Text

301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML15201A538
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	07/16/2015
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Florida Power & Light Co
References
	Download: ML15201A538 (255)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

In itial Conditions: 100% power MOL. Reduce power to 45% to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from service due to an oil leak.

Turnover: 2A High Pressure Safety Injection pump is out of service to repair a motor oil leak. Taken out of service 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. B train protected, OLRM: Yellow I '-~'> V ,' / I ,__,

Critical Tasks:

Close the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker with in 15 minutes of notification that the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Safety Functions are not met.

Start 2B HPSI pump within 15 minutes of notification that the RCS Inventory and Pressure Control Safety Functions are not met.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 1 TS/SRO PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor fails high 2 R/RO, Reduce power to 45% to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump.

N/BOP, SRO 3 2 I/RO FCV-2210Y, Boric Acid Flow valve, fails closed - must open V2514 and cycle a BAM pump 4 3 CIRO Pressurizer level channel LT-1110X fails as is. Requires swapping to the "Y" control channel.

TS/SRO 5 4 C/BOP 28 MFRV fails to respond to downpower requ iring manual feedwater control.

6 5 M/ALL V2515 fails closed followed by a Small Break LOCA. A manual trip

/ will be required due to lowering Pzr level. Following the trip, a Loss of Offsite Power occurs.

7 6 C/BOP 28 Diesel Generator output breaker does not auto close on LOOP.

Manual closure required .

8 7 CI RO Following SIAS actuation, the 28 Diesel Generator output breaker

/ opens but fails to auto close again. After the 28 Diesel Generator output breaker is manually reclosed , the 28 HPSI pump does not auto start. Requires manual start.

... (N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-0-1 HLC 22 NRG Scenario 1 Unit will be turned over at 100% power MOL. Directions are to reduce power to approximately 45% to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from service due to motor oil leak. Operations Management has determined that the Rapid Downpower 2-AOP-22 .01 should be used for this evolution ,

Prior to the downpower starting, Acoustic monitor for PORV 1474 will annunciate and fail high .

The crew will determine this failure is an instrument failure and not a leaking PORV. The SRO is to evaluate T .S. for accident monitoring .

When the RO aligns the CVCS system to begin the RCS boration , boric acid flow control valve FCV-221 OY fails closed . 2-AOP-02.01 , "Boron Concentration Control Abnormal Operation" should be entered and step 4.2.1.4 (open V2514 and cycle a BAM pump) should be implemented to establish boric acid flow.

When the 2"d Charging pump is started for the downpower, pressurizer level channel LT-111 OX fails as is. Because the level setpoint is failed as is and the reference setpoint is loweringL this will result in increasing letdown flow when letdown should be decreasing for the power reduction . The only way to recognize the failure is to monitor LT-111 OX output - not chang(hg. The crew should swap to Pressurizer level channel LT-111 OY to mitigate the failure per 2-AOP-01 .10, "Pressurizer Pressure and Level. The SRO should recognize and apply T.S. 3.3.3.6 Accident Monitoring Table 3.3-10 and T.S.3 .3.3.5 Remote Shutdown System 3.3-9 due to this failure .

As the downpower progresses the 28 Main Feedwater reg . valve (MFRV) is not responding to the reduced steam flow. The immediate operator actions require that the controller for the 2B High Power valve be taken to manual to control 2B SG level. The SRO should continue in 2-AOP-09.01 to step 4.2.1 which references a table for actions to take. Specifically, section 4.2.2 step 2 should be used to position both the High Power AND Low Power Feed Reg valves for this condition.

Letdown isolation valve V2515 fails closed . Shortly after the letdown valve fails closed , RCS leakage will increase to greater than charging pump capacity due to the ruptured non-isolable letdown line. If the RO stops all running Charging pumps they must be restarted again due to lowering pressurizer level. The crew should manually trip the unit and enter 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions .

On the trip , a Loss of Offsite Power will occur with the 28 Diesel generator output breaker failing to close. The BOP should manually close the 2B Diesel generator output breaker. At this point, RCS pressure is still above SIAS setpoint, however later when SIAS is reached, both Diesel Generator output breakers will open but the 2B Diesel Generator output breaker fails to re-close again (the 2A EOG output bkr re-closes as expected). After it is reclosed, the 2B HPSI pump does not auto start (with a SIAS signal present) and should be manually started by the RO. Ail other SIAS loads sequence on as designed . These are both critical tasks since the 2A HPSI was out of service initially. The crew should exit 2-EOP-01 and enter 2-EOP-03, "LOCA".

Recommended termination is when both Diesel generators are loaded on their busses, the 28 HPSI pump has been started and the crew is performing a controlled cooldown.

Scenario 1 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 1 Procedures Used

2-AOP-22 .01 Rapid Downpower

2-AOP-02 .01 , Boron Concentration Control Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

2-AOP-09.01 , Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-02 .03 Charging and Letdown

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-03 , Loss of Coolant Accident Technical Specifications Entered

TS 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Table 3.3-10 (Event 2 & 4)

TS 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System 3.3-9 (Event 4)

Scenario 1 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# Event# 1 Page 4 of 18 NRC Event

Description:

PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor Fails High Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions: Restore IC #1 and OPEN NRC HLC 22 Lesson file

EXECUTE NRC Scenario 1 file .

Verify modification to IC set is triggered and verify equipment 005.

For setup, place placard for 'B' protected train and OLRM YELLOW. Place clearance tag on 2A HPSI pp. Place Green Mylar over annunciator 040. ~ ~

Prior to the start of the downpower OR when directed by examiner, trigger Event 1, PORV Acoustic Failure -

Indications Available: Alarms LC-1 PZR PORV/SAFETY OPEN

'~~"-

SRO/RO/ Recognize that PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor is in alarm and BOP investigate the conditions per annunciator LC-1.

Enters 2-AOP-01 .10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level per the SRO guidance in the ARP for annunciator LC-1.

Evaluates T.S. 3.3.3.6.a, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.

With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring channels less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE TS status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and SRO HOT SHUTDOWN in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The SRO may refer to 2-0SP-100.17, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check. Refer to attached page 5.

/'.

Directs checking plant parameters to determine if PORV is open by 2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level by SRO checking PORV 1474 Position indicating light, Discharge line I,.

/ temperature and Quench Tank parameters. Refer to attached

~\ page 6.

, I Determines that only the PORV 1474 Acoustic Monitor has failed .

~

Checks, as directed, plant parameters to determine if PORV is RO open by checking PORV1474 Position indicating light, Discharge line temperatu re and Quench Tank parameters.

BOP Monitors balance of plant.

EXAMINER' S NOTE: After the Tech Spec actions have been addressed, proceed to Event 2.

Scenario 1 4

5 REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

11 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MONTHLY CHANNEL CHECK 26 of 37 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-0SP-100.17 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.16 PORV Block Valve Position Indicator

1. VERIFY the status of PORV block valve position indicators by performing the following : (RTGB-203)

Component Functional Criteria Results Number {./)

PORV block valve position indicators are ON V1476 AND D SAT D UNSAT indicate desired position PORV block valve position indicators are ON V1477 AND D SAT D UNSAT indicate desired position

~:

2. VERIFY the following acceptance criteria are met:

Acceptance Criteria Results(./)

1 position indicator per valve 0 SAT 0 UNSAT OPERABLE

/

~

v Performed By:

PrinVSign Initials Date 5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 10 of 39 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking NOTE One PORV is normally isolated in Modes 1, 2, or 3.

D 1. VERIFY any Pressurizer PORV or safety is OPEN or leaking using 1.1 IF PORV position indication status lights are NOT available, any of the following : THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 11 :

V1474 , PORV, status lights

V1474 , PORV

V1475 , PORV, status lights

V1475 , PORV

Acoustic Monitor {PACB-2) 1.2 RETURN TO

PORV discharge Section 4.2.1 Step 1.

temperature greater than 210°F:

TIA-1106, PORV LINE

TIA-1110, PORV LINE

Safety valve discharge temperature greater than 185°F OR rising greater than 1°F per hour:

TIA-1 107, SAFETY VALVE

TIA-1108, SAFETY VALVE

TIA-1109, SAFETY VALVE

Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # Event# 2 Page 5 of 18 NRC Event Description : Reduce Power to 45% to Remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from Service Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Prepare the Unit for load reduction using Ops Policy 530, "Pre-SRO Planned Power Change Guidance Refer to attached page 8 Directs actions IAW 2-AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power step 4.1, Immediate Operator Actions AND step 4.2.1 thru 9, Subsequent Operator Actions . Refer to attached pages 9-13 Refer to the power profile for the load reduction (100% to 45%,

RO/BOP 10 MW/Min).

PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, step 4.1, Immediate Operator Actions:

1. BEGIN boration per operator aid.

SRO/RO

2. PREPARE the turbine for the desired load reduction rate per

/BOP OPERATIONS HARD CARD.

3. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature per operations hard cards.

-- BOP Communicating with RO, WHEN Tavg begins to lower, THEN TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (DEH display 5551)

PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per 2-AOP-22.01 ,

RO Attachment 5 (OR Hard Card), Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines when directed by SRO.

ST ART additional Charging pump per guidance from 2-AOP-22.01, Attachment 4 (Or Hard Card), Charging Pump Guidance when directed by the SRO.

_....... MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index 0 0.5 of ESI using CEAs.

]

\l, v

BOP NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function that a rapid downpower has commenced NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction .

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The next event has FCV-2210Y, Boric Acid Flow Control valve, failing closed. Pre-view the event at this point to note when the malfunction should be triggered.

The event after that (Event 4) should be triggered when the 2"d Charging pump is started.

Scenario 1 7

ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-530 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 0 Date 04/28/08 PRE-PLANNED POWER CHANGE GUIDANCE Page 1 of 1 NOTE The down power profiles are to be used for general guidance only . Modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will result in deviations from predictions. There is no substitute for operator knowledge, close monitoring of plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur.

This policy describes the use of pre-determined reactivity change guidance for plant maneuvering .

Profiles have been developed for several anticipated plant down power contingencies .

These profiles are based on specific rates of change in power with plant power level change and reactivity adjustments being made simultaneously. The down power profiles contain guidance for both the actual down power and for follow-up reactivity changes to provide for stabilization at the new power level.

The pre-planned down power profiles are updated periodically by Reactor Engineering and filed in the Plant Physics Curve Book. The profiles provided include:

Normal down power profiles based on a rate of 3 MW/min o 100% to 92%

o 100% to 70%

o 100% to 45%

o 100% to 25%

Rapid down power profiles based on a rate of 1O MW/min o 100% to 92%

o 100% to 45%

o 100% to 25%

Several assumptions were made in the development of the down power profiles; these assumptions include:

Constant rate maintained from initial to final power level CEA insertion used as necessary to maintain sliding ESI curve BAMT makeup @ 6000 ppm CEAs initially @ ARO

Down powers to 25% are intended to remove the unit from service When the need for a plant down power is recognized , the Unit Supervisor should reference the pre-planned down power profile during the evolution brief and provide the profile to the reactor operator.

Approved : (Michael Page - Signature on File)

Assistant Operations Manager - St. Lucie Plant 8

9 REVISION NO.: PROCED URE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWN.POWER 5 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UN IT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS NOTE OPS-530, Pre-Planned Power Change Guidance, delineates operations department policy for the use of pre-planned downpower profiles provided by the Plant Physics Curve Book.

4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. BEGIN boration per operator aid.

D 2. PREPARE turbine for load reduction per OPERATIONS HARD CARDS.

D 3. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature per operations hard cards .

9

tb REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 6 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions

1. WHEN Tavg begins to lower, 1.1 IF manual turbine load reduction THEN TOUCH GO from RAMP is required, THEN PERFORM the INTERFACE group. (DEH display following :

5551)

A. TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.

B. PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up:

(DEH display 7079)

(1) TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

(2) TOUCH desired rate from RATE SELECTION group.

(3) TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower

("T") from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

10

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 7of47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 2. NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows :

"Attention all personnel , Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower due to "

(reason)

D 3. NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction .

D 4. PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 5, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

D 5. START additional charging pump as required per guidance from Attachment 4, Charging Pump Ouidance.

11

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE T ITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 8 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE

O-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control , provides additional guidance on ASI Control.

US may direct temporary operation outside of ASI limit.

6. MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index 6.1 IF operation outside ASI limit is

+/-0.5 of ESI using CEAs . unavoidable, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. NOTIFY US.

B. MAINTAIN ASI within RPS LPD pre-trip limits.

C. RESTORE ASI to within limits as soon as practical.

6.2 IF ASI CAN NOT be maintained within transient band due to the inoperability of CEA(s) ,

THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering to assist in determining the load reduction rate to minimize effects of operation outside of transient limits.

12

REV ISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAP ID DOWNPOWER 9 of 47 PROCEDUR E NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

7. MAINTAIN T ret and Tavg within 7.1 VERIFY boration flow path to 6.6°F. RCS .

7.2 ESTABLISH T ret and Tavg within 6.6 °F using any of the following :

RCS Boration Rate

CEA Position

Turbine Load 7.3 IF Tret and Tavg can NOT be maintained within 6.6 °F, THEN NOTIFY US AND:

A. TRIP reactor.

8. GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Tri p Actions .

D 8. VERIFY boration lineup per Attachment 1, RCS Boration Guidance D 9. IF reducing power by more than 20% , THEN NOTIFY SNPO to secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02 .26, Zinc Addition .

13

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scena rio# Event# 2 Page 6 of 18 NRC Event

Description:

Reduce Power to 45% to Remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from Service Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO MAINTAIN Tref and Tavg within 6.6DF.

VERIFY boration lineup per 2-AOP-22.01 Attachment 1, RCS Boration Guidance when directed by the SRO IF reducing power by more than 20%, THEN NOTIFY SNPO to secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02.26, Zinc Addition .

( r )

Perform the remainder of the subsequent operation action SRO/RO steps (4.2.10 thru 19) as the downpower progresses. Refer to

/BOP attached pages 15-26.

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Scenario 1 14

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 10 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE Condenser back pressure is provided on DEH displays 5559, TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY AND CONDENSER VACUUM and 5605, CONDENSER VACUUM MONITORING. The condenser back pressure trip and alarm setpoints are variables that are dependent on power level.

10. VERIFY Condenser Back 10.1 IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has Pressure less than 8.859 inHgA. been automatically bypassed as indicated by both of the following :

At least 3 out of 4 RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11%

Annunciator t-29 , LOSS OF LOAD I LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED, IN ALARM THEN TRIP Turbine.

10.2 IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has NOT been automatically bypassed , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TRIP reactor.

B. GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

15

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TIT LE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 11 of 47 PROCEDUR E NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

NOTE DEH displays 5559, TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD SPRAY AND CONDENSER VACUUM and5605, CONDENSER VACUUM MONITORING, indicate time remaining before an automatic Turbine Trip is initiated by DEH , when operating in the Restricted Operating Region.

11. VERIFY Condenser Back 11.1 IF condenser back pressure within Pressure below alarm limits Restricted Operating Region ,

Acceptable Operating Region : THEN EXIT Restricted Operating Region within 300 seconds OR

Attachment 6, Condenser REMOVE Turbine from service as Pressure Limitations . follows:

OR A. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has been automatically

DEH display 5605, bypassed as indicated by CONDENSER VACUUM both of the following :

MONITORING.

At least 3 out of 4 RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11%

Annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD I LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED, IN ALARM THEN TRIP Turbine.

16

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 12 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

11. (continued)

8. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has NOT been automatically bypassed ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) TRIP reactor.

(2) GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

11.2 REDUCE load as necessary until Condenser Back Pressure is below alarm limits of Acceptable Operating Region .

17

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 13 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 12. VERIFY CONDENSER 12.1 REDUCE load as necessary until DIFFERENTIAL pressure less Condenser Differential Pressure is than 2.0 inHgA. (OVATION less than 2.0 inHgA.

display 5559 OR 5605) 12.2 IF CONDENSER DIFFERENTIAL pressure CAN NOT be maintained less than 2.5 inHgA, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has been automatically bypassed as indicated by both of the following :

At least 3 out of 4 RPS channels Nuclear Pwr indications are less than 11%

Annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD I LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED , IN ALARM THEN TRIP Turbine.

B. IF Reactor Loss of Load trip has NOT been automatically bypassed ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) TRIP Reactor.

(2) GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions .

18

REVISION NO.: PR OCED URE T ITLE : PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 14 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22. 01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

13. VERIFY parameters listed on 13.1 EVALUATE out of limit parameter Attachment 3, Rapid Downpower with respect to :

Parameters, are within limits.

Trip criteria

Plant cond itions

Potential consequences

Load reduction rate NOTE Rapid Downpower may result in Pressurizer Pressure dropping below DNBR Limit.

14. MAINTAIN PZR pressure 14.1 VERIFY pressurizer spray, between 2225 and 2275 psia. proportional and back-up heaters are operating properly in automatic.

14.2 REFER to 2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

NOTE A large rate of change in Tavg may cause transient level variance.

15. MAINTAIN PZR level between 15.1 ENSURE backup charging pump 27% and 68%. starts.

15.2 Manually CONTROL Letdown as required .

19

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 15 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 16. WHEN Final power level is achieved, THEN GO TO Section 4.2, Step 35 to STABILIZE the unit.

NOTE The 2A or 28 Heater Drain Pump may be stopped first.

CAUTION Heater Drain Pump minimum flow is 1500 gpm . Flows less than 1500 gpm can cause pump damage.

17. WHEN any of the following conditions are met:

Power level is less than 50%

2A Heater Drain Pump discharge flow is less than 1500 GPM as indicated on FIS-11-4A, HTR ORN PUMP 2A DISCH FLOW (TGB/22/N-31 /E-B) 28 Heater Drain Pump discharge flow is less than 1500 GPM as indicated on FIS-11-48, HTR ORN PUMP 28 DISCH FLOW (TGB/22/N-31/E-B)

THEN STOP both Heater Drain Pumps as follows:

20

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 16 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

17. (continued)

A. STOP 2A Heater Drain A.1 IF Main Feed Pump suction is Pump . NOT being maintained greater than OR equal to 375 PSIG ,

ENSURE THEN START Heater Drain Pump LCV-11-1 BA, 4A LP and EVALUATE problem .

HTR ALT DRAIN ,

OPENS to control level in 4A Heater.

(TG B/33/S-24/W-G)

VERIFY Main Feed Pump Suction pressure is being maintained greater than or equal to 375 PSIG as indicated on P1219_A FW PP SUCTION HOR PRESS 21

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 17 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

17. (continued)

B. STOP 28 Heater Drain B.1 IF Main Feed Pump suction is Pump. NOT being maintained greater than OR equal to 375 PSIG,

ENSURE THEN START Heater Drain Pump LCV-11-188, 48 LP and EVALUATE problem .

HTR ALT DRAIN, OPENS to control level in 48 Heater.

(TG 8/33/S-30/W-G)

VERIFY Main Feed Pump Suction pressure is being maintained greater than or equal to 375 PSIG as indicated on P1219 A FW PP SUCTION HOR PRESS 22

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 18 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

18. WHEN power level is approximately 45%,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY flow is within the A.1 CONTINUE power reduction until capacity of one MFW all conditions are satisfied .

pump, as indicated by:

Pump amps low.

Feed regulating valves are almost CLOSED to maintain Steam Generator levels.

Total feedwater flow is less than 15,500 GPM .

B. REMOVE the PSS from service as follows:

(1) PLACE the PSS control switch to OFF.

(2) VERIFY the green PSS "out of service" light is ON .

23

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 19 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

18. B. (continued)

(3) RECORD time the PSS is "out of service" in RCO Chronological Log .

NOTE The System Load Dispatcher shall be notified as soon as practical, but within 30 minutes of a change in status of the Power System Stabilizer (PSS).

(4) NOTIFY the System Load Dispatcher that the PSS has been removed from service.

(Section 6.2, Commit ment 1 D 19. Prior to either Main Feed Pump suction flow reaching 5,000 gpm ,

STOP ONE Maln Feed Pump as follows :

A. VERIFY FIC-12-1 , A.1 ADJUST FIC-12-1, CONDENSATE HOR CONDENSATE HOR RECIRC TO RECIRC TO CNDSR, set to CNDSR, to 10,000 GPM .

10,000 GPM.

(TG B/24/N-25/W-D) 24

1-<

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 20 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

19. (continued)

B. PLACE MFW pump to be stopped in RECIRC .

(RTG8-202)

C. VERIFY associated Main Feed Pump Recirculation Valve automatically opens:

FCV-09-1A2, 2A FW PUMP RECIRC TO CNDSR

FCV-09-182 , 28 FW PUMP RECIRC TO CNDSR D. VERIFY the following :

Main Feed Pump suction pressure greater than 355 psig.

Steam Generators are being maintained between 55% and 75% narrow range level 25

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 RAPID DOWNPOWER 21 of 47 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

19. (continued)

E. STOP the selected MFW pump.

F. VERIFY auxiliary oil pump of secured M FW pump starts.

G. VERIFY Steam Generators G.1 RESTART the MFW pump.

are being maintained within 55% to 75% narrow range level

20. WHEN power level is approximately 40% ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. STOP the Condensate Pump operating on the same electrical train as the secured Main Feed Pump.

8. VERIFY FIC-12-1 , MAIN 8.1 EVA LUA TE operation of CONDENSATE RECIRC FCV-12-1, CONDENSATE HOR REGULATOR, flow greater RECIRC TO CONDSR.

than or equal to 10,000 gpm .

26

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# Event# 3 Page 7 of 18 NRG Event

Description:

Boric Acid Flow Control Valve FCV-2 110Y Fails Closed Time I Position i Applicant' s Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: This failure should be inserted after the down power is started and when power is approximately 97-95%. Trigger Event 3, FCV-2210Y Fails to Open.

When requested by l&C to investigate failure of FCV 2210Y respond they will investigate. Response after investigation, valve diaphragm has failed resulting in the valve being unable to open.

I Control Room Indications Available: Boric acid flow goes to off-scale low, indicating lights for FCV-2210Y goes from dual to green. Annunciator N-40, Boric Acid Flow High/Low, MAY come in.

RO Recognizes closed indication on FCV-221 OY and notifies SRO.

SRO Directs BOP to go to HOLD on turbine. ".,,.;'

Directs RO actions in accordance with 2-AOP-02.01 Boron Concentration Control (BCCS) Abnormal Operations.

Procedure steps 4.2.1.4. Refer to attached pages 28-29.

Ensures Boric Acid pump 2B is running Directs OPENING V2514, Emergency Borate Directs Placing Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL Directs cycling the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid addition rate and rate of power change Monitor T-avg for abnormal changes Notifies Shift Manager of FCV-2210Y failure and entry into 2-AOP-02.01 Boron Concentration Control. Notifies l&C.

Direct continuation of down power with alternate Boration

~ -.

flowpath .

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The Boric Acid Makeup pump should be cycled for approximately 15 seconds every minute (with 2 Charging pumps running).

Scenario 1 27

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

3 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM (SCCS)

ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 13 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-02 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)

3. (continued)

C. IF VCT level continues to rise, THEN STOP the following :

Primary water pumps

Boric acid makeup pumps D. ADJUST RCS boron concentration to maintain steady state RCS conditions .

CAUTION Prolonged use of V2514, EMERGENCY BORATE, can lead to uncontrolled power reduction rates . Boric acid flow rate is equal to the charging pump flow rate when using the emergency borate valve .

D 4. IF FCV-221 OY, BORIC ACID VALVE, fails to OPEN AND boration is required ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. START boric acid pump.

B. OPEN V2514, EMERGENCY BORATE.

28

7/)

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

3 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL SYSTEM (BCCS)

ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 14 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-02.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)

4. (continued)

C. PLACE MAKEUP MODE SELECTOR switch in MANUAL.

0. CYCLE boric acid pump as required to control boration rate.

E. MONITOR T-avg for abnormal changes .

D 5. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met.

D 6. EXIT this procedure.

29

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# Event# 3 Page 8 of 18 NRC Event Description : Boric Acid Flow Control Valve FCV-211 OY Fails Closed Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: None Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator M-42, "Emergency Borate V2514 OPEN/OVLD/SS lsol" will alarm when it is opened.

RO Starts a 2B Boric Acid pump if not already running. '

Secures from previous lineup (close V2525 , to suction of Charging pumps)

-~

OPENS V2514, Emergency Borate

' .......... ?

Places Makeup Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL.

Cycles the Boric Acid pump as necessary to control boric acid addition rate and rate of power change.

Monitors for any abnormal change in T-avg . (Tave-Tref. Within 6.6°F)

I

'\. I BOP Puts turbine on HOLD as directed.

Monitors plant parameters while event in progress.

Continues Turbine down power when directed.

>\

Scenario 1 30

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 1 Event# 4 Page 9 of 18 NRC Event

Description:

Pressurizer level channel LT-11 OOX fa ils as is Time I Position I APPiicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Event 4, LT-111 OX fails as-is when directed by examiner OR after the 2"ct Charging pump is started during the Rapid Down power Control Room Indications Available: Letdown flow not lowering as expected for down power. A Pressurizer level deviation from setpoint occurs as the downpower progresses.

Examiners note: The applicant should recognize that letdown flow should be substantially lower than charging flow due to the downpower (Pzr level tends to "shrink" as the RCS is cooled down). As the downpower progresses Pressurizer level will deviate low from setpoint.

Identifies and communicates abnormal Pressurizer level RO indications and letdown at minimum.

Directs Immediate Operator Actions IAW 2-AOP-01 .10, SRO

'Pressurizer Pressure and level'.

Performs Immediate Operator Actions IAW 2-AOP-01 .10,

'Pressurizer Pressure and level' by:

Step 4.1.4 VERFIY selected Pressurizer level control channel RO LIC-1110X, LEVEL, NORMAL Step 4.1.4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector to non-affected control channel.

., :..... Refer to attached page 32 Enters T.S action 3.3.3.6.a (7 day action) Accident Monitoring

\:.I TS Table 3.3-10 (item 5) and T.S action 3.3.3.5.a (30 day action) v SRO Remote Shutdown System Table 3.3-9 (item 5) due to this

\ failure .

SRO/RO Re-start the down power with LT-111 OY in service .

/ BOP EXAMINER'S NOTE: If necessary, prompt SRO to continue downpower with a report from the NWE that the 2A Main Feedwater pump oil leak is getting worse.

Scenario 1 31

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF at Normal Operating Pressure, THEN VERIFY PIC-1100X(Y) ,

1.1 IF Pressurizer pressure less than 2300 psia PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND PORV leakage is indicated stable. or PORV has failed OPEN ,

THEN PLACE affected PORV in OVERRIDE and CLOSE associated block valve :

V1474 , PORV, and V1476 , PORV BLOCK VALVE

V1475 , PORV, and V1477 , PORV BLOCK VALVE D 2. VERIFY selected Pressurizer pressure control channel 2.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to PIC-11 OOX(Y), PRESSURE, non-affected pressure control NORMAL. channel.

D 3. VERIFY selected RRS channel Pressurizer level setpoint 3.1 PLACE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM selector switch to NORMAL as indicated on non-affected RRS channel.

LR-1110, PRESSURIZER LEVEL.

D 4. VERIFY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-111 OX(Y) ,

4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to LEVEL, NORMAL. non-affected level control channel.

32

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# Event# 5 Page 10 of 18 NRC Event

Description:

28 High Power Feed Reg va lve Fa ils As-ls Time I Position I Appl icant' s Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: During the downpower, Trigger Event 5, 28 MFRV Fails As-ls Control Room Indications Available: 28 SG level rising as downpower progresses. Steam flow Feed flow mismatch. 28 High SG level alarm (G-1) if not noticed in a timely manner.

Recognize that 2A SG level is slowly rising and does not match BOP 2B SG level

. ~"*

/

NOTE: manual trip criteria is s 50% and ~ 70% narrow range.

~"<. ....... -

.)

Direct that IOA from 2-AOP-09.01 , Feedwater Control System SRO Abnormal Operations, step 4.1.1. Refer to attached page 34 IOA from 2-AOP-09.01 , Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operations, If SG levels are not between 60-70% NR and not BOP stable, take manual control of feed flow and stabilize SG levels to 60-70% NR. *. ~

J EXAMINER'S NOTE: The immediate operator actions require that the controller for the 28 High Power valve be taken to manual to control 28 SG level. The SRO should continue in 2-AOP-09.01 to step 4.2.1 which references a table for actions to take. Specifically, section 4.2.2 step 2 should be used to position both the High Power AND Low Power Feed Reg valves for this condition.

Direct the BOP to operate the 2B MFW control system IAW 2-SRO AOP-09 .01 steps 4.2.2.2.1 through 2.5. Refer to attached page 35

~

Operate the 2B MFW control system IAW 2-AOP-09.01 steps

~10, BOP 4.2.2.2.1 through 2.5. by placing the High Power Feed Reg valve in manual and closing it until the Low Power Feed Reg valve opens 20 to 50% in Auto.

When 2B SG level in manual control and controll ing within RO/BOP band continue with downpower as directed by SRO.

Scenario 1 33

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6of64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

1. VERIFY S/G levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable. malfunctioning ,

THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE S/G levels to 60% to 70% NR.

CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high S/G level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent SIG overfill.

2. VERIFY S/G levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.

than 50% NR.

2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open, THEN CLOSE it.

2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions 34

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 SIG Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies

1. PERFORM applicable step(s) in any order per Table 2.

Table 2 Level or Feedwater Control Malfunctions

.I Suspected Malfunction Step HPFRV Section 4.2.2, Step 2 MFW pump recirculation valve Section 4.2.2, Step 3 FCV-12-1 , Condensate Hdr Recirc To Cndsr Section 4.2.2, Step 4 DCS FW inputs ..... Section 4.2.2, Step 5 LPFRV . " Section 4.2.2, Step 6 NOTE The HPFRV and its associated LPFRV have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in an attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

D 2. VERIFY HPFRV controllers are controlling SIG levels in normal 2.1 ENSURE affected LOW PWR MIA STA is in A (auto).

band :

2.2 PLACE affected HIGH PWR MIA FIC-9011 , SIG 2A FLOW STA in M (manual).

CNTL (HPFRV 2A) 2.3 CLOSE affected HPFRV using FIC-9021, SIG 28 FLOW HIGH PWR MIA STA until LPFRV CNTL (HPFRV 28) is 20% to 50% open.

2.4 MAINTAIN S/G .level in normal band .

2.5 MAINTAIN LPFRV between 20%

to 50% open by adjusting HPFRV as required .

35

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 11 of 17 NRG Event

Description:

Letdown Isolation valve V2515 fails closed . Letdown line leak.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 6, V2515 Fail Closed Control Room Indications Available: M-5 Letdown Press High/Low. No letdown flow indication.

Examiners Note: One minute after Letdown valve fails closed a letdown line break in Containment occurs resulting in approximately 200 gpm non-isolable leak.

