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Event 6, V2515 fail closed when directed.

A 200 gpm LOCA auto inserts on this event.

Trigger: Slightly Bigger LOCA to get to SIAS quicker.

Control Room Indications Available: M-5 Letdown Press High/Low. No letdown flow indication.

Examiners Note: One minute after Letdown valve fails closed a letdown line break in Containment automatically occurs resulting in approximately 200 gpm non-isolable leak.

Recognize and communicate letdown valve V2515 failed closed . Stops all running Charging pumps and places control RO switches in AUTO . IOA's from 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

Recognize and communicate RCS leakage alarm, N-46. RCS RO leak rate recorder indicates full scale. Pressurizer level lowering.

SRO Direct to start all available Charging Pumps. (3 are available)

Ensures all Charging pumps are started. Recognize and communicate Pressurizer level lowering and cannot be RO maintained on setpoint with all charging pumps running .

Recommend tripping the Reactor.

Directs that the Reactor be tripped and implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows :

SRO

RO: Reactivity control , Inventory Control, Pressure control ,

Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal , Containment Conditions.

After recognizing that a LOOP has occurred , direct Direct SRO placing an ADV on each SG in service (auto/auto) to control SG pressure at 900 psia.

28 SG on HVAC panel) Assess Reactivity Control and RO Announce "Reactor is Tripped" Place an ADV on each SG in auto/auto (2A SG on RTGB 202, NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 46 of 59 HLC 22 Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _7_ _ _ _ _ Page 1i..._ of _19_ _.1 Event

Description:

SBLOCA manual trip , Loss of Offsite Power, 2B Diesel Breaker fails to close on LOOP Time II Position ~ Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: LOOP. 2B Diesel Generator Breaker does not close.

Examiners note: due to small break, SIAS will probably not occur while crew is in 2-EOP-01 Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control , Pressure Control , Core Heat removal.

Assess Reactivity Control and Announce "Reactor is Tripped" RO Place an ADV on each SG in auto/auto (2A SG on RTGB 202, 2B SG on HVAC panel)

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify all CEAs are fully inserted .

Assess Maintenance of Vital Auxi li aries (MVA) and Announce BOP "Turbine is Tripped" BOP Recognize and communicate 2B Diesel output breaker did not close. Insert Sync. Plug into 2B Diesel breaker and close Diesel Output breaker. Monitor and verify load sequencing on Critical the 2B Diesel.

Task #1 Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital BOP Auxiliaries , RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions.

Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of 2-EOP-99.

BOP

Notify SNPO to VERIFY SFP inventory and temperature are normal on all available indications.

Call the STA to report to the control room Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed .

Verifies GEN Bkr open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and BOP Exciter Breaker.)

Verifies all vital and non vital AC Buses energized .

Verifies all vital and non vital DC Buses energized .

If not previously done, Insert Sync. Plug into 2B Diesel breaker and close Diesel Output breaker.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 47 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _7_ _ _ _ _ Page _!L of _1_9_-1

-- 1 Event

Description:

SBLOCA manual trip, Loss of Offsite Power, 2B Diesel Breaker fails to close on LOOP Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Inventory Control:

Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

RO

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%.

Ensures all charging pumps are running due to lowering PZR level.

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Pressure Control:

Verifies RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia .

RO

Verifies RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia .

Verifies RCS subcooling is _:::20°F.

Pressure and Subcooling are degrading due to the RCS leak.

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Core Heat Removal :

Verifies at least one RCP running with CCW. (no RCP's RO running due to LOOP)

Verifies loop delta Tis <10°F. (loop delta Twill be higher than 10°F due to nat. circ. developing)

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH :

SG Level 20-83% NR BOP Feedwater available, level being restored to 60-70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is betwe~n 525 and 535° F

SG pressure between 850-930 psia via ADV's EXAMINER'S NOTE: AFAS-2 may lockout due to 2A Diesel breaker closing before the manual closure of 28 Diesel breaker. (28 AFW pump start delay). The BOP should recognize this condition and recommend to SRO that AFAS-2 should be manually actuated.

NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 48 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# _?_ _ _ _ _ Page ~of _19_..;

1 Event

Description:

SBLOCA manual trip , Loss of Offsite Power, 2B Diesel Breaker fails to close on LOOP Time II Position ~ Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: N/A Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Containment Conditions

Verifies Containment pressure <2 psig . (Pressure is increasing. Ensures 4 Containment Cooling fans on .)

BOP

Verifies NO Containment radiation monitors in alarm (should begin trending upward)

Verifies Containment temperature is less than 120°F .

(Temperature is increasing)

Verifies NO secondary plant radiation alarms .

Assess safety functions using the diagnostic flow chart.

SRO Recognize that several parameters indicate a LOCA is in progress. Exit 2-EOP-01 and enter 2-EOP-03.

Enter 2-EOP-03, "LOCA" after analysis from Diagnostic Flow SRO chart SRO Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC)

Direct Appendix A and H of 2-EOP-99 to sample the Steam SRO Generators and Restore Instrument Air.

SRO If SIAS present verify SI flow IAW Figure 2 SRO Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify If CCW has been lost > 30 minutes, ensure CCW and SRO Controlled Bleedoff flow are not reinitiated by placing the control switches to close STA

Perform SFSC's 2-EOP-03 when directed .

Verify SI flow IAW Figure 2 Directs BOP:

SRO

Perform Appendix X section 2

Close the MSIV's and SGBD isolation valves

verify SIAS and CIAS actuation NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 49 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event # _B_ _ _ _ _ Page .!Z._ of _1_9---11 Event Description : 28 EOG output breaker fails to re-close following SIAS . 28 HPSI fails to automatically start after the 28 EOG output breaker is closed with SIAS present.

Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Appendix H Restore Instrument Air when directed.

Control Room Indications Available: N/A Perform Appendix A, (step 4) Sampling Steam Generators when directed. Coordinate with NPO to restore Instrument Air (step 1 of Appendix A) IAW Appendix H (refer to attached BOP page 51). When NPO calls stating alignment complete, BOP should reset the 2A and or 2B Instrument air compressors from the control board.

NOTE: CCW cannot be restored to the 'N' header for SG blowdown sample cooling . As a result RP will need to be called BOP for local surveys. (step 4 of Appendix A) (refer to attached page 52)

When directed place the four CCW valves to/from the RCP's to RO CLOSE. Place the two RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE. (step 8.A.3)

When SIAS received, verify ESFAS pumps and valves actuate RO/BOP as designed. (step 6)

Recognize and communicate 2B Diesel output breaker did not BOP re-close following SIAS. Insert Sync. Plug into 2B Diesel breaker and close Diesel Output breaker. Monitor and verify load sequencing on the 2B Diesel.

Critical Task #2 Recognize 2B HPSI did not start on SIAS. Communicates and starts the 2B HPSI pump.

BOP Close the MSIV's and SGBD valves when directed. (step 13)

Perform Appendix X section 2 when directed (step 13B). Refer BOP to attached page 53-57 NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 50 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 3 of 171 PROCEDURE NO .: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERA TORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train(~) B Train (~)

D 1. 1f a LOOP has occurred ,

Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

D A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

D B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors .

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-88) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves , until SIAS is reset CAUTION If a VALID SIAS occurs , the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards siQnals are still present.

D 2. 1f an INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following :

RESTORE flow to the 'A' CCW Header by placing the control switches to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE :

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

RESTORE flow to the 'B' CCW Header by placing the control switches to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-88

HCV-14-10 51 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 4of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)

D 3. lf the 'N' Header has been restored , Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:

A. lf CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE.

B. OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.

D 4. lf the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples for isotopic activity and Tritium .

D 5. lf S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 52 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 121 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 9)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC .

D 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.

D 3. !f AFAS has actuated, and use of Main Feedwater is desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:

D A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET.

D B. ENSURE Steam Generator levels are being restored using Auxiliary Feedwater D C. ENSURE BOTH SIG [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.

1. MV-09-5

2. MV-09-6 D D. ENSURE BOTH Low Power M/A Stations in MANUAL.

D E. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN .

D F. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.

53 of 59 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 122 of 171 PR OCEDURE NO. : SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 9)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. (continued)

D G. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control SIG levels.

D H. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.

D 4. !f AF AS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater in Manual Control is desired ,

Then PERFORM ALL of the following:

D A. ENSURE BOTH SIG [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED .

D B. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.

D C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL .

D D. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves .

D E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control SIG levels.

D 5. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.

54 of 59 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 123of171 PROC EDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 9)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 6. ENSURE BOTH of the following :

D A. Bearing Oil Pump D A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and Air and Seal Oil Backup Pump Side Seal Oil Backup RUNNING . Pump are RUNNING.

D A.2 CONSIDER depressurizing, venting and purging H2 from the generator to prevent a potential H2 explosion .

D 8. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm ,

Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING .

D 7. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN .

D 8. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING .

D 9. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing D 9.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust Oil temperature between 110 to TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler 120°F. to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.

55 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TI TLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 124of171 PROCEDU RE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 9)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 10. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO D 10.1 PERFORM ALL of the following :

rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES .

D A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.

D B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON .

D C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED .

D D. Locally START the Turning Gear.

D 11.!f Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature .

D 12. Place Boron Dilution Alarm D 12.1 !f BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation. System channels are NOT operating, When indicated Reactor power is Then PERFORM applicable less than 10-5%, actions of 2-AOP-02 .01 , Boron Then PERFORM BOTH of the Concentration Control System following: (BCCS) Abnormal Operations.

D A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation .

D B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating .

56 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 125 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 9 of 9)

Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliability if 15 KW heaters are not energized after plant shutdown.

D 13.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.10, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.

D 14.CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects .

END OF APPENDIX X 57 of 59 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : Scenario# Event# _8_ _ _ _ _ Page ~ of _19_-1 1

Event Description : 28 EDG output breaker fails to re-close following SIAS. 28 HPSI fails to automatically start after the 28 EDG output breaker is closed with SIAS present.

Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available:

Directs RO:

SRO

to commence a cooldown of the RCS to regain subcooling When directed, cooldown (step 18) the RCS using the ADV's not to exceed 50°F in any one hour period .

RO A cooldown rate up to 100°F in any one hour period is allowed to regain or maintain subcooling.

When directed depressurize the RCS using Aux. Spray (step RO

19) to maintain subcooling at the lower limits of Figure 1A.

Scenario Termination Cues:

The 28 EOG is loaded on its bus post SIAS

The 28 HPSI pump is running post SIAS

The crew is performinQ a controlled cooldown NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2 58 of 59 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: YELLOW Identified RCS Leakage: .02 GPM Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

ECO hang - 2A MFW pump Tech Spec Action Statement:

3.5.2.a.2, 2A HPSI Pump Out of Service for motor oil leak.

OPS 513's:

None Locked in Annunciators:

Q-40, 2A HPSI PUMP BKR FAILURE/CS STOP Current Status:

100% power MOC, Boron Concentation 608 ppm 2A HPSI pump out of service for motor oil leak for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 2A MFW pump has an oil leak on oil cooler Ops Management direction: Reduce power to 45% at 10 MWe/min, using 2-AOP-22.01 ,

Rapid Down Power, to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from service.

Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months Reactivity Turnover:

20 gallons of primary water every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Reactor Engineering recommends use of Ops-530 Pre-planned Power Change Guidance NRC 22 Scenario 1 Rev.2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 Scenario 2 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No. : 2 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 30% power MOL. The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Forced Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant. Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold . Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100%

Turnover: 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Auxi liary Feedwater pump is out of service due to motor oil leak. 2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals . Return the Unit to 100% power. Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today. The "B" Main Steam Line Rad iation Monitor is out of service Critical Tasks:

1) Crosstie the 2B AFW pump to feed the 2A S/G within 30 minutes of notification that the RCS Heat Removal Safety Function of EOP-05 is not met.

2) Control RCS temperature using the 2A SG after the 2B SG has blown dry to prevent exceeding the upper subcooling limits of 2-EOP-99, Figure 1A OR exceeding a cooldown of 100°F an hour.

3) Initiate/Actuate/Manually position MSIS components (MFIVs on the 2A SG) with in 15 minutes of notification that the RCS Heat Removal Safety Function of 2-EOP-05 is not met.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R/RO Raise power to 100%

NI BOP, SRO 2 TS/SRO Containment Pressure transmitter PT-07-2B fails high (slowly drifts) 3 C/BOP Bearing failure on 2A TCW Pump. 2B TCW pump fails to auto start.

4 I/RO PT-11 OOX drifts high causing Pzr Main Spray valves to open .

TS/SRO 5 MI All HCV-14-1 (CCW to RCP CIS valve) fails closed . After a time delay, the reference leg for the 2B S/G level and pressure instrumentation (including PT8023D) ruptures causing an ESDE in containment. The crew should recognize no CCW flow to the RCP's (manual trip required in < 11 minutes) and degrading 2B SIG and containment conditions and manually trip the reactor.

Complete 2-EOP-01 and diagnose event as ESDE. Transition to 2-EOP-05.

6 C/BOP On AFAS actuation , MV-09-11 AFW to 2A SG fails to open. Open MV-09-9 and then the crosstie valves to feed the 2A SG with the 2B AFW pump.

7 CIRO BOTH trains of MSIS fail to auto actuate. Manual actuation using the RTGB MSIS actuation switches is not successful either.

Individual components must be positioned .

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 of 50 HLC 22 Scenario 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2 The plant is at 30% . Instruction to the crew is to raise power to 100%.

The crew will initiate a power ascension IAW 2-GOP-201 , 'Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1'. As reactor power is increased , ESFAS Channel "B" Containment Pressure transmitter begins drifting upward until it fails high. The SRO should enter 2-AOP-99.01 , "Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation and Tech Specs then carry out the appropriate actions. The instrument should be declared out of service and bypassed/tripped within one hour. Also recognize that if the inoperable channel is not returned to service within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the channel shall be placed in "TRIP'. After these actions have been performed , the up power should continue.

The 2A Turbine Cooling Water Pump will experience increasing amps due to a bearing failure .

When the 2A TCW pump trips, the 2B TCW pump fails to auto start. The 2B TCW pump should be manually started in accordance with 2-AOP-13.01 , Turbine Cooling Water System . The TCW cross-tie must also be maintained open .

Next, the controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-11 OOX) drifts high causing the spray valves to open MORE (Pzr is on recirc). The crew must diagnose the problem and swap to the alternate control channel (Y) and ensure that PZR pressure control is restored in accordance with 2-AOP-01.10 , Pressurizer Pressure and Level. The SRO will refer to Tech Specs for DNB if RCS pressure indication lowers below 2225 psia (LCO 3.2.5).

HCV-14-1 (CCW to RCP CIS valve) fails closed causing the plant to be manually tripped within 10 minutes due to no CCW flow to the RC P's (RCP's must be secured following the trip). Enter 2-AOP-14 .01 "CCW Abnormal" or 2-AOP-01 .09A1 "RCP Abnormal". Following the Rx trip, PT8023D (2B SIG pressure safety channel) fails low. After a time delay, the reference leg for the 2B S/G level and pressure instrumentation (including PT8023D) ruptures causing an ESDE in containment. The crew should recognize degrading containment conditions and enter 2-EOP-05, ESDE.

As the RCS cools down due to the ESDE, SIAS will actuate. The 2B Steam Generator will continue to blow down . Due to the trip at low power, AFAS may not actuate when 2-EOP-01 is exited . In that case, AFW should be manually started and aligned. When 2C AFW is started (either from AFAS or manually), MV-09-11 to 2A SG will not open and cannot be opened .

Success path is to start the 2B AFW pump and open the crossties from the B side to the A side and feed the A SG. BOTH trains of MSIS fail to auto actuate. Manual actuation is not successful either. Individual components must be positioned. Note, the "A" train MFIV's must be closed (at a minimum) to ensure adequate AFW flow is delivered to the 2A SG. BOTH of these are critical tasks.

Terminate the scenario after RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized following 2B S/G dryout, the 2B SG is isolated and the 2A SG is being fed by the 2B AFW Pump.

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 2 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 Scenario 2 Procedures Used

2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation

2-AOP-13.01 , Turbine Cooling Water System

2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

2-AOP-09.02 , Auxiliary Feedwater

2-AOP-01 .09A 1, 2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump

2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand Event

2-EOP-99, Appendix R

2-NOP-02 .24, Boration Concentration Control

2-NOP-99.07 , Operations Hard Cards Tech Specs Entered

TS 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation (Event 2)

TS LCO 3.2.5, Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) (Event 4)

NRG 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 3 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 2 Page 4 of 17 NRC Event

Description:

Raise Power to 100%

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate IC#14, 30% power, (Xenon building in, 7 gpm dilution rate)

Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position

OPEN NRC HLC 22 Lesson file then EXECUTE NRC Scenario 2 file

Ensure modification to IC set is triggered .

Place 2A AFW pump and 2A BAM pump to stop. Place control switch ECO tags on all 3 pumps

Ensure the 2B TCW is secure and in standby with SB13139 TCW pp Discharge cross-tie valves open

Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN

Sign off and handout 1-GOP-201. Also include the RE Power Ascension Guidance Letter (load rate, up to 18% I hour or 3 MW/Min) and 2-GOP-101

Perform 2-GOP-201Attachment3 Section 2.0 step 2.2 (open MSR warm up valves) and step 2.3 ( Reset MSR Reheat Control Valves)

Perform 2-GOP-201 Attachment 3 Section 3.0 step 3.3 (open MSR block valves)

Perform 2-GOP-201 Attachment 3 Section 4.0 steps 4.1 through 4.5 (place MSR in service)

Control Room Indications Available:

G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Failure/CS Stop/SS lsol

N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol

M-46 2A Charginq Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD Continue with 2-GOP-201 'Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 To SRO Mode 1', starting with step 4.7 .17. Refer to attached page 5 and 6 Control Rx power and ASI IAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating SRO Guidelines step 4.1 Refer to attached pages 7-9 Raise dilution rate for power increase IAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 4.2.15 Refer to attached page 10 Withdraw CEAs in 'Manual Sequential' as directed to raise Rx RO power.

Ensure appropriate actions for ASI Control are taken using 0-RO NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control Divert letdown to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS to maintain RO VCT level within normal band .

Raise Turbine load using 2-NOP-99.07 Attachment 3, Turbine BOP Adjustment Program DEH for power increase at a rate not to exceed 3.0 MW/MIN . Refer to attached pages11-13 Monitors dilution and T-avg and Tref and maintain as close as RO possible. (+/- 2°F)

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 4 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 68 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

12. (continued)

c. NOTIFY SCE or l&C to perform DCS Steam Generator Feedwater Discharge Coefficients Verification per 2-NOP-102.01 , Distributed Control System (DCS) -Operations.

SCE I l&C D. ENSURE scheduled lncore surveillances have been performed . (Section 7 .1.3, Management Directive 1)

E. ENSURE lncore Detection System is OPERABLE perO-OSP-64.01 , Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests, Checks And Calibrations. (Section 7 .1.3, Management Directive 1)

RE F. CONTINUE power ascension .

13. WHEN TCW System total flow exceeds 2,000 gpm , THEN PERFORM the following : (TGB/24/22/K)

A. RECORD TCW heat exchanger total flow:

NPO

FR-13-50A, FIT-13-50A + B TOTAL FLOW gpm

FR-13-50B, FIT-13-50B +A TOTAL FLOW gpm B. IF 2A TCW Pump is aligned as the standby pump, THEN ENSURE CS-1/825, TCW STANDBY PUMP CONTROL SWITCH , is in the TCW PP A position .

NPO

c. IF 2B TCW Pump is aligned as the standby pump, THEN ENSURE CS-1/825, TCW STANDBY PUMP CONTROL SWITCH , is in the TCW PPB position.

NPO

14. WHEN Calorimetric power is greater than 30%, THEN INITIATE MSR warmup per Attachment 3, Section 3.0.

5 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 69 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 //

4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

15. IF available, THEN ENSURE second main feed pump is ready to start per 2-NOP-09.01, Main Feedwater System Operation.

16. WHEN Calorimetric power is greater than 32%, THEN INITIATE placing MSRs in service per Attachment 3, Section 4.0.

17. WHEN Reactor power reaches 45%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN STOP power ascension.

6 of 50 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 8 of 20 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with the following guidelines:

All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied .

The performance of the out of sequence steps do NOT change an operational MODE.

SM/US has given authorization.

4.1 Power Level Escalations

1. MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref during main generator loading as follows:

CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

Boron concentration changes per 2-NOP-02 .24, Boron Concentration Control.

NOTE

Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines contains guidance for power escalation rates.

Reactor Engineering may provide clarification for power escalation rates from Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines.

2. IF greater than or equal to 50% power OR 30% power during shape annealing factor test, THEN RAISE power as follows :

A. USE boration or dilution per 2-NOP-02 .24, Boron Concentration Control for fill planned reactivity additions.

CAUTION Adjusting CEAs for ASI impacts Reactivity B. USE CEAs for ASI control per O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control.

3. IF available, THEN ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating per 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and Letdown .

7 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 9 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

... ,/

4.1 Power Level Escalations (continued) Ii'

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 1, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load Main Generator per 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

8 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: i'-

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 20 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

£ .* y*-

~__..,.

ATTACHMENT 2 -

Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines (Page 4 of 4)

NOTE Components of fully conditioned fuel:

Fuel is conditioned to equal to or greater than 90% power .

The core is NOT experiencing a difference greater than plus or minus 0.5 RPS ASI units from the cycle predicted ASI.

3.0 FULLY CONDITIONED FUEL

1. IF performing a mid cycle shutdown or power reduction AND a return to full power occurs within 27 days, THEN RAISE power at a maximum power escalation rate of 30% I hour.

9 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

31 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 87 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)

NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26, DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW

14. ADJUST FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2, Step 4. DODD

IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN, THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 X/Y Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow. DODD

15. IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DODD

16. MAINTAIN PIA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE :s;30 psig by opening and closing V2513, (VCT) VENT VALVE . DODD

17. IF diverting to maintain VCT level , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in the WMS position. DODD

8. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates OPEN. DODD

c. When normal level on LIC-2226, (VCT) LEVEL, is reached, THEN PLACE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in AUTO . DODD D. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates CLOSED. DODD

18. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added, THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP. DODD

19. IF V2512 , REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened ,

THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED. DODD

20. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE , was opened, THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED. DODD

21. ENSURE FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM . DODD

22. MONITOR for any abnormal change in T avg. (RTGB-203) DODD 10 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: -........""'

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 10 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-201. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.

Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Monitoring ~ppropriate critical parameters to recognize , monitor, and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant response and system performance ensures proper control of the plant. The SM/US shall be notified of any abnormal indications.

Reactor Power

MW (Load)

CEA POSITION

DCS Power

RCS Temp

Pzr Level

ASI

1. ENSURE Ovation display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open.

2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.

3. ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)

TARGET SELECT

RATE SELECT

4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)

TARGET

RATE

5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551) 11 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE: -~

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 24 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on Ovation main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL. (display 5551)

7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

(display 5551)

B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:

(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.

(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)

a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.

c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")

from CLOSE INTERFACE group .

C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.

8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:

Reactivity rate

Turbine load rate 12 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE : -

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

/" ,__ II ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER c: c::_._ K (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open.

B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

c. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.

13 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 2 Page 5 of 17 NRC Event Description : Containment Pressure Transmitter PT-07-28 Fails High Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Upon cue from Examiner, Trigger Event 2: PT-07-28 Fails High Control Room Indications Available:

Ann P-23: CNTMT Press High CIS Channel Pre-Trip

Ann P-13: CNTMT Press High CIS Channel Trip

Ann L-5: CNTMT Press High Channel Trip

Ann L-13: CNTMT Press High Channel Pre-Trip

Ann Q-2: Engineered Safeguards ATI Fault

Ann Q-3: CNTMT Press SIAS Channel Trip

Ann S-17: CNTMT Press High CSAS Channel Trip

PIS 07-28 indication is drifting off scale high Recognizes cause of alarm is PT-7-2B drifting High and RO Reports the condition to the crew.

Directs entry into 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instr.

SRO

Determines applicable step to be 4.2.14 Refer to attached page 15 Bypass the following channels affected by the failed instrument

Hi Cont Press RPS trip unit (key 109)

BOP

Cont Press SIAS (key 127)

Cntmt Press CIAS (key 129)

Cntmt Press CSAS (key 128)

Refer to TS 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1 action 2 ACTION 2 - a. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable TS SRO channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN. Refer to attached pages 16-20 NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 14 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

4 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 32 of 91 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.14 Containment Pressure Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument:

PIS-07-2A

PIS-07-28

PIS-07-2C

PIS-07-20 NOTE

Bypassing ESFAS BTUs will require Key 114 for ESFAS cabinet door.

Containment pressure SIAS and MSIS share the same bistable and isolation modules .

D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed:

HI CNT PRESS (RPS)

(Key 109)

CNTMT PRESS SIAS (Key 127)

CNTMT PRESS CIAS (Key 129)

CNTMT PRESS CSAS (Key 128)

A. BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitches .

B. TRIP affected BTUs per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.

15 of50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1 .

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation chan[1el shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1 .2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation .

4.3.1 .3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing . Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment No . 67 16 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. Manua l Reactor Trip 4 2 4 1, 2 1 4 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 5

2. Variable Power Level - High 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

3. Pressurizer Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

5. Containment Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

6. Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4/SG 2/SG(b) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

7. Steam Generator Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

Difference - High

j

2. 8. Steam Generator Level - Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 2#

(J1 0

9. Local Power Density - High 4 2(c)(d) 3 1 2#

10. Loss of Component Cooling Water 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

to Reactor Coolant Pumps 11 . Reactor Protection System Logic 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

3*, 4*, 5* 5

12. Reactor Trip Breakers 4 2(f) 4 1, 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 5

13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor

a. Startup and Operating -

I Rate of Change of Power- 4 2(e)(g) 3 1, 2 2#

r 0 High N

N b. Shutdown 4 0 2 3, 4, 5 3 z

a 14. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low 4/SG 2/SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

0 en 0 15. Loss of Load (Turbine CD 4 2(c) 3 1 2#

J

~

Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low)

O' N

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 60

~

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

With the protective system trip breakers in the closed position , the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal , and fuel in the reactor vessel.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

(a) Trip may be manually bypassed below 0.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER in conjunction with (d) below; bypass shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is greater than or equal to 0.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(b) Trip may be manually bypassed below 705 psig ; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 705 psig.

(c) Trip may be bypassed below 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER ; bypass shall be automatically removed when Power Range Neutron Flux power is greater than or equal to 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(d) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

4 (e) Trip may be bypassed below 10- % and above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER ; bypass 4

shall be automatically removed when Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux power is:::, 1o- %

and Power Range Neutron Flux power~ 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

(f) Each channel shall be comprised of two trip breakers ; actual trip logic shall be one-out-of-two taken twice.

(g) There shall be at least two decades of overlap between the Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels and the Power Range Neutron Flux Monitoring Channels.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT ST AND BY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and/or open the protective system trip breakers.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 98 18 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION ST A TEMENTS ACTION 2 - a. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN .

b. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied :

1. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

2. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition .

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below:

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Safety Channel - Nuclear Instrumentation Wide Range Rate of Change of Power - High (RPS)

Linear Range Variable Power Level - High (RPS)

Local Power Density - High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

2. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure - Low (ESF)

3. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESF)

4. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Steam Generator Pressure - Low (ESF)

5. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No . ~ . ':R, , 149 19 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - (Continued)

6. Cold Leg Temperature Variable Power Level - High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Local Power Density - High (RPS)

7. Hot Leg Temperature Variable Power Level - High (RPS)

Thermal Margin /Low Pressure (RPS)

Local Power Density - High (RPS)

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes*. Verify compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specifica-tion 3.1.1.1 or 3.1 .1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

ACTION 4 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the reactor trip breakers of the inoperable channel are placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , provided the trip breakers of any inoperable channel are in the tripped condition , for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3 .1.1.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

Limited plant cooldown or boron dilution is allowed provided the change is accounted for in the calculated SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 122 20 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 6 of 17 NRG Event Description : Conta inment Pressure Transmitter PT-07-28 Fails High Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Refer to TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 action 13, 18a, 18b for PT-07-2B failure .

ACTION 13 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN .

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels , operation may TS SRO proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If the inoperable channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition .

b. With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

Refer to attached pages 22-26 Notifies Shift Mgr & ICM Conduct a crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 21 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3 .2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value .

