ML13225A135
| ML13225A135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| 50-335/12-301, 50-389/12-301 | |
| Download: ML13225A135 (329) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: HLC 21-NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions: 30% power MOL. The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Short Notice Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant. Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold. Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100%
Turnover: 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump is out of service for leaking plunger. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is out of service due to motor oil leak. Return the Unit to 100% power.
Critical Tasks:
(<15% SG Wide Range level both SG's)
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 T.S. I SRO Containment personnel air lock door fails leak test.
2 1 RIRO Raise power to 100%
N I BOP, SRO 3 2 CIRO Primary Water Makeup valve FCV-221 OX fails open during dilution.
4 3 CIBOP Bearing failure on 2A TCW Pump.
5 4 T.S. I SRO 2A SG safety channel pressure transmitter PT-80138 fails low 6 5 CIRO RCP 2A1 Seal HX CCW outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 fails closed due toTE- 31A1 failing.
7 6 Ml All B MSIV closes at power. Rx trip. LOOP. Two B MSSV's stick open 8 7 CIBOP 2B EDG output breaker fails tore-close after opening on SIAS.
9 8 CIBOP MV-09-11 AFW to 2A SG fails to open. Open MV-09-9 with the crosstie valves open and feed the 2A SG.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The plant is at 30%. Instruction to the crew is to raise power to 100%.
Engineering has just left the Containment after a short entry to take some measurements for an upcoming plant modification. Shortly after the turnover the test group will call the Control room and notify them the outer personnel airlock door has failed the leak test. SRO will evaluate T.S. and enter 2-AOP-68.01, Loss of Containment Integrity I Air Locks.
After the up power is started, FCV-2210X Water Flow Control Valve fails open. The US will direct the RO to stop dilution and the BOP to place the turbine on hold. The power ascension is now secured. The crew should maintain power constant until I&C repairs FCV-2210X.
The 2A Turbine Cooling Water Pump will experience increasing amps due to a bearing failure. The pump will trip within approximately 8 minutes. The crew will identify the failure, start the 2B TCW pump, and secure the 2A TCW pump in accordance with 2-AOP-13.01, Turbine Cooling Water System. The TCW cross-tie must also be maintained open.
PT-80 13B fails low which affects "B" Channel AFAS SG 2A - 2B ll pressure as well as "A" train MSIS. SRO to evaluate T.S. Bypass or trip ESFAS and AFAS 1 & 2 within one hour. T.S. 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3.
After PT-8013B actions are taken, RCP 2A1 seal HX CCW outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 fails closed due to TE-31A1 failing high. Actions are taken lAW 2-AOP-01.09A1, "2A1 Reactor Coolant Pump" to 'override open' HCV-14-11A1 since there is no valid Seal Cooler Hx tube leakage.
Next, the B MSIV will close due to air line rupture resulting in a plant trip. On the trip a loss of offsite power (LOOP) will occur. Two MSSV's will lift and fail to reseat. An excess steam demand is now in progress.
As the RCS cools down due to the ESD, SIAS will actuate. Both Diesel Generator output breakers open on SIAS but the 2B Diesel breaker does not re-close. The BRCO should close the 2B Diesel output breaker.
The 2B Steam Generator will continue to blow down. Due to the trip at low power, AFAS may not actuate when EOP-01 is exited. In that case, AFW should be manually started and aligned. When 2C AFW is started (either from AFAS or manually), MV-09-11 to 2A SG will not open and cannot be opened. Success path is to start the 2B AFW pump and open the crossties from the B side to the A side and feed the A SG.
Terminate the scenario after RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized following 2B S/G dryout, the 2B SG is isolated and the 2A SG is being fed by the 2B AFW Pump.
2 Scenario 1 2
SCENARIO EVENT DESCRIPTION NRC SCENARIO 1 Procedures Used Tech Specs Entered
- 2-GOP-1 01, Rx Operating Guidelines 3.6.1.3 Cont. Integrity
- 2-AOP-68.01, Loss of Containment Integrity I Air Locks
- 2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation
- 2-AOP-13.01, Turbine Cooling Water System
- 2-AOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater or 2-NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation
- 2-AOP-01.09A1, 2A1 Reactor Coolant Pump
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions
- 2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand Event
- 2-EOP-99, Appendix R 3 Scenario 1 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 2 Page 4 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Raise power to 100%
Time I Position I AJ>Piicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.
Initiate IC 14 30% power, and Lesson 'NRC Scenario #1'. Xenon building in, 7 gpm dilution rate. MOL. Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position. Place 2A AFW pump and 2A BAM pump to stop. Place Orange control switch ECO tags on all 3 pumps. Ensure the 2B TCW is secure and in standby with SB13139 TCW pp Discharge cross-tie valves open.
Sign off and handout 1-GOP-201 (or 2-GOP-201 if updated with new DEH steps) step 71 as complete and Attachment 3 (MSR's) signed off to step 3.
If RE called for load rate state up to 30% I hour.
Control Room Indications Available: G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/55 lsol, N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ 55 lsol, M-46 2A Charging Pump 55 lsol/2555 OVRLD Continue with 1(2)-GOP-201 'Reactor Plant Startup- Mode 2 SRO To Mode 1',step 72 (attached page 5,6)
Control Rx power and ASIIAW 2-GOP-101 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached pages 7,8)
Raise dilution rate for power increase lAW 2-NOP-02.24 step RO 4.2.15 (attached page 9,1 0)
Withdraw CEA's to control Rx power and ASI lAW 2-GOP-1 01 Rx Operating Guidelines step 6.1 (attached page xx)
- Move the IN/HOLD/OUT Switch to the OUT direction Divert letdown to WMS by placing V2500 to WMS to maintain VCT level within normal band.
Program DEH for power increase at a rate not to exceed BOP 4.2 MW/MIN lAW Appendix B step 3 2-GOP-101 (attached page 11) 4 Scenario 1 4
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 62 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) INITIAL
- 69. IF reactor power is greater than 20% AND group 7 is inserted greater than 34 inches, THEN LOG length of time Group 7 was inserted greater than 34 inches:
- Time: _ __
- 70. WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 250 MW, THEN VERIFY Secondary Chemistry meets 30% power administrative limits of COP-05.04.
CHEM NOTE Based on JPN Engineering Evaluation, the RE Supervisor, may recommend to Operations that any or all of the 30% Reactor Power level surveillances be performed at 45% following power ascension that was NOT a result of a refueling outage.
- 71. IF required prior to Reactor Power reaching 30%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN PERFORM the following:
(Section 7 .1.3 Management Directive 14)
A. STOP power ascension.
B. PERFORM 1-0SP-69.01, Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration.
C. ENSURE scheduled lncore surveillances have been performed. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 7)
D. ENSURE lncore Detection System is OPERABLE in accordance with 0-0SP-64.01. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 7)
RE
- 72. WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 300 MW, THEN INITIATE MSR warmup per Attachment 3, MSR Operation.
- 73. IF available, THEN ENSURE second Main Feed Pump is ready to start in accordance with 1-NOP-09.01.
- 74. WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 315 MW, THEN INITIATE placing MSRs in service per Attachment 3, MSR Operation.
5
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 63 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued) INITIAL
- 75. WHEN Reactor Power is at approximately 45%, as indicated on highest reading instrument, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. STOP power ascension.
