ML21193A087

File 2A3 Exam Administrative Items

ML21193A087
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/16/2020
From:	Florida Power & Light Co
To:	NRC/RGN-II
References
Download: ML21193A087 (135)

Text

ML21193A087

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

JPM Comments Generic Comments:

The Task Standard portion of the JPM needs to be more specific as to the steps that must be completed to complete the JPM. Specifically, it is a recent expectation that the task standard essentially re-state all critical steps (ref. second bulleted item on ES-303 p. 4 of 19). This allows the examiner the proper justification for failed JPM for failed Critical Steps in cases where something considered important was missed but the overall JPM was satisfactorily completed.

o Example: See A2R comments RO Admin JPM for PZR HTR likely unsat, see comments below.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments RO CONDUCT OF OPS (A1R): RO CALCULATE CONTAINMENT SUMP IN LEAKAGE If the LOCA is not in containment, how did the Sump Level get to 11 feet? Is this operationally valid? There are so many other indications of a LOCA inside containment that would be used besides sump level. Doesnt this lend itself to a bad indication? May need to be enhanced or changed? What specifically does the applicant have to write in leak location to be correct?

On p. 7 of 9, Terminating Cues does not seem to be correct with the JPM: nothing needs to be determined about Boron Concentration or alternate filling methods.

(recurring outline comment follow-up): listed K/A on both JPM cover sheet and RO ES-301-1 is technically incorrect; G 2.1.20 is Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. The K/A for Knowledge of surveillance procedures is G 2.2.12, RO IR 3.7. G 2.2.12 should not be used for a Topic 1/Conduct of Operations JPM. See outline comments for potential fix.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments RO CONDUCT OF OPS (A2R): RO PERFORM RCS INVENTORY BALANCE - UNIT 2 Critical Step at performance step 10 (Procedure step 8.a) to REFER TO 2 AOP-01.08 The JPM ends after this Critical Step is completed. This should not be considered a critical step. Also, it is stated in the cue that they are already implementing 2-AOP-01.08, so why would you fail for not performing a step that tells you to refer to the procedure that made you do the leak rate calculation in the first place?

Performance Step 8 is likely not critical, just re-writing previously determined/calculated values?

Proposed task standard for this JPM that also includes critical step information:

Utilizing the given plant conditions, the applicant will correctly perform section 4.1.6 of 2-OPS-01.03 and determine the following within the range of tolerances stated in the JPM:

-Total Leakage = 71.092 gal

-Identified Leakage = -4.16 gal

-Unidentified Leakage = -66.932 gal

-Unidentified Leakage Rate = 1.115 gpm

-Identified Leakage Rate = 0.076 gpm.

Based on the above values, the applicant will correctly annotate procedure step 8 by identifying Identified Leakage Rate is SAT and Unidentified Leakage Rate is UNSAT.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments RO EQUIPMENT CONTROL (A3): RO PZR Heater Capacity Determination A3R and A1S: We have an exam security vulnerability if these two JPMs are not run on the same day since they are nearly identical. Schedule shows them being run on separate days (JPM 1 on Monday and JPM 3 on Tuesday)

(recurring comment from outlines): K/A number (2.2.12) does not match K/A text. What is specific about this JPM task that involves ability to interpret and execute procedure steps?

This JPM is likely LOD=1 and therefore UNSAT. How could an applicant mis-perform Performance Step 2 by any means other than mis-copying given information, or mis-operation of a calculator?

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments RO RAD CONTROL (A4): RO Determine Total Dose, Authorization Required and area posting level

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments SRO CONDUCT OF OPS (A1-S): PZR Heater Capacity Determination/TS Action Should they calculate 146.5 or 149kW? Different info in different steps. Also, it seems there is a difference between the surveillance requirement of 155kW and the minimum of 150kW required for the TS acceptance. It may be worth putting them between this value to test that they know there is a difference. Otherwise, it is almost a direct lookup.

A3R and A1S: We have an exam security vulnerability if these two JPMs are not run on the same day since they are nearly identical. Schedule shows them being run on separate days (JPM 1 on Monday and JPM 3 on Tuesday)

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments SRO CONDUCT OF OPS (A2-S): Manual RCS Inventory Balance/ TS Action Exam security issue/overlap between RO Admin A2 and SRO Admin A2 - same manual calculation and determinations made.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments SRO EQUIPMENT CONTROL (A3-S): MSIV Accumulator Evaluation and TS Action Seems like a direct lookup. Applicable annunciator is provided. ARP provides the minimum required pressure for MSIV operability and then tells the TS to reference. And the ARP directs them to 1-NOP-08.04 which is a direct lookup of the pressure range provided by the given temperature in the initial conditions. How would any applicant miss this JPM, since there is no critical thought required?

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments SRO Radiation Control (A4-S): Liquid Release Permit Review

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

ADMIN JPM Comments SRO EMERGENCY PLAN (A5S): Determine Emergency Classification For administering, does PSL still use the 11x17 Laminated sheets for the EAL tables? If so all good, but most plants like the large boards that can be easily observed form across the room. This produces an exam security concern since many applicants write on these tables with dry erase (recurring comment from outlines): JPM A5-S: This JPM is easy to make a direct lookup if the provided conditions allow the applicant to only evaluate one thing going on. In other words, if the only information given is a fire, all the applicant has to evaluate/look at are the fire EALs. The initial conditions/cue sheet must provide enough additional distractor information to get the applicant to consider an incorrect EAL. As an example, maybe have the applicant check the fission product barriers and get to a NOUE, concurrent with the fire such that fp barriers evaluation should not elevate to an ALERT.

JPM cue should not state these actions are TIME CRITICAL, this is cueing. Need to say This is a time critical JPM, or Portions of this JPM are TIME CRITICAL.

Need to say Do NOT use Emergency Coordinator Judgement as a basis for your classification or similar statement somewhere in the initiating cue.

Lets discuss how we would administer the JPM - may not want to direct applicants to return to proctor immediately after completion for classification sheet. Maybe just say raise you hand and notify proctor when you have completed your classification sheet.

Then examiner will initial and timestamp the classification and the applicant can keep the classification sheet with them while doing the Notification form?

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM A: S-1 Restore Letdown IAW 2-AOP-02.03 and Attachment 5 JPM step 5: if asked as US, better to respond: what do you recommend? Same comment for JPM step 6.

JPM performance step 13 not critical, just a verification step JPM performance step 14 and 15, need completed applicant standard (just states Applicant will)

JPM performance step 15, what should the final letdown flow value be, before going on to the next step?

Does V2515 close during the JPM? If step is NA, should not be critical step.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM B: S-2 Align the ECCS for Simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Injection (RO/SRO)

Can delete initial condition that both HPSI pumps are running: the applicant can determine this on their own from observation of the plant conditions before beginning the JPM.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM C: S-3 Place LTOP in service per 2-GOP-305 (RO/SRO)

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM D: S-4 Verify MSIS - Unit 2 (RO/SRO)

Performance Step 4 states that it is a Critical Step for DEPRESS and HOLD the B Train MSIS actuation pushbutton and POSITION the B MSIS actuation switch to MSIS ON.

There isnt any note in the JPM but I am assuming that not all the components function since the applicant has to reposition components per EOP-99 Table 5. So is it a critical step to manually actuate MSIS even if the applicant gets all the components into the correct position that the MSIS signal should have actuated. Point being, the applicant can be successful without performing this step, so why is it critical?

Performance Step 9 evaluator note (Handswitch needs to be held in CLOSE until the valve fully strokes.) seems to be in the wrong place since there is no valve manipulation for this step.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Control Room Simulated JPM JPM E: C-5 CSAS evaluation/verification - Unit 1 (RO/SRO)

Outline submittal JPM Replaced with: S5 Place Hydrogen Recombiner in Service (simulator)

Performance step 4 is listed as a critical step. Applicant is required to raise output of H2 recombiner to 70kW. Is it critical that he hits 70kW? If he is slightly over or under does that constitute a JPM failure since this is listed as a critical step. Suggest some guidance in the examiner in the cue. Also see comment above about Task Standard.

Additional guidance needed for Performance Step 6 - how to evaluate if applicant reaches this step and raises temperature? Need additional info for examiner here as to how to fully evaluate the potential applicant performance. Seems like the operator needs to -lower- (not raise) the setting to get temperatures to stabilize. Is this how it would work in the plant?

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM H: S-6 TRANSFER 480V LC 2AB FROM LC 2A2 TO LC 2B2 (RO Only)

(step 1 evaluator note) May be better to just state in the initiating cue that another operator will address the ARP actions for alarms. It is always better to minimize the pre-scripted verbalization between the evaluator and the applicants.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM G: S-7 Respond to Control Room OAI radiation alarms, Unit 2 (RO/SRO)

Performance Step 1 states that the applicant will determine that a U1 CIS has NOT occurred, yet he is provided information in the cue to the contrary, Unit 1 CIAS has occurred. There is also cuing associated with providing the candidate that there are OAI Rad Monitors in alarm, since he is required to determine which ones are in alarm in Performance Step 1. Seems to be a formatting issue with procedure step 7.B, it jumps to step 10 on the bottom of page 11. It appears Performance Step 10 is procedure step 7.B.1.

JPM cover sheet lists this as alternate path, but it is not listed as alternate path coded (A) on the ES-301-2 forms. Believe that the JPM as submitted is an alternate path, this is good because it will give us 5 alt path JPMs (+/- one from min/max). Please update the 301-2 forms with the correct codes.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Simulator JPMs JPM F: S-8 Align CCW Electrical IAW 2-AOP-14.01, 4.2.3 (RO/SRO)

JPM Performance step 9 and Performance step 10 do not have completed standards (just say Applicant will). Need to know what correct actions are.

Better initiating cue is to perform AOP XYZ beginning at step 1 and leave it open as to when the JPM will be considered complete.