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3 .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2 .

4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation .

The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation .

4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No.

of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 67 22 of SO HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12

b. Containment Pressure - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 13*, 14 High

c. Pressurizer Pressure - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3(a) 13*, 14 Low

d. Automatic Actuation - 2 1 2 1,2, 3,4 12 Logic

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1,2, 3,4 12 N

w

2. b. Containment Pressure - 4 2 3 1(b) , 2(b) , 3(b) 1Sa*, 1Sb*, 1Sc (J1 0

High-High

c. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2, 3,4 12 Logic

3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)

a. Manual CIAS (Trip 2 1 2 1, 2, 3,4 12 Buttons)

b. Safety Injection (SIAS) See Functional Unit 1 for all Safety Injection Initiating Functions and Requirements C. Containment Pressure - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 13*, 14 High I

r d. Containment Radiation - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 13*, 14 0

N High N

z e. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12

a 0 Logic en 0

CD

J

~

O' N

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 132 22

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 16

b. Steam Generator 4/steam 2/steam 3/steam 1, 2, 3(c) 13*, 14 Pressure - Low generator generator generator

c. Containment Pressure -

4 2 3 1, 2, 3 13*, 14 High

d. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 12

5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)

.,,.N a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12 2.

(J1 0 b. Refueling Water Storage 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 19 Tank- Low

c. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 12 I

r 0

N N

z

a 0

en 0

CD

J

~

O' N

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. eG, 132 23

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is less than 1836 psia ; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 1836 psia .

(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 700 psia ; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 700 psia.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION OF STATEMENTS ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION 13 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels , STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN .

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure - High (SIAS ,

CIAS , CSAS)

Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)

AF AS-1 and AF AS-2 (AF AS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)

3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B , then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure - Low (SIAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-15 Amendment No . ~ . +J, 149 25 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels , operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If the inoperable channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition .

b. With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

c. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel has been placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels , operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition . If OPERABILITY can not be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2 .1.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16a Amendment No. 132 26 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 7 of 17 NRC Event

Description:

Bearing Failure on the 2A TCW pump.

Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 3: 2A TCW Pump Bearing Fails.

If the NPO is called to investigate the 2A TCW pump, report back 5 minutes later that the pump is not running and the motor bearing is very hot to the touch.

Note to Evaluator: This malfunction ramps in over 1 minute.

Control Room Indications Available: No annunciation until the 2A TCW pp trips then E-34 will alarm (2A TCW pp ovrld/trip), then Generator alarms.

Refer to 2-AOP-13.01 , TCW System and direct subsequent SRO Actions: (section 4.2.1.1) Refer to attached Page 28 IF a TCW pump tripped , THEN ENSURE the other pump is running.

SRO Direct start of the 2B TCW pump (maintain the TCW discharge header cross-tie open)

Recognize rising amp indication on the 2A TCW pump BOP ammeter and secure the pump prior to overload I trip conditions.

BOP Recognize that the 2B TCW pump DID NOT start BOP Contact the field operator to check 2B TCW pump.

BOP Start the 2B TCW pump.

BOP Verify secondary alarms clear after 2B TCW pump running.

Exit the AOP after the 2B TCW pump has been started and SRO subsequent actions are complete SRO Notifies shift manager and ops management SRO Conduct a crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 27 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 7 of 29 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-13.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions NOTE Maximum flow for one TCW pump is 6,500 gpm .

CAUTION Maximum TCW flow for one TCW HX is 5,100 gpm to prevent HX damage .

D 1. VERIFY one or two TCW pumps in service based on unit load AND 1.1 START one or two pumps as required .

TCWflow .

A. IF neither pump can be started ,

THEN PERFORM the following at the direction of the US :

(1) LOWER VARS to minimum.

(2) PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01 , Rapid Down power.

1.2 IF only one TCW pump is running and both pumps are required ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. LOWER VARS to minimum .

B. PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01 ,

Rapid Downpower, to within the capabilities of one TCW pump.

28 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 8 of 17 NRG Event Description : PT11 OOX drifts high causing Main Spray valves to open .

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed. Trigger Event 4: PT-11 OOX Drifts High.

When requested l&C will initiate a work order to repair.

Control Room Indications:

Alarm H10: PZR CHANNEL Y PRESS HIGH I LOW

PZR Pressure Indications lowering with spray valves opening more

RECOGNIZE that the cause of the abnormal condition is RO PT11 OOX failed HIGH .

REPORT the condition to the crew .

BOP

REFER to Annunciator Response Procedure .

DIRECT crew to enter 2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

SRO

DETERMINE that the applicable IOA is AOP step 4.1.2 .

Refer to attached Page 30 VERIFY pressurizer spray valves are NOT operating properly RO in automatic (maintaining the pzr on recirc at 2250 psia)

IF selected pressure channel has failed , THEN shift to the operable pressure channel. Observe that indicated pressure on RO the "X" controller is rising above the setpoint (due to PT-11 OOX failing high) while the "Y" controller indications are matched.

VERIFY spray valves close and PZR pressure is returning to RO program.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: since the pressurizer is on recirc, the sprays are normally open slightly.

EVALUATE Technical Specifications:

The SRO will refer to Tech Specs for DNB if RCS pressure indication lowers below 2225 psia (LCO 3.2.5).

TS SRO

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit (Pressurizer Pressure ::; 2225 psia) restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to< 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months SRO Notifies Shift Mgr & ICM SRO Conduct crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 29 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 39 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF at Normal Operating Pressure, THEN VERIFY PIC-1100X(Y) ,

1.1 IF Pressurizer pressure less than 2300 psia PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND PORV leakage is indicated stable. or PORV has failed OPEN ,

THEN PLACE affected PORV in OVERRIDE and CLOSE associated block valve :

V1474, PORV, and V1476 , PORV BLOCK VALVE

V1475, PORV, and V1477 , PORV BLOCK VALVE D 2. VERIFY selected Pressurizer pressure control channel 2.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to PIC-1100X(Y) , PRESSURE, non-affected pressure control NORMAL. channel.

D 3. VERIFY selected RRS channel Pressurizer level setpoint 3.1 PLACE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM selector switch to NORMAL as indicated on non-affected RRS channel.

LR-1110, PRESSURIZER LEVEL.

D 4. VERIFY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-1110X(Y) ,

4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to LEVEL, NORMAL . non-affected level control channel.

30 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 5,7 Page 9 of 17 NRC Event Description : HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RCP's must be secured with CCW lost), the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers) . MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time II Position ~ Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Upon cue from Examiner, trigger Event 5: HCV-14-1 Fails Closed. Following the manual Rx Trip, the Reference Leg breaks on the 28 SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers)

Control Room Indication available:

RCP Seal Trouble, Cooling Water Flow Low on all four RCP's

HCV-14-1 Indicates Closed

L-14, RCP CCW FLOW 10 Minute Timer Started

Containment Pressure & Rx Cavity Leakage trend up

SG pressure, RCS temp, Pzr pressure and level trend down

Instruments that are reading off-scale high: LT9023D, LT-9022, LT-9006 .

Instruments that are reading off-scale low: PT8023D EXAMINER'S NOTE: the ESDE appears within 1 - 2 minutes following PT8023D failing low. Also, due to the location of the reference leg break, wide range level indication on the 28 SG is failed. However, LT-9024 on the PACB-2 is available to provide wide range indication on the 28 SG (located on a different instrument leg)

SRO/ Based on CCW Low Flow alarms, should recognize that HCV-BOP/RO 14-1 is closed Enter 2-AOP-01 .09A1 , A2 , B1 or B2 and implement section SRO 4.2.10. Refer to attached pages 32-34 Direct step 4.2.10.1.4 (contingency) to be performed. Place SRO HCV-14-1 control switch to OPEN RESET.

Recognize that the valve did not open and direct step 4.2.10.1.5 (contingency) be performed. Within 10 minutes of SRO the loss of CCW to the RCP's, trip the reactor and stop all RCP's. Implement 2-EOP-01 , SPTA's Place HCV-14-1 control switch to OPEN RESET. Recognize it did not open and recommend that within 10 minutes of the loss RO of CCW to the RCP's, the reactor should be tripped and all RCPs stopped.

SRO Direct a Manual reactor trip based on loss of CCW flow to the RCPs , not to exceed 10 minutes. After the reactor is tripped ,

secure all RCPs NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 31 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 2A1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 36 of 60 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-AOP-01 .09A1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.10 Multiple RCP Low CCW Flow I High Temperature D 1. VERIFY CCW containment isolation and CCW N Header 1.1 IF annunciator L-14, RCP CCW FLOW 10 MINUTE TIMER valves , OPEN : STARTED has alarmed , THEN MARK time of alarm. - - - -

CCW N Header isolation valves (RTGB-206) 1.2 IF valid SIAS has occurred ,

THEN ENSURE CCW N Header

HCV-14-8A, remains isolated from Essential NORMAL HOR. Headers.

ISOLATION 1.3 IF an inadvertent SIAS has

HCV-14-88 , occurred and N Header isolation is NORMAL HOR . NOT required ,

ISOLATION THEN PERFORM the following :

HCV-14-9, FROM A. With US concurrence ,

NORMAL HOR OVERRIDE and OPEN ISOLATION HCV-18-1 , INSTRUMENT AIR TO CONTAINMENT.

HCV-14-10, FROM (RTGB-206)

NORMAL HOR ISOLATION B. PLACE each N Header valve control switch to

CCW containment isolation CLOSE, then to valves (RTGB-206) OVERRIDE.

HCV-14-1 , TO RC c. IF SIAS is reset, PUMP THEN PLACE each N Header valve control switch

HCV-14-2 , FROM to CLOSE , then to OPEN .

RC PUMP D. PLACE control switch for

HCV-14-6, FROM all CCW containment RC PUMP isolation valves to OPEN RESET.

HCV-14-7, TO RC PUMP 32 of50* HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 37 of 60 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01. 09A 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.10 Multiple RCP Low CCW Flow I High Temperature (continued)

1. (continued) 1.4 IF CCW containment isolation and CCW N Header valves closed due to other than SIAS ,

THEN PERFORM the following:

A. PLACE N Header valves control switches in OPEN .

B. PLACE CCW containment isolation valves in OPEN RESET 1.5 IF automatic reactor trip is anticipated (time from L-14 alarm recorded approaches 10 minutes) ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TRIP reactor.

B. STOP all RCPs.

C. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP 01 , Standard Post Trip Actions .

1.6 IF CEA TCBs are OPEN and CCW has been lost for 10 minutes, THEN STOP all RCPs .

33 of50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 38 of 60 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .09A 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.10 Multiple RCP Low CCW Flow I High Temperature (continued)

1. (continued) 1.7 IF CCW can NOT be reestablished within 30 minutes, THEN ISOLATE CBO by ensuring the following valves , CLOSED :

(RTGB-205)

V2505 , RCP BLEEDOFF

V2524, RCP BLEEDOFF

V2507, RCP BLEEDOFF RELIEF STOP VLV 1.8 GO TO Section 4.2.1, Step 4.

D 2. GO TO Section 4.2.1 , Step 5.

34 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 5,7 Page 10 of 17 NRG Event

Description:

HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RCP's must be secured with CCW lost) , the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers) . MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO/ BOP Manually trip the reactor within 10 minutes of the loss of CCW to the RCPs , then secure all RCPs.

On the Reactor Trip, recognize TM/LP related alarms, LT-9022 and LT-9006 on the DCS indicate BAD (Transfers Feed Reg SRO/ system to manual) and LT9023D (NR safety channel) indicates BOP/RO off-scale high . RCS temperature , Pressurizer pressure and level trend down while Containment pressure and Rx Cavity Leakage trend up.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

SRO

RO : Reactivity control , Inventory Control , Pressure control , Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal , Containment Conditions.

RO Assess Reactivity Control and Announce "Reactor is Tripped" Assess Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries (MVA) and Announce BOP "Turbine is Tripped"

Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of 2-EOP-99.

BOP

Notify SNPO to VERIFY SFP inventory and temperature are normal on all available indications.

Call the STA to report to the control room Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control , Inventory Control , Pressure Control , Core Heat removal Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Reactivity Control RO

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 35 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 5,7 Page 11 of 17 NRG Event Description : HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RCP's must be secured with CCW lost), the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers). MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time i Position ~ Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of BOP Vital Auxiliaries , RCS Heat Removal , Containment Conditions Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed BOP

Verify GEN Bkr open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2; 2A3 2AB, 2B1 , 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Inventory Control RO

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trendinQ to 30 - 35%

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Pressure Control RO

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia

Verify RCS subcooling is >20°F Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCP running with CCW RO 0 All RCPs should have been secured following the reactor trip

Verify loop delta T is <10°F (NA with No RCPs runninQ)

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 36 of 50 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 5,7 Page 12 of 17 NRC Event

Description:

HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RCP's must be secured with CCW lost), the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers). MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following o SG level is between 20 and 81 % NR o Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F o If RCS approaches 500°F ensure:

At least ONE RCP is stopped (All should be secured from Core Heat Removal Safety Function). All RCPs were tripped earlier.

Emergency borate when directed (from RCS Heat Removal Safety Function) o Ensure V2525 Load control valve closed o Start a BAM Pump o Close V2651 Tank 2B Recirc valve o Open V2514 Emergency Borate valve

SIG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig o Close HCV-08-1A & B if SG pressure <735 psig

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed

MSR warmup valves are closed

If maintaining vacuum desired , ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED EXANINER'S NOTE: MSIS actuation setpoints (high containment pressure or low SG pressure) should not be reached while the crew is in EOP-01. SG pressure should stay above 800 psia so the manual action of closing the MSIV's should not be required (refer to RCS Heat Removal).

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Due to the trip at low power, AFAS may not actuate during 2-EOP-01 implementation. In that case, AFW should be manually started and aligned using the AFW HARD CARD (2-NOP-99.07, Attachment 5). When 2C AFW is started (either from AFAS or manually), MV-09-11 to 2A SG will not open and cannot be opened.

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 37 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 5,7 Page 13 of 17 NRC Event

Description:

HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RCP's must be secured with CCW lost), the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers). MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig 0 Ensure SIAS, CIAS and MSIS have actuated 0 If Containment Pressure is at least 5.4 psig ,

Ensure CSAS has actuated with CS flow at least BOP 2700 gpm

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F 0 Ensure All Containment Fan Coolers are operating

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determ ine that 2-EOP-05 , ESDE should be implemented .

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 38 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 14 of 17 NRC Event Description : Enter 2-EOP-05, MV-09-11 (2C AFW pump to 2A SG) fails closed .

Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by the examiner or AFTER EOP-05 has been entered, Trigger "Increase Steam Leak"

If called as the NPO to investigate the status of MV-09-11, 2C AFW pump to 2A SG report back that it indicates closed.

If called as the NPO to manually open MV-09-11, report back that it is mechanically bound and will not open.

Control Room Indications Available:

MV-09-11 closed indication (green light) .

SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) every 15 minutes.

NOTE: IF no attempts have been made to address the SRO status of AFW or recognize the status of MV-09-11 following AF AS, then when the STA performs RCS Heat Removal Safety Function, he is to inform the US this Safety Function is not met due to SG levels not being restored.

SRO Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify SRO Direct Appendix A 2-EOP-99 Sampling SG's SRO Ensure SIAS (if setpoint reached)

MSIS fails to automatically actuate on either high BOP containment pressure or low SG pressure. Attempt to actuate using the RTGB actuation buttons. If MSIS still not actuated, position ALL MSIS components. The "A" train CRITICAL MFIVs must be closed to ensure adequate AFW flow (once TASK #3 it is restored) to the 2A SG. Refer to attached page 40 If CCW lost to RCP's for >30 minutes ensure CCW remains SRO isolated SRO Protect the Main Condenser. Refer to Appendix X section 2 Direct that AFW should be manually started and aligned using SRO the AFW HARD CARD (2-NOP-99.07 , Attachment 5) .

When directed to align the 2C AFW pump to feed the 2A SG BOP report MV-09-11 2C to 2A will not open . Call NPO to investigate MV-09-11 NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 39 of 50

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 156 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 TABLE 5 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL (Page 1 of 1)

A Train ('1) B Train ('1)

NOTE An MSIS signal generated from EITHER A or B Train will cause ALL MSIS components to actuate due to interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry.

D 1. ENSURE Main Steam Hdr A/B Isolation Valves CLOSED.

HCV-08-1A -

HCV-08-1B -

D 2. ENSURE Header A/B Bypass Valves CLOSED.

MV-08-1A -

MV-08-1B -

D 3. ENSURE Feedwater Hdr A/B lsol Valves CLOSED.

HCV-09-1A -

HCV-09-1 B -

HCV-09-2A -

HCV-09-2B -

END OF TABLE 5 40 of 50 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 6 Page 15 of 17 NRC Event Description : Enter 2-EOP-05, MV-09-11 (2C AFW pump to 2A SG) fails closed .

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed to open AFW crossties, Trigger Event 6: Open AFW Cross Tie Valves. Wait three minutes and state MV-09-13 and MV 14 are open.

Control Room Indications Available: When AFW flow initiated, MV-09-11 2C AFW to 2A SG fails to open.

Implement 2-AOP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Attachment 4 step 2, 2B AFW pump to feed 2A SIG . (Refer to attached SRO pages 42-43) OR 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation , step 4.4.2, 2B AFW Pump to 2A SIG. (Refer to attached pages 44-45.)

SRO Direct opening MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves and throttle MV-09-9 to restore feed to 2A SG using CRITICAL 28 AFW pump.

TASK #1 When directed , call NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 BOP AFW crosstie valves.

NOTE: BOP should close MV-09-9 first When directed perform Appendix A of 2-EOP-99 Sampling BOP SG's BOP When directed close CCW to I from RC P's Direct the 2B SG isolated IAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R.

SRO Recognize step in Appendix to stop the 2B AFW should NOT be performed and communicate this to the BOP.

NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 41 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 29 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Cross-Connecting AFW *

(Page 3 of 4)

2. 28 AFW pump to feed 2A SIG:

A. ENSURE MV-09-9 , PUMP 2A DISCH TO 2A SIG VALVE, is CLOSED. (RTG8-202)

B. START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 28.

C. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV.

(RTG8-202 - Key 84)

NOTE Key-switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are located in 2A/28 AFW Pump Room . Two keys are required since the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 while in MODES 1, 2, 3 will make two independent AFW flow paths inoperable.

D. Locally OPEN MV-09-13 , 2A TO 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE.

(TRSL/211N-T51W-TA) (Key 301)

E. Locally OPEN MV-09-14, 28 TO 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE.

(TRSL/211S-T6/W-TA) (Key 301)

CAUTION The 28 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm .

F. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A SIG.

(RTG8-202)

G. IF feeding the 28 SIG , THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10 , PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE , to maintain proper flow.

42 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISI ON NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 30 of 35 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Cross-Connecting AFW (Page 4 of 4)

2. (continued)

H. To terminate flow to the 2A SIG from the 2B AFW pump , PERFORM the following :

(1) CLOSE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE.

(2) Locally CLOSE MV-09-14 , 2B TO 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE.

(3) Locally CLOSE MV-09-13, 2A TO 2B AFW HOR CROSS-TIE .

I. IF feeding of the 2B S/G is no longer required , THEN:

(1) CLOSE MV-09-10 , PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE.

(2) CLOSE SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B S/G VLV. (Key 84)

(3) STOP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B .

43 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 18 of 36 PROCED URE NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 2A S/G.

NOTE Control switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 Cross-Tie valves are located in the 2A 128 AFW PP Room . The control switches are key operated (#301) .

Two keys are necessary as the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE , and MV-09-14 , 28 to 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE , while in Modes 1, 2, or 3 can only be performed by declaring one AFW train inoperable . (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 1)

1. ENSURE PUMP 28 is running.

2. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV. (KEY 84)

3. ENSURE the RCS is in MODEs 4 , 5, or 6.

Current plant MODE _ __

4. PLACE MV-09-13 , 2A to 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE , key switch

(#301) to OPEN .

5. VERIFY valve is OPEN by local control box indication .

6. PLACE MV-09-14 , 28 to 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE , key switch

(#301) to OPEN .

7. VERIFY the valve is OPEN by local control box indication .

NOTE MV-09-10 should be closed unless feeding of both SIGs is desired .

CAUTION To avoid water hammer, when reinitiating flow to a steam generator that has lost all feedwater, the initial flow rate should be limited to less than or equal to 150 gpm for five minutes or until a level rise is observed .

8. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A SIG .

44 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 19 of 36 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 2A SIG. (continued)

CAUTION The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm .

9. IF flow is desired to the 28 SIG while filling the 2A SIG, THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 28 SIG.

10. IF desired , THEN STOP flow to the 2A SIG from the 28 AFW PUMP by performing the following :

A. CLOSE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE .

B. CLOSE MV-09-14, 28 to 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE , by taking local key switch to CLOSE and removing key.

IV C. CLOSE MV-09-13 , 2A to 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE , by taking local key switch to CLOSE and removing key .

IV

11. IF desired, THEN STOP flow to the 28 SIG from the 28 AFW PUMP by CLOSING MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE .

12. CLOSE SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV.

13. IF steam generator feed is NO longer desired , THEN STOP PUMP 28 .

Performed By: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Print/Sign Initials Date Verified By: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Print/Sign Initials Date 45 of 50 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# 2 Event# 6 Page 16 of 17 NRC Event Description : Enter 2-EOP-05, MV-09-11 (2C AFW pump to 2A SG) fails closed .

Time I Position ~ Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None BOP When MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves are opened, throttle open MV-09-9 to feed the 2B SG.

CRITICAL TASK #1 When directed, isolate the 28 SG IAW 2-EOP-99 Append ix R BOP Refer to attached pages 47-49.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: If not mentioned by SRO, recognize the step in Appendix to place 2B AFW switch to STOP should NOT be performed due to that is the only AFW pump available to supply AFW flow through the cross-tie alignment.

When 2B SG has blown dry, direct stabilization of RCS SRO temperature within the limits of Figure 1A using the 2A SG ADV' s. The US will:

CRITICAL 1. Direct the RCO to stabilize RCS temperature using ADVs TASK#2 at the lowest RCS Tcold.

Determine the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold.

RO Open one ADV on the 2A SG to 100% open, in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto.

CRITICAL TASK#2 Open the second ADV on the 2A SG to 100% open, in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto.

THE SUGGESTED TERMINATION POINT IS:

AFW Restored to the 2A SG

The 2B SG is isolated

RCS Temperature is controlled within the limits of Figure 1A NRC 22 Scenario 2 Rev.2 46 of 50

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TI TLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 99of171 PROCEDU RE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 4 of 6)

Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation NOTE

Local actions are located in step 19 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.

Keys 82 and 81 are required for closing MV-08-17 , 2B SIG ATMOSPHERIC ISOL , and MV-08-16 , 2B SIG ADV ISOL. Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLE/TRIP (contingency) .

CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions .

D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1 B, Main Steam Header 'B' Isolation Valve (MSIV) , is CLOSED .

D 2. !f HCV-08-1 B did not close remotely ,

Then PERFORM local closure .

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1 B, MSIV Header 'B' Bypass Valve , is CLOSED .

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch .

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required , then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered .

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-2A, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED .

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED .

(continued on next page) 47 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 100 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 5 of 6)

Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 6. lf BOTH HCV-09-2A and HCV-09-28, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 28 , are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED :

D MV-09-6 , Stm Gen 28 Reg Block Valve D LCV-9006, 28 15% Bypass D MV-09-4, 28 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps .

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-5, 28 SG Slowdown , is CLOSED .

D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-6, 28 SG Slowdown , is CLOSED .

D 9. ENSURE MV-08-198 , 28 SIG Atmos Dump Viv , is CLOSED .

D 10.CLOSE MV-08-17 , 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 82)

D 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed , Pump 28, in STOP .

D 12. ENSURE MV-09-1 0, Pump 28 Disch to SG 28 Valve,* is CLOSED.

D 13.ENSURE MV-09-12, Pump 2C to SG 28 , is CLOSED.

D 14. PLACE MV-08-12 , SG 28 Stm to AFW PP 2C , in CLOSE .

D 15. If MV-08-12 , SIG 28 Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required, Then CLOSE MV 08-3 , 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)

D 16.ENSURE MV-08-188 , 28 SIG Atmos Dump Viv , is CLOSED .

D 17.CLOSE MV-08-16 , 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 81)

(continued on next page) 48 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 101 of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DAPPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 6 of 6)

Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 18.lf a SGTR is in progress, Then NOTIFY the SM of status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes.

NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete . Local actions may be continued.

D 19. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09158 , 2C AFW Pump to 2B SIG Isolation.

D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09136 , 2B AFW Pump to 2B SIG Isolation.

D C. CLOSE SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid .

D D. lf SE-08-1 , Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then CLOSE V08883 , SE-08-1 Inlet Isolation.

D E. lf MV-08-12 , SIG 2B Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-12 using the handwheel.

D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows :

D a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

D V08622, CB #67 Drain D V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 2 END OF APPENDIX R 49 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

Raise power to 100%

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None this shift Tech Spec Action Statement:

T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action a - 2A AFW pump.

2A BAM Pump N/A with 2B BAM pump is operable 2A Charging Pump N/A with 2B and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps operable.

Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

G-44 2A AFW Pump Bkr Failure/CS Stop/SS lsol N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD Current Status:

Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service Unit 2 at 30% power MOC, Boron 1299 ppm.

The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Forced Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant.

2-GOP-201 is complete through step 4.7.16. Continue with step 4.7.17 Pressurizer is on recirc.

Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold.

Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100% at 3MWe/min Equipment Issues:

2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak.

2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal.

2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals.

Reactivity Turnover:

-7 gpm dilution to suction of the Chging pumps in progress due to Xenon building in.

See RE letter for power ascension guidance 50 of 50 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-0-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO :

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 45% power MOL. 2B Main Feedwater Pump has just been returned to service following repair of an oil leak.

Turnover: 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2C Charg ing pump is out of service for leaking plunger. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is out of service due to motor oil leak. Return the Unit to 100% power. Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today. The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service Critical Tasks:

1) Restore operation to the 2B AFW pump and associated AC MOV's prior to reaching < 15%

SG Wide Range level on the 2B SG

2) Isolate the 2A SG prior to SG overfill , as ind icated by both Narrow and Wide Range level indications going off-scale high Event No. Malt. No. Event Event Description Type*

1 R/RO Raise power to 100%

N/BOP, SRO 2 TS/SRO HCV-09-1A ("A" train MFIV) low nitrogen pressure 3 I/BOP Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-9013D, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high.

TS/SRO 4 CIRO 2B Chg pp develops an oil leak. After securing the 2B Chg pp, TS/SRO additionally, letdown controller LIC-2110 fails as - is (letdown flow for 2 Chg pps) 5 C/BOP 2B ICW pump develops a failed motor bearing TS/SRO 6 M/All A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. Following the LOOP , the 2B EDG failed to load due to a spurious differential current bus I/RO lockout on the 2B3 4.16kV bus. When the ADVs are placed in service post trip, MV-08-1 SA ("A" SG - RTGB 202) fails open.

After AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures :

MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes open momentarily and then its breaker thermals out. Exit EOP-01 & transition to EOP-06.

7 C/BOP While in 2-EOP-06, A SGTR occurs on the 2A SG, requiring a transition to 2-EOP-15. Reset the lockout and restore power to the CIRO 2B3 4.16kV bus (including 480V power to the AFW AC valves).

After power is restored , the 2B AFW pump does not auto start (following the 30 second time delay). Manual start required 8 Due to the LOOP the crew will have to diagnose the SGTR without the use of secondary rad monitors. Isolate the 2A SG

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, ©omponent, (M)ajor NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 1 of 66

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 4 The plant is at 45% with the 28 Main Feedwater pump just returned to service. Instructions to the crew are to raise power to 100%. The MFW pump has just been started per 2-NOP-09.01 step 4.6.23. Directions for the crew are to start an up power to 100%. During the up power, MFIV HCV-09-1A has low nitrogen pressure. The LCO 3.7.1.6 will be entered (72 hr action) . The SRO should evaluate the ARP (P-6) and perform actions to restore operability to the valve.

