ML13225A169
| ML13225A169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| 50-335/12-301, 50-389/12-301 | |
| Download: ML13225A169 (185) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Rev. 02 Facility:
St. Lucie Scenario No.:
5 Op Test No.:
HLC 21-NRC Examiners:
Operators:
SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions:
100% power Turnover: Both Units at 100% power. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is on a clearance due to motor oil leak. The 2A Charging Pump is on a clearance for packing removal.
Critical Tasks:
Power one Safety Related 4160 V bus from Unit 1 within 60 minutes (for Inventory Control) of the loss of power per the Unit 1 UFSAR 15.2.13. This is applied administratively to Unit 2 also.
Restore AFW and feed the SG(s) at > 150 gpm.
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
1 C / BOP Controller for FCV-23-12 (2A SG Blowdown) fails causing the valve to fully open. BOP takes manual control of valve.
2 2
I / RO T.S. / SRO Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-1100X (selected) fails low 3
3 T.S. / SRO A 5 gpm leak develops on the 2B RCS cold leg. Crew identifies leak rate. SRO determines that shutdown is required.
4 R / RO, N / BOP, SRO Downpower to remove unit from service to investigate increasing RCS leakage.
5 4
C / BOP T.S. / SRO 2A Intake Cooling Water Pump trips 6
5 M / All A switchyard malfunction occurs causing the loss of one Midway line. Shortly thereafter, a second Midway Line de-energizes requiring a manual trip for Unit 2. On the trip, a LOOP occurs.
7 6
C / BOP The 2B Diesel Generator fails to start and 2A Diesel Generator output breaker fails to close. Restore power from Unit 1 through the Station Blackout (SBO) Cross-tie breaker.
8 7
C / RO 2C AFW Pump trips on electrical overspeed. RO able to reset and feed both steam generators.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Scenario 5 Rev. 02 2
Turnover will be given that both Units are at 100% power. The controller for FCV-23-3, Stm Gen 2A Blowdown, fails and the valve fully opens. Operators respond IAW ARP M-7 and take manual control of the blowdon FCVs. Due to the SGBD malfunction, Rx power (calormetric) will rise above 100% (approximately 100.5%) so action will be required to lower power to < 100%. The guidance is contained in 2-AOP-08.01, Steam Leak, for minor power excursions above 100.5% (reduce power within 15 minutes).
During the down power Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-1100X (selected) fails low. This will result in letdown lowering to minimum. RO should transfer level control to the Y channel. Pressurizer heaters will de-energize and will need to be restored in accordance with 2-AOP-01.10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level. Only half of the Pressurizer heaters will be able to be restored resulting in the SRO entering T.S. 3.4.3 Action a. (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO). Other Tech Specs that apply are 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation (30 day LCO) and 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (7 day LCO).
A 5 gpm RCS leak develops on the B RCS cold leg. Crew identifies leak rate SRO determines that shutdown is required. TS 3.4.6.2.b requires shutdown within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Crew should enter 2-AOP-01.08 RCS Leakage Abnormal and 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.
Next, the 2A Intake Cooling Water pump trips. The 2C Intake Cooling water pump should be started on the A header using 2-AOP-21.03A, 2A Intake Cooling Water System Header. The SRO should address T.S. 3.7.4 for the 2C ICW pump taking the place of the 2A ICW pp.
When the Intake cooling water system is restored loss of a Midway line will occur. No action is needed for loss of only one line other than referring to 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity. Unit 2 is the designated unit to remove from service due to the RCS leak and other unit equipment complications.
A loss of a second midway line occurs shortly thereafter. Unit 2 should be tripped. A LOOP will occur. The 2B Diesel will fail to start and the 2A Diesel output breaker will not close. The MVA success path (Appendix V) from EOP-01 should be implemented first to restore power from Unit 1 through the Station Blackout (SBO) Cross-tie. The 2C AFW Pump trips on electrical overspeed after the crew enters 2-EOP-10, Station Blackout.
The overspeed can be reset and the pump should be restarted. The crew may elect to enter EOP-15, Functional recovery however MVA safety function will not be met. This procedure will mitigate the event but is not the optimal and EOP-10 Blackout addresses the specific event better.
The scenario can be terminated when AFW flow has been established and Unit 2 has one emergency bus powered through the station cross-tie breaker.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Scenario 5 Rev. 02 3
Procedures Used 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level 2-AOP-01.08 RCS Leakage Abnormal 2-AOP-08.01, Steam Leak 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower 2-AOP-21.03A, 2A Intake Cooling Water System Header 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions 2-EOP-10, Station Blackout Technical Specifications Entered TS 3.4.6.2.b RCS leakage T.S. 3.7.4 ICW System T.S. 3.4.3 Pressurizer heaters T.S. 3.3.3.5 Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation T.S. 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
1 Page 4 of 21 Event
Description:
2A SG Blowdown valve FCV-23-12 fails open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.
Initiate IC 1 100% power. MOL. Place 2A AFW pump to stop. Place Orange control switch ECO tags on the pump control switches. 2A Chg. Pp to stop, 2C Chg. To run and selector switch to B / C.
Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by the lead examiner, Trigger Event 1, FCV-23-12 controller (2A SG Blowdown) output fails to 0% in auto. (2A SG blowdown at max. flow) NOTE: this failure takes appx. 5 minutes to show power increasing.
If the NPO is directed to search for steam leaks, call back in 5 minutes and report nothing abnormal observed.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator M-7 Closed Blowdown HX Temp High comes in appx. 6 minutes after failure.
Annunciator N-5, SGBTF Control Panel Trouble.
Note: Excessive SG blowdown shows as steam leak in that RCS temperature lowers and calorimetric power rises above 100%.
RO Acknowledges alarm and reports to the Unit Supervisor Recognizes RCS temperature lowering and power rising.
(Calorimetric power will rise above 100% if blowdown flow not reduced in a timely manner)
If directed close SG blowdown isolation valves 2A FCV-23-3 and 4, 2B FCV-23-5 and 6.
SRO Reviews guidance from the 2-ARP-01-M7, Step #6 of Operator Actions - excessive blowdown flow. (attached page 5) (may refer to 2-NOP-23.02, Steam Generator Blowdown System Operations)
May enter 2-AOP-08.01, Steam Leak, step 4.2.2.6.1 (attached page 6) and close 2A SG blowdown isolation valves.
Direct boration or CEA insertion to lower power if power rises to above 100%.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
1 Page 5 of 21 Event
Description:
Controller for FCV-23-12,fails low causing FCV-23-12 to fully open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 5
Booth Operator Instructions: If SNPO called report on Aannunciator panel B Annunciator 7 is in alarm. (CLOSED BLDN AFTER HX HIGH TEMP)
Control Room Indications Available:
SRO May refer to 2-AOP-09.04 Condensate, Feedwater but no guidance for this event NOTE: Refer to ARP-12-B7 annunciator 7 (attached page 8)
BOP Goes the back of RTGB panel 202 to observe the controller for FCV-23-12 & 14.
Notes that the output on controller FCV-23-12 is 100% and flow is off-scale high SRO Directs that the controller be placed in manual and flow lowered to 40 gpm (match flow to the B train)
BOP Places the controller in manual and adjusts flow to 40 gpm.
EVALUATOR NOTE: 2A SG BLOWDOWN FLOW IS NOT LOST (ALARM CONFIRMATION). FCV-23-12 CONTROLLER RED PEN GOES OFF-SCALE HIGH WITH CONTROLLER OUTPUT INDICATION = 0 (INDICATES OUTPUT TO THE VALVE TRYING TO CLOSE IT)
RO Initiate boration or CEA insertion as directed by SRO if Reactor power rises above 100%
NOTE SRO This event and the next event may result in Pressurizer pressure lowering to DNB setpoint of 2225 psia. If so, SRO recognized and implements T.S. 3.2.5 IF pressurizer pressure lowers to less than 2225 psia. Restore pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Directs additional Pressruizer heaters energized to raise pressure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
1 Page 6 of 21 Event
Description:
Controller for FCV-23-12,fails low causing FCV-23-12 to fully open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 6
RO If pressure lowers to 2225 psia, communicate to SRO DNB T.S. and energize additional heaters when directed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
2 Page 7 of 21 Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-1100X (selected) fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 2, Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-1100X fails low.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators: H-17 PZR level high/low and Letdown flow lowering, LIC-1110X offscale low, LI-1110X offscale low, loss of half of PZR heaters. Also B-9 and H-29. H-37 comes in when Pzr Lvl key taken to LEVEL position RO Identifies and communicates abnormal Pressurizer level indications and letdown at minimum.
RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions IAW 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and level by:
Step 4.1.4 VERFIY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-1110X, LEVEL, NORMAL Step 4.1.4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector to non-affected control channel.
SRO Directs Immediate Operator Actions IAW 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and level (attached page 11)
Enter subsequent actions, sections 4.2.6 Selected Pressurizer Level Control Channel Failure (attached page 12,13)
Enters T.S. 3.4.3 Action a, one group of heaters inoperable, restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (attached page 14)
NOTE: If Pressurizer pressure lowers to 2225 psia, the SRO should enter DNB T.S.
3.2.5 restore pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Other Tech Specs that apply are 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown Sys Inst. (30 day LCO) and 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Inst. (7 day LCO).
Direct Attachment 5 of 2-AOP-01.10 to recover available heaters (attached page 15-17) Note: not able to regain P-1, B-1, 2,3 heaters due to level channel failure.
RO Places B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL and Resets B side Pressurizer heaters P-2, B-4, B-5, B-6 (attached page 16 step 5 and page 17 step 8) when directed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
3 Page 8 of 21 Event
Description:
5 gpm leak develops on the 2B RCS Cold Leg Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by the lead examiner, trigger Event 3, 5 gpm RCS leak.
Control Room Indications Available:
Rx Cavity leakage recorder FR-07-1 rises (approximately 2-3 minutes)
Annunciator M-46, Reactor Cavity Leakage High Letdown flow lowering SRO Based on indications of RCS leakage, implements 2-AOP-01.08, RCS Leakage Abnormal Operations. (attached page 19-23)
Directs RO to estimate RCS leak rate based on Charging and letdown mis-match.
SRO T.S.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 (operational leakage)
Reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Determine that >1 gpm unidentified RCS leakage is exceeded so power operation cannot continue.
Leak rate is approximately 4-5 gpm based Chg and Letdown flow mismatch and the Rx Cavity Leakage recorder.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
3 Page 9 of 21 Event
Description:
5 gpm leak develops on the 2B RCS Cold Leg Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Same SRO/RO Recognize entry into the DNB T.S. 3.2.5 IF pressurizer pressure lowers to less than 2225 psia. Restore pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Informs SM of leak, may need to classify the event IAW the emergency plan.
RO Energize additional Pressurizer heaters Monitors Pressurizer level and ensure letdown flow lowers to maintain level.
Determines leak rate of approximately 4-5 gpm per Rx Cavity Leakage recorder indication and Charging and Letdown flow mismatch.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
4 Page 10 of 21 Event
Description:
Down power to remove unit from service to investigate increased RCS leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None SRO Implements 2-AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power. (attached page 26-29)
/ BOP Immediate Operator Actions
- 1. BEGIN boration per operator aid.
- 2. PERFORM the following:
A. PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction rate.
B. SET DEMAND to desired power level.
RO Begins Boration per Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power. (attached pages 30-31)
RO Inserts Lead CEA Group 6 inches.
Select MANUAL SEQUENTIAL.
Insert CEAs by taking IN/HOLD/OUT switch to insert.
Starts 2C Charging pump IAW AOP-22.01 Rapid Downpower (attached page 32)
Places Pzr. On recirc. IAW AOP-22.01 Rapid Downpower. (attached page 33)
NOTE: Pressurizer heater availability from LT-1100X failure is not sufficient to place the Pressurizer on recirc.
BOP Programs the DEH per NOP-99.07, Attachment 3, Turbine Adjustment IAW SRO downpower rate. (attached page 34-36)
Notifies Plant Dispatcher step 4.2.4
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
5 Event #
4 Page 11 of 21 Event
Description:
Down power to remove unit from service to investigate increased RCS leakage Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 11 Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None BOP WHEN a Tavg lowering is noted, THEN PRESS the GO pushbutton on the turbine DEH control panel.AOP-22.01 step 4.2.1.
SRO Continues to Supervise/Coordinate Power reduction in accordance with AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power Steps 4.2.8 thru 4.2.14.
RO Controls ASI as directed by SRO with CEAs or per NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control IF a load reduction is required above 50% power, PERFORM the following:
A. MAINTAIN ASI within the transient control band limits below:
- +/- 0.1 during load transients is recommended but should be within +/- 0.2
- +/- 0.5 during load transients with concurrence from Reactor Engineering RO/BOP Maintains T-avg within 6.6°F of T-ref per step 4.2.8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
5 Page 12 of 21 Event
Description:
2A Intake Cooling Water Pump Trips Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 5, 2A Intake Cooling water pump trip (3 minute ramp).
When directed by BOP Trigger 2C ICW PP discharge valve 10 turns open. When directed by BOP and 2C ICW PP running, slowly open discharge valve.
Control Room Indications Available: Increasing Amps on the 2A ICW pump.
Annunciator: E-6 2A ICW PUMP OVRLD/TRIP E-30 ICW HEADERS PRESS LOW, E-17 HYPO LOCAL ALARM S-3 BOP Recognize rising amps on the 2A ICW pump. Stops 2A ICW pump and place switch in Pull to Lock position, of if pump already tripped, place switch in pull to lock position.
SRO Implement 2-AOP-21.03A 2A Intake Cooling Water System Header section 4.2.2 (attached page 39).
Direct performance of Attachment 1 section 2.0, (attached page 40-42). (NPO to perform steps 13-16 of Attachment 1)
BOP Notify ANPO to perform steps 3 and 4, Attachment 1, of 2-AOP-21.03A (attached page 40).
RO When directed Bypass IX by placing V2520 IX bypass valve to BYPASS. Step 2.0.5 Attachment 1 page 3 of 5 BOP Monitor Generator Cold Gas temperature BOP Announce and start 2C ICW pump when directed.
When pressure rises on 2A ICW header direct ANPO/NPO to slowly open 2C ICW discharge valve SB21206.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
6 Page 13 of 21 Event
Description:
Switchyard malfunction, loss of one Midway line Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 6, switchyard malfunction, loss of Midway line #1.
When system dispatcher called, inform the control room will investigate loss of Midway line Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators: LR-6, Midway #1 low load.
BOP Recognize loss of Midway line #1 SRO Implement 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity. (attached page 44-48)
Refers to attachment 1 and determines two lines in service after the loss of one line. Action 2 is applicable. Declare transmission system in ALERT. Notify SM. Contact System for additional requirements.
BOP Monitor Main Generator MW, Voltage and Vars.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
7 Page 14 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 7, loss of second Midway line.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator LR-24, Midway 1,2,3 current high. LR-18, Midway No. 3 Load Low.
SRO Determines Transmission system in Action 3 from attachment 1 of 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity.
Required to trip the Unit within 4 minutes. Option to trip either Unit but Unit 2 should be tripped due to RCS leakage.
Direct manual trip and carry out 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions.
EXAMINERS NOTE: The 60 minute clock to energize at least one vital 4.16kv bus starts at time of trip.
SRO Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions as follows:
RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal, RCS heat removal, Containment conditions BOP: Vital Auxiliaries BOP Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of EOP-99.
Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint. of Vital Auxiliaries NOTE: The RO will be performing all the Safety Functions except MVA due to the BOP aligning electrical to be received from Unit 1.
RO Reactivity Control Verify Reactor power is lowering.
Verify startup rate is negative.
Verify ALL CEAs are fully inserted.
Note that reactivity control is being met.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
7 Page 15 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: If Unit 1 asked about Diesel Generator availability state Unit 1 has both Diesels loaded on their respective bus.
Control Room Indications Available: 2B EDG lockout annunciator.
BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
BOP Identifies 2B Diesel did not start and 2A Diesel output breaker did not close.
SRO Directs attempt to start 2B Diesel and manual breaker closure of 2A Diesel BOP Attempt to close 2A Diesel output breaker and attempt to start 2B Diesel. 2A Diesel breaker fails to close and the 2B Diesel fails to start.
SRO CRITICAL TASK Directs BOP to perform MVA contingency EOP-01 action step 2.C.3 be performed to restore power from Unit 1. (attached page 51)
NOTE: Because the BOP will be tied up restoring power from Unit 1, the RO will be performing all Safety Functions except MVA BOP CRITICAL TASK Notify Unit 1 to perform 1-EOP-99, Appendix W. BOP to Perform 2-EOP-99, Appendix V (includes performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
3 Event #
7 Page 16 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 16 Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Multiple alarms BOP Perform 2-EOP-99, Appendix V (includes performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7). (attached page 53-57)
BOP CRITICAL TASK
- 1. When Unit 1 is ready to supply power to Unit 2, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
A. CLOSE the Unit 2 SBO crosstie breaker, 2AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE (20501).
B. REQUEST Unit 1 close their SBO crosstie breaker, 4160V SWGR 1AB UNIT X-TIE BKR (1-20501).
C. VERIFY the 2AB 4.16 KV bus has power restored.
EXAMINERS NOTE: When step 1.C above complete, the 60 minute critical task clock stops.
- 2. ALIGN the selected train Vital 4.16 KV bus to the 2AB 4.16 KV bus by CLOSING the TWO crosstie breakers:
2AB to 2A3 () 2AB to 2B3 ()
2AB-2A3 (20505)____ 2AB-2B3 (20504)____
2A3-2AB (20208)____ 2B3-2AB (20409)____
NOTE: Due to the 2A AFW pump OOS at time of trip the crew should energize the 2B3 bus to allow the use of 2B AFW pump. (not critical but should be considered)
RO Inventory Control Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%
Note that Charging pumps may not be available yet.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
3 Event #
7 Page 17 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 17 Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Multiple alarms RO Pressure Control Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Note that no Pzr heaters are available.
RO Core Heat Removal Verify at least one RCP running with CCW (N/A LOOP)
Verify loop delta T is <10° F Note that no RCPs are running and that CCW is not available to the RCPs.
RO RCS Heat Removal Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following o SG level is between 20 and 83% NR o Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F S/G pressure is between 835 and 915 psig o Open one ADV on each SG Four MSR TCV Block valves closed o Close MSR TCVs MSR warmup valves are closed If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED (N/A)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
3 Event #
7 Page 18 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 18 Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Multiple alarms RO Due to power lost, ADVs will have to be operated in the MANUAL / MANUAL mode. (DC control)
RO Containment Conditions Verify containment pressure <2 psig Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Note that containment conditions are being met.
SRO Exit EOP-01 and Implement 2-EOP-10, Station Blackout (attached page 60-70)
NOTE: Due to initial RCS leakage the SRO may elect to enter 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery. If so, Safety Function MVA will NOT be met whereas entering 2-EOP-10, all Safety Functions will be met. Entering EOP-15 is NOT the optimal procedure to enter.
RO Close MSIVs, SGBD valves and SG sampling when directed.
Isolate letdown, and RCP controlled bleedoff when directed.
Ensure all 6 RCS sample valves closed.