Last JPM step should be labeled Performance Step: 16 not Performance Step: 1 What are the values of flow and pressure expected here? Use what was validated. This is a check for the evaluator if something was abnormal or missed, if there is a consequence.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

In-Plant JPMs JPM I: P-1 Blend to the VCT Using Local Control (RO/SRO)

Top of the Page 6 references 2-AOP-02.01 for Unit 1 evolution.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

In-Plant JPMs JPM J: P-2 Locally close Unit 1 MSIV (RO/SRO)

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

In-Plant JPMs JPM K: P-3 Unit 1, local start of EDG (RO/SRO)

There is no value in the cue to provide to the applicant for voltage and frequency when the EDG starts. If the applicant is expected to adjust these parameters to a specific range, they must be provided a read value to know which way to take the switches to make adjustments. See JPM Performance Step 9 and 10.

The step numbers on the picture in the back do not correctly correspond to the Performance Step numbers.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Schedule Comments May still have 5th examiner if Tom Morrissey still wants to participate. He performed his one exam for the year at Farley, so he may have other priorities.

But this would help with Admins, but probably not help with the Sim JPMS and overall length of the exam.

On the proposed Schedule, I5 and I7 must be switched for their Monday Scenario. I5 shows two CRS during exam week and I7 shows two BOP and no CRS. Easy fix.

Since I (KK) have work history with one RO and one ISRO, I should be E2 and Pell should not be assigned as I2, I4, or I6. This would keep me from being assigned as Examiner of Record for Pell or Curtis.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Scenario Comments Generic Comments:

General Comment: Better to have the DS2 written in Portrait page format instead of Landscape. Easier for examiners to control their copy while watching, having open pages, and taking notes. Discuss with NRC if swapping to Portrait format would be overly burdensome.

Typically used to seeing an extra column with the Procedural step written verbatim and another column with the expected actions of the operator. This helps examiners to see if/when an applicant does something different than expected or misses procedural note or step. See D2 for past couple PSL exams for examples. Also, space out and BOLD the applicant response as it is written below the procedural steps for easy recognition as what is the procedure and what is the expected response/action. For procedure steps, consistently need to see NOTES, CAUTIONS, TABLES, etc

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

NRC Scenario #1: 2A MFRV Controller fails, RCS Leak, LOCA, an HPSI Sheared Shaft Turnover Event 1 - HVS-2A trips (BOP-Component + SRO-Component)

All events need to include numbered procedure steps, NOTES, CAUTIONS, and Tables. This is needed so the examiner(s) following the procedure users can follow and evaluate procedure usage competency.

Unnecessary duplication of applicant actions: EVALUATES HVS-2A indications and determines written twice; VERIFIES The standby Reactor Cavity Cooling fan

[HVS-2B] has been started written twice etc.

Good practice is to begin new procedures and next events at the top/beginning of a new page.

Event 2 - A Linear Power Range safety NI upper detector fails low (RO-Instrument +

SRO-Instrument, TS)

Better job in this event as compared with Event 1 adding procedure steps. Please put additional space between the procedure step and the text stating the expected applicant actions so it is clear what is the step and what is the examiner text; maybe just bold-font the expected actions as well to explicitly set them apart.

Event 3 - 2A MFRV controller fails in Auto (BOP-Component + SRO-Component)

For all scenarios, the Critical Task language must be strenuously evaluated and consistently written. For Scenario 1, CT-1 on the cover page is worded as follows:

Restore Steam Generator Level prior to RPS trip set point or approaching Manual Trip set point defined in 2-AOP-09.01. However, on ES-D-2 p. 12 of 48 there is different language for CT-1 that does not mention anything about manual trips.

Every time the CTs are written down the language must be exactly the same and precise as to the conditions that constitute the CT. (same comment for CT-1 if listed in Event 3 Event Description in ES-D-1) NRC recommended language for CT-1 was provided with the outline comments: Control Steam Generator level such that neither automatic or manual Reactor trip occurs [as a result of the 2A MFRV controller failure].

Event 4 - V2514 power failure (SRO-TS)

Page 25 states, NOTIFIES plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows: "Attention all personnel, Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower due to S/G tube leak. The event is an RCS Leak.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

Event 5 - RCS Leak (ramps to approx.50 gpm 120 seconds) (RO-Reactivity, BOP-Reactivity, SRO-TS)

Page 25 states, NOTIFIES plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows: "Attention all personnel, Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower due to S/G tube leak. The event is an RCS Leak.

When the Rx and Turbine is tripped, the music states that the Turbine does not trip and the BOP trips the turbine with the manual pushbutton. Is this supposed to be in the script? Was not listed in the malfunctions matrix on DS-1. Repeated in all scenarios.

When checking the Maintenance and Vital Aux, the script does not indicate what should be verified with the LOOP. No mention of verification of the electric buses carried by EDGs.

Que states, IF SIAS occurs the SRO DIRECTS manual actuation of A train SIAS and the crew will trip 2 RCPs and Leave 2 RCPS running and then PERFORM App.

J. LOOP. All RCPs are off.

P. 27 of 48 step 6 talks about starting charging pumps, expected action is something about controlling letdown temperatures? Unsure what should go here P. 29 of 48 step 13 -- What are the Attachment 3 parameters? Examiners need to have them listed in the ES-D-2.

Event 6 - MAJOR EVENT: LOCA (approx. 350 gpm ramped 120 sec) with LOOP on trip Event 7 - Malf after EOP entry - 2B HPSI pump sheared shaft on SIAS, 2A HPSI pump does not start on SIAS Similar comment on Critical Task language from event 3 - what is the Critical Task here (CT-2)? The ES-D-1 cover sheet has language that talks about B train HPSI valves that do not open on SIAS, everywhere else we have pumps fail to start and sheared shaft? If the critical task is something like start 2A HPSI pump and establish ECCS flow to the core what is the bounding criteria? (in other words, by what point has the critical task not been performed correctly?)

Event 8 - Malf after EOP entry - RCS sample valve V5203 fails to close on CIAS Critical Tasks:

CT-1 RESTORE PARAMETER/COMPONENT PRIOR TO RPS/MANUAL TRIP ACTUATION - Restore Steam Generator Level prior to RPS trip set point or approaching Manual Trip set point defined in 2-AOP-09.01.

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

CT-2. INITIATE/ACTUATE/START SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT THAT FAILS TO FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY.

Prior to Major Event:

• RO: Event 2 (I/C) + Event 5 (R) = two

• BOP: Event 1 (I/C) + Event 3 (I/C) + Event 5 (R) = three

• SRO Tech Specs: Event 2 + Event 5 = two

• Abnormal Events: Event 1 + Event 2+ Event 3 + Event 5 = four

• Critical Tasks: one After Major Event:

• Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = two

• EOPs entered = One

• EOP contingencies =

• Critical Tasks = one

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

NRC Scenario #2: Downpower, CEA #57 Fails to Insert, 2B MFIV Fail, TIC-2223, HVS-4A Fail, and 2A SGTR Turnover Is there overlap between initial conditions in this scenario and the SRO written exam Q dealing with CCW cooler leak to the 2A HPSI pump? Evaluate w/facility.

Need to provide reactivity plan or some kind of detailed reactivity direction w/turnover. What would operators use for the downpower if this happened in the real plant? Ensure included w/turnover information.

Event 1 - Unit down power to remove 2A2 Circulating water pump from service (RO-Reactivity + BOP-Normal + SRO-Reactivity)

We need to know what the expected actions are for contingent procedure steps. For example, CYCLES V2513, VENT VALVE as necessary to maintain VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig is just a repeated procedure step. We need to know, for example, VCT pressure was approximately 26 psig and constant during validation, should not need to adjust VCT pressure, or during validation, needed to make one adjustment for VCT pressure control or similar.

Event 2 - CEA #57 fails to insert with group 5 in Manual Sequential (RO-Instrument +

SRO-Instrument)

Event 3 - 2B MFRV HCV-09-2B air failure (SRO-TS)

This is failure on a Main Feed Isolation Valve, not a Feed Reg Valve. MFRV not TS.

Event 4 - TIC-2223 Letdown Temperature Controller fails high (RO- Instrument +SRO-Instrument)

No annunciators listed for the failed TC-2223. What should we expect to see besides the red LED on the controller? Are there alarms associated? M-12, Letdown HX Outlet Temp High/Low?

Event 5 - HVS-4A (RAB Main Supply Fan) will trip (BOP-Component + SRO-Component, TS)

SNPO Report does contradicts Indications provided. SNPO reports HVS-4A motor running but indications provided in the DS-2 state Green Light OFF and Red Light

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

OFF, indicating a failure of control power. The failure seems unclear. If the fan trips off, the Green light would be ON, Red Light OFF, and the motor would be off when reported from the SNPO.

Event 6 - MAJOR EVENT: The 2B SG develops a 350 GPM SGTR trip When the Rx and Turbine is tripped, the music states that the Turbine does not trip and the BOP trips the turbine with the manual pushbutton. Is this supposed to be in the script? Was not listed in the malfunctions matrix on DS-1.

When checking the Maintenance and Vital Aux, the script does not indicate what should be verified with the LOOP. No mention of verification of the electric buses carried by EDGs.

Que states, IF SIAS occurs the SRO DIRECTS manual actuation of A train SIAS and the crew will trip 2 RCPs and Leave 2 RCPS running and then PERFROM App.

J. Based on the LOOP, all RCPs are off?

The CT is not annotated on the DS-2 on page 37 for the ATWS.

Event 7 - Malf after EOP entry - RTGB-204/201 RX Trip Pushbuttons FAIL, ATWS, LOOP on the Trip What is the safety significance of this first CT? If I push the first set of Rx trip buttons and then do not push the second set of trip buttons what is the adverse consequence? What plant parameter gives the applicant operators feedback that they have not correctly performed the CT? Is the automatic Rx trip function blocked for this scenario?

Event 8 - Malf after EOP entry - 2B ADV Block vlv MV-08-17 is failed open and 2B ADV will not close with the controller in auto/man when less than 510 °F or App R when isolating 2B S/G IAW 2-EOP-99 App R Critical Tasks:

CT-1, TRIP REACTOR PRIOR TO EXCEEDING RPS SETPOINTS - Trip the reactor manually prior to exceeding the RPS TM/LP (Variable) trip set points.