Recognize and communicate letdown valve V2515 failed closed. Stops all running Charging pumps and places control RO switches in AUTO. IOA's from 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown . I Recognize and communicate RCS leakage alarm. RCS leak rate recorder indicates full scale. Pressurizer level lowering.

SRO Direct to start all available Charging Pumps .

Ensures all Charging pumps are started. Recognize and communicate Pressurizer level lowering and cannot be RO maintained on setpoint with all charging pumps running .

Recommend tripping the Reactor.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Proceed to the next event Scenario 1 36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o # Event# 7 Page 12 of 17 NRC Eve nt Description : SBLOCA manual trip, Loss of Offsite Power, 2B Diesel Breaker fails to close on LOOP Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: LOOP. 2B Diesel Generator Breaker does not close.

Examiners note: due to small break SIAS will probably not occur while crew is in 1*,

EOP-01 Directs that the Reactor be tripped and implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows :

SRO

RO: Reactivity control , Inventory Control , Pressure control ,

Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal , Containment Conditions.

Manually trips reactor prior to auto trip. Performs EOP-01 RO Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control , Inventory Control , Pressure Control , Core Heat removal.

Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify all CEAs are fully inserted .

Inventory Control

Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% .

Ensures all Charging pumps are runn ing due to lowering Pzr level Pressure Control

,' 1*-.

Verifies RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia .

~

Verifies RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia .

(

Verifies RCS subcooling is ::20°F.

~ \,

~*

Pressure and Subcooling are degrading due to the RCS leak.

Core Heat Removal

Verifies at least one RCP running with CCW. (no RCP's

'> running due to LOOP)

Verifies loop delta T is <10°F. (loop delta Twill be hiQher than 10°F due to nat. circ. DevelopinQ)

Scenario 1 37

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# Event# 7 Page 13 of 17 NRC Event Description : SBLOCA manual trip , Loss of Offsite Power, 28 Diesel Breaker fails to close on LOOP Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None .r.

Control Room Indications Available: NIA Verifies turbine trip on reactor trip. Performs EOP-01 Safety BOP functions as directed for: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS Heat Removal ,

Containment Conditions.

() < ~

Recognize and communicate 2B Diesel output breaker did not BOP close . Insert Sync. Plug into 2B Diesel breaker and close Diesel Output breaker. Monitor and verify load sequencing on the 2B Diesel.

Notifies NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

(outside CR actions)

Notify SNPO to check SFP inventory and temperature.

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed .

Verifies GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker.)

Verifies all vital and non vital AC Buses energized .

Verifies all vital and non vital DC Buses energized .

RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH:

SG Level 20-83% NR Feedwater available, level being restored to 60-70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535° F

SG pressure between 850-930 psia via ADV's EXAMINER'S NOTE: AFAS-2 may lockout due to 2A Diesel breaker closing before the manual closure of 28 Diesel breaker. (28 AFW pump start delay). The BOP should recognize this condition and recommend to SRO that AFAS-2 should be manually actuated.

Scenario 1 38

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# Event # 7 Page 14 of 17 NRC Event Description : SBLOCA manual trip, Loss of Offsite Power, 2B Diesel Breaker fails to close on LOOP Ti me I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Place ADV's in AUTO/AUTO to maintain 900 psia SG BOP pressures. A Containment Conditions

Verifies Containment pressure <2 psig. (Pressure is "'

increasing , ensures 4 Containment Cooling fans on .) v

Verifies NO Containment radiation monitors in alarm .

Verifies Containment temperature is less than 120°F.

(Temperature is increasing)

Verifies NO secondary plant radiation alarms .

Assess safety functions using the diagnostic flow chart.

SRO Recognize that several parameters indicate a LOCA is in progress. Exit EOP-01 and enter EOP-03.

Enter 2-EOP-03, "LOCA" after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart

Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC)

Direct Appendix A and H of EOP-99 to sample the Steam Generators and Restore Instrument Air.

If SIAS present verify SI flow IAW Figure 2

(* Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify

If CCW has been lost > 30 minutes, ensure CCW and Controlled Bleedoff flow are not reinitiated by placing the control switches to close STA

Perform SFSC's EOP-03 when directed .

(

Verify SI flow IAW Figure 2

\I" 11 Directs BOP:

SRO

Perform Appdx X section 2

Close the MSIV's and SGBD isolation valves

verify SIAS and CIAS acuation Scenario 1 39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 1 Event# 8 Page 15 of 17 NRC Event

Description:

28 EDG output breaker fa ils to re-close following SIAS. 28 HPSI fails to automatically start after the 28 EOG output breaker is closed with SIAS present.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed Trigger, Appendix H Restore Instrument Air Control Room Indications Available:

Perform Appendix A, (step 4) Sampling Steam generators j when directed. NOTE: CCW cannot be restored to the 'N' BOP header for SG blowdown sample cooling . As a result RP will need to be called for local surveys .

When directed, place the four CCW valves to/from the RCP's to CLOSE. Place the two RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE. (step 8.A.3)

When SIAS received , verify ESFAS pumps and valves actuate as designed . (step 6)

,, '\..:" "'

Recognize and communicate 2B Diesel output breaker did not BOP re-close following SIAS. Insert Sync. Plug into 2B Diesel breaker and close Diesel Output breaker. Monitor and verify Critical load sequencing on the 2B Diesel.

Step Recognize 2B HPSI did not start on SIAS. Communicates and starts the 2B HPSI pump.

BOP Close the MlSV's and SGBD valves when directed.

Perform Appendix X section 2 when directed When directed, coordinate with NPO to restore Instrument Air

,/ IAW Appendix H. When NPO called stating alignment

\. complete, BOP should reset the 2A and or 2B Instrument air compressors from the control board.

i ' " l

\

Scenario 1 40

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# Event# 8 Page 16 of 17 NRC Event Descri ption : 28 EDG output breaker fails to re-close following SIAS. 28 HPSI fails to automatically start after the 28 EDG output breaker is closed with SIAS present.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: ~

Directs RO :

SRO

to commence a cooldown of the RCS to regain subcooling * -

)

~ ~* \

When directed , cooldown the RCS using the ADV's not to exceed 50°F in any one hour period.

RO A cooldown rate up to 100°F in any one hour period is allowed to regain or maintain subcooling.

RO When directed depressurize the RCS using Aux. Spray to maintain subcooling at the lower limits of Figure 1A.

{ _-- ..... -

Scenario Termination Cues:

The 28 EOG is loaded on its bus post SIAS

The 28 HPSI pump is running post SIAS

The crew is performing a controlled cooldown Scenario 1 41

I I OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: 8 Online Risk: YELLOW Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0.03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

ECO hang - 2A MFW pump Tech Spec Action Statement:

TS 3.5.2 Action a.1 - 2A HPSI Pump Adverse Condition Monitoring (0ps-513s):

None Locked in Annunciators:

Q-40, 2A HPSI PUMP BKR FAILURE/CS STOP Current Status:

100% power MOC, Boron Concentration 608 ppm 2A HPSI Pump Out of Service for motor oil leak 2A MFW pump has an oil leak on oil cooler Ops Management direction - Reduce power to 45% at 10 MWe/min, using 2-AOP-22.01 ,

Rapid Down power, to remove the 2A Main Feedwater pump from service.

Reactivity Turnover: .

20 gallons of primary water every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Reactor Engineering recommends use of Ops-530 Pre-planned Power Change Guidance 42

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 Scenario 2 Faci lity: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 30% power MOL. The Unit is return ing to power after a 6 day Forced Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant. Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold. Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100%

Turnover: 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is out of service due to motor oil leak. 2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals. Return the Unit to 100% power.

Critical Tasks:

Crosstie the 2B AFW pump to feed the 2A SG prior to reaching Once Through Cooling criteria .

(<15% SG Wide Range level both SG's)

Control RCS temperature using the 28 SG after the 2A SG has blown dry to prevent exceeding the upper subcooling limits 2-EOP-99 , Figure 1A OR exceeding a cooldown of 100°F an hour.

Initiate/Actuate/Manually position MSIS components (MFIVs on the 2A SG) with in 15 minutes of notification that the RCS Heat Removal Safety Function of EOP-05 is not met.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R/RO Raise power to 100%

N /BOP, SRO 2 1 TS/SRO Containment Pressure transmitter PT-07-2B fails high (slowly drifts) 3 2 C/BOP Bearing failure on 2A TCW Pump. 2B TCW pump fails to auto start.

4 3 I/RO PT-1100X drifts high causing Pzr Main Spray valves to open.

TS/SRO 5 4 M / All HCV-14-1(CCW to RCP CIS valve) fails closed. After a time delay, the reference leg for the 28 S/G level and pressure instrumentation (including PT8023D) ruptures causing an ESDE in

< containment. The crew should recognize no CCW flow to the RCP's (manual trip required in< 10 minutes) and degrading 28

....... S/G and containment conditions and manually trip the reactor .

Complete EOP-01 and diagnose event as ESDE. Transition to EOP-05.

6 5 C/BOP On AFAS actuation , MV-09-11 AFW to 2A SG fails to open. Open MV-09-9 and then the crosstie valves to feed the 2A SG with the 28 AFW pump.

7 6 CIRO BOTH trains of MSIS fail to auto actuate. Manual actuation using the RTGB MSIS actuation switches is not successfu l either.

Individual components must be positioned.

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

The plant is at 30%. Instruction to the crew is to raise power to 100%.

The crew will initiate a power ascension IAW 2-GOP-201 , 'Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1'. As reactor power is increased, ESFAS Channel "B" Containment Pressure transmitter begins drifting upward until it fails high. The SRO should enter 2-AOP-99.01, "Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation and Tech Specs then carry out the appropriate actions. The instrument should be declared out of service and bypassed/tripped within one hour. Also recognize that if the inoperable channel is not returned to service within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the channel shall be placed in "TRIP'. After these actions have been performed, the up power should continue.

The 2A Turbine Cooling Water Pump will experience increasing amps due to a bearing failure.

When the 2A TCW pump trips, the 2B TCW pump fails to auto start. The 2B TCW pump should be manually started in accordance with 2-AOP-13.01 , Turbine Cooling Water System. The TCW cross-tie must also be maintained open.

Next, the controlling PZR Pressure Channel (PT-11 OOX) drifts high causing the spray valves to open MORE (Pzr is on recirc). The crew must diagnose the problem and swap to the alternate control channel (Y) and ensure that PZR pressure control is restored in accordance with 2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level. The SRO will refer to Tech Specs for DNB if RCS pressure indication lowers below 2225 psia (LCO 3.2.5).

HCV-14-1(CCW to RCP CIS valve) fails closed causing the plant to be manually tripped within 10 minutes due to no CCW flow to the RCP's (RCP's must be secured following the trip). Enter 2-AOP-14.01 "CCW Abnormal" or 2-AOP-01 .09A1 "RCP Abnormal". Following the Rx trip, PT8023D (2B S/G pressure safety channel) fails low. After a time delay, the reference leg for the 2B S/G level and pressure instrumentation (including PT8023D) ruptures causing an ESDE in containment. The crew should recognize degrading containment conditions and enter 2-EOP-05, ESDE.

As the RCS cools down due to the ESDE, SIAS will actuate. The 2B Steam Generator will continue to blow down . Due to the trip at low power, AFAS may not actuate when EOP-01 is exited . In that case, AFW should be manually started and aligned . When 2C AFW is started (either from AFAS or manually), MV-09-11to2A SG will not open and cannot be opened.

Success path is to start the 2B AFW pump and open the crossties from the B side to the A side and feed the A SG . BOTH trains of MSIS fail to auto actuate. Manual actuation is not successful either. Individual components must be positioned. Note, the "A" train MFIV's must be closed (at a minimum) to ensure adequate AFW flow is delivered to the 2A SG. BOTH of these are critical tasks.

Terminate the scenario after RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized following 2B S/G dryout, the 2B SG is isolated and the 2A SG is being fed by the 2B AFW Pump.

Scenario 2 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-0-1 HLC 22 Scenario 2 Procedures Used

2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation

2-AOP-13.01 , Turbine Cooling Water System

2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Equipment

2-AOP-01 .10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level

2-AOP-09.02 , Auxiliary Feedwater

2-AOP-01 .09A 1, 2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand Event

2-EOP-99, Appendix R Tech Specs Entered

TS 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation (Event 2)

TS LCO 3.2.5, Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) (Event 4)

Scenario 2 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# Page 4 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

Raise power to 100%

Ti me I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate IC 14 30% power, and Lesson 'NRC Scenario #2' .

Xenon building in, 7 gpm dilution rate. MOL

Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position.

Place 2A AFW pump and 2A BAM pump to stop. Place Orange control switch ECO *,

tags on all 3 pumps.

Ensure the 28 TCW is secure and in standby with SB13139 TCW pp Discharge cross-tie valves open.

Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN .

Sign off and handout 1-GOP-201. Also include the RE Power Ascension Guidance Letter (load rate, up to 18% I hour or 3 MW/Min) and 2-GOP-101 Control Room Indications Available: G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS lsol, N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol, M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD Continue with 2-GOP-201 'Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 To SRO Mode 1 ', step 4.7 .12. F thru 4.7 .17. Refer to attached page 5-6 Control Rx power and ASI IAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 4.1 Refer to attached pages 7-9 Raise dilution rate for power increase IAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 4.2 .15 Refer to attached page 10 Withdraw CEAs in 'Manual Sequential' as directed to raise Rx power.

Ensure appropriate actions for ASI Control are taken using 0-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control Divert letdown to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS to maintain 1 ~ .. VCT level within normal band .

\: ~ >.

~

I'- Raise Turbine load using 2-NOP-99.07 Attachment 3, Turbine BOP Adjustment Program DEH for power increase at a rate not to I,

exceed 3.0 MW/MIN. Refer to attached pages11-13 Scenario 2 4

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TIT LE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 68 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

12. (continued)

C. NOTIFY SCE or l&C to perform DCS Steam Generator Feedwater Discharge Coefficients Verification per 2-NOP-102.01 , Distributed Control System (DCS) -Operations.

SCE I I&

D. ENSURE scheduled lncore surveillances have been performed. (Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 1)

E. ENSURE lncore Detection System is OPERABLE perO-OSP-64.01 , Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests , Checks And Calibrations . (Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 1)

RE F. CONTINUE power ascension .

13. WHEN TCW System total flow exceeds 2,000 gpm , THEN PERFORM the following : (TGB/24/22/K)

A. RECORD TCW heat exchanger total flow:

NPO

FR-13-50A, FIT-13-50A + B TOTAL FLOW gpm

FR-13-50B, FIT-13-50B +A TOTAL FLOW gpm

8. IF 2A TCW Pump is aligned as the standby pump , THEN ENSURE CS-1/825, TCW STANDBY PUMP CONTROL SWITCH , is in the TCW PP A position .

NPO C. IF 28 TCW Pump is aligned as the standby pump, THEN ENSURE CS-1/825, TCW STANDBY PUMP CONTROL SWITCH , is in the TCW PP B position.

NPO

14. WHEN Calorimetric power is greater than 30% , THEN INITIATE MSR warmup per Attachment 3, Section 3.0.

5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 69 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

15. IF available, THEN ENSURE second main feed pump is ready to start per 2-NOP-09.01, Main Feedwater System Operation.

16. WHEN Calorimetric power is greater than 32%, THEN INITIATE placing MSRs in service per Attachment 3, Section 4.0.

17. WHEN Reactor power reaches 45%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN STOP power ascension.

6

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE PROCEDURE NO.: AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 8 of 20 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with the following guidelines:

All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied .

The performance of the out of sequence steps do NOT change an operational MODE.

SM/US has given authorization .

4.1 Power Level Escalations

1. MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref during main generator loading as follows:

CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

Boron concentration changes per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

NOTE

Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines contains guidance for power escalation rates.

Reactor Engineering may provide clarification for power escalation rates from Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines.

2. IF greater than or equal to 50% power OR 30% power during shape annealing factor test, THEN RAISE power as follows :

A. USE boration or dilution per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control for fill planned reactivity additions.

CAUTION Adjusting CEAs for ASI impacts Reactivity B. USE CEAs for ASI control per O-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control.

3. IF ava ilable, THEN ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating per 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and Letdown.

7

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 9 of 20 PROCEDU RE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 1, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load Main Generator per 2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

8

7 REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 20 of 20 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-GOP-1 01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines (Page 4 of 4)

NOTE Components of fully conditioned fuel:

Fuel is conditioned to equal to or greater than 90% power.

The core is NOT experiencing a difference greater than plus or minus 0.5 RPS ASI units from the cycle predicted ASI.

3.0 FULLY CONDITIONED FUEL

1. IF performing a mid cycle shutdown or power reduction AND a return to full power occurs within 27 days, THEN RAISE power at a maximum power escalation rate of 30% I hour.

9

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

31 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)

NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26, DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW

14. ADJUST FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2, Step 4. DODD

IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN , THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 X/Y Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow. DODD

15. IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DODD

16. MAINTAIN PlA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE ~30 psig by opening and closing V2513 , (VCT) VENT VALVE. DODD

17. IF diverting to maintain VCT level , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in the WMS position. DODD B. ENSURE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates OPEN . DODD

c. When normal level on LIC-2226, (VCT) LEVEL, is reached ,

THEN PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in AUTO . DODD D. ENSURE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates CLOSED. DODD

18. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added ,

THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP. DODD

19. IF V2512 , REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened ,

THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED. ODDO

20. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE , was opened , THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED. DODD

21. ENSURE FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM . DODD

22. MONITOR for any abnormal change in T avg. (RTGB-203) DODD 10

/(

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TIT LE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 10 of 24 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-NOP-99 .07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-201. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.

Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Monitoring ~ppropriate critical parameters to recognize , monitor, and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant response and system performance ensures proper control of the plant. The SM/US shall be notified of any abnormal indications.

Reactor Power

MW (Load)

CEA POSITION

DCS Power

RCS Temp

Pzr Level

ASI

1. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.

3. ADJUST values , as directed by SM/US , for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)

TARGET SELECT

RATE SELECT

4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)

TARGET

RATE

5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551) 11

\v REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Pag~ 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on Ovation main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL. (display 5551)

7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

(display 5551)

B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:

(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.

(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)

a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.

c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")

from CLOSE INTERFACE group .

C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure .

8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following :

Reactivity rate

Turbine load rate 12

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

8. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

C. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.

13

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# Page 5 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

Raise power to 100%

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Refer to Attachment 3 of 2-GOP201 as NPO when called to support placing MSR's in service. Use the IF station to verify MSR valve positions or to position field operated valves.

Control Room Indications Available: N/A ~*,

When Calorimetric power is greater than 30%, Initiate MSR warmup per Attachment 3, Section 3.0 of 2-GOP-201,"Reactor SRO Plant Startup- Mode 2 To Mode 1". Refer to attached pages 15-19 Direct BOP to perform steps to Warmup the MSR 's.

BOP Perform Attachment 3, Section 3.0.1 (Record temperatures)

Coordinate with NPO to continue warming up the MSR's IAW Attachment 3, Section 3.0.2 and Section 3.0.3 Open MSR block valves on RTGB 202 when directed, Attachment 3, Section 3.0.3 When Calorimetric power is greater than 32%, Initiate Placing the MSRs in Service per Attachment 3, Section 4.0 of 2-GOP-SRO 201 ,"Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 To Mode 1". Refer to attached pages 19-23 BOP Perform Attachment 3, Section 4.0.1 thru 4.0.8.E Coordinate with NPO to continue placing MSR's in service IAW Attachment 3, Section 4.0.8.A, B,C and D.

~ Open MSR block valves on RTGB 202 when directed, Step 3.3 i . ._)

1'

\ RO Monitors dilution and T-avg and Tref and maintain as close as possible. (+/- 2°F)

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Warming Up and Placing the MSRs in service is a lengthy evolution. At the evaluator's discretion, move on the next event.

2-GOP-201, Step 4. 7.17 directs the up power be stopped at 45%.

Scenario 2 14

I~

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAG E:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 104of113 PROCEOURE NO. :

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCI EU NIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR 012eration

{Page 4 of 12) 3.0 MSRWARMUP

1. RECORD the following temperatures prior to opening MSR Block Valves:

TEMPERATURE DEHDISPLA Y 5552 INITIAL (oF)

LP Turbine 1 Inlet Temperature I*' .,

LP Turbine 2 Inlet Temperature r;-,*.,_

MSR A Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR D Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature

"\""'

)

"\:.

MSR B Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature _..

MSR C Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature "

2. Locally ENSURE MSR 3-inch TCV manual isolation valves are OPEN :

COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL TCV-08-7 UPSTRM ISOL V08381 OPEN

{TG B/64/S-24/W-C)

TCV-08-7 DWNSTRM ISOL V08370 OPEN

{TG B/64/S-24/W-C)

TCV-08-8 DWNSTRM ISOL V08378 OPEN

{TG B/69/S-22/E-L)

TCV-08-8 UPSTRM ISOL V08382 OPEN (TGB/64/S-22/E-L)

TCV-08-9 UPSTRM ISOL V08383 OPEN

{T G B/65/N-30/W-C)

TCV-08-9 DWNSTRM ISOL V08372 OPEN (T G 8/69/N-30/W-C)

TCV-08-10 DWNSTRM V08375 OPEN ISOL (TGB/68/N-31/E-L)

TCV-08-10 UPSTRM ISOL V08384 OPEN

{TG 8/65/N-31 /E-L) 15

REVISIO N NO.: PRO CEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 105of113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-20 1 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 5 of 12) 3.0 MSR WARMUP (continued)

NOTE A large steam demand may occur when opening the MSR Block Valves . The MSR Block Valves should be opened one at a time , allowing time for the RCS to stabilize .

3. ENSURE the following MSR 8-inchBlock Valves are OPEN :

MV-08-4, 2A MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE

MV-08-6, 20 MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE

MV-08-8, 2B MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE

MV-08-10, 2C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE 16

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 106 of 113 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 6 of 12) 3.0 MSR WARMUP (continued)

NOTE Quench water to the MSRs will be supplied immediately upon opening the MSR Block Valves.

4. WHEN MSR Block Valves are open, THEN ALIGN the following components to adjust MSR subcooling flow to 5 to 7 GPM:

COMP COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL ID 1 SE-09-1A 2A MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain 5 to SU8COOLING 7 GPM on Fl-09-4A, FW to 2A MSR V09322 OWNSTRM ISOL subcooling (TG8/42/S-24/W-8) -, - .*

SE-09-18 28 MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain 5 to SUBCOOLING 7 GPM on Fl-09-48, FW to 28 MSR V09319 OWNSTRM ISOL subcooling (TGB/42/N-30/E-O)

SE-09-10 20 MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain 5 to SUBCOOLING 7 GPM on Fl-09-40, FW to 20 MSR V09325 OWNSTRM ISOL subcooling (TGB/42/N-29/E-L}

SE-09-1C 2C MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain 5 to SUBCOOLING 7 GPM on Fl-09-4C, FW to 2C MSR V09328 OWNSTRM ISOL subcooling (TGB/42/N-25/E-L) 17

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 107of113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 7 of 12) 3.0 MSR WARMUP (continued)

4. (continued)

~ I NOTE

MSR TCV seat leakage is normal and desired. After the MSR Block Valves are opened , a minimal increase of LP Turbine inlet temperature (10°F) is used as indication of sufficient TCV seat leakage.

IF any LP Turbine inlet temperature OR MSR outlet temperature fails to have risen at least 10°F, THEN MSR outlet temperatures to the LP Turbines should be used to identify which MSR is NOT contributing to warm-up.

The LP Inlet Steam Temperature change rate shall NOT exceed a rate of 75°F/hour.

The LP Inlet Steam Temperature step change shall NOT exceed 25°F every 20 minutes.

Instantaneous changes of steam temperature to the LP Turbine Inlets should be limited to a maximum of 50° F.

The temperature difference between the steam entering the inlet on one side of an LP Turbine and that entering the other side should NOT exceed 50° F.

The maximum allowable steam inlet temperature difference between LP Turbine 1 and LP Turbine 2 is 50° F.

5. MONITOR LP Turbine warm-up as follows:

A. ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL is OPEN . (display 5552)

B. VERIFY all MSR outlet temperatures previously recorded in Attachment 3, Section 3.0, Step 1 have risen greater than 10°F.

C. VERIFY both LP Turbine Inlet Temperatures previously recorded in Attachment 3, Section 3.0, Step 1 have risen greater than 10°F.

18

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 108of113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 8 of 12) 3.0 MSR WARMUP (continued)

6. RECORD time and date both Turbine inlet temperatures and all MSR outlet temperatures have risen greater than 10°F above previously recorded in Attachment 3, Section 3.0, Step 1:

Date I Time: I 4.0 PLACE MSR IN SERVICE

1. ENSURE DEH display 5552, MSR CONTROL PANEL, is open .

2. VERIFY display 5552, MODE OF OPERATION group, indicates LOAD >25%.

3. ENSURE MSRs have soaked for greater than 45 minutes from time previously recorded in Attachment 3, Section 3.0, Step 6:

Date I Time: I

4. SET MSR heatup rate to 70°F/HOUR as follows :

A. ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL is open.(display 5552)

B. TOUCH MODIFY for AUTO TEMP TARGET (F/HR) in AUTO RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5552)

C. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower (T) I raise(~) from TEMP RAMP RATE pop-up to set Temp Ramp Rate to 70°F/HOUR. (display 7096)

D. TOUCH ENTER. (display 7096)

E. VERIFY AUTO RAMP INTERFACE group displays 70°F/HOUR.

19

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 109 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 9 of 12) 4.0 PLACE MSR IN SERVICE (continued)

5. INITIATE MSR heatup as follows :

A. TOUCH SELECT MODE from MODE OF OPERATION group.

(display 5552)

B. TOUCH AUTO TEMP from MODE OF OPERATION SELECT pop-upper US/SM direction. (display 7060)

C. TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group .

(display 5552)

D. TOUCH GO on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up .

(display 7069)

6. IF necessary to suspend MSR heatup, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group .

(display 5552)

B. TOUCH HOLD on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.

(display 7069) 20

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 110 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 10 of 12) 4.0 PLACE MSR IN SERVICE (continued)

NOTE

Display 5552 provides a MSR TEMPERATURE RATE/HR group that displays the heatup rate in DEGF/H.

IF DEH automatically suspends the MSR heatup, once the heatup rate lowers below 75°F/hr, THEN DEH will permit the heatup to be restarted .

IF DEH automatically suspends the MSR heatup, THEN manual action will be required to restart the heatup. DEH will NOT automatically re-establish heatup.

7. IF desired to resume MSR heatup, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.

(display 5552)

B. TOUCH GO on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.

(display 7069) 21

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 111 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR 012eration (Page 11 of 12) 4.0 PLACE MSR IN SERVICE (continued)

8. WHEN MSR heatup is completed, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. Locally VERIFY the following MSR 8-inch TCVs are fully OPEN:

COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL MS TO 2A MSR TCV-08-1 OPEN (TGB/64/S-24/W-C)

MS TO 28 MSR TCV-08-3 OPEN (TGB/64/N-30/W-C) '

MS TO 2C MSR TCV-08-4 OPEN (T G B/64/S-30/E-L)

MS TO 2D MSR TCV-08-2 OPEN (TGB/64/N-23/E-L)

8. ENSURE MSR 3-inch TCV manual isolation valves are CLOSED :

COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL TCV-08-7 UPSTRM ISOL V08381 CLOSED (TG B/64/S-24/W-C)

TCV-08-7 DWNSTRM ISOL V08370 CLOSED (TG B/64/S-24/W-C)

TCV-08-8 DWNSTRM ISOL V08378 CLOSED (TGB/69/S-22/E-L)

TCV-08-8 UPSTRM ISOL V08382 CLOSED (TGB/64/S-22/E-L)

TCV-08-9 UPSTRM ISOL V08383 CLOSED (TGB/65/N-30/W-C)

TCV-08-9 DWNSTRM ISOL V08372 CLOSED (TGB/69/N-30/W-C)

TCV-08-10 DWNSTRM V08375 CLOSED ISOL (TGB/68/N-31/E-L)

TCV-08-10 UPSTRM ISOL V08384 CLOSED (TGB/65/N-31/E-L) 22

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 112 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 12 of 12) 4.0 PLACE MSR IN SERVICE (continued)

a. (continued)

C. ENSURE MSR vents to FW Heaters 5A and 58 are OPEN :

COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL 2A MSR TO SB HP HTR ES V11843 OPEN ISOL (TGB/74/S-30/E-B) 2B MSR TO SB HP HTR ES V11844 OPEN ISOL (TGB/74/S-30/E-B) 2C MSR TO SA HP HTR ES V1184S OPEN ISOL (TGB/74/S-24/E-B) 20 MSR TO SA HP HTR ES V11846 OPEN ISOL (TGB/74/S-24/E-B)

D. ENSURE the following MSR vents to Condenser are CLOSED:

COMP POSITIO COMPONENT NAME INITIAL ID N 2B CNDSR VENT FROM 2A V11S08 CLOSED MSR ISOL (TGB/67/N-24/W-C) 2B CNDSR VENT FROM 2B V11 S07 CLOSED MSR ISOL (TGB/67/S-30/E-D) 2B CNDSR VENT FROM 2C V11 S20 CLOSED MSR ISOL (TGB/67/S-30/E-L) 2A CNDSR FROM 2D MSR V11227 TUBE BUNDLE VENT ISOL CLOSED (TGB/67/N-24/E-L)

E. ENSURE the following MSR 1-inch Warmup Valves are CLOSED: (RTG8-201)

MV-08-5, WARMUP 2A MSR

MV-08-7, WARMUP 2D MSR

MV-08-9, WARMUP 28 MSR

MV-08-11 , WARMUP 2C MSR 23

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 2 Page 6 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

Containment Pressure Transmitter PT-07-28 Fails High Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Upon cue from Examiner, Trigger Event 2: PT-07-28 Fails High Control Room Indications Available:

Ann P-23: CNTMT Press High CIS Channel Pre-Trip

Ann P-13: CNTMT Press High CIS Channel Trip

Ann L-5: CNTMT Press High Channel Trip

Ann L-13: CNTMT Press High Channel Pre-Trip

Ann Q-2: Engineered Safeguards ATI Fault

Ann Q-3: CNTMT Press SIAS Channel Trip

Ann S-17: CNTMT Press High CSAS Channel Trip

PIS 07-28 indication is driftin off scale hi h Recognizes cause of alarm is PT 2B drifting High and RO Reports the condition to the crew.

Directs entry into 2-0NP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instr.

SRO

Determines a licable ste to be 4.2.14 Bypass the following channels affected by the failed instrument

Hi Cont Press RPS trip unit (key 109)

BOP

Cont Press SIAS (key 127)

Cntmt Press CIS (key 129)

Cntmt Press CSAS ke 128 Evaluate Tech Spec LCO's. Refer to attached pages 25-33 TS SRO Notifies Shift Mgr & ICM Scenario 2 24

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: As shown i~

ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1 .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1 .