Control Tcold <535°F using ADVs Verify Natural Circulation Block MSIS / SIAS when directed
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
8 Page 19 of 21 Event
Description:
2C AFW pump trips on electrical overspeed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions: when Crew has entered 1-EOP-10, Station Blackout and directed by the lead evaluator, trigger event 8, 2C AFW overspeed trip.
If asked as NPO report that electrical overspeed tripped and the pump is not rotating.
Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger restore Instrument Air per Appendix H of EOP-99. (IF AB 480V bus energized)
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator G-46 2C AFW Pump Turbine Failure/Trip/OVRLD/SS ISOL. Closed position indication of MV-08-3 and G-46 resets (clears), indicates electical overspeed trip.
RO Recognizes alarm and indications that 2C AFW pump has tripped on electrical overspeed.
SRO Directs implementation of 2-AOP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater (attached page 72-75) to reset 2C AFW pump electrical overspeed trip AND / OR if 2B3 4.16KV bus and associated MCCs energized direct 2B AFW pump started and aligned to feed 2A and 2B SGs.
CRITICAL TASK When 2C AFW pump overspeed reset, direct both SG level restored to 60-70% NR OR if 2B3 4.16kv and the vital MCCs to power the B side MOVs energized, start the 2B AFW pump.
RO When directed perform Attachment 1 to reset 2C AFW pump overspeed AND / OR start 2B AFW pump.
RO CRITICAL TASK When 2C AFW pump overspeed reset OR 2B AFW pump available, feed both SGs to restore SG level to 60-70% NR When directed depressurize the RCS to between 1800 and 1850 psia.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
5 Event #
8 Page 20 of 21 Event
Description:
2C AFW pump trips on electrical overspeed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 5 Rev. 02 Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
RO If CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
- 2. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
Suggested termination point:
Power has been restored from Unit 1 to Unit 2 AFW restored feeding both SGs
Scenario 5 Rev. 02 21 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO:
Board RCO:
Protected Train: B Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0.08 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0.14 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A AFW pump T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action a.
2A Charging Pump N/A with 2C and 2B Charging pumps available.
OPS 513s:
Locked in Annunciators:
G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS Isol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS Isol/2555 OVRLD/SS/ISOL Current Status:
Both Units are at 100% power MOC RCS Boron concentration is 777 PPM.
2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak. The 2A Charging Pump is on a clearance for packing removal. None of the above are expected to be returned to service this shift Equipment Problems:
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Facility:
St. Lucie Scenario No.:
4 Op Test No.:
HLC 21-NRC Examiners:
Operators:
SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions:
13% power, MOC. 2A Charging pump OOS for repack.
Turnover: 10-12% power with the main generator on line. The 2A Charging pump is OOS for repack.
MFW and SBCS are in service. Raise power to 30%.
Critical Tasks:
Manually actuate B SIAS within 15 minutes after entering EOP-04 Block MSIS prior to actuation Stop all RCPs no later than 10 minutes after SIAS due to loss of CCW.
Event No.
Malf.
No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
R / RO N/ BOP, SRO The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid. Raise power to 30%.
2 1
C / BOP T.S./ SRO Containment Fan Cooler 2-HVS-1A trips.
3 2
I /RO 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Drifts low. Manual control of Low Power Feedwater valve (FCV 9005) is required.
4 3
T.S./ SRO RCS loop (SG) flow instrument (PDT-1111D) fails low.
5 4
I / RO HIC 1100 Spray Controller fails high 6
5 C / BOP Loss of 2A1 480V Load center. B DEH pump fails to auto start 7
6 M / All Turbine vibration exceeds 14 mils, manual Rx/Turbine trip required. SGTR on the 2B SG 8
7 C / RO B side SIAS does not auto actuate. Manual actuation required.
A side SIAS auto actuates but 2A HPSI Pump is air bound and should be secured 9
8 C / BOP While performing Appendix R for the 2B SG, the 2B MSIV does not close from the Control Room. Local closure by the NPO is required (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Scenario 4 Rev. 03 The Unit is at 13% power. MFW and SBCS are in service. The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid. Directions for the crew are to raise power to approximately 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201.
Allow the crew to up power 2-3%, then the Containment Fan Cooler 2-HVS-1A, will trip. The BOP should start idle Containment cooler (2-HVS-1D). The SRO will be required to implement the appropriate T.S. HVS-1A should be declared inoperable and T.S. 3.6.2.1, Action b, restore inoperable cooling train within 7 days. 2-4 minutes after the Containment Fan Cooler trips, the 2A SG WR Level instrument, LIC-9012, drifts low causing the RO to take manual control of LCV 9005. The Main Feedwater AOP should be entered.
After manual control of SG levels is established and the standby Containment Fan Cooler has been started (and TS actions addressed), the crew should commence the up power. After the crew raises power 3-5%, RCS Loop 2A Channel D flow instrument (PDT-1111D) fails low causing a low flow indication and half trip signal (also appears on PDI-1101D on the RTGB).
The crew must diagnose the problem and bypass the trip signal in accordance with 2-AOP 01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation. The SRO will refer to T.S. for the appropriate action statement.
While the SRO and BOP are diagnosing and taking action to bypass the RCS low flow RPS trip, HIC 1100 Spray controller output fails high. Pressurizer pressure will continue to lower until the crew takes manual control of the spray valves.
A loss of the 2A1 480V load center will occur when the breaker opens. This results in loss of letdown and numerous alarms. The RO should stop the running Charging pumps. The running DEH pump will stop and the backup DEH pump will not start. The BOP should manually start the 2B DEH pump, the 2B Gland exhaust fan and the 2B primary water pump. The breaker can be closed when the crew requests the SNPO to investigate. The report back will be the breaker was opened by mistake in preparation to hang a clearance. The clearance was intended for the other Unit.
After RCS pressure has stabilized, turbine vibration alarms are received (confirmed with control room indications) due to excessive turbine vibrations. The trip vibration limit is exceeded requiring the crew to manually trip the reactor and turbine (power > 15%).
Following the Rx trip, a SGTR will occur on the 2B SG. As the unit depressurizes, B train SIAS does not auto actuate. Manual actuation will be successful. A train SIAS auto actuates but the 2A HPSI pump is air bound and should be secured. This causes the need to manually initiate B train ECCS. The 2A HPSI pump will require venting to become operable (but not until B SIAS is manually actuated).
As the RCS is cooled down (to less than 510ºF Thot) and depressurized, the MSIS block permissive will be received. The crew should block MSIS to maintain SBCS in service to limit steaming the ruptured generator to atmosphere. This is a critical task. When the 2B SG is being isolated IAW EOP-99 Appendix R, the 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Local closure IAW EOP-99 Appendix I will be successful.
The scenario may be terminated when 2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture is implemented, the 2B SG is isolated and the RCS is being cooled down.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Procedures Used 1 (2)-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1 2-NOP-09.01, Main Feedwater System Operation 2-AOP-09.01, Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation 2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Equipment 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level 2-AOP-25.01, Loss of RCB Cooling Fans 2-AOP-47.02A, Loss of Non Safety Related AC Bus - Train A 1(2)-AOP-22.02 Turbine Supervisory 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions 2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2-EOP-99, Appendix R 2-EOP-99, Appendix I Technical Specifications Entered T.S. 3.6.2.1 Containment Cooling T.S. 3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
1 Page 4 of 21 Event
Description:
Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Booth Operator Instructions:
Initiate IC #84, 13% power, then execute HLC 21 NRC Scenario 4 lesson.
Ensure the main generator is synchronized to the grid.
Ensure 2B and 2C Charging pumps are running and 2A Charging Pump out of service.
Charging pump selector switch in the 2B/2C position.
Sign off applicable steps in (1)2-GOP-201 up through step 67 Hand out (1)2-GOP-201 signed off up through step 67.
Indications Available: Numerous alarms due to power level and status of the secondary.
SRO Direct power increase IAW 1(2)-GOP-201 step 68. (Generator is approximately 100 MW) continue with up power.
WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 170 MW, THEN DIRECT the following:
(Step 68.A, B, C)
A. ENSURE Turbine drain valves are closed.
B. Transfer from Startup to Aux. Transformers(Appendix Z of 2-GOP-502) attached page 5,6 C. Place running MFW pump control switch to AUTO.
RO Withdraw CEAs in Manual Sequential as directed to raise Rx power.
EVALUATORS NOTE: Power should be raised initially by CEAs. CEAs should be withdrawn to at least 102 prior to 20% power to meet LTSSIL BOP Raise Turbine load using 1-NOP-99.07 Turbine Adjustment (attached page 7-9)
Monitor SG levels for proper operation of FWCS. (step 67 of GOP-201)
Booth Operator Instructions:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
1 Page 5 of 21 Event
Description:
Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Indications Available:
BOP When Directed perform the following:
(Step 68.A, B, C)
A. ENSURE Turbine drain valves are closed.
B. Transfer from Startup to Aux. Transformers (Appendix Z of 2-GOP-502) attached page 5,6 C. Place running MFW pump control switch to AUTO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
2 Page 6 of 21 Event
Description:
2-HVS-1A Containment Fan Cooler Trips Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 2, HVS-1A trips.
Indications Available: Annunciator T-12, CNTMT FAN CLR HVS-1C OVRLD/TRIP Evaluator Note: 2-4 minutes after event 2 was triggered, trigger event 3.
This is to ensure the BOP does not operate the FWCS for the next event (event 3)
BOP Acknowledge alarm and recognize HVS-1A tripped.
SRO Implement 2-AOP-25.01, Loss Of RCB Cooling Fans Section 4.2.5 (attached page 12-15)
Direct starting HVS-1D in FAST speed BOP Start HVS-1D in FAST speed when directed.
SRO Direct monitoring Containment air temperature T.S. SRO Recognize fan is not operable. Review T.S. 3.6.2.1 Action 1.b restore inoperable containment cooling train within 7 days.
(attached page 16)
BOP Monitor Containment air temperature (UR-07-1B on RTGB 206) to ensure Containment temperature does not exceed 120°F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
3 Page 7 of 21 Event
Description:
LT-9012, 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Booth Operator Instructions: With Event 2 in progress and upon cue from examiner, Trigger Event 3, LT-9012 drifts low.
Indications available:
A SG feedwater controller output rising A SG level rising Annunciator G-1, 2A SG Level Hi/Lo DCS Display will show LT-9012 lowering SRO Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-AOP-09.01 Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation (attached page 18)
Notifies shift manager and I&C of event Direct up power stopped RO Recognize A SG level indication slowly rising Place FCV-9005 controller to manual to restore and maintain SG levels to 60-70%.
Evaluator Note: The wide range level control input is the anticipatory (feed forward) signal when feedwater control is in the low power mode. With LT 9012 drifting low, it influences actual level to rise with the NR inputs operating normally. LT-9012 eventually fails off-scale low and holds last good value (2 minute old value).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
4 Page 8 of 21 Event
Description:
RCS Loop (SG) flow instrument (PDT-1111D) fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 03 Booth Operator Instruction: When directed Trigger Event 4, PDT-1111D fails low Indications Available: Annunciators L-10, L-18, Reactor Coolant Low Flow Pre-Trip
/ Trip.
SG P 2A1, PDI-1101D reads 0 on RTGB 203 apron section.
PDI-1101D reads ~10.9 (half of normal) on RTGB.
EVALUATOR NOTE: TRIGGER EVENT 5 WHILE THE BOP IS BYPASSING THE FAILED CHANNEL ON THE RPS.
SRO /RO Recognize alarms. Confirm failed channel SRO Directs implementation of 2-AOP-99.01, Loss Of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 4.1.1 (attached page 20-22)
Refers to step 4.2.16 and directs bypassing failed D channel SRO T.S.
Recognize entry into T.S. 3.3.1 action 2#. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place in trip or bypass)
Notifies Shift Manager of PDT-1111D failure and entry into 2-AOP-99.01, Loss Of Tech Spec Instrumentation.
BOP Obtains key 103 and Bypasses Channel D RPS trip bistable as directed per of 2-AOP-99.01, Loss Of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 4.2.16.2.A
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
5 Page 9 of 21 Event
Description:
HIC Spray Valve Controller Output Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Rev. 3 Scenario 4 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner initiate HIC 1100 Fails High.
Indications Available: Pressurizer pressure lowering, both spray valves indicate full open.
SRO / RO Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down / main spray valves fully open Directs RO to take manual control of HIC-1100 Refers to 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level step 4.2.3 (attached page 24-26) Direct spray controller operated in manual.
May direct hold on power increase (if still in progress)
Directs RO to control RCS pressure by energizing additional heaters, if available and manual control of spray valves.
Notifies SM and I&C of event Refers to Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB) if pressure <2225 psia.
Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> RO Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down / main spray valves fully open Secures dilution if directed by SRO (if still in progress)
Places HIC 1100, Spray Controller, in manual as per step 4.2.3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
6 Page 10 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of 2A1 480V Load Center Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Rev. 3 Scenario 4 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, initiate loss of 2A1 480V Load Center.
Booth Operator Instructions: When field Operator is requested to investigate, report the SNPO was hanging a clearance which was intended for the other Unit.
Breaker 2-40103 was opened inadvertently.
Booth Operator Instructions: Start 2B Closed blowdown cooling water pump when directed.
When asked, report back Main Transformer cooling is operating.
Recommend triggering next event when breaker 2-40103 has been closed.
Indications Available: Numerous alarms. Running DEH pump trips and backup DEH pump does not start. Running Gland exhaust fan stops, running Primary water pump stops. Letdown valves close.
BOP Report numerous electrical alarms and Breaker 2-40103 2A1 480V Load Center breaker is open.
Recognize and communicate no DEH pumps running. Request to start the 2B DEH pump.
Place Turbine up-power on HOLD when directed When directed call SNPO to investigate breaker 2-40103.
When directed call NPO to ensure Main Transformer cooling is operating.
Verifies 2B isophase Bus cooler is running SRO Direct up-power to be placed on hold.
SRO Implement 2-AOP-47.02A Loss of Non-Safety Related AC Bus
- Train A (attached page 28-31)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
6 Page 11 of 21 Event
Description:
Loss of 2A1 480V Load Center Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Rev. 3 Scenario 4 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
BOP When directed start 2B DEH pump, 2B Gland Exhaust Fan, 2B Primary water pump.
RO Communicates Letdown has been lost and stops running Charging pumps.
BOP When directed close breaker 2-40103 2A1 480V Load Center.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
7 Page 12 of 21 Event
Description:
Turbine vibration exceeds 14 mils, manual Rx/Turbine trip required.
SGTR on 2B SG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 7, Turbine Vibration exceeds 14 mils on Bearing #9 (Y) ramps in over 3 minutes.
Indications Available: Annunciator D-15, Turbine Vibration Abnormal EVALUATOR NOTE: ENSURE ANNUNCIATOR L-29 (Loss of load bypass) is clear prior to initiating event 7. This will ensure the Reactor trips when the Turbine is tripped.
BOP Acknowledge alarm and verify indications on the DEH display SRO Refer to 2-AOP-22.02 section 4.2.2, Turbine Supervisory for guidance (attached page 34)
Examiners note: Due to Unit 2 simulator upgrade to new DEH system and Unit 2 yet to upgrade, the crew will be using Unit 1 DEH / Turbine related procedures. Unit 1 has been upgraded to new DEH system.
BOP Recognize and communicate to SRO Turbine vibration has exceeded 14 mils.
SRO Direct Unit trip when notified vibration has exceeded 14 mils.
Examiners note: If Reactor power <15% when Turbine tripped, the Reactor will not trip.
Crew may elect to trip the Reactor.
Examiners note: A SGTR of about 300 gpm will be inserted upon the unit trip.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
7 Page 13 of 21 Event
Description:
SGTR on the 2B SG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available: Pressurizer level and pressure rapidly lowering SRO Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions as follows:
RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
NOTE: Pressurizer spray valves will probably be in manual / open at time of trip. The RO should take control of the controller and close the spray valves. If this does not occur SIAS will occur earlier than what should have occurred from the SGTR.
RO Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control Verify Reactor power is lowering Verify startup rate is negative.
Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.
Inventory Control Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (Letdown isolated from 2A1 480V failure)
SRO Direct RO to isolate Letdown (Close V2515, V2516, V2522) in attempt to maintain Pressurizer level. (Letdown isolated from 2A1 480V failure)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
7 Page 14 of 21 Event
Description:
SGTR on the 2B SG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Examiners note: SIAS will actuate approximately. 10 minutes after trip.
RO Pressure Control Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia (at 1736 psia verify SIAS and stop RCP in each loop)
Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)
Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Core Heat Removal Verify at least one RCO running with CCW ( if >10 minutes with no CCW must secure)
Verify loop delta T is <10 F BOP Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions RO Critical Task When SIAS, recognize B side did not actuate. Communicate and manually actuate B side SIAS.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
4 Event #
7 Page 15 of 21 Event
Description:
SGTR on the 2B SG Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
BOP Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
All vital and non vital DC Buses energized.
BOP RCS Heat Removal Verify at least one SG has feedwater available (AFW or MFW)
Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535 F Verify SG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig.
Ensure MSR Block valves and warmup valves closed Containment Conditions Verify containment pressure <2 psig Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm.
Verify containment temperature is less than 120 F Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms (SG Blowdown may be in alarm Upon unit trip, notify NPO to perform Appendix X sect.1 of EOP-99.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
6 Event #
8 & 9 Page 16 of 21 Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 2B HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
SRO Evaluate diagnostic flow chart of 2-EOP-01 Determines SGTR.
Directs entry to 2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (attached page 39-47)
Direct BOP/STA to perform SFSCs of EOP-04 Implements place keeper Notifies shift manager to classify the event Direct performance of EOP-99 Appendix A, sampling SGs (attached page 48,49)
Direct BOP to verify Si flow per Figure 2 (attached page 50)
Ensure all available charging pumps are operating Direct one RCP/LOOP stopped when SIAS received on low Pressurizer pressure.
Direct RO to stop all RCPs no later than 10 minutes after SIAS due to loss of CCW.
Directs RO to perform controlled cooldown to <5100F Thot using SBCS in manual, not to exceed 300F in any one hour period.
(300F in any one hour period is limit if no RCPs are operating and SG has been isolated)
NOTE: Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
6 Event #
8 & 9 Page 17 of 21 Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 2B HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions: If SNPO called to investigate 2A HPSI pump, state the pump appears OK.
Trigger vent 2A HPSI pump when asked to vent the 2A HPSI pump. Wait 5 minutes and report back the 2A HPSI has been vented and a large volume of air was vented.
Indications Available:
2A HPSI pump Amps oscillating.
MSIS Block Permissive Annunciator SRO Direct RO to depressurize RCS IAW 2-EOP-04 Within Figure 1A (Attached page 52)
<930 psia Above RCP minimum pressure Approx. Equal to 2A SG pressure (within 50 psia)
Recognize SIAS B side did not actuate at setpoint of 1736 psia.
Directs manual actuation of B side SIAS Critical Task SRO Recognize 2B HPSI pump failed to start upon B side SIAS actuation. Directs manual start of 2B HPSI pump.
SRO Recognize 2A HPSI pump low amps. Direct stopping 2A HPSI pump. Direct BOP to notify SNPO to investigate 2A HPSI pump.