CT-2, ACTUATE EQUIPMENT THAT FAILS TO FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY - 2B ADV does not close automatically and must be isolated manually.

CT-3, Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure.

Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.

Prior to Major Event:

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

• RO: Event 1 (R) + Event 2 (I/C) + Event 4 (I/C) = three

• BOP: Event 1 (N) + Event 5 (I/C) = two

• SRO Tech Specs: Event 3 + Event 5 = two

• Abnormal Events: Event 2 + Event 3+ Event 4 + Event 5 = four

• Critical Tasks: zero After Major Event:

• Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = two

• EOPs entered = One

• EOP contingencies =

• Critical Tasks = two

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

NRC Scenario #3: Raise power, PT-07-02B fails, 2A TCW PP Brg Fail, 2B SG ESD Turnover Event 1 - Raise power to 100% (RO-Reactivity + BOP-Normal + SRO-Reactivity)

This may be one we want to be the extra scenario. Scenario 5 is also an ESD with an RCS leak and requires EOP-15. Scenario 3 is an ESD. Scenario #5 is also the low power scenario. We will decide after validations/after prep week.

Event 2 - Containment Pressure transmitter PT-07-2B fails high (slowly drifts) (RO-Instrument + SRO-Instrument, TS)

Event 3 - 2A TCW Pp Brg Failure, 2B TCW Pp Fails to auto start (BOP-Component _

SRO-Comonent)

When the 2B TCW pump fails to start, what will be the limiting parameter before the crew needs to trip if they do not get the pump started in an efficient manner? Exciter Temp? Lube Oil Temp? What time frame do they have before they reach this criterion? Potential CT, but could be covered in the catch all CT for creating a CT.

Event 4 - HIC-1100 AUTO fails spray valves open (RO- Component +SRO-Component, TS)

Event 5 - HCV-14-1, CCW RCP Supply Fails closed (RO-Component, BOP-Component, SRO-Component)

The 10 minute time to trip the RCP and Rx without CCW flow is to protect the RCP seals. Does the simulator model RCP seal failure if the operators do not secure the RCPs? If so, potential Critical Task?

Please separate out procedural actions and TS calls for evaluation (box just the TS call)

Unsure why CONTINGENCY 1.4 (top of p. 20 of 36) is N/A. Wouldnt the operators attempt to reopen the valve?

Event 6 - MAJOR EVENT: 2B S/G instrument piping rupture resulting in ESDE, MSIS Fails to actuate Same Turbine Trip comment. Seems that the turbine doesnt trip in every scenario per the DS-2, but I havent seen any discussion of this malfunction built into any scenario. What is the malfunction that requires Manual Turbine Trip?

DS-2 is written to directly go to EOP-5 after EOP-1 based on the ESD. However, the ESD is relatively small (Instrument piping) and doesnt get larger until 15-20 minutes after the trip. This coupled with securing all RCPs could result in some delay in ESD

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7) diagnosis and the crew entering EOP-2 for plant stabilization before realizing the ESD. This should be added to the DS-2 as a potential path with a note for the examiners.

If the crew has not identified the ESD in EOP-1 and actuated MSIS, then they wont start AFW in EOP-1, if it didnt start on AFAS, when Main Feed is available and should be recovering SG levels at this point until MSIS is actuated.

For step 11 of EOP-01, the expected response states that the SRO will go to EOP-3 for LOCA. Should be EOP-05 for ESD.

For CT-2, what marks the 15 minute criteria? Does it start at the Rx trip? 2C AFW PP Start or AFAS Actuation? When they recognize they have no flow to 2A SG? Is the 15 minute bound by the requirement to enter EOP-15 if feedwater flow is not restored?

MSIS failure to actuate listed in the DS-2. Is this a credited malfunction? Not in the DS-1.

Step 17 states that when the 2A reaches dryout that the operator will open both ADVs on the 2A to stabilize temperature. Should be 2B.

Event 7 - Malf after EOP entry - On AFAS actuation, MV-09-11 AFW to 2A SG fails to open.

Event 8 - Malf after EOP entry - 2B LPSI Pump Fails to Auto Start. 2A LPSI Pump is OOS Failure of the 2B LPSI PP to start is not included in the DS-2. No mention of it for expected operator actions when verifying SIAS.

Critical Tasks:

CT-1, RESTORE PARAMETER/COMPONENT PRIOR TO RPS/ MANUALTRIP ACTUATION. Restore RCS pressure prior to RPS actuation or meeting Manual Trip Criteria.

CT-2, RESTORE PARAMETER/COMPONENT TO RESTORE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION.

CT-3, Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure.

Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.

Prior to Major Event:

• RO: Event 1 (R) + Event 2 (I/C) + Event 4 (I/C) = three

• BOP: Event 1 (N) + Event 3 (I/C) = two

• SRO Tech Specs: Event 3 + Event 4 = two

• Abnormal Events: Event 2 + Event 3+ Event 4 + Event 5 = four

• Critical Tasks: one After Major Event:

• Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = two

• EOPs entered = One

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

• EOP contingencies =

• Critical Tasks = two

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7)

NRC Scenario #5: Raise Power, LIC-2210 Failure, Letdown leak in RCB, 2A ESD Turnover Event 1 - Raise Power to 1-2%

Event 2 - LIC-2210 LD Flow Controller Fails High Event 3 - 2B2-2B3 breaker 2-20411 open resulting in de-energization of 2B3 4.16 KV bus, 2B EDG starts and breaker fails to close Event 4 - Letdown line leak in containment, RCS leakage (10 gpm)

Event 4 credit given to both the BOP and ATC.

Event 5 - Letdown leak increases to 60 gpm then on the trip the 2A S/G ESDE Inside Containment Big Enough to get to 45 psig in containment.

Why would a leak of 60 GPM drive them to trip the plant? It appears the leak is within Charging capacity and procedurally not driven to trip.

How long to get to 44psig in RCB? If the peak pressure based on leak size is 45 psig, I expect this would take as long as it takes to dryout the SG.

Turbine requires manual trip. Not in cue.

Event 6 - Malf after EOP entry - 2B CS pump shaft shears, 2A CS pump fails to auto start Event 7 - Malf after EOP entry - A train HPSI header valves do not open on SIAS Critical Tasks:

CT-1. INITIATE/ACTUATE/START SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT THAT FAILS TO FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY-Safeguards Equipment that is essential to the maintenance of Safety Functions has NOT auto-actuated when it should have. Actuation of 2B CS Pump prior to reaching 44 psig inside CNTMT. (Design Basis Failure).

CT-2 INITIATE/ACTUATE/START SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT THAT FAILS TO FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY - Safeguards Equipment that is essential to the maintenance

St Lucie 2020 Draft Exam Comments (Attachment to ES-301-7) of Safety Functions has NOT auto-actuated when it should have. A train HPSI header valves do not open on SIAS and must be manually opened to meet Figure 2 of 2-EOP-99 and within 15 minutes of entering 2-EOP-15 to prevent unnecessary escalation of EAL to SAE (Loss of second Fission Product Barrier) due to inaction by the operators.

CT-3, Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure.

Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.

Prior to Major Event:

• RO: Event 1 (R) + Event 2 (I/C) + Event 4 (I/C) = three

• BOP: Event 1 (N) + Event 3 (I/C) + Event 4 (I/C) = three

• SRO Tech Specs: Event 3 + Event 4 = two

• Abnormal Events: Event 2 + Event 3+ Event 4 = three

• Critical Tasks: zero After Major Event:

• Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = two

• EOPs entered = One

• EOP contingencies =

• Critical Tasks = two

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: Saint Lucie Exam Date: December 6 - 12, 2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 Attributes Job Content ADMIN Topic LOD Admin JPMs U/E/S Explanation and K/A (1-5) I/C Critical Scope Perf. Job Cues Overlap Key Minutia Focus Steps (N/B) Std. Link See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations A1-R Calculate COO Containment 2 X U The original A1-R contained cueing errors.

Sump In Leakage 2.1.20 The JPM to be replaced, as identified during onsite validation.

A2-R Manual COO RCS Inventory 3 X X E Balance 2.1.7 A3-R PZR Heater EC LOD-1. JPM was replaced with a Manual Capacity 1 U 2.2.12 Calorimetric.

Determination A4-R Determine Total Dose, Authorization RC 2.3.7 3 E Required and area posting level A1-S PZR Heater Capacity COO 3 X E Determination/TS 2.1.32 Action A2-S Manual RCS Inventory COO 3 E Balance/ TS 2.1.7 Action A3-S MSIV Unsat due to Direct Lookup.

Accumulator EC 1 U Modified JPM to remove items to remove direct Evaluation and 2.2.40 lookup aspect and increase LOD TS Action A4-S Liquid RC Release Permit 3 S Review 2.3.6 A5-S Determine EP Emergency 2 X E Classification 2.4.41

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 1

Simulator/In-Plant Safety Function and JPMs K/A S-1 Restore Letdown IAW 2-1 AOP-02.03, X X E 004 A4.06 See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations Section 4.2.5 and Att. 5 S-2 Align the ECCS for 2

Simultaneous Hot X E and Cold Leg 006 A4.07 Injection S-3 Place LTOP 3

in service per 2- S GOP-305 027 AK3.03 S-4 Verify MSIS - 4S X E Unit 2 039 A3.02 S-5 Place H2 5

Recombiner in X X E Service - Unit 2 028 A4.01 S-8 Align CCW 8

Electrical IAW 2- X X E AOP-14.01, 4.2.3 008 A4.01 S-7 Respond to JPM credits Alternate Path but has no verifiable Control Room 7 steps associated with the Alternate Path to X X U OAI radiation 072.A3.01 evaluate decision making.

alarms, Unit 2 JPM was replaced during validation week.

S-6 Transfer 480V LC 2AB 6 X E From LC 2A2 To 062 A2.10 LC 2B2 -RO Only P-1 Blend to the 1

VCT Using Local S Control 004.K4.04 P-2 Locally close 8 S

Unit 1 MSIV 068 AA1.21 6

P-3 Unit 1, local start of EDG 064 X E G2.4.35

ES-301 3 Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.