4.3 .1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing . Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1 .

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 67 25

~

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. Manual Reactor Trip 4 2 4 1, 2 1 4 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 5

2. Variable Power Level - High 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

3. Pressurizer Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

cs:= Containm~nt Pressur~

Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4

4/SG 2

2/SG(b) 3 3/SG 1, 2 1, 2

<Y2#

6.

7. Steam Generator Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#

Difference - High

8. Steam Generator Level - Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 2#

9. Local Power Density - High 4 2(c)(d) 3 2#

10. loss of Component Cooling Water 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

to Reactor Coolant Pumps 11 . Reactor Protection System logic 4 2 3 1, 2 2#

3*, 4*, 5* 5

12. Reactor Trip Breakers 4 2(f) 4 1, 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 5

13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor

a. Startup and Operating -

Rate of Change of Power - 4 2(e)(g) 3 1, 2 2#

High

b. Shutdown 4 0 2 3, 4, 5 3

14. Reactor Coolant Flow - low 4/SG 2/SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 2#

15. loss of Load (Turbine 4 2(c) 3 2#

Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - low)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 60 26

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

b. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied :

1. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

2. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition .

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below:

- Process Measurement Circuit

1. Safety Channel - Nuclear Functional Unit Bypassed Instrumentation Wide Range Rate of Change of Power - High (RPS)

Linear Range Variable Power Level - High (RPS)

Local Power Density - High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/low Pressure (RPS)

2. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)

Thermal Margin/low Pressure (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure - Low (ESF)

3. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESF)

4. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Steam Generator Pressure - Low (ESF)

5. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-28 , then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 48, 13, 149 27

INSTRUMENTATION 314.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.

APPLICABILIT ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3 .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2 .

4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation .

The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation .

4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No.

of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 67 28

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) 2

~

a. Ma Buttons) 2 1, 2, 3, 4 Containment Pressure - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 High

c. Pressurizer Pressure - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3(a) 13*, 14 Low

d. Automatic Actuation - 2 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12 Logic

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12

b. Containment Pressure High-High

c. Automatic Actuation 4

2 2 3 2

1{b), 2(b), 3(b) 1, 2, 3, 4

~ 12 Logic

3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)

a. Manual CIAS (Trip 2 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12 Buttons)

b. Safety Injection (SIAS) See Functional Unit 1 for all Safety Injection Initiating Functions and Requirements 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 E)

d. 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 13*, 14

e. Automatic Actuation 2 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12 Logic ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 132 29

TABLE 3.3-3 {Continued}

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS}

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 2 1, 2, 3 16

b. Steam Generator 4/steam 2/steam 3/steam 1, 2, 3(c) 13*, 14 Pressure - Low generator generator generator

c. Containment Pressure -

4 2

2 3 2

1, 2, 3 1, 2,3

@) 12

d. Automatic Actuation Logic

5. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (RAS)

a. Manual RAS (Trip Buttons) 2 2 1, 2, 3, 4 12

b. Refueling Water Storage 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 19 Tank - Low

c. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 2 1, 2, 3 12 ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 60. 132 30

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is less than 1836 psia ; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 1836 psia.

(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 700 psia ; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 700 psia.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION OF STATEMENTS ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

~With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total

(~ Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN .

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure - High (SIAS ,

CIAS , CSAS)

Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)

3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B , then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure - Low (SIAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3- 15 Amendment No . ~ . ~. 149 31

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 14 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

b. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed/Tripped

1. Containment Pressure - Containment Pressure - High (SIAS, CIAS, CSAS)

Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)

AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

Steam Generator Pressure - Low (RPS)

3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)

If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)

If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)

4. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure - High (RPS)

Pressurizer Pressure - Low (SIAS)

Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3. 7 .1.5.

ACTION 17 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition and verify that the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ; one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per

Specification 4.3.2.1.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. ~ . 73 32

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is demonstrated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If the inoperable channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition .

b. With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

c. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provi<;fed one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel has been placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels , operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition. If OPERABILITY can not be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4 .3.2.1.

ST. LUC IE - UN IT 2 3/4 3-1 6a Amendment No. 132 33

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 7 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

Bearing Failure on the 2A TCW pump.

Time I Position I Aoolica nt's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 3: 2A TCW Pump Bearing Fails.

Note to Evaluator: This malfunction ramps in over 8 minutes (pump will trip after 8 minutes).

Control Room Indications Available: No annunciation until the 2A TCW pp trips then E-34 will alarm (2A TCW pp ovrld/trip), then Generator alarms.

SRO Refer to 2-AOP-13.01 , TCW System and direct subsequent Actions: (section 4.2.1.1)

IF a TCW pump tripped , THEN ENSURE the other pump is running.

Maintain the TCW discharge header cross-tie open.

Recognize rising amp indication on the 2A TCW pump BOP ammeter and secure the pump prior to overload I trip conditions .

Recognize that the 28 TCW pump DID NOT start Contact the field operator for a start of the 28 TCW pump.

When directed start the 28 TCW pump.

Verify secondary alarms clear after 28 TCW pump running .

Exit the AOP after the 28 TCW pump has been started and SRO subsequent actions are complete Notifies shift manager.

Scenario 2 34

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 4 Page 8 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

PT1100X drifts high.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed. Trigger Event 4: PT-1100X Drifts High.

When requested l&C will initiate a work order to repair .

Control Room Indications:

Alarm H10: PZR CHANNEL Y PRESS HIGH I LOW

PZR Pressure Indications lowering with spray valves opening more

RECOGNIZE that the cause of the abnormal condition is RO PT1100X failed HIGH .

REPORT the condition to the crew. ,,

~ '"'- *..*

BOP

REFER to Annunciator Response Procedure.

DIRECT crew to enter 2-AOP-01.10, Pressurizer Pressure SRO and Level.

DETERMINE that the applicable IOA's AOP step 4.1.2 VERIFY pressurizer spray valves are NOT operating properly RO in automatic (maintaining the pzr on recirc at 2250 psia)

IF selected pressure channel has failed , THEN shift to the operable pressure channel. Observe that indicated pressure on the "X" controller is rising above the setpoint (due to PT-11 OOx failing high) while the "Y" controller indications are matched.

VERIFY spray valves close and PZR pressure is returning to program.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: since the pressurizer is on recirc, the sprays are normally open slightly.

EVALUATE Technical Specifications:

\/

,_)

The SRO will refer to Tech Specs for DNB if RCS pressure indication lowers below 2225 psia (LCO 3.2.5).

v TS SRO

With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit (Pressurizer Pressure s 2225 psia) restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or reduce THERMAL

- POWER to< 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Notifies Shift Mgr & ICM Scenario 2 35

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 2 Event# 5,7 Page 9 of 16 NRC Event Description : HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RPC's must be secured with CCW lost) , the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers) . MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Upon cue from Examiner, trigger Event 5: HCV-14-1 Fails Closed. Following the manual Rx Trip, the Reference Leg breaks on the 28 SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers) ,

Control Room Indication available: 'I . ( ), -

RCP Seal Trouble, Cooling Water Flow Low on all four RCP's

HCV-14-1 Indicates Closed

L-14, RCP CCW FLOW 10 Minute Timer Started

Containment Pressure & Rx Cavity Leakage trend up

SG pressure, RCS temp, Pzr pressure and level trend down

Instruments that are reading off-scale high: PT8023D, LT9023D, LT-9022, LT-9006.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: the ESDE appears within 1 - 2 minutes following PT8023D failing low. Also, due to the location of the reference leg break, wide range level indication on the 28 SG is failed. However, LT-9024 on the PACB-2 is available to provide wide range indication on the 28 SG (located on a different leg)

SRO/BOP Based on CCW Low Flow alarms, should recognize that HCV-

/RO 14-1 is closed Enter 2-AOP-01 .09A 1, A2 ,B1 or B2 and implement section SRO 4.2.10.

Direct step 4.2.10.1.4 (contingency) to be performed. Place HCV-14-1 control switch to OPEN RESET.

Recognize that the valve did not open and direct step If:.~ 4.2.10.1.5 (contingency) be performed . Within 10 minutes of the loss of CCW to the RC P's, trip the reactor and stop all I j RCP's. Implement EOP-01 , SPTA's

~/

\I'~

I Place HCV-14-1 control switch to OPEN RESET. Recognize it did not open and recommend that within 1O minutes of the loss RO of CCW to the RCP's, the reactor should be tripped and all RCPs stopped .

SRO Direct a Manual reactor trip based on loss of CCW flow the RCPs not to exceed 10 minutes. After the reactor is tripped, secure all RCPs Scenario 2 36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 5,7 Page 10 of 16 NRG Event

Description:

HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RPC's must be secured with CCW lost) , the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers). MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior RO .BOP Manually trip the reactor within 10 minutes of the loss of CCW to the RCPs, then secure all RCPs.

f J, '

t On the Reactor Trip, recognize TM/LP related alarms , LT-9022 and LT-9006 on the DCS indicate BAD (Transfers Feed Reg SRO/BOP system to manual) and LT9023D (NR safety channel) indicates

/RO off-scale high. RCS temperature, Pressurizer pressure and level trend down while Containment pressure and Rx Cavity Leakage trend up.

I Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

SRO

RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control , Pressure control, Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

~

Verfiy Reactor and Turbine have tripped (make RO/BOP announcement)

/

Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control , Inventory Control , Pressure Control , Core Heat removal Reactivity Control jV

Verify Reactor power is lowering.

Verify startup rate is negative .

~

Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .

(~ Inventory Control

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trendinq to 30 - 35%

Pressure Control

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia

Verify RCS subcoolinq is >20°F Scenario 2 37

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 5,7 Page 11 of 16 NRG Event Description : HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RPC's must be secured with CCW lost) , the Reference Leg breaks on the 2B SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers). MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCP running with CCW RO o All RCPs should have been secured following the reactor trip

Verif loo delta T is <10°F NA with No RCPs runnin Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of BOP Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal , Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1 , 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following o SG level is between 20 and 81% NR o Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F o If RCS approaches 500°F ensure:

At least ONE RCP is stopped (All should be secured from Core Heat Removal Safety Function). All RCPs were tripped earlier.

Emergency borate when directed (from RCS Heat Removal Safety Function) o Ensure V2525 Load control valve closed o Start a BAM Pump o Close V2651 Tank 28 Recirc valve o Open V2514 Emergency Borate valve

S/G pressure is between 835 and 915 psig o Close HCV-08-1A & B if SG pressure <735 psig

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed

MSR warmup valves are closed

If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED Scenario 2 38

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 5,7 Page 12 of 17 NRC Event

Description:

HCV-14-1 Fails Closed Requiring a Reactor Trip. Following the manual Rx Trip (RPC's must be secured with CCW lost), the Reference Leg breaks on the 28 SG which causes an ESDE in containment (auto triggers) . MSIS Fails to auto actuate.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior EXAMINER'S NOTE: Due to the trip at low power, AFAS may not actuate during EOP-01 '

implementation. In that case, AFW should be manually started and aligned using the AFW HARD CARD (2-NOP-99.07 , Attachment 5). When 2C AFW is started (either from AFAS or manually),

MV-09-11 to 2A SG will not open and cannot be opened.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: MSIS fails to auto actuate on High Containment pressure or Low SG pressure. The crew should recognize that parameters in excess of the MSIS actuation set point could be present while performing SPTAs. Manual action is required .

Containment Conditions -.....~,

Verify containment pressure <2 psig 0 Ensure SIAS, CIAS and MSIS have actuated 0 If Containment Pressure is at least 5.4 psig ,

Ensure CSAS has actuated with CS flow at least 2700 gpm

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F 0 Ensure All Containment Fan Coolers are operating

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of EOP-99.

Verify Spent Fuel Pool inventory and temperature ar normal on

/~ all available indications MSIS fails to automatically actuate on either high containment

(

BOP pressure or low SG pressure. Attempt to actuate using the

\ RTGB actuation buttons. Further actions are required after

_); EOP-05 is entered.

\

\.,: When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determine that 2-EOP-05, ESDE should be implemented .

Scenario 2 39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 13 of 17 NRC Event Description : Enter EOP-05, MV-09-11 (2C AFW pump to 2A SG) fails closed .

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

If called as the NPO to investigate the status of MV-09-11, 2C AFW pump to 2A SG report back that it indicates closed.

If called as the NPO to manually open MV-09-11, report back that it is ~

mechanically bound and will not open. ..... ...

Control Room Indications Available:

MV-09-11 closed indication (green light) .

(:/ *"' \

SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) every 15 minutes.

NOTE: IF no attempts have been made to address the status of AFW or recognize the status of MV-09-11 following AFAS, then when the STA performs RCS Heat Removal Safety Function, he is to inform the US this Safety Function is not met due to SG levels not being restored.

Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's Ensure SIAS (if setpoint reached)

MSIS fails to automatically actuate on either high containment pressure or low SG pressure. Attempt to BOP actuate using the RTGB actuation buttons. If MSIS still not CRITICAL actuated, position ALL MSIS components. The "A" train TASK MFIVs must be closed to ensure adequate AFW flow to the

'-.., 2A SG. Refer to attached page 41 If CCW lost to RCP's for >30 minutes ensure CCW remains

-~

isolated 1 Protect the Main Condenser. Refer to Appendix X section 2

~/ Direct that AFW should be manually started and aligned using the

\'I AFW HARD CARD (2-NOP-99.07, Attachment 5).

When directed to align the 2C AFW pump to feed the 2A SG BOP report MV-09-11 2C to 2A will not open. Call NPO to investigate MV-09-11 Scenario 2 40

REV ISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 156 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 TABLE 5 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL (Page 1 of 1)

A Train ('1) B Train(-./)

NOTE An MSIS signal generated from EITHER A or B Train will cause ALL MSIS com onents to actuate due to inter osin rela s in the MSIS circuit D 1. ENSURE Main Steam Hdr A/B Isolation Valves CLOSED.

HCV-08-1A

HCV-08-1 B D 2. ENSURE Header A/B Bypass Valves CLOSED.

MV-08-1A

MV-08-1 B D 3. ENSURE Feedwater Hdr A/B lsol Valves CLOSED.

HCV-09-1A

HCV-09-1 B

HCV-09-2A

HCV-09-28 END OF TABLE 5 41

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 2 Event# 6 Page 14 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

Enter EOP-05, MV-09-11 (2C AFW pump to 2A SG) fails closed .

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed to open AFW crossties, Trigger Event 6: Open AFW Cross Tie Valves. Wait three minutes and state MV-09-13 and MV 14 are open.

Control Room Indications Available: When AFW flow initiated, MV-09-11 2C AFW to 2A SG fails to open.

- . I

)

l ,J*

Implement 2-AOP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Attachment 4 step 2 2B AFW pump to feed 2A SIG Refer to attached pages SRO 43-44) OR 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation , step 4.4.2 2B AFW Pump to 2A SIG . Refer to attached pages 45-46.

" ~ " """>

SRO Direct opening MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves CRITICAL and throttle MV-09-9 to restore feed to 2A SG using 2B AFW pump.

TASK ( l, ~ - .... '\

_/

When directed , call NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 BOP AFW crosstie valves.

NOTE BOP should close MV-09-9 first

. When directed perform Appendix A of EOP-99 Sampling SG's

\. When directed close CCW to I from RCPS 's Direct the 2B SG isolated IAW EOP-99 Appendix R. Recognize

\ I SRO step in Appendix to stop the 2B AFW should NOT be

\'~ performed and communicate this to the BOP.

\~ ,;

I.;'

Scenario 2 42

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 29 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Cross-Connecting AFW (Page 3 of 4)

2. 28 AFW pump to feed 2A SIG :

A. ENSURE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO 2A SIG VALVE, is CLOSED. (RTGB-202)

B. START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 28.

C. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV.

(RTG8-202 - Key 84)

NOTE Key-switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are located in 2A/28 AFW Pump Room . Two keys are required since the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 while in MODES 1, 2, 3 will make two independent AFW flow paths inoperable.

D. Locally OPEN MV-09-13, 2A TO 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE.

(TRSL/211N-T5/W-TA) (Key 301)

E. Locally OPEN MV-09-14, 28 TO 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE.

(TRSL/211S-T6/W-TA) (Key 301)

CAUTION The 28 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm*.

F. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A SIG .

(RTG8-202)

G. IF feed ing the 28 SIG , THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE , to maintain proper flow.

43

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 30 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Cross-Connecting AFW (Page 4 of 4)

2. (continued)

H. To terminate flow to the 2A SIG from the 2B AFW pump, PERFORM the following :

(1) CLOSE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE.

(2) Locally CLOSE MV-09-14, 2B TO 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE.

(3) Locally CLOSE MV-09-13, 2A TO 2B AFW HDR CROSS-TIE.

I. IF feeding of the 2B SIG is no longer required , THEN :

(1) CLOSE MV-09-10, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE .

(2) CLOSE SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV. (Key 84)

(3) STOP Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B.

44

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 18 of 36 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 2A SIG.

NOTE Control switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 Cross-Tie valves are located in the 2A I 28 AFW PP Room. The control switches are key operated (#301 ).

Two keys are necessary as the keys are removable in CLOSE only.

CAUTION .> I Opening both MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE, and MV-09-14, 28 to 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE, while in Modes 1, 2, or 3 can only be performed by declaring one AFW train inoperable. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 1)

1. ENSURE PUMP 28 is running .

2. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV. (KEY 84)

3. ENSURE the RCS is in MODEs 4, 5, or 6.

Current plant MODE \

4. PLACE MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE, key switch

(#301) to OPEN .

5. VERIFY valve is OPEN by local control box indication.

6. PLACE MV-09-14, 28 to 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE, key switch

(#301) to OPEN .

7. VERIFY the valve is OPEN by local control box indication .

NOTE MV-09-10 should be closed unless feeding of both S/Gs is desired .

CAUTION To avoid water hammer, when reinitiating flow to a steam generator that has lost all feedwater, the initial flow rate should be limited to less than or equal to 150 gpm for five minutes or until a level rise is observed .

8. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A S/G.

45

REVISION NO.: PROCEDUR E TITLE: PAGE:

6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 19 of 36 PROCEDUR E NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 2A SIG. (continued)

CAUTION The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm.

9. IF flow is desired to the 28 SIG while filling the 2A SIG , THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 28 SIG .

10. IF desired , THEN STOP flow to the 2A SIG from the 28 AFW PUMP by performing the following :

A. CLOSE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE .

B. CLOSE MV-09-14, 28 to 2A AFW HOR CROSS-TIE, by taking local key switch to CLOSE and removing key.

IV C. CLOSE MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HOR CROSS-TIE, by taking local key switch to CLOSE and removing key .

IV

11. IF desired , THEN STOP flow to the 28 SIG from the 28 AFW PUMP by CLOSING MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE .

12. CLOSE SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV.

13. IF steam generator feed is NO longer desired , THEN STOP PUMP 28.

Performed By: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Print/Sign Initials Date Print/Sign Initials Date 46

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0 -2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o # 2 Event# 6 Page 15 of 16 NRC Event

Description:

Enter EOP-05, MV-09-11 (2C AFW pump to 2A SG) fails closed.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None ~

BOP ....."....

CRITICAL When MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves are ~,

opened , throttle open MV-09-9 to feed the 28 SG.

TASK l,,.~ .....

When directed, isolate the 28 SG IAW EOP-99 Appendix R BOP Refer to attached pages 48-50.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: If not mentioned by SRO, recognize step in Appendix to place 2B AFW switch to STOP should NOT be performed due to that is the only AFW pump available.

When 28 SG has blown dry direct stabilization of RCS SRO temperature within the limits of Figure 1A using the 2A SG CRITICAL ADV's. The US will :

1. Direct the RCO to stabilize RCS temperature using ADVs at TASK the lowest RCS Tcold.

Determine the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold .

Open one ADV on the 28 SG to 100% open , in manual, then RO adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the CRITICAL lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto. Open the second ADV on the 28 SG to 100% open , in manual , then adjust the auto TASK setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold

..... and place it in auto .

THE SUGGESTED TERMINATION POINT IS:

AFW Restored to the 2A SG

The 2B SG is isolated RCS Temperatureis controlled within the limits of Figure IA Scenario 2 47

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 99of1 71 PROCEDUR E NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 4 of 6)

Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation NOTE

Local actions are located in step 19 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.

Keys 82 and 81 are required for closing MV-08-17 , 28 SIG ATMOSPHERIC ISOL , and MV-08-16, 2B SIG ADV ISOL. Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTILE!TRIP (continqencv).

CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1 B, Main Steam Header 'B' Isolation Valve (MSIV) , is CLOSED.

D 2. lf HCV-08-1B did not close remotely ,

Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1B, MSIV Header 'B' Bypass Valve , is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch .

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required , then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-2A, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED.

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED.

(continued on next page) 48

w '

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 100 of 171 PROCEDURE NO .: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERA TOR ISOLATION (Page 5 of 6)

Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-2A and HCV-09-28, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2B, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

D MV-09-6, Stm Gen 2B Reg Block Valve D LCV-9006, 2B 15% Bypass D MV-09-4, 2B 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-5, 2B SG Slowdown , is CLOSED.

D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-6 , 28 SG Slowdown , is CLOSED.

D 9. ENSURE MV-08-198, 28 SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED.

D 10.CLOSE MV-08-17, 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 82)

D 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed , Pump 28, in STOP.

D 12.ENSURE MV-09-10, Pump 2B Disch to SG 28 Va lve , is CLOSED.

D 13.ENSURE MV-09-12, Pump 2C to SG 28, is CLOSED.

D 14.PLACE MV-08-12 , SG 28 Stm to AFW PP 2C , in CLOSE.

D 15.lf MV-08-12, SIG 28 Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking , AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required , Then CLOSE MV 08-3 , 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)

D 16.ENSURE MV-08-188, 28 SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED.

D 17.CLOSE MV-08-16, 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 81)

(continued on next page) 49

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 101 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DAPPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 6 of 6)

Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 18.!f a SGTR is in progress, Then NOTIFY the SM of status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes.

NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete . Local actions may be continued .

(

D 19. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09158 , 2C AFW Pump to 2B SIG Isolation.

D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09136 , 2B AFW Pump to 2B SIG Isolation.

D C. CLOSE SE-08-1 , Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.

D D. !f SE-08-1 , Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then CLOSE V08883 , SE-08-1 Inlet Isolation.

D E. !f MV-08-12, SIG 2B Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-12 using the handwheel.

D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

D a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

D V08622 , CB #67 Drain D V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 2 END OF APPENDIX R 50

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

Raise power to 100%

Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None this shift Tech Spec Action Statement:

T.S . 3.7.1.2 Action a - 2A AFW pump.

2A BAM Pump NIA with 2B BAM pump is operable 2A Charging Pump N/A with 28 and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps operable.

Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS lsol N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD Current Status:

Unit 2 at 30% power MOC, Boron 1299 ppm.

The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Forced Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant.

2-GOP-201 is complete up to step 4.7.12. F Pressurizer is on recirc.

Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold.

Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100% at 3MWe/min Equipment Issues:

2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak.

2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal.

2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals.

Reactivity Turnover:

-7 gpm dilution to suction of the Chging pumps in progress due to Xenon building in .

See RE letter for power ascension guidance 51

Inter-Office Correspondence

@ RE/PSL Trng 15-003 FPL To: SM Date: Today From : R. Eng Department: Reactor Engineering

Subject:

Unit 2 Power Ascension Guidance This letter is issued to provide guidance to the Operations Department for power ascension .

Unit 2 Power Escalation Following 30% to 100% Power

1. Per 2-GOP-101 , "Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady-State and Scheduled Load Changes," Unit 2 fuel is fully pre-conditioned . Reactor power should not be increased at a rate exceeding 18% per hour (3 MW/min).

2. Water/boron requirements for the up-power at 18% per hour are included in this letter. It is estimated that 16, 100 gal of water will be required to raise power to 100%.

3. 2 charging pumps will be required during the power ascension evolution.

4. ASI will be maintained within the Sliding ESI scale.

General Considerations

1. A BEACON simulation of the power maneuver provided estimates of the quantity of water to be added . Please note that th is is estimation only and that modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will result in deviations from the prediction. This guidance is NOT to be used as a substitute for operator knowledge, close monitoring of plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur

2. No challenge to the DNB LCO or LHR LSSS is expected .

3. Reactor Engineering will be on site to provide support for the up-power. The on-site Reactor Engineer may modify the above guidance as needed to respond to actual plant conditions.

~~

Reacto~neering R. Eng Reactor Engineering Supervisor 52

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No. : 4 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 45% power MOL. 2B Main Feedwater Pump has just been returned to service following repair of an oil leak.

Turnover: 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2C Charging pump is out of service for leaking plunger. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is out of service due to motor oil leak. Return the Unit to 100% power.

Critical Tasks: .'\. \

Restore operation to the 2B AFW pump and associated AC MOV's prior to reaching Once Through Cooling criteria(< 15% SG Wide Range level on both SGs)

The 2A SG is reported to be isolated and Independently Verified per 2-EOP-04 Event No. Malf. No. Event Event Description Type*

1 R/RO Raise power to 1 00%

N/BOP ,

SRO 2 1 TS/SRO HCV-09-1A ("A" train MFIV) low nitrogen pressure alarm (P-6) 3 2 I/BOP Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90130, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high .

TS/SRO 4 3 CIRO 28 Chg pp develops an oil leak. After securing the 2B Chg pp, TS/SRO letdown controller LIC-2110 fails as - is (letdown flow for 2 Chg pps) 5 4 C/BOP 2B ICW pump develops a failed motor bearing TS/SRO 6 5 M/All A LOOP occurs resulting in a reactor trip. When the ADVs are placed in service post trip, MV-08-18A ("A" SG - RTGB 202) fails I/RO open . After AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following

... , .... failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out.

\J.

7 6a C/BOP Following the LOOP, the 2B EOG failed to load due to a spurious differential current bus lockout on the 2B3 4.16kV bus. Exit EOP-6b CIRO 01 & transition to EOP-06 . Reset the lockout and restore power to the 2B3 4.16kV bus (including 480V power to the AFW AC valves) .

After power is restored, the 2B AFW pump does not auto start (following the 30 second time delay). Manual start required 8 7 M/All A SGTR occurs on the 2A SG , transition to EOP-04 . Due to the LOOP the crew will have to diagnose the SGTR without the use of secondary rad monitors. Isolate the 2A SG

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, ©omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 4 The plant is at 45% with the 28 Main Feedwater pump just returned to service. Instructions to the crew are to raise power to 100%. The MFW pump has just been started per 2-NOP-09.01 step 4.6.23. Directions for the crew are to start an up power to 100%.During the up power, MFIV HCV-09-iA has low nitrogen pressure. The LCO 3.7.1.6 will be entered (72 hr action). The SRO should evaluate the ARP (P-6) and perform actions to restore operability to the valve.

After HCV-09-1A actions are taken, a reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90130, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high. The crew enters 2-AOP-09.01 Feedwater Control System Abnormal OPS. The crew will need to take manual control of 2A FRV (FCV-9011) to restore level to normal in 2A S/G. Only the High Power FRV will respond in manual. The Low Power FRV may indicate open intermittently (while in auto) when the HPFRV is opened.

Ultimately, the LPFRV will close due to the failure on LT-9005 (input to the LPFRV). Refer to TS 3.3.2 for LT-90130 failure. Implement 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation and bypass only AFAS-1 on for AFAS Channel "D".

Continuing with the up power with FW control in manual on the 2A SG , the SNPO will call the Control Room and inform them the 28 Charging pump has a severe oil leak. The crew should stop the pump. This results in only the 2A Charging pump available. The SRO should refer to T.S.

(3.1 .2.4 & 3.5.2) and apply the appropriate action statement. When the 28 Charging pump is stopped, LIC-2110 fails as - is (letdown flow for 2 Chg pps). Manual control should be taken to match letdown with Charging flow.

After Charging and Letdown are matched, the 28 ICW pump develops a bad motor bearing (no oil in the upper motor bearing) and there will be indications of increasing amps. Align & start 2C ICW pp IAW 2-AOP-21.038, "28 Intake Cooling Water System Header. Review TS 3.7.4 for

- using the 2C ICW pump in lieu of the 28 ICW pump (discharge valve alignment verified to agree with electrical alignment every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months )

A LOOP occurs resulting in a Reactor trip. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADV's are placed in service (Auto/Auto- "A" SG on RTG8 202 , 8" SG on HVAC panel) post trip, MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTG8 202) fails open due to the Main Steam process input failing high. The crew should take action to close the failed open ADV by placing the controller PIC-08-1 BA in manual (maintain the Auto-Manual selector switch in AUTO) and use the increase/decrease buttons to control the ADV to maintain 900 psia on the 2A SG . While in EOP-01 after AFAS; the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures : MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30% open and then thermals out. The crew should exit EOP-01 and enter EOP-06 due to inadequate feedwater to at least one SG. After entering EOP-06, the crew must locally reset the differential current lockout relay (per 2-AOP-47.018 , "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B") to allow the recovery of the vital 4.16kV 283 bus by the 28 EOG. The 28 AFW pump does not auto start following the AFAS time delay. A manual start of the 28 AFW pump is required . This is a critical task to restore power to the 28 AFW pump and associated AC MOV's (LCs de-energize on the bus lockout).

After Feedwater is restored in EOP-06 , a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG so the crew could transition to EOP-04 or EOP-15 (it would be allowed to exit EOP-06 since Feedwater is now available but the crew could consider it a dual event and go to EOP-15) . The crew will have to respond the SGTR without the use of secondary rad monitors due to the LOOP and Rx tripped (No N-16 gammas) . RCS Pressure & Level lowering with the 2A SG level rising should be used to diagnose the event along with local area surveys by RP. The event should be re-diagnosed and 2-EOP-04 entered .The crew should begin an RCS cooldown to< 510°F and then perform Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG. This is a critical task. After Appendix R is complete, terminate the scenario.

Scenario 4 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 4 Procedures Used

2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1

2-GOP-101 , Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation

2-NOP-09.01 , Main Feedwater System Operation

2-AOP-09.01, Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown

2-AOP-21.038 , 28 Intake Cooling Water System Header

2-AOP-47.018 , Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-06, Total Loss of Feedwater

2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Technical Specifications Entered

3. 7 .1.6, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (Event 2)

3.3.1, RPS Instrumentation (Event 3)

3.1 .2.4, Charging pumps (Event 4)

3.5.2, ECCS (Event 4)

3.7.4 , Intake Cooling Water (Event 5)

Scenario 4 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 1 Page 4 of 19 NRC Event Descri ption: Raise power to 100%

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.

Initiate IC 3 45% power. Xenon building in, 25 gpm dilution rate. MOL.

2C Charging Pump OOS for repack. '

2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. '

2A AFW Pump OOS to repair oil leak.

Start 2B MFW pump and leave in recirc. position.

Place 2A AFW pump, 2A BAM pump and 2C Charging pump to stop. ---:'\."