B. PERFORM Nuclear I Delta T power calibration in accordance with 1-0SP-69.01, Nuclear and Delta T Power Calibration.
(Section 7 .1.3 Management Directive 4)
C. IF NOT performed at 30% Reactor Power, THEN ENSURE scheduled incore surveillance have been performed.
D. IF NOT performed at 30% Reactor Power, THEN ENSURE lncore Detection System is OPERABLE in accordance with 0-0SP-64.01, Reactor Engineering Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 7)
E. IF Condensate Polisher is in service, THEN ENSURE enough Powdex vessels are in service to support a rise in condensate flow.
F. START second Condensate Pump in accordance with 1-NOP-12.03, Condensate System Operation.
G. WARMUP Heater Drain Pumps in accordance with 1-NOP-11.02.
H. VERIFY proper operation of Heater Drain and Vent system as follows:
- VERIFY proper heater levels.
- VERIFY proper operation of normal and alt drain valves.
I. Prior to exceeding 5100 gpm total TCW flow, ENSURE both Turbine Cooling Water Pumps are in operation.
6
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
11 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY t-------------1 6 of 16 PROCEDURE NO.: STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence provided:
- All applicable conditions necessary to perform the step are satisfied and,
- The performance of the out of sequence steps do not change an operational mode and
- Permission is granted from SM/US 6.1 Power Level Escalations NOTE CEAs should be above the Long-term Steady State Insertion Limit (102 inches withdrawn on Group 5) before reaching 20% core power and at a position to begin controlling ASI at the ESI between 20% and 50% power.
Refer to NOP-1 00.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for further guidance.
- 1. As Main Generator loading commences, MAINTAIN T-avg at T-ref by:
A. CEA withdrawal in Manual Sequential.
AND/OR B. Boron concentration changes in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
NOTE Contact Reactor Engineering if further assistance is required when using Appendix B.
- 2. At or above 50% power (or 30% if a shape annealing factor test is performed), refer to Appendix B for power escalation rates.
- 3. At or above 50% power:
A. All planned reactivity additions should be made by boration or dilution in accordance with 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
B. USE CEAs for ASI control, CONSIDER the reactivity effect of CEAs when adjusting ASI.
C. REFER to NOP-1 00.02, Axial Shape Index Control, for specific instructions regarding ASI control during power escalations.
~
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7
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
11 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY 1-P-RO_C_E-DU_R..;.E..;..NO-.:---t STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 7 of 16 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.1 Power Level Escalations (continued)
- 4. !f available, Then ENSURE two Charging Pumps are operating.
If necessary, START an additional Charging Pump in accordance with 2-NOP-02.02, Charging and Letdown.
- 5. PLACE the Pressurizer on recirculation in accordance with Appendix A, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.
- 6. CONTINUE to load the Main Generator in accordance with 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup, Mode 2 to Mode 1.
END OF SECTION 6.1 8
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
28 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 17 of 88 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)
CAUTION Allowing PMW flow rate to exceed the running charging pump(s) capacity while using V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE may cause the VCT relief valve to lift.
- 14. IF using V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE, THEN ENSURE the flow rate on FIA-2212, CHARGING TO REGEN HX, for the number of running charging pumps is NOT exceeded. DDDD NOTE Performance of the following step may result in receipt of annunciator M-26, DEMIN REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FLOW HIGH/LOW
- 15. ADJUST FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, in AUTO or MANUAL to provide flow rate based on volume of primary water to be added per Section 4.2 Step 4. DODD
- IF FIC-2210X, PMW FLOW, does NOT OPEN, THEN PERFORM Attachment 2, FIC-2210 XN Controllers Hard Manual Operating Instructions, to adjust flow. DODD
- 16. IF performing constant dilution flow, THEN VERIFY flow is observable on FIC-2210X, MAKEUP WATER FLOW. DODD
- 17. MAINTAIN PIA-2223, (VCT) PRESSURE $30 psig by opening and DODD closing V2513, (VCT} VENT VALVE.
- 18. IF diverting to maintain VCT level, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in the WMS position. DODD B. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates OPEN. DODD
- c. When normal level on LIC-2226, (VCT) LEVEL, is reached, THEN PLACE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO. DODD D. ENSURE V2500, (VCT) DIVERT VALVE, indicates CLOSED. DODD
- 19. WHEN the predetermined amount of primary water has been added, THEN CLOSE FCV-2210X, REACTOR MAKEUP. DODD 9
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
28 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL 18 of 88 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-NOP-02.24 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Aligning For Manual Dilution (continued)
- 20. IF V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV, was opened, THEN PLACE V2512 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2512 indicates CLOSED. DODD
- 21. IF V2525 BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE, was opened, THEN PLACE V2525 in CLOSE and ENSURE V2525 indicates CLOSED. DODD
- 22. ENSURE FIC-221 OX, PMW FLOW, controller is in MANUAL and REDUCE controller output to MINIMUM. DODD
- 23. MONITOR for any abnormal change in T avg* (RTGB-203) DODD
- 24. RECORD on Attachment 3, Boration I Dilution Log the number of gallons of primary makeup water added, as indicated on FQI-2210X, PMW FLOW TOTALIZER. (Section 7.2 Commitment 1) DODD
- 25. IF additional dilutions are required, OR the expected changes to Tavg or boron concentration are NOT achieved, THEN REPEAT Section 4.2 Step 3 through Section 4.2 Step 24. DODD 10
~~~~--- ~--- ~-----------------------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
11 REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY t-P-RO_C_E_D-UR_E_N_0-.:---1 STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 16 of 16 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX 8 FUEL PRECONDITIONING GUIDELINES (Page 3 of 3)
- 2. For Reduced Power Operation NOTE
- For the power holds below, zero percent power is to be considered less than 2% power.
- For reduced power conditions, fuel is considered conditioned at a particular power level if it has operated at or above that power level for 72 cumulative hours in a 30 day period.
A. The following guidelines shall be employed for reduced power operation.
Down time or time at zero power is not considered as operating time.
B. Operation at reduced power levels for greater than 27 days establishes a reduced power threshold.
C. The reduced power threshold is the highest power level at which the reactor has experienced 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of operation in the preceding 30 days.
D. Power increases above the reduce power threshold should be less than or equal to 3 percent full power per hour, but shall not excee3d an increase of 10% over any 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> period and no single step increase in power shall exceed 10 percent full reactor power.
- 3. Fully Conditioned Fuel A. During a mid cycle shutdown or power reduction where return to full power occurs within 27 days, a maximum power escalation rate of 30 percent I hour applies, provided:
- 1. The fuel is conditioned to 90% power or greater, and
- 2. The core is not experiencing a difference greater than+/- 0.5 RPS ASI units from the cycle predicted ASI.
END OF APPENDIX 8 11
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 2 Page 5 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Raise power to 100%
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Refer to Attachment 3 of 1(2)-GOP201 as NPO when called to support placing MSR's in service.
Control Room Indications Available:
When Generator load is greater than 300 Mw continue with SRO Attachment 3 step 3 of 1(2)-GOP-201 'MSR Operation' (attached page 13-21)
Direct BOP to perform steps to place MSR's in service.
BOP Perform step 3.A (Record temperatures) of Attachment 3 Open MSR block valves when directed, Step 3.8 Coordinate with NPO to continue placing MSR's in service lAW Attachment 3 Monitors dilution and T-avg and Tref and maintain as close as RO possible. (+/- 2°F)
When power is above 50%, control ASIIAW 0-NOP-100.02,
'Axial Shape Index Control' within transient band .+/- 0.1 recommended but should be.+/- 0.2. Step 4.1 (attached page 22,23) 5 Scenario 1 12
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 87 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Oeeration (Page 3 of 11)
A. RECORD the following temperatures prior to opening MSR Block Valves:
DEH Display 5552 TEMPERATURE INITIAL (oF)
LP Turbine 1 Inlet Temperature LP Turbine 2 Inlet Temperature MSR A Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR D Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR B Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature MSR C Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature NOTE A large steam demand may occur when opening the MSR Block Valves. The MSR Block Valves should be opened one at a time, allowing time for the RCS to stabilize.