1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.

(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)

2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)

3. In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:

The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)

The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)

All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.

The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).

Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)

The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.

A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).

4. For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:

Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).

The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)

5. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.

6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

ES-301 4 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Saint Lucie Scenario: 1 Exam Date: December 6 - 12, 2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations 2 X S Failure requires two components, LT9005, then LT 9011. Failure of LT9005 X E provides cuing to a Feed Control Failure before any action required.

3 Moved the failure of LT9005 to be included in turnover.

4 S 5 X X E 6 Major S 7 X E 8 S 8 1 2 2 E

ES-301 5 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Saint Lucie Scenario: 2 Exam Date: December 6 - 12, 2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 S See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations 2 S 3 X E Failure of TIC-2223 within downpower resulted in no appreciable indication of temperature change or alarms while being masked by the downpower. IX already E bypassed for downpower and starting charging pumps. No actions required.

Failure of TIC-2223 was moved to the first malfunction of the scenario to allow the 4 crew to better see plant response and take actions.

5 X X E 6 Major E 7 X E 8 X E 8 1 E

ES-301 6 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Saint Lucie Scenario: 3 Exam Date: December 6 - 12, 2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations 1 X E Multiple Hard Card steps missing in DS2 associated with operator actions for up power. Need these steps and expected actions for examiners to follow.

Added steps 2 X S Need CT associated with NOT starting TCW PP.

3 X X E Added.

4 S 5 S 6 Major X X E 7 S 8 X E 8 1 1 2 2 E

ES-301 7 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Saint Lucie Scenario: 5 Exam Date: December 6 - 12, 2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.

Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations 1 E There is no actions associated with BOP for raising power without turbine online.

Credited in DS-1. Fixed.

Additional C/I failure needed in scenario to ensure not the minimum for any RO 2 E applicant. Added Reactor Reg Instrument failure to scenario.

3 X S Add expected actions for crew to complete the 1 hr TS requirement. Also, possibility that crew will isolate ledtown and secure charging. Need this added to X E scenario and DS-2 4 Added to scenario DS-2 The scenario as written would not procedurally drive the crew to trip. Increase the X U leak size to drive the plant to manually trip.

5 Major Leak size increased to 160 gpm Critical task defined, bounded and properly worded.

6 X U Corrected per CE guidance.

Critical task defined, bounded and properly worded.

7 X U Corrected per CE guidance.

7 1 2 2 U

ES-301 8 Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.

2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.

3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)

• opening, closing, and throttling valves

• starting and stopping equipment

• raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure

• making decisions and giving directions

• acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)

5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.

6 Check this box if the event has a TS.

7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.

8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.

10 Record any explanations of the events here.

In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.

• In column 1, sum the number of events.

• In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.

• In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.

• In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)

• In column 7, preidentified CTs should be 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)

• In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)

• In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.

ES-301 9 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Saint Lucie Exam Date: December 6 - 12, 2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 Scenario  % Unsat. Explanation Event Events TS TS CT CT Scenario U/E/S Totals Unsat. Total Unsat. Total Unsat.

Elements 1 8 2 2 0% E See 301-7 Attachment for additional explanations 2 8 2 2 0% E 3 8 2 2 0% E 4 7 2 2 43% U Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.

1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).

This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).

2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:

a. Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.

b. TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)

c. CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.

2+4+6 7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements: 100%

1+3+5 8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.

9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

ES-301 10 Form ES-301-7 Site name: Exam Date:

OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Total  %

Total Explanation Unsat. Edits Sat. Unsat.

Admin.

9 3 5 1 JPMs Sim./In-Plant 10 1 7 3 JPMs Scenarios 4 1 3 0 Op. Test 23 5 15 4 21.7%

Totals:

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.

1. Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.

For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.

Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and 2.

simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.

Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous 3.

tables. This task is for tracking only.

4. Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.

Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test 5.

Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.

Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:

• satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%

• unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%

Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test 6.

required content changes, including the following:

• The JPM performance standards were incorrect.

• The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.

• CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).

• The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).

• TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).

ES-301 11 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 12 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 13 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 14 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 15 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 16 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 17 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 18 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 19 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 20 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 21 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 22 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 23 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 24 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 25 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 26 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 27 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 28 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 29 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 30 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 31 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 32 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 33 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 34 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 35 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 36 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 37 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 38 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 39 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 40 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 41 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 42 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 43 Form ES-301-7 The Final Written Exam Sample Plan for the 2021 St. Lucie Exam can be determined by combining the final ES-401-4 form of changed K/A statements with the initial/draft written exam sample plan.

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection New K/A Group Selected K/A 1/1 062 AA1.02 PSL has no Service Water Loads 062 AA1.07; Ability to operate and / or monitor in the CR the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the SWS; interactions among the components 1/2 001 AA1.06 PSL new rod control system does not have rod transfer switches Due to the new Rod Control 058 AA1.03; Ability to operate and / or monitor System, applicability of the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Continuous Rod Withdrawal to A1 Power: Vital and battery bus components selections is not plausible for an operationally valid Tier 1 question.

[001 AA1.03; Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Boric acid pump control switch] Cannot write an operationally valid question since all Continuous Rod Withdrawal requires immediate Trip since there is no In/Hold/Out switch.

2/1 003 A3.01 PSL has no seal injection for 003 A3.05; Ability to monitor automatic RCPs operation of the RCPS, including: RCP lube oil and bearing lift pumps 2/1 004 K1.25 PSL has no interface between HPI 004 K1.23; Knowledge of the physical and Excess Letdown connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems:

RWST 2/2 079 A4.01 Overlap with T2G2 KA 078 A4.01 No other 078 (Service Air) with IR >2.5 Random selection of new system in SF 8 for question: 008 CCW 008 A4.07; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Control of minimum level in the CCWS surge tank SRO 1/2 076 PSL has no specific Hi Reactor 076 G2.2.40; High Reactor Coolant Activity:

AG2.2.44 Coolant Activity monitors in the Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a Control Room. All High RCS system.

Activity Rad Monitors have been removed from service.

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 2/1 062 This is not an SRO Knowledge 062 G2.4.22; A.C. Electrical Distribution:

G2.4.35 item (Auxiliary Operator Task), Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety Also overlap with RO 27 same functions during abnormal/emergency Generic KA different System operations.

2/2 086 This is not an SRO function at 086 G2.1.27; Fire Protection System (FPS):

G2.1.19 PSL Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

1/2 074 EK1.09 Test question written but 074 EK1.03 Knowledge of the operational references needed and turned into implications of the following concepts as they ADMIN JPM. Cannot write test apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling:

question to appropriate level Processes for removing decay heat from the core

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only All 008 AK2.03 1 H 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Readability/first part Q statement: RISE Letdown flow, or LOWER Letdown flow; neither choice works grammatically.

3. If this leak was truly at the upper instrument tap, between the pressurizer and the condensing pot, would there really be any change in indicated level? The condensate pot should keep the reference leg full. Recommend a different/better description of the leak location if it supposed to be on the high pressure connection of the D/P cell to improve operational validity.

4. Indeterminate as to what licensed operators as humans will or will not do or act in a hypothetical future-tense situation. Need to write the Qs to test specific procedural requirements when testing operator actions.

5. Second part Q statement asks for actions (plural) but there is only one action provided in the distractors. Sometimes Qs can read better/more clearly when the two parts of the Q statement are separated (as long as there is no common information that can be combined). Consider the following recommendation for the Q statements:

WOOTF completes the below statements?

(1) Based on the given conditions, the automatic response of the Pressurizer Level Control system is that letdown flow will ___(1)___ .

(2) In accordance with 2-AOP-01.10, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL, operators are required to place the ___(2)___ to mitigate the event.

Q evaluated as E at this time.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 009 EK2.03 2 H 2 X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. It is not plausible that S/G cooling would not be required during a SBLOCA.

Consider the following statement: S/G cooling is not required to ensure adequate heat removal during a SBLOCA, is what was proposed. The statement is very broad-based and must be made more precise in order to be used on an NRC examyou are evaluating a SBLOCA, which because it is not specific could be construed as any SBLOCA or all postulated SBLOCAs.

EOPs definitely require S/G cooling for LOCAs; the Q statement does not specify what reference would not require S/G cooling, so the entire library of procedures and references is wide open when assessing this distractor choice.

3. One recommendation: Consider providing SGs and Break Flow as choices to test if applicant understands the need for SGs during SBLOCA.

4. Another potential recommendation: The EOP background document states that S/G cooling is ___(1)___ [only required for a postulated design-basis SBLOCA/required for a postulated design-basis SBLOCA and other analyzed accidents. This line of Q may be SRO-only based on background documents unless there are RO level training objectives that cover this knowledge.

However, as submitted the Q is evaluated as U based on multiple non-credible distractors.

011 EK3.12 3 H 3 X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.. K/A match is weak but acceptable, first part Q is the only part dealing with procedural knowledge/EOP actions and it could be argued that first part Q could be answered with systems knowledge. Chief Examiner will not declare K/A match not met based on knowledge that is in a procedure, but is not exclusive to a procedure. Note that this K/A specifically requires EOP actions knowledge beyond the Tier 1 considerations that generally call for AOP/EOP procedure content in Q development space.

2. Non credible distractor for A1 and B1. When would closing a breaker for a valve inhibit its operation? Plausible if opening the breaker with the valve in the closed position to prevent auto opening, but not the other way around.

Comparing the SIT isolation to the Recirc Isolation is Apples to Oranges.

3. Recommend changing the crew will to IAW 1-EOP-03, The crew is required to Q evaluated as U due to multiple non-plausible distractors.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 015 AA2.10 4 H 2 X X X Y N E B

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Need to change R-26-56 from alarm to rising trend. With the Rad monitor in alarm it takes away the validity of the distractor to take the switch to Open Reset Also remove the SNPO report of rising level in CCW Surge Tank. If there is a noticeable rising trend this leak would be on the LOCA range.

3. Cue in the second part distractors: it is a logical true in all cases that CCW Flow is NOT restored. Since that is true, hard to believe an applicant would think the first part Q should be attempting to open the isolation valve (first part distractor C and D).