Control Room Indications Available: ~,'*

G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS lsol

N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol

M-48 2C Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Continue with 2-GOP-201 'Reactor Plant Startup- Mode 2 To SRO Mode 1', step 4.8.4 Refer to attached pages 5-8 Control Rx power and ASI IAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 4.1 Refer to attached pages 9-11 Raise dilution rate for power increase IAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 4.2.15 Refer to attached page 12 Withdraw CEAs in 'Manual Sequential' as directed to raise Rx

,/( power.

""'- Ensure appropriate actions for ASI Control are taken using 0-

, NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control

' Divert letdown to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS to maintain I

--~ VCT level within normal band.

\~

Raise Turbine load using 2-NOP-99.07 Attachment 3, Turbine BOP Adjustment Program DEH for power increase at a rate not to exceed 3.0 MW/MIN . Refer to attached pages 13-15 Monitors dilution and T-avg and Tref and maintain as close as RO possible. (+/- 2°F)

Scenario 4 4

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 70 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100%

1. PERFORM Nuclear I Delta T power calibration per 2-0SP-69.01 ,

Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration.

(Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 4)

2. IF NOT performed at 30% Reactor power, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. NOTIFY SCE or l&C to perform DCS Steam Generator Feedwater Discharge Coefficients Verification per 2-NOP-102.01 , Distributed Control System (DCS) -Operations.

SCE I I&

B. ENSURE scheduled lncore surveillances have been performed . (Section 7 .1.3, Management Directive 1)

C. ENSURE lncore Detection System is OPERABLE per O-OSP-64.01, Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests , Checks and Calibrations. (Section 7 .1.3, Management Directive 1)

RE

3. IF Condensate Polisher is in service, THEN ENSURE enough Powdex vessels are in service to support a rise in condensate flow.

4. CONTINUE power ascension.

5. START second condensate pump per 2-NOP-12.03, Condensate System Operation.

6. WARMUP heater drain pumps per 2-NOP-11 .02, Heater Drain and Vents System Operation.

7. VERIFY proper operation of Heater Drain and Vent system as follows :

NPO

Level controls maintaining normal level.

NO abnormal noise or vibration that may indicate water hammer or loose parts.

NO air leaks in control lines I components .

Alternate drain valves SHUT.

5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 71 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCI EUN IT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100% (continued)

8. ENSURE the following TCW TCVs have been placed in automatic operation per 2-NOP-13.03, Turbine Cooling Water System Normal Operation:

TCV-13-15 , H2 COOLER OUTLET NPO

TCV-13-21 , H2 SEAL OIL COOLER AIR SIDE OUTLET NPO

TCV-13-22 , H2 SEAL OIL COOLER H2 SIDE OUTLET NPO

9. WHEN total TCW flow is between 6,000 to 6,500 gpm , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. RECORD TCW heat exchanger total flow: (TGB/24/22/K)

FR-13-50A, FIT-13-50A + B TOTAL FLOW

_ ___ gpm

FR-13-508, FIT-13-508 +A TOTAL FLOW

/ '- gpm

8. START the second TCW pump per 2-NOP-13.03, Turbine Cooling Water System Normal Operation.

10. IF Condensate Polisher System is in service, THEN ENSURE that four polisher vessels are in service or as recommended by Chemistry.

CAUTION The second main feed pump should NOT be started until second condensate pump is running and total Feedwater flow is approximately 10,000 GPM with the recirculation valve CLOSED to prevent tripping the running pump.

11. IF second Main Feed Pump is available , THEN PERFORM the following :

6

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 72 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100% (continued)

11. (continued)

A. START second Main Feed Pump per 2-NOP-09.01, Main Feedwater System Operation.

8. WHEN total feedwater flow is between 15,000 GPM and 20,000 GPM , THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) PLACE second main feed pump control switch in AUTO RECIRC.

(2) VERIFY recirc valve CLOSES.

12. PERFORM 2-NOP-22 .02, Generator Seal Oil System Operation , to drain water and dirt from seal oil system.

NOTE The System Load Dispatch shall be notified as soon as practical , but within 30 minutes of a change in status of the Power System Stabilizer (PSS).

(Section 7 .2, Commitment 2)

13. PLACE PSS in service as follows: (RTGB-201)

A. PLACE POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER control switch in ON.

8. VERIFY red PSS light is ON .

C. RECORD time PSS placed in service in Narrative log .

(Section 7.2, Commitment 2)

D. NOTIFY System Load Dispatch that the PSS has been placed in service. (Section 7.2 , Commitment 2)

RECORD time System Load Dispatch is notified in Narrative log . (Section 7.2, Commitment 2)

F. NOTIFY Unit 1 that the Unit 2 PSS is in service, reactive load should be adjusted as necessary.

14. MAINTAIN reactive load within the applicable limitations of Attachment 4.

7

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP -

MODE 2 TO MODE 1 73 of 113 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.8 Raising Reactor Power from 45% to 100% (continued)

15. Prior to reaching 50% Calorimetric power, VERIFY Secondary Chemistry meet 50% power limits of O-COP-05.04, Chemistry Department Surveillances and Parameters.

CHEM CAUTION Power ascension should be stopped ifmain feed pump suction pressure drops to less than 330 psig or if MFRV demand is greater than 90% to prevent loss of feedwater due to low suction pressure.

16. MAINTAIN the following with only one Main Feed Pump running :

Main Feed Pump suction pressure greater than 400 psig.

Maximum FRV demand of 90% open.

17. VERIFY Moderator Temperature Coefficient is within limits as specified in T.S. 3.1 .1 .4.

Date I Time: I RE

18. IF at any time while performing Section 4.8, Step 19 thru Section 4.8, Step 28, either of the following conditions exist:

PCV-08-815, GLAND STM TO HP SEAL BYPASS TO CNDSR, is fully OPEN.

Pressure upstream of PCV-08-815 exceeds 18 psia THEN PERFORM the following : (RTGB-201)

A. THROTTLE MV-08-814, SPILLOVER BYPASS VALVE, until upstream pressure is between 16-18 psia .

B. THROTTLE MV-08-814, SPILLOVER BYPASS VALVE , as required for the rest of the power increase to maintain upstream pressure between 16-18 psia .

8

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 8 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCI E UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with the following guidelines:

All applicable cond itions necessary to perform the step are satisfied .

The performance of the out of sequence steps do NOT change an operational MODE.

SM/US has given authorization .

4.1 Power Level Escalations

1. MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref during main generator loading as follows:

CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

Boron concentration changes per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

NOTE

Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines contains guidance for power escalation rates.

Reactor Engineering may provide clarification for power escalation rates from Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines.

2. IF greater than or equal to 50% power OR 30% power during shape annealing factor test, THEN RAISE power as follows :

A. USE boration or dilution per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control for fill planned reactivity additions.

CAUTION Adjusting CEAs for ASI impacts Reactivity B. USE CEAs for ASI control per O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control .

3. IF available, THEN ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating per 2-NOP-02 .02, Charging and Letdown .

9

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 9 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Power Level Escalations (continued}

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 1, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.

5. CONTINUE to load Main Generator per 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MOOE 1.

10

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE PROCEDURE NO.:

AN D SCH EDULED LOAD CHANGES 20 of 20 2-GO P-101 ST. LUC IE UN IT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines (Page 4 of 4)

NOTE Components of fully cond itioned fuel :

Fuel is cond itioned to equal to or greater than 90% power.

The core is NOT experiencing a difference greater than plus or minus 0.5 RPS ASI units from the cycle predicted ASI.

3.0 FULLY CONDITIONED FUEL

1. IF performing a mid cycle shutdown or power reduction AND a return to full power occurs within 27 days, THEN RAISE power at a maximum power esca lation rate of 30% I hour.

11

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

31 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)

NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26 , DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW

14. ADJUST FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2, Step 4. ODDO

IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN , THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 X/Y Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow. DODO

15. IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DODD

16. MAINTAIN PIA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE ::;30 psig by opening and closing V2513, (VCT) VENT VALVE. DODD

17. IF diverting to maintain VCT level , THEN PERFORM the following:

A. PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in the WMS position . ODDO B. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates OPEN. DODD

c. When normal level on LIC-2226, (VC!) LEVEL, is reached ,

THEN PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO . DODD D. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates CLOSED. DODD

18. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added ,

THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP. DODD

19. IF V2512 , REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened, THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED. ODDO

20. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE, was opened , THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED. DODD

21. ENSURE FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM . ODDO

22. MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tavg* (RTGB-203) DODD 12

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TIT LE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 10 of 24 PROCE DURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-201 . Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and , if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard .

Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity . Monitoring ~ppropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor, and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant response and system performance ensures proper control of the plant. The SM/US sha ll be notified of any abnormal indications .

Reactor Power

MW (Load)

CEA POSITION

OCS Power

RCS Temp

Pzr Level

ASI

1. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open.

2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group .

3. ADJUST va lues, as directed by SM/US , for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS : (display 7055)

TARGET SELECT

RATE SELECT

4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)

TARGET

RATE

5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. {display 5551 )

13

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on Ovation main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL. (display 5551)

7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group .

(display 5551)

B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended , THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:

(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.

(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)

a. TOUCH FUN CT . ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.

c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")

from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure .

8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:

Reactivity rate

Turbine load rate 14

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-"99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation displ ay 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

C. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.

15

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 5 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

HCV 1A ("A" train MFIV) low nitrogen pressure Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 2: MFIV (HCV-09-1A)

Low Nitrogen Pressure.

Report back as NPO that local nitrogen pressure at HCV-09-1A is 4700 psia and fairly stable. Air Reservoir pressure is normal at 87 psi stable.

Report back as NPO that HCV-09-1A Hydraulic Air Pump is not pumping up the .,

Nitrogen accumulator.

Control Room Indications Available: /'....-' ~.. \

Annunciator P-6, "MFIV HCV-09-1A Accum Press Low/DC Failure" The SRO should evaluate the ARP (P-6) and perform actions SRO to restore operability to the valve .

"' l.

v TS LCO 3.7.1.6.a should be entered.

Restore the valve to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . IF not SRO T.S .

returned to operable status , THEN the MFIV shall be closed or isolated.

- BOP Contact the NPO to investigate both Air and Nitrogen pressure at HCV-09-1A.

Notify MM to trouble the low Nitrogen pressure condition on SRO HCV-09-1A and the SM of T.S action required .

,* \ \ 'l

~-

, J Scenario 4 16

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

14 9 CONTROL ROOM PANEL P RTGB-206 PROCEDURE NO.: WINDOW:

2-ARP-01-POO ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 P-6 (Page 1 of 1)

CAUSES: Any of the following:

Blown fuse MFIV

Loss of control power HCV-09-1A

One of the three pressure switches is in alarm

Pressure switch failure ACCUM PRESS LOW

/DC FAILURE P-6 DEVICE: SETPOINT: LOCATION:

74/655 De-energized HCV-09-1A Relay box PS-09-1A1 4750 psig TRSU36/N-T2/W-TA PS-09-1A2 75 psig TRSU36/N-T2/W-TA PS-09-1A3 75 psig TRSU36/N-T2/W-TA ALARM CONFIRMATION

1. HCV-09-1 A, FEEDWATER HOR A ISOLATION VALVE , NO position indication.

2. Loss of Control power indicated at Local Control Panel by NO lights ON.

3. Local Control Panel indicates one of the following alarms:

Accumulator Pressure 1

I Local air regulator gage is NOT calibrated , use the calibrated (0-300 psi) gage to verify air reservoir pressure.

Air Reservoir Pressure

Air Supply Pressure OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE

MFIVs shall be declared inoperable if accumulator pressure falls below 4600 psig or air reservoir pressure is less than 70 psig .

MFIV hydraulic actuator will NOT operate if the Air Reservoir Pressure is less than 70 psig, due to the spring tension in the 4 way shuttle valves. In this condition the valve is required to be declared inoperable.

1. ENSURE 125V DC SA Fuses F61 , F62 are checked for continuity. (RTGB-206)

2. Locally PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE 2-60119, 125 voe FUSED POWER SUPPLY, is CLOSED. (125V DC BUS 2A)

B. At the Local Control Panel CHECK for any of the following alarms:

Accumulator pressure

Air reservoir pressure

Air supply pressure C. ENSURE V18556, INSTR AIR TO HCV-09-1A ISOL, is OPEN. (TRSU44/S-T1/W-TA)

3. NOTIFY l&C Department to troubleshoot and repair any pressure switch problems.

REFERENCES:

1. CWD 2998-8-327 Sheets 655, 646

2. Schematic 2998-B-326, Sh 655

3. AR 00547905, Minimum Hydraulic Pressure for MFIV Operability.

4. EC 278113, U2 MFIV Air Reservoir Pressure Gauges 17

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:* MODES 1, 2 and 3, except when the MFIV is closed and deactivated.

ACTION :

a. With one MFIV inoperable in one or more main feedwater lines, OPERATION may continue provided each inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status, closed, or isolated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With two MFIVs inoperable in the same flowpath , restore at least one of the inoperable MFIVs to OPERABLE status or close one of the inoperable valves within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6.a Each MFIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5.15 seconds when tested pursuant to the lnservice Testing Program . The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

4.7.1. 6.b For each inoperable MFIV, verify that it is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

Each MFIV shall be treated independently.

ST. LUCI E - UNIT 2 3/4 7-10 Amendment No. S, Ja, ~. +.+, 91 18

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# 4 Event# 3 Page 6 of 19 NRG Event

Description:

Reference leg failure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90130, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger event 3: Reference Leg Failure '..

Control Room Indications Available: ~

"A" SG feedwater controller output lowering

"A" SG level lowering on LT-9011 ' I>

Annunciator G-1, "2A SG Level Hi/Lo"

DCS Display will show LT-9012,LT-90130 and LT-9005 rising Recognizes High Power FRV FCV-9011 (2A SG) going closed SRO/RO/

and subsequently diagnoses cause to be an instrument failure BOP (reference leg failure).

Enters 2-AOP-09.01 Feedwater Control System Abnormal OPS Directs taking manual control (open) of FCV-9011 (2A S/G) and restoring normal SIG level, 2-AOP-09.01 step 4.1.1.1 (contingency)

IF automatic level control is malfunctioning, THEN take manual BOP control of feed flow and stabilze SIG levels to 60% to 70% NR.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: only the HPFRV will respond in manual. The LPFRV may indicate open intermittently (while in auto) when the HPFRV is opened. Ultimately, the LPFRV will close due to the failure on LT-9005 (input to the LPFRV).

BOP Ensure affected LOW PWR MIA STA is in A (auto).

Place affected HIGH PWR MIA STA in M (manual) and open it due to the input to the HPFRV failinq hiqh

-- *.. Maintain SIG level in normal band .

\ )

r,'

Scenario 4 19

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6of64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

1. VERIFY S/G levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable. malfunctioning ,

THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE S/G levels to 60% to 70% NR.

CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high S/G level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent SIG overfill.

2. VERIFY S/G levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.

than 50% NR.

2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open ,

THEN CLOSE it.

2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions 20

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 S/G Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies

1. PERFORM applicable step(s) in any order per Table 2.

Table 2 Level or Feedwater Control Malfunctions Suspected Malfunction Step HPFRV Section 4.2.2, Step 2 MFW pump recirculation valve Section 4.2.2, Step 3 FCV-12-1 , Condensate Hdr Recirc To Cndsr Section 4.2.2, Step 4 DCS FW inputs Section 4.2.2, Step 5 LPFRV .-

' Section 4.2.2 , Step 6 NOTE The HPFRV and its associated LPFRV have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in an attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

D 2. VERIFY HPFRV controllers are controlling SIG levels in normal 2.1 ENSURE affected LOW PWR MIA STA is in A (auto) .

band :

2.2 PLACE affected HIGH PWR MIA FIC-9011, SIG 2A FLOW STA in M (manual).

CNTL (HPFRV 2A) 2.3 CLOSE affected HPFRV using FIC-9021, SIG 28 FLOW HIGH PWR MIA STA until LPFRV CNTL (HPFRV 28) is 20% to 50% open.

2.4 MAINTAIN SIG level in normal band.

2.5 MAINTAIN LPFRV between 20%

to 50% open by adjusting HPFRV as required.

21

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No .: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 3 Page 7 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

Reference leg fa ilure on 2A Steam Generator causes LT-90 130, LT-9005, and LT-9012 to fail high Time I Position I Ap pl icant's Action s or Behavior Enter 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation and bypass ONLY AFAS-1 for AFAS Channel 0 . Refer to TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3 action 20a for LT-90130 failure .

ACTION 20 - With the number of channels Operable one less >

than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or TS SRO tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If an inoperable SG level channel can not be restored to Operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 as applicable in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next Cold Shutdown.

- ' ) 1 I

-..... ~ ...... /~

Notify l&C of the instrumentation failure and the SM of T.S SRO action required.

~- /)'

/"- ~ /

{'

\\

~\

1\

~lJ

/,,_ \,

(

~ \"-/

Scenario 4 18 22

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 28 of 91 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.11 SIG Level Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument and channel:

LIC-9013 A I B I C I D

LIC-9023 A I B I C I D NOTE

Bypassing AFAS will require Key 202 and one of the following keys; 203, 204, 205, or206.

If it is necessary to TRIP the RPS and ESFAS bistable trip units (BTUs).

then it is preferable to leave the AFAS BTUs in BYPASS.

(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)

An AFAS channel in the TRIPPED condition is limited to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months per Tech Spec 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3. (Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)

D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed:

LO LVL SG (RPS)

(Key 104)

For LIC-9013 only AFAS-1 For LIC-9023 only AFAS-2 A. BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitch and pushbuttons.

B. TRIP affected BTUs per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.

23

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION ACTION 20 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in either the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If an inoperable SG level channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 as applicable in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition.

If an inoperable SG DP or FW Header DP channel can not be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , then both AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 in the inoperable channel shall be placed in the bypassed condition . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

b With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed in ACTION 13.

c. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may proceed provided one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and the other inoperable channel placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 314 3-16b Amendment No . ~ . 149 24

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# 4 Event# 4 Page 8 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

28 Charging pump oil leak. Letdown Level Controller LIC 21 10 Fails As Is when the 28 Charging pump is secured Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 4: 28 Chg pp trips and Letdown Fails As-ls. When the 28 Charging Pump is secured, LIC-2110, Letdown Level Controller Fails As-ls When SNPO called report back oil all over the 28 Charging pump. -(fJr'i ~ *,

~~'~

Control Room Indications Available:

Annunciator M-31 28 Charging Pump Trouble.

M-23 28 Charging Pump Suet Press low I OVRLD I Trip Examiners note: Shortly after the Charging pump oil alarm the pump will trip. No applicable procedure for Charging pump tripping since a complete loss of charging flow did not occur.

RO Acknowledge alarm and notify SNPO to investigate

Communicate loss of 2B Charg ing pump .

Recognize letdown level control LIC-2110 BIAS is not auto adjusting letdown flow to one Charging pump operation (letdown flow is still at the rate for 2 Charging pumps)

Implement 2-AOP-02 .03, Charging and Letdown , step 4.2.6.1 including contingency action 4.2.6.1.A. Refer to attached page SRO 20.

Recognize no specific guidance in 2-AOP-02.03 for loss of Charging pump.

~

T.S . 3.1.2.4 should be entered. W ith only One charging pump

'- Operable, restore at least Two charging pumps to Operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and SRO T.S . borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to its COLR limit at 200°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charg ing pumps to Operable status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

T. S. 3.5.2 should be entered. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable fo r reasons other than condition a.1 (LPSI pump inoperable), restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

Scenario 4 25

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 CHARGING AND LETDOWN 14 of 44 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-AOP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.6 Letdown Level Control Malfunction D 1. IF letdown level control is malfunctioning, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the output of A.1 PLACE LIC-2110, LETDOWN LIC-2110, LETDOWN LEVEL in MANUAL, by performing LEVEL, is responding as the following :

expected to current plant conditions. 1. PLACE LIC-2110 in MANUAL.

2. ADJUST letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

3. PERFORM a system walkdown observing for leaks or lifting relief valves .

NOTE

Hard Manual operation is available to control Letdown Flow if either processor input is lost and AC power is available.

Operation in Hard Manual will only operate LCV-211 OP.

The GREEN light is LIT when Balanced in Section 4.2.6, Step 1. B B. VERIFY LIC-2110, B.1 IF Hard Manual operation is LETDOWN LEVEL, is desired due to loss of processor operating normally. input(s), THEN PERFORM :

A. RAISE LIC-2110, LETDOWN LEVEL, Controller Face .

26

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 4 Page 9 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

28 Charging pump oil leak. Letdown Level Controller LIC 2110 Fails As Is when the 28 Charging pump is secured Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notify MM about the Charging pump condition and SM of T.S SRO action required . Notify l&C about the problem with LIC-2110 Places LIC-2110 in manual IAW 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown steps 4.2.6.1 .A.1 and A.1.2:

Place LIC-2110, LETDOWN LEVEL in MANUAL, by performing the following :

RO

1. Place LIC-2110 in MANUAL.

2. Adjust letdown flow to a value consistent with the current plant conditions.

Contact SNPO to walk down system observing for leaks or lifting relief valves. Step 4.2.6.1 .A.1 .3 f

~

\\ /

Scenario 4 27

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 5 Page 10 of 19 NRC Event Descripti on : 28 ICW pump develops a failed motor bearing Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 5: 28 ICW Bearing Failure When directed to perform the ANPO actions to re-aligned the 2C ICW pump to the B ICW Header, Trigger: Align C ICW to B Header and Prepare to Start Control Room Indications Available: Increasing Amps on the 2B ICW pump.

Annunciator:

E-7 2B ICW PUMP OVRLD/TRIP E-30 ICW HEADERS PRESS LOW, E-17 HYPO LOCAL ALARM Recognize rising amps on the 2B ICW pump. Stops 2B ICW BOP pump and place switch in Pull to Lock position , of if pump already tripped , place switch in pull to lock position.

Implement 2-AOP-21 .03B 28 Intake Cooling Water System Header section 4.2.1, Perform applicable section per SRO Table 1.This directs using section 4.2.2 Due to the tripped condition of the 2B ICW pump. Refer to attached page 23 IF 2B ICW pump TRIPPED, Then perform the following:

A. IF health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, then attempt one restart only.

B. IF 2B ICW pump was NOT restarted, Then perform Attachment 1 Section 2.0, STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION Steps 1through12. Refer to attached pages 24-25 EXAMINER'S NOTE: The plant conditions do not one re-start since the healh and safety of the public is not in jeapardy TS 3.7.4 should be reviewed for applicability. With the 2A and 2C ICW pumps in service the LCO is satisfied. However, the Tech Spec requires that when ICW pump 2C is being used to

~.

TS SRO satisfy the requirements of this specification , the alignment of

?"' the discharge valves must be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Perform the actions of Attachment 1 Section 2.0, STARTING BOP 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION Steps 1 through

12. Refer to attached pages XX Scenario 4 28

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 2B INTAKE COOLING WATE R SYSTEM HEADER 7 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21.036 ST. LUCI E UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 28 ICW Pump Ovrld/Trip D 1. VERIFY 28 ICW pump amps normal.

1.1 IF 28 ICW pump indicates abnormally high amps ,

THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE 28 ICW pump control switch to PULL TO LOCK position .

B. PERFORM Attachment 1 Section 2.0.

1.2 IF 28 ICW pump TRIPPED, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, THEN ATTEMPT one restart only.

(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)

B. IF 28 ICW pump was NOT restarted ,

THEN PERFORM Attachment 1 Section 2.0.

29

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 28 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21.038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 28 ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 3 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION

1. ENSURE*2B ICW Pump Control Switch in PULL TO LOCK position.

2. ENSURE 2C ICW Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position .

3. ENSURE 2C ICW Pump aligned to 2B ICW header.

A. LOCK CLOSED SB21165, 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH TO 'A' TRAIN ISOL.

(I NTK/9/N-4N.J-C)

B. LOCK OPEN SB21211 , 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH TO 'B' TRAIN ISOL.

(I NTK/9/N-4N.J-C)

4. THROTTLE 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL, approximately 10 turns OPEN , SB21206.

(INTK/18/N-3N.J-C)

5. BYPASS CVCS Ion Exchangers by placing V2520, ION EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE , to BYPASS.

(RTGB-205)

6. MONITOR Generator Average Cold Gas*temperature.

IF Average Cold Gas Temperature rises to 47.7°C, THEN REDUCE MVARS to minimum, but NOT less than (unity) 0 MVARS .

(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 2)

IF Average Cold Gas Temperature rises to 50.7°C, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-22.01 , Rapid Downpower to REDUCE power as necessary to stabilize main generator cold gas temperature.

7. IF 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump is NOT running, THEN ENSURE AB 4.1 6kv bus ALIGNED to B side .

A. ENSURE 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position .

B. OPEN Bkr 2-20505, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB - 2A3. (RTGB-201)

C. OPEN Bkr 2-20208, 4 .16KV BUS TIE 2A3 - 2AB. (RTGB-201)

D. CLOSE Bkr 2-20409, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2B3 - 2AB. (RTGB-201)

E. CLOSE Bkr 2-20504 , 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB - 2B3. (RTGB-201) 30

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITL E: PAGE:

7 28 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 29 of 46 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-21 .038 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 28 ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 4 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION (continued)

8. WHEN 2C ICW Pump alignment is complete , THEN START 2C ICW Pump.

9. IF 2C ICW pump start was NOT successful, THEN GO TO Attachment 2, Contingency Action With 28 ICW Header Depressurized.

10. As pressure begins to rise in 28 ICW Header as indicated by Pl-21-SC , 2C ICW PUMP DISCH PRESS (INTK/26/N-3/E-B), SLOWLY OPEN , SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL, until valve is fully OPEN .

11. LOCK OPEN , SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL.

12. IF 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump OR 2C ICW Pump are operating and supplying the applicable header, THEN ENSURE Tech Spec requirements of Section 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 are satisfied .

NOTE The following step will require a ladder at CCW platform for access to HX vent valves and a pipe wrench to remove vent caps .

13. VENT 28 Essential ICW Header until a steady stream of water issues for 1 minute by open ing and closing each of the following valves individually:

A. SH21337 , SS-21-1 B VENT (CCW/28/N-E/W-4)

B. SH212050, SS-21 -1 B BACKWASH OUTLET VENT (CCW/31/N-E/W-4)

C. SH21244, 2B CCW HX TUBE SIDE INLET HEAD VENT (CCW/32/S-D/W-4)

D. SH21245, 2B CCW HX ICW OUTLET VENT (CCW/38/N-E/W-2)

14. VENT 2B Non-Essential ICW Header until a steady stream of water issues for 1 minute by opening and closing each of the following valves individually:

A. SH21363, SS-21-48 VENT (TGB/26/S-21/W-G)

B. SH21218, 2B TCW HX TUBE SIDE OUTLET HEAD VENT (TGB/26/N-22/E-K)

C. SH21219, 28 TCW HX TUBE SIDE INLET HEAD VENT {TGB/26/N-22/W-D) 31

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 11 of 19 NRC Event Description : LOOP. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTG8 202) fails open. While in EOP-0 1 after AFAS , the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out. Enter EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger Event 6: The Trip ((() '":.

If called as Unit 1, report we are also in a LOOP, make plant trip announcement

If called as the SNPO at the 4.16KV SWGR 283, report that the 4.16KV SGWR 283 lockout relay handle is pointing to the 10 O'clock position and the Lockout relay blue light on 4.16KV SGWR 283 is FLASHING.

After AFAS actuation, if called as the NPO to manually open MV-09-11, 2C AFW pump to 2A SG report back MV-09-11 is frozen and will not open.

Control Room Indications Available:

Annunciator A-14, 4.16KV SWGR 283 lJ.. Current Trip (Red Annunciator) 283 4.16KV SWGR VM-964, VOLTAGE and AM-937, AMPERES indicate zero

After ADV,MV-08-18A is placed in auto/auto post trip, valve position indicating light indicates red light on, green light off. PIC-08-1 *A indicates process pressure of scale high and 100% output.

After AFAS actuates, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures:

MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30% open and then thermals out.

After recognizing that a LOOP has occurred , directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as SRO follows:

RO: Reactivity control , Inventory Control , Pressure control , Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal , Containment Conditions.

Direct placing an ADV on each SG in service (auto/auto) to

,, .__); control SG pressure at 900 psia .

\

\., Place an ADV on each SG in auto/auto ("A" SG on RTG8 202, RO "8" SG on HVAC panel)

EXAMINER'S NOTE: When the ADV's are placed in service post trip, MV-08-18A

("A" SG on RTGB 202) fails open due to the Main Steam process input to Controller PIC-08-1 SA failing high.

Take action to close the failed open ADV by placing controller PIC-08-18A in manual (maintain the Auto-Manual selector RO switch in AUTO) and use the increase/decrease buttons on Pl C-08-18A to control the ADV to maintain 900 psi a.

Scenario 4 32

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 12 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

LOOP. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTG8 202) fails open. While in EOP-01 after AFAS , the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out. Enter EOP-06 due to. no feedwater available.

Time I Position ! Applicant's Actions or Behavior r

I Booth Operator Instructions: h ) ' I , ,

~~

Control Room Indications Available:

~ '"" /

0~

Reactivity Control RO

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative .

Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted. ...

Inventory Control

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%

Pressure Control RO

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia

Verify RCS subcooling is >20°F Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCP running with CCW (N/A LOOP)

Verify loop delta Tis <10°F I I I..,

Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of 2-EOP-99.

BOP

Notify SNPO to VERIFY SFP inventory and temperature are normal on all available indications.

Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of

,, ""'\\. Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions

' Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

~f ....._.,

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1 , 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)

Scenario 4 33

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 13 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

LOOP. The 2B EDG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 2B3 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTGB 202) fai ls open . While in EOP-01 after AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-1 1 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out. Enter EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

t '

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize that the 2B EOG is running but its output breaker is BOP open and the 2B3 4.16KV bus is de-energized due to an apparent differential current lockout Report that the 2A3 4.16KV bus is energized from the 2A EOG.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The differential current lockout was spurious and can be reset after exiting EOP-01 and entering EOP-06 using 2-AOP-47.018 "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B" RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0 SG level is between 20 and 83% NR 0 Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR BOP

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F

SIG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed (N/A LOOP)

MSR warmup valves are closed

If maintaining vacuum desired , ENSURE MV-08-814

/ Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED (N/A LOOP)

/( If not yet recognized , report to the crew that MV-08-18A is 100% open (RCS temperature and SG pressure would be

. trending out of the parameter ranges listed above).

Recommend or take actions to manually close the valve as

~\ previously discussed under RO actions.

___) Recognize after AFAS actuates, that MV-09-11 did not open and MV-09-12 shows dual with degraded flow on the "B" FW

\ header (2C AFW flow control valves).

\,.,

Scenario 4 34

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No. : HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 14 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

LOOP. The 28 EDG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTGB 202) fails open . While in EOP-01 after AFAS , the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out. Enter EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior **..