B. ENSURE the following MSR Block Valves are OPEN:
COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL MV-08-4 1A MSR TCV Block Valve OPEN MV-08-6 1D MSR TCV Block Valve OPEN MV-08-8 1B MSR TCV Block Valve OPEN 13
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 88 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 4 of 11)
- 3. (continued)
NOTE Quench water to the MSRs will be supplied immediately upon opening the MSR Block Valves.
- c. WHEN MSR Block Valves are open, THEN ALIGN the following components to adjust MSR subcooling flow to approximately 6 GPM:
COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V09322 SE-09-1A 1A MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Ownstrm lsol approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4A, FW to1A MSR subcooling V09319 SE-09-18 18 MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Ownstrm lsol approximately 6 GPM on Fl-09-48, FW to 18 MSR subcooling V09328 SE-09-1 0 10 MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Ownstrm lsol approximately 6 GPM on Fl-09-40, FW to 10 MSR subcooling D. OPEN Breaker 1-41637, REHEATER 1B2 BLOCK VALVE MV-08-10. (480V MCC 1B1 Turbine)
NOTE Manual Operation of Motor Operated Valves is performed using OP 1250020, Valve, Breaker, Motor and Instrument Instructions.
E. THROTTLE OPEN MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE as directed by US/SM.
F. ALIGN the following component to adjust MSR subcooling flow to approximately 6 GPM:
14
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 89 of 9S PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (PageS of 11)
- 3. F. (continued)
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V09325 SE-09-1C 1C MSR THROTTLE OPEN to maintain Subcooling Dwnstrm lsol approximately 6 GPM on FI-09-4C, FW to 1C MSR subcooling NOTE
- MSR TCV seat leakage is normal and desired. After the MSR Block Valves are opened, a minimal increase of LP Turbine inlet temperature (1 aoF) is used as indication of sufficient TCV seat leakage.
- IF any LP Turbine inlet temperature OR MSR outlet temperature fails to have risen at least 1aoF, THEN MSR outlet temperatures to the LP Turbines should be used to identify which MSR is NOT contributing to warm-up.
- The LP Inlet Steam Temperature change rate shall NOT exceed a rate of 75°F/hour.
- The LP Inlet Steam Temperature step change shall NOT exceed 2S°F every 2a minutes.
- Instantaneous changes of steam temperature to the LP Turbine Inlets should be limited to a maximum of sao F.
- The temperature difference between the steam entering the inlet on one side of an LP Turbine and that entering the other side should not exceed sao F.
- The maximum allowable steam inlet temperature difference between LP Turbine 1 and LP Turbine 2 is sao F.
G. MONITOR LP Turbine warm-up as follows:
(1) ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL is open.
(display SSS2)
(2) CONSULT with SM/US to determine sufficient time to allow LP Turbine inlet temperature rise of at least 1a°F.
15
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 90 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 6 of 11)
- 3. (continued)
H. WHEN sufficient time has passed to allow LP Turbine inlet temperature to rise at least 10°F, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) ENSURE DEH display 5552, MSR CONTROL PANEL, is open.
(2) RECORD the following temperatures for use as indication of sufficient MSR TCV seat leakage:
DEH display 5552 points TEMPERATURE INITIAL (oF)
LP Turbine 1 Inlet Temperature LP Turbine 2 Inlet Temperature MSR A Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR D Outlet to LP Turbine 1 Temperature MSR B Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature MSR C Outlet to LP Turbine 2 Temperature (3) VERIFY all MSR outlet temperatures previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.A have risen greater than 10°F.
(4) VERIFY both LP Turbine Inlet Temperatures previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.A have risen greater than 10°F.
I. RECORD time and date both Turbine inlet temperatures and all MSR outlet temperatures have risen greater than 10°F above previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.A:
Date I Time: I 16
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 91 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 7 of 11)
NOTE MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE will be throttled as directed by US/SM.
A. ENSURE DEH display 5552, MSR CONTROL PANEL, is open.
B. VERIFY display 5552, MODE OF OPERATION group, indicates LOAD > 25%.
C. ENSURE MSRs have soaked for greater than 45 minutes from time previously recorded in Attachment 3 Step 3.1:
Date I Time: I D. SET MSR heatup rate to 70°F/HOUR as follows:
(1) ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL is open.
(display 5552)
(2) TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T") I raise
("A") from TEMP RAMP RATE pop-up to set Temp Ramp Rate to 70°F/HOUR. (display 7096)
(3) TOUCH ENTER. (display 7096)
(4) VERIFY AUTO RAMP INTERFACE group displays 70°F/HOUR.
17
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PlANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 92 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 8 of 11 )
- 4. (continued)
E. INITIATE MSR heatup as follows:
(1) TOUCH SELECT MODE from MODE OF OPERATION group. (display 5552)
(2) TOUCH AUTO TEMP or AUTO TIME from MODE OF OPERATION SELECT pop-up per US/SM direction. (display 7060)
(3) TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.
(display 5552)
(4) TOUCH GO on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.
(display 7069) 18
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 93 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 MSR Operation (Page 9 of 11)
- 4. (continued)
F. IF necessary to suspend MSR heatup, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.
(display 5552)
(2) TOUCH HOLD on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.
(display 7069)
NOTE
- Display 5552 provides a MSR TEMPERATURE RATE/HR group that displays the heatup rate in DEGF/H.
- If DEH automatically suspends the MSR heatup, once the heatup rate lowers below 75°F/HOUR, then DEH will permit the heatup to be restarted.
- If DEH automatically suspends the MSR heatup, then manual action will be required to restart the heatup. DEH will NOT automatically re-establish heatup.
G. IF desired to resume MSR heatup, THEN PERFORM the following:
{1) TOUCH GO/HOLD on RAMP GO/HOLD group.
(display 5552)
(2) TOUCH GO on MSR RAMP MODE SELECT pop-up.
(display 7069) 19
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 94 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Oeeration (Page 1 0 of 11)
- 4. (continued)
H. WHEN MSR heatup is completed, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) Locally VERIFY the following MSR TCVs are fully OPEN:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL TCV-08-1 MS to 1A MSR OPEN TCV-08-3 MS to 1B MSR OPEN TCV-08-4 MS to 1C MSR OPEN TCV-08-2 MS to 1D MSR OPEN (2) ENSURE SA and 58 MSR vents are positioned as follows:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V11836 MSR 1A Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 5B LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN V11831 MSR 1B Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 5B LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN V11846 MSR 1C Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 5A LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN V11841 MSR 1D Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 5A LOCKED 3 TURNS OPEN (3) ENSURE MSR vents to Condenser are CLOSED:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL V11829 1A MSR Scavenging Vent to 1B Cndsr lsol CLOSED V11834 1B MSR to 1B Cndsr MSR Scavenging Vent lsol CLOSED V11839 1C MSR Scavenging Vent Isol CLOSED V11844 1D MSR Scavenging Vent Isol CLOSED 20
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 95 of 95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 11 of 11)
- 4. H. {continued)
(4) WHEN MV-08-10, 1C MSR TCV BLOCK VALVE is full OPEN locally, THEN PERFORM the following:
RCO
- b. CLOSE Breaker 1-41637, REHEATER 1B2 BLOCK VALVE MV-08-10.