4. First part Q statement must test procedure requirements not what operators will do.

5. Distractor credibility of A(2) and C(2) is weak when compared with the other choice. Consider what these distractors are saying: youve exceeded 250 degrees CBO temperature, but you are going to sit there and continue operating the RCP until 10 minutes have elapsed and CCW flow is not restored, and only then trip the pump which you have allowed to continue running with an overtemperature condition - very unlikely. Giving some benefit of doubt here on overall Q evaluation.

Q as submitted evaluated as E at this time.

022 AA2.04 5 H 2 X X X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Recommend adding bullet at end of conditions list as follows (or similar): No operator actions were taken, and all RCS leakage parameters remained constant for the next two hours. Otherwise the applicant is required to predict how all these thermal-hydraulic conditions are going to change over a long time interval.

3. Subset issue with distractors. If I thought, incorrectly, that the PZR is at the MIN TS limit at 1501, then it is also true that the PZR is below this limit for all other choices, therefore I must have done something wrongI know the latest time is the correct time (and it actually is the correct answer). Need to ask something like earliest time in the Q statement, e.g. WOOTF describes the earliest time that Pressurizer level will be at the MINIMUM Tech. Spec. 3.4.3, PRESSSURIZER, limit?

Q evaluated as E at this time.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 025 AK2.01 6 H 2 X X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. This is a weak K/A tie to a Tier 1 question, since the calculation to Time to Boil is performed daily the RCS is not intact. Also, there is no real tie to an AOP step. Although the TTB calculation is contained in the procedure, it is not driven to be evaluated based on any procedural step. Could be argued that the proposed Q is not Tier 1.

3. Is the failure of the HX due to an instrument air failure? Since it is a rare instance for a HX to stop working, this reduces the operational validity of the question.

4. Correct numerical answer is technically 29.8152, must add approximately to Q statement if facility decides to keep TTB aspect of the Q.

Q evaluated as E since it does not meet Tier 1, hope it is easy correction.

026AG2.1.30 7 H 3 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Tier 1 procedural aspect of this Q is weak because it could be argued that an applicant could answer the Q solely w/systems knowledge. One easy way to increase the procedural-ness of the Q: rewrite the Q statement to ask the crew is required to first attempt to locally align the ___(1)___ Header to restore Q evaluated as E at this time.

027 AG2.4.3 8 H 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Two correct answers. Since Close PORV Block, is part of the correct answer, this does not eliminate Close PORV Block valve as an incorrect answer. Also cues because Q statement asks for plural actions, can fix easily by writing action(s). Recommend, asking which action should be performed first IAW EOP-1? Close Both, or close either.

3. What procedure or requirement tells the operators which instrumentation should be used FIRST? It seems like the Q is really driving toward which instrumentation should be used at all? Maybe change the first part Q slightly to something like this: If the US asks the RO to report current RCS pressure, the RO is required to answer ___(1)___ [1504 psia/1506 psia]

Q evaluated as E due to two correct answers as written.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only APE029EK1.01 9 H 3 X X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Please provide simulator data to support assertions concerning Reactor power trends. Would it be better (?) to ask this question as something like:

With no operator actions, Reactor Power 5 minutes after the ATWS will be

___(1)___ [approximately the same as/lower than] Reactor Power just before the ATWS occurred.

3. Add technical reference to second part Q statement. Distractors basically resolve to either PZR safeties or DSS, everything else is confusing window dressing. Recommend just asking FSAR credits the ____(2)___ [PZR safety valve/Diverse SCRAM] system to mitigate this accident. Wouldnt consider this SRO level knowledge as it is basically the system purpose/function of the DSS.

Q evaluated as E at this time.

038EA1.32 10 F 2 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Not plausible that an applicant would confuse the min pressure for Criticality with SGTR SG isolation requirements. Nowhere in EOP-4 does it discuss 515F or min temp for criticality. Giving benefit of the doubt here in overall rating.

3. Be careful with potential for subset issue here, probably need to use term setpoint or procedure states somehow, it is logically/technically correct that 510 is less than 515.

Q evaluated as E due to non-credible distractors.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 055EK3.02 11 H 3 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level. K/A match for reasons K3 here is indirect in that it could be implied that if the applicant know the correct actions, there is also implicit knowledge of the correct reasons for those actions.

2. Distractor D is a potential correct answer. Without knowing the load on the Unit 1 EDG, it is not possible to determine that you would not overload that EDG by starting ICW. This question may need a reference and some values provide with the running equipment to allow the applicant to evaluate the conditions and make the decision driving to the correct answer.

3. Overlap with SRO Q dealing with SBO entry on loss of AC only or loss of both AC and DC. Potential fix (?) for both issues above: eliminate the given bulleted conditions and just ask the following:

WOOTF completes the below statement?

A CAUTION in 2-EOP-10, STATION BLACKOUT SBO, states the following: Do NOT restart ___(1)___ [ICW pumps [ONLY/no other pumps are listed in the CAUTION statement]/ICW or CCW pumps] if power is from ___(2)___.[the ONLY operating EDG on Unit 1/the Station Blackout Crosstie, to prevent exceeding breaker amperage limits]

Q evaluated as E due to one non-credible distractor.

1 056 AK3.01 12 H X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level..

2. It is LOD=1/GFES common knowledge that there is no cause-and-effect relationship at all between load sequencing pump starts on EDG and water hammer. Overlap: Both the previous Q and this one can be logically reduced to dont start ICW or CCW (biggest pump loads) because you can overload EDGs.

Q evaluated as U due to multiple non-plausible distractors/LOD=1 on water hammer as distractor given the proposed Q.

057 AA1.06 13 H 3 X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Two correct answers. 2A DC Bus powers the 2MA and 2MC DC buses which power the 2MA and 2MC instrument buses. So the loss of 2A DC Bus results in a loss of 2MA Instrument Bus. Items listed in subsequent would happen in both cases.

Q evaluated as U due to two correct answers.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 058 AG2.2.37 14 H 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Plausibility concern with the 1A AFW Pump choice. It should be obvious without DC bus there is no DC control power on A buses and, therefore, no A train AFW pump. Better distractor may be to utilize 1B AFW PP through crosstie.

3. Editorial: please change will be verbs to is required to format in both Q parts.

Q evaluated as E at this time for plausible distractor.

062 AA1.07 15 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Potential correct answer concern: Based on distractor analysis, the Circ Water Pump seal coolers will automatically swap to domestic water as backup, but manual actions are required to align backup cooling to the Inst Air compressors. Are we absolutely sure that the Circ Water Pump seal coolers do not have any transient temperature perturbations on the swap to backup/domestic water cooling? Could be o.k., discuss w/facility licensee.

Q evaluated as E at this time, potential S.

065 AA2.06 16 F 3 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Potential for subset issues first and second part Q statements. Should be easy to fix. Recommend the following for the two Q statements:

The Unit to Unit cross-tie from Unit 2 will OPEN at a setpoint of ___(1)___ .

1-AOP-18.01 states the following: IF Instrument Air header pressure indicates less than ___(2)___ and lowering, THEN PERFORM the following: A. TRIP reactor. B. GO TO 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

Q evaluated as E at this time due to minor wording improvements required to fix subset number issues.

CE02 EK1.2 17 F 2 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only CE05 EK1.3 18 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Need to correct the indeterminate Q statements should/should be.

3. Also recommend more closely parallelism with ADM-11.16 for technically correct answer and technically incorrect distractors. Issue is that generic statement BEFORE 2A S/G reaches dryout does not provide the applicant a specific reason/condition/parameter to commence stabilization, which is what the Q is asking.

Maybe consider the following recommendation for Q statements and second part distractors to fix the above issues (?):

WOOTF completes the statements below in accordance with the requirements of ADM-11.16, TRANSIENT PROCEDURE USE AND ADHERENCE, section 4.3.1.N, RCS Temperature Stabilization Guidance following an Excessive Steam Demand?

The crew is required to establish a pressure band on the 2B S/G of ___(1)___.

Stabilization of the 2B S/G was required to be commenced ___(2)___. [when the Excessive Steam Demand terminated, or the 2A S/G was blown dry/as soon as the operators verified that only the 2A S/G is faulted.]

Q evaluated as E at this time.

058 AA1.03 19 H 3 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time 003 AA1.02 20 H 3 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 032 AA2.07 21 H 2 X X U Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Readability/cueing. The statement, IF proper overlap with Wide Range Channels is observed, implies the answer will be correct. Is it possible to go critical low in the SR and WR overlap not yet verified? What happens in this instance? The question basically tells me that WR are on scale so I can continue without SRNIs. Recommend removing the Wide range portion since it drives the applicant to the correct answer. Maybe have the reactor start lower and go critical lower?

3. The first part of the question, C.1, and D.1 are not plausible. The value is only 2 doublings and is obviously an incorrect value given that the Rx started at 50 CPS and is now critical.

4. LOD is weak.

Q evaluated as U due to multiple non credible distractors.

051 AK3.01 22 H 3 X Y? N N E

1. Q=K/A but weak Tier 1 match (see below), Q=RO level.

2. What is a Small vacuum leak? Does that mean vacuum is leaking in?

Stating the condenser has an air leak at 11% power should be sufficient.

3. Weak Tier 1 tie. Doesnt test EOP/AOP level knowledge. Setpoint and basis are more Tier 2. Understand that it is a difficult K/A to meet since there arent AOP actions associated with SBCS. Recommend tying the question to the AOP value for Turbine trip. IAW 1-AOP-12.01, at 8 Hg Abs, the (turbine/SBCS) will be tripped to protect the (Main Condenser/turbine blades).

Q evaluated as E at this time based on Tier level/ K/A match concerns.

061 AK2.01 23 L 3 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Not Tier 1. Systems level knowledge. Example: IAW 1-AOP-26.02, the operator is required to.

3. New or Bank? Says both.

Q evaluated as E at this time based on Tier level.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 074 EK1.03 24 H 1 X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. It is LOD=1 and non-plausible that LPSI pumps will be used for OTC given an inadequate core cooling condition. When have applicants ever been taught or performed a simulator scenario when LPSI pumps are used for OTC? Or in other words, under what plant conditions would LPSI pumps ever be used for OTC?