Report that RCS Heat Removal Safety Function is not being BOP met at this time due to no Main or Auxiliary Feedwater being supplied to either SG.

Containment Conditions .<:

Verify containment pressure <2 psig

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm

Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms

..... ~

When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determine that 2-EOP-O, TLOF should be implemented.

- I

.6 Scenario 4 35

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 15 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

LOOP. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differential current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service, MV-08-18A ("A" SG on RTG8 202) fails open . While in EOP-01 after AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following failures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out. Enter EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If called as the SNPO at the 4.16KV SWGR 2B3, report that the 4.1 GKV SGWR 2B3 lockout relay handle is pointing to the 1O O'clock position and the Lockout relay blue light on 4.1 GKV SGWR 2B3 is FLASHING.

Also report that no apparent abnormal conditions present that would cause the lockout to actuate.

Report as Elect Maintenance that one attempt to reset the lockout should be attempted.

Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger: Reset Bus Lockout After the lockout relay is reset, report as the SNPO that no unexpected conditions were encountered at the 4.1 GKV SGWR 2B3 bus Booth Operator lnstructions:When directed, Trigger: NPO Air- Appendix H NOTIFY Unit 2 Control Room as the NPO that 2A Instrument Air Compressor is running after the compressor has been reset from the control room.

Control Room Indications Available:

2B3 4.1 GkB Bus is energized Both SG Narrow Range levels are trending down SRO Direct SFSC's for EOP-06 performed every 15 minutes.

Contact the Shift Mgr and inform him of plant conditions and

' to review the EPIPs for event classification

,_)

Notify BOP to implement 2-EOP-99, Appendix A, Sampling Steam Generators.

\':'\ )

Direct 2-E OP-99, Aooendix H to restore Instrument air

,,I Direct HP to perform secondary surveys Direct RCS depressurized to 1800 to 1850 psia using auxiliary sprays.

Call NPO to perform Appendix H to restore Instrument air (2A BOP Instrument Air Compressor only)

When notified by the NPO, RESET the 2A Instrument Air Compressor on the plant auxiliaries panel.

Scenario 4 36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# 4 Event# 6 Page 16 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

LOOP. The 28 EOG does not energize the vital 4.16kV 283 bus because of a spurious differen tial current lockout on that bus. When the ADVs are placed in service , MV-08-1 8A ("A" SG on RTG8 202) fails open . While in EOP-01 after AFAS, the 2C AFW pump starts with the following fai lures: MV-09-11 fails closed and MV-09-12 goes about 30%

open and then thermals out. Enter EOP-06 due to no feedwater available.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Direct CCW to RC P's remains isolated by placing CCW valves SRO to/from RCP's to close.

Conserve SG Inventory by directing the SG Slowdown isolation valves and sample valves be closed .

SRO Reset the Differential Current Lockout per 2-AOP-47.01 B, CRITICAL "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B" to allow the TASK recovery of the vital 4.16kV 2B3 bus by the 2B EOG, t' " ........\... )

BOP Direct the SNPO to reset the Differential Current Lockout Relay CRITICAL for the 4.16KV SGWR 2B3 bus.

TASK Verify that the subsequent steps of 2-AOP-47.01 B, "Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus Train B" are addressed. Refer to attached pages 32-37 RO Recognize that the 2B AFW pump does not auto start following CRITICAL the AFAS time delay. A manual start of the 2B AFW pump is TASK required .

Establish AFW flow at 150 gpm for 5 minutes in accordance

.... 1,. with 2-NOP-97 .01 "Operations Hard Card". Refer to attached

-....... \ pages 38-42

,~_)I After 5 minutes at 150 gpm , raise AFW flow rate in order to r~ restore the 2A SG level to 60-70% Narrow Range.

EXAMINER' S NOTE: After Auxiliary Feedwater flow has been re-establish to the 2A SG, allow the crew time to assess the EOP-06 safety functions. All safety functions should be met. This will allow the crew to exit EOP-06.

Proceed to the next event after it has been confirmed that all safety functions are met.

Scenario 4 37

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 10 of 70 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-47. 01 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 NOTE

Attachment 2, Major Vital AC Loads List, contains a listing of the major loads that have been lost. .

Attachment 3, Undervoltage Relay Information, describes the bus UV relay scheme.

CAUTION Various instruments and equipment normally used for assessment of critical safety functions may NOT be OPERABLE. All available indications should be used.

D 1. DISPATCH an operator to switchgear to check for relay indications and any other possible problems.

2. Closely MONITOR RCP bearing and seal temperatures .

D 3. VERIFY two CCW pumps running . 3.1 CLOSE the following CCW header isolation valves to raise cooling to RCPs :

HCV-14-88, NORMAL HOR ISOLATION

HCV-14-10, FROM NORMAL HOR ISOLATION 38

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 11 of 70 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.01 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

3. (continued) 3.2 PLACE control switch(es) for CCW pump(s) aligned to Train 8 in PULL TO LOCK:

CCW Pump 28

CCW Pump 2C 0 4. VERIFY annunciator L-14 , RCP 4.1 PLACE control switch for CCW FLOW LOW 10 MINUTE MV-14-17/19 (Header 8 To/From TIMER STARTED is CLEAR. Fuel Pool Hx) in LOCKED CLOSED. (Key 91)

D 5. VERIFY ICW pump aligned to 5.1 PLACE control switch(es) for ICW Train 8 is running: pump(s) aligned to Train 8 in PULL TO LOCK:

ICW Pump 28

ICW Pump 28

ICW Pump 2C

ICW Pump 2C 39

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS-TRAIN B 12 of 70 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.01 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IrNSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

NOTE

If 28 EOG is running , resetting the!:::. Current Relay will result in immediate diesel output breaker closure and loading of the diesel onto the bus.

!:::. Current Relay is located on CCW Pump 28 breaker cubicle (2-20404) at 4160V SWGR 283.

D 6. VERIFY annunciator A-14, 4.16KV SWGR 283 /').CURRENT 6.1 IF NO damage is apparent, THEN RESET the lockout.

TRIP is CLEAR.

6.2 IF lockout failed to reset after first attempt, THEN CONTACT Electrical Maintenance 6.3 IF unable to reset lockout, THEN GO TO Section 4 .2.2 Step 17.

D 7. VERIFY EOG 28 is at rated 7 .1 PERFORM manual start of EOG 28 per Attachment 4, Diesel frequency and voltage .

Generator 28 Local Start.

7.2 IF EOG 28 fails to start, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 12.

D 8. VERIFY DG 4.16 KV BREAKER (2-20401) is CLOSED.

8.1 INSERT sync plug and PLACE in DG-28.

8.2 CLOSE DG 4.16 KV BREAKER (2-20401) , one attempt only.

40

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS -TRAIN B 13 of 70 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47 .018 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

8. (continued) 8.3 IF DG 4.16 KV BREAKER (2-20401 ), did NOT CLOSE, THEN ENSURE control switch is green flagged .

8.4 PLACE sync plug in OFF and REMOVE plug .

8.5 IF EDG Output Breaker fails to close from Control Room, THEN at 4.16 KV SWGR 2B3 PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE Bkr 2-20401 ,

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 2B, Normal/Isolate switch in ISOLATE.

B. CLOSE Bkr 2-20401, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 2B.

C. IF Bkr 2-20401, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 2B, did NOT CLOSE, THEN ENSURE control switch is green flagged .

D. PLACE Bkr 2-20401 ,

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 2B, Normal/Isolate switch in NORMAL.

41

REVISION NO.: PR OCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

9 LOSS OF A SAF ETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 14 of 70 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.0 1 B ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

8. (continued) 8.6 IF unable to close EOG Output Breaker, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 12.

D 9. VERIFY loading per Attachment 5, Unit 2 EOG 2B Automatic Load ing 9.1 START load(s) per applicable normal operating procedure(s).

Sequence (Significant Loads Only) , as expected .

D 10. VERIFY the following are ENERGIZED:

A. The following swing buses: A.1 REFER TO 2-AOP-47.01AB, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus - AB

4160 SWGR 2AB Swing Buses.

480V LC 2AB

480V MCC 2AB B. 480V LC 2B2 . B.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.3.

c. 480V LC 2B5. C.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.4.

D. 480V MCC 2B5. 0.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.5.

42

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITL E: PAGE:

9 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN B 15 of 70 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47 .018 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Loss of 4160V SWGR 283 (continued)

10. (continued)

E. 480V MCC 286. E.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.6.

F. 480V MCC 287. F.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.7.

G. 480V MCC 288. G.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.8.

H. 480V MCC 28-9. H.1 REFER TO Section 4.2.9.

D 11. IF 4160V SWGR 283 is energized ,

THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 29.

NOTE ti Current Relay is located on 2-20310, Feed to 480V LC 281 , breaker cubicle at 4160V SWGR 282.

D 12. VERIFY annunciator A-13, 4.16KV SWGR 28211 CURRENT 12.1 IF NO damage is apparent, THEN RESET the lockout.

TRIP is CLEAR.

12.2 IF lockout relay failed to reset after first attempt, THEN CONTACT Electrical Maintenance.

12.3 IF unable to reset lockout, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 17.

43

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 16 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS NOTE

An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-202. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and , if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard .

1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred NOTE

The discharge valves may be taken off the open seat to expedite acknowledgement of their alarms.

Feeding with the electric pump is preferred over the steam driven pump.

A trip from 100% power (Post EPU) will require -500 gpm total AFW flow.

1. FEED each Steam Generator at the desired flow rate by throttling the following valves OPEN or CLOSED:

2A Steam Generator

MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE

MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A 28 Steam Generator

MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28

MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE 44

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 17 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 2 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. WHEN AFAS has reached the reset level , THEN RESET either AFAS 1 (2A SG) OR AFAS 2 (28 SG) at the AFAS Cabinets A through D as follows (Key 202) :

NOTE When AF AS is reset in each cabinet the following will occur:

Actuation light will illuminate

1-3 AND 2-4 AFAS Lockout Relay Status lights will extinguish A. PRESS either AFAS-1 ACT RESET OR AFAS-2 ACT RESET pushbutton.

B. FEED the Steam Generator(s) using the desired flow path:

(1) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-2, 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2AVALVE (2) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A (3) FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 28 AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 84) 45

!lo REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 18 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 3 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. B. (3) (continued)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE (4) FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-5, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 86)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns .

1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured

1. PERFORM any of the following steps as necessary to restore Steam Generator levels .

FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 2A (2) OPEN SE-09-2, 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VAL VE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 2A SIG B. FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 28 AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 28 46

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 19 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 4 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

1. B. (continued)

(2) OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV (KEY 84)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VAL VE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 28 S/G NOTE The following valves should be opened simultaneously to prevent overspeed tripping of the 2C AFW Pump:

MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C If a Steam Generator Tube Rupture is in progress, the steam supply from the ruptured Steam Generator should NOT be opened .

CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns .

2. FEED the 2A AND 28 Steam Generators using the 2C AFW PUMP.

A. START 2C AFW PUMP by performing both of the following simultaneously:

OPEN MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

OPEN MV-08-13 , SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C B. OPEN the solenoid valve(s) in the header(s) to feed the appropriate S/G(s) :

SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85) 47

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE :

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 20 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 5 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

2. B. (continued)

SE-09-5, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV (KEY 86)

C. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN desired flow in the header(s) to feed the appropriate S/G(s):

THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A

THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 48

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0 -2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 4 Event# 6 Page 17 of 19 NRG Event

Description:

After Feedwater is restored in EOP-06, a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG.

Cooldown to< 510°F and then perform Append ix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 8: A SGTR -500 gpm Chemistry role play:

Approximately 10 minutes after the SG sampling is requested, call the *>*. . . . .

control room as Chemistry and report initial frisk of samples indicates activity in the 2A SG. Communicate that the isotopic analysis will be complete in about 30 minutes.

Role Play HP to perform secondary area surveys .

SNPO role play (if SGTL steps are performed):

When directed wait 5 minutes then report: rollup door closed, HVS-10A running, HVE-41A running, and SGBTF process monitor is on.

When directed by the US, trigger NPO CLOSE V08245. This closes Aux Priming Stm isolation V08245

Report back the air ejector vent is aligned to the plant stack and Aux Priming Steam lsol V08245 are closed.

Control Room Indications Available:

RCS Pressure & Level lowering with the 2A SG level rising Enter 2-EOP-04 SGTR after analysis from Diagnostic Flow SRO chart Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) for EOP-04 Direct Appendix A EOP-99 be performed. HP conduct local area surveys.

/..r Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify Direct CCW to the RCP 's be isolated in < 30 minutes due to SIAS

.. Verify Fig.2 met

(',

, BOP Contact HP to perform secondary area surveys RO Isolate CCW and CBO to the RCP's due to SIAS.

SRO Direct RCS cooldown , to< 510°F Thot using an ADV fully opened on each SG.

Scenario 4 49

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0 -2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# 4 Event# 6 Page 18 of 19 NRC Event

Description:

After Feedwater is restored in EOP-06 , a SGTR occurs on the 2A SG.

Cooldown to < 510°F and then perform Appendix R of 2-EOP-99 to isolate the 2A SG.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Perform a cooldown , using ADV's, to< 510°F That, then RO throttle ADV's to maintain cooldown rate < 100 °F in any one hour.

Give direction to perform an RCS depressurization as follows :

A. MAINTAIN RCS pressure within ALL the following criteria (listed in order of priority) :

Within the limits of Figure 1A, SRO

Less than 930 psia

Above the minimum pressure for RCP operation

Approximately equal to the most affected SIG pressure (within 50 psia)

B. OPERATE Auxiliary Pressurizer spray.

Using Aux Spray, depressurize the RCS maintaining Fig 1A RO and < 930 psia. Ultimately depressurize the RCS to within 50 psi of the 28 SG.

/( '

SRO When < 510°F Thot , direct 2-EOP-99, Appdx R be performed to CRITICAL isolate the 2A SG . Refer to attached pages 45-47 TASK BOP

'{ CRITICAL Isolate the 28 SG using Appdx R. Refer to attached page 45-48

~ TASK Contact tt\e NPO to perform field actions for isolating the 28 BOP SG per Appdx R. Refer to attached pages 45-47 Suggested termination point:

The crew is perform ing a controlled cooldown

ECCS flow meets figure 2 .

Scenario 4 50

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 96of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation NOTE

Local actions are located in step 19 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.

Keys 79 and 80 are required for closing MV-08-14, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-18A ISOL, and MV-08-15, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-19A ISOL.

Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLE/TRIP (contingency) .

CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

0 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is

'- CLOSED.

D 2. !f HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.

0 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve , is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered .

0 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED.

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.

51

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 97of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERA TOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 6. 1f BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

D MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Blowdown , is CLOSED.

D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4 , 2A SG Blowdown , is CLOSED.

D 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED.

D 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 79)

D 11.PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed , Pump 2A, in STOP.

D 12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve , is CLOSED.

D 13. ENSURE MV-09-11 , Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

D 14.PLACE MV-08-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

D 15.lf MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking , AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required , Then CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump to !SOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)

D 16. ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv , is CLOSED.

D 17.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 80) 52

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITL E: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 98of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 18.!f a SGTR is in progress, Then NOTIFY the SM of status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes.

NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete. Local actions may be continued .

D 19. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.

D 8. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.

D C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid .

D D. !f SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then CLOSE V08884 , SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.

D E. !f MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

D a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves :

D V08622 , CB #67 Drain D V08618 , Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619 , Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 1 53

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None Tech Spec Action Statement:

2A AFW pump T.S . 3.7.1.2 Action a.

2A BAM Pump N/A with 2B BAM pump available 2C Charging Pump N/A with 2A and 28 Charging pumps available.

Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Failure/CS Stop/SS lsol N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-48 2C Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Current Status:

Unit 2 at 45% power MOC, Boron 857 ppm 28 Main Feedwater Pump has just been returned to service and started following repair of an oil leak.

Chem istry reports there are no chemistry holds 2-GOP-201 is complete through step 4.8.3.

Raise power to 100% at 3 MWe/min Equipment Problems:

2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak.

2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal.

2C Charg ing pump removed from service to replace plunger seals.

Reactivity Turnover:

-25 gpm dilution due to Xenon building in See RE letter for power ascension guidance 54

Inter-Office Correspondence RE/PSL Trng 15-004 To: SM Date: Today From : R. Eng Department: Reactor Engineering

Subject:

Unit 2 Power Ascension Guidance This letter is issued to provide guidance to the Operations Department for power ascension.

Unit 2 Power Escalation Following 45% to 100% Power

1. Per 2-GOP-101 , "Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady-State and Scheduled Load Changes," Unit 2 fuel is fully pre-conditioned. Reactor power should not be increased at a rate exceeding 18% per hour (3 MW/min).

2. Water/boron requirements for the up-power at 18% per hour are included in this letter. It is estimated that 4,900 gal of water, and 240 gallons of acid during performance of the Nuc Delta T's, will be required to raise power to 100%.

3. 2 charging pumps will be required during the power ascension evolution .

4. ASI will be. maintained within the Sliding ESI scale.

General Considerations

1. A BEACON simulation of the power maneuver provided estimates of the quantity of water to be added. Please note

..._. that this is estimation only and that modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will resu lt in deviations from the prediction. This guidance is NOT to be used as a substitute for operator knowledge, close monitoring of plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur

2. No challenge to the DNB LCO or LHR LSSS is expected .

3. Reactor Engineering will be on site to provide support for the up-power. The on-site Reactor Engineer may modify the above guidance as needed to respond to actual plant conditions.

1;;~eering £ fk_----

E. Neering Reactor Engineering Supervi.sor 55

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners : Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: 10-12 % power, MOC. 2A Charging pump is out of service for repack. 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal Turnover: 10-12% power with the main generator on li ne. 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump is out of service for leaking plunger. MFW and SBCS are in service. Raise power to 30%.

Critical Tasks:

Secure all RCPs prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals .

t~ ~ ~

Start 2B HPSI pump with in 15 minutes of report that the RCS Pressure & Inventory Control Safety Functions are not met (no SI flow).

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R/RO The main generator has just been synchron ized to the grid . Raise power to 30%.

N/BOP, SRO 2 1 TS/SRO CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 (B Channel) fails high . Bypass ESFAS bistable 3 2 CIRO, CEA# 59 Slipped >15 inches (Recoverable).

TS/SRO 4 3 CIRO 2A1 RCP Seal Hx CCW outlet (HCV-14-11A1) fails closed due to TE-31A1 failing high. Requ ires manually overriding signal and opening the valve.

5 4 C/BOP Loss of 2A 1 480V Load center.

6 5 C/BOP 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Drifts low. Manual control of Low Power Feedwater valve (FCV 9005) is required .

7 6 M/All CEA #14 and #1 fa ll into the core. RCO should trip the un it. On the trip, a Pressurizer Safety will open fully and then close back to

...... v: a leak after pressure drops below 1000 psia (LOCA). Loss of 480V MCC 2A6 also occurs on the Rx trip.

8 7 CI RO 2B HPSI pump fails to auto start on SIAS. A manual start is required .

(N)ormal , (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5 The Unit is at 10-12% power. MFW and SBCS are in service. The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid. Directions for the crew are to raise power to approximately 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 .

Shortly after turnover, CIS RM-26-4-2 fails high . The crew must diagnose the problem and bypass the trip signal in accordance with 2-AOP-99-01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation. The SRO will refer to T.S. for the appropriate action statement.

This next event should be put in after PCV-8801 is fully closed and Taveff/Ref are within 1°F of each other. With the up power in progress and while moving CEA's, CEA #59 slips >15 inches. 2-AOP-66.01, Dropped or Misaligned CEA Operations and Realignment should be entered . The crew is required to re-align the CEA to within 7 inches of other CEA's within that group. The SRO should refer to T.S. 3.1.3.1.d for the appropriate actions.

After CEA #59 is recovered , RCP 2A1 seal heat exchanger valve HCV-14-11A1 fails closed due to a failed temperature signal. With HCV-14-11A1 closed, seal temperatures will increase and possible seal failure will occur if prompt actions (within 1O minutes) are not taken to override. Procedural directions allow the valve to be taken to open I reset then back to AUTO if no valid indications of high CCW temperature or CCW activity exist. The valve will stay open in the AUTO position for one minute then close again (the failed temperature signal is still present). Procedure direction also allows the valve to re-opened and left in the open I reset position which maintains the valve open. This direction is based on US discretion. No manual rx trip I rep trip is warranted.

Once HCV-14-11A1 is opened, a loss of the 2A 1 480V load center (Bkr 20110) will occur when the breaker opens. This results in numerous alarms. The running DEH pump will stop (lost power) and the backup DEH pump will not auto start. The BOP should manually start the 2B DEH pump, the 2B Gland exhaust fan and the 2B primary water pump. The 2A 1 LC breaker breaker can be closed when the crew requests the SNPO to investigate. The report back will be the breaker was opened by mistake in preparation to hang a clearance.

After Rx power is above 15% (to ensure both the Rx and Turbine would need to be tripped if the crew couldn't control SG levels) but less than 20%, the 2A SG WR Level instrument, LIC-9012, drifts low causing the BOP to take manual control of LCV 9005. The Main Feedwater AOP should be entered .

After manual control of SG levels is established, or if the crew decides to trip the unit, CEAs #14 and #1 fall into the core. The RO will trip the reactor. Upon the reactor trip, safety valve V1201 will fail open. Also, feeder breaker to MCC 2A6 will trip resulting in the loss of various plant equipment, including ECCS injection valves HCV-3637 & HCV-3627 and the 2B Boric Acid Makeup pump ..

The plant will de pressurize due to the failed Pressurizer Code Safety valve (LOCA) that opens and drops back to a leak at -1000 psia. When SIAS actuates the 2B HPSI fails to start. Due the loss of MCC 2A6, two HPSI "A" side injection valves are without power and closed . HCV-3647 (also "A" train) fails to open and can 't be opened from the RTGB. This results in inadequate ECCS flow from the "A" ECCS train so starting the 2B HPSI pump is required in order to meet safety functions. This is a critical task.

The scenario can be terminated when the operators have stabilized the plant and have "B" train of Safety Injection fully actuated.

Scenario 5 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5 Procedures Used

2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

2-GOP-101, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes

O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control

2-NOP-09.01, Main Feedwater System Operation

2-AOP-09.01 , Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-99 .01 , Loss of Tech Spec Equipment

2-AOP-66 .01 , Dropped or Misaligned CEA Operations and Realignment

2-AOP-47.02A, Loss of Non Safety Related AC Bus - Train A

2-AOP-01.09A1 , 2A1 Reactor Coolant Pump

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident Technical Specifications Entered

T.S. 3.3.2 ESFAS Table 3.3-3, (Event 2)

T.S. 3.1.3.1.d, CEA Position (Event 3)

Scenario 5 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 1 Page 4 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate IC 13, 11 % power, then Open the NRC lesson file and execute HLC 22 NRC Scenario 5 lesson. Verify Main Generator is synched to the grid.

Place Green OLRM status placard and Protected Train B sign on RTGB 203

Ensure 2B and 2C Charging pumps are running and 2A Charging Pump is in STOP

Charging pump selector switch in the 2B/2C position.

Hand out 2-GOP-201 signed off up to step 4.7.9. and R.E. Power Ascension Guidance letter (load rate, up to 18% I hour or 3 MW/Min). Also 2-GOP-101 Ensure Control Board ECO Tags and Green mylar are placed on:

2A BAM Pump RTGB switch (Place CS in Stop)

2A Charging Pump RTGB switch (Place CS in Stop)

N-47: 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop I SS lsol

M-46: 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Indications Available:

Numerous alarms due to power level and status of the secondary.

2-GOP-201 has been completed up to step 4.7 .9. (Generator is approximately 100 MW) Continue with up power. Refer to SRO attached pages 5-6 Control Rx power and ASl lAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 4.1 Refer to attached pages 7-9 When Reactor Power is between 18% and 20%, Then direct the following :

A. Ensure the Turbine Drain valves are closed .

8 . Transfer Station Electrical Loads from the Start Up to Auxiliary Transformers per 2-GOP-502, Attachment 24.

C. Place running Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO REC IRC .

D. Verify the associated Disch Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

E. Ensure appropriate actions for ASI control are taken using O-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control.

F. IF Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150DF, Then close TCV-22-61A & B BYPASS valves Withdraw CEAs in 'Manual Sequential' as directed to raise Rx RO power.

Raise dilution rate for power increase IAW 2-NOP-02.24 step 4.2.15 Refer to attached page 1O Scenario 5 4

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-MODE 2 TO MODE 1 66 of 113 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

NOTE Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 may be referenced for Reactor Protective Instrumentation requirements.

7. IF HI RATE (SUR) trip bistable was removed from service due to Linear Range Safety Channel being out of service AND both of the following conditions are met:

Reactor power is greater than 15%,

HI RATE trip bistable is NOT in TRIP or BYPASS for any other reason THEN RETURN HI RATE trip bistable to NORMAL.

8. IF HI RATE trip bistable was placed in TRIP by removing trip module AND trip module has been reinserted, THEN NOTIFY l&C to perform a functional test per 2-SMl-64.05A(B/C/D), Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Calibration Channel A(B/C/D) .

9. WHEN Reactor power is between 18% and 20%, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE the following Turbine drain valves are CLOSED:

(RTGB-201)

FCV-24-1 00, 2A MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-107, 2C MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-101 , 2B MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-108 , 20 MSR INLET CROSS UNDER

FCV-24-104, HP TURBINE OUTER CASING

FCV-24-103, HP TURBINE INLET LEFT UPPER

FCV-24-105, HP TURBINE INLET RIGHT UPPER

FCV-24-102 , HP TURBINE INLET LEFT LOWER

FCV-24-1 06, HP TURBINE INLET RIGHT LOWER B. PERFORM the Transfer Station Electrical.Loads From Startup to Auxiliary Transformers of 2-GOP-502, Data Sheets Required for Heatup.

5

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

95 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP-PROCEDURE NO.: MODE 2 TO MODE 1 67 of 113 2-GOP-201 ST. LUCIEUNIT 2 INITIAL 4.7 Raising Reactor Power to 45% (continued)

9. (continued)

C. PLACE running Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO RECIRC. (RTGB-202)

D. VERIFY the associated Disch Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

E. ENSURE appropriate actions for ASI control are taken using O-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control.

F. IF Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150°F, THEN PERFORM the following:(display 5559)

CLOSE V12396, 2A LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61A BYPASS. (TGB/47/N-26/E-D)

CLOSE V12403, 2B LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61 B BYPASS. (TGB/45/N-28/W-D)

10. IF Reactor power is greater than 20% AND group 5 is inserted greater than 34 inches, THEN LOG length of time Group 5 was inserted greater than 34 inches:

Time:

11. Prior to exceeding 30% Calorimetric power, VERIFY Secondary Chemistry meets 30% power administrative limits of COP-05.04, Chemistry Department Surveillances and Parameters.

CHEM NOTE Based on JPN Engineering Evaluation, the RE Supervisor, may recommend to Operations that any or all of the 30% Reactor power level surveillances be performed at 45% following power ascension that was NOT a result of a refueling outage.

12. IF required, prior to Reactor power reaching 30%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN PERFORM the following :

(Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 3)

A. STOP power ascension.

8. PERFORM 2-0SP-69.01, Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration. (Section 7.1.3, Management Directive 4) 6

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TIT LE: PAGE: ,.,_.

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 8 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with the following guidelines:

All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied.

The performance of the out of sequence steps do NOT change an operational MODE .

SM/US has given authorization.

4.1 Power Level Escalations

1. MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref during main generator loading as follows :

CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.

Boron concentration changes per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.

NOTE

Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines contains guidance for

power escalation rates.

Reactor Engineering may provide clarification for power escalation rates from Attachment 2, Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines.

2. IF greater than or equal to 50% power OR 30% power during shape annealing factor test, THEN RAISE power as fo llows :

A. USE boration or dilution per 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control for fill planned reactivity additions.

CAUTION Adjusting CEAs for ASI impacts Reactivity B. USE CEAs for ASI control per O-NOP-100.02 , Axial Shape Index Control.

3. IF available, THEN ENSURE two Charg ing Pumps are operating per 2-NOP-02 .02, Charging and Letdown .

7

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: '

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES.DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 9 of 20 (

PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2

=~

~I **

-~: I.-~~~:*,! 1 4.1 Power Level Escalations (continued) . '**

4. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 1, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines .

5. CONTINUE to load Main Generator per 2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

8

~-

,--~~.-----~~~~~~~~~~/

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

J

14 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 20 of 20 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Fuel Preconditioning Guidelines (Page 4 of 4)

NOTE Components of fully conditioned fuel:

Fuel is conditioned to equal to or greater than 90% power.

The core is NOT experiencing a difference greater than plus or minus 0.5 RPS ASI units from the cycle predicted ASI.

3.0 FULLY CONDITIONED FUEL

1. !F performing a mid cycle shutdown or power reduction AND a return to full power occurs within 27 days, THEN RAISE power at a maximum power escalation rate of 30% I hour.

9

REVISION NO.: PROCE DURE TITLE: PAGE:

31 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.:

ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 2-NOP-02 .24 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)

NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26, DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW

14. ADJUST FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2, Step 4. DDD D

IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN , THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 XN Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow. DODD

15. IF perform ing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DD DD

16. MAINTAIN PIA-2223 , (VCT) PRESSURE ::;30 psig by opening and closing V2513 , (VCT) VENT VALVE. DD DD

17. IF diverting to maintain VCT level , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in the WMS position . DD D D B. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates OPEN . DD DD C. When normal level on LIC-2226, (VCT) LEVEL, is reached ,

THEN PLACE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , in AUTO . DD DD D. ENSURE V2500 , (VCT) DIVERT VALVE , indicates CLOSED. DD DD

18. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added, THEN CLOSE FCV-221 OX, REACTOR MAKEUP. DD D D

19. IF V2512 , REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened ,

THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED. DD D D

20. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE , was opened , THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED. D DD D

21. ENSURE FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM . D DD D

22. MONITOR for any abnormal change in Tavg. (RTGB-203) ODD O 10

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 1 Page 5 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time I Position I Aoolicant' s Actions or Behavior EXAMINER'S NOTE: Power should be raised initially by CEA's. Group 5 CEA's should be withdrawn to at least 102" prior to 20% power to meet LTSSIL Booth Operator Instructions: '

Report back that V12396 and V12403 are closed when directed to perform '*

step 4.7.9.F.

Ensure appropriate actions for ASI Control are taken using 0-RO NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control I Raise Turbine load using 2-NOP-99.07 Attachment 3, Turbine BOP Adjustment Program DEH for power increase at a rate not to exceed 3.0 MW/MIN Refer to attached page 12-14 Perform step 4.7.9.B Transfer Station Electrical Loads from the Start Up to Auxiliary Transformers per 2-GOP-502, Attachment 24. Refer to attached pages 15-16

'- -- /

Place the running Main Feed Pump control switch in AUTO RO RECIRC . (RTGB-202)

Verify the associated Disch Recirc Valve is CLOSED.