After HCV-09-1A actions are taken , a reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90130 , LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high . The crew enters 2-AOP-09.01 Feedwater Control System Abnormal OPS. The crew will need to take manual control of 2A FRV (FCV-9011) to restore level to normal in 2A SIG . Only the High Power FRV will respond in manual. The Low Power FRV may indicate open intermittently (while in auto) when the HPFRV is opened.

Ultimately, the LPFRV will close due to the failure on LT-9005 (input to the LPFRV). Refer to TS 3.3.2 for LT-90130 failure . Implement 2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation and bypass only AFAS-1 on for AFAS Channel "D". Also , due to the failure on LT-9012 (2A SG Wide Range level instrument) , Remote Shutdown Tech Spec LCO 3.3.3.5 must be entered . This is a 30 day action statement.

Continuing with the up power with FW control in manual on the 2A SG, the SNPO will call the Control Room and inform them the 28 Charging pump has a severe oil leak. The crew should stop the pump. This results in only the 2A Charging pump available. The SRO should refer to T.S .

(3.1.2.4 & 3.5.2) and apply the appropriate action statement. When the 28 Charging pump is stopped , LIC-2110 fails as - is (letdown flow for 2 Chg pps) . Manual control should be taken to match letdown with Charging flow.

After Charging and Letdown are matched , the 28 ICW pump develops a bad motor bearing (no oil in the upper motor bearing) and there will be indications of increasing amps. Align & start 2C ICW pp IAW 2-AOP-21 .038, "28 Intake Cooling Water System Header". Review TS 3.7.4 for using the 2C ICW pump in lieu of the 28 ICW pump (discharge valve alignment verified to agree with electrical alignment every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months )

A LOOP occurs resulting in a Reactor trip. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADV's are placed in service (Auto/Auto - "A" SG on RTGB 202 , "B" SG on HVAC panel) post trip , MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTGB 202) fails open due to the Main Steam process input failing high . The crew should take action to close the failed open ADV by placing the controller PIC-08-18A in manual (maintain the Auto-Manual selector switch in AUTO) and use the increase/decrease buttons to control the ADV to maintain 900 psia on the 2A SG . While in 2-EOP-01 after AFAS ; the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures : MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes open momentarily and its breaker thermals out. The crew should exit 2-EOP-01 and enter 2-EOP-06 due to inadequate feedwater to at least one SG . After entering 2-EOP-06, a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG so the crew must transition to 2-EOP-15. The crew must locally reset the differential current lockout relay (per 2-AOP-47 .01 B, "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B") to allow the recovery of the vital 4.16kV 283 bus by the 28 EOG . The 28 AFW pump does not auto start following the AFAS time delay. A manual start of the 28 AFW pump is required. This is a critical task to restore power to the 28 AFW pump and associated AC MOV's (LCs de-energize on the bus lockout).

While in 2-EOP-15, the crew will have to diagnose the SGTR without the use of secondary rad monitors due to the LOOP and Rx tripped (No N-16 gammas). RCS Pressure & Level lowering with the 2A SG level rising should be used to diagnose the event along with local area surveys by RP. The crew should begin an RCS cooldown to< 510°F and then perform Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG . This is a critical task. After Appendix R is complete, terminate the scenario.

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 2 of 66

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 4 Procedures Used

2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1

2-GOP-101 , Reactor Operating Gu idelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation

2-NOP-09.01 , Main Feedwater System Operation

2-AOP-09.01 , Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown

2-AOP-21.038, 28 Intake Cooling Water System Header

2-AOP-47.01 B, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B

2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-06, Total Loss of Feedwater

2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Technical Specifications Entered

3.7.1.6, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (Event 2)

3.3.1 , RPS Instrumentation (Event 3)

3.3.3.5 Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation (Event 3)

3.1 .2.4, Charging pumps (Event 4)

3.5.2, ECCS (Event 4)

3.7.4, Intake Cooling Water (Event 5)

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 3 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# Page 4 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

Raise power to 100%

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate IC 3 45% power. Xenon building in, 25 gpm dilution rate. MOL

Open the NRC lesson file and execute HLC 22 NRC Scenario 4 file .

Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN

Start 2B MFW pump and place in auto recirc position

Place 2A AFW pump, 2A BAM pump and 2C Charging pump to stop with ECO Info tags

Place green mylar on the annunciators G-44, M-48 and N-47

Sign off and handout 2-GOP-201 .

Control Room Indications Available:

G-44 2A AFW Pump Bkr Failure/CS Stop/SS lsol

N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol

M-48 2C Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD After Shift turnover is complete , continue with 2-GOP-201 SRO "Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 To Mode 1," step 4.8.4 Refer to attached pages 5-8 Control Rx power and ASI IAW 2-GOP- 101 "Rx Operating SRO Guidelines," step 4.1 Refer to attached pages 9-11 Raise dilution rate for power increase IAW 2-NOP-02.24 "Boron RO Concentration Control ," step 4.2 .15 Refer to attached page 12 Withdraw CEAs in Manual Sequential (MS) as directed to raise RO Rx power Ensure appropriate actions for ASI Control are taken using 0-RO NOP-100.02, "Axial Shape Index Control" Divert letdown to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS to maintain RO VCT level within normal band Raise Turbine load using 2-NOP-99.07 "Operations Hard Cards" Attachment 3, Turbine Adjustment Program DEH for BOP power increase at a rate not to exceed 3.0 MW/MIN . Refer to attached pages 13-15 Monitors dilution and T-avg and Tref and maintain as close as RO possible. (+/- 2°F) 4 of 66 NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 4 of 66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 70 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100%

1. PERFORM Nuclear I Delta T power calibration per 2-0SP-69.01 ,

Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration .

(Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 4)

2. IF NOT performed at 30% Reactor power, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. NOTIFY SCE or l&C to perform DCS Steam Generator Feedwater Discharge Coefficients Verification per 2-NOP-102 .01, Distributed Control System (DCS) -Operations.

SCE I l&C

8. ENSURE scheduled lncore surveillances have been performed . (Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 1)

c. ENSURE lncore Detection System is OPERABLE per O-OSP-64.01, Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations . (Section 7.1 .3, Management Directive 1)

RE

3. IF Condensate Polisher is in service, THEN ENSURE enough Powdex vessels are in service to support a rise in condensate flow .

4. CONTINUE power ascension.

5. START second condensate pump per 2-NOP-12 .03, Condensate System Operation.

6. WARMUP heater drain pumps per 2-NOP-11 .02 , Heater Drain and Vents System Operation .

7. VERIFY proper operation of Heater Drain and Vent system as follows:

NPO

Level controls maintaining normal level.

NO abnormal noise or vibration that may indicate water hammer or loose parts.

NO air leaks in control lines I components .

Alternate drain valves SHUT.

5 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 71 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100% (continued)

8. ENSURE the following TCW TCVs have been placed in automatic operation per 2-NOP-13.03 , Turbine Cooling Water System Normal Operation:

TCV-13-15, H2 COOLER OUTLET NPO

TCV-13-21 , H2 SEAL OIL COOLER AIR SIDE OUTLET NPO

TCV-13-22, H2 SEAL OIL COOLER H2 SIDE OUTLET NPO

9. WHEN total TCW flow is between 6,000 to 6,500 gpm, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. RECORD TCW heat exchanger total flow : (TG8/24/22/K)

FR-13-50A, FIT-13-50A + 8 TOTAL FLOW

_ _ __ gpm

FR-13-508 , FIT-13-508 +A TOTAL FLOW

_ _ _ gpm

8. START the second TCW pump per 2-NOP-13.03 , Turbine Cooling Water System Normal Operation .

10. IF Condensate Polisher System is in service, THEN ENSURE that four polisher vessels are in service or as recommended by Chemistry.

CAUTION The second main feed pump should NOT be started until second condensate pump is running and total Feedwater flow is approximately 10,000 GPM with the recirculation valve CLOSED to prevent tripping the running pump .

11. IF second Main Feed Pump is available , THEN PERFORM the following:

6 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 72 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100% (continued)

11. (continued)

A. START second Main Feed Pump per 2-NOP-09 .01, Main Feedwater System Operation .

B. WHEN total feedwater flow is between 15,000 GPM and 20,000 GPM , THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) PLACE second main feed pump control switch in AUTO RECIRC .

(2) VERIFY recirc valve CLOSES.

12. PERFORM 2-NOP-22.02 , Generator Seal Oil System Operation , to drain water and dirt from seal oil system .

NOTE The System Load Dispatch shall be notified as soon as practical, but within 30 minutes of a change in status of the Power System Stabilizer (PSS) .

(Section 7.2, Commitment 2)

13. PLACE PSS in service as follows : (RTGB-201)

A. PLACE POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER control switch in ON .

8. VERIFY red PSS light is ON.

C. RECORD time PSS placed in service in Narrative log .

(Section 7.2 , Commitment 2)

D. NOTIFY System Load Dispatch that the PSS has been placed in service . (Section 7.2, Commitment 2)

E. RECORD time System Load Dispatch is notified in Narrative log. (Section 7.2, Commitment 2)

F. NOTIFY Unit 1 that the Unit 2 PSS is in service, reactive load should be adjusted as necessary.

14. MAINTAIN reactive load within the applicable limitations of Attachment 4.

7 of 66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 73 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100% (continued)

15. Prior to reaching 50% Calorimetric power, VERIFY Secondary Chemistry meet 50% power limits of O-COP-05.04 , Chemistry Department Surveillances and Parameters.

CHEM CAUTION Power ascension should be stopped ifmain feed pump suction pressure drops to less than 330 psig or if MFRV demand is greater than 90% to prevent loss of feedwater due to low suction pressure.

16. MAINTAIN the following with only one Main Feed Pump running :

Main Feed Pump suction pressure greater than 400 psig .

Maximum FRV demand of 90% open .

17. VERIFY Moderator Temperature Coefficient is within limits as specified in T.S . 3.1 .1.4.

Date I Time: I RE

18. IF at any time while performing Section 4.8, Step 19 thru Section 4.8 , Step 28 , either of the following conditions exist:

PCV-08-815 , GLAND STM TO HP SEAL BYPASS TO CNDSR, is fully OPEN .

Pressure upstream of PCV-08-815 exceeds 18 psia THEN PERFORM the following: (RTGB-201)

A. THROTTLE MV-08-814 , SPILLOVER BYPASS VALVE , until upstream pressure is between 16-18 psia .

B. THROTTLE MV-08-814, SPILLOVER BYPASS VALVE , as required for the rest of the power increase to maintain upstream pressure between 16-18 psia .

8 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 8 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with the following guidelines:

All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied .

The performance of the out of sequence steps do NOT change an operational MODE.

SM/US has given authorization .

4.1 Power Level Escalations

1. MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref during main generator loading as follows :

CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

Boron concentration changes per 2-NOP-02.24 , Boron Concentration Control.

NOTE

Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines contains guidance for power escalation rates.

Reactor Engineering may provide clarification for power escalation rates from Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines.

2. IF greater than or equal to 50% power OR 30% power during shape annealing factor test, THEN RAISE power as follows :

A. USE boration or dilution per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control for .ill! planned reactivity additions .

CAUTION Adjusting CEAs for ASI impacts Reactivity B. USE CEAs for ASI control per O-NOP-100 .02, Axial Shape Index Control.

3. IF available, THEN ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating per 2-NOP-02 .02 , Charging and Letdown .

9 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 9 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 1, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load Main Generator per 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

10 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

31 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)

NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26, DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW

14. ADJUST FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2, Step 4. DODD

IF FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN, THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 XN Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow . DODD

15. IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DODD

16. MAINTAIN PIA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE ~30 psig by opening and closing V2513, (VCT) VENT VALVE . DODD

17. IF diverting to maintain VCT level, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in the WMS position . DODD B. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates OPEN . DODD

c. When normal level on LIC-2226, (VCT) LEVEL, is reached ,

THEN PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO . DODD D. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates CLOSED . DODD

18. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added, THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP. DODD

19. IF V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened, THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED . DODD

20. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE , was opened, THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED . DODD

21. ENSURE FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM. DODD

22. MONITOR for any abnormal change in T avg * (RTGB-203) DODD 11 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL , is open .

B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

c. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.

12 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 10 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-201. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.

Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Monitoring appropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor, and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant response and system performance ensures proper control of the plant. The SM/US shall be notified of any abnormal indications .

Reactor Power

MW (Load)

CEA POSITION

DCS Power

RCS Temp

Pzr Level

ASI

1. ENSURE Ovation display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.

3. ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)

TARGET SELECT

RATE SELECT

4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group : (display 5551)

TARGET

RATE

5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group . (display 5551) 13 of 66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 24 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on Ovation main operation window , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL. (display 5551)

7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

(display 5551)

B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended , THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows :

(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group .

(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up : (display 7079)

a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group .

b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group .

c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T ")

from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure .

8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:

Reactivity rate

Turbine load rate 14 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

c. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group .

15 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 5 of 24 NRC Event Description : HCV-09-1A ("A" train MFIV) low nitrogen pressure Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 2: MFIV (HCV-09-1A)

Low Nitrogen Pressure.

Report back as NPO that local nitrogen pressure at HCV-09-1A is 4500 psig and fairly stable. Air Reservoir pressure is normal at 87 psi stable.

Report back as NPO that HCV-09-1A Hydraulic Air Pump is not operating to pump up the Nitrogen accumulator.

30 minutes after the request for Maintenance, report that a portable air pump is being used to restore MFIV accumulator pressure. Trigger "Fix Low Nitrogen" to clear Annunciator P-6 Control Room Indications Available:

Annunciator P-6, "MFIV HCV-09-1A Accum Press Low/DC Failure" Evaluates ARP P-6 and assesses operability of the valve .

SRO Refer to attached page 17 TS LCO 3.7.1.6 .a should be entered:

Restore the valve to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . IF not returned to operable status , THEN the MFIV shall TS SRO be closed or isolated.

Otherwise , be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Contact the NPO to investigate both A ir and Nitrogen pressure BOP at HCV 1A.

Notify MM to trouble shoot the low Nitrogen pressure condition SRO on HCV-09-1A as well as Ops Mgmt and the SM of T.S action required.

SRO Conduct a crew brief on current plant status If the Variable High Power Reset lights come on during the up SRO power, direct the RO to reset them.

Reset the Variable High Power Reset lights as necessary if RO they illuminate during the up power 16 of 66 NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 16 of 66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 9 CONTROL ROOM PANEL P RTGB-206 PROCEDURE NO.: WINDOW:

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 P-6 2-ARP-01 -POO (Page 1of1)

CAUSES : Any of the following :

Blown fuse MFIV

Loss of control power HCV-09-1A

One of the three pressure switches is in alarm

Pressure switch failure ACCUM PRESS LOW

/DC FAILURE P-6 DEVICE: SETPOINT: LOCATION:

74/655 De-energized HCV-09-1A Relay box PS-09-1A1 4750 psig TRSU36/N-T2M/-TA PS-09-1A2 75 psig TRSU36/N-T2M/-TA PS-09-1A3 75 psig TRSU36/N-T2M/-TA ALARM CONFIRMATION

1. HCV-09-1A, FEEDWATER HOR A ISOLATION VALVE, NO position indication .

2. Loss of Control power indicated at Local Control Panel by NO lights ON .

3 . Local Control Panel indicates one of the following alarms:

Accumulator Pressure NOTE Local air regulator gage is NOT calibrated , use the calibrated (0-300 psi) gage to verify air reservoir pressure.

Air Reservoir Pressure

Air Supply Pressure OPERA TOR ACTIONS NOTE

MF IVs shall be declared inoperable if accumulator pressure falls below 4600 psig or air reservoir pressure is less than 70 psig .

MFIV hydraulic actuator will NOT operate if the Air Reservoir Pressure is less than 70 psig , due to the spring tension in the 4 way shuttle valves. In this condition the valve is required to be declared inoperable.

1. ENSURE 125V DC SA Fuses F61 , F62 are checked for continuity. (RTGB-206)

2. Locally PERFORM the following:

A. ENSURE 2-60119, 125 voe FUSED POWER SUPPLY, is CLOSED. (125V DC BUS 2A)

B. At the Local Control Panel CHECK for any of the following alarms:

Accumulator pressure

Air reservoir pressure

Air supply pressure C. ENSURE V18556 , INSTR AIR TO HCV-09-1A ISOL, is OPEN . (TRSL/44/S-T1/W-TA)

3. NOTIFY l&C Department to troubleshoot and repair any pressure switch problems.

REFERENCES : 1. CWD 2998-8-327 Sheets 655, 646

2. Schematic 2998-B-326, Sh 655

3. AR 00547905, Minimum Hydraulic Pressure for MFIV Operability.

4. EC 278113 , U2 MFIV Air Reservoir Pressure Gauges 17 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 6 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90130, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger event 3: Reference Leg Failure Control Room Indications Available:

2A SG feedwater controller output lowering

2A SG level lowering on LT-9011

Annunciator G-1, "2A SG Level Hi/Lo"

DCS Display will show LT-9012,LT-90130 and LT-9005 rising Recognizes High Power FRV FCV-9011 (2A SG) going closed SRO/RO/

and subsequently diagnoses cause to be an instrument failure BOP (reference leg failure) .

SRO Enters 2-AOP-09.01 Feedwater Control System Abnormal OPS If no action is being taken , direct the BOP to take manual control (open) of FCV-9011 (2A S/G) and restoring normal S/G SRO level , 2-AOP-09.01 step 4.1.1.1 (contingency). Refer to attached page 19 Take manual control of feed flow and stabilize SIG levels to BOP 60% to 70% NR.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: only the HPFRV will respond in manual. The LPFRV may indicate open intermittently (while in auto) when the HPFRV is opened. Ultimately, the LPFRV will close due to the failure on LT-9005 {input to the LPFRV).

RO Secures the dilution BOP Places the Turbine on hold Place affected HIGH PWR M/A STA in "M" (manual) and open BOP it due to the input to the HPFRV failing high BOP Maintain S/G level in normal band .

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 18 of 66

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6 of 64 PROCED URE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

1. VERIFY S/G levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable. malfunctioning ,

THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE S/G levels to 60% to 70% NR.

CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high S/G level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent SIG overfill.

2. VERIFY S/G levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.

than 50% NR.

2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open ,

THEN CLOSE it.

2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions 19 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 3 Page 7 of 24 NRC Event Description : Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90130, LT-9005 , and LT-9012 to fail high Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Enter 2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation:

bypass ONLY AFAS-1 for AFAS Channel D SRO

Also place SG HI LEVEL OVERRIDE keyswitch to bypass (Step 4.2.11.2 and 3). Refer to attached page 21 and 22 Refer to TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 action 20a for LT-90130 failure.

ACTION 20 - With the number of channels Operable one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

£!.:. The inoperable channel is placed in either the TS SRO bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If an inoperable SG level channel cannot be restored to Operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 as applicable in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next Cold Shutdown.

Refer to attached page 23 Examiner's Note: the above actions cause annunciators G-33 and G-34 to alarm .

This is a normal response At the AFAS Cabinet, bypass AFAS-1 ONLY on the "D" AFAS BOP Channel and place the SG Hi Level Override key switch for the "D" Channel in bypass (behind RTGB 202)

T.S action 3.3.3.5.a (30 day action) Remote Shutdown System TS SRO Table 3.3-9 (item 7) also applies to LT-9012.

Notify l&C of the instrumentation failure SRO Notify Ops Mgmt and the SM of T.S action required .

SRO Conduct a crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 20 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 28 of 91 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.11 SIG Level Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument and channel :

LIC-9013 A I B I C I D

LIC-9023 A I B I C I D NOTE

Bypassing AFAS will require Key 202 and one of the following keys; 203 ,

204, 205 , or 206 .

If it is necessary to TRIP the RPS and ESFAS bistable trip units (BTUs) ,

then it is preferable to leave the AFAS BTUs in BYPASS .

(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)

An AFAS channel in the TRIPPED condition is limited to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months per Tech Spec 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3. (Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)

D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed:

LO LVL SG (RPS)

(Key 104)

For LIC-9013 only AFAS-1

For LIC-9023 only AFAS-2 A. BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitch and pushbuttons .

8. TRIP affected BTUs per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.

21 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 29 of 91 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.11 S/G Level Channel Failure (continued)

D 3. PLACE SIG HI LEVEL OVERRIDE keyswitch for affected channel in BYPASS : (rear of RTGB-202)

Channel A (Key 15)

Channel B (Key 16)

Channel C (Key 17)

Channel D (Key 18) 22 of 66

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 20 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels , operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If an inoperable SG level channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 as applicable in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition .

If an inoperable SG DP or FW Header DP channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

b With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

c. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16b Amendment No . ~ . 149 23 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page 8 of 24 NRC Event Description : 28 Charging pump oil leak. Letdown Level Controller LIC 2110 Fails As Is when the 28 Charging pump is secured Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 4: 28 Chg pp trips and Letdown Fails As-ls.

When the 28 Charging Pump is secured, LIC-2110, Letdown Level Controller Fails As-ls

When SNPO called, report back the 28 Charging pump has a severe oil leak.

Control Room Indications Available:

Annunciator M-31 28 Charging Pump Trouble .

M-23 28 Charging Pump Suet Press low I OVRLD I Trip Examiners note: Shortly after the Charging pump oil alarm the pump will trip.

RO/BOP Acknowledge alarm and notify SNPO to investigate

Communicate loss of 2B Charging pump after it trips

Recognize letdown level control LIC-2110 BIAS is NOT RO auto adjusting letdown flow to one Charging pump operation - -40 gpm (letdown flow is still at the rate for 2 Chan::iinQ pumps - -84 Qpm)

Implement 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown , step 4.2.6.1 including contingency action 4.2.6.1.A. Refer to attached page SRO 25.

Recognize no specific guidance in 2-AOP-02.03 for loss of Charging pump.

T.S . 3.1.2.4 must be entered :

With only One charging pump Operable, restore at least Two charging pumps to Operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a TS SRO SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to its COLR limit at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ;

Restore at least two charging pumps to Operable status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 24 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 CHARGING AND LETDOWN 14 of 44 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.6 Letdown Level Control Malfunction D 1. IF letdown level control is malfunctioning, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE LIC-2110, LETDOWN LIC-2110, LETDOWN LEVEL in MANUAL, by performing LEVEL, is responding as the following :

expected to current plant conditions . 1. PLACE LIC-2110 in MANUAL.

2. ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions .

3. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves .

NOTE

Hard Manual operation is available to control Letdown Flow if either processor input is lost and AC power is available.

Operation in Hard Manual will only operate LCV-211 OP .

The GREEN light is LIT when Balanced in Section 4.2 .6, Step 1.B

8. VERIFY LIC-2110 , 8.1 IF Hard Manual operation is LETDOWN LEVEL, is desired due to loss of processor operating normally. input(s) , THEN PERFORM :

A. RAISE LIC-2110, LETDOWN LEVEL, Controller Face.

25 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page 9 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

28 Charging pump oil leak. Letdown Level Controller LIC 2110 Fails As Is when the 28 Charging pump is secured Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior T.S . 3.5.2 must be entered:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable for reasons other TS SRO than condition a.1 (LPSI pump inoperable), restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

IAW 2-AOP-02.03, "Charging and Letdown" (Steps 4.2.6.1 .A.1 and A.1 .2), place LIC-2110 in manual:

Place LIC-2110, LETDOWN LEVEL in MANUAL, by performing the following:

RO

1. Place LIC-2110 in MANUAL.

2. Adjust letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

Contact SNPO to walk down system observing for leaks or RO lifting relief valves. (Step 4.2.6.1.A.1 .3)

Notify MM about the Charging pump condition SRO Notify l&C about the problem with LIC-2110 SRO Notify Ops Mgmt and the SM of T.S action required .

SRO Conduct a crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 26 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 5 Page 10 of 24 NRC Event Description : 28 ICW pump develops a failed motor bearing Time II Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 5: 2B ICW Bearing Failure

When directed to perform the ANPO actions to re-align the 2C ICW pump to the B ICW Header (requires manipulating Valves SB21165 and SB 21211)

AND to throttle the 2C ICW discharge valve (SB 21206) 10 turns OPEN, Trigger: Align C ICW to B Header and Prepare to Start

Report back as the ANPO that SB21165 is Locked Closed and SB 21211 is Locked Open AND the 2C ICW pump discharge valve is 10 turns open

When asked to open the 2C ICW pp discharge valve fully, trigger:

Unthrottle Disc valve Control Room Indications Available: Increasing Amps on the 2B ICW pump.

Annunciator:

E-7 2B ICW PUMP OVRLD/TRIP

E-30 ICW HEADERS PRESS LOW,

E-17 HYPO LOCAL ALARM

Recognize rising amps on the 2B ICW pump.

Stop 2B ICW pump and place control switch in Pull to BOP Lock position, OR if pump already tripped , place switch in pull to lock position.

Dispatch the ANPO to investigate 2B ICW pump status Implement 2-AOP-21 .03B: 2B Intake Cooling Water System Header" section 4.2.1.

SRO Perform applicable section per Table 1.This directs using section 4.2.2 due to the tripped condition of the 2B ICW pump.

Refer to attached pages 28-30 IF 2B ICW pump TRIPPED, Then perform the following :

A. IF health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, then attempt one restart only.

SRO B. IF 2B ICW pump was NOT restarted , Then perform Attachment 1 Section 2.0, STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION Steps 1through12.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The plant conditions do not allow one re-start since the health and safety of the public is not in jeopardy NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 27 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDU RE TITLE: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 6 of 46 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21 .038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operations Actions 4.2.1 General Actions D 1. PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.

Table 1 Abnormal or Entry Condition Section AM-833 , PUMP 28 AMPERE (RTG8-202) Section 4.2.2 Observed Indication AM 834 , PUMP 2C AMPERE (RTG8-202) Section 4.2.3 NOT as expected TR-25-18 , TEMPERATURES , CHNL 11 , CCW HEAT Section 4.2.7 EXCHANGER 28 OUTLET (HVCB)

E-7 , 28 ICW PUMP OVRLD/TRIP Section 4.2.2 E-8 , 2C ICW PUMP OVRLD/TRIP Section 4.2.3 E-30, ICW HEADERS PRESS LOW Section 4.2.4 Directed By ARP E-32, ICW TO TCW HX STRNRS N P HIGH Section 4.2.5 S-5, 28 CCW HX ICW FLOW LOW Section 4.2.6 S-13, 2A/2B CCW HX TEMP HIGH Section 4.2.7 D 2. VERIFY Exit Conditions satisfied . 2.1 GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 1.

28 of 66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 7 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21 .038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 28 ICW Pump Ovrld/Trip D 1. VERIFY 28 ICW pump amps normal.

1.1 IF 28 ICW pump indicates abnormally high amps, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE 28 ICW pump control switch to PULL TO LOCK position.

B. PERFORM Attachment 1 Section 2.0.

1.2 IF 28 ICW pump TRIPPED, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, THEN ATTEMPT one restart only.

(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)

B. IF 28 ICW pump was NOT restarted, THEN PERFORM Attachment 1 Section 2.0.

29 of 66

REVISION NO.: PR OC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 2B INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 8 of 46 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21 .038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 28 ICW Pump Ovrld/Trip (continued)

D 2. IF an ICW pump can NOT be restored to 28 ICW header, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF all of the following A.1 IMPLEMENT Low Mode AOP for conditions exist: current plant conditions .

Unit 2 is in MODE 3 thru 6

SIAS blocked THEN VERIFY at 15 minute intervals that SFSC criteria are met per Low Mode AOP for the current plant conditions .

B. GO TO Attachment 2, Contingency Action With 28 ICW Header Depress u rized .

D 3. GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 2.

30 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 5 Page 11 of 24 NRC Event Description : 28 ICW pump develops a failed motor bearing Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior TS 3.7.4 must be reviewed for applicability:

A 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action statement is entered after the 2B ICW pump trips or is shut off and when the 2C ICW pump aligned to the B ICW Header and started.

With the 2A and 2C ICW pumps in service, the LCO is satisfied. However, the Tech Spec requires that when TS SRO ICW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves must be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Perform the actions of Attachment 1 Section 2.0, STARTING BOP 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION Steps 1 through

12. Refer to attached pages 32-34 SRO Notify Mech Maint and Elect Maint about the 2B ICW pump SRO Notify Ops Mgmt and the SM of T .S action required .