Q evaluated as U at this time due to LOD=1 and multiple non plausible distractors.

CA11AA2.1 25 H 3 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A. Q=SRO level on second part.

2. As written, the submitted Q is technically an SRO level Q because it involves analysis of plant conditions and selection of procedures beyond entry-level into AOPs or EOPs, therefore beyond RO level procedure transition knowledge and SRO only/SRO function. Giving benefit of the doubt here because the K/A statement specifically calls for selection of appropriate procedures which is difficult to do on the RO level for this particular topic.

3. Multiple correct answers: as pointed out in the distractor analysis, the same parameters could be either a LOCA or ESDE; because we are not given Containment Radiation readings we dont know.

3. Chief Examiner is willing to accept K/A match in an implicit manner that is more suitable to RO level knowledge for the below recommended fix, given the same submitted information:

In 2-EOP-01, Standard Post-Trip Actions, operators are required to evaluate the need for emergency boration based upon ___(1)___. [RCS Temperature ONLY/RCS Temperature and CEA Positions]

Operators ___(2)___ [can/can NOT] differentiate between a LOCA inside Containment and an ESDE inside Containment based upon the initial trends of the following parameters: Pressurizer Level, Pressurizer/RCS Pressure, and Steam Generator Pressures.

Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only CA13 AK1.2 26 H 3 X X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Not enough given parameters are provided to completely evaluate the plant conditionsno initial power level or RCS temperature (what if the event happened somewhere in MODE 3?).

3. Based on the provided reference of 2-AOP-01.13, it seems like there are multiple required soaks that must be performed - there is a 9 hr 9 min soak requirement, followed by a 19 hr 21 min soak requirement, followed by a final 23 hr 21 minute soak requirement. Under what plant conditions would AOP-01.13 not require any RCS soak to be performed? Distractors not plausible.

Q evaluated as U due to multiple non plausible distractors.

CE09 G2.4.35 27 F 3 X X X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. There is a NOTE in 2-EOP-4 that states: Cooldown rates up to 100 degrees F in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.

It could therefore be argued distractors B(2) and D(2) are potentially correct.

Recommended fix is to add an additional bullet in the given conditions that says something like, Operators have verified that minimum subcooling has been established

3. Plausibility of opening DC supply breaker to MSIV is weak - opening DC supply breaker to what component? Are there MSIV components powered from DC? Need to be precise here. Also need to avoid asking what NPO will do.

4. When the MSIV is locally closed implies that the cooldown rate changes with MSIV closure but that is incorrect, max C/D rate is dependent on natural circ/loss of RCPs. Better not to include technically incorrect implications.

Recommend asking: Based on the given conditions, 2-EOP-04 directs the crew to COOLDOWN at a rate NOT to exceed ___(2)___ in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.

Q evaluated as E at this time.

003A2.03 28 H 3 X X Y N B U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Cueing: similar to Q21 above, 2nd part Q statement If the Reactor DOES trip. Is a cue that the answer to the 1st part Q is that the Reactor will trip (which is also the correct answer).

3. Plausibility of tripping RCP before verifying Rx trip is low; when a Rx trip has just occurred, under what plant circumstance would operators ever take any actions before checking/verifying the Rx is actually tripped?

Q evaluated as U due to multiple non plausible distractors.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 003 A3.05 29 F 2 Y N B S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time 004 K1.23 30 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Readability/clarity. Recommend rewrite to place the valve as the first part of the question, with at ____ and as the second part.

Q evaluated as E at this time due to minor editorial enhancements 005 A2.04 31 H 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Testing Tier 1 level knowledge of procedural requirements of AOP.

3. Throttling FCV-3306 will have no effect on temperature unless HCV-3657 is first open to allow flow from the SDC HX. Therefore, without stating that HCV-3657 has been repositioned on the hand jack, part two of this question makes no sense.

4. Is the second part asking how to reposition the valve after the failure or IA or is it asking generally which way to turn the valve to increase cooldown rate?

Q evaluated as E at this time 006 K6.13 32 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Could not find specific procedure step in 2-EOP-03 that matches what is stated in second part Q. Discuss w/facility licensee, may not be an issue.

Q may be E or S based on resolution of 2. above.

007 2.4.50 33 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Readability. Better to rewrite as, The HIGH Alarm Setpoint is ____

Q evaluated as E at this time due to minor editorial enhancement.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 007K5.02 34 H 2 X Y N M E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Is passing fluid the same as leaking or does this mean the PORV is open?

3. Second part Q statement of ..this type of leakage somewhat indeterminate.

Recommend stating more precisely what we mean: RCS leakage through the PORV into the Quench Tank? or similar Q evaluated as E at this time.

008 G2.2.22 35 H 3 Y N B S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time IMPORTANT NOTE/POTENTIAL OVERLAP W/JPM?: Although this Q appears o.k. from a stand-alone/psychometric analysis standpoint, discuss w/facility licensee potential overlap with simulator JPM dealing with CCW pump alignment.

010 A1.07 36 H 3 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time 012 K4.05 37 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Slight cueing/manual bypassing doesnt work as definitely bypassing at a given power. Recommend minor adjustment to Q statements:

(1) During power ascension, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) Hi Startup Rate trip bypass setpoint is ___(1)___ power.

(2) The RPS Hi Startup Rate trip is bypassed ___(2)___ . [via operator action/automatically]

Q evaluated as E at this time.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 013 K3.01 38 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Are Figures 1A, 1b, AND Figure 2 going to be provided? Do we need to add REFERENCE PROVIDED for this Q?

3. First bullet under Subsequently: needs to be experienced not experiences

4. What is the technical definition of fuel being adequately cooled, or not?

Based on the distractor analysis, we are really asking whether or not Core Heat Removal Safety Function is or is not met. Better to specify this in the first part Q statement if so.

Q evaluated as E at this time 022 A1.04 39 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Tier 1 level question asking AOP procedural requirements in both parts.

Q evaluated as E at this time doe to being written to Tier 1 level 022K4.02 40 H 3 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time 026 K1.02 41 H 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. First part Q grammatical match with distractors: spray pumps do or do not.

3. Delete during large break LOCA, there is not specific LBLOCA signal, or configuration of containment spray system, based on LBLOCA (apart from RAS). Also to start second part Q sentence with Unit 2 is awkward and cueing unit difference. Second part Q statement recommendation: Following actuation of RAS, Unit 2 Containment Spray flow ___(2)___ cooled by the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Heat Exchangers.

Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 039 A3.02 42 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Be precise: we mention Unit 1 in the first part Q, but not in the second part Q. Second part Q statement needs to also specify: Unit 1 MSR Block valves can be .

3. Check w/facility licensee: understand that on Unit 1 there is a switch on the RTGB for the block valves. From the provided references, it is unclear that you can not operate them via OVATION. Please discuss.

Q evaluated as E at this time 039 K1.02 43 F 2 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time 059 A1.03 44 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Too many trip words in distractors B(2), D(2). Q statement is still slightly unclear. Consider the following:

(1) The ___(1)___ will automatically trip.

(2) The DIRECT cause of the above automatic trip signal is an interlock based on ___(2)___. [LOW MFWP Suction Pressure logic/1A Condensate Pump breaker trip logic]

Q evaluated as E at this time 059G2.4.45 45 H 3 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time 061 A2.08 46 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. SG Level given as 27%. Is this WR Level or NR Level? Since AFAS Actuates off NR level, doesnt affect the answer.

Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 061 K3.01 47 H 1.5 X X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Weak LOD, somewhat affected by cueing in distractors. See recommendations below.

3. Please provide simulator parameter data to support correct answer.

Recommend the following distractors/improve parallelism between distractor choices:

A. RISE, because the RCS delta T power RISES B. RISE, because the RCS temperature RISES C. LOWER, because the boiling rate in the S/G tube bundle region RISES D. LOWER, because the S/G level initially RISES (swell phenomenon)

Q evaluated as E at this time 062 K2.01 48 F 1 Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Think this is Fundamental LOK, not High

3. LOD=1. Simple power supply memorization Q evaluated as U at this time due to LOD=1 concern.

063K2.01 49 F X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. If AB DC Bus is aligned to A DC Bus and A is lost, then AB is lost and there is no power to MV-08-3 or Turbine control. The TTV would close. No C AFW PP until AB aligned to B. It didnt say No operator action, but it is implied.

Easy correction? by aligning AB DC Bus to B DC in the stem of the question.

3. Editorial correction in second part distractors: change feeding to feed Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 064 A4.01 50 F 3 X X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Based on the submitted distractors, it is a logical cue/logical true statement that both start and stop can be performed locally. For this Q, believe it is better psychometrically to just ask whether or not both start and stop can be performed from the control room, which is the only logical differentiation.

3. Plausibility of distractor C is low; why would there be capability to start from the CR but not shut it down? Lets discuss.

Consider the following recommendation:

(1) The 2B EDG SLOW speed start ___(1)___ [can/can NOT] be performed from the Control Room.

(2) If an EMERGENCY stop of the 2B EDG is required during the 2-OSP-59.01B monthly surveillance run, this ___(2)___ [can/can NOT] be performed from the Control Room.

Q evaluated as E at this time.

064K6.08 51 H 3 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Recommend minor enhancement to second part Q statement: were to occur, with no operator actions the 1A EDG would run Q evaluated as E due to minor editorial enhancement

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 073 K5.01 52 F 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Will a damaged new fuel element not release an iota of beta-type radiation?

Believe distractors C(1) and D(1) could be argued partially correct because the Q statement is asking what type(s) of radiation will be released.

Recommendation to resolve this comment would be to focus on the language in the NOTE which covers the same information:

The same given information, then WOOTF completes the statement below?