IF Exhaust Hood temperatures are less than 150°F, (display 5559) Direct the NPO to:

BOP

CLOSE V12396 , 2A LP TURB SPRAY HOR TCV-22-61A BYPASS . (TGB/47/N-26/E-D)

~--*

{/ .

CLOSE V12403, 2B LP TURB SPRAY HOR

.( ,.,.-- -.. TCV-22-61 B BYPASS. (TGB/45/N-28/W-D)

("' )

..... ~/

IF Reactor power is greater than 20% AND group 5 is inserted

\Y, SRO greater than 34 inches, Then log length of time Group 5 was inserted greater than 34 inches: THIS STEP IS NIA. See Examiner's Note on this page.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Proceed to Event 2 after the up power has been started and a power change has been observed. The next step in the procedure (step 4.7.11) is the 30% calorimetric power hold to verify secondary chemistry is within administrative limits.

Scenario 5 11

( 'v REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE T ITLE : PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 10 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-201. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.

Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Monitoring appropriate critical parameters to recognize , monitor, and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant response and system performance ensures proper control of the plant. The SM/US shall be notified of any abnormal indications.

Reactor Power

MW (Load)

CEA POSITION

DCS Power

RCS Temp

Pzr Level

ASI

1. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.

3. ADJUST values , as directed by SM/US , for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)

TARGET SELECT

RATE SELECT

4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)

TARGET

RATE

5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551) 12

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 24 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on Ovation main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL. (display 5551)

7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:

A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.

(display 5551)

B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended , THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:

(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.

(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)

a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.

c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")

from CLOSE INTERFACE group.

C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.

8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following :

Reactivity rate

Turbine load rate 13

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE T ITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UN IT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)

9. IF desired to stop load change , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Ovation display 5551 , TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM - OPERATION PANEL, is open .

B. TOUCH HOL D from RAMP INTERFACE group.

C. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.

14

/

I~

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

81 DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP 144 of 149 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 24 Transferring Station Electrical Loads from Startup to Auxiliary Transformers (Page 1 of 2)

Date __/__/__

NOTE Attachment 24 , Step 1 through Attachment 24, Step 9 should be performed one bus at a time .

1. INSERT synchroscope plug into the receptacle for the bus to be transferred .

2. ROTATE the synchroscope switch to the AT position per Table 8.

Table 8 BUS to be Synchroscope Breaker to Breaker to Transferred Switch Position CLOSE OPEN 6.9 KV AT-2A1 2-30101 2-30102 BUS 2A1 4.16 KV AT-2A2 2-20101 2-20102 BUS 2A2 6.9 KV AT-2B1 2-30201 2-30202 BUS 2B1 4.16 KV AT-2B2 2-20301 2-20302 BUS 2B2

3. VERIFY SYN-888 , SYNCHROSCOPE, is stationary at the 12 o'clock position .

4. VERIFY the following are matched :

VM-8881 , INCOMING VOLT

VM-888R , RUNNING VOLT

5. TURN and HOLD AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER feeder breaker switch per Table 8, to the CLOSE position.

6. VERIFY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER feeder breaker is CLOSED.

15

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

81 DATA SHEETS REQUIRED FOR HEATUP 145of149 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-GOP-502 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 24 Transferring Station Electrical Loads from Startup to Auxiliary Transformers (Page 2 of 2)

7. Simultaneously PERFORM the following :

Slowly RELEASE the AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER feeder breaker switch .

VERIFY associated STARTUP TRANSFORMER feeder breaker, OPENS automatically per Table 8.

8. ROTATE associated STARTUP TRANSFORMER breaker control switch, per Table 8, to TRIP (green flag) .

9. REMOVE the synchroscope plug.

10. REPEAT Attachment 24, Step 1 through Attachment 24, Step 9 for the remaining buses listed on Table 8.

16

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 2 Page 6 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CIS RM RIS-26-4-2 fails high Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 2: CIS Rad Mon RIS 4-2 Fails High Control Room Indications:

Channel B Containment Radition instrument failed high '>~.

Annunciators:

P CNTMT Rad High CIS Channel Trip

P CNTMT Rad High CIS Channel Pre Trip

Q Engineered Safeguards ATI Fault

Containment evacuation alarm Direct actions IAW 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation section 4.2.15.

Refer to TS 3.3.2 Action b. (Table 3.3-3) Action 13 and 14.

TS SRO With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN May enter 2-AOP-26.02, "Area Radiation Monitors" (including SRO Appendix A) , to verify validity of the alarm.

RO/BOP Plant announces disregard invalid alarm

/

Contacts Shift Manager to report failure of RM RIS-26-4-2, and SRO entry into 2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation.

....... RO Recognize Channel B ESFAS CIS rad monitor failed high Verify PC-11 channel indications and that only one channel is

\ I in alarm .

BOP Make plant announcement to disregard Cont. Evac alarm When directed Bypass ESFAS channel MB instrument RIS 4-2 (Key 130)

Scenario 5 17

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 3 Page 7 of 21 NRC Event Description : Slipped CEA #59 >15 inches Time I Pos ition I Ao olicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 3: CEA #59 Slips >15 inches Booth Operator Response: When l/C called to .determine cause of abnormal '~~

condition wait five minutes and call back, 'a loose card was reseated' and CEA ..

~

problem should be corrected.

If RE called, report no limitations on recovering CEA If upper management called, report CEA retrieval should be attempted.

Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator K-11 CEA Motion Inhibit, K-30 deviation, ADS display.

SRO/RO Recognize CEA # 59 slipped > 15" (not dropped)

SRO Direct RO to secure dilution if initiated.

Recognize T.S . 3.1.3.1 Action d, realign within 7" of other SRO T.S.

CEA'swithin COLR fig. 3.1-1a (attached pages 19-20)

Direct Immediate Operator actions IAW 2-AOP-66.01 , 'Dropped or Misaligned CEA Abnormal Operations':

Direct RO to place CEDMCS control panel in off.

SRO

Verify all CEA motion has stopped

Verify No dropped CEA's:

- 1....

0 Rod bottom lights 0 ADS Display CRT 0 DCS screen Implement 2-AOP-66.01 , "Dropped or Misaligned CEA

(

Abnormal Operations", subsequent operator actions step 4.2.1

(', ')'j through 4.2.6

~/

\ Step 4.2.6.2, Direct Attachment 4, Maj or Misalignment step 1

\I and 2

" Direct step 3 of Attachment 4, Perform Attachment 6, CEA functional test and operability determination Direct Attachment 4 to re-align CEA to with in 7" of other CEA's W ithin group.

Scenario 5 18

l ~

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES CEA POSITION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 The CEA Block Circuit and all full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7.0 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With the CEA Block Circuit inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months either:

1. With one CEA position indicator per group inoperable take action per Specification 3.1 .3.2, or

2. With the group overlap and/or sequencing interlocks inoperable maintain CEA groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 fully withdrawn and the CEAs in group 5 to less than 15%

insertion and place and maintain the CEA drive system in either the "Manual" or "Off' position , or

3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY.

c. With more than one full-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches (indicated position}, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d. With one full-length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue , provided that the misaligned CEA is positioned within 15 inches of the other CEAs in its group in accordance with the time constraints shown in COLR Figure 3.1-1 a.

See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2, 3.10.4 and 3.10.5.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 8 Ame ndment No. 8, 92 19

EC-DCP No. 280247. Rev. 2 Att<1chment 13, P<1ge 8of18 1.62 1.60 1.58 LL

'"O 1.56 Q) c

.Q>

ro 1.54

.!:a

~I Q)

'- 1.52 a..

'"O Q)

J 1.50

(/)

ro Q)

~ 1.48 1.46 1.44 1.42 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 Time at Full Power to Realign CEA, Minutes FIGURE 3.1-1a Allowable Time to Realign CEA vs . Initial F/

St. Lucie Unit 2 Cycle 21 COLR Rev. 1 P<1ge 8of18 20

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 3 Page 8 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Slipped CEA #59 >15 inches Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior RO Secure dilution when directed Perform immediate Operator actions:

Place CEDMCS control panel in off.

Verify all CEA motion has stopped

Verify No dropped CEA's:

o Rod bottom lights o ADS Display CRT o DCS screen Perform subsequent operator actions step 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 as directed. Refer to attached pages 22-24 Perform attachment 4 as directed. Refer to attached pages 25-28 Perform step 3 of attachment 4, Perform Attachment 6, CEA functional test and operability determination as directed Refer to attached pages 29-31 Re-align CEA as per attachment 4 step 7 and 8 as directed while maintaining power level recorded in section 4.2. Refer to attached pages 27-28 EXAMINER'S NOTE: While CEA 59 is being re-aligned, proceed with event 4.

Event 4 must be triggered with the unit less than 20% power Scenario 5 21

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions

1. MAINTAIN T-avg -T-ref deviation by adjusting turbine load or RCS boron concentration to meet the following conditions:

Stable

Less than or equal to +/-2°F D 2. NOTIFY the following personnel of time and nature of abnormal event:

Reactor Engineering

l&C D 3. VERIFY NO dropped or slipped CEAs have been retrieved within 3.1 CONSULT with upper management to determine the the past 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . following :

Should CEA retrieval be attempted?

Should power operation be continued?

22

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 10 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 4. RECORD the following data :

Event initiation time :

Stable ti T power level established after event:

D 5. VERIFY NO dropped CEAs: 5.1 IF CEA DROPPED with reactor critical , THEN PERFORM

All rod bottom lights OFF Attachment 2, Dropped CEA Recovery With Reactor Critical

ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY 5.2 IF CEA(s) dropped with reactor subcritical , THEN PERFORM

Pulse Count Displays Attachment 3, Dropped CEA Recovery With Reactor Subcritical.

23

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 11 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 6. VERIFY NO misaligned CEAs: 6.1 IF 2-PTP-81 , Reload Startup Physics Testing , is in progress ,

ADS FLAT PANEL THEN REFER TO that procedure DISPLAY for alignment actions.

Pulse Count Displays 6.2 IF major misalignment is indicated AND reactor is critical , THEN PERFORM Attachment 4, Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (2:15 inches).

6.3 IF major misalignment is indicated AND reactor is subcritical, THEN PERFORM Attachment 5, Other Misalignments.

6.4 IF ONLY minor misalignments are indicated, THEN PERFORM Attachment 5, Other Misalignments.

D 7. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met. 7.1 IF additional misaligned or dropped CEAs need alignment or recovery, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.2 Step 3.

24

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE :

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 20 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AO P-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)

(Page 1 of 4)

1. VERIFY the following :

CEDMCS MODE SELECT switch is in OFF.

T-avg - T-ref deviation is stable AND less than or equal to +/-2°F.

CEA motion inhibit exists.

2. RECORD and MAINTAIN b.T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4.

Power level to maintain: _ _ _ __ _ _ %

3. PERFORM Attachment 6, CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination.

4. IF at any time a dropped CEA occurs during performance of this attachment, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.1 Step 1.

NOTE Tech Specs allow a maximum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to realign CEAs . The COLR times are variable based on F,T . The use of the most conservative value is to used in determining the allowed time.

5. DETERMINE allowable amount of time to restore CEA to within 7.0 inches of all other CEAs in its group, as follows :

A. OBTAIN most recent F,T value from Plant Physics Curve Book Figure C.3.

B. Using most recent F,T value and COLR Figure 3.1-1 a or 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , DETERMINE allowable time to align CEA to its group.

Allowable time : - - - - - minutes 25

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 21 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (2:15 inches)

(Page 2 of 4)

NOTE

Tech Spec Bases B 3/4 .1.3 requires a prompt realignment of the ' I>,

misaligned CEA. Therefore , it is expected that Attachment 4 Step 6 *,_

through Attachment 4 Step 8 will be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following expiration of the time allowed by Tech Specs COLR Figure 3.1-1 a in order to be in full compliance with Tech Spec 3.1.3.1.

. Tech Spec basis require a downpower if the allowed time is exceeded .

Once started this downpower must continue at the maximum rate permitted by plant conditions , NOT to exceed 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

6. IF ~T power is greater than 70%, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. IF at any time either of the following conditions is met:

It is expected that CEA can NOT be aligned to within 7 .0 inches of all other CEAs in its group within allowable time.

Allowable time elapses before misaligned CEA can be aligned with its group.

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) SUSPEND misaligned CEA alignment actions.

(2) PLACE CEOMCS MODE SELECT switch in OFF.

(3) REDUCE ~ T power to less than or equal to 70% rated thermal power per 2-AOP-22.01 , Rapid Downpower.

(4) WHEN ~T power is stable AND less than or equal to 70% rated thermal power, THEN RESUME alignment actions by continuing to Attachment 4 Step 7.

26

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 22 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)

(Page 3 of 4)

NOTE

In MODES 1 and 2, Tech Specs requires the affected CEA to be aligned within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

L-33, START-UP RATE HIGH CHANNEL PRE TRIP, will alarm at greater than or equal to 1.3 DPM .

7. PREPARE to align CEA as follows :

A. NOTIFY Reactor Engineering of the following information as it relates to this alignment:

Current power level:

Any other CEAs to be moved:

B. OBSERVE the following limitations while aligning CEA(s):

WITHDRAW regulating CEAs in normal sequence.

MAINTAIN overlap between regulating groups within 54 inches.

DO NOT EXCEED sustained SUR of 1.3 DPM .

IF deviation between CEAs in any group approaches 3 inches, THEN STOP group motion and ALIGN CEAs.

27

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 23 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (;::15 inches)

(Page 4 of 4)

8. ALIGN affected CEA as follows:

A. MAINTAIN t:i.T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4 and T-avg and T-ref matched within +/-2°F as follows:

(1) IF affected CEA is to be withdrawn to its group, THEN BORATE RCS as needed while withdrawing CEA.

(2) IF affected CEA is to be inserted to its group, THEN REDUCE turbine load as needed while inserting CEA B. NAVIGATE to the affected CEA on the ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY for CEA position indication during CEA recovery .

C. On MODE SELECT switch, SELECT Ml (manual individual).

D. On INDIVIDUAL CEA SELECTION panel, SELECT affected CEA.

E. On GROUP SELECT switch, SELECT affected group.

F. IF CEA motion inhibit is present, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:

(1) PRESS and HOLD CMI BYPASS pushbutton.

(2) PRESS and RELEASE BYPASS ENABLE pushbutton .

G. ALIGN affected CEA to its group as closely as possible.

H. IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

I. VERIFY fill CEAs in group aligned within 7.0 inches of each other using ADS and DCS .

J. ENSURE group positions are adjusted for proper sequencing using MANUAL GROUP mode.

K. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF.

L. RETURN TO Section 4.2 Step 7.

28

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 28 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 FUNCTIONAL TEST NOTE Per OPS-503, Technical Specifications Guidance, between required surveillance requirement performances, if a CEA is immovable but trippable, then the CEA is considered to be OPERABLE.

1. MAINTAIN ~T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4 or 70% , whichever limit is in effect.

2. IF cause of abnormal condition is known , THEN VERIFY problem has been corrected .

3. DETERMINE if affected CEA can be moved as follows :

A. NAVIGATE to the affected CEA on the ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY for CEA position indication during CEA recovery .

8. On MODE SELECT switch , SELECT Ml (manual individual).

C. On INDIVIDUAL CEA SELECTION panel, SELECT affected CEA.

D. On GROUP SELECT switch , SELECT affected group.

E. IF CEA motion inhibit is present, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:

(1) PRESS and HOLD CMI BYPASS pushbutton.

(2) PRESS and RELEASE BYPASS ENABLE pushbutton .

F. IF affected CEA was dropped, THEN EXERCISE CEA as follows:

(1) DO NOT EXCEED 10 inches withdrawn without US permission.

(2) WITHDRAW affected CEA until positive indication of movement is verified by observing CEA on ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY.

(3) IF CEA will NOT move, THEN PERFORM the following :

a. IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.

b. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF.

29

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 29 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 2 of 5) 1.0 FUNCTIONAL TEST (continued)

3. F. (3) (continued)

c. GO TO Attachment 6 Section 2.0 Step 1.

(4) VERIFY rod bottom and LEL lights are OFF.

(5) INSERT affected CEA to LEL or rod bottom light, whichever occurs first, while checking for normal operation and indications.

(6) VERIFY rod bottom or LEL light is ON , as applicable.

(7) IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.

(8) IF CEA moved freely in both directions, THEN CONSIDER CEA functional and OPERABLE and RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.

G. IF affected CEA was misaligned AND NOT dropped , THEN EXERCISE CEA as follows :

(1) DO NOT EXCEED +/-10 inches CEA movement from original misaligned position without US permission.

(2) NOTE CEA initial position and INSERT affected CEA until positive indication of movement is verified by observing the CEA on ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY.

(3) IF CEA will NOT move, THEN PERFORM the following :

a. IF held pressed , THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

b. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF.

c. GO TO Attachment 6 Section 2.0 Step 1.

(4) WITHDRAW affected CEA to its position just prior to insertion.

(5) IF held pressed, THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton .

(6) IF CEA moved freely in both directions, THEN CONSIDER affected CEA functional and OPERABLE and RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.

30

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 30 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 3 of 5) 2.0 OPERABILITY DETERMINATION

1. DETERMINE OPERABILITY for immovable CEA as follows:

A. IF CEA is dropped , THEN CONSIDER CEA trippable and OPERABLE.

B. IF CEA is misaligned, THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) REQUEST l&C and Engineering to determine if CEA is trippable.

(2) IF l&C requests additional troubleshooting of inoperable CEA, THEN concurrently PERFORM Attachment 6 Section 3.0 while continuing with next step.

(3) IF CEA is determined to be trippable , THEN CONSIDER CEA to be OPERABLE.

(4) IF CEA is determined to be NOT trippable, THEN DECLARE CEA to be inoperable.

C. PERFORM applicable actions per Attachment 7, Tech Specs Related to CEA Abnormal Operations.

D. RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.

31

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 4 Page 9 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

2A 1 RCP Seal Cooler Outlet valve HCV 11A1 Closes Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger Event 4: 2A1 RCP Seal HX CCW Outlet Closes on Hi Temp Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator J-25 2A1 RCP Seal Trouble, cooling Wtr Flow Low I"*.

Examiners note: When HCV is taken back to AUTO from OPEN RESET, after a short time delay the HCV will re-close.

Acknowledge annunciator. Recognize and communicate HCV-RO 14-11A1 is closed.

Monitors 2A 1 RCP seal temperatures I. . ,__ '.><

Implement 2-AOP-01 .09A 1, '2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump' step SRO 4.2.7.

Direct BOP to determine if increase CCW activity rising trend is indicated.

When no activity indicated direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset and verify open indication . Step 4.2.7.1.2 When HCV re-closes direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset and leave the control switch to Open. Step 4.2.7.1.2 When directed, place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and back RO to AUTO. Refer to attached pages 33-34 When directed, place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and leave in that position .

\ ,,

I BOP Observe RC-26-1 and RC-26-2 CCW radiation and determine no activity increase.

\/

'v Scenario 5 32

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TIT LE: PAGE:

2 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 31 of 60 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-01 .09A 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature NOTE

Valve HCV-14-11A1 , SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, closes on high seal cooler outlet temperature (200°F) and fails open on loss of instrument air or loss of power.

Maintaining HCV-14-11A1 control switch in OPEN overrides the automatic closure function on seal cooler outlet high temperature.

If a high temperature condition exists upon release of the control switch, there is a 1 minute time delay before closure of valve .

CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage when the control switch is maintained in OPEN .

Consideration should be given to returning the control switch to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.

CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow to the RCP coolers can result in thermal stress and flashing in the heat exchanger upon re-admittance of cooling water flow.

D 1. NAVIGATE to 2A1 PUMP DETAILS and 1.1 IF CCW activity rising trend is indicated on RR-26-1/2 , RAD VERIFY HCV-14-11A1 SEAL I MONITORING PANEL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, RECORDERS ,

OPEN . THEN PLACE HCV-14-11A1 ,

SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, control switch in CLOSED.

1.2 IF CCW activity rising trend is NOT indicated, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE HCV-14-11A1 ,

SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VAL VE control switch to OPEN RESET and VERIFY OPEN indication.

33

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

2 2A1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 32 of 60 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01.09A1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature (continued)

1. (continued)

B. EVALUATE placing control switch in AUTO .

C. IF valve re-closes after returning control switch to AUTO, THEN OBTAIN US permission prior to re-opening.

D 2. IF fill of the following conditions 2.1 PERFORM the following :

are satisfied within 1O minutes, A. IF CEA TCBs are OPEN ,

CCW RESTORED THEN STOP 2A1 RCP .

CBO temperature less than B. IF CEA TCBs are 250°F CLOSED,

Lower Seal Cavity THEN PERFORM the temperature less than 250°F following:

THEN GO TO (1) TRIP reactor.

Section 4.2.1, Step 5.

(2) STOP 2A1 RCP .

(3) IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions.

D 3. RESTORE CCW to 2A 1 RCP within 30 minutes.

3.1 GO TO Section 4.2.12.

D 4. GO TO Section 4.2.1, Step 4.

34

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 10 of 21 NRC Event Description : Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, Trigger Event 5: Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center.

Booth Operator Instructions: When field Operator is requested to investigate, report the SNPO was hanging a clearance which was intended for the other Unit. ', ......

Breaker 2-20110 was opened inadvertently.

Booth Operator Instructions: Start 2B Closed blowdown cooling water pump when directed.

When asked, report back Main Transformer cooling is operating.

Recommend triggering next event when breakers 2-20110 and 2-40103 have been closed.

Indications Available: Numerous alarms. Running DEH pump trips and backup DEH pump does not start. Running Gland exhaust fan stops, running Primary water pump stops and back up Primary Water pump did not auto start Report numerous electrical alarms and Breakers 2-2011 O and BOP 2-40103 2A 1 480V Load Center breakers are open.

Recognize and communicate no DEH pumps running . Request to start the 2B DEH pump.

Place Turbine up-power on HOLD when directed When directed call SNPO to investigate breakers 2-20110 and 2-40103.

<;: When directed call NPO to ensure Main Transformer cooling is operating .

'\

Verifies 2B lsophase Bus cooler is running 1"-.. . . SRO Direct up-power to be placed on hold.

\ ..... Implement 2-AOP-47.02A Loss of Non-Safety Related AC Bus

\, - Train A Step 4.2.3 Direct that an attempt is made to close breakers2-20110 and 2-40103 Scenario 5 35

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 11 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior When directed, start 28 DEH pump, 28 Gland Exhaust Fan, 28 BOP Primary water pump.

When directed perform step 4.2.3.15 and close Bkr 2-2011 O "

and close breaker 2-40103 2A 1 480V Load Center. Refer to attached page 37 ~ .

~ ~*J>

(t "~~" *?

'"';(* <""'

Scenario 5 36

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

4 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS - TRAIN A 15 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)

D 15. WHEN determined power may be restored to 480V LC 2A 1, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY Bkr 2-20110, A.1 CLOSE Bkr 2-20110, STATION STATION SERVICE SERVICE TRANSFORMER 2A 1.

TRANSFORMER 2A 1, is CLOSED. (RTGB-201)

B. ENSURE Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER, is green flagged .

(RTGB-201)

C. CLOSE Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER.

(RTGB-201)

D. IF charging and letdown needs to be restored ,

THEN ESTABLISH charging and letdown per 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.

D 16. RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 4.

37

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 6 Page 12 of 21 NRC Event Description : LT-9012 , 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Fails Low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Event 6: A SG WR LT-9012 Drifts Low.

Ensure reactor power is less than 20% _\,,

Indications available:

"A" SG feedwater controller output rising

"A" SG level rising Annunciator G-1, "2A SG Level Hi/Lo" DCS Display will show LT-9012 lowering

Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-AOP-09.01 SRO 'Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation' Step 4.2.2.6.B Notifies shift manager and l&C of event Direct up power stopped --

v

'\

RO Recognize "A" SG level indication slowly rising Place Low Power FRV LCV-9005 controller to manual to restore and maintain SG levels to 60-70%. Refer to attached pages 39-42 Evaluator Note: The wide range level control input is the anticipatory (feed forward) signal when feedwater control is in the low power mode. With LT 9012 drifting low, it influences actual level to rise with the NR inputs operating normally. L T-9012 eventually fails off-scale low and holds last good value (2 minute old value).

\,~ )_,,/

v"I

\,/

Scenario 5 38

REV ISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation log ic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

1. VERIFY SIG levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable. malfunctioning ,

THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE SIG levels to 60% to 70% NR.

CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high SIG level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent SIG overfill.

2. VERIFY SIG levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.

than 50% NR.

2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open, THEN CLOSE it.

2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions 39

REVISION NO.: PROC EDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 8 of 64 PROC EDURE NO .:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions D 1. PERFORM applicable section or attachment per Table 1.

Table 1 ;

Abnormal Condition I '*". Section SIG level , feed flow, or steam flow anomalies HPFRV supply air pressure low C,

.... ,., Section 4.2.2 Section 4.2.3 MFIV accumulator nitrogen pressure abnormal conditions Section 4.2.4 Transfer of feedwater control from HPFRV 2A to the bypass valves Attachment 2 Transfer of feedwater control from HPFRV 28 to the bypass valves Attachment 3 Transfer of feedwater control from bypass valves to HPFRV 2A Attachment 4 Transfer of feedwater control from bypass valves to HPFRV 28 Attachment 5 Valve testing of HPFRV 2A, FCV-9011 -~

Attachment 6 Valve testing of HPFRV 28, FCV-9021 Attachment 7 Valve testing of LPFRV 2A, LCV-9005 Attachment 8 Valve testing of LPFRV 28, LCV-9006 Attachment 9 D 2. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met. 2.1 RETURN TO Section 4.2.1, Step 1.

D 3. EXIT this procedure.

40

~/'

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9of64 PROCED URE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 S/G Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies

1. PERFORM applicable step(s) in any order per Table 2.

Table 2 Level or Feedwater Control Malfunctions

,~' ~

Suspected Malfunction Step '

HPFRV Section 4.2.2, Step 2 MFW pump recirculation valve Section 4.2.2, Step 3 FCV-12-1 , Condensate Hdr Recirc To Cndsr Section 4.2.2, Step 4 DCS FW inputs Section 4.2.2, Step 5 LPFRV Section 4.2.2, Step 6 NOTE The HPFRV and its associated LPFRV have flow-compensation log ic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in an attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.

D 2. VERIFY HPFRV controllers are controlling SIG levels in normal 2.1 ENSURE affected LOW PWR MIA STA is in A (auto) .

band :

2.2 PLACE affected HIGH PWR MIA FIC-9011 , SIG 2A FLOW STA in M (manual) .

CNTL (HPFRV 2A) 2.3 CLOSE affected HPFRV using FIC-9021 , SIG 28 FLOW HIGH PWR MIA STA until LPFRV CNTL (HPFRV 28) is 20% to 50% open.

2.4 MAINTAIN SIG level in normal band .

2.5 MAINTAIN LPFRV between 20%

to 50% open by adjusting HPFRV as required .

41

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE T ITLE: PAGE:

7 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 15 of 64 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 SIG Level, Feed Flow, or Steam Flow Anomalies (continued)

6. A. (continued)

(3) CLOSE affected LPFRV.

B. IF reactor power is less than 20%,

THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) IF associated (1).1 PLACE associated HPFRV HIGH HPFRV is OPEN, PWR MIA STA in A (auto).

THEN VERIFY associated HPFRV HIGH PWR MIA STA in A (auto) .

(2) IF associated (2).1 PLACE associated HPFRV HIGH HPFRV is CLOSED, PWR MIA STA in M (manual).

THEN VERIFY associated HPFRV HIGH PWR MIA STA in M (manual).

(3) CONTROL SIG level at setpoint using affected LOW PWR MIA STA in M.

D 7. RETURN TO Section 4.2.1, Step 1.

42

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 7&8 Page 13 of 21 NRC Event Description : CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger Event 7: Two CEAs Drop Safety Opens '\'

Examiners Note: As CEA #59 is being re-aligned, CEA 14 & 1 will drop which '!'""

should result in a manual reactor trip. At that time, V1201 lifts full open which results in a Loss of Coolant accident. 480V MCC 2A6 de-energizes on trip.

EXAMINERS NOTE: V1201 will reseat when RCS pressure is -1000 psia.

Control Room Indications Available: Lowering RCS pressure, increasing Containment pressure. Acoustic monitor led indication on V1201.

Booth Operator Response: Respond as NPO to perform Appendix X. 10 minutes later call Appendix X complete.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:

SRO

RO : Reactivity control , Inventory Control, Pressure control , Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries , RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.

SRO On SIAS recognize 28 HPSI does not start. Direct starting of CRITICAL 28 HPSI and attempt to open HCV-3647.

TASK SRO CRITICAL Direct stopping ALL RCP's TASK Start 2B HPSI pump and attempt to open HCV-3647.

BOP/RO Communicate to SRO 2B HPSI pump started but HCV-3646

\ I failed to open.

I Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of BOP EOP-99.

Verify Spent Fuel Pool inventory and temperature ar normal on all available indications Scenario 5 43

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 14 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: The SNPO could be dispatched to open de-energized HPSI valves in the field if directed but ONLY AFTER the 28 HPSI pp has been manually started from the RTGB. ' ~

Control Room Indications Available: '~~ \_

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries ~ ~

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed

Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)

BOP

Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B 1, 2B2 and 2B3 6. 9 and 4.1 6kv buses) 0 Recognize MCC 2A6 de-energized Evaluator's Note: On SIAS, HCV-3627 and HCV-3637 are de-energized due to the loss of MCC 2A6. HCV-3647 has power but failed to open on SIAS. If attempted, HCV-3647 will not open from the control room.

Scenario 5 44

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 15 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following o SG level is between 20 and 83% NR o Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F o <525°F ensure ADV's valves restoring Tave BOP

S/G pressure is between 835 and 915 psig o ADV's in auto set to 900 psia.

o IF SG pressure <735 psig close MSIV's

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed. (closed prior to trip)

MSR warmup valves are closed . (closed prior to trip)

If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 S illover b ass valve is CLOSED Scenario 5 45

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 7&8 Page 16 of 21 NRC Event Description : CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs . V1200 lifts. 2B HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Conditions

Verify containment pressure <2 psig

Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm BOP

Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F

Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Recognize there are no secondary plant radiation alarms, all other Containment Conditions are in *eo ard RO/BOP CRITICAL Start 2B HPSI pump on SIAS TASK When directed, attempt to open HCV-3647 (valve won't open RO/BOP from RTGB or locally)

RO Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control , Core Heat removal Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering.

Verify startup rate is negative.

Verif ALL CEA's are full inserted.