SRO Conduct a crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 31 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 28 of 46 PROCEDU RE NO.:

2-AOP-2 1.038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 2B ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 3 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION

1. ENSURE 2B ICW Pump Control Switch in PULL TO LOCK position .

2. ENSURE 2C ICW Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position .

3. ENSURE 2C ICW Pump aligned to 2B ICW header.

A. LOCK CLOSED SB21165 , 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH TO 'A' TRAIN ISOL.

(INTK/9/N-4/W-C)

B. LOCK OPEN SB21211, 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH TO 'B' TRAIN ISOL.

(I NTK/9/N-4/W-C)

4. THROTTLE 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL, approximately 10 turns OPEN , SB21206 .

(INTK/18/N-3/W-C)

5. BYPASS CVCS Ion Exchangers by placing V2520 , ION EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE, to BYPASS .

(RTGB-205)

6. MONITOR Generator Average Cold Gas temperature .

IF Ave rage Cold Gas Temperature rises to 47.?°C, THEN REDUCE MVARS to minimum , but NOT less than (unity) 0 MVARS.

(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 2)

IF Average Cold Gas Temperature rises to 50.7°C, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-22.01 , Rap id Downpower to REDUCE power as necessary to stabilize main generator cold gas temperature .

7. IF 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump is NOT running, THEN ENSURE AB 4.16kv bus ALIGNED to B side.

A. ENSURE 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position .

B. OPEN Bkr 2-20505, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB - 2A3 . (RTGB-201)

C. OPEN Bkr 2-20208 , 4.16KV BUS TIE 2A3 - 2AB . (RTGB-201)

D. CLOSE Bkr 2-20409, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2B3 - 2AB . (RTGB-201)

E. CLOSE Bkr 2-20504, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB - 2B3. (RTGB-201) 32 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 29 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21.038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 28 ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 4 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION (continued)

8. WHEN 2C ICW Pump alignment is complete , THEN START 2C ICW Pump.

9. IF 2C ICW pump start was NOT successful, THEN GO TO Attachment 2, Contingency Action With 2B ICW Header Depressurized.

10. As pressure begins to rise in 2B ICW Header as indicated by Pl-21-SC, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH PRESS (INTK/26/N-3/E-B), SLOWLY OPEN , SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL, until valve is fully OPEN .

11. LOCK OPEN , SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL.

12. IF 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump OR 2C ICW Pump are operating and supplying the applicable header, THEN ENSURE Tech Spec requirements of Section 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 are satisfied.

NOTE The following step will require a ladder at CCW platform for access to HX vent valves and a pipe wrench to remove vent caps.

13. VENT 2B Essential ICW Header until a steady stream of water issues for 1 minute by opening and closing each of the following valves individually:

A. SH21337, SS-21-1 B VENT (CCW/28/N-E/W-4)

B. SH212050 , SS-21-1 B BACKWASH OUTLET VENT (CCW/31/N-E/W-4)

C. SH21244, 2B CCW HX TUBE SIDE INLET HEAD VENT (CCW/32/S-D/W-4)

D. SH21245 , 2B CCW HX ICW OUTLET VENT (CCW/38/N-E/W-2)

14. VENT 2B Non-Essential ICW Header until a steady stream of water issues for 1 minute by opening and closing each of the following valves individually:

A. SH21363, SS-21-4B VENT (TGB/26/S-21/W-G)

B. SH21218 , 2B TCW HX TUBE SIDE OUTLET HEAD VENT (TGB/26/N-22/E-K)

C. SH21219, 2B TCW HX TUBE SIDE INLET HEAD VENT (TGB/26/N-22/W-D) 33 of 66

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 30 of 46 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21 .038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 28 ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 5 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION (continued)

15. ENSURE SH40077 , 2C ICW HYPO HOR ACID RETURN ISOL, OPEN (INTK/17/N-3/E-C) .

16. ENSURE SH40078 , 28 ICW HYPO HOR ACID RETURN ISOL, CLOSED (INTK/18/S-3/E-C) .

17. WHEN letdown temperature is stable , THEN PLACE V2520 , ION EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE , in RESET.

34 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 12 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. The 28 EDG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-1BA (2A SG on RTG8 202) fails open . While in 2-EOP-01 , after AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures : MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 momentarily opens and then its breaker thermals out. Enter 2-EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time I Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger Event 6, The Trip

Trigger Event 9: MV-08-18A 2A SG ADV Fails Open after ADV's are opened

If called as the SNPO at the 4.16KV SWGR 283, report that the 4.16KV SGWR 283 lockout relay handle is pointing to the 10 O'clock position and the Lockout relay blue light on 4.16KV SGWR 283 is FLASHING.

After AFAS actuation (or AFW manual start), if called as the NPO to manually open MV-09-12, 2C AFW pump to 28 SG report back MV-09-12 won't move. Suspect that it's mechanically bound.

If asked to manually open MV-09-11, 2C AFW pump to 2A SG, report that its handwheel is turning very easily with no valve position change. Suspect a stem to disc separation.

Control Room Indications Available:

Annunciator A-14, 4.16KV SWGR 283 ll Current Trip (Red Annunciator) 283 4.16KV SWGR VM-964, VOLTAGE and AM-937, AMPERES indicate zero

After ADV MV-08-18A is placed in auto/auto post trip, valve position indicating light indicates red light on, green light off. PIC-08-1*A indicates process pressure of scale high and 100% output.

After AFAS actuates, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures:

MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 shows dual momentarily and then its breaker thermals out.

After recognizing that a LOOP has occurred , direct implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as SRO follows:

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control , Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal , Containment Conditions.

Direct placing an ADV on each SG in service (auto/auto) to SRO control SG pressure at 900 psia.

Assess Reactivity Control and Announce "Reactor is Tripped" RO Place an ADV on each SG in auto/auto (2A SG on RTGB 202, 28 SG on HVAC panel)

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 35 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 13 of 24 NRC Event Description : A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A (2A SG on RTG8 202) fails open . While in 2-EOP-01 , after AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 momentarily opens and then its breaker thermals out. Enter 2-EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time ~ Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER'S NOTE: When the ADV's are placed in service post trip, MV-08-1 SA (2A SG on RTGB 202) fails open due to the Main Steam process input to Controller PIC-08-18A failing high.

Due to the 2A AFW pump being out of service and no power to the 28 AFW pump, ONLY the 2C AFW pump is available During 2-EOP-01 implementation , take action to close the failed open ADV by placing controller PIC-08-18A in manual RO (maintain the Auto-Manual selector switch in AUTO) and use the increase/decrease buttons on PIC-08-18A to control the ADV MV-08-18A to maintain 900 psia.

Assess Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries (MVA) and Announce BOP "Turbine is Tripped"

Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of 2-EOP-99.

BOP

Notify SNPO to VERIFY SFP inventory and temperature are normal on all available indications.

Call the STA to report to the control room Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Reactivity Control :

RO

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Maint of Vital Auxiliaries :

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and BOP Exciter Breaker)

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 36 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 14 of 24 NRC Event Description : A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A (2A SG on RTG8 202) fails open . While in 2-EOP-01 , after AFAS , the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fa ils closed and MV-09-12 momentarily opens and then its breaker thermals out. Enter 2-EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time II Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize that the 28 EOG is running but its output breaker is open BOP Recognize the 283 4.16KV bus is de-energized due to an apparent differential current lockout EXAMINER'S NOTE: The differential current lockout was spurious and can be reset after entering EOP- using 2-AOP-47.018 "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B" Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Inventory Control:

RO

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%

Recognize that the 28 Charging pump is not running due to the loss of power

Recognize that Letdown is isolated due to valve(s) closing on loss of power to instrumentation that auto RO close them

The 2A Charging pump may be secured and returned to the auto position due to Pzr level being at 50% and rising due to loss of letdown.

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Pressure Control:

RO

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia

Verify RCS subcoolinQ is >20°F Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Core Heat Removal :

RO

Verify at least one RCP running with CCW (N/A LOOP)

Verify loop delta T is <10°F NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 37 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 15 of 24 NRG Event

Description:

A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A (2A SG on RTG8 202) fails open . Wh ile in 2-EOP-01 , after AFAS , the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fa ils closed and MV-09-12 momentarily opens and then its breaker thermals out. Enter 2-EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time ! Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0 SG level is between 20 and 83% NR 0 Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR BOP

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F

SIG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed (N/A LOOP)

MSR warmup valves are closed

If maintaining vacuum desired , ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED (N/A LOOP)

If not yet recognized , report to the crew that MV-08-18A is 100% open (RCS temperature and SG pressure would be BOP trending out of the parameter ranges listed above) .

Recommend or take actions to manually close the valve as previously discussed under RO actions.

Recognize after AFAS actuates, that MV-09-11 did not open BOP and MV-09-12 position indicating lights are de-energized (2C AFW flow control valves).

Report that RCS Heat Removal Safety Function is not being BOP met at this time due to no Main or Auxiliary Feedwater being supplied to either SG.

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 38 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 16 of 24 NRC Event Description : A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-1 8A (2A SG on RTG8 202) fails open . While in 2-EOP-01 , after AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 momentarily opens and then its breaker thermals out. Enter 2-EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: n/a Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig BOP

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determine that 2-EOP-06, TLOF should be implemented.

SRO Notify Ops Mgmt and the SM of plant status.

SRO Conduct a transition brief to 2-EOP-06 NRG 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 39 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 7&8 Page 17 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

After 2-EOP-06 is entered , a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG. Re-diagnose event and enter 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If called as the SNPO at the 4.1 GKV SWGR 2B3, report that the 4.1 GKV SGWR 2B3 lockout relay handle is pointing to the 1O O'clock position and the Lockout relay blue light on 4.16KV SGWR 2B3 is FLASHING.

Also report that no apparent abnormal conditions present that would cause the lockout to actuate.

Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger: NPO Air- Appendix H NOTIFY Unit 2 Control Room as the NPO that 2A Instrument Air Compressor is running after the compressor has been reset from the control room.

Control Room Indications Available:

2B3 4.1 GKV Bus is de-energized Both SG Narrow Range levels are trending down SRO Direct SFSC's for 2-EOP-06 performed every 15 minutes.

Contact the Shift Mgr and inform him of plant conditions and SRO to review the EPIPs for event classification BOP Direct HP to perform secondary surveys Direct RCS depressurized to 1800 to 1850 psia using auxiliary BOP sprays.

Call NPO to perform Appendix H to restore Instrument air (2A BOP Instrument Air Compressor only)

When notified by the NPO, RESET the 2A Instrument Air BOP Compressor on the plant auxiliaries panel.

Direct CCW to RC P's remains isolated by placing CCW valves BOP to/from RCP's to close.

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 40 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 7&8 Page 18 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

After 2-EOP-06 is entered , a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG . Re-diagnose event and enter 2-EOP-15 , Functional Recovery Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Conserve SG Inventory by directing the SG Slowdown isolation SRO valves and sample valves be closed.

STA Perform SFSC's for 2-EOP-06 performed every 15 minutes.

Restore Auxiliary Feedwater components. Refer to 2-AOP-SRO 09.02, "Auxiliary Feedwater" and assess the most likely AFW alignment to restore AFW to at least ONE SG Continue efforts to restore AFW to at least ONE SG using 2-BOP AOP-09.02, "Auxiliary Feedwater recognizing that getting power back to the 283 4.16kV bus is essential.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Early in 2-EOP-06 implementation, the 2A SGTR will occur. At that time, the crew should re-diagnose the event and transition to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" IF SIAS occurs, the Instrument Air Compressor will need to be reset from the control room to restore instrument air.

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 41 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 7&8 Page 19 of 24 NRC Event Description : After 2-EOP-06 is entered , a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG. Re-d iagnose event and enter 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: After the STA has performed the first set of Safety Functions for 2-EOP-06 OR when directed, Trigger Event 8: A SGTR -500 gpm If called as RP or when directed, report indications of higher than normal backround radiation on the 2A Main Steam Header.

If called as Electrical Maintenance, report that the journeymen are walking down the 2B3 4.16kV bus to inspect for indications of damage.

Control Room Indications Available:

RCS Pressure & Level lowering with the 2A SG level rising

Containment Conditions (temperature, pressure, sump level and radiation) are STABLE Enter 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" after re-diagnosing using Diagnostic Flow chart. Start at step 1 and perform all SRO steps that have not been previously done (while in 2-EOP-06) through step 11 .

Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) for SRO 2-EOP-15 Directs RO to trip all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes. (N/A due SRO to LOOP)

Direct Appendix A 2-EOP-99 Sample SG's OR RP to perform SRO secondary area surveys (if not performed previously)

Direct that the condenser be protected by closing the MSIV's SRO and isolating Steam Generator Slowdown SRO Direct that 2-EOP-99 Appendix X Section 2 be performed Per 2-EOP-15 step 4.10 and 11 , PERFORM ALL of the following IN THE ORDER LISTED.

SRO A . Implement the success path MOST LIKELY to be met for safety functions that are NOT met by ANY success path.

Refer to attached pages 43-44 NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 42 of66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 10 of 211 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 8. Restore Instrument Air 1f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors .

0 9. Perform Safety Function Status Checks PERFORM the Safety Function Status Checks every 15 minutes.

REFER TO Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet.

0 10. Identify Success Paths IDENTIFY the success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function .

REFER TO Attachment 3, Functional Recovery Success Paths.

43 of66

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:

11 of 211 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 11. Perform Success Path Instructions PERFORM ALL of the following IN THE ORDER LISTED.

A. Instructions for a success path MOST LIKELY to be met for safety functions that are NOT met by ANY success path .

B. Instructions for success paths for safety functions that are NOT met by Success Path 1.

C. Instructions for ALL other success paths for safety functions met by Success Path 1.

0 12. Perform Long Term Actions When ALL Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied, Then PERFORM Long Term Actions .

REFER TO Section 4.9, Long Term Actions .

END OF INITIAL ACTIONS 44 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 7&8 Page 20 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

After 2-EOP-06 is entered , a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG . Re-diagnose event and enter 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery Time I Position i Applicant's Actions or Behavior Identify Success paths in service per Attachment 3 as:

RC-1 MVA-DC-1 MVA-AC-1 SRO IC-2 PC-1 HR-2 (not met until power restored to the 283 4.16kV bus)

Cl-1 (not met until 2A SG Isolated)

CTPC-1 Refer to attached page 46 Implements success path for HR-2 first, due to Safety Function not being met in the order listed on Chart 3.

SRO Start at 4.6.33, Replenish SG Inventory, per 2-AOP-09.02 "Auxiliary Feedwater" Refer to attached page 47.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: HR 2 should be entered at step 1 and then the applicable steps to isolate the 2A SG and then AFW restoration to ONE SG must be identified and performed. Proceed to the next page for guidance to restore the 283 4.16kV bus. After power is restored, Cl-1 is still not met. It will be met when the 2A SG is isolated per Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 (this guidance is also in HR-2) 2-NOP-97.01 "Operations Hard Card" is the more appropriate guidance to use to restore AFW flow since the normal "B" train flowpath is available. 2-NOP-09.02, "AFW Operation" may also be used.

Perform SFSC 's for 2-EOP-15 performed every 15 minutes.

STA

Confer with US to determine most affected safety functions per Chart 3 Close the MSIV's and Steam Generator Slowdown isolation BOP valves BOP Perform 2-EOP-99 Appendix X Section 2 BOP Contact RP to perform secondary area surveys Continue efforts to restore AFW to at least ONE SG using 2-BOP AOP-09.02, "Auxiliary Feedwater" recognizing that getting power back to the 283 4.16kV bus is essential.

NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 45 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 211 of 211 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY SUCCESS PATHS (Page 1 of 1)

Checkoffs Safety Functions Success Paths 1 2 3 4 5 6 Reactivity Control RC-1 , CEA Insertion RC-2, Boration via CVCS RC-3, Boration via SIAS Maint of Vital Aux - DC MVA-DC-1, Batteries/Chargers Maint of Vital Aux - AC MVA-AC-1 , Startup Transformers MVA-AC-2, EDGs MVA-AC-3, Unit Crosstie RCS Inventory Control 1c-1 . eves IC-2, Safety Injection RCS Pressure Control PC-1, Subcooled Control PC-2, PORVs/Pzr Vent PC-3 , Saturated Control RCS & Core Heat HR-1 , SIG Without SIAS HR-2 , SIG With SIAS HR-3 , Once Through Cooling Containment lsol Cl -1, Automatic/Manual lsol Cntmt Press & Temp CTPC-1 , Normal Cntmt Fans CTPC-2 , Cntmt Fan Coolers CTPC-3, Cntmt Spray END OF ATT AC HM ENT 3 46 of66

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 115 of 211 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL- Success Path 2 - SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

33. A. (continued)

2. lf ANY of the following 2.1 lf Control Room operation of the conditions exist, 2C AFW Pump is unsuccessful, Then take local control.

Mechanical or electrical REFER TO Appendix G, Local overspeed of the 2C Operation of the '2C' Auxiliary AFW Pump has occurred Feedwater Pump .

Steam binding of an AFW Pump is suspected

Crosstying of Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Headers is desired Then RESTORE Auxiliary Feedwater components.

REFER TO 2-AOP-09 .02 ,

Auxiliary Feedwater.

B. lf Offsite power is available, Then attempt to restore Main Feedwater to at least ONE S/G as follows:

1. ENSURE SIAS and MSIS are RESET.

REFER TO Appendix P, Restoration of Components Actuated by ESFAS .

2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING .

(continued on next page) 47 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 7&8 Page 21 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

Restore Power to the 283 4.16kV bus then cooldown to < 510°F and perform Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: AFTER 2-EOP-15 has been entered, OR when directed report as Elect Maintenance that one attempt to reset the lockout should be attempted.

Booth Operator Instructions: AFTER 2-EOP-15 has been entered, OR when directed, Trigger: Reset Bus Lockout After the lockout relay is reset, report as the SNPO that no unexpected conditions were encountered at the 4.16KV SGWR 2B3 bus SRO Direct that the Differential Current Lockout is reset per 2-AOP-47.01 B, "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B" to CRITICAL al low recovery of the vital 4.16kV 2B3 bus by the 2B EOG.

TASK #1 Per step 4.2.2.6. Refer to attached pages 49 BOP Direct the SNPO to reset the Differential Current Lockout CRITICAL Relay for the 4.16KV SGWR 2B3 bus. Ensure that the 2B2 TASK #1 and 2B5 480VAC busses are re-energized.

Verify that the subsequent steps of 2-AOP-47.01 B, "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B" are addressed so the 2B2 and BOP 2B5 480 VAC busses are energized. This restores power the B side AFW valves. Refer to attached pages 50-51 RO Recognize that the 2B AFW pump does not auto start following the AFAS time delay. A manual start of the 2B AFW pump is CRITICAL required.

TASK #1 Prior to starting the 2B AFW pump, ensure that MV-09-9 is closed to establish AFW flow at 150 gpm for 5 minutes in RO accordance with 2-NOP-97.01 "Operations Hard Card". Refer to attached pages 52-56 After 5 minutes at 150 gpm, raise AFW flow rate in order to RO restore the 2A SG level to 60-70% Narrow Range.

48 of66 NRC 22 Sceanario 4 Rev.2

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TI TLE: PAGE :

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 12 of 70 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47 .01 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

NOTE

If 2B EOG is running, resetting the~ Current Relay will result in immediate diesel output breaker closure and loading of the diesel onto the bus .

~Current Relay is located on CCW Pump 2B breaker cubicle (2-20404) at 4160V SWGR 2B3.

D 6. VERIFY annunciator A-14, 4.16KV SWGR 2B3 Li CURRENT 6.1 IF NO damage is apparent, THEN RESET the lockout.

TRIP is CLEAR.

6.2 IF lockout failed to reset after first attempt, THEN CONTACT Electrical Maintenance 6.3 IF unable to reset lockout, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 17.

D 7. VERIFY EOG 2B is at rated frequency and voltage.

7.1 PERFORM manual start of EOG 2B per Attachment 4, Diesel Generator 2B Local Start.

7.2 IF EOG 2B fails to start, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 12.

D 8. VERIFY DG 4.16 KV BREAKER (2-20401) *is CLOSED .

8.1 INSERT sync plug and PLACE in DG-2B .

8.2 CLOSE DG 4.16 KV BREAKER (2-20401 ), one attempt only.

49 of66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 14 of 70 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.01 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

8. (continued) 8.6 IF unable to close EOG Output Breaker, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 12.

D 9. VERIFY loading per Attachment 5, Unit 2 EOG 2B Automatic Loading 9.1 START load(s) per applicable normal operating procedure(s) .

Sequence (Significant Loads Only) , as expected.

D 10. VERIFY the following are ENERGIZED:

A. The following swing buses: A.1 REFER TO 2-AOP-47 .01AB , Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus - AB

4160 SWGR 2AB Swing Buses .

480V LC 2AB

480V MCC 2AB

8. 480V LC 2B2 . 8.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.3.

c. 480V LC 2B5 . C.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.4 .

D. 480V MCC 2B5 . D.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.5.

50 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE :

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 15 of 70 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.01 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 41 GOV SWGR 283 (continued)

10. (continued)

E. 480V MCC 286 . E.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.6 .

F. 480V MCC 287. F.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.7.

G. 480V MCC 288 . G.1 REFER TO Section 4.2 .8.

H. 480V MCC 28-9. H.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.9.

D 11. IF 4160V SWGR 283 is energized ,

THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 29 .

NOTE ti Current Relay is located on 2-20310, Feed to 480V LC 281 , breaker cubicle at 4160V SWGR 282 .

D 12. VERIFY annunciator A-13 ,

4.16KV SWGR 282 ~ CURRENT 12.1 IF NO damage is apparent, THEN RESET the lockout.

TRIP is CLEAR .

12.2 IF lockout relay failed to reset after first attempt, THEN CONTACT Electrical Maintenance.

12.3 IF unable to reset lockout, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 17.

51 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 16 of 24 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS NOTE

An Operator Aid has been placed at RTG8-202 . Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard.

1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred NOTE

The discharge valves may be taken off the open seat to expedite acknowledgement of their alarms.

Feeding with the electric pump is preferred over the steam driven pump .

A trip from 100% power (Post EPU) will require -500 gpm total AFW flow .

1. FEED each Steam Generator at the desired flow rate by throttling the following valves OPEN or CLOSED:

2A Steam Generator

MV-09-9 , PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE

MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A 28 Steam Generator

MV-09-12 , PUMP 2C TO SG 28

MV-09-10 , PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE 52 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 17 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 2 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. WHEN AFAS has reached the reset level , THEN RESET either AFAS 1 (2A SG) OR AFAS 2 (28 SG) at the AFAS Cabinets A through Das follows (Key 202) :

NOTE When AFAS is reset in each cabinet the following will occur:

Actuation light will illuminate

1-3 AND 2-4 AFAS Lockout Relay Status lights will extinguish A. PRESS either AFAS-1 ACT RESET OR AFAS-2 ACT RESET pushbutton .

B. FEED the Steam Generator(s) using the desired flow path :

(1) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-2 , 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-9 , PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE (2) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A (3) FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 28 AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-3 , 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 84) 53 of 66

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 18 of 24 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 3 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. 8. (3) (continued)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-10 , PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE (4) FEED the 2B Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-5 , 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV (KEY 86)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 2B CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns.

1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured

1. PERFORM any of the following steps as necessary to restore Steam Generator levels .

A. FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 2A (2) OPEN SE-09-2 , 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 2A SIG B. FEED the 2B Steam Generator using the 2B AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 2B 54 of66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 19 of 24 PROCED URE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 4 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

1. B. (continued)

(2) OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 84)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 28 SIG NOTE The following valves should be opened simultaneously to prevent overspeed tripping of the 2C AFW Pump :

MV-08-12 , SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

MV-08-13 , SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C If a Steam Generator Tube Rupture is in progress, the steam supply from the ruptured Steam Generator should NOT be opened .

CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns.

2. FEED the 2A AND 28 Steam Generators using the 2C AFW PUMP.

A. START 2C AFW PUMP by performing both of the following simultaneously:

OPEN MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

OPEN MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C B. OPEN the solenoid valve(s) in the header(s) to feed the appropriate SIG(s) :

SE-09-4 , 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85) 55 of 66

REVISION NO.: PR OCEDURE TI TLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 20 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 5 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

2. 8. (continued)

SE-09-5 , 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV (KEY 86)

C. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN desired flow in the header(s) to feed the appropriate S/G(s) :

THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A

THROTTLE MV-09-12 , PUMP 2C TO SG 28 56 of 66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 22 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

Restore Power to the 283 4.16kV bus then cooldown to< 510°F and perform Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed to perform the field actions for isolating the 2A SG per 2-EOP-99, Appendix R, Trigger Event 8: Isolate 2A SG App R

Report back as the NPO in 5 minutes that steps19. A, Band C have been performed SRO Direct RCS cooldown, to < 510°F Thot using an ADV fully opened on each SG per 2-EOP-15, HR-2 step 4.6.15. Refer to attached pages 58-61 Perform a cooldown , using ADV's, to< 510°F Thot, then RO throttle ADV's to maintain cooldown rate < 100 °F in any one hour.

Give direction to perform an RCS depressurization as follows:

A. MAINTAIN RCS pressure within ALL the following criteria (listed in order of priority) :

Within the limits of Figure 1A, SRO

Less than 930 psia

Above the minimum pressure for RCP operation

Approximately equal to the most affected SIG pressure (within 50 psia)

B. OPERATE Auxiliary Pressurizer spray.

Using Aux Spray, depressurize the RCS maintaining Fig 1A RO and < 930 psia. Ultimately depressurize the RCS to within 50 psi of the 28 SG.

SRO When < 510°F Thot, direct 2-EOP-99, Appendix R be performed to isolate the 2A SG. Refer to attached page 62-CRITICAL 64 TASK#2 NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 57 of 66 HLC 22 Scenario 4

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 104 of 211 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL- Success Path 2 - SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION 1f there is a conflict between isolating a SIG with indications of SIG tube leakage or isolating a SIG with an unisolable steam leak, Then the SIG with the ESD should be isolated . At least ONE SIG must remain available for heat removal.

0 15. Determine If SGTR Present If a SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following:

SIG sample activities

Main Steam Line radiation monitoring trending prior to the trip

SIG level change when NOT feeding

SGBD radiation monitoring

ONE SIG level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same

Feed flow mismatch between SI Gs

Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a SIG prior to the trip Then DETERMINE the MOST affected SIG .

D 16. If No SGTR, GO TO Step 29

!! there are NO SGTR indications, Then GO TO Step 29.

58 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 105 of 211 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL- Success Path 2 - SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Operation of the 2C AFW Pump should be avoided to minimize direct releases to the environment. If motor driven AFW pumps are NOT available, steam from the least affected SIG should be used .

0 17. RCS Cool down to less than 510°F 17.1 COOLDOWN the RCS using AD Vs .

COOLDOWN the RCS to T HOT less than 510°F using SBCS . 17.2 COOLDOWN using 2C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths on the unisolated SIG.

REFER TO Table 12, Alternate SIG Heat Removal Paths.

59 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 106 of 211 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL- Success Path 2 - SIG With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE RCP operation is desirable while depressurizing the RCS during a SGTR event.

RCP operation takes precedence over equalizing primary and secondary pressures .

Monitor RCPs for cavitation as the NPSH curve is approached and exceeded .

Maintain minimum subcooling within the limits of Figure 1A or 1B.

0 18. Depressurize the RCS 18.1 !f RCS pressure can NOT be LOWERED and MAINTAINED PERFORM a controlled RCS within the specified criteria ,

depressurization as follows :

Then OPERATE the PORVs or RCGVS to reduce pressure.

A. MAINTAIN RCS pressure within ALL the following criteria (listed REFER TO Pressure Control Success Path PC-2 .

in order of priority):

Within the limits of Figure 1A or 1B, RCS Pressure Temperature

Less than 930 psia

Above the minimum pressure for RCP operation

Approximately equal to the most affected SIG pressure (within 50 psia)

B. OPERATE Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer spray.

C. !f HPSI throttle criteria are met, Then THROTTLE SI flow .

REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration .

60 of 66

REVI SION NO .: PROC EDURE TITLE : PAGE:

42 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 107of211 PR OCEDU RE NO.:

2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL - Success Path 2 - S/G With SIAS HR-2 (continued) (continued)

INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 19. Isolate the MOST Affected S/G When RCS hot leg temperature is less thari 510°F, Then ISOLATE the MOST affected SIG .

REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation .

0 20. Maintain ISOLATED S/G below 915 psig (930 psia)

MAINTAIN the ISOLATED SIG pressure less than 915 psig (930 psia) by ANY of the following :

Manual operation of the MSIV Bypass valve . (If condenser vacuum exists)

Manual operation of the associated ADV

Local operation of the associated ADV 0 21. Verify Correct S/G was Isolated 21.1 lf the wrong SIG was isolated ,

Then RESTORE feeding and VERIFY the MOST affected SIG is steaming capability to the isolated isolated by observing ALL of the SIG .

following:

21 .2 When RCS heat removal has been

SIG sample activities re-established on the least affected SIG ,

SGBD monitor radiation levels Then ISOLATE the most affected SIG. REFER TO Appendix R,

SJAE exhaust monitor radiation Steam Generator Isolation .

level

SIG levels 61 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 96 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation NOTE

Local actions are located in step 19 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions .

Keys 79 and 80 are required for closing MV-08-14, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-18A ISOL, and MV-08-15 , 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-19A ISOL. '

Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLE/TRIP (contingency) .

CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions .

D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV) , is CLOSED.

D 2. lf HCV-08-1A did not close remotely ,

Then PERFORM local closure .

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure .

D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve , is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch .

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is requ ired , then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered .

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED.

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED .

62 of 66

REVI SION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 97of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 6. lf BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED :

D MV-09-5 , Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3 , 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3 , 2A SG Slowdown , is CLOSED.

D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Slowdown , is CLOSED.

D 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED .

D 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 79)

D 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed , Pump 2A, in STOP .

D 12.ENSURE MV-09-9 , Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve , is CLOSED .

D 13. ENSURE MV-09-11 , Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

D 14. PLACE MV-08-13 , SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C , in CLOSE .

D 15.lf MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required , Then CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)

D 16.ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED .

D 17. CLOSE MV-08-15 , 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 80) 63 of 66

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 98 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 18.lf a SGTR is in progress , Then NOTIFY the SM of status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes .

NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete. Local actions may be continued .

D 19. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152 , 2C AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation .

D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120 , 2A AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.

D C. CLOSE SE-08-2 , Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid .

D D. lf SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then CLOSE V08884 , SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation .

D E. lf MV-08-13 , SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows :

D a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves :

D V08622, CB #67 Drain D V08618 , Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619 , Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 1 64 of66

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 7&8 Page 23 of 24 NRC Event

Description:

Restore Power to the 283 4.16kV bus then cooldown to < 510°F and perform Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG.

Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Isolate the 2A SG using Appendix R. Refer to attached page 62-64 CRITICAL TASK#2 Contact the NPO to perform field actions for isolating the 2A BOP SG per Appendix R. Refer to attached page 64 SRO Conduct a crew brief on current plant status Suggested termination point:

AFW flow has been restored to the 28 SG

The 2A SG is isolated NRC 22 Scenario 4 Rev.2 65 of 66 HLC 22 Scenario 4

. OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None Tech Spec Action Statement:

2A AFW pump T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action a.

2A BAM Pump N/A with 2B BAM pump available 2C Charging Pump N/A with 2A and 2B Charging pumps available.

Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Failure/CS Stop/SS lsol N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-48 2C Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Current Status:

Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service Unit 2 at 45% power MOC, Boron 857 ppm 2B Main Feedwater Pump has just been returned to service and started following repair of an oil leak.

Chemistry reports there are no chemistry holds 2-GOP-201 is complete through step 4.8.3.

Raise power to 100% at 3 MWe/min Equipment Problems:

2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak.

2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal.

2C Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals.

Reactivity Turnover:

-25 gpm dilution due to Xenon building in See RE letter for power ascension guidance 66 of 66

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO :

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 10-12 % power, MOC. 2A Charging pump is out of service for repack. 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal Turnover: 10-12% power with the main generator on line. 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump is out of service for leaking plunger. MFW and SBCS are in service. Raise power to 30%. Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today. The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service.

Critical Tasks:

1) Secure all RCPs prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals and within 11 minutes of a loss of CCW

2) Start 2B HPSI pump within 15 minutes of report that the RCS Pressure & Inventory Control Safety Functions are not met (no SI flow) .

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R/RO The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid . Raise power to 30% .

N/BOP, SRO 2 TS/SRO CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 (B Channel) fails high . Bypass ESFAS bistable 3 CIRO, CEA# 59 Slipped >15 inches (Recoverable) . (Group 5)

TS/SRO 4 CIRO 2A1 RCP Seal Hx CCW outlet (HCV-14-11A1) fails closed due to TE-31A1 failing high . Requires manually overriding signal and opening the valve.

5 C/BOP Loss of 2A 1 480V Load center.

6 C/BOP 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Drifts low. Manual control of Low Power Feedwater valve (FCV 9005) is required.

7 M/All CEA #56 and #59 slip >15 inches. RCO should trip the unit. On the trip, a Pressurizer Safety will open fully and then close back to a leak after pressure drops below 1000 psia (LOCA). Loss of 480V MCC 2A6 also occurs on the Rx trip.

8 CIRO 2B HPSI pump fails to auto start on SIAS. A manual start is required .

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5 The Unit is at 10-12% power. MFW and SBCS are in service. The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid . Directions for the crew are to raise power to approximately 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 .

Shortly after turnover, CIS RM-26-4-2 fails high. The crew must diagnose the problem and bypass the trip signal in accordance with 2-AOP-99-01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation. The SRO will refer to T.S. for the appropriate action statement.

This next event should be put in after PCV-8801 is fully closed and Tave/T/Ref are within 1°F of each other. With the up power in progress and while moving CEA's, CEA #59 slips >15 inches. 2-AOP-66.01 ,

Dropped or Misaligned CEA Operations and Realignment should be entered . The crew is required to re-align the CEA to within 7 inches of other CEA's within that group. The SRO should refer to T.S . 3.1.3.1.d for the appropriate actions.

While CEA#59 is being recovered , RCP 2A1 seal heat exchanger valve HCV-14-11A1 fails closed due to a failed temperature signal. With HCV-14-11A1 closed , seal temperatures will increase and possible seal failure will occur if prompt actions (within 10 minutes) are not taken to override. Procedural directions allow the valve to be taken to open I reset then back to AUTO if no valid indications of high CCW temperature or CCW activity exist. The valve will stay open in the AUTO position for one minute then close again (the failed temperature signal is still present) . Procedure direction also allows the valve to re-opened and left in the open I reset position which maintains the valve open. This direction is based on US discretion. No manual rx trip I rep trip is warranted.

Once HCV-14-11A1 is opened , a loss of the 2A 1 480V load center (Bkr 20110) will occur when the breaker opens. This results in numerous alarms. The running DEH pump will stop (lost power) and the backup DEH pump will not auto start. The BOP should manually start the 2B DEH pumP., the 2B Gland exhaust fan and the 2B primary water pump. The 2A 1 LC breaker breaker can be closed when the crew requests the SNPO to investigate. The report back will be the breaker was opened by mistake in preparation to hang a clearance.

After Rx power is above 15% (to ensure both the Rx and Turbine would need to be tripped if the crew couldn 't control SG levels) but less than 20%, the 2A SG WR Level instrument, LIC-9012 , drifts low causing the BOP to take manual control of LCV 9005. The Main Feedwater AOP should be entered .

After manual control of SG levels is established, CEA #56 and #59 slip >15 inches. The RO will trip the reactor. Upon the reactor trip, safety valve V1201 will fail open . Also, feeder breaker to MCC 2A6 will trip resulting in the loss of various plant equipment, including ECCS injection valves HCV-3637 & HCV-3627 and the 2B Boric Acid Makeup pump.

The plant will depressurize due to the failed Pressurizer Code Safety valve (LOCA) that opens and drops back to a leak at -1000 psia. When SIAS actuates the 2B HPSI fails to start. Due the loss of MCC 2A6 ,

two HPSI "A" side injection valves are without power and closed . HCV-3647 (also "A" train) fails to open and can 't be opened from the RTGB. This results in inadequate ECCS flow from the "A" ECCS train so starting the 2B HPSI pump is required in order to meet safety functions . This is a critical task.

The scenario can be terminated when the operators have stabilized the plant and have "B" train of Safety Injection fully actuated .

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 2 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5 Procedures Used

2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

2-GOP-101 , Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control

2-NOP-09.01 , Main Feedwater System Operation

2-AOP-09 .01 , Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Equipment

2-AOP-66 .01 , Dropped or Misaligned CEA Operations and Realignment

2-AOP-47.02A, Loss of Non Safety Related AC Bus - Train A

2-AOP-01 .09A 1, 2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident Technical Specifications Entered

T.S. 3.3.2 ESFAS Table 3.3-3 , (Event 2)

T.S. 3.1.3.1.d, CEA Position (Event 3)

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 3 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 1 Page 4 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate IC 86, 13% power, then Open the NRC lesson file and execute HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5 file. Verify Main Generator is synched to the grid.

Place Green OLRM status placard and Protected Train B sign on RTGB 203

Ensure 2B and 2C Charging pumps are running and 2A Charging Pump is in STOP

Charging pump selector switch in the 2B/2C position.

Hand out signed off copy of 2-GOP-201 and R.E. Power Ascension Guidance letter (load rate, up to 18% I hour or 3 MW/Min). Also 2-GOP-101 Ensure Control Board ECO Tags and Green mylar are placed on:

2A BAM Pump RTGB switch (Place CS in Stop)

2A Charging Pump RTGB switch (Place CS in Stop)

N-47: 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop I SS lsol

M-46: 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Indications Available:

Numerous alarms due to power level and status of the secondary.

2-GOP-201 has been completed up to step 4.7.9. (Generator is approximately 100 MW) Continue with up power. Refer to SRO attached pages 5-6 Control Rx power and ASI IAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 4.1 Refer to attached pages 7-9 When Reactor Power is between 18% and 20%, Then direct the following :

A. Ensure the Turbine Drain valves are closed .

B. Transfer Station Electrical Loads from the Start Up to Auxiliary Transformers per 2-GOP-502 , Attachment 24.

C. Place running Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO BOP RECIRC .

D. Verify the associated Disch Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

E. Ensure appropriate actions for ASI control are taken using O-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control.

F. IF Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150DF, Then close TCV-22-61A & B BYPASS valves Withdraw CEAs in 'Manual Sequential ' as directed to raise Rx RO power.

Raise dilution rate for power increase IAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 4.2.15 Refer to attached page 10 NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 4 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 66 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

NOTE Tech Spec 3.3.1 .1 may be referenced for Reactor Protective Instrumentation requirements .

7. IF HI RATE (SUR) trip bistable was removed from service due to Linear Range Safety Channel being out of service AND both of the following conditions are met:

Reactor power is greater than 15%,

HI RATE trip bistable is NOT in TRIP or BYPASS for any other reason THEN RETURN HI RATE trip bistable to NORMAL.

8. IF HI RATE trip bistable was placed in TRIP by removing trip module AND trip module has been reinserted, THEN NOTIFY l&C to perform a functional test per 2-SMl-64.05A(B/C/D) , Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Calibration Channel A(B/C/D) .

9. WHEN Reactor power is between 18% and 20% , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE the following Turbine drain valves are CLOSED :

(RTGB-201)

FCV-24-100, 2A MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-107, 2C MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-101 , 2B MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-108, 2D MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-104, HP TURBINE OUTER CASING

FCV-24-103, HP TURBINE INLET LEFT UPPER

FCV-24-105, HP TURBINE INLET RIGHT UPPER

FCV-24-102, HP TURBINE INLET LEFT LOWER

FCV-24-106 , HP TURBINE INLET RIGHT LOWER

8. PERFORM the Transfer Station Electrical Loads From Startup to Auxiliary Transformers of 2-GOP-502 , Data Sheets Required for Heatup .

5 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 67 of 113 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

9. (continued)

C. PLACE running Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO RECIRC. (RTGB-202)

D. VERIFY the associated Disch Recirc Valve is CLOSED .

E. ENSURE appropriate actions for ASI control are taken using O-NOP-100 .02, Axial Shape Index Control.

F. IF Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150°F, THEN PERFORM the following:(display 5559)

CLOSE V12396 , 2A LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61A BYPASS. (TGB/47/N-26/E-D)

CLOSE V12403, 2B LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61 B BYPASS . (TGB/45/N-28/W-D)

10. IF Reactor power is greater than 20% AND group 5 is inserted greater than 34 inches, THEN LOG length of time Group 5 was inserted greater than 34 inches:

Time :

11. Prior to exceeding 30% Calorimetric power, VERIFY Secondary Chemistry meets 30% power administrative limits of COP-05.04, Chemistry Department Surveillances and Parameters .

CHEM NOTE Based on JPN Engineering Evaluation, the RE Supervisor, may recommend to Operations that any or all of the 30% Reactor power level surveillances be performed at 45% following power ascension that was NOT a result of a refueling outage.

12. IF required , prior to Reactor power reaching 30% , as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN PERFORM the following :

(Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 3)

A. STOP power ascension.

8. PERFORM 2-0SP-69.01 , Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration . (Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 4) 6 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE T ITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 8 of 20 PROCED URE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with the following guidelines :

All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied .

The performance of the out of sequence steps do NOT change an operational MODE.

SM/US has given authorization .

4.1 Power Level Escalations

1. MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref during main generator loading as follows :

CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

Boron concentration changes per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

NOTE

Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines contains guidance for power escalation rates.

Reactor Engineering may provide clarification for power escalation rates from Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines.

2. IF greater than or equal to 50% power OR 30% power during shape annealing factor test, THEN RAISE power as follows :

A. USE boration or dilution per 2-NOP-02.24 , Boron Concentration Control for ill! planned reactivity additions.

CAUTION Adjusting CEAs for ASI impacts Reactivity B. USE CEAs for ASI control per O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control.

3. IF available , THEN ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating per 2-NOP-02 .02 , Charging and Letdown .

7 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 9 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 1, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines .

5. CONTINUE to load Main Generator per 2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

8 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISI ON NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 20 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines (Page 4 of 4)

NOTE Components of fully conditioned fuel :

Fuel is conditioned to equal to or greater than 90% power.

The core is NOT experiencing a difference greater than plus or minus 0.5 RPS ASI units from the cycle predicted ASI.

3.0 FULLY CONDITIONED FUEL

1. IF performing a mid cycle shutdown or power reduction AND a return to full power occurs within 27 days, THEN RAISE power at a maximum power escalation rate of 30% I hour.

9 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

31 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)

NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26 , DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW

14. ADJUST FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4 .2, Step 4. DODD

IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN, THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 X/Y Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow . DODD

15. IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DODD

16. MAINTAIN PIA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE ~30 psig by opening and closing V2513, (VCT) VENT VALVE . DODD

17. IF diverting to maintain VCT level, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in the WMS position . DODD

8. ENSURE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates OPEN. DODD

c. When normal level on LIC-2226 , (VCT) LEVEL, is reached ,

THEN PLACE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in AUTO . DODD D. ENSURE V2Q00 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates CLOSED. DODD

18. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added ,

THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP . DODD

19. IF V2512 , REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened ,

THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED . DODD

20. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE, was opened , THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED. DODD

21. ENSURE FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM . DODD

22. MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tavg . (RTGB-203) DODD 10 of 60 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 1 Page 5 of 21 NRC Event Description : Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time i Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER'S NOTE: Power should be raised initially by CEA's. Group 5 CEA's should be withdrawn to at least 102" prior to 20% power to meet L TSSIL Booth Operator Instructions:

Report back that V12396 and V12403 are closed when directed to perform step 4.7.9.F.

Ensure appropriate actions for ASI Control are taken using 0-RO NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control Raise Turbine load using 2-NOP-99.07 Attachment 3, Turbine BOP Adjustment Program DEH for power increase at a rate not to exceed 3.0 MW/MIN Refer to attached page 12-14 Perform step 4.7.9.B Transfer Station Electrical Loads from the Start Up to Auxiliary BOP Transformers per 2-GOP-502 , Attachment 24. Refer to attached pages 15-16 Place the running Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO RO RECIRC . (RTGB-202)

RO Verify the associated Disch Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

IF Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150°F, (display 5559) Direct the NPO to :

BOP

CLOSE V12396 , 2A LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61A BYPASS . (TGB/47/N-26/E-D)

CLOSE V12403 , 2B LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61 B BYPASS . (TGB/45/N-28/W-D)

IF Reactor power is greater than 20% AND group 5 is inserted greater than 34 inches, Then log length of time Group 5 was SRO inserted greater than 34 inches: THIS STEP IS N/A. See Examiner's Note on this page.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Proceed to Event 2 after the up power has been started and a power change has been observed. The next step in the procedure (step 4.7.11) is the 30% calorimetric power hold to verify secondary chemistry is within administrative limits.

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 11 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OP ERATIONS HARD CARDS 10 of 24 PROCEDU RE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-201 . Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and , if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard .

Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity . Monitoring appropriate critical parameters to recognize , monitor, and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant response and system performance ensures proper control of the plant. The SM/US shall be notified of any abnormal indications.

Reactor Power

MW (Load)

CEA POSITION

DCS Power

RCS Temp

Pzr Level

ASI

1. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

2. TOUCH MOD IFY from RAMP INTERFACE group .

3. ADJUST values , as directed by SM/US , for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)

TARGET SELECT

RATE SELECT

4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)

TARGET

RATE

5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group . (display 5551) 12 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on Ovation main operation window , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL. (display 5551)

7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

(display 5551)

B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended , THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows :

(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group .

(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)

a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group .

b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.

c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")

from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure .

8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following :

Reactivity rate

Turbine load rate 13 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TI TLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open.

B. TOUCH HOL D from RAMP INTERFACE group.

c. TOUCH CANC EL from RAMP INTERFACE group .

14 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

81 DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP 144 of 149 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 24 Transferring Station Electrical Loads from Startup to Auxiliary Transformers (Page 1 of 2)

Date __!__!__

NOTE Attachment 24, Step 1 through Attachment 24, Step 9 should be performed one bus at a time .

1. INSERT synchroscope plug into the receptacle for the bus to be transferred .

2. ROTATE the synchroscope switch to the AT position per Table 8.

Table 8 BUS to be Synchroscope Breaker to Breaker to Transferred Switch Position CLOSE OPEN 6.9 KV AT-2A1 2-30101 2-30102 BUS 2A1 4.16 KV AT-2A2 2-20101 2-20102 BUS 2A2 6.9 KV AT-2B1 2-30201 2-30202 BUS 2B1 4.16 KV AT-2B2 2-20301 2-20302 BUS 2B2

3. VERIFY SYN-888 , SYNCHROSCOPE, is stationary at the 12 o'clock position.

4. VERIFY the following are matched:

VM-8881 , INCOMING VOLT

VM-888R, RUNNING VOLT

5. TURN and HOLD AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER feeder breaker switch per Table 8, to the ~LOSE position .

6. VERIFY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER feeder breaker is CLOSED.

15 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

81 DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP 145of149 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 24 Transferring Station Electrical Loads from Startu~ to Auxiliary Transformers (Page 2 of 2)

7. Simultaneously PERFORM the following:

Slowly RELEASE the AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER feeder breaker switch.

VERIFY associated STARTUP TRANSFORMER feeder breaker, OPENS automatically per Table 8.

8. ROTATE associated STARTUP TRANSFORMER breaker control switch, per Table 8, to TRIP (green flag).

9. REMOVE the synchroscope plug .

10. REPEAT Attachment 24, Step 1 through Attachment 24, Step 9 for the remaining buses listed on Table 8.

16 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 2 Page 6 of 21 NRC Event Description : CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 fails high Time I Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 2: CIS Rad Mon RIS 4-2 Fails High Control Room Indications:

Channel B Containment Radition instrument failed high

Annunciators:

P CNTMT Rad High CIS Channel Trip

P CNTMT Rad High CIS Channel Pre Trip

Q Engineered Safeguards ATI Fault

Containment evacuation alarm Direct actions IAW 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation section 4.2.15 to bypass ESFAS channel MB CNTMT RAD CIS bistable trip unit.

Refer to TS 3.3.2 Action b. (Table 3.3-3) Action 13 and 14.

TS SRO With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN May enter 2-AOP-26.02 , "Area Radiation Monitors" (including SRO Appendix A) , to verify validity of the alarm.

RO/BOP Plant announces disregard invalid alarm Contacts Shift Manager to report failure of RM RIS-26-4-2, and SRO entry into 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation .

Contact l&C for assistance.

RO Recognize Channel B ESFAS CIS rad monitor failed high Verify PC-11 channel indications and that only one channel is in alarm .

BOP Verify ESFAS MB channel for RS-26-4-2 is tripped BOP Make plant announcement to disregard Cont. Evac alarm When directed Bypass ESFAS channel MB instrument RIS 4-2 (Key 130) Refer to attached page 18 SRO Conduct crew brief on plant status.

Notify Ops management of plant status NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 17 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 33 of 91 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.15 Containment Radiation Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument:

RIS-26-3-2 ,

CONTAINMENT RADIATION (MA)

RIS-26-4-2 ,

CONTAINMENT RADIATION (MB)

RIS-26-5-2 ,

CONTAINMENT RADIATION (MC)

RIS-26-6-2 ,

CONTAINMENT RADIATION (MD)

NOTE Bypassing ESFAS BTUs will require Key 114 for ESFAS cabinet door.

D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed :

CNTMT RAD CIS (Key 130)

A. BYPASS affected BTU using keyswitch .

8. TRIP affected BTU per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.

18 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 7 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Slipped CEA #59 >15 inches Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 3: CEA #59 Slips >15 inches Booth Operator Response: When l/C called to determine cause of abnormal condition wait five minutes and call back, 'a loose card was reseated' and CEA problem should be corrected.

If RE called, report no limitations on recovering CEA If upper management called, report CEA retrieval should be attempted.

Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator K-11 CEA Motion Inhibit, K-30 deviation, ADS display.

SRO/RO Recognize CEA# 59 slipped >from -106 to 87" (not dropped)

SRO Direct RO to secure dilution if initiated.

Recognize T.S . 3.1.3.1 Action d, realign within 7" of other SRO T.S . CEA's within COLR fig . 3.1-1a, 63 minutes (Refer to attached pages 20-21)

Direct Immediate Operator actions IAW 2-AOP-66.01 , 'Dropped or Misaligned CEA Abnormal Operations':

Direct RO to place CEDMCS control panel in off.

SRO

Verify all CEA motion has stopped

Verify No dropped CEA's:

0 Rod bottom lights 0 ADS Display CRT 0 DCS screen Implement 2-AOP-66.01 , "Dropped or Misaligned CEA SRO Abnormal Operations", subsequent operator actions step 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 Direct step 4.2.6.2, Direct Attachment 4, Major Misalignment SRO step 1 and 2 Direct step 3 of Attachment 4, Perform Attachment 6, CEA SRO functional test and operability determination Direct Attachment 4 to re-align CEA to within 7" of other CEA's SRO Within group.

SRO Notify l&C and Reactor Engineering NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 19 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES CEA POSITION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 The CEA Block Circuit and all full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7.0 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1 .1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With the CEA Block Circuit inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months either:

1. With one CEA position indicator per group inoperable take action per Specification 3.1.3.2 , or

2. With the group overlap and/or sequencing interlocks inoperable maintain CEA groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 fully withdrawn and the CEAs in group 5 to less than 15%

insertion and place and maintain the CEA drive system in either the "Manual" or "Off' position , or

3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY.

c. With more than one full-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches (indicated position) , be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With one full-length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that the misaligned CEA is positioned within 15 inches of the other CEAs in its group in accordance with the time constraints shown in COLR Figure 3.1-1 a.

See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2, 3.10.4 and 3.10.5.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. g , 92 20 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

EC-DCP No. 280247 , Rev. 2 Attachment 13 , Page 8of18 1.60 1.58 I- ...

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~ 1.48 1.46 1.44 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 Time at Full Power to Realign CEA, Minutes FIGURE 3.1-1 a Allowable Time to Realign CEA vs . Initial F/

St. Lucie Unit 2 Cycle 21 COLR Rev. 1 Page 8of18 21 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 8 of 21 NRC Event Description : Slipped CEA #59 >15 inches Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Secure dilution when directed Perform immediate Operator actions:

Place CEDMCS control panel in off.

Verify all CEA motion has stopped RO

Verify No dropped CEA's:

0 Rod bottom lights 0 ADS Display CRT 0 DCS screen Perform subsequent operator actions step 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 RO as directed . Refer to attached pages 23-25 Perform attachment 4 as directed. Refer to attached pages RO 26-29 Perform step 3 of attachment 4, Perform Attachment 6, CEA RO functional test and operability determination as directed Refer to attached pages 30-34 Re-align CEA as per attachment 4 step 7 and 8 as directed RO while maintaining power level recorded in section 4.2. Refer to attached pages 28-29 NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 22 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISI ON NO.: PROCEDU RE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 33 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCI E UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions

1. MAINTAIN T-avg -T-ref deviation by adjusting turbine load or RCS boron concentration to meet the following conditions :

Stable

Less than or equal to +/-2°F D 2. NOTIFY the following personnel of time and nature of abnormal event:

Reactor Engineering

l&C D 3. VERIFY NO dropped or slipped CEAs have been retrieved within 3.1 CONSULT with upper management to determine the the past 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . following :

Should CEA retrieval be attempted?

Should power operation be continued?

23 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 10 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 4. RECORD the following data :

Event initiation time :

Stable ti T power level established after event:

D 5. VERIFY NO dropped CEAs : 5.1 IF CEA DROPPED with reactor critical , THEN PERFORM

All rod bottom lights OFF Attachment 2, Dropped CEA Recovery With Reactor Critical

ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY 5.2 IF CEA(s) dropped with reactor subcritical , THEN PERFORM

Pulse Count Displays Attachment 3, Dropped CEA Recovery With Reactor Subcritical.

24 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 11 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 6. VERIFY NO misaligned CEAs : 6.1 IF 2-PTP-81 , Reload Startup Physics Testing , is in progress,

ADS FLAT PANEL THEN REFER TO that procedure DISPLAY for alignment actions.

Pulse Count Displays 6.2 IF major misalignment is ind icated AND reactor is critical , THEN PERFORM Attachment 4, Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical

(~15 inches) .

6.3 IF major misalignment is indicated AND reactor is subcritical, THEN PERFORM Attachment 5, Other Misalignments.

6.4 IF ONLY minor misalignments are indicated , THEN PERFORM Attachment 5, Other Misalignments.

D 7. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met. 7.1 IF additional misaligned or dropped CEAs need alignment or recovery, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.2 Step 3.

25 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 20 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)

(Page 1 of 4)

1. VERIFY the following:

CEDMCS MODE SELECT switch is in OFF.

T-avg - T-ref deviation is stable AND less than or equal to +/-2°F.

CEA motion inhibit exists .

2. RECORD and MAINTAIN LiT power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4.

Power level to maintain : - - - - - - - %

3. PERFORM Attachment 6, CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination.

4. IF at any time a dropped CEA occurs during performance of this attachment, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.1 Step 1.

NOTE Tech Specs allow a maximum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to realign CEAs . The COLR times are variable based on FrT . The use of the most conservative value is to used in determining the allowed time .

5. DETERMINE allowable amount of time to restore CEA to within 7.0 inches of all other CEAs in its group, as follows :

A. OBTAIN most recent FrT value from Plant Physics Curve Book Figure C.3.

8. Using most recent FrT value and COLR Figure 3.1-1a or 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , DETERMINE allowable time to align CEA to its group .

Allowable time : - - - - - minutes 26 of60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 21 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)

(Page 2 of 4)

NOTE

Tech Spec Bases B 3/4 .1.3 requires a prompt realignment of the misaligned CEA. Therefore, it is expected that Attachment 4 Step 6 through Attachment 4 Step 8 will be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following expiration of the time allowed by Tech Specs COLR Figure 3.1-1 a in order to be in full compliance with Tech Spec 3.1.3.1.

Tech Spec basis require a downpower if the allowed time is exceeded .

Once started this downpower must continue at the maximum rate permitted by plant conditions , NOT to exceed 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

6. IF ~T power is greater than 70% , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF at any time either of the following conditions is met:

It is expected that CEA can NOT be aligned to within 7.0 inches of all other CEAs in its group within allowable time.

Allowable time elapses before misaligned CEA can be aligned with its group .

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) SUSPEND misaligned CEA alignment actions.

(2) PLACE CEDMCS MODE SELECT switch in OFF .