A NOTE in 2-AOP-67.01 states that the ___(1)___ [alpha radiation/alpha and beta radiation] associated with a damaged new fuel assembly

______(2)______ . [will NOT cause actuation of Area or Process Radiation Monitor high radiation alarms/may cause actuation of a high radiation signal in the control room and cause isolation of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation and activate Shield Building Ventilation]

Q evaluated as E at this time 076A4.04 53 F 2 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Indicates properly tells me that the indication is working correctly. It could be argued that both valves indicate properly if their position matches the indication on RTGB-102. Recommend changing indicates properly to is in the correct SIAS position.

3. Parallelism and grammar match with C(2) distractor, needs to be on RTGB 102 to match A(2)

Q evaluated as E at this time due to stem focus.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 078A4.01 54 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Technically speaking, the AOP does not specifically direct starting the Instrument Air Compressors locally; the step specifies starting the standby IACs per procedure. Similar comment as Q50 - it is a given logical truth that the standby IACs can be started locally. Note that K/A specifies ability to operate and/or monitor in the control room.

3. Need to move away from what operators will do. See below recommendation:

(1) The crew ___(1)___ start the standby Instrument Air Compressors from the Control Room.

(2) If Instrument Air Pressure continues to lower, the crew is required to commence a Unit Shutdown due to ___(2)___ .

Q evaluated as E at this time 103 K4.04 55 L 1.1 X Y N N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. LOD - Weak. Not plausible that there is only an electrical interlock. It is common knowledge that there is a complicated mechanical interlock used for Containment hatches. How would an electrical interlock, absent any mechanical components, function to prevent local operation of the Containment doors?

Q evaluated as U due to multiple non plausible distractors.

002 G2.2.3 56 L 1 Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Seems too easy to ask which system is bigger. May be able to increase the LOD by providing the volume of one unit and asking which one? Giving benefit of the doubt here.

Q evaluated as E at this time 011 K2.02 57 H 3 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 014 K5.01 58 F 1 X U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. With RSPT as the first part and Reed switch in the second, it seems pretty obvious that they go together, and the rest of the distractors can be dismissed.

3. Is there CEA Gripper Motion with a Mechanically stuck rod? If gripper engages and rod will not move, I suspect it is magnetic slippage and the gripper never moves. This would mean D.2 could be a correct answer as well Q evaluated as U at this time due to LOD=1, and possible multiple correct answers.

015 A1.04 59 H 4 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Seems like a difficult question to know from memory the alarm setpoint of L-

20. Is there an RO training objective that covers this setpoint? May be o.k.

Q evaluated as E at this time 016 A3.01 60 H 3 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Implausible distractors. Not sure of an instance where 8801 would fail full open. But for answers A and B, 8801 either goes open as it went to manual or stayed in automatic yet still went full open. These are incompatible and easy to eliminate. Failing closed would make the distractors more plausible. Plus, why would a steam flow control valve ever fail open? Giving benefit of the doubt with overall Q evaluation based upon potential ease of correction.

Q evaluated as E at this time for credible distractors.

029K1.03 61 F 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. A(1) and B(1) distractors do not work grammatically/reading. (Valves CLOSING ONLY.)

3. It is technically correct that closing the isolation valves will terminate the mini purge, no matter what happens with the HVE-7A fan.

Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 033 K4.04 62 F 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. First part Q statement unnecessary repetition: Spent Fuel Pool TS 3.9.11 Spent Fuel Storage Pool, . Just delete initial Spent Fuel Pool and ask IAW TS 3.9.11 Spent Fuel Storage Pool,

3. Unnecessary information/cueing: we can delete the final clauses to be maintained to minimize radiation levels in the Fuel Handling Building. and low enough to raise radiation levels in the Fuel Handling Building.

Q evaluated as E at this time 045K3.01 63 H 3 X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. After one minute, the system returns to Auto if SG Lvl stayed >45% NR.

Therefore Answer C can be a correct answer. Need to provide a limitation on the time after trip.

Q evaluated as E at this time 068 K6.10 64 F 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Subset issues/partial correct answers. As stated every distractor could be argued partially correct because they are all logically true actions to perform a controlled liquid release as the Q statement asks. Note that the use of ONLY for subset bounding here would not be technically accurate because there are other actions needed to correctly execute the release. Recommend modifying the distractors as follows, can keep the submitted distractor and add:

A. Two independent radioactivity analysis of the tank to be released is NOT required.

B. Two independent release rate calculations are NOT required.

C. An independent verification of the initial valve alignment is NOT required.

Q evaluated as E at this time 008 A4.07 65 H 3 Y N B S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. If desired, we can move some language in the second part distractors into the Q statement. Ok with the submitted format in any case.

Q evaluated as S at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.1.3 66 F 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Candidate may consider 5:30 as turnover time, which would meet the requirement. Also, since the SRO relieve before the ROs, the oncoming SRO could come in and take the RO watch until the scheduled RO came in at 6:30.

This could be considered Shift Turnover for appeals purposes. Recommend bounding the question to provide a relief time of 6:30 and specify being relieved by the oncoming RO.

Q evaluated as E at this time G2.1.37 67 F 3 Y N B S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time G2.1.41 68 H 3 X X Y N B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Technically distractor B could be argued correct as it is a subset of the correct answer (D). Need to add something like WR NI status doesnt matter or only one BF3 Log Startup Channel is required to be OPERABLE to continue the core reload to make distractor B completely wrong.

Q evaluated as E at this time G2.2.35 69 F 2 Y N N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time G2.2.39 70 F 3 Y N B S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.3.13 71 F 3 X Y Y N U

1. Q=K/A, Second part Q is on SRO level. Knowledge of the position that must authorize deviations, is generally taken to be SRO-only level questions, especially for Tier 3/generic administrative Qs. For example, who can authorize a planned special exposure? is generally taken to be an SRO-level Tier 3 Q.

2. Second part Q is confusing; it is asking if the power ascension may continue, when a given condition is that the power ascension is in progress. Confusing to applicant as to what the actual conditions are. Also, generally better to state a condition (personnel inside containment for loose debris verification) in the given/bulleted area and not as a conditional statement modifying the Q statement(s).

Q as submitted evaluated as U due to license-level mismatch.

Consider the following recommendation with basically same content, would this be more RO-level(?):

Given the following conditions:

-Unit 2 is performing a plant start up IAW 2-GOP-302, Mode 3 to Mode 2

-Reactor Power is 3% and stable

-Personnel are inside Containment for loose debris verification

-A small RCS leak is suspected inside Containment WOOTF completes the statements below IAW 0-NOP-68.00, CONTAINMENT ENTRIES MODE 1-4?

(1) Based on the given conditions, the appropriate senior management position(s) ___(1)___ [can/can NOT] authorize personnel to enter the biological shield to investigate the RCS leak.

(2) Based on the given conditions, the power ascension ______(2)______ .

[can continue with personnel in Containment, if specifically authorized by the appropriate senior management position(s)/can NOT continue until all personnel have exited Containment]

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.3.4 72 F 3 X X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. The use of Initial is confusing. Are we trying to tell the applicant that the person has had no other extensions?

3. It appears that answer B is also correct. Can the extension not be immediately taken to 3000mr/yr which would encompass the 2000 mr extension.

4. Consider the need to bound the distractor choices or re-state the Q more clearly to eliminate a possible subset issue; it is technically correct that 3000, 4000, and 5000 mrem are all greater than 2000 mrem Q evaluated as E at this time G2.4.14 73 F 2 Y N B S

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

Q evaluated as S at this time G2.4.20 74 H 2 X Y N N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Is the PZR Steam Space not considered the RCS? Need to differentiate between and RCS Pipe LOCA and a Steam pipe LOCA to eliminate the subset.

Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.4.9 75 H 2 X Y N B U

1. Q=K/A, Q=RO level.

2. Font in the Given area appears different from the other submitted Qs (slightly smaller?)

3. First part Q can be answered solely using systems knowledge (knowledge of low power mitigation strategy not elicited): with RCS at 900 psia, above shutoff head of both LPSI pump and SIT. Non plausible distractors as compared to HPSI flow as an option.

4. Unsure about technical accuracy of the given information. Under what plant conditions would a LOCA result in 900 psia and stable over 30 minute period?

If break flow out is exactly matched by ECCS injection flow in during a 30 minute C/D, wouldnt the containment sumps be filling?

5. Is there a plant reference document that defines short term and long term w.r.t. procedural mitigation strategies? Does the applicant have enough information to evaluate what will be required for long term cooling? In other words, how does the applicant know that in the 4 to 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> window of 2-EOP-03 that simultaneous hot and cold leg injection would, or would not, be required?

Q evaluated as U at this time due to multiple non plausible distractors.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only

• • • SRO-ONLY EXAM QUESTIONS BELOW***

009EA2.34 76 H 3 X X X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO level.

2. Do not believe enough parameters are provided in the Q stem to make a complete determination on HPSI throttling criteria. Based on the procedure, believe we need to add, for example: (1) pzr level trend, (2) what about Rx vessel level indication or Thot parameters? Maybe say Thot = 547 or something similar (3) how to determine minimum subcooling? If we need to add reference tables (1A/1B) for this, also add REFERENCE PROVIDED to Q stem.

3. 2nd part Q statement is awkward and cueing (if/when HPSI throttling criteria is met, implication is that it is met otherwise how could you evaluate HPSI throttling criteria against the given conditions?) In other words, if an applicant thought, wrongly, that HPSI throttling criteria was not met based on the given conditions, how would they know to evaluate whether or not one or zero charging pumps required? Potential fix?: write 2nd part Q statement as When HPSI Throttle Criteria are met then include/add Note: When considering securing pumps for future HPSI throttling, Pressurizer Level continues to increase after each pump is secured. (otherwise, how does an applicant know what pzr level trend is after securing one or more pumps? Indeterminate future speculation)

Q evaluated as E at this time.

022AG2.2.38 77 H 2 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q SRO Level.

2. Discussion: Provided analysis seems to contradict the answer. The analysis states Therefore this specification is met with use of a gravity feed and the 1A Boric Acid Makeup Tank and the V2514 with Boric Acid Makeup Pumps via the 1A Boric Acid Make up tank. The RWT flow path to Charging is never credited for TS 3.5.2. This contradicts the answer that TS 3.5.2 is NOT maintained and the operability of V2504 has no bearing on TS 3.5.2. It almost looks as if the question was modified significantly from the original, but portions were not properly addressed. Given information seems to relate to TS 3.1.2.1 but 2nd part only asks impact on TS 3.5.2?