Inventory Control

Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%

nize Pzr level is not trendin within the % level band Scenario 5 46

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 7&8 Page 17 of 21 NRG Event

Description:

CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fa ils to open on SIAS Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Pressure Control

Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia *.

Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia "'"

RO

Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F .'

0 Recognize RCS subcooling <20°F 0 RCS Pressure is not trending in the pressure band -

Core Heat Removal

Verify at least one RCP running with CCW (if SIAS identified CCW isolated)

Verify loop delta T is <10° F ' .......:

\I Evaluator Note: The 2 HPSI valves without power have the ability to be opened locally. The SNPO could be dispatched to perform this operation if directed but ONLY AFTER the 28 HPSI has been manually started from the RTGB.

,,.._ /

RO \'

CRITICAL Stop ALL RCP's TASK

,.. .... (

Scenario 5 47

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 18 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Exit EOP-01 and Implement 2-EOP-03, "Loss of Coolant SRO Accident" (attached page 37-48)

I~

Directs STA to perform SFSC's " - ((A,

Contact SM to classify the event ' ~

Direct implementation of Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's (attached page 49,50)

Ensure SIAS flow adequate per Figure 2 SI flow Vs .

RCS pressure.(attached page 51)

Within 30 minutes of SIAS ensure CCW to RCP's remains SRO isolated by directing :

Placing four CCW valves to/from RCP's to close

Ensure RCP bleedoff remains isolated by placing two RCP bleedoff valves to close Ensure Both of the following :

CIAS actuated

MSIS actuated (if Containment pressure setpoint met)

Evaluator Note: V1200 will reseat around 1000 psia.

Scenario 5 48

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 5 Event# 7&8 Page 19 of 21 NRC Event

Description:

CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicanl's Actions or Behavior Ensure Containment HVAC SRO

At least one train SBVS

At least one train Containment fan coolers '

Ensure Containment spray if Containment pressure >5.4 psig: '

CSAS actuated

Flow > 2700 QPm each header Direct RCS cooldown not to exceed 50°F in any one hour period using ADV's. (cooldown up to 100°F in any one hour period to maintain or regain subcooling)

Direct HPSI throttling when throttling criteria met:

HPSI pumps are operating , and ALL of the following conditions are satisfied ,

RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling

Pressurizer level is at least 30% and NOT lowering

At least ONE S/G is available for RCS heat removal with level being restored to or maintained between 60 and 70% NR

Rx Vessel level indicates sensors 4 through 8 are covered or NO abnormal differences (greater than 20°F) between THOT and Rep GET temperature e

Scenario 5 49

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 5 Event# 7&8 Page 20 of 21 NRC Event Description : CEAs 14 & 1 drop and Loss of 2A6 MCC occurs. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI pump fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open on SIAS Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Direct manual start of AFW system . (Due to the low power ......

level , the AFAS setpoint might not be reached) . This will be SRO required to meet the Safety Function of RCS heat removal when SG levels lower to <60% NR.)

.\, ~

. ~*-."'~

BOP Verifies Figure 2 SI flow Vs . RCS pressure . .'.... "'

Initiate AFW flow when directed. Refer to 2-NOP-09.02 ,

Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation or use 2-NOP-97.01 Operations Hard Card and throttle AFW to 150 gpm for 5 minutes.

Places four CCW valves to/from RCP's to close when directed and places two RCP bleedoff valves to close when directed Verifies one train SBVS and one train Containment fan coolers Initiates cooldown using ADV's not to exceed 50°F in any one RO hour period to meet Figure 1A. (cooldown up to 100°F in any one hour period to maintain or regain subcooling)

Suggested termination point:

{'\.

.,,\I * "B" train of Safety Injection fully actuated ..

'i

\

~r Scenario 5 50

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: B Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None Tech Spec Action Statement:

2A Charging Pump - None with 2B and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps operable.

2A BAM Pump - None with 2B BAM pump operable Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Current Status:

Unit 2 at-11% power MOC, Boron 1326 ppm.

The Generator has just been synchronized to the grid.

All turbine testing is completed SAT.

2-GOP-201 is complete through step 4.7.8.

Raise power to 30% at 3 MWe/min Equipment Issues:

2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal.

2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals.

Neither component is expected to be returned to service this shift.

Reactivity Turnover:

See RE letter for power ascension guidance 51

Inter-Office Correspondence RE/PSL Trng 15-002 To: SM Date: Today From: R. Eng Department: Reactor Eng ineering

Subject:

Unit 2 Power Ascension Guidance This letter is issued to provide guidance to the Operations Department for power ascension.

Unit 2 Power Escalation Following Criticality to 100% Power

1. At some point between achieving criticality and preparing for turbine roll , it is recommended that the Lead Group 5 CEAs be repositioned at approximately 100 inches withdrawn with the remaining CEA Regulating and Shutdown Groups positioned at 136 inches withdrawn . Group 5 CEAs at 100 inches withdrawn supports latching the main turbine.

2. Group 5 CEAs are not expected to return to a height lower than the long term steady state insertion limit (L TSSIL) by the time reactor power reaches 20%. If CEAs are not greater than the LTSSIL when 20% power is achieved, please ensure the time the Group 5 CEAs are inserted below the LTSSIL is logged in the RCO chronological logs and the Reactor Engineer on shift is notified .

3. Per 2-GOP-101 , "Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady-State and Scheduled Load Changes," Unit 2 fuel is fully pre-conditioned. Reactor power should not be increased at a rate exceeding 18% per hour (3 MW/min) once the turbine is synchronized to the grid.

4. Water/boron requirements for the up-power at 18% per hour is included with this letter. It is estimated that 19,000 gal of water will be required to raise power to 100%, and approximately 270 gallons of acid during the Nuc Delta T's.

5. 2 charging pumps will be required during the power ascension evolution .

6. ASI will be maintained within the Sliding ESI scale.

General Considerations

1. A BEACON simulation of the power maneuver provided estimates of the quantity of water to be added. Please note that this is estimation only and that modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will result in deviations from the prediction. This guidance is NOT to be used as a substitute for operator knowledge ,

close monitoring of plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur

2. No challenge to the DNB LCO or LHR LSSS is expected .

3. Reactor Engineering will be on site to provide support for the up-power. The on-site Reactor Engineer may modify the above guidance as needed to respond to actual plant conditions.

~ q, R.E~g Cf Reactor Engineering E . Neering Reactor Engineering Supervisor 52

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 "Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: HLC 22 NRC Examiners : Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: -5X 10-4 % power Turnover: Reactor power is -5X10-4% power, 6000 EFPH , Xenon free. RCS boron is 1327 ppm . Raise power to 2-4%

Critical Tasks: ....

Emergency borate via the 2C Charging pump and open V2508 ,V2509 OR V2504

Secure all RCPs prior to the loss of RCS Integrity through the seals .

Control RCS temperature using the 2B SG after the 2A SG has blown dry to prevent exceeding the upper subcooling limits 2-EOP-99, Figure 1A OR exceeding a cooldown of 100°F an hour.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Event Description Type*

1 R/RO Power increase to 2-4%

N/BOP, SRO 2 1 TS/SRO Loss of the 2B CCW pump. Evaluate TS for aligning 2C CCW pp C/BOP/RO 3 2 TS/SRO 2MA Instrument Inverter fails . Loss of all Pressurizer heaters. LT-111 OX loses power.

C/BOP, I/RO 4 3 CIRO SBCS system malfunction causes RCS temperature to lower and power to increase.

5 4 M/All 2A SG ESD in Containment. Auto I Manual Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fails open . 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close.

6 5 CIRO 2B Charging pump trips requiring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump 7 6 CIRO V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Manual action required to open them 8 7 C/BOP Following SIAS, re-throttle MV-09-1 O to prevent overfeeding the 2B SG

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6 Directions to the crew will be to raise Reactor power to 2-4%. RE guidance is to be at 100"

- withdrawn in preparation for synching to the grid.

During the up power the 2B CCW pump will experience a bad motor bearing resulting in increasing amps. If not recognized early the pump will trip on overload. The 2C CCW pump will be aligned to the B header IAW 2-AOP-14 .01 , Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operation.

TS 3.0.4 applies for this event so the crew should not change modes.

After the 2AB 4.16kV bus is aligned to the "B" train , the MA Instrument Inverter fails resulting in the Instrument bus de-energizing . This will require the crew to place the MA Instrument bus on the Bypass bus using 2-AOP-49.02 , 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1 E). All Pressurizer heaters will de-energize and will need to be restored in accordance with 2-AOP-01.10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level (re-energizing the bypass bus). LT-1110X fails and causes letdown flow to go to minimum so swap to LT-1110Y. Tech Specs should be reviewed for the Pzr Heaters, MA Instrument Inverter and possibly DNBR depending on how low pressurizer pressure got due to the event.

During the up-power the SBCS will malfunction (8801 fails open) causing RCS temperature to lower and Reactor power to increase. The crew should enter 2-AOP-08.03 , Steam Bypass Control System, section 4.2.3 & 4 OR 2-AOP-08.01 Steam Leak section 4 .2.3. Taking the SBCS permissive switch to 'OFF' will close the valve and terminate the transient. Also, taking the controller to manual and closing the valve will work . If the crew choses not to use SBCS, the ADV's could also be placed in service to control RCS temperature. V-8801 will not respond in auto. If the transient is not addressed promptly, the plant could be challenging to control (minimum temperature for criticality may be exceeded and reactor power may rise to the High SUR pre-trip setpoint) so the crew may chose to manually trip the reactor at that point.

Next, the 'A' side 4.16 KV Startup Transformer breaker opens unexpectedly. The crew should manually trip the unit due to the loss of the Condensate pump (trips the Feedwater pump). The 2A EOG will start but the output breaker will fail to close and cannot be closed . Post trip, an ESDE will occur in the Containment on the 2A Steam Generator post trip (3 minute ramp) .

2B Charging pump trips when the Unit trips. Due to loss of "A" train AC power, the 480V Load Center should be re-aligned to the 'B' side to allow the 2C Charging pump to be started . This alignment should be made to facilitate emergency boration due to excessive cooldown from the ESDE. At least one Charging pump must be running to facilitate Emergency Boration. The loss of power results in the Boric Acid pumps and V2514 being unavailable. On SIAS, an ESFAS relay malfunction causes V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) to remain closed . Manual action is required to open them for Emergency Boration. This is a critical task (If the crew attempts emergency boration using the gravity feed valves prior to SIAS, they will not open. V2504, "RWT to the Charging pump suction," is the success path in this case and a critical task). Also , following SIAS , AFW flow control valves to the 28 SG go full open so they will need to be re-throttled (closeef) to avoid overfeeding the 28 SG and adding to the cooldown from the ESDE.

Suggested termination point is when the 2A Steam Generator is isolated.

Scenario 6 2

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 HLC 22 NRC Scenario 6 Procedures Used

2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1

2-NOP-02 .24, 'Boron Concentration Control'

2-AOP-14 .01, Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operation

2-AOP-49.02 , 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E)

2-AOP-01 .10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level

2-AOP-99.01 , Loss of Tech Spec Equipment

2-AOP-08.01 , Steam Leak

2-AOP-08.03, Steam Bypass System

2-NOP-47 .01 Crosstying I Removal I Restoration of 480V Susses

2-EOP-01 , Standard Post Trip Actions

2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand Event Technical Specifications Entered

T.S. 3.7.3 CCW (Event 2)

T.S. 3.8.3.1 Onsite Power Distribution (Event 3)

T.S 3.4.3 Pzr Heaters (Event 3)

T.S. 3.2 .5 Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) (Event 3)

Scenario 6 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# - - - - - Page 4 of _1_s_

Event Description : Raise power to 2-4%

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Restore IC# 4, 5x10-4 Reactor Startup and Open the NRC lesson file .

EXECUTE HLC-22, NRC Scenario# 6 file

Ensure modification to IC set is triggered .

Place the Green OLRM status placard on RTGB 203

Place Protected Train A sign on RTGB 203

Unfreeze the simulator and ensure Group 4 CEA's are at the UEL and that '

the 2B TCW pump is off

Let the simulator run for a minute and then freeze until the crew is on station

Sign off applicable steps in 2-GOP-302 up to step 4.6.7

Hand out 2-GOP-302 signed off up to step 4.6.7

RE has determined that ASI is favorable for power escalation Control Room Indications Available: Several alarms are in due to the start up in progress DIRECT the crew to continue the reactor/plant startup at Step SRO 4.6.7 of 2-GOP-302, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 3 to Mode

2. Refer to attached pages 5-6 When directed, RAISE Reactor power at a sustained startup RO rate of less than .5 DPM by withdrawing Group 5 CEAs.

Monitor SIG water levels to ensure LPFWCS is controlling SG BOP levels.

STABILIZE Reactor power at 2% to 4% as indicted on the RO higher reading of RPS Nuclear or Delta-T power.

VERIFY Linear Range Nuclear Instruments respond and that

('* ~:1

/

channel readings are in agreement.

\ Transition to 2-GOP-201 Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to SRO Mode 1 EXAMINER'S NOTE: Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass Control System are in service. When reactor power is at the point of adding heat and relatively stable, or at the Lead Evaluator's direction, PROCEED to Event 2.

Scenario 6 4

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 3 TO MODE 2 48 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-302 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.6 Raising Reactor power NOTE

The RPS High Startup Rate Pre-Trip is 1.3 DPM

The Start-up rate trip is in service between 10-4 and 15% power.

1. Raise Reactor power at a sustained startup rate of less than .5 DPM.

2. VERIFY SUR protection is enabled at approximately 1x10-4 % power as follows:

A. LOG light is ON for fill OPERABLE Wide Range Log Safety channels.

8. L-41 , START-UP RATE TRIP IN SERVICE, in alarm .

3. STABILIZE reactor power between 3x10-4% power and 7x10-4%

power.

4. RECORD actual critical conditions on Attachment 2, ECC Calculation Worksheet, Table 1.

5. IF CEA insertion limits are NOT met, THEN ADJUST the following to meet Technical Specification 3.1.3.6, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits:

RCS boron concentration

Regulating Group CEA position

6. IF Reactor Engineering determines Reload Physics Testing is to be performed, THEN GO TO 2-PTP-81, Reload Startup Physics Testing .

RE or US

7. RAISE reactor power at a sustained startup rate of less than .5 DPM.

NOTE Equilibrium Shape Index (ESI) and control band values are provided by Reactor Engineering .

8. IF ASI is unfavorable for power escalation, THEN MAINTAIN power stable until ASI can be maintained within ESI control bands .

5

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE T ITLE : PAGE :

60 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 3 TO MODE 2 49 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-GOP-302 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.6 Raising Reactor power (continued)

9. STABILIZE reactor power indicated on the higher reading of RPS Nuclear or Delta-T power by one of the following :

IF AFW is in service, THEN MAINTAIN reactor power between 1% and 3% .

IF MFW is in service, THEN MAINTAIN reactor power between 2% and 4%.

10. VERIFY four Linear Power Range Safety channels as follows :

Channels are on scale

Channel readings are in agreement

11. GO TO 2-GOP-201 , Reactor Plant Startup - MODE 2 to MODE 1.

r 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page _5_ of _1_5_

Event

Description:

28 CCW pump trips. Align 2C CCW pump to the B header.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, Trigger Event 2: Loss of 2B CCW pump.

Indications Available: Increasing amps on 2B CCW pump.

Alarms: S-2: 28 CCW Hdr Flow High/Low S-32: 28 CCW PUMP OVRLO/ TRIP, alarms and will clear after pump trip.

S-26: 2C CCW PUMP HOR VALVES/AB BUS MISALIGNMENT, while alignini 2C pump.

Recognize rising amps on the 28 CCW pump .

/'

Perform IOA of 2-AOP-14.01, Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations, (step 4.1.1 and RO contingency step 4.1.1 .1.1 .). Refer to attached page 8

Stops the 28 CCW pump

Places the control switch in Pull-To-Lock Enters 2-AOP-14.01 , Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations and directs actions from step 4.2.1 for the loss of CCW pump 28 (section 4.2.3 steps 4.2.3.1 thru 13 including SRO contingency step 4.2.3.7.7.1 which aligns the 2A8 4160V bus to the "8" side per Attachment 2 of 2-AOP-14.01 ). Refer to attached pages 9-15 EXAMINER'S NOTE: Contingency action 4.2.3.11.1of2-AOP-14.01, does not need to be performed (re-alignment of the 125 VOC and 480VAC "AB" busses).

Enters T.S . 3.7.3. (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action to restore 2 CCW pumps, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to ensure lineup). The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Tech Spec action can be TS SRO exited when the 2C CCW pump is started however, the line up must be verified every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months until the 2B CCW pump is back in service Verify the 2C CCW pump is stopped

\i When directed, CLOSE the following :

BOP v

MV-14-1, PUMP 2C DISCH 'fO HEADER A

'I

MV-14-3, HEADER A TO PUMP 2C When directed OPEN the following:

MV-14-2, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER B

MV-14-4, HEADER B TO PUMP 2C When directed PERFORM Attachment 2, 2-AOP-14.01 ,

'Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations' Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B Side, prior to starting CCW Pump 2C on Header B. Refer to attached page 15 Start the 2C CCW pump and VERIFY CCW Header B pressures and flows return to normal:

SRO Contact Ops Management and inform them of the plant status Scenario 6 7

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 7of112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AO P-1 4.01 ST. LUCI E UN IT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. VERIFY CCW pump amps stable for running CCW pumps:

1.1 STOP affected CCW pump and PLACE control switch in PULL TO LOCK.

AM-201 , PUMP 2A AMPERES

AM-205, PUMP 28 AMPERES

AM-209 , PUMP 2C AMPERES 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions

1. IF§!! of the following cond itions 1.1 IMPLEMENT Low Mode ONP for exist: current plant cond itions.

Unit 2 is in MODE 3 thru 6

SIAS blocked

Shutdown Cooling is in service THEN VERIFY at 15 minute intervals that SFSC criteria are met per Low Mode ONP for the cu rrent plant cond itions.

8

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9of112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)

D 3. PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.

Table 1 Abnormal Condition Section Loss of CCW Pump 2A rr Section 4.2.2 Loss of CCW Pump 28 ...J '., Section 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 2C & -----~........... Section 4.2.4 Loss of Two CCW Pumps . . . . ~. . . /"' ' \I v Section 4.2.5 Loss of CCW Heat Exchanger 2A \.".... '\: j Section 4.2.6 Loss of CCW Heat Exchanger 28 / )

~ .'.

',')

~I v Section 4.2.7 Rupture of CCW Header (1' ,..* ~ ...... ~/ Section 4.2.8 Abnormal CCW Surge Tank Level ) Section 4.2.12 Unexpected CCW Temperature Rise

' Section 4.2.13 9

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITL E:

l '° PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 15 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 D 1. VERIFY both the following conditions are met:

1.1 PLACE CCW Pump 28 control switch in PULL TO LOCK.

CCW Pump 28 tripped . 1.2 GO TO Section 4.2.5, Loss of Two CCW Pumps.

CCW Pump 2C available to supply CCW Header B.

D 2. PLACE CCW Pump 28 control switch in PULL TO LOCK.

CAUTION If CCW is completely lost to a SOC HX, then SOC flow must be promptly isolated to limit flashing and prior to restoring CCW flow to limit thermal stress.

D 3. VERIFY SOC Loop 28 is NOT in 3.1 ISOLATE SOC HX 28 flow as seNice. follows:

A. ENSURE FCV-3301 ,

BYPASS (SOC Loop 282 ,

Key 43), is OPEN or THROTTLED OPEN.

B. CLOSE HCV-3512, FLOW (SOC Loop 282 , Key 51 ).

C. CLOSE HCV-14-38, SHUTDOWN HX 28 (CCW) .

10

\\.

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 16 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

D 4. VERIFY CCW Pump 2C is 4.1 IF CCW Pump 2A is on standby, stopped. THEN PERFORM the foilowing :

A. START CCW Pump 2A.

8. STOP CCW Pump 2C.

I NOTE Annunciator S-26, 2C CCW PUMP HOR VALVES I AB BUS MISALIGNMENT, is expected while re-aligning CCW Pump 2C to CCW Header B if electrically aligned on Train A.

D 5. VERIFY the following CLOSED: 5.1 CLOSE the following :

MV-14-1 , PUMP 2C DISCH

MV-14-1 , PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER A TO HEADER A

MV-14-3, HEADER A TO

MV-14-3, HEADER A TO PUMP 2C PUMP 2C D 6. VERIFY the following OPEN : 6.1 OPEN the following :

MV-14-2 , PUMP 2C DISCH

MV-14-2, PUMP 2C DISCH TO HEADER B TO HEADER B MV-14-4, HEADER B TO

MV-14-4 , HEADER B TO PUMP 2C PUMP 2C 11

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 17 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

NOTE If 2AB AC and DC Buses are NOT all powered from the B side, then Tech Specs credit can NOT be taken for CCW Pump 2C until alignment is complete .

D 7. VERIFY both the following conditions are met:

7.1 IF in MODES 1 to 4 AND 4160V Bus 283 ENERGIZED,

CCW Pump 2C electrically THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, aligned to B Side . Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B Side, prior to starting CCW

4160V Bus 283 Pump 2C on Header B.

ENERGIZED. (Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 2) 7.2 IF 4160V Bus 2B3 is NOT ENERGIZED, THEN PERFORM the following :

ENSURE 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to A Side per Attachment 1, Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to A Side, prior to starting CCW Pump 2C on CCW Header B.

REVIEW Tech Specs 3.8.1.1 , AC. Sources.

12

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 18 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

D 8. WHEN both the following conditions are met 8.1 GO TO Section 4.2.5, Loss of Two CCW Pumps.

IF SOC HX 28 was in service, THEN SOC HX 28 flow isolation is complete per Section 4.2.3 Step 3

4160V electrical alignment of CCW Pump 2C complete THEN START CCW Pump 2C.

D 9. VERIFY CCW Header B pressures and flows return to 9.1 INVESTIGATE cause .

normal :

FIS-14-18, HEADER FLOW

PIS-14-88, HEADER PRESSURE D 10. VERIFY SOC Loop 28 was NOT in service when CCW pump was 10.1 PERFORM Attachment 3, Restoration of CCW to SOC HX.

lost.

13

REVISION NO.: PROCEDUR E T ITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 19 of 112 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of CCW Pump 28 (continued)

D 11. IF 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to 4160V Bus 283, 11.1 ALIGN the following to B side per 2-NOP-52.02, Alignment of 2AB THEN VERIFY the following Buses and Components:

aligned to B side:

125V DC Bus 2AB

125V DC Bus 2AB

480V Load Center 2AB

480V Load Center 2AB D 12. REVIEW Tech Spec 3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System.

D 13. WHEN Section 3.0, EXIT CONDITIONS are met, THEN EXIT this procedure.

14

/

t~

REVISION NO.: PR OCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 73 of 112 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-14.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to 8 Side (Page 1 of 1)

NOTE

Tech Spec 3.7.3, Component Cooling Water System , applies until 480 VAC and 125 VDC busses are realigned .

While aligning 4160V Bus 2AB to B side, the following annunciators will be received :

B-48, 4.16KV SWGR 480V LC/MCC 2AB UV (RTGB-201)

B-60, EMERG 125V DC/ 4.16KV / 480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB-201)

S-16, EMERG 125VDC/4.16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB-206)

1. VERIFY the following tie breakers are OPEN: (RTGB-201)

Bkr 1-20501 , 1AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE

Bkr 2-20501, 2AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE

2. VERIFY the following pump control switches are in PULL-TO-LOCK:

Component Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB-206)

Intake Cooling Water Pump 2C (RTGB-202)

3. ENSURE 4160V Bus 2AB aligned to B side as follows: (RTGB-201)

A. Bkr 2-20505, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB/2A3 OPEN

8. Bkr 2-20208, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2A3/2AB OPEN C. Bkr 2-20409, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2B3/2AB CLOSED D. Bkr 2-20504, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB/283 CLOSED 15

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page _6_ of _1_s_

Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter fails. Loss of Pressurizer heaters. Letdown flow to minimum .

Ti me I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Upon cue from Examiner, Trigger Event 3: 2MA Instrument Inverter Fails Booth Operator Instructions:

If status of input breaker is requested, state breaker is tripped .

Booth Operator Instructions: ~>:.,

When directed, Trigger Place 2A Instrument Bus to Alternate Source to '"*.

load Control Room Indication available:

Annunciator B-43 MA inst. Bus trouble

Loss of all Pressurizer heaters

TCB 1,2,5 and 6 open .

Denergized RPS channel 'A' and ESFAS channel 'A'

Pressurizer level channel alarms Enter 2-AOP-49.02, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) at step 4.2.1. Refer to attached pages 17-18 SRO

Recognize loss of ALL Pressurizer heaters

Recognize minimum letdown and loss of Pressurizer Level channel 'X'. Swap to level channel 'Y'

Containment Evacuation Alarm Direct restoration of Pressurizer Heaters per 2-AOP-01 .10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level (contingency action 4.2.1.2).

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The crew may opt to place the Instrument Bus on the bypass source load FIRST then restore the Pzr heaters.

IF in Modes 1-4 AND the affected instrument bus was being supplied by its inverter, THEN , within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , place the TS SRO affected instrument bus onto its isolimiter, per Attachment 3, Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter. Refer to attached page 18-22

Determine which instrument bus has been lost by checking RPS cabinet power loss RO I'\

Monitor Pressurizer pressure to ensure spray valves I, respond (close) to loss of heaters v Notify the SNPO to place MA Instrument bus on bypass IAW BOP Attachment 3 of 2-AOP-49.02, 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) steps 1,2 and 3 below Direct SNPO to:

Verify closed Bkr. 2-41207 lsolimiter 2A is closed on MCC2A5

Place Manual Bypass Switch in Bypass to Load

Verify annunciator B-43 is clear, RPS channel A restored , ESFAS channel A restored.

Scenario 6 16

REVISION NO .: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 6 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUCI E UN IT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions NOTE RPS , ESFAS and AFAS will be in a 1 out of 3 logic on loss of one instrument bus and 4 TCBs will be tripped . Attachment 1, Instrument Bus Loads, contains a listing of additional instrumentation supplied by the instrument buses.

D 1. VERIFY the following plant operating parameters are stable 1.1 IF a loss of SOC has occurred ,

THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-03.02, by comparing redundant Shutdown Cooling Abnormal unaffected instrumentation: Operations.

soc 1.2 IF a loss of Pressurizer Heaters has occurred ,

Pressurizer heaters and level THEN RESTORE Pressurizer

Containment Evacuation Heaters per 2-AOP-01 .10, Alarm Pressurizer Pressure and Level.

1.3 IF the Containment Evacuation Alarm has sounded ,

THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-26.02, Area Radiation Monitors.

17

lb REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 7 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 2. DETERMINE which Instrument Bus has been lost by checking annunciators and RPS cabinet power loss:

Instrument Bus Annunciator RPS Cabinet MA B-43 MA . ....

MB A-43 < MB MC B-53 '-.. MC MD A-53 MD D 3. IF in MODES 1-4 AND the affected instrument bus was being supplied 3.1 IF instrument bus cannot be energized , within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , by its inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

THEN , within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , (Section 6.2, Commitment 1)

PLACE the affected instrument A. Be in at least HOT bus onto its isolimiter, per STANDBY within the next Attachment 3, Placing an 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter. COLD SHUTDOWN within (Section 6.2, Commitment 1) the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

B. BEGIN plant shutdown per 2-AOP-22.01 , Rapid Down power.

18

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 32 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST . LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 1 of 4)

CAUTION This attachment is to be used for a loss of instrument bus onlv. These instructions are NOT to be used for normal removal or restoration of inverters.

Incorrect execution of this attachment can result in the inadvertent actuation of safeguards equipment as well as a plant trip .

1.0 PLACING THE 2MA INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER

1. VERIFY 2-41207, ISOLIMITER 2A, is CLOSED at MCC 2A5.

2. IF the 2MA bus is deenergized, THEN PLACE the MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD position on STATIC INVERTER - 2A Panel.

3. VERIFY B-43, 120V AC INVTR 2A I INSTR BUS 2MA/2MA-1 TROUBLE, undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized .

B. PRESS the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton on Static Inverter 2A.

C. PLACE B-2 , INVERTER OUTPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2A.

D. PLACE B-1, DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2A.

E. ENSURE B-4 , BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT, is ON at Static Inverter 2A.

F. PLACE MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2A.

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MA Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2, Commitment 1) 19

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 33 of 35 PROCEDURE NO .:

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 2 of 4) 2.0 PLACING THE 2MB INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER II ~

1. VERIFY 2-42050, ISOLIMITER 2B, is ON at MCC 2B5.

2. IF the 2MB bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD.

3. VERIFY A-43 , 120V AC INVTR 2B/INSTR BUS 2MB/2MB-1 TROUBLE, undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized .

B. PRESS BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton C. PLACE B-2 , INVERTER OUTPUT , in OFF on Static Inverter 2B .

D. PLACE B-1 , 125V DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2B.

E. ENSURE B-4, BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT , is ON at Static Inverter 2B.

F. PLACE MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2B.

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MB Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2, Commitment 1) 20

2- I REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 34 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 3 of 4) 3.0 PLACING THE 2MC INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER

1. VERIFY 2-41212 , ISOLIMITER 2C, is CLOSED at MCC 2A5.

2. IF the 2MC bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD position on STATIC INVERTER 2C Panel.

3. VERIFY B-53, 120V AC INSTR BUS/INVTR 2MC/2MC-1 TROUBLE, undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized.

B. PRESS the BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton on Static Inverter 2C.

C. PLACE B-2, INVERTER OUTPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2C.

D. PLACE B-1 , DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2C.

E. ENSURE B-4, BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT, is ON at Static Inverter 2C.

F. PLACE MANUAL BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2C.

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MC Instrument Bus is now being supplied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2, Commitment 1) 21

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTE M (CLASS 1E) 35 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUC IE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Placing an Instrument Bus on its lsolimiter (Page 4 of 4) 4.0 PLACING THE 2MD INSTRUMENT BUS ON THE ISOLIMITER

1. VERIFY 2-42016, ISOLIMITER 20, is ON at MCC 285.

2. IF the 2MD bus is deenergized , THEN PLACE the MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH in BYPASS TO LOAD.

3. VERIFY A-53 , 120V AC INSTR BUS/INVTR 2MD/2MD-1 TROUBLE, undervoltage and ground alarms are clear.

4. IF conditions exist that require shutdown of the inverter, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. VERIFY the other three instrument buses are energized .

B. PRESS BYPASS SOURCE TO LOAD pushbutton C. PLACE B-2, INVERTER OUTPUT , in OFF on Static Inverter 2D.

D. PLACE B-1 , 125V DC INPUT, in OFF on Static Inverter 2D.

E. ENSURE B-4, BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT , is ON on Static Inverter 2D.

F. PLACE MANUAL/BYPASS SWITCH to BYPASS TO LOAD position on Static Inverter 2D.

5. NOTIFY the Control Room that 2MD Instrument Bus is now being suppl ied by its Maintenance Bypass Bus.

6. IF in MODES 1-4, THEN RE-ENERGIZE the Instrument Bus from its associated Inverter within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Section 6.2, Comm itmen t 1) 22

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page _7_ of _1_5__

Event

Description:

2MA Instrument Inverter fails. Loss of Pressurizer heaters. Letdown flow to minimum.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indication available:

When bus restored implement 2-AOP-01.10 Attachment 5, RO Pressurizer Pressure and Level to restore Pressurizer heaters.