(480V MCC 1B1 Turbine)
RCO
{5) ENSURE MSR Warmup Valves are CLOSED:
COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL MV-08-5 Warmup 1A MSR CLOSED MV-08-7 Warmup 1D MSR CLOSED MV-08-9 Warmup 18 MSR CLOSED MV-08-11 Warmup 1C MSR CLOSED 21
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX CONTROL 8 of 25 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-NOP-100.02 ST. LUCIE PLANT 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 General
- 1. REVIEW Section 2.0, PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
- 2. REVIEW Section 3.0, PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS.
NOTE Reactor Engineering will furnish an ESI for Operations at various times throughout the cycle. On new reload cores, ESI guidance is provided in 3200092, Reactor Engineering Power Ascension Program.
- 3. IF assistance is needed for ASI control, THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering.
NOTE Inserting Shutdown CEAs and Regulating CEAs (other than the lead bank) up to 129 inches withdrawn during EOC shutdowns should provide enough ASI control to avoid LPD pre-trips.
- 4. APPLY Axial shape control under the following conditions:
- At all times when core power is at or above 40% of rated power
- Should be considered and established as soon as possible after exceeding 25% power
- 5. PERFORM the following for ASI control:
A. BORATE OR DILUTE per 1(2)-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
B. USE Group 7 for Unit 1 ASI control.
C. USE Group 5 for Unit 2 ASI control.
22
---~------,-~~-
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX CONTROL 9 of25 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-NOP-100.02 ST. LUCIE PLANT 4.1 General {continued)
- 5. {continued)
D. IF power is above 50%, THEN MAINTAIN the ASI within the I following control bands:
- Steady State band- +/- 0.5 during steady state operation
- Transient band (Section 7 .1.3 Management Directive 2)
- +/- 0.1 during load transients is recommended but should be within+/- 0.2
- +/- 0.5 during load transients with concurrence from Reactor Engineering E. IF necessary, THEN USE Shutdown Groups and Reg.
Groups 1 - 6 on Unit 1 (Reg. Groups 1 - 4 for Unit 2) for ASI control, as long as the Shutdown Groups and the Reg. Groups (other than the lead group) are maintained greater than 129" withdrawn.
F. IF performing power manipulations between 100% and approximately 90% power, THEN USE the full power ESI for ASI control unless Reactor Engineering provides other written guidance.
G. IF performing reactor startups and shutdowns, or power maneuvers outside of the band of 100% to approximately 90%
power, THEN USE the sliding ESI graph for ASI control unless Reactor Engineering provides other written guidance.
23
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# Page 6 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Containment Airlock Door Fails Leak Test Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Shortly after the turnover, call the Control Room and notify the SRO the Containment outer personnel air lock door has failed the leak test.
Control Room Indications Available: None SRO T.S. Notify SM of door failure.
Implement 2-AOP-68.01, 'Loss of Containment Integrity I Air Locks' step 4.2.2.2.1 (attached page 25)
Applies T.S. 3.6.1.3 determines Action a.1 maintain the operable door closed and either restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock the Operable door closed.
6 Scenario 1 24
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
0 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY I AIR LOCKS 7 of 12 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-68.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4
- 1. VERIFY CONTAINMENT 1.1 REFER TO Tech Spec Section VESSEL INTEGRITY is met. 3.6.1.1 for required actions.
D 2. VERIFY both doors CLOSED and sealed for each containment air 2.1 IF one containment air lock door is inoperable, lock. THEN PERFORM the following:
A. REFER TO Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.3 for required actions.
B. MAINTAIN at least the OPERABLE air lock door CLOSED.
C. RESTORE the inoperable door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or LOCK the OPERABLE door CLOSED.
2.2 IF at least one containment air lock door will NOT close and seal, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. REFER TO Tech Spec Section 3.6.1.3 for required actions.
B. CONTACT Maintenance for assistance.
2.3 IF outer containment air lock door is inoperable, THEN ENSURE interior door equalizing valve is CLOSED.
25
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 3 Page 7 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Reactor Water Makeup Valve FCV-2210X Drifts Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
- Trigger Event 2, FRC-2210X Reactor Makeup Water valve fails full (output) open on examiner cue.
When contacted as I&C, wait 5 minutes and report that a there is a valve positioner problem.
EXAMINERS NOTE: No specific procedural guidance for this failure.
Control Room Indications Available: primary water flow increasing, reactor power increasing, RCS temperature increasing Recognize FRC-2210X full output:
- Primary water flow rate about 90 gpm
- Reactor Power increasing
Direct RO to attempt to manually close FCV-221 OX. Direct RO to close MV-2525 Boron Load Control Valve when FCV-2210X SRO does not close or may direct the RO to turn off primary water pump.
Direct RO to monitor Promary plant parameters as Xenon is SRO building in and dilution is not available.
SRO Contacts I&C to repair FCV-221 OX Direct BOP to 'HOLD' on Turbine. May direct Turbine load SRO reduction as Xenon builds in and no way to dilute.
BOP Place Turbine on HOLD when directed.
SRO Notifies shift manager.
7 Scenario 1 26
~-~--------
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 4 Page 8 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Bearing Failure on the 2A TCW pump.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 3, 2A TCW pp bearing failure.
Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger 'Fix FCV-221 OX' and call as 1/C that FCV-221 OX has been repaired.
Note to Evaluator: This malfunction ramps in over 8 minutes {pump will trip after 8 minutes}.
Control Room Indications Available: No annunciation until the 2A TCW pp trips then E-34 will alarm {2A TCW pp ovrld/trip}, then Generator alarms.
SRO Refer to 2-AOP-13.01, TCW System and direct subsequent Actions: (section 4.2.1.1) (attached page 28,29)
- 1) Start one TCW pump (28) as required by unit load.
- 2) Maintain the TCW discharge header cross-tie open.
Recognize rising amp indication on the 2A TCW pump BOP ammeter and secure the pump prior to overload I trip conditions.
Contact the field operator and make preparations for a start of the 28 TCW pump.
When directed start the 28 TCW pump.
Verify secondary alarms clear after 28 TCW pump running.
Exit the AOP after the 28 TCW pump has been started and SRO subsequent actions are complete After 1/C reports FCV-210X repaired. SRO MAY Continue with NOTE the unit up power but not exceed the limits of one TCW pump
(-50% power).
8 Scenario 1 27
- ----------~----~~~--------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
3 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 6 of 28 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-13.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions D 1. VERIFY one or two TCW pumps in service based on unit load.
1.1 START one or two pumps as required.
A. IF neither pump can be started, THEN PERFORM the following at the direction of the US:
(1} LOWER VARS to minimum.
(2} PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Down power.
B. IF only one TCW pump can be started and both pumps are required, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1} OPEN SB13139, TCW DISCHARGE HEADER CROSSTIE, to align flow to TCW heat exchangers.
(TGB/28/S-22/W-K)
(2} LOWER VARS to minimum.
28
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
3 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 7 of 28 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-13.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 1. (continued)
(3) PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower, to within the heat removal capabilities of one TCW pump.
D 2. VERIFY NO leaks by performing visual inspection of the TCW 2.1 IF leak can be isolated without impacting cooling capability, System. THEN ISOLATE leak.