(3) REDUCE ~T power to less than or equal to 70% rated thermal power per 2-AOP-22 .01 , Rapid Downpower.

(4) WHEN ~T power is stable AND less than or equal to 70% rated thermal power, THEN RESUME alignment actions by continuing to Attachment 4 Step 7.

27 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 22 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (2':15 inches)

(Page 3 of 4)

NOTE

In MODES 1 and 2, Tech Specs requires the affected CEA to be aligned within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

L-33, START-UP RATE HIGH CHANNEL PRE TRIP, will alarm at greater than or equal to 1.3 DPM .

7. PREPARE to align CEA as follows :

A. NOTIFY Reactor Engineering of the following information as it relates to this alignment:

Current power level :

Rate of CEA movement: ~~~~~~~~~

inches/minute

Any other CEAs to be moved :

8. OBSERVE the following limitations while aligning CEA(s) :

WITHDRAW regulating CEAs in normal sequence.

MAINTAIN overlap between regulating groups within 54 inches.

DO NOT EXCEED sustained SUR of 1.3 DPM .

IF deviation between CEAs in any group approaches 3 inches , THEN STOP group motion and ALIGN CEAs .

28 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 23 of 33 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)

(Page 4 of 4)

8. ALIGN affected CEA as follows:

A. MAINTAIN ~T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4 and T-avg and T-ref matched within +/-2°F as follows :

(1) IF affected CEA is to be withdrawn to its group, THEN BORATE RCS as needed while withdrawing CEA.

(2) IF affected CEA is to be inserted to its group, THEN REDUCE turbine load as needed while inserting CEA.

B. NAVIGATE to the affected CEA on the ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY for CEA position indication during CEA recovery.

C. On MODE SELECT switch, SELECT Ml (manual individual) .

D. On INDIVIDUAL CEA SELECTION panel , SELECT affected CEA.

E. On GROUP SELECT switch , SELECT affected group.

F. IF CEA motion inhibit is present, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:

(1) PRESS and HOLD CMI BYPASS pushbutton.

(2) PRESS and RELEASE BYPASS ENABLE pushbutton .

G. ALIGN affected CEA to its group as closely as possible.

H. IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

I. VERIFY ill! CEAs in group aligned within 7.0 inches of each other using ADS and DCS.

J. ENSURE group positions are adjusted for proper sequencing using MANUAL GROUP mode.

K. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF .

L. RETURN TO Section 4.2 Step 7.

29 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDU RE TI TLE: PAG E:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 28 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 FUNCTIONAL TEST NOTE Per OPS-503 , Technical Specifications Guidance , between required surveillance requirement performances , if a CEA is immovable but trippable ,

then the CEA is considered to be OPERABLE .

1. MAINTAIN ~ T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4 or 70% , whichever limit is in effect.

2. IF cause of abnormal condition is known , THEN VERIFY problem has been corrected .

3. DETERMINE if affected CEA can be moved as follows :

A. NAVIGATE to the affected CEA on the ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY for CEA position indication during CEA recovery.

8. On MODE SELECT switch, SELECT Ml (manual individual) .

C. On INDIVIDUAL CEA SELECTION panel , SELECT affected CEA.

D. On GROUP SELECT switch , SELECT affected group.

E. IF CEA motion inhibit is present, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:

(1) PRESS and HOLD CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

(2) PRESS and RELEASE BYPASS ENABLE pushbutton .

F. IF affected CEA was dropped , THEN EXERCISE CEA as follows :

(1) DO NOT EXCEED 10 inches withdrawn without US permission .

(2) WITHDRAW affected CEA until positive indication of movement is verified by observing CEA on ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY.

(3) IF CEA will NOT move , THEN PERFORM the following :

a. IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

b. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF .

30 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 29 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 2 of 5) 1.0 FUNCTIONAL TEST (continued)

3. F. (3) (continued)

c. GO TO Attachment 6 Section 2 .0 Step 1.

(4) VERIFY rod bottom and LEL lights are OFF.

(5) INSERT affected CEA to LEL or rod bottom light, whichever occurs first, while checking for normal operation and ind ications .

(6) VERIFY rod bottom or LEL light is ON , as applicable .

(7) IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

(8) IF CEA moved freely in both directions , THEN CONSIDER CEA functional and OPERABLE and RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.

G. IF affected CEA was misaligned AND NOT dropped , THEN EXERCISE CEA as follows :

(1) DO NOT EXCEED +/-10 inches CEA movement from original misaligned position without US permission .

(2) NOTE CEA initial pos ition and INSERT affected CEA until positive indication of movement is verified by observing the CEA on ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY.

(3) IF CEA will NOT move, THEN PERFORM the following :

a. IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

b. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF .

c. GO TO Attachment 6 Section 2.0 Step 1.

(4) WITHDRAW affected CEA to its position just prior to insertion .

(5) IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

(6) IF CEA moved freely in both directions, THEN CONSIDER affected CEA functional and OPERABLE and RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.

31 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 30 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 3 of 5) 2.0 OPERABILITY DETERMINATION

1. DETERMINE OPERABILITY for immovable CEA as follows :

A. IF CEA is dropped, THEN CONSIDER CEA trippable and OPERABLE.

B. IF CEA is misaligned , THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) REQUEST l&C and Engineering to determine if CEA is trippable .

(2) IF l&C requests additional troubleshooting of inoperable CEA, THEN concurrently PERFORM Attachment 6 Section 3.0 while continuing with next step.

(3) IF CEA is determined to be trippable, THEN CONSIDER CEA to be OPERABLE .

(4) IF CEA is determined to be NOT trippable , THEN DECLARE CEA to be inoperable.

C. PERFORM applicable actions per Attachment 7, Tech Specs Related to CEA Abnormal Operations .

D. RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.

32 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 31 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 4 of 5) 3.0 TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIONS FOR INOPERABLE CEA(S)

1. OBTAIN CEDM ROOM Key 224 from keylocker.

2. ENSURE affected CEA DISCONNECT breaker is in ON position . (CEDMCS Room)

3. INSPECT affected ACTM as follows : (inside CEDMCS cabinet)

A. NOTE any LEDs that are ON .

B. RESET affected ACTM card using RESET toggle switch .

C. VERIFY UG ENGD light is ON .

D. IF any abnormal LEDs are still ON , THEN NOTIFY l&C .

4. ENSURE CEDMCS air conditioning system is RUNNING and exhausting cool air into the room .

5. ENSURE CEDMCS cabinet cooling fans are RUNNING .

6. EXAMINE ADS and CEDMCS cabinets fo r abnormal indications.

7. IF two or more CEAs simultaneously transfer to lower gripper, as indicated by their ACTM LG ENGD LEDs ON , THEN PERFORM the following :

NOTIFY l&C of possible system grounds.

MINIMIZE CEA movement.

8. NOTIFY l&C of any problems found.

33 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 32 of 33 PR OCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 5 of 5) 3.0 TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIONS FOR INOPERABLE CEA(S) (continued)

9. IF directed by US , THEN CONTINUE troubleshooting efforts as follows :

A. CONDUCT pre-troubleshooting briefing to include the following :

Potential for control rod drop

Review of the testing procedure

Review of expected alarms and indications

Installation and removal of the Gripper Engagement Module (GEM)

B. DO NOT MOVE affected CEA more than +/-10 inches from original post-event position without US permission .

C. OPERATE CEAs in Ml (manual individual) or MG (manual group) mode as requested by l&C to support troubleshooting .

D. REQUEST l&C perform the following :

INSPECT associated power supplies and fuses . (CEDMCS cabinets)

OBTAIN coil current traces and voltage readings to localize trouble .

10. WHEN affected CEA is ready for functional test and OPERABILITY determination ,

THEN RETURN TO Attachment 6 Section 1.0 Step 1.

34 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 4 Page 9 of 21 NRC Event Description : 2A1 RCP Seal Cooler Outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 Closes Ti me ~ Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger Event 4: 2A1 RCP Seal HX CCW Outlet Closes on Hi Temp Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator J-25 2A1 RCP Seal Trouble, cooling Wtr Flow Low Examiners note: When HCV is taken back to AUTO from OPEN RESET, after a short time delay the HCV will re-close.

Acknowledge annunciator. Recognize and communicate HCV-RO 14-11A1 is closed .

RO Monitors 2A 1 RCP seal temperatures Implement 2-AOP-01 .09A 1, '2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump' step SRO 4.2.7.

Direct BOP to determine if increase CCW activity rising trend SRO is indicated.

When no activity indicated direct HCV to be taken to SRO Open/Reset and verify open indication . Step 4.2.7.1.2 When HCV re-closes direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset SRO and leave the control switch to Open. Step 4.2.7 .1.2 Place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and back to AUTO . Refer RO to attached pages 36-37 RO Place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and leave in that position.

Observe RC-26-1 and RC-26-2 CCW radiation and determine BOP no activity increase.

Contacts Shift Manager and Ops Management to report issues SRO with HCV.

SRO Conducts crew brief SRO Contacts l&C for troubleshooting .

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 35 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 31 of 60 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .09A 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature NOTE

Valve HCV-14-11A1 , SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE , closes on high seal cooler outlet temperature (200°F) and fails open on loss of instrument air or loss of power.

Maintaining HCV-14-11A1 control switch in OPEN overrides the automatic closure function on seal cooler outlet high temperature.

If a high temperature condition exists upon release of the control switch , there is a 1 minute time delay before closure of valve.

CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage when the control switch is maintained in OPEN .

Consideration should be given to returning the control switch to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened .

CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow to the RCP coolers can result in thermal stress and flashing in the heat exchanger upon re-admittance of cooling water flow.

D 1. NAVIGATE to 2A1 PUMP DETAILS and 1.1 IF CCW activity rising trend is indicated on RR-26-1/2 , RAD VERIFY HCV-14-11A1 , SEAL MONITORING PANEL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE , RECORDERS ,

OPEN . THEN PLACE HCV-14-11A1 ,

SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE ,

control switch in CLOSED .

1.2 IF CCW activity rising trend is NOT indicated, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE HCV-14-11A1 ,

SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VAL VE control switch to OPEN RESET and VERIFY OPEN indication .

36 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

2 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 32 of 60 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .09A1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature (continued)

1. (continued)

B. EVALUATE placing control switch in AUTO .

C. IF valve re-closes after returning control switch to AUTO, THEN OBTAIN US permission prior to re-opening .

D 2. IF ill! of the following conditions 2.1 PERFORM the following:

are satisfied within 10 minutes, A. IF CEA TCBs are OPEN,

CCW RESTORED THEN STOP 2A1 RCP .

CBO temperature less than B. IF CEA TCBs are 250°F CLOSED,

Lower Seal Cavity THEN PERFORM the temperature less than 250°F following:

THEN GOTO (1) TRIP reactor.

Section 4 .2.1, Step 5.

(2) STOP 2A1 RCP .

(3) IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

D 3. RESTORE CCW to 2A 1 RCP within 30 minutes.

3.1 GO TO Section 4.2 .12.

D 4. GO TO Section 4.2.1, Step 4.

37 of 60 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0 -2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 10 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, Trigger Event 5: Loss of 2A1 480V Load Center.

Booth Operator Instructions: When field Operator is requested to investigate, report the SNPO was hanging a clearance which was intended for the other Unit.

Breaker 2-20110 was opened inadvertently.

Booth Operator Instructions: Start 28 Closed blowdown cooling water pump when directed.

When asked, report back Main Transformer cooling is operating.

Recommend triggering next event when breakers 2-20110 and 2-40103 have been closed.

Indications Available: Numerous alarms. Running DEH pump trips and backup DEH pump does not start. Running Gland exhaust fan stops, running Primary water pump stops and back up Primary Water pump did not auto start. 2A Closed Slowdown Cooling pump stops. 2C IA compressor stops.

Report numerous electrical alarms and Breakers 2-20110 and BOP 2-40103 2A 1 480V Load Center breakers are open.

Recognize and communicate no DEH pumps running . Request BOP to start the 2B DEH pump.

BOP Place Turbine up-power on HOLD when directed BOP Call the SNPO to investigate breakers 2-20110 and 2-40103.

BOP Call the NPO to ensure Main Transformer cooling is operating.

BOP Verifies 2B lsophase Bus cooler is running SRO Direct up-power to be placed on hold.

Implement 2-AOP-47.02A Loss of Non-Safety Related AC Bus SRO

- Train A Step 4.2.3 Refer to attached page 40-44 Direct that an attempt is made to close breakers 2-20110 and SRO 2-40103 NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 38 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN A 11 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A 1 NOTE

Attachment 2, Major Vital AC Loads List, contains a listing of the major loads that have been lost.

Closing Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER , should only be attempted after the cause of loss is identified and corrected unless an emergency situation exists.

D 1. DISPATCH operator to check load center for possible problems.

D 2. VERIFY EH Fluid Pump 2B is running and maintaining DEH 2.1 START EH Fluid Pump 2B per 2-NOP-22.03 , DEH System pressure. (RTGB-201) Qperation .

D 3. VERIFY Condenser Exhauster 2B is operating. (RTGB-201) 3.1 START Condenser Exhauster 2B per 2-NOP-12 .07, Condenser Air Removal System Operations .

D 4. VERIFY Primary Makeup Water Pump 2B is running . (RTGB-202) 4.1 START Primary Makeup Water Pump 2B.

D 5. DISPATCH operator to verify main transformer cooling.

5.1 IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-53.03, Main Transformer.

39 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

4 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN A 12 of 34 PROCEDURE NO. :

2 ~AOP -47 . 02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)

D 6. VERIFY lsophase Bus Duct Cooler Fan 28 is running .

6.1 Locally START lsophase Bus Duct Cooler Fan 28 :

A. IF stop/reset button 's red light is flashing at IPBD Panel VFD2B, THEN RESET 28 VFD by pressing stop I reset button .

8. PLACE SW2B , FAN 28 CONTROL to RUN .

C. VERIFY 28 VFD RPM DISPLAY indicates Fan 28 RUNNING .

D 7. VERIFY Instrument Air pressure is being maintained .

7.1 IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-18 .01 ,

Instrument Air Malfunction .

D 8. VERIFY 2-HVS-19, TGB Supply Fan is running .

8.1 Locally START 2-HVS-19, TGB Supply Fan . (South of fan)

NOTE If two closed blowdown cooling pumps were operating prior to the loss of power, consider lowering blowdown flow.

D 9. VERIFY Closed Slowdown Cooling Pump 28 is operating .

9.1 START Closed Slowdown Cooling Pump 28 per 2-NOP-34.02 ,

Slowdown Cooling System - Closed .

40 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN A 13 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47 .02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)

D 10. PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY Waste Gas A.1 PLACE Waste Gas Compressor Compressor select switch select switch in WG28 .

positioned to WG28.

8. VERIFY Waste Gas 8 .1 PLACE Waste Gas Compressor Compressor 28 start switch 28 in service per 2-NOP-06.19, positioned to AUTO. Waste Gas System Operation .

8.2 IF Waste Gas Compressor 28 NOT available ,

THEN CONSIDER shutting down Waste Gas System per 2-NOP-06 .19, Waste Gas System Operation .

D 11. VERIFY 480V MCC 2C is energized from 480V LC 281 .

11 .1 IMPLEMENT Attachment 4, Loss of 480V MCC 2C .

D 12. Locally, VERIFY Screen Wash Pump 28 is in AUTO.

12.1 Locally, PLACE Screen Wash Pump 28 control switch in AUTO .

D 13. NOTIFY Electrical Maintenance of current condition of Load Center.

41 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN A 14 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)

14. PERFORM one of the following due to loss of ADS Display:

VERIFY compliance with Tech Spec 3.1.3.1, Moveable Control Assemblies

IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-66.02, CEA Position Indicating System Abnormal Operation 42 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN A 15 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)

D 15. WHEN determined power may be restored to 480V LC 2A 1, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY Bkr 2-20110 , A.1 CLOSE Bkr 2-20110 , STATION STATION SERVICE SERVICE TRANSFORMER 2A 1.

TRANSFORMER 2A1 , is CLOSED. (RTGB-201)

B. ENSURE Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER, is green flagged .

(RTGB-201)

c. CLOSE Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER.

(RTGB-201)

D. IF charging and letdown needs to be restored ,

THEN ESTABLISH charging and letdown per 2-AOP-02.03 , Charging and Letdown .

D 16. RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 4.

43 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 11 of 21 NRG Event

Description:

Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center Time II Position II

Applicant's Actions or Behavior When directed , start 2B DEH pump, 2B Gland Exhaust Fan, 2B BOP Primary water pump.

When directed perform step 4.2.3.15 and close Bkr 2-20110 BOP and close breaker 2-40103 2A 1 480V Load Center. Refer to attached page 44 NRG 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 44 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 6 Page 12 of 21 NRC Event Description : LT-9012 , 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Fails Low Time . i Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Event 6: A SG WR LT-9012 Drifts Low.

Ensure reactor power is less than 20%

Indications available:

"A" SG feedwater controller output rising

"A" SG level rising

Annunciator G-1, "2A SG Level Hi/Lo"

DCS Display will show L T-9012 lowering SRO/RO Recognize "A" SG level indication slowly rising

/BOP Perform immediate operator action to place Low Power FRV BOP LCV-9005 controller to manual to restore and maintain SG levels to 60-70%. Refer to attached pages 46 SRO Direct up power stopped Implement 2-AOP-09.01 and direct subsequent actions. Refer to attached pages 47-48 Evaluator Note: The AOP subsequent actions are the same as the immediate operator action Notifies shift manager, ops management and l&C of event Conduct crew brief on plant status Evaluator Note: The wide range level control input is the anticipatory (feed forward) signal when feedwater control is in the low power mode. With LT-9012 drifting low, it influences actual level to rise with the NR inputs operating normally. L T-9012 eventually fails off-scale low and holds last good value (2 minute old value).

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev. 2 45 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDU RE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6 of 64 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

1. VERIFY S/G levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable . malfunctioning ,

THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE S/G levels to 60% to 70% N R.

CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high S/G level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent SIG overfill.

2. VERIFY S/G levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.

than 50% NR.

2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open ,

THEN CLOSE it.

2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions 46 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 14 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 SIG Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies (continued)

NOTE

The LPFRV gets a close signal at 25% power rising. This signal is removed at 20% power lowering .

When greater than 20% power, the HPFRVs can control SIG levels with their respective LPFRVs closed .

A high power MIA station should be in manual anytime its low power MIA station is in manual AND the HPFRV is full closed .

The initial transfer from the LPFRV in manual to the HPFRV in auto should be continuous and steady until the HPFRV is at least 5% open .

This step is a continuous action step. If reactor power level is passing through 20%, different parts of this step may apply as power changes.

6. VERIFY LPFRVs are controlling SIG levels in AUTO as follows :

A. IF reactor power is greater than or equal to 20%,

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) VERIFY associated (1).1 PLACE associated HPFRV HIGH HPFRV HIGH PWR PWR MIA STA in A (auto).

MIA STA in A (auto) .

(2) PLACE affected LOW PWR MIA STA in M (manual) .

47 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 15 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 S/G Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies (continued)

6. A. (continued)

(3) CLOSE affected LPFRV.

8. IF reactor power is less than 20% ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) IF associated (1 ).1 PLACE associated HPFRV HIGH HPFRV is OPEN , PWR M/A STA in A (auto).

THEN VERIFY associated HPFRV HIGH PWR M/A STA in A (auto).

(2) IF associated (2).1 PLACE associated HPFRV HIGH HPFRV is CLOSED, PWR M/A STA in M (manual).

THEN VERIFY associated HPFRV HIGH PWR M/A STA in M (manual) .

(3) CONTROL SIG level at setpoint using affected LOW PWR M/A STA in M.

D 7. RETURN TO Section 4.2 .1, Step 1.

48 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0 -2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 13 of 21 NRC Event Description : CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1201 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time II Position ! Appl icant's Actions or Behavior .

Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger Event 7: Two CEAs Slip Safety Opens Examiners Note: CEA #56 and 59 will slip >15 inches which should result in a manual reactor trip. At that time, V1201 lifts full open which results in a Loss of Coolant accident. 480V MCC 2A6 de-energizes on trip.

EXAMINERS NOTE: V1201 will reseat when RCS pressure is -1000 psia.

Control Room Indications Available: Lowering RCS pressure, increasing Containment pressure. Acoustic monitor LED indication on V1201.

Booth Operator Response: Respond as NPO to perform Appendix X. 10 minutes later call Appendix X complete.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

SRO

RO: Reactivity control , Inventory Control, Pressure control , Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

RO Assess Reactivity Control and Announce "Reactor is Tripped" Assess Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries (MVA) and Announce BOP "Turbine is Tripped" SRO

On SIAS recognize 2B HPSI does not start

Direct starting of 2B HPSI within 15 minutes of report that the RCS Pressure & Inventory Control CRITICAL Safety Functions are not met (no SI flow) .

TASK#2

Attempt to open HCV-3647 SRO Direct stopping ALL RC P's prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals and within 11 minutes of a loss CRITICAL ofCCW TASK#1 Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of BOP 2-EOP-99.

Notify SNPO to verify Spent Fuel Pool inventory and BOP temperature are normal on all available indications NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 49 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 14 of 21 NRC Event Description : CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1201 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time II Position I Applicant' s Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: The SNPO could be dispatched to open de-energized HPSI valves in the field if directed but the action and the report back will ONLY BE AFTER the 2B HPSI pp has been manually started from the RTGB.

Booth Operator Response: If dispatched as SNPO to investigate MCC 2A6, report back in 5 minutes that breaker 40351 is tripped and appears to be damaged.

If dispatched as EM to investigate MCC 2A6, report back in 5 minutes that breaker 40351 is damaged and will need to be replaced .

Control Room Indications Available: NIA RO/BOP Start 2B HPSI pump on SIAS within 15 minutes of report that the RCS Pressure & Inventory Control Safety CRITICAL Functions are not met (no SI flow) .

TASK#2 When directed , attempt to open HCV-3647 (valve won't open RO/BOP from RTGB or locally)

Evaluator Note: The 2 HPSI valves without power have the ability to be opened locally. The SNPO could be dispatched to perform this operation if directed but will take action ONLY AFTER the 2B HPSI has been manually started from the RTGB.

RO Stop ALL RCP's prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through CRITICAL the seals and within 11 minutes of a loss of CCW TASK #1 RO Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control , Inventory Control , Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 50 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 15 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1201 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal ,

Containment Conditions Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Bkr open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

BOP

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized . (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B 1, 2B2 and 2B3 6. 9 and 4.16kv buses)

Recognize MCC 2A6 de-energized and breaker 2-40351 is open Directs SNPO to investigate breaker 2-40351 Evaluator's Note: On SIAS, HCV-3627 and HCV-3637 are de-energized due to the loss of MCC 2A6. HCV-3647 has power but failed to open on SIAS. If attempted, HCV-3647 will not open from the control room.

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 51 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 7&8 Page 16 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs . V1201 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for Inventory Control RO

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%

Recognize Pzr level is not trending within the % level band Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for Pressure Control

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia RO

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia

Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Recognize RCS subcooling <20°F RCS Pressure is not trending in the pressure band Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for Core Heat Removal RO

Verify at least one RCP running with CCW (if SIAS identified CCW isolated)

Verify loop delta T is <10° F Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0 SG level is between 20 and 83% NR 0 Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F 0 <525°F ensure ADV's valves restoring Tavg BOP * .SIG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig 0 ADV's in auto set to 900 psia .

0 IF SG pressure <735 psig close MSIV's

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed . (closed prior to trip)

MSR warmup valves are closed . (closed prior to trip)

If maintaining vacuum desired , ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 52 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 7&8 Page 17 of 21 NRG Event Description : CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1201 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions for Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig BOP

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Recognize there are no secondary plant radiation alarms , all other Containment Conditions are in jeopardy When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determine that 2-EOP-O, LOCA should be implemented.

SRO Notify Ops Mgmt and the SM of plant status .

SRO Conduct a transition brief to 2-EOP-03 NRG 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 53 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 18 of 21 NRC Event Description : CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1201 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time II Position ~ Aool icant's Actions or Behavior Exit 2-EOP-01 and Implement 2-EOP-03, "Loss of Coolant SRO Accident" SRO

Directs STA to perform SFSC's SRO

Contact SM to classify the event SRO

Direct implementation of Appendix A 2-EOP-99 Sampling SG's (Refer to attached page 55-56)

SRO

Ensure SIAS flow adequate per Figure 2 SI flow vs .

RCS pressure.( Refer to attached page 57)

Within 30 minutes of SIAS ensure CCW to RCP's remains SRO isolated by directing :

Placing four CCW valves to/from RCP's to close

Ensure RCP bleedoff remains isolated by placing two RCP bleedoff valves to close Ensure Both of the following:

SRO

CIAS actuated

MSIS actuated (if Containment pressure setpoint met)

Evaluator Note: V1201 will reseat around 1000 psia but will still have leak by.

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 54 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 3 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A

SAMPLING STEAM GENERA TORS (Page 1 of 2)

A Train (-../) B Train (-../)

D 1. J1 a LOOP has occurred ,

Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

D A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.

D B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.

REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.

NOTE

HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-88) starts to open

When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves , until SIAS is reset CAUTION If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards siQnals are still present.

D 2. J1 an INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:

RESTORE flow to the 'A' CCW Header by placing the control switches to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE :

HCV-14-8A

HCV-14-9 OR

RESTORE flow to the 'B' CCW Header by placing the control switches to CLOSE and then to OVERRIDE:

HCV-14-88

HCV-14-10 55 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVI SION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 4 of 171 PROC EDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)

D 3. !f the 'N' Header has been restored , Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 ,

SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:

A. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE .

B. OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 , SGBD Sample Valves .

D 4. !f the 'N' Header is in service , Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples for isotopic activity and Tritium.

D 5. !f S/Gs cannot be sampled , Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.

END OF APPENDIX A 56 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 128of171 PROCEDURE NO. : SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1200 NOTE 1100 This curve represents minimum expected SI Flow. If measured flow 1000 is less than this figure, then SI System lineup should be verified.

iU 900

n

-c.

QI

I 800 Ill Ill QI

""' 700 c.

QI N

600

I Ill Ill QI

""' 500 c.

400 300 200 100 0

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 Total Safety Injection Flow (gpm) (PJEOP!l*EOP*99!Fi9.l!Rev.l/pn9) 57 of 60 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 19 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs . V1201 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time II Position II Aool icant's Actions or Behavior Ensure Containment HVAC SRO

At least one train SBVS

At least one train Containment fan coolers Ensure Containment spray if Containment pressure >5.4 psig :

SRO

CSAS actuated

Flow > 2700 gpm each header

Direct RCS cooldown not to exceed 50°F in any one hour period using ADV's.

SRO

Cooldown up to 100°F in any one hour period to maintain or regain subcooling Direct HPSI throttling when throttling criteria met:

HPSI pumps are operating , and ALL of the following conditions are satisfied ,

RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling SRO

Pressurizer level is at least 30% and NOT lowering

At least ONE SIG is available for RCS heat removal with level being restored to or maintained between 60 and 70% NR

Rx Vessel level indicates sensors 4 through 8 are covered or NO abnormal differences (greater than 20°F) between THOT and Rep CET temperature NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 58 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 20 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 56 & 59 slip and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1201 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct manual start of AFW system . (Due to the low power level , the AFAS setpoint might not be reached) . This will be SRO required to meet the Safety Function of RCS heat removal when SG levels lower to <60% NR.)

BOP Verifies Figure 2 SI flow Vs. RCS pressure.

Initiate AFW flow when directed. Refer to 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation or use 2-NOP-97.01 BOP Operations Hard Card and throttle AFW to 150 gpm for 5 minutes.

BOP Places four CCW valves to/from RCP's to close when directed and places two RCP bleedoff valves to close when directed BOP Verifies one train SBVS and one train Containment fan coolers

Initiates cooldown using ADV's not to exceed 50°F in any one hour period to meet Figure 1A.

RO

Cooldown up to 100°F in any one hour period to maintain or regain subcooling Suggested termination point:

2-EOP-03 entered and a controlled cooldown is in progress

"B" train of Safety Injection fully actuated .

NRC 22 Scenario 5 Rev.2 59 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None Tech Spec Action Statement:

2A Charging Pump - None with 2B and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps operable.

2A BAM Pump - None with 2B BAM pump operable Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Current Status:

Unit 2 at -11% power MOC, Boron 1326 ppm .

The Generator has just been synchronized to the grid.