Refer to attached page 24-26 v

When directed close TCB's IAW Attachment 2 of 2-AOP-49.02 BOP Refer to attached page 27-28 Reset ESFAS ATI fault at ESFAS cabinet.

IF in Modes 1-4 AND an inverter is not connected to its associated D.C. Bus, THEN , re-energize the A.G . Instrument TS SRO Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Contact the Shift Mgr and Ops Management to inform them of the plant status J

\\

~

~"'

-.~ \

! '(").~.. '\

... ( J ** ....,.

Scenario 6 23

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 37 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 1 of 3)

1. VERIFY ill! the following conditions are met:

IF SIAS has actuated , THEN SIAS is RESET.

Pressurizer level is greater than 27% .

At least one 4160V vital bus is energized :

2A3

283

2. IF any of the following control channels failed , THEN ENSURE non-affected control channel(s) selected:

Reactor Regulating System

Level

Pressure

3. IF Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3, is OPEN AND ill! of the following conditions are met:

LI C-111 OX, LEVEL, indicates greater than 27%

Vital 4160 V bus 2A3 is energized

SIAS A is RESET THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3, control switch indicates green flag.

B. CLOSE Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3.

24

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 38 of 39 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 2 of 3)

4. IF Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3, is OPEN AND fill of the following conditions are met:

LIC-111 OY , LEVEL, indicates greater than 27%

Vital 4160 V bus 2B3 is energized SIAS B is RESET THEN PERFORM the following :

A. ENSURE Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3 , control switch indicates green flag.

B. CLOSE Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3.

NOTE The Backup Interlock Bypass Key Switch , selected to the LEVEL position ,

allows the 480V heater power supply contactors controlled by the selected channel to be reset.

5. IF only one Pressurizer heater bus has power available OR only one Pressurizer level control channel is functioning , THEN PLACE B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL.

6. IF EOG is powering vital bus(es), THEN RESET only Backup Banks B-1 and/or B-4 by placing heater control switch(es) to OFF I RESET and to AUTO or ON .

7. IF A Pressurizer Heater Bus is energized from offsite power, THEN RESET the following Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF I RESET and to AUTO or ON :

PROPORTIONAL BANK P-1

BACKUP BANK B-1

BACKUP BANK B-2

BACKUP BANK B-3 25

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 39 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-01 .10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 3 of 3)

8. IF B Pressurizer Heater Bus is energized from offsite power, THEN RESET the following Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF I RESET and to AUTO or ON :

PROPORTIONAL BANK P-2

BACKUP BANK B-4

BACKUP BANK B-5

BACKUP BANK B-6

9. IF B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL AND the following conditions are met:

A and B Pressurizer heater buses energized

X and Y Pressurizer level control channels available THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE B/U INTLK B/P in LOCKED OFF.

8. ENSURE fill Pressurizer heaters RESET.

26

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 30 of 35 PROC EDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Closing TCBs Following Instrument Bus Restoration (Page 1 of 2)

1. IF TCB-1 is OPEN, THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-1 :

A. RESET TCB-1 .

B. VERIFY TCB-1 is CLOSED.

2. IF TCB-5 is OPEN, THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-5:

A. RESET TCB-5.

B. VERIFY TCB-5 is CLOSED.

3. IF TCB-2 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-2:

A. RESET TCB-2.

B. VERIFY TCB-2 is CLOSED.

4. IF TCB-6 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-6:

A. RESET TCB-6.

B. VERIFY TCB-6 is CLOSED.

5. IF TCB-3 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-3 :

A. RESET TCB-3.

B. VERIFY TCB-3 is CLOSED.

6. IF TCB-7 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-7 :

A. RESET TCB-7.

B. VERIFY TCB-7 is CLOSED.

7. IF TCB-4 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-4 :

A. RESET TCB-4.

B. VERIFY TCB-4 is CLOSED.

27

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1E) 31 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-49.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Closing TCBs Following Instrument Bus Restoration (Page 2 of 2)

8. IF TCB-8 is OPEN , THEN PERFORM the following to CLOSE TCB-8:

A. RESET TCB-8.

B. VERIFY TCB-8 is CLOSED.

28

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _4..;....__ _ _ _ Page 8 of 15 Event

Description:

SBCS system malfunction Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed (recommend when power is around 3-4%), trigger Event 4: PCV 8801 Drifts Open If directed as the NPO, initiate 'Isolate PCV 8801' this will close the manual isolation valve for 8801.

NOTE: If crew manually trips the plant due to SBCS failure, immediately trigger ES, 2A SG ESD in Can SU 4kv fails.

~

Control Room Indications Available: Tave lowering, power increasing, Pzr pressure lowering, SG pressure lowering, letdown flow lowering. Red I Green light on PCV-8801, Valve indicates CYAN on DCS.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: V-8801 will not respond (i.e. remains failed open) with its CONTROLLER in auto. If the CONTROLLER for PCV 8801 is taken to MANUAL, PCV 8801 WILL OPERATE NORMALLY.

ALL Steam Bypass valves that are open will CLOSE if the PERMISSIVE switch is taken to off.

Recognize Tave lowering, power increasing. Pressurizer SRO/RO pressure lowering , SG pressure lowering, letdown flow lowering If PCV-8801 drifting open not recognized , call NPO to look for RO secondary steam leak.

From 2-AOP-08.01 , 'Steam Leak' IOA, if two of four RPS channels indicate Reactor Power High Pre-trip, THEN trip the Reactor.

If Tave lowers to greater than 6.0°F below no load Tref, THEN trip the Reactor.

/. When PCV-8801 recognized as failed open, PLACE SBCS permissive switch to OFF IAW 2-AOP-08.01 step 4.2.2.5.1.

When SBCS valves closed , place ADV's in service to control

.." RCS temperature. Refer to attached pages 30-32

\ )

\ BOP If SBCS failure not recognized , notify NPO to search for steam leak.

Recognize open indication on PCV-8801 and CYAN indication on SBCS DCS page.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: 2-AOP-08.03, Steam Bypass Control System may be referred to with 2-AOP-08.01 or by itself. Both of these procedures direct the permissive switch to be taken to 'Off' to close the SBCS valves followed by placing ADVs in service to control Tavg Scenario 6 29

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 STEAM LEAK 6 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08 .01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF two out of four RPS channels indicate Reactor Power High Pre-Trip, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. TRIP the Reactor.

B. GO TO 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions.

4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE Attachment 1, General Notes, provides guidelines on CEAs, Variable High Power Trip setpoints, and reactivity changes .

D 1. DETERMINE plant MODE and GO TO applicable section per Table 1.

Table 1 Mode of 0 1pera bTt 11 :v Det ermina

. t'ion MODE SIAS Blocked GOTO 1 No Section 4.2.2, MODE 1 2 or 3 No Section 4.2.3, MODES 2 or 3 - SIAS NOT Blocked 3 or 4 Yes Section 4.2.4, MODES 3 or 4 - SIAS Blocked 30

~I REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 STEAM LEAK 7 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1 NOTE

Variable High Power Trip setpoints shall NOT be reset in response to a steam leak.

Minor excursions up to 100.5% Reactor power require power reduction within 15 minutes.

Lesser excursions up to 100.1% Reactor power require power reduction within 30 minutes.

1. IF either of the following exist:

Source of steam leak is unknown

Leak could be a potential safety hazard THEN TRANSMIT site announcement using Gai-Tronics with Boost function to alert personnel.

2. IF in MODE 1, 2.1 TRIP Reactor.

THEN MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref deviation less than 6.0°F by 2.2 GO TO 2-EOP-01 , Standard Post lowering Turbine load . Trip Actions.

31

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

5 STEAM LEAK 10 of 34 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-AOP-08.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1 (continued) 0 5. VERIFY steam bypass valves are in proper positions for current 5.1 PLACE STEAM BYPASS PERMISSIVE switch in OFF.

mode of RCS Temperature (RTGB-202) control. (RTGB-202) 5.2 IF valves did NOT CLOSE ,

PCV-8801 , TO THEN PERFORM the following :

CONDENSER VALVE A. SELECT SBCS overview

PCV-8802, TO screen on either FW Flat CONDENSER VALVE Panel Display.

PCV-8803, TO B. SELECT [EMERGENCY CONDENSER VALVE OFF] button to display

[EMERGENCY OFF] button

PCV-8804 , TO overlay.

CONDENSER VALVE

c. SELECT[EMERGENCY PCV-8805, TO OFF] button on overlay.

CONDENSER VALVE D. VERIFY L-4, STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE, reflashes .

5.3 IF unable to close SBCS valves ,

THEN DISPATCH operator to close affected SBCS isolation valve :

V08359, PCV-8801 UPSTRMISOL (TG B/41 /N-28/W-K)

V08307 , PCV-8802 UPSTRMISOL

{TGB/41 /S-29/E-D)

V08349, PCV-8803 UPSTRM ISOL (TGB/41/N-25/W-K) 32

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 9 of 15 Event Description : SBCS system malfunction Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-AOP-08.03, 'Steam SRO Bypass Control System' section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 Refer to attached pages 34-37 Direct SBCS permissive switch taken to OFF. '

Direct the RO to place at least one ADV on each SG to AUTO I AUTO set to 900 psia (step 4.2.4.1.B of AOP-08.03) Refer to attached page 37 Notifies l&C of event and Plant Management I SM notifications When PCV-8801 recognized as failed open , PLACE SBCS permissive switch to OFF RO When SBCS valves closed , place ADV's in service to control RCS temperature EXAMINER'S NOTE: Once plant conditions have been stabilized, proceed to Event

5. ~-

Scenario 6 33

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 6 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions

1. IF Reactor trip occurs, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01 ,

Standard Post Trip Actions.

NOTE

Attachment 1, Failure Analysis provides useful information to be used to determine failures and effects.

Attachment 2, General Information contains additional information that can be utilized in troubleshooting .

SBCS valves may lose DCS position indication following interruption of HART communications from the positioner. Communications interruptions may occur when restoring power to positioners.

Atta~hment 7, SBCS VALVE POSITION INDICATION RESTORATION ,

includes steps to restore SBCS valve position indication

Normal post trip Steam Generator pressure is between 850 psia and 930 psia (835 and 915 psig) with a target of 900 psia (885 psig).

Low Condenser Vacuum Interlock actuates at greater than or equal to 12" Hg .

CAUTION Blank Eycon 1O controller screens may still be active and should not be touched to prevent unwanted system response.

Ovation Drops 2 OR 52 need to be in the Control Mode (GREEN) for Condenser Vacuum Permissive signal to operate correctly .

D 2. VERIFY steam generator pressure is trending to normal pressure for 2.1 IF S/G pressure is less than normal pressure for existing plant existing plant conditions . conditions AND NOT recovering ,

THEN GO TO Section 4.2 Step 3.

34

REVI SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 9 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

D 3. VERIFY S/G pressure is recovering to normal for existing 3.1 IF S/G pressures remain below normal ,

plant conditions . AND are NOT trending to normal for existing plant conditions, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PLACE STEAM BYPASS PERMISSIVE switch in OFF.

B. VERIFY SBCS valves CLOSED:

PCV-8801 , TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8802, TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8803, TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8804, TO CONDENSER VALVE

PCV-8805, TO CONDENSER VALVE 3.2 IF SBCS valves NOT CLOSED, THEN PERFORM the following :

A. PRESS EMERGENCY OFF push button on SBCS Overview Display.

B. VERIFY fill SBCS Valves are CLOSED.

35

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 10 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08 .03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

3. (continued)

C. IF any steam bypass valves remain OPEN and cannot be closed ,

THEN DISPATCH an operator to isolate OPEN valve(s) by closing the associated steam bypass valve or isolation valve per Attachment 5, Local Action To Isolate Steam Bypass Valves.

D. GO TO Section 4.2 Step 4 CAUTION Stabilizing the plant will require the use of manual actions when restoring RCS temperature . Manual actions shall be maintained , otherwise, there may be a potential to reactivate the failure.

D 4. VERIFY RCS temperature control has been restored .

4.1 RESTORE RCS temperature control as follows :

A. IF SBCS is being operated in manual ,

and US directs ADVs be placed in service, THEN PERFORM the following :

(1) ENSURE SBCS in MANUAL.

36

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE : PAGE:

6 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 11 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)

4. (continued}

(2} Slowly OPEN ADVs while simultaneously closing the SBCS valves to maintain Tavg at approximately 532°F or at a temperature directed by the US.

B. IF SBCS is NOT in service ,

THEN slowly OPEN ADVs to maintain Tavg at approximately 532°F or at a temperature directed by the US .

c. IF s~cs OVERVIEW Screen display shows error code "41 waiting acknowledge", THEN locally RESET valve digital controller. (Attachment 3, SBCS OVERVIEW SCREEN contains guidance).

D. IF SBCS OVERVIEW screen display shows any error code other than "41 waiting acknowledge",

THEN NOTIFY Maintenance to trouble shoot and repair.

D 5. REVIEW Attachment 1, Failure Analysis, for failure and effects.

37

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event # _5_&_6_ _ _ Page .:!..Q.__ of _1_5----"

Event Description : 2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fails open. 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close. 28 Chargi ng pump trips requ iring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, Trigger Event 5: 2A SG ESD in Cont A 4.16kv SU Xfmr Fails Control Room Indication available: Reactor trip on high Containment Pressure, MSIS and SIAS.

Recognizes SIG pressures dropping. and Containment Building RO / BOP temperature and pressure rising .

RO/BOP Manually trip the Reactor when directed. ' '*~* ......*";::.

."" '*v EXAMINER'S NOTE: an automatic trip may occur prior to a manual trip.

Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01 , "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows :

SRO

RO: Reactivity control , Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal

BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal , Containment Conditions.

J Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control , Inventory Control , Pressure Control , Core Heat removal Reactivity Control

Verify Reactor power is lowering .

Verify startup rate is negative.

\\.....,

Verify all CEAs are fully inserted .

".., Inventory Control

Verify Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%

.... '

Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% .

I~/"

I Recognize that No Charging pumps are operating due to the loss of the 2A EOG and the 2B Charging pump trip. This safety

(

function is in jeopardy. The 2C Charging pump can be re-

,'/" aligned electrically to the "B" train and started.

Pressure Control

Verifies RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia .

Verifies RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia .

Verifies RCS subcooling is~ 20°F.

RCS pressure is trending down due to lowering RCS temperature Scenario 6 38

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario # 6 Event# _5_&_6_ _ _ Page _11_ of _1_5--;i Event

Description:

2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.16 KV breaker fa ils open . 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker will not close. 28 Charging pump trips requiring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indication available: If SIAS actuates during EOP-01 implementation, V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) indicate green Core Heat Removal

Verifies at least one RCP running with CCW. (if >10 RO minutes with no CCW must secure)

Verifies loo delta T is <10°F.

Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital BOP Auxiliaries , RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions.

Notifies NPO to perform Appendix X section 1 of EOP-99.

Notif SNPO to check SFP invento and tern erature.

Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries

Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed .

Verifies GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker.)

Verifies all vital and non vital AC Buses energized.

Verifies all vital and non vital DC Buses ener ized.

Recognize 2A Diesel output breaker fails to close, 2A3 4.16 KV bus de-ener ized.

RCS Heat Removal

Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following o SG level is between 20 and 81 % NR o Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR

Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F o If RCS approaches 500°F ensure:

At least ONE RCP is stopped. All RCP's tripped in Core Heat Removal

Emergency borate when directed. No Chg pps running at this time

SIG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig o Close HCV-08-1A & B if SG pressure <735 psig

Four MSR TCV Block valves closed

MSR warmup valves are closed

If maintaining vacuum desired , ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED Scenario 6 39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No .: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event # _5_&_6_ _ _ Page £..__ of _1_5_...

Event

Description:

2A SG ESD in Containment, Reactor trip, 'A' side Startup transformer 4.1 6 KV breaker fa ils open. 2A Diesel will start but the output breaker wil l not close. 28 Charging pump trips requi ring AB power to be re-aligned to start the 2C Chg pump.

Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Conditions

Verifies Containment pressure <2 psig .

Recognizes 28 CS pump did not start and

~**,\.

0 starts 28 CS pump.

Verifies NO Containment radiation monitors in alarm .

Verifies Containment temperature is less than 120°F.

(Temperature is increasing)

Verifies NO secondary plant radiation alarms .

When ALL safety function acceptance criteria have been EVALUATED, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following :

SRO A. Diagnose the event. Refer to Chart 1, Diagnostic Flow Chart.

B. Determine that 2-EOP-05, ESDE should be implemented.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: If SIAS actuates during EOP-01 implementation, V2508 &

V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed. Manual action required to open them . If the crew attempts emergency boration using the gravity feed valves PRIOR to SIAS, they will not open. V2504, "RWT to the Charging pump suction," is the success path in this case

\\

. . 1\

Scenario 6 40

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenario# 6 Event# _7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _1_s_

Event Description : V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Ma nual action required to open them . Following SIAS, re-throttle MV-09-10 to prevent overfeeding the 28 SG Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event: Isolate 2A SG App R-NPO Actions Report back as NPO 15 minutes later that field actions are complete ~

Control Room Indication available: /

SRO Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) every 15 minutes.

Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's Ensure SIAS (if setpoint reached) .

On SIAS, an ESFAS relay malfunction causes V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) to remain closed Verify ALL available Charging Pumps are runn ing . Due to the loss of "A " train electric power and the 2B Chg pump tripping , the only available pump is the 2C Chg pp .

Direct the 2AB 480V Load Center be re-al igned IAW 2-NOP-52 .02 SRO ALIGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS to the "B" CRITICAL side to allow the 2C Charg ing pump to be started. Refer to attached TASK paQe 42 Ensure closed MSIV's and MFIV's If CCW lost to RCP's for >30 minutes ensure CCW remains isolated Protect the Main Condenser. Refer to Appendix X section 2

'* Direct that AFW be manually started and aligned using the AFW

.... \

HARD CARD OR NOP-09 .02 , Auxiliary Feedwater I

LI

_),.' Direct the 2A SG isolated IAW EOP-99 Appendix R

\ - - Direct that HPSI be throttled if HPSI throttling criteria exists

\,/

Throttle HPSI to control Pressurizer level with in Safety Function RO check sheet criteria RO On SIAS , when CCW has isolated to the RCP's stop ALL CRITICAL RC P's.

TASK NOTE: This may have been performed in EOP-01 Scenario 6 41

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

25 ALIGNMENT OF 2AB BUSES AND COMPONENTS 13 of 40 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-52 .02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.1 Transfer of 2AB Buses and Components from A Side to B Side (continued)

6. (continued)

C. IF Control Room A/C HVA/ACC-3C is operating , THEN ALIGN Control Room air conditioning per 2-NOP-25 .07, Control Room Ventilation System , to prepare for the loss of HVA/ACC-3C.

NOTE Refer to Attachment 2, Expected Alarms When Transferring 480V Load Center 2AB Power Source, for alarms received when performing the following step.

D. At RTGB 201 , PERFORM the following :

(1) OPEN Bkr 2-40702, 480V BUS TIE 2AB/2A2.

(2) OPEN Bkr 2-40220, 480V BUS TIE 2A2/2AB.

(3) CLOSE Bkr 2-40504 , 480V BUS TIE 2B2/2AB.

(4) CLOSE Bkr 2-40706, 480V BUS TIE 2AB/2B2.

7. VERIFY the following annunciators are CLEAR:

B-60, EMERG 125V DC/4.16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 201)

S-16, EMERG 125VDC/4.16KV/480V AB BUSES MISALIGNED (RTGB 206)

NOTE Section 4.1, Step 8 through Section 4.1, Step 21 , may be completed in any order.

8. ENSURE N-45, WASTE MANAGEMENT LOCAL ALARM (RTGB-205) is CLEAR by locally acknowledging alarms on Waste Management Panel , if necessary.

42

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC22 Scenari o# 6 Event# _7_&_8_ _ _ Page .li._ of _1_s__

Event

Description:

V2508 & V2509 (Gravity Feed valves) relay malfunctions on SIAS and stay closed . Manual action requ ired to open them . Following SIAS, re-throttle MV-09-10 to prevent overfeeding the 28 SG Time I Position I Aoolicant's Actions or Behavior RO Open V2508, V2509 OR V2504 and Emergency borate by CRITICAL starting the 2C Charging pump.

TASK EXAMINER'S NOTE: With V2508, V2509 OR V2504 closed and the 2C Chg pump is started, a low suction pressure trip will occur due to no suction flow path. Once the valves are opened, the alarm and trip clears allowing the 2C Chg pump to start.

BOP When directed perform 2-EOP-99 Appendix A, sampling SG 's On SIAS, verify available HPSI , LPSI pumps start and BOP/RO associated ECCS injection valves open .

Verify adequate SI flow per Figure 2, EOP-99. (may be performed by STA)

Place all four CCW valves to/from RCP's to CLOSE when CCW lost for greater than 30 minutes.

Place two RCP bleedoff valves to close when CCW lost to RCP's for greater than 30 minutes.

If directed , Manually started and aligned using the AFW HARD CARD (2-NOP-99.07 , Attachment 5) OR NOP-09.02, Auxiliary feedwater section 4.2. Refer to attached pages 44-49 Following SIAS, AFW flow control valves to the 28 SG go full open so they will need to be re-throttled (closed) to avoid overfeeding the 28 SG and adding to the cooldown from the ESD When directed , isolate the 2A SG IAW EOP-99 Appendix R BOP Refer to attached pages 50-52 When 2A SG has blown dry, direct stabil ization of RCS SRO temperature within the limits of Figure 1A. The US will :

CRITICAL Direct the RCO to stabilize RCS temperature using ADVs at the TASK

(', lowest RCS Tcold.

l Determine the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold .

Open one ADV on the 2B SG to 100% open, in manual, then RO adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the CRITICAL lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto. Open the second ADV TASK on the 2B SG to 100% open , in manual, then adjust the auto setpoint to the saturation pressure for the lowest RCS Tcold and place it in auto.

Suggested termination points:

2A Steam Generator is isolated. (Appendix R complete)

RCS te mperature is stabilized after 2A SG is isolated .

Scenario 6 43

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 16 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS NOTE '

An Operator Aid has been placed at RTG8-202. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and , if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placard .

1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred NOTE

The discharge valves may be taken off the open seat to expedite acknowledgement of their alarms.

Feeding with the electric pump is preferred over the steam driven pump.

A trip from 100% power (Post EPU) will require -500 gpm total AFW flow.

1. FEED each Steam Generator at the desired flow rate by throttling the following valves OPEN or CLOSED:

2A Steam Generator

MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE

MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A 28 Steam Generator

MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28

MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE 44

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITL E: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 17 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99 .07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 2 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. WHEN AFAS has reached the reset level, THEN RESET either AFAS 1 (2A SG) OR AFAS 2 (28 SG) at the AFAS Cabinets A through Das follows (Key 202):

NOTE When AFAS is reset in each cabinet the following will occur:

Actuation light will illuminate

1-3 AND 2-4 AFAS Lockout Relay Status lights will extinguish A. PRESS either AFAS-1 ACT RESET OR AFAS-2 ACT RESET pushbutton.

B. FEED the Steam Generator(s) using the desired flow path:

(1) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-2, 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2AVALVE (2) FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A (3) FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 28 AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 84) 45

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 18 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 3 of 5) 1.1 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater after AFAS has occurred (continued)

2. 8. (3) (continued)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE (4) FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 2C AFW Pump

a. OPEN SE-09-5, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 SIG VLV (KEY 86)

b. THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns.

1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured

1. PERFORM any of the following steps as necessary to restore Steam Generator levels.

FEED the 2A Steam Generator using the 2A AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 2A (2) OPEN SE-09-2, 2A PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 83)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 2A SIG

8. FEED the 28 Steam Generator using the 28 AFW Pump (1) START PUMP 28 46

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 19 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 4 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

1. B. (continued)

(2) OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV (KEY 84)

(3) THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 28 S/G NOTE The following valves should be opened simultaneously to prevent overspeed tripping of the 2C AFW Pump:

MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C If a Steam Generator Tube Rupture is in progress, the steam supply from the ruptured Steam Generator should NOT be opened.

CAUTION Initial feedwater flow should be controlled to less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes when using Aux Feed for water hammer and thermal shock concerns.

2. FEED the 2A AND 28 Steam Generators using the 2C AFW PUMP.

A. START 2C AFW PUMP by performing both of the following simultaneously:

OPEN MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C

OPEN MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C B. OPEN the solenoid valve(s) in the header(s) to feed the appropriate S/G(s) :

SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A SIG VLV (KEY 85) 47

REVIS ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 20 of 24 PROCEDURE NO. :

2-NOP-99.07 ST. LUC IE UN IT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER OPERATIONS (Page 5 of 5) 1.2 Restoring Steam Generator Levels using Auxiliary Feedwater when an AFAS has NOT occured (continued)

2. B. (continued)

SE-09-5, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV (KEY 86)

C. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN desired flow in the header(s) to feed the appropriate S/G(s):

THROTTLE MV-09-11 , PUMP 2C TO SG 2A

THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 48

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 8 of 36 PROCEDURE NO.:

2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL 4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 28 S/G

1. START PUMP 2B.

2. OPEN SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV. (KEY 84)

CAUTION '~ I '

To avoid water hammer, when reinitiating flow to a steam generator that has lost all feedwater, the initial flow rate should be limited to less than or equal to 150 gpm for five minutes or until a level rise is observed.

J""*.

3. THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE , as necessary to establish and maintain desired AFW flow to 2B SIG .

4. WHEN desired level is achieved AND the 2B AFW PUMP is NO longer needed , THEN PERFORM the following :

A. CLOSE MV-09-10, PUMP 2B DISCH TO SG 2B VALVE .

B. PLACE key switch for SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV, to AUTO.

IV C. VERIFY SE-09-3, 2B PUMP DISCH TO 2B SIG VLV, is CLOSED.

D. STOP PUMP 2B.

E. RETURN PUMP 2B switch to AUTO.

IV Performed By: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Print/Sign Initials Date Verified By: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Print/Sign Initials Date 49

REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGUR ES I TABLES I DATA 96 of 171 PROCEDURE NO .: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation NOTE

Local actions are located in step 19 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.

Keys 79 and 80 are required for closing MV-08-14, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-18A ISOL, and MV-08-15, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-19A ISOL.

Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTILE/TRIP (contingency).

CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.

D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV) , is CLOSED.

D 2. !f HCV-08-1A did not close remotely ,

Then PERFORM local closure .

REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure .

D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve , is CLOSED.

NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch .

If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required , then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered .

D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED.

D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve , is CLOSED.

50

REVISION NO. : PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 97 of 171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)

D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:

D MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.

D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.

D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Slowdown , is CLOSED.

D 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED.

D 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 79)

D 11.PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed , Pump 2A, in STOP.

D 12. ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve , is CLOSED.

D 13. ENSURE MV-09-11 , Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.

D 14.PLACE MV-08-13 , SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.

D 15.!f MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C , is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking , AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required , Then CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)

D 16.ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Viv, is CLOSED.

D 17.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 80) 51

REVISION NO.: PROCEDUR E TITLE: PAGE:

50 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 98of171 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERA TOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)

Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued) 0 18.!f a SGTR is in progress, Then NOTIFY the SM of status of terminating contaminated steam release for E-Plan purposes.

NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete. Local actions may be continued.

0 19. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:

D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120 , 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.

O C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid .

O D. !f SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884 , SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.

0 E. !f MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking ,

Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:

O 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.

O 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:

0 a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.

O b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:

0 V08622 , CB #67 Drain D V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol 0 V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 1 52

OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:

Protected Train: A Online Risk: GREEN Identified RCS Leakage: .02 gpm Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0.03 gpm Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:

None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:

None Tech Spec Action Statement:

None Adverse Condition Monitoring (OPS 513's):

None Locked in Annunciators:

Numerous - expected for current plant conditions (no unexpected annunciators)

Current Status:

Reactor power approximately -5X10-4% , Xenon free.

2-GOP-302 in progress , completed through step 4.6.6. Next activity is to raise reactor power to 2-4%

Main Feedwater and SBCS in service. Boron concentration is 1327 ppm.

All surveillances are completed to support transition to mode 1 Goals for shift is to raise Reactor power to 10-12% and place the Main Generator on line.

Equipment Issues:

None Reactivity Turnover:

See RE guidance letter 53

Inter-Office Correspondence RE/PSL Trng 15-002 To: SM Date: Today From : R. Eng Department: Reactor Engineering

Subject:

Unit 2 Power Ascension Guidance This letter is issued to provide guidance to the Operations Department for power ascension.

Unit 2 Power Escalation Following Criticality to 100% Power

1. At some point between achieving criticality and preparing for turbine roll, it is recommended that the Lead Group 5 CEAs be reposi tioned at approximately 100 inches withdrawn with the rema ining CEA Regulating and Shutdown Groups positioned at 136 inches withdrawn. Group 5 CEAs at 100 inches withdrawn supports latching the main turbine.

2. Group 5 CEAs are not expected to return to a height lower than the long term steady state insertion limit (L TSSIL) by the time reactor power reaches 20%. If CEAs are not greater than the LTSSIL when 20% power is achieved , please ensure the time the Group 5 CEAs are inserted below the LTSSIL is logged in the RCO chronological logs and the Reactor Engineer on shift is notified.

3. Per 2-GOP-101, "Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady-State and Scheduled Load Changes, Unit 2 fuel is fully pre-conditioned. Reactor power should not be increased at a rate exceeding 18% per hour (3 MW/min) once the turbine is synchronized to the grid.

4. Water/boron requirements for the up-power at 18% per hour is included with this letter. It is estimated that 19,000 gal of water will be required to raise power to 100%, and approximately 270 gallons of acid during the Nuc Delta T's.

5. 2 charging pumps will be required during the power ascension evolution .

6. ASI will be maintained within the Sliding ESI scale.

General Considerations

1. A BEACON simulation of the power maneuver provided estimates of the quantity of water to be added. Please note that this is estimation only and that modeling limitations and differences between actual and assumed conditions will result in deviations from the prediction. This guidance is NOT to be used as a substitute for operator knowledge, close monitoring of. plant parameters, and responding to actual conditions as they occur

2. No challenge to the DNB LCO or LHR LSSS is expected.

3. Reactor Engineering will be on site to provide support for the up-power. The on-site Reactor Engineer may modify the above guidance as needed to respond to actual plant conditions.

1;§1:ineering E. Neering Reactor Engineering Supervisor 54

ML15201A538

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