2.2 IF isolation of leak will impact unit operation, THEN PERFORM the following prior to isolating leak:
A. LOWER VARS to minimum.
B. PERFORM 2-AOP-22.01 I Rapid Downpower.
D 3. IF two TCW pumps are running and one pump must be secured, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. LOWER VARS to minimum.
29
~~-~~~~~~~~-
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 5 Page 9 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
PT-80138 Fails Low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger event 4, PT-80138 Fails Low.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators: Q-2 ESFAS ATI Fault, SG Press trip, TMLP trip, MSIS trip.
Direct the implementation of 2-AOP-99.01 step 4.1 (attached, Page 31-33) S/G pressure Channel Failure section 4.2.10.
SRO T.S.
Implement T.S. 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 Table 3.3-1 and 3.3-3.
(attached page 34-39)
Direct placing ESFAS Channel MB S/G 2A Pressure (MSIS),
Channel B AFAS-1 and 2, Channel MB TM/LP (RPS) and SROT.S.
Channel MB Low SG Pressure (RPS) in bypass or trip lAW 2-AOP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation' step 4.2.1 0.
Recognize PT-8013B has failed low. RPS bistables TMLP and RO Lo SG Press have tripped.
Bypass or trip ESFAS Channel MB S/G 2A Pressure (MSIS) as directed.
- Obtain key 114 and 134.
Bypass or trip RPS channel MB TM/LP (RPS) and Channel MB Low SG Pressure as directed.
- Obtain key 105 and 107 .
Bypass or trip AFAS channel MB
- Obtain key 202 and 204 and use pushbuttons 9 Scenario 1 30
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 10 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A TRANSMITTER failure can be discriminated from a METER failure by the presence of annunciators and protection and control actuations.
D 1. CONFIRM failed channel by any of the following methods:
- Channel check comparison with redundant channels
- Bistable or status lights
- Any instrument-related testing or surveillance procedure in progress 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE BISTABLE TRIP UNIT is abbreviated as BTU in this AOP.
D 1. IF entering this procedure to restore an affected channel, THEN GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
31
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 26 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.10 5/G Pressure Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument and channel:
- Pl-8013 A I B I C I D
- Pl-8023 A I B I C I D NOTE
- Bypassing ESFAS BTUs will require door Key 114 and either Key 134 or 136.
- Bypassing AFAS will require Key 202 and one of the following keys; 203, 204, 205, or 206.
then it is preferable to leave the AFAS BTUs in BYPASS.
(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)
- An AFAS channel in the TRIPPED condition is limited to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> per Tech Spec 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3. (Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)
D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed:
(Key 105)
- TMILO PRESS (RPS)
(Key 107)
- For Pl-8013 OR Pl-8023 AFAS-1
- For Pl-8013 OR Pl-8023 AFAS-2 32
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 27 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I I CONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.10 S/G Pressure Channel Failure (continued)
- 2. (continued)
- For Pl-8013 only S/G 2A PRESS (MSIS)
(Key 134)
- For Pl-8023 only S/G 28 PRESS (MSIS)
(Key 136)
A. BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitches and pushbuttons.
OR B. TRIP affected BTUs per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.
33
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
As shown in Table 3.3-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.
4.3.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to each reactor startup unless performed during the preceding 92 days. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.
Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.
ST. LUCIE- UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 67 34
TABLE 3.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 1. Manual Reactor Trip 4 2 4 1, 2 1 4 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 5
- 2. Variable Power Level- High 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#
- 3. Pressurizer Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2#
- 4. Thermal Margin/Low Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#
- 5. Containment Pressure- High 4 2 3 1' 2 2#
- 6. Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4/SG 2/SG(b) 3/SG 1, 2 2#
- 7. Steam Generator Pressure 4 2(a)(d) 3 1, 2 2#
Difference- High 35
- 8. Steam Generator Level - Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 2#
- 9. Local Power Density- High 4 2(c)(d) 3 1 2#
- 10. Loss of Component Cooling Water to Reactor Coolant Pumps 4 2 3 1' 2 2#
- 11. Reactor Protection System Logic 4 2 3 1, 2 2#
3*, 4*, 5* 5
- 12. Reactor Trip Breakers 4 2(f) 4 1, 2 4 3*, 4*, 5* 5
- 13. Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor
- a. Startup and Operating -
Rate of Change of Power- 4 2(e)(g) 3 1, 2 2#
High
- b. Shutdown 4 0 2 3,4,5 3
- 14. Reactor Coolant Flow- Low 4/SG 2/SG(a)(d) 3/SG 1, 2 2#
- 15. Loss of Load (Turbine Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low) 4 2(c) 3 1 2#
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 60
TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - a. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.
- b. With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the following conditions are satisfied:
- 1. Verify that one of the inoperable channels has been bypassed and place the other inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- 2. All functional units affected by the bypassed/tripped channel shall also be placed in the bypassed/tripped condition.
With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below:
Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed
- 1. Safety Channel - Nuclear Instrumentation Wide Range Rate of Change of Power- High (RPS)
Linear Range Variable Power Level- High (RPS)
Local Power Density- High (RPS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
- 2. Pressurizer Pressure - Pressurizer Pressure- High (RPS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure - Low (ESF)
- 3. Containment Pressure- Containment Pressure- High (RPS)
Containment Pressure- High (ESF)
- 4. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure- Low (RPS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Steam Generator Pressure - Low (ESF)
- 5. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level - Low (RPS)
If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)
If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. ~. +J, 149 36
~-~*---*-*--*----------------
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
- a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.
4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.
The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No.
of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.
ST. LUCIE- UNIT 2 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 67 37
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION (MSIS)
- a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 16
- b. Steam Generator 4/steam 2/steam 3/steam 1, 2, 3(c) 13*, 14 Pressure - Low generator generator generator
- c. Containment Pressure -
4 2 3 1, 2, 3 13*, 14 High
- d. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 12
- b. Refueling Water Storage 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 19 Tank- Low
- c. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 12 ST. LUCIE- UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 00, 132
- ---------~------~~~------------
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is less than 1836 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 1836 psia.
(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.
(c) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 700 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 700 psia.
- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
ACTION OF STATEMENTS ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
ACTION 13 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status no later than during the next COLD SHUTDOWN.
With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.
Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed
Containment Pressure- High (RPS)
- 2. Steam Generator Pressure - Steam Generator Pressure - Low (MSIS)
AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 (AFAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
Steam Generator Pressure- Low (RPS)
- 3. Steam Generator Level - Steam Generator Level- Low (RPS)
If SG-2A, then AFAS-1 (AFAS)
If SG-2B, then AFAS-2 (AFAS)
- 4. Pressurizer Pressure- Pressurizer Pressure- High (RPS)
Pressurizer Pressure - Low (SIAS)
Thermal Margin/Low Pressure (RPS)
ST. LUCIE- UNIT 2 3/4 3-15 Amendment No. 28, ~. 149 39
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 6 Page 10 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
2A1 RCP Seal HX Cooler outlet valve HCV-14-11A1 Closes Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 5, RCP 2A1 Seal HX Outlet valve HCV-11A1 fails closed.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator J-25 2A1 RCP Seal Trouble, cooling Wtr Flow Low Examiners note: When HCV is taken back to AUTO from OPEN RESET, after a short time delay the HCV will re-close.
Acknowledge annunciator. Recognize and communicate HCV-RO 14-11A1 is closed.
Monitors 2A 1 RCP seal temperatures Implement 2-AOP-01.09A 1, '2A 1 Reactor Coolant Pump' step SRO 4.2.7. (attached page 41 ,42)
Direct BOP to determine if increase CCW activity rising trend is indicated.