All turbine testing is completed SAT.

2-GOP-201 is complete through step 4.7.8'.

Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service Raise power to 30% at 3 MWe/min Equipment Issues:

2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal.

2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals.

Neither component is expected to be returned to service this shift.

Reactivity Turnover:

See RE letter for power ascension guidance 60 of 60 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

' Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No. : HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 5X10-4% power Turnover: Reactor power is -5X10-4% power, 6000 EFPH , Xenon free. RCS boron is 1327 ppm . Raise power to 2-4% . Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today. The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service

Critical Tasks:

1) Emergency borate via the 2C Charging pump and open V2508 , 2509 or V2504 within 15 minutes of notification that RCS temperature <500°F Tcold .

2) Secure all RCPs prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals and within 11 minutes of a loss of CCW.

3) Control RCS temperature using the 2B SG after the 2A SG has blown dry to prevent exceeding the upper subcooling limits 2-EOP-99, Figure 1A OR exceeding a cooldown of 100°F an hour.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Event Description Type*

1 R/RO Power increase to 2-4%

N/BOP, SRO 2 TS/SRO Loss of the 2B CCW pump. Evaluate TS for aligning 2C CCW pp C/BOP/RO 3 TS/SRO 2MA Instrument Inverter fails . Loss of all Pressurizer heaters. LT-111 OX loses power.

C/BOP, I/RO 4 CIRO SBCS system malfunction causes RCS temperature to lower and power to increase.

5 M/All 2A SG ESD in Containment. Auto I Manual Reactor trip , 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fails open. 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close.

6 CIRO 2B Charging pump trips requiring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump 7 CIRO V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Manual action required to open them 8 C/BOP Following SIAS, re-throttle MV-09-10 to prevent overfeeding the 2B SG

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6 Directions to the crew will be to raise Reactor power to 2-4%. RE guidance is to be at 100" withdrawn in preparation for synching to the grid .

During the up power the 2B CCW pump will experience a bad motor bearing resulting in increasing amps. If not recognized early the pump will trip on overload . The 2C CCW pump will be aligned to the B header IAW 2-AOP-14.01 , Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operation .

TS 3.0.4 applies for this event so the crew should not change modes.

After the 2AB 4.16kV bus is aligned to the "B" train , the MA Instrument Inverter fails resulting in the Instrument bus de-energizing . This will require the crew to place the MA Instrument bus on the Bypass bus using 2-AOP-49 .02, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E). All Pressurizer heaters will de-energize and will need to be restored in accordance with 2-AOP-01 .10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level (re-energizing the bypass bus). LT-111 OX fails and causes letdown flow to go to minimum so swap to LT-1110Y. Tech Specs should be reviewed for the Pzr Heaters, MA Instrument Inverter and possibly DNBR depending on how low pressurizer pressure got due to the event.

During the up-power the SBCS will malfunction (8801 fails open) causing RCS temperature to lower and Reactor power to increase. The crew should enter 2-AOP-08.03, Steam Bypass Control System , section 4.2 .3 & 4 OR 2-AOP-08.01 Steam Leak section 4.2.3. Taking the SBCS permissive switch to 'OFF' will close the valve and terminate the transient. Also , taking the controller to manual and closing the valve will work. If the crew chooses not to use SBCS , the ADV's could also be placed in service to control RCS temperature. V-8801 will not respond in auto. If the transient is not addressed promptly, the plant could be challeng ing to control (minimum temperature for criticality may be exceeded and reactor power may rise to the High SUR pre-trip setpoint) so the crew may choose to manually trip the reactor at that point.

Next, the 'A' side 4.16 KV Startup Transformer breaker opens unexpectedly. The crew should manually trip the unit due to the loss of the Condensate pump (trips the Feedwater pump) . The 2A EDG will start but the output breaker will fail to close and cannot be closed . Post trip , an ESDE will occur in the Containment on the 2A Steam Generator (3 minute ramp) .

2B Charg ing pump trips when the Unit trips. Due to loss of "A" train AC power, the 480V Load Center should be re-aligned to the 'B' side to allow the 2C Charging pump to be started . This alignment should be made to facilitate emergency boration due to excessive cooldown from the ESDE. At least one Charging pump must be running to facilitate Emergency Boration . The loss of power results in the Boric Acid pumps and V2514 being unavailable. On SIAS, an ESFAS relay malfunction causes V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) to remain closed. Manual action is required to open them for Emergency Boration . This is a critical task (If the crew attempts emergency boration using the gravity feed valves prior to SIAS, they will not open . V2504 , "RWT to the Charging pump suction ," is the success path in this case and a critical task). Also , following SIAS , AFW flow control valves to the 2B SG go full open so they will need to be re-throttled (closed) to avoid overfeeding the 2B SG and adding to the cooldown from the ESDE .

Suggested termination point is when the 2A Steam Generator is isolated .

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 2 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6 Procedures Used

2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

2-NOP-02.24, 'Boron Concentration Control'

2-AOP-14.01 , Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-49.02, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) .

2-AOP-01.10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level

2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Equipment

2-AOP-08.01 , Steam Leak

2-AOP-08 .03, Steam Bypass System

2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus - Train A

2-NOP-52 .02, Alignment of 2AB Buses and Components

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand Event Technical Specifications Entered

T.S. 3.7.3 CCW (Event 2)

T.S. 3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution (Event 3)

T.S 3.4.3 Pzr Heaters (Event 3)

T.S. 3.2.5 Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) (Event 3)

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 3 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# -----Page 4 of _1_9___,1 Event

Description:

Raise power to 2-4%

Time II Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Restore IC# 4, 5x10-4 Reactor Startup and Open the NRC lesson file then EXECUTE HLC-22, NRC Scenario# 6 file

Ensure modification to IC set is triggered .

Place the Green OLRM status placard on RTGB 203

Place Protected Train A sign on RTGB 203

Unfreeze the simulator and ensure Group 4 CEA's are at the UEL and that the 2B TCW pump is off

Let the simulator run for a minute and then freeze until the crew is on station

Sign off and handout 2-GOP-302

RE has determined that ASI is favorable for power escalation Control Room Indications Available: Several alarms are in due to the start up in progress DIRECT the crew to continue the reactor/plant startup at Step SRO 4.6.7 of 2-GOP-302, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 3 to Mode

2. Refer to attached pages 5-6 When directed, RAISE Reactor power at a sustained startup RO rate of less than .5 DPM by withdrawing Group 5 CEAs.

Monitor SIG water levels to ensure LPFWCS is controlling SG BOP levels.

STABILIZE Reactor power at 2% to 4% as indicted on the RO higher reading of RPS Nuclear or Delta-T power.

VERIFY Linear Range Nuclear Instruments respond and that RO channel readings are in agreement.

Transition to 2-GOP-201 Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to SRO Mode 1 EXAMINER'S NOTE: Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass Control System are in service. When reactor power is at the point of adding heat and relatively stable, or at the Lead Evaluator's direction, PROCEED to Event 2.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 4 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 3 TO MODE 2 48 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-302 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.6 Raising Reactor power NOTE

The RPS High Startup Rate Pre-Trip is 1.3 DPM

The Start-up rate trip is in service between 10-4 and 15% power.

1. Raise Reactor power at a sustained startup rate of less than .5 DPM.

2. VERIFY SUR protection is enabled at approximately 1x1 o-4 % power as follows :

A. LOG light is ON for fill OPERABLE Wide Range Log Safety channels.

B. L-41, START-UP RATE TRIP IN SERVICE , in alarm.

3. STABILIZE reactor power between 3x1 o-4 % power and 7x1 o-4 %

power.

4. RECORD actual critical conditions on Attachment 2, ECC Calculation Worksheet, Table 1.

5. IF CEA insertion limits are NOT met, THEN ADJUST the following to meet Technical Specification 3.1 .3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits:

RCS boron concentration

Regulating Group CEA position

6. IF Reactor Engineering determines Reload Physics Testing is to be performed , THEN GO TO 2-PTP-81 , Reload Startup Physics Testing .

RE or US

7. RAISE reactor power at a sustained startup rate of less than .5 DPM .

NOTE Equilibrium Shape Index (ESI) and control band values are provided by Reactor Engineering.

8. IF ASI is unfavorable for power escalation, THEN MAINTAIN power stable until ASI can be maintained within ESI control bands .

5 of63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 3 TO MODE 2 49 of 83 PROCED URE NO. :

2-GOP-302 ST. LUCIE UN IT 2 4.6 Raising Reactor power (continued)

9. STABILIZE reactor power indicated on the higher reading of RPS Nuclear or Delta-T power by one of the following :

IF AFW is in service, THEN MAINTAIN reactor power between 1% and 3% .

IF MFW is in service , THEN MAINTAIN reactor power between 2% and 4% .

10. VERIFY four Linear Power Range Safety channels as follows :

Channels are on scale

Channel readings are in agreement

11. GO TO 2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

Reviewed By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Date: _ _ /_ _ /_ _

us 6 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page _5_ of _1_9__

1 Event

Description:

2B CCW pump trips. Align 2C CCW pump to the B header.

Time II Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, Trigger Event 2: Loss of 2B CCW pump.

Indications Available: Increasing amps on 2B CCW pump.

Alarms:*S-2: 2B CCW Hdr Flow High/Low S-32: 2B CCW PUMP OVRLO/ TRIP, alarms and will clear after pump trip.

S-26: 2C CCW PUMP HOR VALVES/AB BUS MISALIGNMENT, while alignim 2C pump.

Recognize rising amps on the 2B CCW pump .

Perform IOA of 2-AOP-14.01 , Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations, (step 4.1.1 and BOP contingency step 4.1.1.1.1.). Refer to attached page 8

Stops the 2B CCW pump

Places the control switch in Pull-To-Lock RO When directed , secures power increase SRO Directs securing from up power Enters 2-AOP-14.01 , Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations and directs actions from step 4.2.1 for the loss of CCW pump 2B (section 4.2.3 steps 4.2.3.1 thru 13 including SRO contingency step 4.2.3.7.7.1 which aligns the 2AB 4160V bus to the "B" side per Attachment 2 of 2-AOP-14.01 ). Refer to attached pages 9-15 EXAMINER'S NOTE: Contingency action 4.2.3.11.1of2-AOP-14.01, does not need -

to be performed (re-alignment of the 125 VOC and 480VAC "AB" busses).

Enters T.S. 3.7.3.

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

When CCW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements TS SRO of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves shall be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Upon receipt of annunciation for improper alignment of the pump 2C motor power in relation to any of its motor-operated discharge valves positions, restore proper system alignment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Refer to attached page 16 NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 7 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDU RE TI TLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 7 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. VERIFY CCW pump amps stable for running CCW pumps:

1.1 STOP affected CCW pump and PLACE control switch in PULL TO LOCK.

AM-201 , PUMP 2A AMPERES

AM-205 , PUMP 2B AMPERES

AM-209 , PUMP 2C AMPERES 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions 0 1. IF .§.1! of the following cond itions exist:

1.1 IMPLEMENT Low Mode ONP fo r current plant conditions .

Unit 2 is in MODE 3 thru 6

SIAS blocked

Shutdown Cooling is in service THEN VERIFY at 15 minute intervals that .SFSC criteria are met per Low Mode ONP for the current plant conditions .

8 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVIS ION NO. : PROCEDU RE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)

D 3. PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.

Table 1 Abnormal Condition Section Loss of CCW Pump 2A Section 4 .2.2 Loss of CCW Pump 28 Section 4 .2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 2C Section 4 .2.4 Loss of Two CCW Pumps Section 4 .2.5 Loss of CCW Heat Exchanger 2A Section 4.2 .6 Loss of CCW Heat Exchanger 28 Section 4 .2.7 Rupture of CCW Header Section 4 .2.8 Abnormal CCW Surge Tank Level Section 4.2 .12 Unexpected CCW Temperature Rise Section 4 .2.13 9 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 15 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 D 1. VERIFY both the following conditions are met:

1.1 PLACE CCW Pump 28 control switch in PULL TO LOCK.

CCW Pump 28 tripped . 1.2 GO TO Section 4.2.5, Loss of Two CCWPumps.

CCW Pump 2C available to supply CCW Header B.

D 2. PLACE CCW Pump 28 control switch in PULL TO LOCK.

CAUTION If CCW is completely lost to a SOC HX, then SOC flow must be promptly isolated to limit flashing and prior to restoring CCW flow to limit thermal stress .

D 3. VERIFY SOC Loop 28 is NOT in service.

3.1 ISOLATE SOC HX 28 flow as follows :

A. ENSURE FCV-3301 ,

BYPASS (SOC Loop 282 ,

Key 43) , is OPEN or THROTTLED OPEN .

8. CLOSE HCV-3512 , FLOW (SOC Loop 282 , Key 51 ).

c. CLOSE HCV-14-38 ,

SHUTDOWN HX 28 (CCW) .

10 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 16 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

D 4. VERIFY CCW Pump 2C is stopped.

4.1 IF CCW Pump 2A is on standby, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ST ART CCW Pump 2A.

B. STOP CCW Pump 2C.

NOTE Annunciator S-26, 2C CCW PUMP HOR VALVES I AB BUS MISALIGNMENT, is expected while re-aligning CCW Pump 2C to CCW Header B if electrically aligned on Train A D 5. VERIFY the following CLOSED : 5.1 CLOSE the following :

MV-14-1, PUMP 2C DISCH

MV-14-1 , PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER A TO HEADER A

MV-14-3, HEADER A TO

MV-14-3, HEADER A TO PUMP 2C PUMP 2C D 6. VERIFY the following OPEN : 6.1 OPEN the following:

MV-14-2, PUMP 2C DISCH

MV-14-2, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER B TO HEADER B

MV-14-4 , HEADER B TO

MV-14-4, HEADER B TO PUMP 2C PUMP 2C 11 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 17 of 112 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

NOTE If 2AB AC and DC Buses are NOT all powered from the B side, then Tech Specs credit can NOT be taken for CCW Pump 2C until alignment is complete .

D 7. VERIFY both the following conditions are met:

7.1 IF in MODES 1 to 4 AND 4160V Bus 2B3 ENERGIZED,

CCW Pump 2C electrically THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, aligned to B Side . Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B Side, prior to starting CCW

4160V Bus 2B3 Pump 2C on Header B.

ENERGIZED . (Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 2) 7.2 IF 4160V Bus 2B3 is NOT ENERGIZED ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

ENSURE 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to A Side per Attachment 1, Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to A Side, prior to starting CCW Pump 2C on CCW Header B.

REVIEW Tech Specs 3.8.1.1, A.C. Sources .

12 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDU RE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 18 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

D 8. WHEN both the following conditions are met:

8.1 GO TO Section 4.2.5, Loss of Two CCW Pumps .

IF SOC HX 2B was in service, THEN SOC HX 2B flow isolation is complete per Section 4.2.3 Step 3

4160V electrical alignment of CCW Pump 2C complete THEN START CCW Pump 2C .

D 9. VERIFY CCW Header B pressures and flows return to 9.1 INVESTIGATE cause .

normal :

FIS-14-1B, HEADER FLOW

PIS-14-88 , HEADER PRESSURE D 10. VERIFY SOC Loop 2B was NOT in service when CCW pump was 10.1 PERFORM Attachment 3, Restoration of CCW to SOC HX.

lost.

13 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 19 of 112 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

D 11. IF 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to 4160V Bus 2B3, 11.1 ALIGN the following to B side per 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment of 2AB THEN VERIFY the following Buses and Components:

aligned to B side:

125V DC Bus 2AB

125V DC Bus 2AB

480V Load Center 2AB

480V Load Center 2AB D 12. REVIEW Tech Spec 3.7 .3, Component Cooling Water System.

D 13. WHEN Section 3.0, EXIT CONDITIONS are met, THEN EXIT this procedure.

14 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 73of112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Aligning 41 GOV Bus 2AB to B Side (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

Tech Spec 3.7 .3, Component Cooling Water System , applies until 480 VAC and 125 VDC busses are realigned.

While aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B side, the following annunciators will be received:

B-48 , 4.16KV SWGR 480V LC/MCC 2AB UV (RTGB-201)

B-60, EMERG 125V DC I 4.16KV I 480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB-201)

S-16, EMERG 125VDC/4.16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB-206)

1. VERIFY the following tie breakers are OPEN : (RTGB-201)

Bkr 1-20501 , 1AB 4.1 6 KV BUS SBO TIE

Bkr 2-20501 , 2AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE

2. VERIFY the following pump control switches are in PULL-TO-LOCK:

Component Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB-206)

Intake Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB-202)

3. ENSURE 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to B side as follows : (RTGB-201)

A. Bkr 2-20505, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB/2A3 OPEN B. Bkr 2-20208 , 4.16KV BUS TIE 2A3/2AB OPEN C. Bkr 2-20409, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2B3/2AB CLOSED D. Bkr 2-20504, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB/2B3 CLOSED 15 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7 .3 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked , sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position .

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.

When CCW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves shall be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Upon receipt of annunciation for improper alignment of the pump 2C motor power in relation to any of its motor-operated discharge valves positions, restore proper system alignment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-13 16 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page _6_ of _1_9~

Event Description : 28 CCW pump trips. Al ign 2C CCW pump to the B header.

Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verify the 2C CCW pump is stopped When directed, CLOSE the following :

BOP

MV-14-1, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER A

MV-14-3, HEADER A TO PUMP 2C When directed OPEN the following:

BOP

MV-14-2, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER B

MV-14-4, HEADER B TO PUMP 2C When directed PERFORM Attachment 2, 2-AOP-14.01 ,

'Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations' BOP Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B Side, prior to starting CCW Pump 2C on Header B. Refer to attached page 18 Announce and Start the 2C CCW pump and VERIFY CCW BOP Header B pressures and flows return to normal :

Contact shift manager and Ops Management and inform them SRO of the plant status SRO Perform crew brief on current plant status NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 17 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 73 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14. 01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B Side (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

Tech Spec 3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System, applies until 480 VAC and 125 VDC busses are realigned.

While aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B side, the following annunciators will be received :

B-48 , 4.16KV SWGR 480V LC/MCC 2AB UV (RTGB-201)

B-60, EMERG 125V DC I 4.16KV I 480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB-201)

S-16 , EMERG 125VDC/4.16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB-206)

1. VERIFY the following tie breakers are OPEN: (RTGB-201)

Bkr 1-20501 , 1AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE

Bkr 2-20501 , 2AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE

2. VERIFY the following pump control switches are in PULL-TO-LOCK:

Component Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB-206)

Intake Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB-202)

3. ENSURE 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to B side as follows : (RTGB-201 )"

A. Bkr 2-20505, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB/2A3 OPEN B. Bkr 2-20208, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2A3/2AB OPEN C. Bkr 2-20409, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2B3/2AB CLOSED D. Bkr 2-20504 , 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB/2B3 CLOSED 18 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page _7_ of _1_9____,

1 Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter fails . Loss of Pressurizer heaters. Letdown flow to minimum .

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Upon cue from Examiner, Trigger Event 3: 2MA Instrument Inverter Fails Booth Operator Instructions:

If status of input breaker is requested, state breaker is tripped .

Booth Operator Instructions:

When directed, Trigger Place 2A Instrument Bus to Alternate Source to load Control Room Indication available:

Annunciator B-43 MA Inst. Bus trouble

Loss of power to A side Pressurizer heaters, B side Heaters shut off

TCB 1, 2, 5 and 6 open .

De-energized RPS channel 'MA' and ESFAS channel 'MA'

Pressurizer level channel alarms Enter 2-AOP-49.02, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) at step 4.2.1. Refer to attached pages 20-21

Recognize 4 TCB's open SRO

Recognize loss of ALL Pressurizer heaters

Recognize minimum letdown and loss of Pressurizer Level channel 'X'.

Direct swap to level channel 'Y'

Containment Evacuation Alarm Perform immediate operator action to place Pressurizer Level RO Control Channel "Y" in service. Refer to attached page 22 EVALUATE Technical Specifications:

The SRO will refer to Tech Specs for DNB if RCS pressure indication lowers below 2225 psia (LCO 3.2.5) .

TS SRO

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit (Pressurizer Pressure ::; 2225 psia) restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to< 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Refer to attached pages 23 Direct restoration of Pressurizer Heaters per 2-AOP-01 .10 SRO Pressurizer Pressure and Level (contingency action 4.2.1.2) .

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The crew may opt to place the Instrument Bus on the bypass source load FIRST then restore the Pzr heaters.

NRC 22 Scenario 6.Rev. 2 19 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCE DURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 6 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions NOTE RPS , ESFAS and AFAS will be in a 1 out of 3 logic on loss of one instrument bus and 4 TCBs will be tripped . Attachment 1, Instrument Bus Loads, contains a listing of additional instrumentation supplied by the instrument buses .

D 1. VERIFY the following plant operating parameters are stable 1.1 IF a loss of SOC has occurred ,

THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-03.02 ,

by comparing redundant Shutdown Cooling Abnormal unaffected instrumentation : Operations.

soc 1.2 IF a loss of Pressurizer Heaters has occurred ,

Pressurizer heaters and level THEN RESTORE Pressurizer

Containment Evacuation Heaters per 2-AOP-01 .10, Alarm Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

1.3 IF the Containment Evacuation Alarm has sounded ,

THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-26 .02 ,

Area Radiation Monitors .

20 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 7 of 35 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 2. DETERMINE which Instrument Bus has been lost by checking annunciators and RPS cabinet power loss:

Instrument Bus Annunciator RPS Cabinet MA B-43 MA MB A-43 MB MC B-53 MC MD A-53 MD D 3. IF in MODES 1-4 AND the affected instrument bus was being supplied 3.1 IF instrument bus cannot be energized, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ,

by its inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

THEN , within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , (Section 6.2, Commitment 1)

PLACE the affected instrument A. Be in at least HOT bus onto its isolimiter, per STANDBY within the next Attachment 3, Placing an 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter. COLD SHUTDOWN within (Section 6.2, Commitment 1) the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

8. BEGIN plant shutdown per 2-AOP-22.01 , Rapid Down power.

21 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF at Normal Operating Pressure, THEN VERIFY PIC-11 OOX(Y) ,

1.1 IF Pressurizer pressure less than 2300 psia PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND PORV leakage is indicated stable. or PORV has failed OPEN, THEN PLACE affected PORV in OVERRIDE and CLOSE associated block valve:

V1474 , PORV, and V1476 , PORV BLOCK VALVE

V1475 , PORV, and V1477 , PORV BLOCK VALVE D 2. VERIFY selected Pressurizer pressure control channel 2.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to PIC-1100X(Y) , PRESSURE , non-affected pressure control NORMAL. channel.

D 3. VERIFY selected RRS channel Pressurizer level setpoint 3.1 PLACE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM selector switch to NORMAL as indicated on non-affected RRS channel.

LR-1110, PRESSURIZER LEVEL.

D 4. VERIFY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-111 OX(Y) ,

4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to LEVEL, NORMAL . non-affected level control channel.

22 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS DNB PARAMETERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the limits:

a. Cold Leg Temperature as shown on Table 3.2-2 of the COLR ,

b. Pressurizer Pressure* as shown on Table 3.2-2 of the COLR ,

c. Reactor Coolant System Total Flow Rate - greater than or equal to 375 ,000 gpm ,

and

d. AXIAL SHAPE INDEX as shown on Figure 3.2-4 of the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION :

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to .S 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.5.1 Each of the DNB-related parameters shall be verified to be within their limits by instrument readout at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

4.2.5.2 The Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be determined to be within its limit by measurement** at least once per 18 months.

Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of 5% per minute of RATED THERMAL POWER or a THERMAL POWER step increase of greater than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

- Not required to be performed until THERMAL POWER is.:::_ 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 2-14 Amendment No . gg, 443, 163 23 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page _a_ of _19_.....

1 Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter fails . Loss of Pressurizer heaters. Letdown flow to minimum .

Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior IF in Modes 1-4 AND the affected instrument bus was being supplied by its inverter, THEN , within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , place the SRO affected instrument bus onto its isolimiter, per Attachment 3, Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter. Refer to attached page 25-28 TS 3.8.3.1 Action b With one A.C . Instrument Bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus: (1) re-energize the A.C . Instrument Bus within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next TS SRO 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months and (2) re-energize the A.C . Instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Refer to attached page 29-30

Determine which instrument bus has been lost by checking RPS cabinet power loss RO

Monitor Pressurizer pressure to ensure spray valves respond (close) to loss of heaters

Swap PZR level control to "Y" channel.

Notify the SNPO to place MA Instrument bus on bypass IAW BOP Attachment 3 of 2-AOP-49.02, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) 3 steps below Direct SNPO to:

Verify closed Bkr. 2-41207 lsolimiter 2A is closed on MCC2A5 BOP

Place Manual Bypass Switch in Bypass to Load

Verify annunciator B-43 is clear, RPS channel A restored , ESFAS channel A restored .

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 24 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 32 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 1 of 4)

CAUTION This attachment is to be used for a loss of instrument bus only. These instructions are NOT to be used for normal removal or restoration of inverters.

Incorrect execution of this attachment can result in the inadvertent actuation of safeguards equipment as well as a plant trip .

1.0 PLACING THE 2MA INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER

1. VERIFY 2-41207 , ISOLIMITER 2A, is CLOSED at MCC 2A5.

2. IF the 2MA bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD position on STATIC INVERTER - 2A Panel.

3. VERIFY B-43 , 120V AC INVTR 2A I INSTR BUS 2MA/2MA-1 TROUBLE ,

undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized .

B. PRESS the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton on Static Inverter 2A.

C. PLACE B-2, INVERTER OUTPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2A.

D. PLACE B-1 , DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2A.

E. ENSURE B-4, BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT, is ON at Static Inverter 2A.

F. PLACE MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2A.

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MA Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2 , Commitment 1) 25 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 33 of 35 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 2 of 4) 2.0 PLACING THE 2MB INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER II II

1. VERIFY 2-42050 , ISOLIMITER 2B , is ON at MCC 2B5.

2. IF the 2MB bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD .

3. VERIFY A-43 , 120V AC INVTR 2B/INSTR BUS 2MB/2MB-1 TROUBLE , undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized .

B. PRESS BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton C. PLACE B-2 , INVERTER OUTPUT , in OFF on Static Inverter 2B .

D. PLACE B-1 , 125V DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2B .

E. ENSURE B-4, BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT, is ON at Static Inverter 2B .

F. PLACE MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2B .

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MB Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2 , Commitment 1) 26 of 63 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 6

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 34 of 35 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 3 of 4) 3.0 PLACING THE 2MC INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER

1. VERIFY 2-41212 , ISOLIMITER 2C , is CLOSED at MCC 2A5.

2. IF the 2MC bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD position on STATIC INVERTER 2C Panel.

3. VERIFY B-53 , 120V AC INSTR BUS/INVTR 2MC/2MC-1 TROUBLE , undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized.

B. PRESS the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton on Static Inverter 2C.

C. PLACE B-2 , INVERTER OUTPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2C .

D. PLACE B-1 , DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2C .

E. ENSURE B-4 , BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT, is ON at Static Inverter 2C .

F. PLACE MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2C .

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MC Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus .

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2 , Commitment 1) 27 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCE DURE T ITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 35 of 35 I PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 4 of 4) 4.0 PLACING THE 2MD INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER

1. VERIFY 2-42016 , ISOLIMITER 2D , is ON at MCC 2B5.

2. IF the 2MD bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD.

3. VERIFY A-53 , 120V AC INSTR BUS/INVTR 2MD/2MD-1 TROUBLE, undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized .

B. PRESS BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton C. PLACE B-2, INVERTER OUTPUT , in OFF on Static Inverter 2D .