Direct venting 2A HPSI pump Direct starting the 2A HPSI pump when venting complete Critical Task SRO Direct MSIS blocked when block permissive received at 685 psia.(must be done before MSIS occurs at 600 psia)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
6 Event #
8 & 9 Page 18 of 21 Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 2B HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
SRO Directs BOP to isolate 2B Steam Generator when Thot is
<5100F IAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix R (attached page 54-56)
SRO Direct performance of 2-EOP-99 Appendix I, MSIV local closure, to close HCV-08-1B, 2B MSIV (attached page 57)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
6 Event #
8 & 9 Page 19 of 21 Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 2B HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions: When directed to perform local actions of Appendix R, trigger isolate 2B SG When instructed to locally close 2B MSIV, trigger locally close 2B MSIV. Wait 5 minutes and inform the control room.
Indications Available: Close indication on 2B MSIV, HCV-08-1B BOP Call SNPO to investigate the status of 2A HPSI pump. State low amps, low flow was observed.
BOP Direct SNPO to vent the 2A HPSI pump BOP Start the 2A HPSI pump when directed BOP Isolate 2B Steam Generator IAW Appendix R, when directed.
(attached page 55-57)
BOP Communicate HCV-08-1B 2B MSIV did not close.
BOP Inform the US HCV-08-1B, 2B MSIV is closed when NPO communicates Appendix I is complete.
BOP Critical Task Block MSIS when directed by SRO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 NRC Scenario #
6 Event #
8 & 9 Page 20 of 21 Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 2B HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Booth Operator Instructions: None Indications Available:
RO Cooldown the RCS to <510°F Thot using SBCS, in manual, not to exceed 30°F in any one hour period.
Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.
RO When directed, depressurize the RCS IAW step EOP-04.
Examiners Note: Only Auxiliary spray is available due to RCPs off.
Within Figure 1A (attached page 53)
<930 psia Above RCP minimum pressure Approx. Equal to 2A SG pressure (within 50 psia)
Suggested termination point:
B Train SIAS manually actuated 2A HPSI is vented and running 2B SG is isolated IAW Appendix R 2B MSIV is closed
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM SCENARIO 4 Rev. 3 Day: Today Desk RCO:
Board RCO:
Protected Train: B Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 012 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Raise power to 100%
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A Charging Pump N/A with 2B and 2C (AB Bus aligned to the A train) Charging pumps available.
OPS 513s:
Locked in Annunciators:
M-46 2A Charging Pump SS Isol/2555 OVRLD Current Status:
Unit 1 at 100% power, Unit 2 at 13% power MOC. (1)2-GOP-201 is complete up through step 67. The Generator has just been synchronized to the grid. All turbine testing is completed SAT. MFW and SBCS are in service.
Equipment Problems:
2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals. Not expected to be returned to service this shift
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
St. Lucie Scenario No.:
3 Op Test No.:
HLC 21-NRC Examiners:
Operators:
SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions:
100% power 2A Charging pump OOS for repack.
Turnover: 100% power, No evolutions scheduled.
Critical Tasks:
Initiate Containment Spray.
Control RCS temperature within Figure 1A after 2A SG has blown dry.
Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
R/RO 2A Heater Drain pump amps rise due to bad bearing. A Unit down N / BOP, power to 90% is required to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from SRO service.
2 1
T.S. I SRO When the 2B Charging pump is started for the rapid down power, recirc valve fails to close when started.
3 2
C/RO V14 74 PORV Leakage 4
3 T.S. I SRO PT -11 02C, Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel "C" fails low 5
4 C/BOP The 2A 4.16/6.9 KV Aux Transformer removed from service due to high winding temperature 6
5 MI All ESDE in Containment on the 2A SG and SGTR on the 2B SG post trip 7
6 C/BOP Turbine fails to trip on Rx trip requiring MSIV's to be closed.
8 7
C/RO Failure of channel "A" CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start 9
8 C/RO FCV-07-1 B, "2B Containment Spray header valve" fails to open on "B" CSAS actuation.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The unit is turned over at 100% power. The 2A Heater Drain Pump amps start rising. The pump will trip if not manually secured. The crew must perform a rapid downpower to remove the pump from service and maintain adequate feed pump suction pressure. When the 2nd Charging pump is started (2B Chg pp) as required for a rapid downpower, its recirc valve fails to close. The crew may choose to secure the 2B Chg pp or they may have the SNPO manually isolate the recirc valve. If the valve is isolated, the pump may be considered operable. While the recirc valve is open and not isolated, only the 2C Charging pump is operable. The SRO should refer to T.S.
and apply the appropriate action statement. The down power should then continue with only the 2C Charging pump running.
After the desired power level is reached, PORV 1474 leakage << 10gpm) requires the PORV block valve to be closed and the other PORV placed in service.
After the alternate PORV is in service, PT-1102C, Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel "C" instrument will fail low requiring Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS), TMLP (RPS), and Pressurizer Pressure Low (RPS) to be bypassed. T.S. will be evaluated by the SRO.
C-60, AUXISTART UP XFMR WINDINGS TEMP HIGH, alarms. The ARP directs actions lAW 2-AOP-53.02. Auxiliary Transformer. The 2A 4160V/6900V Aux Transformer on TI-53-1 reading is 105 of and rising. The BOP will be directed to remove the 2A Aux Transformer from service per Attachment 1 of the AOP.
An ESDE on the 2A SG in the Containment will slowly ramp in requiring the crew to manually trip the reactor. After the Rx is tripped, the turbine does not trip (Throttle Valve 1 and Governor Valve 1 fail as is). The crew will be required to close the MSIV's (the turbine will trip on the secondary generator lockout or locally from the front standard). A SGTR will also ramp in on the 2B SG post trip. 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" is to be implemented.
"A" train CSAS does not auto actuate on high containment pressure. When manually actuated, the 2A CS pump will not start. "B" train CSAS will auto actuate but FCV-07-1 B (2B CS header valve) will not open. It will be necessary to take further manual actions to start the 2A CS pump or open FCV-07-2B from the RTGB to meet the safety function for Containment temperature and pressure control.
The scenario may be terminated when the 2A SG is isolated, RCS temperature is under positive control and CS is initiated.
Scenario 3 Rev.3
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Procedures Used 2-AOP-09.04, Feedwater, Condensate and Heater Drain pump Abnormal Operation 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level 2-0NP-22.01, Rapid Down Power 2-AOP-53.02. Auxiliary Transformer 2-0NP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery 2-EOP-99, Appendices Figures and Tables Technical Specifications Entered T.S. 3.1.2.4 Reactivity Control system T.S. 3.3.1 Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1(PT-1102C)
Scenario 3 3
Rev.3
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 1 and 2 Page 4
of 19 Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain pump from service. 2B Chg pump recirc valve fails to close when pump is started Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.
Initiate IC 100% power, MOL. Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position.
When directed by the lead examiner, Trigger: Heater Drain pump 2A bearing failure.
Booth Operator Instructions: The 2B Chg pp recirc valve fail to close malfunction is part of initial conditions and will show up when pump is started.
Control room Indications Available: 2A Heater Drain pump amp indication rising Control room Indications Available when the 2B Chg pp is started: 2B Charging Pump recirc valve indication stays red, charging flow remains at -44 gpm.
Implement 2-AOP-09.04, "Feedwater, Condensate and Heater SRO Drain pump Abnormal Operation" section 4.2.2 (attached page 5-7)
NOTE: Rapid downpower may result in Pressurizer pressure lowering to the DNB setpoint of 2225 psia. If this occurs the SRO should recognize Pressurizer pressure should be restored to ;:: 2225 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Ref. Tech. Spec. 3.2.5 and Table 3.2-2.
The US should recognize that the 2A HDP is not operating properly and must be removed from service. Since the unit is at 100%, a power reduction should be directed lAW 2-AOP 22.01, "Rapid Downpower". Directs boration and CEA insertion (attached page 8-14).
The down power can be stopped when the following conditions are met: (should be approximately 90% power)
S/G Levels are 60 - 70%
- MFW pump suction pressure is > 400 psig (2-AOP-09.04,Section 4.2.2 contingency action 1.1)
Directs Pressurizer to be placed on recirc lAW 2-AOP-22.01 (attached pages 19)
Directs additional Charging pump started lAW 2-AOP-22.01 (attached page 20)
Direct DEH programmed for load rate step 4.1.2.A and B.
Scenano 3 Rev.3
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
1 FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP 8of25 PROCEDURE NO.:
ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 2-AOP-09.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE, General Information, lists pump trip signals.
D
- 1.
PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.
Table 1 Abnormal Condition Section MFW pump, condensate pump, or heater drain pump trip Section 4.2.2 MFW pump low flow Section 4.2.3 MFW pump low suction pressure Section 4.2.4 MFW pump low oil pressure Section 4.2.5 MFW pump high bearing temperature Section 4.2.6 D
- 2.
VERIFY Exit Conditions are met.
2.1 RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 1.
D
- 3.
EXIT this procedure.
5
.-~--------.---------------~--------
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS PAGE:
90f25 2-AOP-09.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MFW, Condensate, or Heater Drain Pump Trip D
NOTE MFW pump low suction pressure alarms at 350 psig lowering and MFW pump low suction pressure trip occurs at 275 psig lowering.
- 1.
VERIFY current power level can be supported by number of running MFW, condensate, and heater drain pumps.
1.1 COMMENCE downpower per 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower, until the following conditions are met:
S/G levels 60% to 70% NR MFW pump suction pressure greater than or equal to 400 psig D
- 2.
IF heater drain pump was tripped, THEN PLACE quench water on tripped pump as follows:
For 2A Heater Drain Pump, OPEN V38238, DEMIN WTR TO 2A HTR DRAIN PUMP GLAND QUENCH SEAL ISOL.
(TGB/26/N-311W-A)
For 2B Heater Drain Pump.
OPEN V38239, DEMIN WTR TO 28 HTR DRAIN PUMP GLAND QUENCH SEAL ISOL.
(TG8/26/S-311W-A) 6
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
1 FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 10 of 25 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MFW, Condensate, or Heater Drain Pump Trip (continued) 0
- 3.
IF any of the following has tripped.
THEN, NOTIFY Chemistry to monitor for dissolved oxygen levels.
Heater Drain Pump Condensate Pump Feedwater Pump 0
- 4.
RETURN TO I
Section 4.2.1 Step 2.
7
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
RAPID DOWN POWER PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE OPS-530, Pre-Planned Power Change Guidance, delineates operations department policy for the use of pre-planned downpower profiles provided by the Plant Physics Curve Book.
4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D
- 1.
D
- 2.
D
- 3.
BEGIN boration per operator aid.
PERFORM the following:
A.
PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction rate.
B.
SET DEMAND to desired power level.
INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature.
8 5 of 39
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 6of39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions
- 1.
o
- 2.
o
- 3.
o
- 4.
o
- 5.
WHEN a Tavg lowering is noted, THEN PRESS the GO pushbutton on the turbine DEH control panel.
IF reducing power by more than 20%, THEN NOTIFY SNPO to secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02.26, Zinc Addition.
NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows:
"Attention all personnel, Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower due to (reason)
NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction.
PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 5, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.
9 I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 1.1 IF in turbine MANUAL, THEN PRESS and RELEASE the GV LOWER pushbutton as necessary to reduce / control the load reduction rate.
--~----~--.~--------
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
RAPID DOWNPOWER 70f39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) o
- 6.
START additional charging pump as required per guidance from, Charging Pump Guidance.
NOTE O-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, provides additional guidance on ASI Control.
US may direct temporary operation outside of ASI limit.
- 7.
MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index
10 7.1 IF operation outside ASllimit is unavoidable, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
NOTIFY US.
B.
MAINTAIN ASI within RPS LPD pre-trip limits.
C.
RESTORE ASI to within limits as soon as practical.
7.2 IF ASI CANNOT be maintained within transient band due to the inoperability of CEA(s),
THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering to assist in determining the load reduction rate to minimize effects of operation outside of transient limits.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 8of39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS!
! CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
GJ
- 8.
MAINTAIN Tref and Tavg within 8.1 VERIFY boration flow path to 6.6°F.
RCS.
8.2 ESTABLISH T ref and Tavg within 6.6 of using any of the following:
RCS Boration Rate CEA Position Turbine Load 8.3 IF Tref and Tavg can NOT be maintained within 6.6 of, THEN NOTIFY US AND:
A.
TRIP reactor.
B.
GO TO 2-EOP-01,
Standard Post Trip Actions.
D
- 9.
VERIFY boration lineup per I, RCS Boration Guidance 11
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
RAPID DOWNPOWER 9 of 39.
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
NOTE A Manual turbine trip is required anytime condenser back pressure exceeds 8.5 inches Hg absolute. Condenser back pressure is allowed to exceed the 6 inch Hg absolute limit for a maximum of 5 minutes prior to tripping the turbine.
The 6 inch Hg absolute condenser back pressure limit applies anytime unit load is greater than or equal to 45% power and less than 65% power.
- 10.
VERIFY the following parameters:
Differential pressure between the condensers less than 2.5 inches of Hg.
VERIFY Turbine back pressure less than or equal to 8.5 inches Hg absolute.
IF unit load is greater than or equal to 45% power but less than 65% power, THEN VERIFY back pressure does NOT exceed 6 inches Hg absolute for greater than 5 minutes.
TIME 6 in Hg absolute exceeded:
IF back pressure exceeds 6 inches Hg absolute, THEN INITIATE a CR to the SCE to determine and record time spent in the limited region of CT-27476.
12 10.1 IF either parameter is exceeded, THEN NOTIFY US AND:
\\
A.
B.
TRIP reactor.
GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
RAPID DOWNPOWER 10 of 39 2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 11.
VERIFY parameters listed on, Rapid Downpower Parameters, are within limits.
NOTE 11.1 EVALUATE out of limit parameter with respect to:
Trip criteria Plant conditions Potential consequences Load reduction rate Rapid Downpower may result in Pressurizer Pressure dropping below DNBR Limit.
- 12.
MAINTAIN PZR pressure between 2225 and 2275 psia.
NOTE 12.1 VERIFY pressurizer spray, proportional and back-up heaters are operating properly in automatic.
12.2 REFER to 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level.
A large rate of change in T avg may cause transient level variance.
- 13.
MAINTAIN PZR level between 27% and 68%.
13 13.1 ENSURE backup charging pump starts.
13.2 Manually CONTROL Letdown as required.
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
RAPID DOWNPOWER 2*AOP*22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 14.
WHEN Final power level is
- achieved, THEN GO TO Section 4.2 Step 32 to STABILIZE the unit.
- 15.
WHEN power level is approximately 45%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
PAGE:
.. ;11 of 39 A.
VERIFY flow is within the capacity of one MFW pump, as indicated by:
A.1 CONTINUE power reduction until all conditions are satisfied.
Pump amps low.
Feed regulating valves are almost CLOSED to maintain Steam Generator levels.
Total feedwater flow is less than 15,000 GPM.
B.
REMOVE the PSS from service as follows:
(1)
PLACE the PSS control switch to OFF.
14
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC 3
Event #
1 and 2 Page 5 of 18 Event
Description:
Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain pump from service. 2B Chg pump recirc valve fails to close when pump is started Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 2B Charging pump recirc isolation if directed.
Indications: None SRO When Tave decrease noted direct GO on the turbine step 4.2.1 Recognizes 2B Charging Pump recirc valve not closing Directs RO to secure 2B Charging Pump (may direct NLO to locally close recirc. isolation valve)
Refer to 2-AOP-02.03, Charging And Letdown. Recognize no SRO specific guidance for loss of single Charging pump as long as one Charging pump still running.
Recognizes T.S. 3.1.2.4 Reactivity Control system, Restore two SROT.S.
Charging pumps within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Also T.S. 3.5.2 ECCS, Action a.2, restore two Charging Pumps within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Directs the down power be continued with one Charging pump running.
Notifies shift manager of event Notify MM to repair and SM of T.S action required.
Commence boration per 2-AOP-22.01 'Rapid Down power' RO Operator aid and later verify lineup per Attachment 1. (attached page 16,17)
Scenario 3 Rev.3
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 PROCEDURE TITLE:
RAPID DOWNPOWER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 RCS Boration Guidance (Page 1 of 2)
NOTE PAGE:
31 of 39 Step 1 in this attachment is applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress. If other than normal alignment, use guidance of 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid Placard.
- 1.
BORATE the RCS by the following:
A.
START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.
B.
PLACE FCV-2210Y, BORIC ACID (RTGB-205), control switch in AUTO.
C.
IF borating to the Charging Pump suction, THEN OPEN V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE (RTGB-205).
D.
IF borating to the VCT, THEN OPEN V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV (RTGB-205).
E.
ADJUST FIC-2210Y, BORIC ACID, to the desired flowrate.
F.
IF desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, THEN CLOSE the running BAM pump recirc valve.
V2650, TANK 2A RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
V2651, TANK 2B RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
G.
CYCLE V2513, VENT VALVE (RTGB-205) to maintain VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig.
H.
CYCLE V2500, DIVERT VALVE (RTGB-205) to WMS if necessary to maintain the desired VCT level.
16
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 32 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATIACHMENT1 RCS Boration Guidance (Page 2 of 2)
- 2.
SECURE boration as follows:
A.
ENSURE BAM pump recirc valves, OPEN V2650, TANK 2A RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
V2651, TANK 2B RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
B.
CLOSE FCV-2210Y, BORIC ACID (RTGB 205).
C.
ADJUST FIC-221 OY, BORIC ACID, to zero (RTGB 205).
D.
STOP running Boric Acid Pump.
E.
ENSURE CLOSED V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV (RTGB-205).
F.
ENSURE CLOSED V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE (RTGB-205).
G.
ENSURE CLOSED V2513, VENT VALVE (RTGB-205)
H.
ENSURE V2500, DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO (RTGB 205).
17
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 1 and 2 Page 6 of 19 Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain pump from service. 2B Chg pump recirc valve fails to close when pump is started Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Indications: None Insert control rods approx. 6 inches per 2-AOP-22.01 'Rapid RO Downpower'step 4.1.3 for power reduction as directed.
(CEDMCS Control switch to MS and IN/HOLD/OUT switch to IN.)
If directed place Pressurizer on recirc. lAW 2-AOP-22.01
'Rapid Downpower' Attachment 5 (attached page 19).
If directed start the 2B Charging pump lAW 2-AOP-22.01
'Rapid Downpower' Attachment 4 (attached page 20).
Recognize and communicate Charging flow has not changed after starting the 2B Charging pump. Recognize recirc valve did not change position. Secures 2B Charging Pump Program DEH per 1 (2)NOP-99.07 Operations Hard cards,.0, Turbine Adjustments. (attached page 21-23)
BOP ADJUST values, as directed by US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
TARGET SELECT
. RATE SELECT Stop 2A Heater Drain pump when directed.
Scenario 3 Rev.3
REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 RAPID DOWNPOWER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines (Page 1 of 1)
NOTE The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.
From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:
Time (in min.) to correct mismatch = [(pzr ppm - RCS ppm) -25 ppm] x 3
- 1.
To place the Pressurizer on recirculation, PERFORM following:
A.
PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.
39 of 39 B.
Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on Pressurizer Pressure Cntl Vlv PIC-1100X or PIC-11 OOY, PRESSURE, to maintain normal operating pressure.
C.
OBSERVE Pzr Pressure Spray Cntl Vlv HIC-11 00, SPRAY, AND Pressurizer Spray Valves, PCV-1100E 11100F, VALVE 2B21 VALVE 2B1, position indication to verify Main Spray flow.
19
REVISION NO,:
7 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 PROCEDURE TITLE:
RAPID DOWNPOWER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Charging Pump Guidance (Page 1 of 1)
- 1.
IF Charging Pump(s) are to be started, THEN PERFORM the following:
PAGE:
38 of 39 A.
ENSURE that each Charging pump that is to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.
B.
PLACE V2520, Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve, to BYPASS RESET unless otherwise requested by the Chemistry Department. (RTGB 205)
WARNING Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow with resultant reduction in transport time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.
This may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration Room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed the Locked High Radiation Area limit of 1000 mr/hr.
C.
START the Charging pump.
D.
ADJUST the bias on HIC-1110, PZR LEVEL LTDN CNTL VLV (RTGB-205), to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer level to program RRS Pressurizer level for current plant conditions, if required.
E.
IF FIA-2212, CHG FLOW TO REGEN HX (RTGB-205), is in service, THEN VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-2212 rise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
F.
IF FIA-2212, CHG FLOW TO REGEN HX, is NOT in service, THEN VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
G.
WHEN letdown temperature stabilizes, PLACE V2520, Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve, to AUTO.
H.
ENSURE Charging Pump Recirc Valve CLOSED.
I.
PLACE the CHRG PUMP SEL RUNNING BtU switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard, Charging Pump Combinations vs. Selector Switch, on RTGB-205.
J.
NOTIFY Health Physics of the charging pump alignment.
20
REVISION NO.:
2 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE 11 of 19 An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-101. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.
Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Use of appropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant responses and system performance to ensure proper control of the plant.
Notification to the SM/US is required prior to manipulation for any abnormal indications.
Reactor Power MW (Load)
CEA POSITION DCS Power RCS Temp Pzr Level ASI
- 1.
ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
- 2.
TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- 3.
ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
TARGET SELECT RATE SELECT
- 4.
VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)
TARGET RATE 21
.~-------------------------------------.
REVISION NO.:
2 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
OPERATIONS HARD CARDS PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 5.
TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551)
- 6.
MONITOR turbine governor valves response on DEH main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL.
(display 5551)
- 7.
IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
(display 5551)
B.
IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:
(1)
TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.
(2)
PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)
- a.
TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
- b.
TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.
- c.
TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower (liT")
from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
C.
IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.
- 8.
MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:
Reactivity rate Turbine load rate 22 12 of 19
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 13 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 9.
IF desired to stop load change, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
B.
TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
C.
TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.
23
-~---~--------
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Operator Action HLC21 Scenario #
NRC 3
PORV V-1474 Leakage Event #
Form ES-D-2 3
Page 7
of 19 Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger PORV leakage when directed.
Indications Available: Temperature increase on TIA 1110 PORV line for V1474 One LED illuminated on the PACB No.2 for PORV V1474 Annunciator H*32 Quench Tank Level High I Low RO Identify increasing temperature on TIA 1110 PORV line for V1474. Monitors pressurizer pressure.
Identifies PORV V-1474 leaking Verify spray valves close in response to lowering pressure SRO Implements 2-AOP-01.10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level section 4.2.2.1 (attached pages 25-33)
Directs PORV V-1474 placed in override and block valve V-1476 closed. Step 4.2.2.4 Direct placing alternate PORV V-1475 is service by opening block valve V-1477. Step 4.2.2.8 RO Closes PORV block V-1476 when directed.
Opens PORV block valve V-1477 when directed.
Verify TIA-1110 lowering and LED on PACB No.2 has extinguished.
Scenario 3 Rev.3
-~~----~-~--------------~---~
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 7 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE
- , Automatic Responses to Pressurizer Pressure Deviations, contains a listing of automatic actions associated with Pressurizer pressures.
- , Automatic Responses to Pressurizer Level Deviations, contains a listing of automatic actions associated with Pressurizer levels.
- , Pressurizer Level Program Graph, provides Pressurizer level program vs T-avg.
0
- 1.
PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.
Table 1 Abnormal Condition Section Pressurizer PORV or safety valve OPEN or leaking Section 4.2.2 Selected Pressurizer pressure control channel failure Section 4.2.3 Pressurizer Spray or Auxiliary Spray Valves OPEN or leaking Section 4.2.4 Selected RRS channel failure Section 4.2.5 Selected Pressurizer level control channel failure Section 4.2.6 Pressurizer pressure or level abnormal Section 4.2.7 Pressurizer heaters deenergized 25
REVISION NO.:
5 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
'INSTRUCTIONS'
, CONTINGENCY ACTIONS' 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking NOTE One PORV is normally isolated in Modes 1, 2, or 3.
PAGE:
9 of 38 0
- 1.
VERIFY any Pressurizer PORV or 1.1 IF PORV position indication status safety is OPEN or leaking using any of the following:
V1474, PORV, status lights V1475, PORV, status lights Acoustic Monitor (PACB-2)
PORV discharge temperature greater than 210°F:
TIA-1106, PORV LINE TIA-1110, PORV LINE Safety valve discharge temperature greater than 185°F OR rising greater than 1 ° F per hour:
TIA-1107, SAFETY VALVE TIA-1108, SAFETY VALVE TIA-1109, SAFETY VALVE Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 26 lights are NOT available, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 11 :
V1474, PORV V1475, PORV 1.2 RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 1.
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 10 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
D
- 2.
D
- 3.
IF safety valve leakage is identified, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 9.
IF PORV flow is indicated, THEN VERIFY TI-1115, 2A1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE, AND TI-1125, 2B1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE, indicate RCS temperature is greater than the following:
255°F during heatup 240°F during cooldown 27 3.1 IF V1474, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 490 psia, THEN PERFORM the following:
PLACE V1474, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
CLOSE V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE.
3.2 IF V1475, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 490 psia, THEN PERFORM the following:
PLACE V1475, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
CLOSE V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE.
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 11 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
- 3.
(continued) 28 3.3 IF affected PORV can NOT be identified AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 490 psia, THEN ENSURE both PORVs in OVERRIDE and associated block valves CLOSED:
V1474, PORV, and V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE V1475, PORV, and V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE 3.4 IF affected PORV MODE SELECT switch was NOT in L TOP, THEN EVALUATE positioning affected PORV switches as follows:
PORV MODE SELECT switch in L TOP PaRVin OFF 3.5 GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 8.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 12 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS !
I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS !
4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued) 0
- 4.
IF V1474, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, THEN ENSURE the following:
V1474, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE,CLOSED 0
- 5.
IF V1475, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, THEN ENSURE the following:
V1475, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE,CLOSED 29
REVISION NO.:
5 PROCEDURE NO.:
-~ -
--~-----------
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 13 of 38 2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued) o
- 6.
o
- 7.
IF affected PORV can NOT be identified AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, THEN ENSURE both PORVs in OVERRIDE and associated block valves CLOSED:
V1474, PORV, and V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE V1475, PORV, and V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE VERIFY both PORV Mode Select switches in NORMAL:
V1474, MODE SELECT V1475, MODE SELECT 30 7.1 EVALUATE positioning switches as follows:
PORV MODE SELECT switch in NORMAL PORV in OFF
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL
'14 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
D
- 8.
IF either PORV was isolated AND is available, THEN EVALUATE placing isolated PORV in service as follows:
IF placing V1474, PORV, in service, THEN OPEN V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE.
IF placing V1475, PORV, in service, THEN OPEN V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE.
D
- 9.
IF Quench Tank parameters are normal AND either of the following safety valve leakage conditions exist:
Safety valve tailpipe temperature(s) are increasing greater than 1°F per hour.
Safety valve tailpipe temperature(s) are greater than 185°F.
THEN PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per 2-GOP-1 01, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes.
31
~~---~-------------
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 15 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued) 0
- 10.
VERIFY Pressurizer PORVs and 10.1 IF PORV or safety valve is still safety valves CLOSED using all of
- leaking, the following:
THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-01.08, RCS Leakage Abnormal V1474, PORV, status lights Operations.
V1475, PORV, status lights Acoustic Monitors TIA-1106, PORV LINE TIA-1110, PORV LINE TIA-1107, SAFETY VALVE TIA-1108, SAFETY VALVE TIA-1109, SAFETY VALVE Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 0
- 11.
VERIFY position indication status 11.1 MONITOR the following for lights available for the following:
indications of PORV leakage:
V1474, PORV TIA-1110, PORV LINE V1475, PORV TIA-1106, PORV LINE Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 11.2 DOCUMENT tailpipe reading and quench tank parameters every eight hours.
32
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL PROCEDURE NO.:
16 of 38 2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
- 11.
(continued) 11.3 IF PORV leakage is indicated, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.2.2 Step 1.
0
- 12.
VERIFY Pressurizer pressure 12.1 RETURN TO stable Section 4.2.1 Step 1.
OR trending to Pressurizer pressure setpoint:
PR-1100, PRESSURE PIC-1100X, PRESSURE PIC-1100Y, PRESSURE 0
- 13.
GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 2.
33
~--,--------
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
4 Page 8
Form ES-D-2 of 19 PT-1102C, Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel "C" fails low Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Pressurizer Pressure fails low when directed.
Indications Available: Annunciators as listed in section 4.2.1 2*AOp*99.01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation (attached).
RPS Channel C TMLP Bistable tripped RO/BOP Identifies PT -11 02C Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel has failed low (1500 psia)
SRO Implements 2-AOP-99.01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation Step 4.1.1 (attached pages 35,36)
Refer to Attachment 5 of 2-AOP-99.01 (attached page 37)
Refer to step 4.2.6 to bypass PT-1102C (attached page 38)
Implements T.S. 3.3.1 table 3.3-1. and T.S. 3.3.2 table 3.3-3 within one (1) hour, directs bypassing Channel C,
- HI PZR PRESS (RPS)
(Key 106)
- TM/LO PRESS (RPS)
(Key 107)
- PZR PRESS SIAS (Key 132)
- PZR PRESS A TWS (Key 157)
Notify IIC, Step 4.2.1.3 Scenario 3 Rev.3
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D
NOTE A TRANSMITTER failure can be discriminated from a METER failure by the presence of annunciators and protection and control actuations.
- 1.
CONFIRM failed channel by any of the following methods:
Channel check comparison with redundant channels Annunciators Bistable or status lights Any instrument-related testing or surveillance procedure in progress 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE BISTABLE TRIP UNIT is abbreviated as BTU in this AOP.
D
- 1.
IF entering this procedure to restore an affected channel, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
35 10 of 92
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 11 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2*AOp*99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued) 0
- 2.
Using Attachment 5, Channel Failure Impact Table, PERFORM the following:
A.
LOCATE table row for affected instrument or channel.
B.
REFER TO applicable Tech Specs.
C.
PERFORM applicable procedure section for affected instrument.
0
- 3.
INITIATE work request for affected instrument or channel and NOTIFY I&C or EM as applicable.
0
- 4.
DOCUMENT problem as required:
EOOS Log Condition report Ops narrative log 36
VJ
-...J REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Channel Failure Im~act Table (Page 2 of 4)
Channel Indicator (source device)
RPS Trip ESFASTrlp Other Functions VHP, LPD, TMiLP CWPs Linear Power Range Safety NI HI POWER >107%/+9.61% (VHP)
LlN115%
MAlMBIMC/MD LOC PWR DEN (variable) (LPD)
N/A Input to TM/LP setpt (ASI)
TM/LO PRESS Input to HI RA TEILOSS LOAD trip blocks Pressurizer Pressure Pzr Press> 2370 pSia PI-1102AIB/C/D TMlLO PRESS (TMlLP)
SIAS < 1736 psia DSS > 2450 psia (ATWS)
T-cold TI-1102AIB/CID Input to ~ T Power (TY-1112CNCB/CC/CD N/A N/A Input to TM/LP setpt (0 Pwr)
TY-1122CNCB/CC/CD)
Input to LPD CWP T-hot TI-1102AIB/C/D Input to ~ T Power (TY-1112HNHB/HC/HD N/A NlA Input to TM/LP setpt (0 Pwr)
TY-1122HNHBIHC/HD)
Input to LPD CWP TM/LP Setpoint Generator Variable between 1900 and P IA-11 O2AIB/C/D N/A N/A 2370 psia.
Set to 2500 psia for ASGT S/G Pressure PI-SO 13NB/C/D S/G Press s 626 psia (auct low)
MSIS < 600 psia Input to AFAS PI-S023NB/C/D TMILO PRES (ASGT >120 psid)
PAGE:
90 of 92 Tech Specs AOPSection 3.3.1 Section 4.2.5 3.2.4 3.3.1 Section 4.2.6 3.3.2 3.3.1 Section 4.2.7 3.3.1 Section 4.2.S 3.3.1 Section 4.2.9 3.3.2 Section 4.2.10 I
I
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS!
! CONTINGENCY ACTIONS!
4.2.6 Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure o
- 1.
CIRCLE affected instrument:
PI-1102A PI-1102B PI-1102C PI-1102D NOTE Bypassing ESFAS BTUs will require Key 114 for ESFAS cabinet door.
Placing ATWS in TRIP condition is NOT required (optional).
o
- 2.
PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed:
HI PZR PRESS (RPS)
(Key 106)
TM/LO PRESS (RPS)
(Key 107)
PZR PRESS SIAS (Key 132)
PZR PRESS ATWS (Key 157)
A.
BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitches.
B.
TRIP affected BTUs per, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.
38 PAGE:
21 of 92
Appendix D Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
5 Page 9 Event
Description:
2A Aux Transformer High Windings Temperature Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Form ES-D-2 of 18 Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 2A Aux Xfmr Winding High Temp when directed.
ANPO report from the field the following:
No local alarms are present on the 2A Aux XFRM alarm panel.
No indication of any fires/smoke on the 2A Aux XFRM.
Gas Accumulator Indicators on the 2A Aux XFRM are indicating 0 cc.
Winding Hot Spot temperature on the 2A Aux XFRM is 112°C and stable.
Top Oil Temperature is 100°C on the 2A Aux XFRM and stable.
All 6 Cooling Fans on the 2A Aux XFRM are running.
Both Oil Cooing Pumps on the 2A Aux XFRM are running.
All Reflash Alarm Panels are clear.
Indications Available: Annunciators C-60 Aux/Start Up Xfmr Windings Temp High (alarms at 110°C). Temperature Recorder 53-1 trending up.
SRO Implement 2-AOP-53.02, "Auxiliary Transformer" (attached page 40-44).
Dispatch an Operator to perform Attachment 4 of 2-AOP-53.02 After verifying Top Oil Temperature on the on the 2A Aux XFRM is less than 110°C and Winding Hot Spot temperature on the 2A Aux XFRM is less than 140°C, (step 4.2.6.3) remove the the 2A Aux XFRM from service lAW Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-53.02 (attached page 45-47)
Place the 2A Startup XFRM in service and remove the 2A Aux BOP XRMR from service lAW Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-53.02 (attached page 45-47)
Scenario 3 Rev.3
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 60f32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions o
- 1.
o
- 2.
- 3.
IF Reactor trips due to auxiliary transformer fault.
THEN IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01.
Standard Post Trip Actions.
VERIFY NO fire on 2A or 2B Auxiliary Transformer(s).
As soon as practical, NOTIFY System Load Dispatch of any auxiliary transformer malfunction.
40 I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 2.1 ENSURE Aux Transformer Deluge System activated.
2.2 IMPLEMENT 2-0NP-1 00.01, Response to Fire.
2.3 REMOVE affected transformer per, Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service.
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 7 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) o WARNING An energized transformer with a gas reading above 200 cc should NOT be approached as elevated gas levels can be explosive.
- 4.
DISPATCH an operator with a copy of Attachment 4, Auxiliary Transformer Local Alarms and Responses, to verify 2A and 2B Aux Transformer Gas Accumulator Indicators reading o cc.
41 4.1 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading 400 cc or more, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
TRIP Reactor.
B.
IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
4.2 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading between 200 and 400 cc AND one or more of the following exist:
Fault Pressure Trip alarm (C-18 or C-20)
Local MECH. RELIEF ALARM Oil leak observed THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
TRIP Reactor.
B.
IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
4.3 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading greater than 200 cc, THEN SHUTDOWN plant per 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown-Full Load to Zero Load.
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 PROCEDURE TITLE:
I INSTRUCTIONS I PAGE:
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 8of32 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 4.
(continued) 42 4.4 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading greater than 0 CC, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
DIRECT operator to record data on Attachment 3, Transformer Gas Accumulation Data Sheet, every 10 minutes until transformer is isolated OR substation personnel provide additional instructions.
B.
NOTIFY Fire Brigade Leader of situation.
C.
TRANSMIT site announcement using Gai-Tronics with Boost function, warning personnel to stay clear of the Main, StU, and Aux transformers.
4.5 IF after 60 minutes of data taking AND transformer gas accumulation rate is greater than or equal to 100 cc!hr (16 cct10 min),
THEN SHUTDOWN plant per 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown -
Full Load to Zero Load.
---~-------------------------------------------.---------~-----
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 90f32 2-AOp-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D
- 5.
D
- 6.
VERIFY the following annunciators are CLEAR:
C-48, AUX XFMR 2A ALARM PANEL C-50, AUX XFMR 2B ALARM PANEL 5.1 DISPATCH operator to investigate cause of alarm per Attachment 4, Auxiliary Transformer Local Alarms and Responses.
VERIFY C-60, AUXISTART UP 6.1 VALIDATE alarm by observing one or more of the following is 100°C or higher on recorder TR-53-1, (Transformer)
TEMPERATURE, on RTGB-201:
XFMR WINDINGS TEMP HIGH, is CLEAR.
43 CHNL 1, AUX XFMR 2A 6.9KV CHNL 2, AUX XFMR 2A 4.1 KV CHNL 3, AUX XFMR 2B 6.9KV CHNL 4, AUX XFMR 2B 4.1 KV 6.2 DISPATCH operator to investigate cause of alarm per Attachment 4, Auxiliary Transformer Local Alarms and Responses.
~------------------------~
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 10 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2*AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 6.
(continued) 6.3 IF valid alarm persists, THEN ISOLATE transformer per, Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service, before reaching any of the following:
Top Oil Temperature of 110°C Hot Spot Temperature of 140°C 0
- 7.
VERIFY the following ground 7.1 IF ground exists, alarms are CLEAR:
THEN PERFORM the following:
C-28, AUX XFMR 2A A.
NOTIFY the Electrical 4.16KV GROUND Department.
C-30, AUX XFMR 28 B.
INSPECT bus ground fault 4.16 KV GROUND relay targets to determine the location of the fault.
C-38, AUX XFMR 2A 6.9KV GROUND C.
CONSIDER transferring loads to the Startup C-40, AUX XFMR 28 Transformer per 6.9KV GROUND, Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s)
From Service.