When no activity indicated direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset and verify open indication. Step 4.2. 7.1.2 When HCV re-closes direct HCV to be taken to Open/Reset and leave the control switch to Open. Step 4.2. 7.1.2 When directed, place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and back RO to AUTO.
When directed, place HCV-14-11A1 to OPEN/Reset and leave RO in that position.
Observe RC-26-1 and RC-26-2 CCW radiation and determine BOP no activity increase.
10 Scenario 1 40
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
0 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 31 of 59 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.09A1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature NOTE
- Valve HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, closes on high seal cooler outlet temperature (200°F) and fails open on loss of instrument air or loss of power.
- Maintaining HCV-14-11A1 control switch in OPEN overrides the automatic closure function on seal cooler outlet high temperature.
- If a high temperature condition exists upon release of the control switch, there is a 1 minute time delay before closure of valve.
- CCW radiation monitors should be closely monitored for indication of RCS to CCW leakage when the control switch is maintained in OPEN.
- Consideration should be given to returning the control switch to the AUTO position once the valves have been opened.
CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow to the RCP coolers can result in thermal stress and flashing in the heat exchanger upon re-admittance of cooling water flow.
D 1. NAVIGATE to 2A1 PUMP DETAILS and 1.1 IF CCW activity rising trend is indicated on RR-26-1/2, RAD VERIFY HCV-14-11A1, SEAL MONITORING PANEL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, RECORDERS, OPEN. THEN PLACE HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE, control switch in CLOSED.
1.2 IF CCW activity rising trend is NOT indicated, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. PLACE HCV-14-11A1, SEAL COOLER HX ISOL VALVE control switch to OPEN RESET and VERIFY OPEN indication.
41
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
0 2A 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 32 of 59 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.09A1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.7 RCP 2A1 CCW Low Flow I High Temperature (continued}
- 1. (continued}
B. EVALUATE placing control switch in AUTO.
C. IF valve re-closes after returning control switch to AUTO, THEN OBTAIN US permission prior to re-opening.
D 2. IF§.!! of the following conditions 2.1 PERFORM the following:
are satisfied within 10 minutes, A. IF CEA TCBs are OPEN,
- CBO temperature less than B. IF CEA TCBs are 250°F CLOSED,
- Lower Seal Cavity THEN PERFORM the temperature less than 250°F following:
THEN GOTO (1} TRIP reactor.
Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
(2} STOP 2A1 RCP.
(3} IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
D 3. RESTORE CCW to 2A 1 RCP within 30 minutes.
3.1 GO TO Section 4.2.12.
D 4. GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 4.
42
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 7 and 8 Page 11 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 2B EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 8, MSIV closes, LOOP, two MSSV's stick open.
Call as Unit 1, we are also in a LOOP Two minutes after the trip, call as NPO and report two MSSV's on the 28 SG are open Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator P-49 MSIV HCV-08-1 B Air Press Low/DC Failure will annunciate a couple seconds before the MSIV closes, Unit trip.
Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
- RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal
- BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of BOP EOP-99.
Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
Recognize loss of offsite power and verify both EDG started and loaded on the busses.
11 Scenario 1 43
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 7 and 8 Page 12 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 28 EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: On SIAS the 2B EDG output breaker will open (as designed) but fails tore-close and sequence on the bus. Breaker can be closed manually from the RTGB.
SRO Direct closing 28 EDG output breaker after SIAS CRITICAL sequencing failed to reclose breaker. This will provide power to the 28 AFW pump TASK BOP Recognize 28 EDG breaker did notre-close on SIAS and close CRITICAL when directed. This will provide power to the 28 AFW pump TASK Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control RO
- Verify Reactor power is lowering .
- Verify startup rate is negative .
- Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .
Inventory Control
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
- Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%
Pressure Control
- Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20°F 12 Scenario 1 44
~~~~-
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 7 and 8 Page 13 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 2B EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Core Heat Removal RO
- Verify loop delta Tis <10°F RCS Heat Removal
- Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0 SG level is between 20 and 83% NR 0 Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR
- S/G pressure is between 835 and 915 psig 0 Close HCV-08-1A if SG pressure <735 psia
- MSR warmup valves are closed
- If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED (N/A LOOP)
If RCS approaches 500°F ensure:
- Emergency borate when directed (from RCS Heat Removal Safety Function)
Ensure V2525 Load control valve closed Start 2B BAM Pump Close V2651 Tank 2B Recirc valve Open V2514 Emergency Borate valve 13 Scenario 1 45
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 7 and 8 Page 14 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MSIV Closes, LOOP, Two MSSV's Stick Open, 28 EDG Output Breaker Fails to Close after opening on SIAS, SPTA's Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig BOP
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120°F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms 14 Scenario 1 46
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 9 Page 15 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MV-09-11 Fails to Open, Enter EOP ESDE Time ~ Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger restore Instrument Air per Appendix H of EOP-99.
If called as NPO to manually open MV-09-11, 2C AFW pump to 2A SG report back MV-09-11 is frozen and will not open.
Control Room Indications Available: MV-09-11 closed indication {green light).
Enter 2-EOP-05 ESD after analysis from Diagnostic Flow chart SRO (attached page 48)
Direct STA perform Safety Function Status Check's (SFSC) every 15 minutes.
NOTE: When STA performs RCS Heat Removal Safety Function, he is to inform the US this Safety Function is not met due to SG levels are not being restored with Feedwater Notifies shift manager of event and need to classify Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sampling SG's (attached page 49,50)
Direct AFW flow initiated to the 2A SG by starting the 2C AFW pump (MV-08-13, steam from the 2A SG) and MV-09-11 2C AFW to 2A SG. (may have been done earlier)
Ensure SIAS (if setpoint reached)
Ensure closed MSIV's and MFIV's If CCW lost to RCP's for >30 minutes ensure CCW remains isolated Protect the Main Condenser. Refer to Appendix X section 2 (attached page 51-54) 15 Scenario 1 47
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
28 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS PROCEDURE NO.:
17 of 17 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 CHART 1 DIAGNOSTIC FLOW CHART (Page 1 of 1)
N An Operator Ad has been pfaeed .n 1t1* Uot 2 Conl:rol Room us desk
(.AJly llt~oo to thi$ s~~, ot tiH!
pmr..(!dul'tl ~hall~ tM valldey of lhe ()peflliO< Aid n ao<l, ChO"'J"" .,.,
~ry, notify 1he EOP Coordm3tor, 48
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 3 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)
A Train(--./) B Train(--./)
D 1. !fa LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
D A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
D B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.
CAUTION If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.
NOTE
- HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-88) starts to open
- When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset D 2. !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:
- HCV-14-8A
- HCV-14-9 OR
- HCV-14-88
- HCV-14-10 49
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 4 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)
D 3. !f the 'N' Header has been restored, Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:
A. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE.
B. OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.
D 4. !f the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples for isotopic activity and Tritium.
D 5. !f SIGs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.
END OF APPENDIX A 50
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 118 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC.
D 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.
D 3. !f AFAS has actuated, and use of Main Feedwater is desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
D A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET.
D B. ENSURE Steam Generator levels are being restored using Auxiliary Feedwater D C. ENSURE BOTH SIG [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
- 1. MV-09-5
- 2. MV-09-6 D D. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
D E. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
D F. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
51
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 119 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. (continued)
D G. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control SIG levels.
D H. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.