D. PLACE B-1, 125V DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2D .

E. ENSURE B-4 , BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT , is ON on Static Inverter 2D .

F. PLACE MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2D .

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MD Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2 , Commitment 1) 28 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 The following electrical busses shall be energized in the specified manner with both tie breakers open between redundant busses and between St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2.

a. Train A A.C. Emergency Susses consisting of:

1. 4160 volt Emergency Bus #2A3

2. 480 volt Emergency Bus # 2A2

3. 480 volt Emergency Bus # 2A5

4. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus #2A5

5. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus #2A6

6. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus #2A7

7. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus #2A8

8. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus #2A9

b. Train B A.C. Emergency Susses consisting of:

1. 4160 volt Emergency Bus #283

2. 480 volt Emergency Bus #282

3. 480 volt Emergency Bus #285

4. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus # 285

5. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus # 286

6. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus # 287

7. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus # 288

8. 480 volt MCC Emergency Bus #289

c. 120 volt A.C . Instrument Bus# 2MA energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus# 2A*.

d. 120 volt A.C . Instrument Bus# 2MB energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus# 28*.

e. 120 volt A.C. Instrument Bus# 2MC energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus# 2A*.

f. 120 volt A.C . Instrument Bus# 2MD energized from its associated inverter connected to D.C. Bus# 28*.

g. 125 volt D.C. Bus# 2A energized from Battery Bank# 2A.

h. 125 volt D.C . Bus# 28 energized from Battery Bank# 28.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Two inverters may be disconnected from their D.C. Bus for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , as necessary, for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on their associ-ated battery bank provided (1) their vital busses are energized , and (2) the vital busses associated with the other battery bank are energized from their associated inverters and connected to their associated D.C. Bus.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-14 29 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ACTION:

a. With one of the required trains of A.C . Emergency busses not fully energized , re-energize the train within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within .the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With one A.C . Instrument Bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus: (1) re-energize the A.C . Instrument Bus within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months and (2) re-energize the A.C . Instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c. With one D.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize the D.C. Bus from its associated Battery Bank within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energ ized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-15 30 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page _9_ of _1_9___,

1 Event Description : 2MA Instrument Inverter fails. Loss of Pressurizer heaters. Letdown flow to minimum .

Time II Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indication available:

When directed , implement 2-AOP-01 .10 Attachment 5, Pressurizer Pressure and Level to restore Pressurizer heaters.

Place B/U lntlk B/P switch in Level. (key 98)

RO

Reset "B" side proportional and backup heater banks.

Operate heater banks as necessary to restore PZR pressure.

Refer to attached page 32-34 When directed , close TCB's IAW Attachment 2 of 2-AOP-49.02.

Reset ESFAS ATI fault at ESFAS cabinet. (2-AOP-.

BOP 49.02 step 10)

Reset MA channel RPS (2-AOP-49.02 step 11)

Refer to attached page 35-36 Contact the Shift Manager and Ops Management to inform SRO them of the plant status SRO Contact l&C and EM for troubleshooting assistance.

SRO Conduct crew brief on current plant status.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 31 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 37 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 1 of 3)

1. VERIFY 9.11 the following conditions are met:

IF SIAS has actuated , THEN SIAS is RESET.

Pressurizer level is greater than 27%.

At least one 4160V vital bus is energized:

2A3

283

2. IF any of the following control channels failed, THEN ENSURE non-affected control channel(s) selected :

Reactor Regulating System

Level

Pressure

3. IF Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3, is OPEN AND 9.11 of the following conditions are met:

LIC-111 OX , LEVEL, indicates greater than 27%

Vital 4160 V bus 2A3 is energized

SIAS A is RESET THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3, control switch indicates green flag .

8. CLOSE Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3 .

32 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 38 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 2 of 3)

4. IF Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3 , is OPEN AND ill! of the following conditions are met:

LIC-111 OY, LEVEL, indicates greater than 27%

Vital 4160 V bus 2B3 is energized

SIAS B is RESET THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3, control switch indicates green flag .

B. CLOSE Bkr 2-20403 , PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3 .

NOTE The Backup Interlock Bypass Key Switch , selected to the LEVEL position ,

allows the 480V heater power supply contactors controlled by the selected channel to be reset.

5. IF only one Pressurizer heater bus has power available OR only one Pressurizer level control channel is functioning, THEN PLACE B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL.

6. IF EOG is powering vital bus(es) , THEN RESET only Backup Banks B-1 and/or B-4 by placing heater control switch(es) to OFF I RESET and to AUTO or ON .

7. IF A Pressurizer Heater Bus is energized from offsite power, THEN RESET the following Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF I RESET and to AUTO or ON :

PROPORTIONAL BANK P-1

BACKUP BANK B-1

BACKUP BANK B-2

BACKUP BANK B-3 33 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 39 of 39 PROCED URE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 3 of 3)

8. IF B Pressurizer Heater Bus is energized from offsite power, THEN RESET the following Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF I RESET and to AUTO or ON :

PROPORTIONAL BANK P-2

BACKUPBANKB4

BACKUP BANK B-5

BACKUP BANK B-6

9. IF B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL AND the following conditions are met:

A and B Pressurizer heater buses energized

X and Y Pressurizer level control channels available THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE B/U INTLK B/P in LOCKED OFF.

8. ENSURE ill! Pressurizer heaters RESET.

34 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 30 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Closing TCBs Following Instrument Bus Restoration (Page 1 of 2)

1. IF TCB-1 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-1 :

A. RESET TCB-1 .

B. VERIFY TCB-1 is CLOSED .

2. IF TCB-5 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-5 :

A. RESET TCB-5 .

8. VERIFY TCB-5 is CLOSED .

3. IF TCB-2 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-2 :

A. RESET TCB-2 .

B. VERIFY TCB-2 is CLOSED .

4. IF TCB-6 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-6 :

A. RESET TCB-6 .

8. VERIFY TCB-6 is CLOSED .

5. IF TCB-3 is OPEN, THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-3 :

A. RESET TCB-3.

B. VERIFY TCB-3 is CLOSED.

6. IF TCB-7 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-7 :

A. RESET TCB-7 .

8. VERIFY TCB-7 is CLOSED .

7. IF TCB-4 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-4 :

A. RESET TCB-4.

8. VERIFY TCB-4 is CLOSED.

35 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 31 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Closing TCBs Following Instrument Bus Restoration (Page 2 of 2)

8. IF TCB-8 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-8:

A. RESET TCB-8 .

8. VERIFY TCB-8 is CLOSED .

36 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 10 of _1_9__,

1 Event

Description:

SBCS system malfunction Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed (recommend when power .is around 3-4%), trigger Event 4: PCV 8801 Drifts Open If directed as the NPO, initiate 'Isolate PCV 8801' this will close the manual isolation valve for 8801.

NOTE: If crew manually trips the plant due to SBCS failure, immediately trigger ES, 2A SG ESD in Can SU 4kv fails.

Control Room Indications Available: Tave lowering, power increasing, Pzr pressure lowering, SG pressure lowering, letdown flow lowering. Red I Green light on PCV-8801, Valve indicates CYAN on DCS.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: V-8801 will not respond (i.e. remains failed open) with its CONTROLLER in auto. If the CONTROLLER for PCV 8801 is taken to MANUAL, PCV 8801 WILL OPERATE NORMALLY.

ALL Steam Bypass valves that are open will CLOSE if the PERMISSIVE switch is taken to off.

Recognize Tave lowering , power increasing . Pressurizer SRO/RO pressure lowering , SG pressure lowering , letdown flow lowering If PCV-8801 drifting open not recognized , call NPO to look for RO secondary steam leak.

From 2-AOP-08.01 , 'Steam Leak' IOA, if two of four RPS RO channels indicate Reactor Power High Pre-trip, THEN trip the Reactor.

If Tavg lowers to greater than 6.0°F below no load Tref, THEN RO trip the Reactor.

When PCV-8801 recognized as failed open , PLACE SBCS permissive switch to OFF IAW 2-AOP-08.01 step 4.2.2.5.1.

RO When SBCS valves closed , place ADV's in service to control RCS temperature . Refer to attached pages 38-40 If SBCS failure not recognized , notify NPO to search for steam BOP leak.

Recognize open indication on PCV-8801 and CYAN indication on SBCS DCS page.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: 2-AOP-08.03, Steam Bypass Control System may be referred to with 2-AOP-08.01 or by itself. Both of these procedures direct the permissive switch to be taken to 'Off' to close the SBCS valves followed by placing ADVs in service to control Tavg.

If the Variable High Power Trip reset lights come on due to power rising from the ESDE, it would be incorrect to reset them.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 37 of63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCE DU RE TITLE: PAGE:

5 STEAM LEAK 1: 6 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF two out of four RPS channels indicate Reactor Power High Pre-Trip ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TRIP the Reactor.

8. GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE Attachment 1, General Notes, provides guidelines on CEAs , Variable High Power Trip setpoints, and reactivity changes.

D 1. DETERMINE plant MODE and GO TO applicable section per Table 1.

Table 1 Mode of Operability Determination MODE SIAS Blocked GOTO 1 No Section 4.2.2, MODE 1 2 or 3 No Section 4.2 .3, MODES 2 or 3 - SIAS NOT Blocked 3 or 4 Yes Section 4.2.4, MODES 3 or 4 - SIAS Blocked 38 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 STEAM LEAK 7 of 34 PROCED URE NO.:

2-AOP-08.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1 NOTE

Variable High Power Trip setpoints shall NOT be reset in response to a steam leak.

Minor excursions up to 100.5% Reactor power require power reduction within 15 minutes.

Lesser excursions up to 100.1% Reactor power require power reduction within 30 minutes.

1. IF either of the following exist:

Source of steam leak is unknown

Leak could be a potential safety hazard THEN TRANSMIT site announcement using Gai-Tronics with Boost function to alert personnel.

2. IF in MODE 1, 2.1 TRIP Reactor.

THEN MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref deviation less than 6.0°F by 2.2 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post lowering Turbine load. Trip Actions .

39 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 STEAM LEAK 10 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1 (continued) 0 5. VERIFY steam bypass valves are in proper positions for current 5.1 PLACE STEAM BYPASS PERMISSIVE switch in OFF.

mode of RCS Temperature (RTGB-202) control. (RTGB-202) 5.2 IF valves did NOT CLOSE ,

PCV-8801 , TO THEN PERFORM the following :

CONDENSER VALVE A. SELECT SBCS overview

PCV-8802 , TO screen on either FW Flat CONDENSER VALVE Panel Display.

PCV-8803, TO 8. SELECT[EMERGENCY CONDENSER VALVE OFF] button to display

[EMERGENCY OFF] button

PCV-8804 , TO overlay.

CONDENSER VALVE

c. SELECT[EMERGENCY

PCV-8805 , TO OFF] button on overlay.

CONDENSER VALVE D. VERIFY L-4 , STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE ,

reflashes .

5.3 IF unable to close SBCS valves ,

THEN DISPATCH operator to close affected SBCS isolation valve :

V08359 , PCV-8801 UPSTRMISOL (TGB/41 /N-28/W-K)

V08307 , PCV-8802 UPSTRM ISOL (TGB/41 /S-29/E-D)

V08349 , PCV-8803 UPSTRM ISOL (TGB/41/N-25/W-K) 40 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 11 of 19 Event Description : SBCS system malfunction Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-AOP-08.03, 'Steam SRO Bypass Control System ' section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 Refer to attached pages 42-44 Direct SBCS permissive switch taken to OFF.

Direct the RO to place at least one ADV on each SG to AUTO I AUTO set to 900 psia (step 4.2.4.1.B of AOP-08.03) Refer to attached page 44 Notifies l&C of event and Plant Management I SM notifications When PCV-8801 recognized as fa iled open, PLACE SBCS permissive switch to OFF RO When SBCS valves closed , place ADV's in service to control RCS temperature EXAMINER'S NOTE: Once plant conditions have been stabilized, proceed to Event 5.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 41 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 9 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 3. VERIFY S/G pressure is recovering to normal for existing 3.1 IF SIG pressures remain below normal ,

plant conditions. AND are NOT trending to normal for existing plant conditions, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. PLACE STEAM BYPASS PERMISSIVE switch in OFF .

B. VERIFY SBCS valves CLOSED :

PCV-8801 , TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8802, TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8803, TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8804 , TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8805 , TO CONDENSER VALVE 3.2 IF SBCS valves NOT CLOSED ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PRESS EMERGENCY OFF push button on SBCS Overview Display.

B. VERIFY .ill! SBCS Valves are CLOSED .

42 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 10 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

3. (continued)

C. IF any steam bypass valves remain OPEN and cannot be closed ,

THEN DISPATCH an operator to isolate OPEN valve(s) by closing the associated steam bypass valve or isolation valve per Attachment 5, Local Action To Isolate Steam Bypass Valves .

D. GO TO Section 4.2 Step 4 CAUTION Stabilizing the plant will require the use of manual actions when restoring RCS temperature . Manual actions shall be maintained , otherwise , there may be a potential to reactivate the failure.

D 4. VERIFY RCS temperature control has been restored .

4.1 RESTORE RCS temperature control as follows :

A. IF SBCS is being operated in manual ,

and US directs ADVs be placed in service, THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) ENSURE SBCS in MANUAL.

43 of 63 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 6

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 11 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

4. (continued)

(2) Slowly OPEN ADVs while simultaneously closing the SBCS valves to maintain Tavg at approximately 532°F or at a temperature directed by the US.

8. IF SBCS is NOT in service, THEN slowly OPEN ADVs to maintain Tavg at approximately 532°F or at a temperature directed by the US .

C. IF SBCS OVERVIEW Screen display shows error code "41 waiting acknowledge", THEN locally RESET valve digital controller. (Attachment 3, SBCS OVERVIEW SCREEN contains guidance) .

D. IF SBCS OVERVIEW screen display shows any error code other than "41 waiting acknowledge",

THEN NOTIFY Maintenance to trouble shoot and repair.

D 5. REVIEW Attachment 1, Failure Analysis , for failure and effects.

44 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _5_&_6_ _ _ Page g_ of _1_9_

1 Event

Description:

2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fa ils open . 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close . 28 Charging pump trips requ iring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time II Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, Trigger Event 5: 2A SG ESD in Containment "A" 4.16kv SU Xfmr Fails Control Room Indication available: Reactor trip on high Containment Pressure, MSIS and SIAS.

Recognizes SIG pressures dropping and Containment Building RO/BOP temperature and pressure rising.

RO/BOP Manually trip the Reactor when directed .

EXAMINER'S NOTE: an automatic trip may occur prior to a manual trip.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

RO: Reactivity control , Inventory Control , Pressure SRO control , Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

Direct one attempt to close the 2A EOG output breaker .

RO Assess Reactivity Control and Announce "Reactor is Tripped" Assess Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries (MVA) and Announce BOP "Turbine is Tripped" Attempts one closure of the 2A EOG output breaker. Breaker will not close.

BOP Announces plant trip on gaitronics and directs STA to report to the Control Room .

Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control , Inventory Control , Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Reactivity Control RO

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify all CEAs are fully inserted .

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 45 of63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _5_&_6_ _ _ Page Q_ of _19_-1 1

Event Description : 2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fails open . 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close. 28 Charging pump trips requiring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs 2-EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital BOP Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions.

Notifies NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of 2-EOP-99.

BOP Notify SNPO to check SFP inventory and temperature.

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed .

BOP

Verifies GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker.)

Verifies all vital and non vital AC Buses energized .

Verifies all vital and non vital DC Buses energized .

Recognize 2A Diesel output breaker fails to close , 2A3 4.16 KV BOP bus de-enerQized .

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Inventory Control RO

Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% .

Recognize that No Charging pumps are operating due to the loss of the 2A EOG and the 2B Charging pump trip. This safety RO function is in jeopardy. Re-align the 2AB 480v bus to the "B" train and start the 2C CharQing pump EXAMINER'S NOTE: Step 4 of 2-EOP-05 for Sampling S/G's will direct re-aligning the 2AB bus.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 46 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _5_&_6_ _ _ Page ~ of _1_9___,

1 Event Description : 2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fails open . 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close. 28 Charging pump trips requiring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indication available: If SIAS actuates during 2-EOP-01 implementation, V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) indicate green (did not auto open Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Pressure Control RO

Verifies RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia .

Verifies RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia .

Verifies RCS subcoolinQ is;::: 20°F .

Recognize RCS pressure is trending down due to lowering RO RCS temperature Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Core Heat Removal RO

Verifies at least one RCP running with CCW. (if >10 minutes with no CCW, must secure)

Verifies loop delta Tis <10°F .

Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0 SG level is between 20 and 81 % NR 0 Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F 0 If RCS approaches 500°F ensure:

BOP

At least ONE RCP is stopped . All RCP's tripped in Core Heat Removal

Emergency borate when directed. No Chg pps running at this time

SIG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig 0 Close HCV-08-1A & B if SG pressure <735 psig

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed

MSR warmup valves are closed

If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 47 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _5_&_6_ _ _ Page ~of _19__

11 Event

Description:

2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fails open . 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close. 28 Charging pump trips requiring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform 2-EOP-01 Safety functions for Containment Conditions

Verifies Containment pressure <2 psig .

0 Recognizes 28 CS pump did not start and starts 28 CS pump.

BOP

Verifies NO Containment radiation monitors in alarm .

Verifies Containment temperature is less than 120°F.

(Temperature is increasing)

Verifies NO secondary plant radiation alarms .

When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determine that 2-EOP-05, ESDE should be implemented .

SRO Conduct crew brief on current plant status.

Contact shift manager and ops management with current plant SRO status.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: If SIAS actuates during 2-EOP-01 implementation, V2508 &

V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions and the valves stay closed. Manual action is required to open them . If the crew attempts emergency boration using the gravity feed valves PRIOR to SIAS, they will not open. V2504, "RWT to the Charging pump suction," is the success path in this case.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 48 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _1_9_

Event Description : V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Manual action requ ired to open them. Following SIAS, re-throttle MV-09-10 to prevent overfeeding the 28 SG Time II Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 9: Isolate 2A SG App R-NPO Actions Report back as NPO 15 minutes later that field actions are complete Control Room Indication available:

SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC)

SRO every 15 minutes.

SRO Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify Direct Appendix A 2-EOP-99 Sampling SG's. This Appendix SRO includes re-aligning the 2AB bus to an energized source.

Ensure SIAS (if setpoint reached).

On SIAS , an ESFAS relay malfunction causes V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) to remain closed .

SRO Verify ALL available Charging Pumps are running . Due to the loss of "A" train electric power and the 2B Chg pump tripping, the only available pump is the 2C Chg pp after the 2AB is re-aligned. Refer to attached page 49 Direct that the 2AB 480VAC Load Center be re-aligned to SRO the 'B' train to allow the 2C Charging pump to be started.

CRITICAL Emergency borate via the 2C Charging pump and open TASK #1 V2508, V2509 OR V2504 Refer to attached page 50-51 Re-align the 2AB 480VAC Load Center to the 'B' train to RO allow the 2C Charging pump to be started.

CRITICAL Open V2508, V2509 OR V2504 and Emergency borate by TASK #1 starting the 2C Charging pump. Refer to attached page 50-51 RO Ensure closed MSIV's and MFIV's If CCW lost to RCP's for >30 minutes ensure CCW remains RO isolated BOP Protect the Main Condenser. Refer to Appendix X section 2 NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 49 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

25 ALIGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 13 of 40 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-52.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of 2AB Buses and Components from A Side to 8 Side (continued)

6. (continued)

C. IF Control Room A/C HVA/ACC-3C is operating , THEN ALIGN Control Room air conditioning per 2-NOP-25.07, Control Room Ventilation System, to prepare for the loss of HVA/ACC-3C.

NOTE Refer to Attachment 2, Expected Alarms When Transferring 480V Load Center 2AB Power Source, for alarms received when performing the following step.

D. At RTGB 201 , PERFORM the following:

(1) OPEN Bkr 2-40702 , 480V BUS TIE 2AB/2A2 .

(2) OPEN Bkr 2-40220, 480V BUS TIE 2A2/2AB .

(3) CLOSE Bkr 2-40504, 480V BUS TIE 2B2/2AB .

(4) CLOSE Bkr 2-40706, 480V BUS TIE 2AB/2B2 .

7. VERIFY the following annunciators are CLEAR:

B-60 , EMERG 125V DC/4 .16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 201)

S-16 , EMERG 125VDC/4.16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 206)

NOTE Section 4.1, Step 8 through Section 4.1 , Step 21 , may be completed in any order.

8. ENSURE N-45, WASTE MANAGEMENT LOCAL ALARM (RTGB-205) is CLEAR by locally acknowledging alarms on Waste Management Panel , if necessary.

50 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

6 EMERGENCY BORATION 8of15 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-02.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE Both Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves are required to be placed in service when the combined Boric Acid Makeup Tank volumes are being credited as a borated water source . Otherwise, the Gravity Feed valve associated with the Boric Acid Makeup Tank being credited as the borated water source should be opened .

D 5. IF unable to Emergency Borate using V2514, 5.1 GO TO Section 4.2 Step 6.

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. STOP the running BORIC ACID PUMPS .

B. OPEN at least one of the following :

V2508 VALVE ,

(BA Gravity Feed B)

V2509 VALVE, (BA Gravity Feed A)

c. CLOSE V2501 VCT I OUTLET VALVE .

51 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 EMERGENCY BORATION 9of15 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-02.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 6. IF the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks are unavailable OR both Gravity Feed valves failed to OPEN, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. OPEN V2504 , REFUEL WATER TO CHARGING PUMPS .

B. ENSURE V2501, VCT OUTLET VALVE ,

CLOSED.

c. CLOSE V2508 , BA GRAVITY FEED B.

D. CLOSE V2509 BA GRAVITY FEED A.

E. CLOSE V2514, EMERGENCY BORATE.

52 of 63 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 6

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _7_&_8_ _ _ Page !Z__ of _1_9__

1 Event Description : V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Manual action required to open them . Following SIAS , re-throttle MV-09-10 to prevent overfeeding the 28 SG Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Following SIAS, Direct that all RCPs be secured prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals.

CRITICAL TASK#2 NOTE: This may have been performed in 2-EOP-01 Direct that AFW be manually started and aligned using the AFW SRO HARD CARD OR NOP-09.02 , Auxiliary Feedwater SRO Direct the 2A SG isolated IAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R SRO Direct that HPSI be throttled if HPSI throttling criteria exists Throttle HPSI to control Pressurizer level within Safety Function RO acceptance criteria value RO Secure all RCPs prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals.

CRITICAL TASK#2 NOTE: This may have been performed in 2-EOP-01 BOP When directed perform 2-EOP-99 Appendix A , sampling SG 's On SIAS , verify available HPSI , LPSI pumps start and BOP/RO associated ECCS injection valves open.

Verify adequate SI flow per Figure 2, 2-EOP-99. (may be BOP performed by STA)

Place all four CCW valves to/from RCP's to CLOSE when RO CCW lost for greater than 30 minutes.

Place two RCP bleedoff valves to close when CCW lost to RO RCP's for greater than 30 minutes.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: With V2508, V2509 OR V2504 closed and the 2C Chg pump is started, a low suction pressure trip will occur due to no suction flow path. Once the valves are opened, the alarm and trip clears allowing the 2C Chg pump to start.

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 53 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _7_&_8_ _ _ Page 2_L of _1_9____,

1 Event Description : V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Manual action required to open them. Following SIAS , re-throttle MV-09-10 to prevent overfeeding the 28 SG Time II Position II Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Manually start and align AFW using the AFW HARD CARD (2-NOP-99.07, Attachment 5) OR NOP-09.02, Auxiliary feedwater section 4.2. Refer to attached pages 53-57 BOP Following SIAS, AFW flow control valves to the 28 SG go full open so they will need to be re-throttled (closed) to avoid overfeeding the 28 SG and adding to the cooldown from the ESD When directed, isolate the 2A SG IAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R BOP Refer to attached pages 58-60 Control RCS temperature using the 28 SG after the 2A SG has blown dry to prevent exceeding the upper subcooling SRO limits 2-EOP-99, Figure 1A OR exceeding a cooldown of 100°F an hour.

CRITICAL TASK#3 Direct the RCO to stabilize RCS temperature using ADVs at the lowest RCS Tcold.

Determine the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold.

RO Open one ADV on the 28 SG to 100% open, in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for CRITICAL the lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto.

TASK#3 Open the second ADV on the 28 SG to 100% open, in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto.

Suggested termination points:

2A Steam Generator is isolated. (Appendix R complete)

RCS temperature is stabilized after 2A SG dry out has occurred .

NRC 22 Scenario 6 Rev. 2 54 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCE DU RE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 16 of 24 PROC EDU RE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS NOTE

An Operator Aid has been placed at RTG8-202 . Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard .

1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred NOTE

The discharge valves may be taken off the open seat to expedite acknowledgement of their alarms.

Feeding with the electric pump is preferred over the steam driven pump .

A trip from 100% power (Post EPU) will require -500 gpm total AFW flow.

1. FEED each Steam Generator at the desired flow rate by throttling the following valves OPEN or CLOSED :

2A Steam Generator

MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE

MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A 28 Steam Generator

MV-09-12 , PUMP 2C TO SG 28

MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE 55 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVI SION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAG E:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 17 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 2 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. WHEN AFAS has reached the reset level , THEN RESET either AFAS 1 (2A SG) OR AFAS 2 (2B SG) at the AFAS Cabinets A through D as follows (Key 202) :

NOTE When AFAS is reset in each cabinet the following will occur:

Actuation light will illuminate

1-3 AND 2-4 AFAS Lockout Relay Status lights will extinguish A. PRESS either AFAS-1 ACT RESET OR AFAS-2 ACT RESET pushbutton .

B. FEED the Steam Generator(s) using the desired flow path :

(1) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-2 , 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-9 , PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE (2) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A (3) FEED the 2B Steam Generator using the 2B AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV (KEY 84) 56 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 18 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 3 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. B. (3) (continued)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-10 , PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE (4) FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-5 , 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 86)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 CAUTION Initial feedwate r flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns .

1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured

1. PERFORM any of the following steps as necessary to restore Steam Generator levels.

A. FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 2A (2) OPEN SE-09-2 , 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 2A SIG B. FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 28 AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 28 57 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 19 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 4 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

1. B. (continued)

(2) OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 84)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 28 SIG NOTE The following valves should be opened simultaneously to prevent overspeed tripping of the 2C AFW Pump:

MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

MV-08-13 , SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C If a Steam Generator Tube Rupture is in progress, the steam supply from the ruptured Steam Generator should NOT be opened.

CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 .

minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns.

2. FEED the 2A AND 28 Steam Generators using the 2C AFW PUMP .

A. START 2C AFW PUMP by performing both of the following simultaneously:

OPEN MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

OPEN MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C B. OPEN the solenoid valve(s) in the header(s) to feed the appropriate SIG(s) :

SE-09-4 , 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85) 58 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 20 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 5 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

2. B. (continued)

SE-09-5, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 86)

C. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN desired flow in the header(s) to feed the appropriate S/G(s) :

THROTTLE MV-09-11, PUMP 2C TO SG 2A

THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 59 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 96 of 171 PROCEDURE NO .: SHEETS '

2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation NOTE

Local actions are located in step 19 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.

Keys 79 and 80 are required for closing MV-08-14, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-18A ISOL, and MV-08-15 , 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-19A ISOL.

Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLE/TRIP (contingency) .

CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV) , is CLOSED .

D 2. 1f HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure .

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve , is CLOSED .

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch .

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required , then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered .

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED .

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED .

60 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

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50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 97of171 PROCEDURE NO. : SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

D MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005 , 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3 , 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.

D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.

D 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED .

D 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 79)

D 11 . PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed , Pump 2A, in STOP .

D 12. ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.

D 13. ENSURE MV-09-11 , Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

D 14. PLACE MV-08-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

D 15.!f MV-08-13 , SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required , Then CLOSE MV-08-3 , 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)

D 16. ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv , is CLOSED .

D 17.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 80) 61 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

REVISI ON NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 98 of 171 PROC EDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 18.lf a SGTR is in progress, Then NOTIFY the SM of status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes.

NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete. Local actions may be continued .

D 19. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152 , 2C AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation .

D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120 , 2A AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation .

D C. CLOSE SE-08-2 , Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

D D. lf SE-08-2 , Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884 , SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.

D E. lf MV-08-13 , SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows :

D a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

D V08622 , CB #67 Drain D V08618 , Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619 , Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 1 62 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: A Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0.03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None Tech Spec Action Statement:

None Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

Numerous - expected for current plant conditions (no unexpected annunciators)

Current Status:

Reactor power approximately -5X10-4%, Xenon free.

2-GOP-302 in progress, completed through step 4.6.6. Next activity is to raise reactor power to 2-4%

Main Feedwater and SBCS in service. Boron concentration is 1327 ppm .

All surveillances are completed to support transition to mode 1 Severe thunderstorms are forecast for today The "B" Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service Goals for shift are to raise Reactor power to 10-12% and place the Main Generator on line.

Equipment Issues:

None Reactivity Turnover:

See RE guidance letter 0

63 of 63 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6

ML15201A558

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