44
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 PROCEDURE TITLE:
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service (Page 1 of 6) 1.0 REMOVING AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 2A FROM SERVICE 1.1 Transferring Loads to Start-Up Transformer 2A PAGE:
15 of 32
- 1.
IF Start-Up Transformer 2A is NOT available, THEN GO TO Attachment 1 Section 1.2.
- 2.
IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is NOT loaded and needs to be removed from service, THEN GO TO Attachment 1 Section 1.3.
- 3.
INSERT Sync Plug into 6.9 KV BUS 2A1 sync selector switch and POSITION to ST-2A1.
- 4.
VERIFY SYN-888, SYNCHROSCOPE, is stationary at 12 o'clock position.
- 5.
VERIFY the following are approximately matched:
VM-8881, INCOMING VOLT VM-888R, RUNNING VOLT
- 6.
PLACE and HOLD Bkr 2-30102, START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A, control switch in CLOSE.
- 7.
VERIFY START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A breaker CLOSED.
- 8.
Slowly RELEASE Bkr 2-30102 control switch and ENSURE Bkr 2-30101, AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 2A, automatically OPENS.
- 9.
Momentarily POSITION Bkr 2-30101 control switch to TRIP to green flag breaker.
- 10.
POSITION Sync Plug to OFF and REMOVE.
- 11.
INSERT Sync Plug into 4.16 KV BUS 2A2 sync selector switch and POSITION to ST-2A2.
- 12.
VERIFY SYN-888, SYNCHROSCOPE, is stationary at 12 o'clock position.
- 13.
VERIFY the following are approximately matched:
VM-8881, INCOMING VOLT VM-888R, RUNNING VOLT 45
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 PROCEDURE TITLE:
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Removing Auxiliary Transformer's) From Service (Page 2 of 6)
PAGE:
16 of 32
- 14.
PLACE and HOLD Bkr 2-20102, START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A, control switch in CLOSE.
- 15.
VERIFY START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A breaker CLOSED.
- 16.
Slowly RELEASE Bkr 2-20102 control switch and ENSURE Bkr 2-20101, AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 2A, automatically OPENS.
- 17.
Momentarily POSITION Bkr 2-20101 control switch to TRIP to green flag breaker.
- 18.
POSITION Sync Plug to OFF and REMOVE.
- 19.
NOTIFY System Load Dispatch of plant conditions.
- 20.
IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is to be removed from service, THEN GO TO Section 1.3.
1.2 Start-Up Transformer 2A Unavailable CAUTION Deenergizing 6.9 KV or 4.16 KV non-vital buses will cause a reactor trip.
- 1.
TRIP Reactor.
- 2.
IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions, prior to isolating the transformer.
- 3.
IF a vital AC bus is lost, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus - Train A
- 4.
IF a non-vital AC bus is lost, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-47.02A, Loss of a Non-Safety Related AC. Bus - Train A
- 5.
IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is to be removed from service, THEN GO TO Section 1.3.
46
~.~-~~~~
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service (Page 3 of 6) 1.1 Transferring Loads to Start-Up Transformer 2A (continued) 1.3 Removing Auxiliary Transformer 2A From Service 17 of 32
- 1.
IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is to be removed from service, THEN ENSURE the following breakers are OPEN:
Bkr 2-30101, INCOMING FEEDER FROM UA TRANSF. 2A (6.9 KV SWGR 2A1)
Bkr 2-20101, INCOMING FEEDER FROM UA TRANSFER. NO. 2A (4.16 KV SWGR 2A2)
Bkr 2-40814, UNIT AUX TRANSF 2A COOLING (Preferred Supply)
(480V MCC 2A1)
Bkr 2-41605, UNIT AUX TRANSF 2A COOLING STAND BY SUPPLY (480V MCC 2B1)
NOTE Electrical isolation of the Aux Transformer(s) will require a plant shutdown and the main generator removed from the grid.
- 2.
CONTACT Power Delivery I Substation Department to determine the need to isolate the Auxiliary Transformer 2A.
- 3.
IF transformer isolation is required, THEN REQUEST a generator clearance from the System Load Dispatch.
47
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 6and 7 Page 10 of 18 ESDE in Containment on 2A SG requires manual Reactor trip, Turbine does not trip.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger ESDE on 2A SG when directed. SGTR 200 gpm on 2B SG is auto triggered on the reactor trip. TV1 and GV1 Fail As Is is also auto triggered on the reactor trip When directed to manually trip the turbine from the front standard, wait till the turbine trips on Generator Motoring, then report the turbine is tripped.
Indications Available: Containment pressure rising, RCS temperature lowering, SG pressure lowering, Pressurizer pressure lowering.
When Unit tripped, Throttle valve 1 and Governor valve 1 fail as is. Pressurizer pressure lowering.
RO Recognize Containment pressure rising, RCS temperature lowering, SG pressure lowering, Pressurizer pressure lowering.
SRO Direct manual Reactor trip as above parameters rapidly change.
Recognizes Turbine did not trip when Reactor tripped.
BOP Manually pushes. Turbine Trip pushbutton, recognizes Turbine still not tripped.
SRO Directs Both MSIV's to be closed manually from the RTGB when identified Turbine did not trip. Directs NPO to locally trip the turbine from the front standard.
Note: The turbine will eventually trip on a secondary lockout (Generator Motoring).
BOP Manually closes the MSIV's Scenario 3 Rev.3
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 6and 7 Page 11 of 18 ESDE in Containment on 2A SG requires manual Reactor trip, Turbine does not trip.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
- RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
Directs one RCP in each loop stopped when SIAS on low pressurizer pressure. Direct all RCP's stopped if CCW lost >10 minutes.
Scenario 3 Rev.3
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 6 and 7 Page 12 of 18 ESDE in Containment on 2A SG requires manual Reactor trip, Turbine does not trip.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available: Rising Containment pressure. Failure of 'A' train CSAS actuation when setpoint exceeded.
SRO Direct 'A' side CSAS manually actuated when identifies auto Critical actions did not occur. Direct 2A CS pump started, FCV-07-1 B Task opened.
BOP Close MSR reheat block valves.
Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of EOP-99.
Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
RCS Heat Removal
- Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535 0 F
- Place ADV's in service Close Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 Scenario 3 Rev.3
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 8 and 9 Page 13 of 18 SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available: SJAE in alarm 6 minutes post trip Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig (recognize Containment Pressure rising)
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120 0 F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms. (recognize SJAE in alarm approximately 6 minutes after trip)
BOP Critical Recognize 'A' side CSAS did not actuate. Manually actuate 'A' side CSAS, manually start 2A CS pump and open FCV-07-1 B Task Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Recognize SIAS on low pressuirizer pressure and stops one RCP in each loop when directed.
Reactivity Control
- Verify Reactor power is lowering.
- Verify startup rate is negative.
- Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted.
Inventory Control
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
- Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (take manual control of chg pumps and isolate letdown)
Scenario 3 Rev.3
~----"---~------------------
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 8 and 9 Page 14 of 18 SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-O? -1 B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When Chemistry asked to sample SG's report back 10 minutes later, activity increasing on 2B SG.
Indications Available: Note: SG blowdown radiation will not show up on PC-11.
Step 6 of EOP-15 will direct sampling SG's.
Pressure Control
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20 0 F Core Heat Removal
- Verify at least one RCP running with CCW Verify loop delta T is <10 0 F Note: AFAS will actuate approximately 5 minutes after the trip. 2A SG will initially be fed, then AFAS-1 lockout will occur 10 minutes after trip and only 2B SG SG will be fed.
SRO Direct throttling AFW to 2B SG to approximately 220 gpm Direct resetting AFAS-2 when notified AFAS reset criteria met.
Directs entry to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" due to dual event (SGTR I ESDE) (attached pages 53-58)
Directs RO to trip all RCP's if CCW lost >10 minutes. (if not performed previously)
Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's (may ask for 'quick frisk') (attached pages 59,60).
Scenario 3 Rev.3
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
6 of 206 36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A harsh containment condition exists if containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should be used for determination of saturation margin when indicated containment temperature is less than or equal to 200°F. Figure 1 B should be used when indicated containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should also be used if containment temperature had exceeded 200°F during event progression but was lowered to 200°F or less by containment cooling systems.
NOTE Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available. Reg Guide 1.97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.
Steps designated with an
- may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously.
o 1.
Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.
REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies.
o 2.
Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.
53
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
7 of 206 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 36 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 3.
RCP Trip Strategy A. !f ANY of the following conditions
- exist, 2A or 2B AFW Pump is the ONLY source of Feedwater RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia RCS Temperature is less than 500°F Then STOP ONE RCP in EACH loop.
- 8. 1f ANY of the following conditions
- exist, Main or Auxiliary Feedwater flow can NOT be re-established RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling CCW is LOST to the RCPs for greater than 10 minutes Then STOP ALL RCPs.
54
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 8 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS o 4.
Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERIFY CCW to the RCPs.
B. If BOTH of the following conditions exist, RCPs have CCW flow CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff f10wpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleedoff fIowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.
55 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS A.1 If an INADVERTENT SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW.
REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.
A.2 !f a VALID SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED.
A.3 If CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 9 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued) o 5.
INSTRUCTIONS Verify RCP Operating Limits
!f RCPs are RUNNING, Then VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied.
REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits.
D 6.
Sample SIGs Sample BOTH S/Gs for activity and boron.
REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling Steam Generators.
o 7.
Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. !f Circulating Water flow to the Main Condenser has been lost, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:
- 1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.
- 2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.
B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant AS NECESSARY.
REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.
56 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 5.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
10 of 206 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 36 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 8.
Restore Instrument Air Jf a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE 2A8 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.
o 9.
Perform Safety Function Status Checks PERFORM the Safety Function Status Checks every 15 minutes.
REFER TO Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet.
o 10. Identify Success Paths IDENTIFY the success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function.
REFER TO Attachment 3, Functional Recovery Success Paths.
57
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
36 PROCEDURE NO.:
FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 11 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 11. Perform Success Path Instructions PERFORM ALL of the following IN THE ORDER LISTED.
A. Instructions for a success path MOST LIKELY to be met for safety functions that are NOT met by ANY success path.
B. Instructions for success paths for safety functions that are NOT met by Success Path 1.
C. Instructions for ALL other success paths for safety functions met by Success Path 1.
o 12. Perform Long Term Actions When ALL Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied, Then PERFORM Long Term Actions.
REFER TO Section 4.9, Long Term Actions.
END OF INITIAL ACTIONS 58
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2) o 1. !f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.
CAUTION A Train ("..J)
PAGE:
3 of 159 B Train ("..J)
If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.
NOTE HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. !f an INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header
- valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:
HCV-14-8A HCV-14-9 OR
HCV-14-8B HCV-14-10 59
~--~.
REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)
PAGE:
4 of 159 o 3. !f the 'N' Header has been restored, Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:
A. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE / OVERRIDE.
B.
OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.
o 4. !f the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples
~
for isotopic activity and Tritium.
~
o 5. !f S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.
END OF APPENDIX A 60
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 8 and 9 Page 15 of 18 SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1 B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When Appendix R outside actions directed, call back in five minutes and report complete.
Indications Available:
SRO Direct Hydrogen Analyzers placed in service per Appendix L EOP-99 (attached pages 62,63)
Direct BOP to perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 (attached pages 64-67).
Direct Safety Function Status Check's performed every 15 minutes Identify Success paths in service per Attachment 3 as:
RC-1 MVA-DC-1 MVA-AC-1 IC-2 PC-1 HR-2 CI-1 (not met until 2A SG Isolated)
CTPC-3 (if 2A Containment Spray started and I or FCV-07-1 B 2B Spray header valve opened)
Performs success path for CI-1 (attached pages 68-71) first, due to Safety Function not being met until 2A SG isolated.
Identify and Isolate the most affected SG. (2A SG). Step 2 Refers to HR-2 (step 4.6.11) to address isolation of 2A SG, then returns to CI-1 when the 2A SG isolated. Direct 2-EOP-99 Appendix R to isolate the 2A SG (attached pages 72-74).
Scenario 3 Rev.3
--~-------------------~-----------
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS 68 of 159 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX l PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 1 of 2)
A Train (..J)
B Train (..J)
- 1. SELECT ONE sample point by PLACING the sample valve selector switch in the desired position.
FSE-27-8_ FSE-27-12_
(Upper Cntmt. Dome) (Lwr. Cntmt.)
- 2. OPEN the Containment Isolation Valves.
- 3. ENSURE the function selector switch is in the SAMPLE position.
- 4. PLACE the OFF / STANDBY / ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.
NOTE FSE-27-9_ FSE-27-13_
(Pzr. Area)
(2B2 RCP)
FSE-27-10 FSE-27-14_
(2A1 RCP)
(2B1 RCP)
FSE-27-11_
(2A2 RCP)
FSE-27-15_ FSE-27-17_
(Sample in to H2 Analyzer)
AND FSE-27 -16_ FSE-27 -18_
(Sample out of H2 Analyzer)
If power is interrupted and then restored to an in-service Hydrogen Analyzer (such as after an ESFAS or Undervoltage Relay actuation) the remote control selector pushbutton must be depressed to allow for continued operation of the analyzer from the Control Room.
- 5. DEPRESS the remote control selector pushbutton.
- 6. VERIFY the red sample light energizes.
62
~
.. ------~-------~---------.------
-----... --.---- -- -... ---~.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 69 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.:
SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANAL YZER IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2)
A Train (-Y)
B Train (-Y)
- 7. ENSURE the Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder has been started. (Start button located on front of Yokogawa recorder)
- 8. Allow five to ten minutes for the Hydrogen Analyzer to stabilize as indicated by the (%) indication leveling off.
END OF APPENDIX L 63
---~~~
--~----
~---------
--~---..
REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS PAGE:
118 of 159 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC.
o 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.
o 3. !f AFAS has actuated, and use of Main Feedwater is
- desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
o A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET.
o B. ENSURE Steam Generator levels are being restored using Auxiliary Feedwater o C. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
- 1. MV-09-5
- 2. MV-09-6 o D. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
o E. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
o F. DEPRESS BOTH push buttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
64
REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
PAGE:
119 of 159 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. (continued) o G. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.
o H. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.
o 4. !f AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater is
- desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
o A. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
o B. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
o C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
o D. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
o E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.
o 5. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.
L-____________________________________________________ ~
65
~
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 120 of 159 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS o 6. ENSURE BOTH of the following:
o A. Bearing Oil Pump and Seal Oil Backup Pump RUNNING.
o B. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm, Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.
o 7. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.
o 8. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.
o 9. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.
CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil Pump RUNNING.
o 9.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.
o 10. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO 0 10.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:
- rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.
66 o A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.
o B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON.
o C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.
o D. Locally START the Turning Gear.
REVISION NO_:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8)
PAGE:
121 of 159 Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 11.!f Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.
o 12. Place Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation.
When indicated Reactor power is less than 10.5%,
Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
o A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.
o B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.
012.1 !f BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System channels are NOT operating, Then PERFORM applicable actions of 2-AOP-02.01, Boron Concentration Control System (BCCS) Abnormal Operations.
NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliability if 15 KW heaters are not energized after plant shutdown.
o 13.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.10, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.
o 14. CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.
END OF APPENDIX X 67
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 148 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 o 1.
INSTRUCTIONS Ensure Containment Isolation and Cooling
!f ANY of the following conditions
- exist, Containment pressure greater than 3.5 psig Containment radiation greater than 10 Rlhr SIAS is ACTUATED Then PERFORM ALL the following:
A. ENSURE BOTH the following:
- 1. ENSURE CIAS has ACTUATED.
- 2. !f Containment pressure is greater than 3.5 psig, Then ENSURE MSIS has ACTUATED.
B. ENSURE ALL available Emergency Containment HVAC systems are RUNNING:
At least ONE train of SBVS At least ONE train of Containment Fan Coolers 68 Success Path 1 - Automatic/Manual Isolation CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN CIAS components.
REFER TO Table 2, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.
2.1 Manually START/ALIGN MSIS components.
REFER TO Table 5, Main Steam Isolation Actuation Signal.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
149 of 206 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 36 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1
( continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CAUTION Success Path 1 - Automatic/Manual Isolation (continued)
CONTINGENCY ACTIONS If there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.
o 2.
Determine If SGTR Present If a SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following, S/G activity Main steam piping radiation S/G level change when NOT feeding S/G blowdown activity ONE S/G level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same for BOTH Feedflow mismatch between S/Gs Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a S/G PRIOR to the trip Then IDENTIFY and ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.
REFER TO Heat Removal Success Path HR-1 or HR-2, and RETURN TO this success path when the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.
69
~-----
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 150 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1 (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS o 3.
Verify No RCS to CCW Leak VERIFY NO RCS leakage into the CCW system:
A. Absence of CCW Surge Tank high level alarm (Annunciator LB-10).
B. ENSURE sample flow to the CCW radiation monitors and NO indication of activity.
70 Success Path 1 - Automatic/Manual Isolation (continued)
CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 3.1 !f RCS to CCW leakage is suspected, Then ISOLATE the leak.
REFER TO 2-AOP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 151 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - CI-1
( continued)
INSTRUCTIONS o 4.
Verify CI-1 Satisfied VERIFY CI-1 (Automatic/Manual Isolation) is satisfied by ANY of the following conditions being satisfied:
Condition 1:
A. !f ANY secondary plant activity monitor alarms or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.
B. Containment pressure is less than 3.5 psig.
C. NO containment area or atmospheric radiation monitor alarms or unexplained rise.
D. If a SGTR exists, Then the isolated S/G pressure is less than 915 psig (930 psia) and NOT steaming via ADV.
Condition 2:
A. !f ANY secondary plant activity monitor alarms or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.
B. CIAS is ACTUATED.
71 Success Path 1 - Automatic/Manual Isolation (continued)
CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 4.1 !f Containment Isolation is still in
- jeopardy, Then PURSUE Containment Isolation and other jeopardized safety functions simultaneously.
4.2 CONTINUE efforts to establish Containment Isolation by evaluating further actions based on ALL of the following:
The urgency of other jeopardized safety functions The risk to plant personnel and the public of leaving certain containment penetrations unisolated The feasibility of isolating containment penetration(s) by alternate means
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)
Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation NOTE Local actions are located in step 18 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.
93 of 159 Keys 79 and 80 are required for closing MV-08-14, 2A S/G MS ADV MV-08-18A ISOL, and MV-08-15, 2A S/G MS ADV MV-08-19A ISOL.
Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLEITRIP (contingency).
CAUTION If S/G isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.
o 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.
o 2. !f HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.
REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.
o 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.
If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.
o 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
o 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
72
REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99
---~----~.--~---'"-----
PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)
Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
PAGE:
94 of 1S9 o 6. If BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
o A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:
o MV-09-S, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve o LCV-900S, 2A 1S% Bypass o MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass o B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.
o 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.
o 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.
o 9. ENSURE MV-OB-1BA, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
o 10.CLOSE MV-OB-14, 2A S/G ADV Isol. (Key 79) o 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.
o 12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.
o 13. ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.
o 14. PLACE MV-OB-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.
o 15.lf MV-OB-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required, Then CLOSE MV-OB-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 7B) o 16.ENSURE MV-OB-19A, 2A S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
o 17. CLOSE MV-OB-1S, 2A S/G ADV Isol. (Key 80) 73
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REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)
Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
NOTE 95 of 159 Control room isolation actions are now complete. !f a SGTR is in progress, Then the SM should be informed of the status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes.
o 18. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:
o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.
o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.
o C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.
o D. !f SE-08-2. Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884, SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.
o E. !f MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking.
Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
o 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.
o 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:
o a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.
o b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:
o V08622, CB #67 Drain o V08618. Drain off MV-08-3 1501 o V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 1 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
3 Event #
8 and 9 Page 16 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1 B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Chemistry reports, after time delay, there is elevated activity in the 2B SG Indications Available:
SRO When CI-1 satisfied refer to IC-2 (next safety function not met by success path one (1)
Direct monitoring Pressurizer level to determine if HPSI throttling criteria met.
Critical Direct RCS cooldown not to exceed 50°F in anyone hour Task period due to RCP's not operating.
RO Monitor RCS temperature, subcooling, Pressurizer level.
Critical Cooldown the RCS not to exceed 50°F in anyone hour period Task when directed.
If CCW lost to RCP's >30 minutes:
A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by BOP PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleed off will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
Perform SFSC's of EOP-15 every 15 minutes Perform Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's, when directed (attached pages 59,60)
Isolates 2A S/G lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R when directed (attached pages 72-74)
Scenario 3 Rev.3
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action 3
Event #
Form ES-D-2 8 and 9 Page 17 of 18 SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1 B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
BOP Perform Appendix L EOP-99 Hydrogen Analyzers when directed (attached pages 62,63)
Perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 when directed (attached pages 64-67)
Reset AFAS-2 when directed Throttle HPSI flow when directed Scenario Termination:
- Safety Functions met in EOP-15 Scenario 3 Rev.3
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO:
Board RCO:
Protected Train:
B Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage:
o Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage:.012 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
None Tech Spec Action Statement:
None.
OPS 513's:
None Locked in Annunciators:
M-46 2A Charging Pump SS IsolN2555 Ovrld/SS 1501 Current Status:
100% power, steady state equilibrium Xenon, MOL. RCS Boron concentration is 777 ppm.
Equipment Problems:
2A Charging pump OOS for repack.
Scenario 3 Rev.3
1 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
St. Lucie Scenario No.:
1 Op Test No.:
HLC 21-NRC Examiners:
Operators:
SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions:
30% power MOL. The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Short Notice Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant. Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold. Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100%
Turnover:
2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump is out of service for leaking plunger. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is out of service due to motor oil leak. Return the Unit to 100% power.
Critical Tasks:
- Crosstie the 2B AFW pump to feed the 2A SG at ~150 gpm prior to reaching OTC criteria. <<15% SG Wide Range level both SG's)
Event Malf.
Event Event No.
No.
Type*
Description 1
1 T.S. I Containment personnel air lock door fails leak test.
SRO 2
R/RO Raise power to 100%
2 C/RO Primary Water Makeup valve FCV-221OX fails open during dilution.
4 3
C/BOP Bearing failure on 2A TCW Pump.
5 4
T.S. I 2A SG safety channel pressure transmitter PT-8013B fails SRO low 6
5 C/RO RCP 2A1 Seal HX CCW outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 fails closed due to TE - 31A1 failing.
7 6
MI All B MSIV closes at power. Rx trip. LOOP. Two B MSSV's stick open 8
7 C/BOP 2B EDG output breaker fails to re-close after opening on SIAS.
9 8
C/BOP MV-09-11 AFW to 2A SG fails to open. Open MV-09-9 with the crosstie valves open and feed the 2A SG.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Rev. 4
2 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The plant is at 30%. Instruction to the crew is to raise power to 100%.
Engineering has just left the Containment after a short entry to take some measurements for an upcoming plant modification. Shortly after the turnover the test group will call the Control room and notify them the outer personnel airlock door has failed the leak test. SRO will evaluate T.S. 3.6.1.3 and enter 2-AOP-6B.01, Loss of Containment Integrity I Air Locks.
After the up power is started, FCV-221OX Water Flow Control Valve fails open. The US will direct the RO to stop dilution and the BOP to place the turbine on hold. The power ascension is now secured. The crew should maintain power constant until I&C repairs FCV-221 OX.
The 2A Turbine Cooling Water Pump will experience increasing amps due to a bearing failure. The pump will trip within approximately B minutes. The crew will identify the failure, start the 2B TCW pump, and secure the 2A TCW pump in accordance with 2-AOP-13.01, Turbine Cooling Water System. The TCW cross-tie must also be maintained open. If pumps trips on overload, Instrument air compressor will also trip on high temperature. If standby compressor auto starts it will also trip on high temperature if the 2B TCW pump has not been manually started. 2-AOP-1B.01, Instrument air malfunction should be implement to restore Instrument air pressure.
PT-B013B fails low which affects "B" Channel AFAS SG 2A - 2B ~ pressure as well as "A" train MSIS and channel MB TMLP trip. SRO to evaluate T.S. Bypass or trip ESFAS and AFAS 1 & 2 within one hour. T.S. 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3.
After PT-B013B actions are taken, RCP 2A1 seal HX CCW outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 fails closed due to TE-31A1 failing high. Actions are taken lAW 2-AOP-01.09A1, "2A1 Reactor Coolant Pump" to 'override open' HCV-14-11A1 since there is no valid Seal Cooler Hx tube leakage.
Next, the B MSIV will close due to air line rupture resulting in a plant trip. On the trip a loss of offsite power (LOOP) will occur. Two MSSV's will lift and fail to reseat. An excess steam demand is now in progress.
As the RCS cools down due to the ESD, SIAS will actuate. Both Diesel Generator output breakers open on SIAS but the 2B Diesel breaker does not re-close. The BRCO should close the 2B Diesel output breaker.
The 2B Steam Generator will continue to blow down. Due to the trip at low power, AFAS may not actuate when EOP-01 is exited. In that case, AFW should be manually started and aligned. When 2C AFW is started (either from AFAS or manually), MV-09-11 to 2A SG will not open and cannot be opened. Success path is to start the 2B AFW pump and open the crossties from the B side to the A side and feed the A SG.
Terminate the scenario after RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized following 2B S/G dryout, the 2B SG is isolated and the 2A SG is being fed by the 2B AFW Pump.
Rev. 4 Scenario 1
3 SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION NRC SCENARIO 1 Procedures Used Tech Specs Entered 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1 3.3.2 Inst. (SG Pressure I ECCS) 2-GOP-1 01, Rx Operating Guidelines 3.6.1.3 Cont. Integrity 2-AOP-68.01, Loss of Containment Integrity I Air Locks 2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation 2-AOP-13.01, Turbine Cooling Water System 2-AOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater or 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation 2-AOP-01.09A1, 2A1 Reactor Coolant Pump 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions 2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand Event 2-EOP-99, Appendix R Rev. 4 Scenario 1
4 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
Raise power to 100%
Form ES-D-2 2
Page 4
of 19 Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.
Initiate IC 1430% power, and Lesson 'NRC Scenario #1'. Xenon building in, 7 gpm dilution rate. MOL. Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position. Place 2A AFW pump and 2A BAM pump to stop. Place Orange control switch ECO tags on all 3 pumps. Ensure the 2B TCW is secure and in standby with SB13139 TCW pp Discharge cross-tie valves open.
Sign off and handout 1-GOP-201 (or 2-GOP-201 if updated with new DEH steps) step 71 as complete and Attachment 3 (MSR's) signed off to step 3.
If RE called for load rate state up to 30% 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Control Room Indications Available: G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS Isol, N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stopl SS Isol, M-46 2A Charging Pump SS Isol/2555 OVRLD SRO Continue with 1 (2)-GOP-201 'Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 To Mode 1', step 72 (attached page 5,6)
Control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached pages 7,8)
Recognize Annunciator L-12, 'Steam Byapss Demand AWP' RO alarming due to Steam Pressure greater than 886 psia with Reactor NOT tripped.
Raise dilution rate for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step 4.2.15 (attached page 9,10)
Withdraw CEA's to control Rx power and ASIIAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached page 7,8)
- CEA Withdrawal, select MS on the CEDMCS Control Switch Move the IN/HOLD/OUT Switch to the OUT direction Divert letdown to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS to maintain VCT level within normal band.
Scenario 1 Rev. 4
5 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
62 of 95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:
4.0 1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)
- 69.
IF reactor power is greater than 20% AND group 7 is inserted greater than 34 inches, THEN LOG length of time Group 7 was inserted greater than 34 inches:
Time: __ _
- 70.
WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 250 MW, THEN VERIFY Secondary Chemistry meets 30% power administrative limits of COP-05.04.
NOTE Based on JPN Engineering Evaluation, the RE Supervisor, may recommend to Operations that any or all of the 30% Reactor Power level surveillances be performed at 45% following power ascension that was NOT a result of a refueling outage.
- 71.
IF required prior to Reactor Power reaching 30%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN PERFORM the following:
(Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 14)
A.
STOP power ascension.
B.
PERFORM 1-0SP-69.01, Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration.
C.
ENSURE scheduled Incore surveillances have been performed. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 7)
D.
ENSURE Incore Detection System is OPERABLE in accordance with 0-OSP-64.01. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 7)
- 72.
WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 300 MW, THEN INITIATE MSR warmup per Attachment 3, MSR Operation.
- 73.
IF available, THEN ENSURE second Main Feed Pump is ready to start in accordance with 1-NOP-09.01.
- 74.
WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 315 MW, THEN INITIATE placing MSRs in service per Attachment 3, MSR Operation.
CHEM RE
6 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 PROCEDURE NO.:
4.0 1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)
- 75.
WHEN Reactor Power is at approximately 45%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
STOP power ascension.
B.
PERFORM Nuclear I Delta T power calibration in accordance with 1-0SP-69.01, Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration.
(Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 4)
C.
IF NOT performed at 30% Reactor Power, THEN ENSURE scheduled incore surveillance have been performed.
D.
IF NOT performed at 30% Reactor Power, THEN ENSURE Incore Detection System is OPERABLE in accordance with 0-OSP-64.01, Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 7)
E.
IF Condensate Polisher is in service, THEN ENSURE enough Powdex vessels are in service to support a rise in condensate flow.
F.
START second Condensate Pump in accordance with 1-NOP-12.03, Condensate System Operation.
G.
WARMUP Heater Drain Pumps in accordance with 1-NOP-11.02.
H.
VERIFY proper operation of Heater Drain and Vent system as follows:
VERIFY proper heater levels.
VERIFY proper operation of normal and alt drain valves.
I.
Prior to exceeding 5100 gpm total TCW flow, ENSURE both Turbine Cooling Water Pumps are in operation.
63 of 95
7 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
11 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY 1---...;...;..--.......
PROCEDURE NO.:
STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 6 of 16 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence provided:
- All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied and,
- The performance of the out of sequence steps do not change an operational mode and
- Permission is granted from SM/US 6.1 Power Level Escalations NOTE CEAs should be above the Long-term Steady State Insertion limit (102 inches withdrawn on Group 5) before reaching 20% core power and at a position to begin controlling ASI at the ESI between 20% and 50% power.
Refer to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for further_guidance.
- 1.
As Main Generator loading commences, MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref by:
A.
CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.
AND/OR B.
Boron concentration changes in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
NOTE Contact Reactor Engineering if further assistance is required when using Appendix B.
- 2.
At or above 50% power (or 30% if a shape annealing factor test is performed), refer to Appendix B for power escalation rates.
- 3.
At or above 50% power:
A.
All planned reactivity additions should be made by boration or dilution in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
B.
USE CEAs for ASI control, CONSIDER the reactivity effect of CEAs when adjusting ASI.
C.
REFER to NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for specific instructions regarding ASI control during power escalations.
8 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
11 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY PR-O-C-ED-U-RE.;..;N-O-.: ----4 STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 7 of 16 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)
- 4.
.If available, Then ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating.
If necessary, START an additional Charging Pump in accordance with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and Letdown.
- 5.
PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation in accordance with Appendix A, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.
- 6.
CONTINUE to load the Main Generator in accordance with 2-GOP-201,
Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.
END OF SECTION 6.1
9 REVISION NO.:
28 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 88 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)
CAUTION Allowing PMW flow rate to exceed the running charging pump(s) capacity while using V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE may cause the VCT relief valve to lift.
- 14.
IF using V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE, THEN ENSURE the flow rate on FIA-2212, CHARGING TO REGEN HX, for the number of running charging pumps is NOT exceeded.
0 0 0 0 NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26, DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW
- 15.
ADJUST FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2 Step 4.
IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN, THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 XN Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjustflow.
- 16.
IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW.
- 17.
MAINTAIN PIA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE :530 psig by opening and closing V2513, (VCT) VENT VALVE.
- 18.
IF diverting to maintain VCT level, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in the WMS position.
B.
ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates OPEN.
C.
When normal level on LlC-2226, (VCT) LEVEL, is reached, THEN PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO.
D.
ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates CLOSED.
- 19.
WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added, THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP.
DODD DODD DODD DODD DODD DODD DODD DODD DODD
10 REVISION NO.:
28 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 18 of 88 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)
- 20.
IF V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened, THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED.
DODD
- 21.
IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE, was opened, THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED.
DODD
- 22.
ENSURE FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM.
DODD
- 23.
MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tavg. (RTGB-203)
DODD
- 24.
RECORD on Attachment 3, Boration I Dilution Log the number of gallons of primary makeup water added, as indicated on FQI-2210X, PMW FLOW TOTALIZER. (Section 7.2 Commitment 1)
DODD
- 25.
IF additional dilutions are required, OR the expected changes to Tavg or boron concentration are NOT achieved, THEN REPEAT Section 4.2 Step 3 through Section 4.2 Step 24.
DODD
11 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
Raise power to 1 00%
Form ES-D-2 2
Page 5
of 19 Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Refer to Attachment 3 of 1 (2)-GOP-201 as NPO when called to support placing MSR's in service.
Control Room Indications Available:
When Generator load is greater than 300 Mw continue with SRO step 3 of 1 (2)-GOP-201 'MSR Operation' (attached page 12-20)
Direct BOP to perform steps to place MSR's in service.
BOP Perform step 3.A (Record temperatures) of Attachment 3 Open MSR block valves when directed, Step 3.B Coordinate with NPO to continue placing MSR's in service lAW Program DEH per 1 (2)NOP-99.07 Operations Hard cards,.0, Turbine Adjustments. (attached page 21-23)
ADJUST values, as directed by US, not to exceed 4.2 MWe for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
- TARGET SELECT
- RATE SELECT RO Monitors dilution and T-avg and Tref and maintain as close as possible. (+/- 2°F)
When power is above 50%, control ASI lAW 0-NOP-100.02,
'Axial Shape Index Control' within transient band.:t 0.1 recommended but should be.:t 0.2. Step 4.1 (attached page 24,25) 5 Scenario 1 Rev. 4
12 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 87 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Oeeration (Page 3 of 11)
- 3.
WHEN GENERA TOR LOAD exceeds 300 MW, THEN INITIATE MSR warmup as follows:
A.
RECORD the following temperatures prior to opening MSR Block Valves:
DEH Display 5552 TEMPERATURE INITIAL (OF)
LP Turbine 1 Inlet Temperature LP Turbine 2 Inlet Temperature MSR A Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR D Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR B Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature MSR e Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature NOTE A large steam demand may occur when opening the MSR Block Valves. The MSR Block Valves should be opened one at a time, allowing time for the ReS to stabilize.
B.
ENSURE the following MSR Block Valves are OPEN:
COMPID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL MV-08-4 1A MSR TeV Block Valve OPEN MV-08-6 1 D MSR TeV Block Valve OPEN MV-08-8 1B MSR TeV Block Valve OPEN
13 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE; 88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 88 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INmAL MSR Operation (Page 4 of 11)
- 3.
(continued)
NOTE Quench water to the MSRs will be supplied immediately upon opening the MSR Block Valves.
C.
WHEN MSR Block Valves are open, THEN ALIGN the following components to adjust MSR subcooling flow to approximately 6 GPM:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V09322 SE-09-1A 1A MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Ownstrm Isol approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4A, FW t01A MSR subcooling V09319 SE-09-1B 1B MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Ownstrm Isol approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4B, FW to 1 B MSR subcooling V09328 SE-09-1D 10 MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Ownstrm Isol approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4D. FW to 10 MSR subcooling D.
OPEN Breaker 1-41637, REHEATER 1B2 BLOCK VALVE MV-08-10. (480V MCC 181 Turbine)
NOTE Manual Operation of Motor Operated Valves is performed using OP 1250020, Valve, Breaker, Motor and Instrument Instructions.
E.
THROTTLE OPEN MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE as directed by US/SM.
F.
ALIGN the following component to adjust MSR subcooling flow to approximately 6 GPM:
14 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201
- 3.
F.
REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 (continued)
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 5 of 11 )
69 of 95 COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V09325 SE-09-1C 1C MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Dwnstrm 1501 approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4C, FW to 1C MSR subcooling NOTE MSR TCV seat leakage is normal and desired. After the MSR Block Valves are opened, a minimal increase of LP Turbine inlet temperature (10°F) is used as indication of sufficient TCV seat leakage.
IF any LP Turbine inlet temperature OR MSR outlet temperature fails to have risen at least 10°F, THEN MSR outlet temperatures to the LP Turbines should be used to identify which MSR is NOT contributing to warm-up.
The LP Inlet Steam Temperature change rate shall NOT exceed a rate of 75°F/hour.
The LP Inlet Steam Temperature step change shall NOT exceed 25°F every 20 minutes.
Instantaneous changes of steam temperature to the LP Turbine Inlets should be limited to a maximum of 50° F.
The temperature difference between the steam entering the inlet on one side of an LP Turbine and that entering the other side should not exceed 50° F.
The maximum allowable steam inlet temperature difference between LP Turbine 1 and LP Turbine 2 is 50 0 F.
G.
MONITOR LP Turbine warm-up as follows:
(1)
ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL is open.
(display 5552)
(2)
CONSULT with SM/US to determine sufficient time to allow LP Turbine inlet temperature rise of at least 10°F.
15 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 PROCEDURE TITLE:
REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATIACHMENT3 MSR Operation (Page 6 of 11 )
PAGE:
90 of 95
- 3.
(continued)
H.
WHEN sufficient time has passed to allow LP Turbine inlet temperature to rise at least 10°F, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1)
ENSURE DEH display 5552, MSR CONTROL PANEL, is open.
(2)
RECORD the following temperatures for use as indication of sufficient MSR TCV seat leakage:
DEH display 5552 points LP Turbine 1 Inlet Temperature LP Turbine 2 Inlet Temperature MSR A Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR D Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR B Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature MSR C Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature TEMPERATURE INITIAL (OF)
(3)
VERIFY all MSR outlet temperatures previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.A have risen greater than 10°F.
(4)
VERIFY both LP Turbine Inlet Temperatures previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.A have risen greater than 10°F.
I.
RECORD time and date both Turbine inlet temperatures and all MSR outlet temperatures have risen greater than 10°F above previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.A:
Date I Time:
I
16 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 7 of 11 )
NOTE MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE will be throttled as directed by US/SM.