D 4. !f AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater is desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
D A. ENSURE BOTH SIG [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
D B. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
D C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
D D. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
D E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control SIG levels.
D 5. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.
52
*----~----~-
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 120 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 6. ENSURE BOTH of the following:
0 A. Bearing Oil Pump 0 A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and Seal Oil Backup Pump RUNNING.
RUNNING.
0 B. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm, Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.
0 7. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.
0 8. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.
0 9. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing 0 9.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust Oil temperature between 11 0 to TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler 120°F. to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 11 0 to 120°F.
0 10. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO 0 10.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:
rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.
0 A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.
0 B. VERIFY the Tl:Jrning Gear Permissive Light is ON.
0 C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.
0 D. Locally START the Turning Gear.
53
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 121 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 11.1f Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.
D 12. Place Boron Dilution Alarm D 12.11f BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation. System channels are NOT operating, When indicated Reactor power is Then PERFORM applicable less than 1o-5%, actions of 2-AOP-02.01, Boron Then PERFORM BOTH of the Concentration Control System following: (BCCS) Abnormal Operations.
D A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.
D B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.
NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliability if 15 KW heaters are not energized after plant shutdown.
D 13.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.1 0, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.
D 14. CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.
END OF APPENDIX X 54
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 9 Page 16 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MV-09-11 Fails to Open, Enter EOP ESDE Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: :If asked to attempt to manually open MV-09-11, three minutes later state the valve would not move and the handwheel broke in attempt to open.
When directed to open AFW crossties, wait three minutes and state MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are open.
Control Room Indications Available: When AFW flow initiated, MV-09-11 2C AFW to 2A SG fails to open. On SIAS the 2B EDG output breaker will open (as designed) but fails to re-close and sequence on the bus. Breaker can be closed manually from the RTGB.
When directed to align the 2C AFW pump to feed the 2A SG BOP report MV-09-11 2C to 2A will not open. Call NPO to investigate MV-09-11 Implement 2-AOP-09.02 Auxiliary Feedwater Attachment 4 step 2 2B AFW pump to feed 2A S/G (attached page 56) OR 2-SRO NOP-09.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation, step 4.4.2 2B AFW Pump to 2A S/G. (attached page 57)
CRITICAL Direct opening MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves and throttle MV-09-9 to restore feed to 2A SG using TASK 2B AFW pump.
When directed, call NPO to open MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves. NOTE BOP should close MV-09-9 first When directed perform Appendix A of EOP-99 Sampling SG's When directed close CCW to I from RCPS's Direct the 2B SG isolated lAW EOP-99 Appendix R (attached SRO page 58-60). Recognize step in Appendix to stop the 2B AFW should NOT be performed and communicate this to the BOP.
16 Scenario 1 55
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 29 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Cross-Connecting AFW (Page 3 of 4)
- 2. 28 AFW pump to feed 2A S/G:
A. ENSURE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO 2A S/G VALVE, is CLOSED. (RTG8-202)
B. START Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 28.
C. OPEN SE-09-3, 28 PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV.
(RTG8-202- Key 84)
NOTE Key-switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 are located in 2A/28 AFW Pump Room. Two keys are required since the keys are removable in CLOSE only.
CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 while in MODES 1, 2, 3 will make two independent AFW flow paths inoperable.
D. Locally OPEN MV-09-13, 2A TO 28 AFW HDR CROSS-TIE.
(TRSL/21/N-T5/W-TA) (Key 301)
E. Locally OPEN MV-09-14, 28 TO 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE.
(TRSL/21/S-T6/W-TA) (Key 301)
CAUTION The 28 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm.
F. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A S/G.
{RTG8-202)
G. IF feeding the 28 S/G, THEN THROTTLE MV-09-1 0, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE, to maintain proper flow.
56
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION 17 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-NOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.4.2 28 AFW PUMP to 2A S/G. INITIAL NOTE Control switches for MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 Cross-Tie valves are located in the 2A I 28 AFW PP Room. The control switches are key operated (#301 ).
Two keys are necessary as the keys are removable in CLOSE only.
CAUTION Opening both MV-09-13, 2A to 28 AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, and MV 09 14, 28 to 2A AFW HDR CROSS-TIE, while in Modes 1, 2, or 3 can only be performed by declaring one AFW train inoperable. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 1)
- 1. ENSURE PUMP 28 is running.
- 3. ENSURE the RCS is in MODEs 4, 5, or 6.
Current plant MODE_ __
(#301) to OPEN.
- 5. VERIFY valve is OPEN by local control box indication.
(#301) to OPEN.
- 7. VERIFY the valve is OPEN by local control box indication.
NOTE MV-09-1 0 should be closed unless feeding of both S/Gs is desired.
- 8. THROTTLE MV-09-9, PUMP 2A DISCH TO SG 2A VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 2A S/G.
CAUTION The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is limited to a total pump flow of 425 gpm.
- 9. IF flow is desired to the 28 S/G while filling the 2A S/G, THEN THROTTLE MV-09-10, PUMP 28 DISCH TO SG 28 VALVE, as necessary to establish and maintain desired flow to 28 S/G.
57
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 96 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 4 of 6)
Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation NOTE
- Local actions are located in step 18 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.
- Keys 82 and 81 are required for closing MV-08-17, 2B SIG ATMOSPHERIC ISOL, and MV-08-16, 2B SIG ADV ISOL. Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLE/TRIP (contingency).
CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.
D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1B, Main Steam Header 'B' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.
D 2. .!f HCV-08-1 B did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.
REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.
D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1 B, MSIV Header 'B' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.
If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.
D 4. ENSURE HCV-09-2A, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
D 5. ENSURE HCV-09-2B, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
(continued on next page) 58
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 97 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 5 of 6)
Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-2A and HCV-09-28, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 28, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:
D MV-09-6, Stm Gen 28 Reg Block Valve D LCV-9006, 28 15% Bypass D MV-09-4, 28 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.
D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-5, 28 SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.
D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-6, 28 SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.
D 9. ENSURE MV-08-198, 28 SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
D 10.CLOSE MV-08-17, 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 82)
D 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 28, in STOP.
D 12.ENSURE MV-09-10, Pump 28 Disch to SG 28 Valve, is CLOSED.
D 13.ENSURE MV-09-12, Pump 2C to SG 28, is CLOSED.
D 14. PLACE MV-08-12, SG 28 Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.
D 15.1f MV-08-12, SIG 28 Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required, Then CLOSE MV 08-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)
D 16.ENSURE MV-08-188, 28 SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
D 17.CLOSE MV-08-16, 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 81)
(continued on next page) 59
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 98 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DAPPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 6 of 6)
Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete. !fa SGTR is in progress, Then the SM should be informed of the status of terminating contaminated steam release forE-Pian purposes. Continue with local actions.
D 18. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:
D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09158, 2C AFW Pump to 28 SIG Isolation.
D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09136, 28 AFW Pump to 28 SIG Isolation.
D C. CLOSE SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.
D D. !f SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08883, SE-08-1 Inlet Isolation.
D E. !f MV-08-12, SIG 28 Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-12 using the handwheel.
D 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:
D a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.
D b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:
D V08622, CB #67 Drain D V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 2 END OF APPENDIX R 60
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# Event# 9 Page 17 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
MV-09-11 Fails to Open, Enter EOP ESDE Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None BOP When MV-09-13 and MV-09-14 AFW crosstie valves are CRITICAL opened, throttle open MV-09-9 to feed the 2B SG.