Unsure about second part of question technical accuracy. Confusion between given information and what is being asked. Discuss with facility to resolve.

3. Q stem states REFERENCE PROVIDED, but 401-5 info says no references provided. Which is correct?

Q evaluated as E at this time, need to discuss w/facility.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 025AA2.04 78 H 2 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Minor tweak: First part distractors do not match Q statement grammaticallyvalve manipulation does required.

Q appears E at this time.

055EG2.4.2 79 F 2 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Need to change will be entered in first part Q statement and would be required in second part Q statement and make the Qs ask specific procedural requirements. (be careful with indeterminate will construct for operator actions, can be used for determined/specific automatic actions per next Q discussion)

Q as submitted E at this time.

077AG2.2.22 80 H 2 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Need to make first part Q statement match grammatically (sources is).

3. Second part question statement, add, with no operator action and tweak, would change to will change.

Q appears E at this time.

CE06EA2.1 81 H 3 X X Y Y M U

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. First part Q needs to be tighter/more specific (based on is very broad statement), maybe something like 1-EOP-06 requires the operators to establish OTC based upon the given ___(1)___.

3. Unsure how B(2) and D(2) distractors are plausible. Were the applicants trained on the previous revision of the EOPs? If not, why would any applicant think that method is the correct method of establishing OTC? Would the applicants have ever performed the previous EOP method of OTC usage in the simulator?

Noted overlap with Scenario 4, but this should be the scenario we do not use now that the class size supports 3 scenarios.

Q evaluated as U due to multiple non-plausible distractors.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 005AG2.1.7 82 X E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Testing >1hr TSAS in second part of question without reference. Potential fix? Recommend testing the AOP requirements for shutdown based on rod operability/inoperability, maybe just ask if plant shutdown is required for 2nd part Q statement (delete TS reference).

Q appears E at this time.

068AA2.03 83 F 2 X X X Y Y N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Distractors A(1) and B(1) could be considered partially correct since Thot is what is being determined. Maybe use highest loop Thot indicated on Remote Shutdown Panel or similar that would be definitely wrong?

3. Second part distractors not plausible. There is never a 15 min NRC reporting requirement. Furthermore, provided reference/overlap with Q100 make it a direct lookup that there are no 15 min NRC reports. Also, the reference for question 100 allows the applicant to look up the reporting requirements and see there are no 15 min reports to the NRC.

Q evaluated as U based on overlap/provided reference to another Q makes multiple distractors non-plausible 076G2.4.40 84 H 3 X X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Minor tweak to second part Q statement: need to add latest time for subset/bounding, maybe Activity, the latest time Unit 1 is required to be

3. Dont understand what the third bullet is telling us: what does relatively unchanged mean for Gross Coolant Activity? Should this parameter be given under the subsequently information? And wouldnt an increase in Specific Activity due to I-131 cause a corresponding increase in Gross Activity?

Recommend actual values to allow the applicant to evaluate GA. There is no TS for Gross Activity which brings the plausibility of A and B into question. The remainder is a direct lookup with the reference provided. Believe Q can be salvaged, giving some benefit-of-doubt here for evaluation purposes.

Q evaluated as E at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only CA16G2.4.23 85 H 3 X Y Y B E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Minor tweak to Q statement: and Adherence, based on parameters at time ___(1)___

Q evaluated as E at this time.

005A2.01 86 H 3 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. The plausibility justification for A(2) is that Unit 2 can be 1850 gpm if a lot of conditions are met (time after shutdown, CCW temps etc.), but these conditions are not given in the Q stem. If this is the basis of plausibility, we need to provide these conditions.

Q evaluated as E at this time.

006G2.4.31 87 F 2 Y Y N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

Q appears S at this time.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 012A2.06 88 F 1 X Y Y N U

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Distractors A(1) and B(1) are non plausible; these are actions that do not appear anywhere in the EOP-01 procedure. EOP-1 step 1 is an immediate operator action and is performed every day in the simulator for training. Not plausible that any SRO applicant would choose actions that do not appear in the procedure when presented with another choice that they read every day.

Maybe rewrite the question to indicate the next required action and use Emergency Borate as a distractor?

3. Second part question is a direct lookup based on the provided reference. It is a given information/logical true that the unit failed to automatically trip from both a valid RPS signal and the RTGB pushbuttons, and language of EAL SS2 is automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken from the RTGB are not successful so why would anyone who pick SA2?

Possibly change power level to provide some analysis by the candidate. I.E.

ATWS occurred during reactor startup <5% Another thought: Provide that the plant manually tripped (Lowering SG Level/loss of feed control). Upon Post Trip Review it was noted that the automatic RPS trip setpoint was met but did not provide the Rx Trip and operators actually tripped Rx a few seconds after the automatic RPS should have actuated. Is the EAL required to be entered?

Q evaluated as U due to LOD=1 (first part Q) and direct lookup/non plausible distractors (second part Q).

062G2.4.22 89 F 3 Y Y N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Most likely lower cog level vs. higher cog.

Q appears S at this time.

073A2.02 90 F 2 Y Y N S

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

Q appears S at this time.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 001A2.19 91 H 3 X Y Y N E

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Worried that we are asking second part Q statement with iaw language that is not exactly matching the provided basis material. Recommend something like the following: In accordance with TS 3.2.5 BASES, Operating within ASI limits will result in meeting the ___(2)___ criterion in the event of a limiting transient.

Q evaluated as E at this time.

E 041A2.03 92 H 3 X Y Y N

1. Q=K/A, Q=SRO only.

2. Minor tweak: Do we need to provide nomenclature for PCV-8801?

Q evaluated as E at this time.

086G2.1.27 93 F 2 X Y Y N U

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A but weak, Chief Examiner willing to allow this Q topic/subject matter as indirectly relating to system purpose and/or function as per the following discussion: knowledge of those systems that require fire watches and/or automatic fire suppression systems is a way of eliciting which systems have more important purposes/functions that others from a perspective of the fire protection system. In other (most) cases, system purpose and/or function is a difficult K/A to match on the SRO only level, it could be argued that we should have screened this K/A out on review.

2. Based on the provided reference, the first part Q is a direct lookupzone 6A requires a continuous fire watch as the comp measure.

Q is evaluated as U based on direct lookup of provided reference material making multiple proposed distractors non-plausible.

Potential fix? Recommend writing the question with several detectors out in several zones and make the applicant determine which need comp measure and what they are.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.1.34 94 H 1 X Y Y N U

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A

2. First part direct look up/LOD=1. Provided reference in Note 1 states before entering the appropriate Action Level based solely on cation conductivity, therefore it must be true that you enter Action Levels based on only one parameter.

3. Careful with Second part Q, subset issue causing multiple correct answers.

If you are in Mode 3, you are <50% power. Should be easy to fix.

Q is evaluated as U based on LOD=1.

G2.1.35 95 F 2 X Y Y N E

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A

2. Subset issue: Based on OPS-202, FHS can have an SRO license but must have PSL SRO for Core Alterations. Therefore, Answer B can also be considered correct if Refuel Supervisor has a PSL SRO. Needs to clarify if the FHS has active/inactive/no SRO license in the question stem.

First statement of OPS-202: The Fuel Handling Supervisor (FHS) shall have a PSL SRO License, prior SRO experience from a similar facility, or have special technical experience in the area of fuel handling operations and be approved by the Operations Assistant Manager (AOM).

3. From a strictly logical/psychometric standpoint, first part Q is asking basically can FHS be in FHB. Why would any SRO applicant pick against the Refueling Supervisor being in Containment? This seems to be a low LOD.

Q evaluated as E at this time G2.2.23 96 H 3 Y Y N S

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A Q evaluated as S at this time

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.2.7 97 F 3 X X Y Y B E

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A

2. Logical interplay of distractor C non plausible: why would anyone consider major evolution of initial crit following a refuel (major big time rod moves and lots of extra administrative requirements) NOT an IPTE, but think that periodic rod control exercise at power (small rod moves) is an IPTE? Distractor C implausible.

3. Is the IPTE list required to be memorized by SRO applicants or minutia?

Discuss w/facility.

Question as submitted evaluated as E due to one non plausible distractor.

G2.3.6 98 H 3 X Y Y N E

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A

2. Potential for multiple correct answers as per the following discussion: Since there is no time for the GDT Batch release, could it not be held and signed two hours later after the mini purge? Bounding the time for when the GDT release is to be performed should correct the issue. Also for first part Q statement, if minipurge goes from batch to continuous release at 10 hr point, also need to provide timeframe for first part Q.

Question evaluated as E due to potential for two correct answers, think we can fix relatively quick.

G2.4.29 99 H 3 X Y Y N E

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A

2. Add bullet to Initial Conditions to state that the STA has an active SRO license. Makes the distractor more plausible.

3. For the second part, need to change indeterminate will construct and ask Q in terms of procedural requirements. For example: IAW EPIP-02, If the SM event, the ___(2)___ is the NEXT designated position to assume the duties of the Emergency Coordinator (EC).

Question evaluated as E due to plausibility.

ST LUCIE 2020-301 Written Examination Review

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.4.30 100 H 3 X Y Y N E

1. Q=SRO only. Q=K/A

2. Would there be an EAL call associated with this condition? If so, technically correct answer would be 1 hr NRC notification. Can you even get down to 1100 psia on spray valve failed open without LOCA?

3. How is 8 hr report plausible? There are multiple instances in the provided reference material that specify 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification criteria for the given conditions (4hr report is required for a Rx trip at power irrespective of ECCS injection), why would applicant believe they are not applicable? Recommend rewrite to determine if an additional report for 8hr is required or if 8 hr report can be included with the 4 hr notification, may not need reference provided if this suggestion used.

Giving benefit-of-doubt here due to potential ease of correction. Q evaluated as E at this time.

Instructions

[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

• The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

• The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

• The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

• One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

• The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

• The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

• The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

• The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).