- 4.
WHEN GENERATOR LOAD exceeds 315 MW, THEN PLACE MSRs in service as follows:
A.
ENSURE DEH display 5552, MSR CONTROL PANEL, is open.
B.
VERIFY display 5552, MODE OF OPERATION group, indicates LOAD> 25%.
C.
ENSURE MSRs have soaked for greater than 45 minutes from time previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.1:
Date / Time:
/
D.
SET MSR heatup rate to 70°F/HOUR as follows:
(1)
ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL is open.
(display 5552)
(2)
TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T") / raise
(" * ") from TEMP RAMP RATE pop-up to set Temp Ramp Rate to 70°F/HOUR. (display 7096)
(3)
TOUCH ENTER. (display 7096)
(4)
VERIFY AUTO RAMP INTERFACE group displays 70°F/HOUR.
91 of 95
17
-" -.. -.--~-~--------
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 92 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 8 of 11 )
- 4.
(continued)
E.
INITIATE MSR heatup as follows:
(1)
TOUCH SELECT MODE from MODE OF OPERATION group. (display 5552)
(2)
TOUCH AUTO TEMP or AUTO TIME from MODE OF OPERATION SELECT pop-up per US/SM direction. (display 7060)
(3)
TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.
(display 5552)
(4)
TOUCH GO on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.
(display 7069)
18 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
1*GOp*201 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATIACHMENT3 MSR Operation (Page 9 of 11 )
- 4.
(continued)
F.
IF necessary to suspend MSR heatup, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1)
TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.
(display 5552)
(2)
TOUCH HOLD on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.
(display 7069)
NOTE Display 5552 provides a MSR TEMPERATURE RATE/HR group that displays the heatup rate in DEGF/H.
93 of 95 If DEH automatically suspends the MSR heatup, once the heatup rate lowers below 75°F/HOUR, then DEH will permit the heatup to be restarted.
If DEH automatically suspends the MSR heatup, then manual action will be required to restart the heatup. DEH will NOT automatically re-establish heatup.
G.
IF desired to resume MSR heatup, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1)
TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.
(display 5552)
(2)
TOUCH GO on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.
(display 7069)
19 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TrrLE:
PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 94 of'95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1~OP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATIACHMENT3 INmAL MSR Oeeratlon (Page 10 of 11)
- 4.
(continued)
H.
WHEN MSR heatup is completed, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1)
Locally VERIFY the following MSR TCVs are fully OPEN:
COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL TCV-08-1 MS to 1A MSR OPEN TCV-08-3 MS to 16 MSR OPEN TCV-08-4 MS to 1C MSR OPEN TCV-08-2 MS to 10 MSR OPEN (2)
ENSURE 5A and 58 MSR vents are positioned as follows:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V11836 MSR 1 A Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 56 LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN V11831 MSR 16 Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 56 LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN V11846 MSR 1 C Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 5A LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN V11841 MSR 1 D Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 5A LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN (3)
ENSURE MSR vents to Condenser are CLOSED:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V11829 1A MSR Scavenging Vent to 16 Cndsr 1501 CLOSED V11834 16 MSR to 16 Cndsr MSR Scavenging Vent 1501 CLOSED V11839 1 C MSR Scavenging Vent 1501 CLOSED V11844 1 D MSR Scavenging Vent Isol CLOSED
20 REVISION NO.:
88 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 PROCEDURE TITLE:
REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 11 of 11)
PAGE:
95 of 95
- 4.
H.
(continued)
COMPID MV-08-5 MV-08-7 MV-08-9 MV-08-11 (4)
WHEN MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE is full OPEN locally, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a.
PLACE control switch for MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE in OPEN. (RTGB-101)
- b.
CLOSE Breaker 1-41637, REHEATER 1B2 BLOCK VALVE MV-08-10.
(480V MCC 1 B1 Turbine)
- c.
WHEN MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE indicates full OPEN, THEN RELEASE control switch.
- d.
ENSURE approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4C, FW to 1 C MSR subcooling (5)
ENSURE MSR Warmup Valves are CLOSED:
RCO RCO COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL Wannup 1A MSR CLOSED Warmup 10 MSR CLOSED Wannup 19 MSR CLOSED Wannup 1C MSR CLOSED
21 REVISION NO.:
2 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE 11 of 19 An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-101. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.
Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Use of appropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant responses and system performance to ensure proper control of the plant.
Notification to the SM/US is required prior to manipulation for any abnormal indications.
Reactor Power MW (Load)
CEA POSITION DCS Power RCS Temp Pzr Level ASI
- 1.
ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
- 2.
TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- 3.
ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
TARGET SELECT RATE SELECT
- 4.
VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)
TARGET RATE
22 REVISION NO.:
2 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
OPERATIONS HARD CARDS PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 5.
TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551)
- 6.
MONITOR turbine governor valves response on DEH main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL.
(display 5551)
- 7.
IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
(display 5551)
B.
IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:
(1)
TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.
(2)
PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)
- a.
TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
- b.
TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.
- c.
TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")
from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
C.
IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.
- 8.
MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:
Reactivity rate Turbine load rate 12 of 19
23 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 13 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 9.
IF desired to stop load change, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
B.
TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
C.
TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.
24 REVISION NO.:
7 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-NOP-100.02 PROCEDURE TITLE:
4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 General AXIAL SHAPE INDEX CONTROL ST. LUCIE PLANT
- 1.
REVIEW Section 2.0, PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
- 2.
REVIEW Section 3.0, PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS.
NOTE Reactor Engineering will furnish an ESI for Operations at various times throughout the cycle. On new reload cores, ESI guidance is provided in 3200092, Reactor Engineering Power Ascension Program.
- 3.
IF assistance is needed for ASI control, THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering.
NOTE PAGE:
80f25 Inserting Shutdown CEAs and Regulating CEAs (other than the lead bank) up to 129 inches withdrawn during EOC shutdowns should provide enough ASI control to avoid LPD pre-trips.
- 4.
APPLY Axial shape control under the following conditions:
At all times when core power is at or above 40% of rated power Should be considered and established as soon as possible after exceeding 25% power
- 5.
PERFORM the following for ASI control:
A.
BORATE OR DILUTE per 1(2)-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
B.
USE Group 7 for Unit 1 ASI control.
C.
USE Group 5 for Unit 2 ASI control.
25
.-.--~--.~~~~~------~-~~------~~-----~----.
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX CONTROL 90f25 PROCEDURE NO.:
O-NOP-100.02 ST. LUCIE PLANT 4.1 General (continued)
- 5.
(continued)
D.
IF power is above 50%, THEN MAINTAIN the ASI within the I
following control bands:
Steady State band - +/- 0.5 during steady state operation Transient band (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 2)
+/- 0.1 during load transients is recommended but should be within +/- 0.2
+/- 0.5 during load transients with concurrence from Reactor Engineering E.
IF necessary, THEN USE Shutdown Groups and Reg.
I Groups 1 - 6 on Unit 1 (Reg. Groups 1 - 4 for Unit 2) for ASI control, as long as the Shutdown Groups and the Reg. Groups (other than the lead group) are maintained greater than 129" withdrawn.
F.
IF performing power manipulations between 100% and I
approximately 90% power, THEN USE the full power ESI for ASI control unless Reactor Engineering provides other written guidance.
G.
IF performing reactor startups and shutdowns, or power I
maneuvers outside of the band of 100% to approximately 90%
power, THEN USE the sliding ESI graph for ASI control unless Reactor Engineering provides other written guidance.
26 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
Containment Airlock Door Fails Leak Test Form ES-D-2 Page 6 of 19 Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Shortly after the turnover, call the Control Room and notify the SRO the Containment outer personnel air lock door has failed the leak test.
Control Room Indications Available: None SRO T.S.
Notify SM of door failure.
Implement 2-AOP-68.01, 'Loss of Containment Integrity / Air Locks' step 4.2.2.2.1 (attached page 27)
Applies T.S. 3.6.1.3 determines Action a.1 maintain the operable door closed and either restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the Operable door closed.
6 Scenario 1
27 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
o PROCEDURE NO.:
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY I AIR LOCKS 7 of 12 2-AOP-68.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4 o
- 1.
D
- 2.
VERIFY CONTAINMENT VESSEL INTEGRITY is met.
VERIFY both doors CLOSED and sealed for each containment air lock.
I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 1.1 REFER TO Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.1 for required actions.
2.1 IF one containment air lock door is inoperable, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
REFER TO Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.3 for required actions.
B.
MAINTAIN at least the OPERABLE air lock door CLOSED.
C.
RESTORE the inoperable door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or LOCK the OPERABLE door CLOSED.
2.2 IF at least one containment air lock door will NOT close and seal, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
REFER TO Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.3 for required actions.
B.
CONTACT Maintenance for assistance.
2.3 IF outer containment air lock door is inoperable, THEN ENSURE interior door equalizing valve is CLOSED.
28 Appendix D Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
3 Page 7
Event
Description:
Reactor Water Makeup Valve FCV-2210X Drifts Open Time i
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Form ES-D-2 of 19
- Trigger Event 2, FRC*221OX Reactor Makeup Water valve fails full (output) open on examiner cue.
When contacted as I&C, wait 5 minutes and report that a there is a valve positioner problem.
EXAMINERS NOTE: No specific procedural guidance for this failure.
Control Room Indications Available: primary water flow increasing, reactor power increasing, RCS temperature increasing Recognize FRC-2210X full output:
- Primary water flow rate about 90 gpm SRO
- Reactor Power increasing
Direct RO to attempt to manually close FCV-2210X. Direct RO to close MV-2525 Boron Load Control Valve when FCV-2210X SRO does not close or may direct the RO to turn off primary water pump. May refer to 2-AOP-02.01, 'Boron Concentration Control'. Recognize no procedure guidance.
SRO Direct RO to monitor Primary plant parameters as Xenon is building in and dilution is not available.
SRO Contacts I&C to repair FCV-221 OX SRO Direct BOP to 'HOLD' on Turbine. May direct Turbine load reduction as Xenon builds in and no way to dilute.
BOP Place Turbine on HOLD when directed.
SRO Notifies shift manager.
Scenario 1
29 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
4 Bearing Failure on the 2A TCW pump.
Form ES-D-2 Page 8 of 19 Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 3, 2A TCW pp bearing failure.
Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger 'Fix FCV*221 OX' and call as I/C that FCV*2210X has been repaired.
Note to Evaluator: This malfunction ramps in over 8 minutes (pump will trip after 8 minutes).
Control Room Indications Available: No annunciation until the 2A TCW pp trips then E*34 will alarm (2A TCW pp ovrld/trip), then Generator alarms.
NOTE: If crew does not recognize high amps prior to overload trip, the running Instrument air compressor will trip on high temperature. Annunciator F-5, 'Inst. Air press high / low' will alarm. The standby air compressor may also trip if started prior to starting the 2B TCW pump.
SRO Refer to 2-AOP-13.01, TCW System and direct subsequent Actions: (section 4.2.1.1) (attached page 30,31)
- 1) Start one TCW pump (2B) as required by unit load.
- 2) Maintain the TCW discharge header cross-tie open.
If TCW pump trips on overload and annuncaitor F-5 alarms, implement 2-AOP-18.01, 'Instrument Air Malfunction' and direct:
- Open SH18718 station to inst air crosstie
- Open V18075 air dryer bypass.
- Verify standby air compressor has started Recognize rising amps on the 2A TCW pump ammeter and BOP secure the pump prior to overload / trip conditions. If pump trips on overload, recognize Annunciator F-5 and lowering Instrument air pressure.
Contact the field operator and make preparations for a start of the 2B TCW pump.
When directed start the 2B TCW pump and Verify secondary alarms clear after 2B TCW pump running.
8 Scenario 1
30 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
3 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 6of28 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-13.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions D
- 1.
VERIFY one or two TCW pumps in service based on unit load.
I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 1.1 START one or two pumps as required.
A.
IF neither pump can be
- started, THEN PERFORM the following at the direction of the US:
(1)
LOWER VARS to minimum.
(2)
PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.
B.
IF only one TCW pump can be started and both pumps are required, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1)
OPEN SB13139, TCW DISCHARGE HEADER CROSSTIE, to align flow to TCW heat exchangers.
(TGB/28/S-221W-K)
(2)
LOWER VARS to minimum.
31
~~~--~--
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
3 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 70f28 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-13.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 1.
(continued) o
- 2.
o
- 3.
VERIFY NO leaks by performing visual inspection of the TCW System.
IF two TCW pumps are running and one pump must be secured, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
LOWER VARS to minimum.
(3)
PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower, to within the heat removal capabilities of one TCW pump.
2.1 IF leak can be isolated without impacting cooling capability, THEN ISOLATE leak.
2.2 IF isolation of leak will impact unit operation, THEN PERFORM the following prior to isolating leak:
A.
LOWER VARS to minimum.
B.
PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower.
32
~--.--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~------~----------~---
Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
4 Bearing Failure on the 2A TCW pump.
Form ES-D-2 Page 9
of 19 Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If called to open Station to Instrument air crosstie, open SH18718, SERVICE AIR CROSSTIE TO INSTR AIR ISOL.
Control Room Indications Available: Lowering Instrument air pressure on PI*18*
9/16, INSTR AIR & STA AIR PRESSURE Exit the AOP after the 2B TCW pump has been started and SRO subsequent actions are complete. Verify Instrument air pressure returned to normal and Air Compressors running satisfactorily.
After I/C reports FCV-2210X repaired. SRO MAY Continue with NOTE the unit up power but not exceed the limits of one TCW pump
(-50% power).
Scenario 1
33 Appendix D Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event #
5 Page 10 of 19 Event
Description:
PT -80138 2A SG Pressure Fails Low Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger event 5, PT*8013B Fails Low.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators: Q*2 ESFAS ATI Fault, SG Press trip, TMLP trip, MSIS trip.
Direct the implementation of 2-AOP-99.01 step 4.1 (attached, SRO T.S.
Page 31-33) S/G pressure Channel Failure section 4.2.10.
Implement T.S. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Table 3.3-1 and 3.3-3.
(attached page 34-42)
Direct placing ESFAS Channel MB S/G 2A Pressure (MSIS),
Channel B AFAS-1 and 2, Channel MB TM/LP (RPS) and SRO T.S.
Channel MB Low SG Pressure (RPS) in bypass or trip within one hour lAW 2-AOP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation' step 4.2.10.
RO Recognize PT-8013B has failed low. RPS bistables TMLP and Lo SG Press have tripped.
Bypass or trip ESFAS Channel MB S/G 2A Pressure (MSIS) as BOP directed.
- Obtain key 114 and 134.
Bypass or trip RPS channel MB TM/LP (RPS) and Channel MB Low SG Pressure as directed.
- Obtain key 105 and 107.
Bypass or trip AFAS channel MB
- Obtain key 202 and 204 and use pushbuttons 10 Scenario 1
34
~~ -~~~--~---------------------------------------
REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions o
NOTE A TRANSMITTER failure can be discriminated from a METER failure by the presence of annunciators and protection and control actuations.
- 1.
CONFIRM failed channel by any of the following methods:
Channel check comparison with redundant channels Annunciators Bistable or status lights Any instrument-related testing or surveillance procedure in progress 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions o
- 1.
NOTE BISTABLE TRIP UNIT is abbreviated as BTU in this AOP.
IF entering this procedure to restore an affected channel, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
10 of 92
35 REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I 4.2.10 S/G Pressure Channel Failure D
- 1.
CIRCLE affected instrument and channel:
PI-8013 A I B I C I D PI-8023 A I B I C I D I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I NOTE PAGE:
26 of 92 Bypassing ESFAS BTUs will require door Key 114 and either Key 134 or 136.
Bypassing AFAS will require Key 202 and ~
of the following keys; 203, 204, 205, or 206.
If it is necessary to TRIP the RPS and ESFAS bistable trip units (BTUs),
then it is preferable to leave the AFAS BTUs in BYPASS.
(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)
An AFAS channel in the TRIPPED condition is limited to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> per Tech Spec 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3. (Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)
D
- 2.
PERFORM one of the following for the affected BrUs listed:
(Key 105)
TM/LO PRESS (RPS)
(Key 107)
For PI-8013 OR PI-8023 AFAS-1 For PI-8013 OR PI-8023 AFAS-2
36 REVISION NO.:
1 PROCEDURE NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I
, CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.10 S/G Pressure Channel Failure (continued)
- 2.
(continued)
For PJ-8013 only S/G 2A PRESS (MSIS)
(Key 134)
For PI-8023 only S/G 2B PRESS (MSIS)
(Key 136)
A.
BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitches and push buttons.
OR B.
TRIP affected BTUs per, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.
PAGE:
27 of 92
37 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONP'T'ON FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.
4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.
Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/43-1 Amendment No. 67
38 TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 1.
2 4
1,2 1
4 2
4 3*,4*,5*
5
- 2.
Variable Power Level - High 4
2(a)(d) 3 1,2 2#
- 3.
Pressurizer Pressure - High 4
2 3
1,2 2#
- 4.
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 4
2(a)(d) 3 1,2 2#
- 5.
Containment Pressure - High 4
2 3
1,2 2#
- 6.
Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4/SG 21SG(b) 3/SG 1,2 2#
- 7.
Steam Generator Pressure 4
2(a)(d) 3 1,2 2#
Difference - High
- 8.
Steam Generator Level - Low 4/SG 21SG 3/SG 1,2 2#
- 9.
Local Power Density - High 4
2(c)(d) 3 1
2#
- 10. Loss of Component Cooling Water 4
2 3
1,2 2#
to Reactor Coolant Pumps
- 11. Reactor Protection System Logic 4
2 3
1,2 2#
3*,4*,5*
5
- 12. Reactor Trip Breakers 4
2(f) 4 1,2 4
3*,4*,5*
5
- 13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor
- a. Startup and Operating -
Rate of Change of Power -
4 2(e)(g) 3 1,2 2#
High
- b. Shutdown 4
0 2
3,4,5 3
- 14. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low 4/SG 21SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1,2 2#
- 15. Loss of Load (Turbine 4
2(c) 3 1
2#
Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low)
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/43-2 Amendment No. 60
39 TABLE 3.3*1 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 -
- a.
With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.
- b.
With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- 1.
Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- 2.
All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition.
With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below:
Process Measurement Circuit
- 1. Safety Channel - Nuclear Instrumentation Wide Range Linear Range
- 2. Pressurizer Pressure -
- 3. Containment Pressure-
- 4. Steam Generator Pressure -
- 5. Steam Generator Level -
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 Functional Unit Bypassed Rate of Change of Power - High (RPS)
Variable Power Level - High (RPS)
Local Power Density - High (RPS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure - Low (ESF)
Containment Pressure - High (RPS)
Containment Pressure - High (ESF)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (ESF)
Steam Generator Level-Low (RPS)
If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)
If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS) 3/43-4 Amendment No. 4i, +3, 149
40 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONPITION FOR OPEBATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
- a.
With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b.
With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.
4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.
The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No.
of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 67
41 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued}
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 4.
MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)
- a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3 16
- b. Steam Generator 4/steam 21steam 3/steam 1,2,3(c) 13*, 14 Pressure - Low generator generator generator
- c. Containment Pressure -
4 2
3 1,2,3 13*, 14 High
- d. Automatic Actuation logic 2
1 2
1,2,3 12
- 5.
CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)
- a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1
2 1,2,3,4 12
- b. Refueling Water Storage 4
2 3
1,2,3 19 Tank -low
- c. Automatic Actuation logic 2
1 2
1,2,3 12 ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3143-13 Amendment No. fiG, 132
42 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (a)
Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is less than 1836 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 1836 psia.
(b)
An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.
(c)
Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 700 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 700 psia.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
ACTION OF STATEMENTS ACTION 12 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
ACTION 13 -
With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.
With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.
Process Measurement Circuit
- 1. Containment Pressure -
- 2. Steam Generator Pressure-
- 3. Steam Generator Level -
- 4. Pressurizer Pressure -
ST. LUCIE* UNIT 2 Functional Unit Bypassed Containment Pressure - High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)
Containment Pressure - High (RPS)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)
AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)
Steam Generator Level-Low (RPS)
If SG-2A. then AFAS-1 (AFAS)
If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure - Low (SIAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS) 3/43*15 Amendment No.~,~. 149
43 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
Event #
6 Page 11 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
2A1 RCP Seal HX Cooler outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 Closes Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 6, RCP 2A1 Seal HX Outlet valve HCV-11A1 fails closed.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator J-25 2A1 RCP Seal Trouble, cooling Wtr Flow Low Examiners note: When HCV is taken back to AUTO from OPEN RESET, after a short time delay the HCV will re-close.
RO Acknowledge annunciator. Recognize and communicate HCV-14-11A1 is closed.
Monitors 2A 1 RCP seal temperatures SRO Implement 2-AOP-01.09A 1, '2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump' step 4.2.7. (attached page 44,45)
Direct BOP to determine if increase CCW activity rising trend is indicated.
When no activity indicated direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset and verify open indication. Step 4.2.7.1.2 When HCV re-closes direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset and leave the control switch to Open. Step 4.2.7.1.2 RO When directed, place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and back to AUTO.
RO When directed, place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and leave in that position.
BOP Observe RC-26-1 and RC-26-2 CCW radiation and determine no activity increase.
11 Scenario 1
44 REVISION NO.:
o PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
2A1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PROCEDURE NO.:
31 of 59 2-AOP-01.09A 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature o
NOTE Valve HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, closes on high seal cooler outlet temperature (200°F) and fails open on loss of instrument air or loss of power.
Maintaining HCV-14-11A1 control switch in OPEN overrides the automatic closure function on seal cooler outlet high temperature.
If a high temperature condition exists upon release of the control switch, there is a 1 minute time delay before closure of valve.
CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage when the control switch is maintained in OPEN.
Consideration should be given to returning the control switch to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.
CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow to the RCP coolers can result in thermal stress and flashing in the heat exchanger upon re-admittance of cooling water flow.
- 1.
NAVIGATE to 2A1 PUMP DETAILS and VERIFY HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, OPEN.
1.1 IF CCW activity rising trend is indicated on RR-26-1/2, RAD MONITORING PANEL RECORDERS, THEN PLACE HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, control switch in CLOSED.
1.2 IF CCW activity rising trend is NOT indicated, THEN PERFORM the following:
A.
PLACE HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE control switch to OPEN RESET and VERIFY OPEN indication.
45
~.----~--
-~.-----~- ----.~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~-
-~------
~~-
--~-
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
REVISION NO.:
o 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 32 of 59 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.09A 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 I INSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature (continued)
- 1.
(continued)
D
- 2.
D
- 3.
D
- 4.
IF all of the following conditions are satisfied within 10 minutes, CCW RESTORED CBO temperature less than 250°F Lower Seal Cavity temperature less than 250°F THEN GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
RESTORE CCW to 2A 1 RCP within 30 minutes.
GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 4.
B.
EVALUATE placing control switch in AUTO.
C.
IF valve re-closes after returning control switch to
- AUTO, THEN OBTAIN US permission prior to re-opening.
2.1 PERFORM the following:
A.
B.
IF CEA TCBs are OPEN, THEN STOP 2A1 RCP.
IF CEA TCBs are
- CLOSED, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1)
TRIP reactor.
(2)
STOP 2A 1 RCP.
(3)
IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
3.1 GO TO Section 4.2.12.
46 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC
."-~---------~--.~--~
~"-
.--.---~--
Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event #
7 and 8 Page 12 of 19 MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 2B EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 7, MSIV closes, LOOP, two MSSV's stick open.
Call as Unit 1, we are also in a LOOP Two minutes after the trip, call as NPO and report two MSSV's on the 2B SG are open Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator P*49 MSIV HCV*08*1 B Air Press Low/DC Failure will annunciate a couple seconds before the MSIV closes, Unit trip.
Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
SRO RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal
- BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
BOP Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of EOP-99.
Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
Recognize loss of offsite power and verify both EDG started and loaded on the busses.
Scenario 1
47 Appendix D Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event #
7 and 8 Page 13 of 19 Event
Description:
MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 2B EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: On SIAS the 2B EDG output breaker will open (as designed) but fails to re-close and sequence on the bus. Breaker can be closed manually from the RTGB.
SRO Direct closing 2B EDG output breaker after SIAS CRITICAL sequencing failed to reclose breaker. This will provide TASK power to the 2B AFW pump BOP CRITICAL Recognize 2B EDG breaker did not re-close on SIAS and close when directed. This will provide power to the 2B AFW pump TASK Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control
- Verify Reactor power is lowering.
- Verify startup rate is negative.
- Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted.
Inventory Control
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%
Pressure Control
- Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20°F Scenario 1
48 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Event #
Form ES-D-2 7 and 8 Page 14 of 19 MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 2B EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPT A's Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Core Heat Removal RO
- Verify loop delta T is <10°F RCS Heat Removal
- Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0
SG level is between 20 and 83% NR 0
Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR
- S/G pressure is between 835 and 915 psig 0
Close HCV-08-1A if SG pressure <735 psia Four MSR TCV Block valves closed (N/A LOOP) 0 Close TCV's
- MSR warmup valves are closed If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED (N/A LOOP)
If RCS approaches 500°F ensure:
Emergency borate when directed (from RCS Heat Removal Safety Function)
Ensure V2525 Load control valve closed Start 2B BAM Pump Close V2651 Tank 2B Recirc valve Open V2514 Emergency Borate valve Scenario 1
49 Appendix D Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Operator Action Form ES-D-2 HLC21 Scenario #
Event #
7 and 8 Page 15 of 19 NRC MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 2B EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig BOP
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Scenario 1
50 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
Event #
9 Page 16 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
MV-09-11 Fails to Open, Enter EOP-OS - ESDE Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger restore Instrument Air per Appendix H of EOP-99.
If called as NPO to manually open MV-09-11, 2C AFW pump to 2A SG report back MV-09-11 is frozen and will not open.
Control Room Indications Available: MV-09-11 closed indication (green light).
SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart (attached page 51)
Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) every 15 minutes.
NOTE: When STA performs RCS Heat Removal Safety Function, he is to inform the US this Safety Function is not met due to SG levels are not being restored with Feedwater Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's (attached page 52,53)
Direct AFW flow initiated to the 2A SG by starting the 2C AFW pump (MV-OB-13, steam from the 2A SG) and MV-09-11 2C AFW to 2A SG. (may have been done earlier)
Ensure SIAS (if setpoint reached)
Ensure closed MSIV's and MFIV's If CCW lost to RCP's for >30 minutes ensure CCW remains isolated Protect the Main Condenser. Refer to Appendix X section 2 (attached page 54-57) 16 Scenario 1
51 REVISION NO.:
28 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-01 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 17 of 17 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 CHART 1 DIAGNOSTIC FLOW CHART (Page 1 of 1)
..... 0prIrII0r ~
hal bien ~
ttl IN UnI% CoIWot Room va OeIk wrr.. ___ to... MellOn DC tttt
__..... "'"'.... '*Yof
... Qpot.... AIII""".* C!IIIlgts...
-..y
....., Iho EOP CoonIo_
52 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2) o 1. !f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
o A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
o B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.
CAUTION A Train (~)
PAGE:
3 of 159 B Train (~)
If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.
NOTE HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-8B) starts to open When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW "N' header valves, until SIAS is reset o 2. !f an INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the "N' Header
- valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:
HCV-14-8A HCV-14-9 OR
HCV-14-8B HCV-14-10
53 REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)
PAGE:
4 of 159 o 3. !f the 'N' Header has been restored, Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:
A. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE / OVERRIDE.
B.
OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.
o 4. !f the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform S/G samples
~
for isotopic activity and Tritium.
~
o 5. !f S/Gs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.
END OF APPENDIX A
54 REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS PAGE:
118 of 159 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC.
o 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.
o 3. !f AFAS has actuated, and use of Main Feedwater is
- desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
o A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET.
o B. ENSURE Steam Generator levels are being restored using Auxiliary Feedwater o C. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main FRY] Block valves CLOSED.
- 1. MV-09-5
- 2. MV-09-6 o D. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
o E. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
o F. DEPRESS BOTH push buttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
55 REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
PAGE:
119 of 159 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. (continued) o G. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.
o H. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.
o 4. !! AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater is
- desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
o A. ENSURE BOTH S/G [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
o B. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
o C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
o D. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
o E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control S/G levels.
o 5. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.
56
~
REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS 120 of 159 2-EOP-99 ST. lUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS o 6. ENSURE BOTH of the following:
o A. Bearing Oil Pump and Seal Oil Backup Pump RUNNING.
o B. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm, Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.
o 7. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.
o 8. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.
o 9. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.
CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil Pump RUNNING.
o 9.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust TCW to the in-service TlO Cooler to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.
o 10. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO 010.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:
- rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.
o A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.
o B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON.
o C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.
o D. Locally START the Turning Gear.
57 REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
PAGE:
121 of 159 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 11..!! Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.
o 12. Place Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation.
When indicated Reactor power is less than 10-5%,
Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
o A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.
o B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.
o 12.1.!! BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System channels are NOT operating, Then PERFORM applicable actions of 2-AOP-02.01, Boron Concentration Control System (BCCS) Abnormal Operations.
NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliability if 15 KW heaters are not energized after plant shutdown.
o 13. NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.10, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.
o 14. CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.
END OF APPENDIX X
58 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Event 9 Page 17 of 19 Event
Description:
MV-09-11 Fails to Open, Enter EOP-OS - ESDE Time I
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: : If asked to attempt to manually open MV-09-11, three minutes later state the valve would not move and the handwheel broke in attempt to open.
When directed to open AFW crossties, wait three minutes and state MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are open.
Control Room Indications Available: When AFW flow initiated, MV-09-11 2C AFW to 2A SG fails to open. On SIAS the 2B EDG output breaker will open (as designed) but fails to re-close and sequence on the bus. Breaker can be closed manually from the RTGB.
When directed to align the 2C AFW pump to feed the 2A SG BOP report MV-09-11 2C to 2A will not open. Call NPO to investigate MV-09-11 Implement 2-AOP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Attachment 4 SRO step 2 2B AFW pump to feed 2A S/G (attached page 59) OR 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation, step 4.4.2 2B AFW Pump to 2A S/G. (attached page 60)
CRITICAL Direct opening MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie TASK valves and throttle MV-09-9 to restore feed to 2A SG using 2B AFW pump.
When directed, call NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves. NOTE BOP should close MV-09-9 first When directed perform Appendix A of EOP-99 Sampling SG's When directed close CCW to 1 from RCPS's Direct the 2B SG isolated lAW EOP-99 Appendix R (attached SRO page 61-63). Recognize step in Appendix to stop the 2B AFW should NOT be performed and communicate this to the BOP.
17 Scenario 1
59
~-.-.--.-----------.-.-... --~~-.-------------------
REVISION NO.:
2 PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.02 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Cross-Connecting AFW (Page 3 of 4)
- 2.
2B AFW pump to feed 2A S/G:
A.
ENSURE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO 2A S/G VALVE, is CLOSED. (RTGB-202)
B.
START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B.
C.
OPEN SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B S/G VLV.
(RTGB-202 - Key 84)
NOTE Key-switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are located in 2A12B AFW Pump Room. Two keys are required since the keys are removable in CLOSE only.
CAUTION 29 of 35 Opening both MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 while in MODES 1, 2, 3 will make two independent AFW flow paths inoperable.
D.
Locally OPEN MV-09-13, 2A TO 2B AFW HDR CROSS-TIE.
(TRSU21/N-T51W-TA) (Key 301)
E.
Locally OPEN MV-09-14, 2B TO 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE.
(TRSU21/S-T61W-TA) (Key 301)
CAUTION The 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm.
F.
THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A S/G.
(RTGB-202)
G.
IF feeding the 2B S/G, THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE, to maintain proper flow.
60
~-
PROCEDURE TITLE:
REVISION NO.:
4 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION PROCEDURE NO.:
2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 2A S/G.
NOTE PAGE:
17 of 34 Control switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 Cross-Tie valves are located in the 2A I 2B AFW PP Room. The control switches are key operated (#301).
Two keys are necessary as the keys are removable in CLOSE only.
CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13, 2A to 2B AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, and MV 0914, 2B to 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, while in Modes 1. 2, or 3 can only be performed by declaring one AFW train inoperable. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive
- 1)
- 1.
ENSURE PUMP 2B is running.
- 2.
OPEN SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV. (KEY 84)
- 3.
ENSURE the RCS is in MODEs 4, 5, or 6.
Current plant MODE. __
- 4.
PLACE MV-09-13, 2A to 2B AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, key switch
(#301) to OPEN.
- 5.
VERIFY valve is OPEN by local control box indication.
- 6.
PLACE MV-09-14, 2B to 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE. key switch
(#301) to OPEN.
- 7.
VERIFY the valve is OPEN by local control box indication.
NOTE MV-09-10 should be closed unless feeding of both SIGs is desired.
- 8.
THROTTLE MV-09-9. PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A S/G.
CAUTION The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm.
- 9.
IF flow is desired to the 2B SIG while filling the 2A SIG, THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2B S/G.
61 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 4 of 6)
Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation NOTE Local actions are located in step 18 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.
96 of 159 Keys 82 and 81 are required for closing MV-08-17, 2B SIG ATMOSPHERIC ISOL, and MV-08-16, 2B SIG ADV ISOL. Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLEITRIP
( contingency).
CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.
D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1B, Main Steam Header 'B' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.
D 2..If HCV-08-1 B did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.
REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.
D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1 B, MSIV Header 'B' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.
If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.
D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-2A, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
(continued on next page)
62 REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 5 of 6)
Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
PAGE:
97 of 159 D 6. !! BOTH HCV-09-2A and HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to S/G 2B, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
o A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:
o MV-09-6, Stm Gen 2B Reg Block Valve D LCV-9006, 2B 15% Bypass D MV-09-4, 2B 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.
D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-5, 2B SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.
o 8. ENSURE FCV-23-6, 2B SG Blowdown, is CLOSED.
D 9. ENSURE MV-OS-19B, 2B S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
o 10.CLOSE MV-OS-17, 2B S/G ADV Isol. (Key S2)
D 11.PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2B, in STOP.
D 12.ENSURE MV-09-10, Pump 2B Disch to SG 2B Valve, is CLOSED.
o 13.ENSURE MV-09-12, Pump 2C to SG 2B, is CLOSED.
D 14. PLACE MV-OS-12, SG 2B Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.
D 15.lf MV-OS-12, S/G 2B Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required, Then CLOSE MV OS-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 7S)
D 16.ENSURE MV-08-1SB, 2B S/G Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
D 17. CLOSE MV-08-16, 2B S/G ADV Isol. (Key S1)
(continued on next page)
63
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REVISION NO.:
PROCEDURE TITLE:
PAGE:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-99 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DAPPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 6 of 6)
Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
NOTE 98 of 159 Control room isolation actions are now complete. !f a SGTR is in progress, Then the SM should be informed of the status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes. Continue with local actions.
o 18. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:
o A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09158, 2C AFW Pump to 2B S/G Isolation.
o B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09136, 2B AFW Pump to 2B S/G Isolation.
o C. CLOSE SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.
o D. !f SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08883, SE-08-1 Inlet Isolation.
o E. !f MV-08-12, S/G 2B Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
o 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-12 using the handwheel.
o 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:
o a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.
o b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:
o V08622, CB #67 Drain o V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol o V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 Isol End of Section 2 END OF APPENDIX R
64 Appendix D Op Test No.:
HLC21 Scenario #
NRC Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event #
9 Page 18 of 19 Event
Description:
MV-09-11 Fails to Open, Enter EOP ESDE Time
~
Position I
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None BOP CRITICAL When MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves are opened, throttle open MV-09-9 to feed the 2B SG.
TASK When directed isolate the 2B SG lAW EOP-99 Appendix R (attached page 61-63) NOTE: If not mentioned by SRO, BOP recognize step in Appendix to place 2B AFW switch to STOP should NOT be performed due to that is the only AFW pump available.
When 2B SG has blown dry direct stabilization of RCS SRO temperature within the limits of Figure 1A (attached page 65) using the 2A SG ADV's.
RO Open 2A SG ADV's to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of Figure 1A.
THE SUGGESTED TERMINATION POINT IS:
- 1) AFW RESTORED TO THE 2A SIG
- 2) THE 2B SIG IS ISOLATED
- 3) RCS TEMPERATURE IS CONTROLLED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF FIGURE 1A 18 Scenario 1
65 REVISION NO.:
44 PROCEDURE NO.:
.-----~-
--.--------~---
PROCEDURE TITLE:
APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS PAGE:
122 of 159 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)
(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)
CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.
2400 " MOpot_"""'_~""Un42c-_RCO
..... {My_.. ""'........ ""'....,...w..... '...
vaktly Of Ihe ()pH.to( Illd aM. if Chal'9!_ ~
n~,
notify the EOf' CoQfdIM~)
2200 2000 1800 800 600.
400 o o RCPNPSH Requirement' 100 200 Maximum Subi:ooled' 300
~oo Minimum Subi:ooled'
- Inc'udes Instrument Uncertainties 500 600 700 Indicated RCS Temperature (F) 800 RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CEll 2250 psi a to 1000 psia 1000 psi a to 500 psia Less than 500 psi a
66 Desk RCO:
Protected Train:
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Board RCO:
B Day: Today Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage:
o Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage:.03 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Raise power to 100%
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A AFW pump T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action a.
2A BAM Pump N/A with 2B BAM pump available 2A Charging Pump N/A with 2B and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps available.
OPS 513's:
Locked in Annunciators:
G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS Isol N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stopl SS Isol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS Isol/2555 OVRLD Current Status:
Unit 1 at 100% power, Unit 2 at 30% power MOL. 1(2)-GOP-201 is complete through step 71. A 7 gpm dilution to the suction of the Charging pumps is in progress due to Xenon building in. Pressurizer is on recirc. The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Short Notice Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant. Engineering has just left the Containment after taking some engineering measurements for upcoming modifications. Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold. Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100%
Equipment Problems:
2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak. 2A BAM pump removed from service three hours ago to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals. None of the above are expected to be returned to service this shift.
Scenario 1