TASK When directed isolate the 2B SG lAW EOP-99 Appendix R (attached page 58-60) NOTE: If not mentioned by SRO, BOP recognize step in Appendix to place 2B AFW switch to STOP should NOT be performed due to that is the only AFW pump available.
When 2B SG has blown dry direct stabilization of RCS SRO temperature within the limits of Figure 1A (attached page xx) using the 2A SG ADV's.
RO Open 2A SG ADV's to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of Figure 1A.
THE SUGGESTED TERMINATION POINT IS:
- 1) AFW RESTORED TO THE 2A S/G
- 2) THE 28 S/G IS ISOLATED
- 3) RCS TEMPERATURE IS CONTROLLED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF FIGURE 1A 17 Scenario 1 61
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:
Protected Train: B Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: .03 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Raise power to 100%
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A AFW pump T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action a.
2A BAM Pump N/A with 2B BAM pump available 2A Charging Pump N/A with 2B and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps available.
OPS 513's:
Locked in Annunciators:
G-44 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS lsol N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD Current Status:
Unit 1 at 100% power, Unit 2 at 30% power MOL. 1(2)-GOP-201 is complete up to step
- 71. A 7 gpm dilution to the suction of the Charging pumps is in progress due to Xenon building in. Pressurizer is on recirc. The Unit is returning to power after a 6 day Short Notice Outage for storm water intrusion in the secondary plant. Engineering has just left the Containment after taking some engineering measurements for upcoming modifications. Chemistry has just released the power ascension hold. Directions for the shift are to raise power to 100%
Equipment Problems:
2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak. 2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals. None of the above are expected to be returned to service this shift.
18 Scenario 1 62
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: HLC 21-NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions: Power is approximately 5x1 0-4% power, MOL. Raise power to 10-12% in preparation for rolling the turbine.
Turnover: 2A Boric Acid Makeup pump is out of service to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump is out of service for leaking plunger.
Critical Tasks:
- Start 2B HPSI pump Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RIRO Raise power to 10-12% power.
N I BOP, SRO 2 1 II RO TIC-2223 Letdown Temperature Controller malfunction. CVCS IX Bypass valve V2520 does not reposition.
3 2 T.S. I SRO RWT level instrument LIS 07 -2B fails low 4 3 CIBOP SBCS valve PCV-8801 fails open.
5 4 CIRO, CEA #59 Slipped >15 inches (Recoverable).
T.S. I SRO 6 5 MIAII CEA #14 and #1 fall into the core. RCO should trip the unit. On the trip, a Pressurizer Safety will open fully and then close back to a leak after pressure drops below 900 psia (LOCA). Loss of 480V MCC 2A6 also occurs on the Rx trip.
7 6 CIBOP 2B HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 The crew will assume the watch with the plant stable at approximately 5x1 0-4% power.
They will perform a power ascension to 10-12% power and prepare to place the unit on line.
During the power ascension TIC-2223 fails low causing CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger be reduced to zero. When the letdown high temperature auto close setpoint is reached, CVCS IX bypass valve V2520 does not isolate letdown to the CVCS IX's.
Manual control of TIC-2223 is required, lAW section 4.2.8 of 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown to re-establish adequate CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Annunciator M-10 should be reviewed for guidance on manual operation of V2520 to prevent damaging the CVCS IX resin.
After TIC 2223 is being controlled in manual, RWT level switch, RWT LIS-07-2B, fails low. The SRO should enter 2-AOP-99.01, "Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation" and address T.S. 3.3.2, Table 3.3-3.
Next, PCV-8801 fails (drifts) open. The crew should enter 2-AOP-08.03, 'Steam Bypass Control System', section 4.2.3 & 4 OR 2-AOP-08.01 'Steam Leak' section 4.2.3. With the SBCS unable to control RCS temperature, the ADV's will be put in service.
After the crew regains control of RCS temperature, CEA #59 slips >15 inches. The crew is required to re-align the CEA to within 7 inches of other CEA's within that group. The SRO should refer to T.S. 3.1.3.1.d for the appropriate actions. While withdrawing the slipped CEA, CEAs14 and1 fall into the core. The RO will trip the reactor. Upon the reactor trip, safety valve V1201 will fail open.
On the trip, feeder breaker to MCC 2A6 will trip resulting in the loss of various plant equipment, including ECCS injection valves HCV-3637 & HCV-3627 and the 2B Boric Acid Makeup pump.
The plant will depressurize due to the failed Pressurizer Code Safety valve (LOCA) that opens and will reseat at -1000 psia. When SIAS actuates the 2B HPSI fails to start. Due the loss of MCC 2A6, two HPSI 'A' side injection valves are without power and closed.
HCV-3647 (also "A" train) fails to open and can't be opened from the RTGB. This results in inadequate ECCS flow from the "A" ECCS train so starting the 2B HPSI pump is required in order to meet safety functions.
The scenario can be terminated when the operators have stabilized the plant and have "B" train of Safety Injection fully actuated.
2 Scenario 2 2
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Procedures Used
- 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1
- 2-AOP-08.03, Steam Bypass Control System
- 2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus- A Train
- 2-AOP-01.1 0, Pressurizer Pressure and Level
- 2-AOP-66.01, Dropped or Misaligned CEA Operations and Realignment
- 2-AOP-02.03 Charging and Letdown
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions
- 2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident Technical Specifications Entered
- T.S. 3.1.3.1 CEA Position
- T.S. 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3 RWT level channel failure 3 Scenario 2 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# Page 4 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
Continue Reactor Startup to 10-12% Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
- Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position.
- EXECUTE HLC-21 NRC Scenario #2 file .
- Ensure modification to IC set is triggered .
- Ensure Group 4 CEA's are at the UEL and that the 2B TCW pump is off.
- Sign off applicable steps in 2-GOP-302 up to step 6.14.38
- Hand out 2-GOP-302 signed off up to step 6.14.38 .
- Ensure Control Board ECO Tags are hung on:
- 2A BAM Pump RTGB switch (Place CS in Stop)
- 2A Charging Pump RTGB switch (Place CS in Stop)
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators N-47: 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop I SS lsol M-46: 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Several low power alarm indications.
DIRECT the crew to continue the reactor/plant startup at Step SRO 6.14.38 of 2-GOP-302, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 3 to Mode 2. (attached page 5,6)
When directed RAISE Reactor power at a sustained startup RO rate of less than .5 DPM.
Monitor S/G water levels to ensure LPFWCS is controlling SG BOP levels.
STABILIZE Reactor power at 2% to 4% as indicted on the RO higher reading of RPS Nuclear or Delta-T power.
4 Scenario 2 4
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1--___;4..;;,9_ _-tREACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 3 TO MODE 2 41 of 67 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-GOP-302 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.14 (continued) INITIAL
- 33. Verify that SUR protection is enabled at approximately 1 X 10"4 % power as follows:
A. LOG light is lit on all operable Wide Range Log Safety channels.
B. L-41, Reactor Startup Rate Trip In Service, Power 1o*4 -
15%, annunciates.
- 34. Stabilize Reactor power between 3 X 10"4% power and 7 X 10"4 %
power.
- 35. Record actual critical conditions.
- Date of Criticality _ _/_ _/_ _
- Time (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock) _ _ _ __
- CEA Group/Position (inches) _ _
- T-Ave (F0 ) _ _ __
- Reactor Power (%) _ _ __
- 36. !f necessary, Then adjust RCS boron concentration and Regulating CEA position to meet CEA insertion limit requirements to Technical Specification 3.1.3.6.
- 37. !f Reactor Engineering determines that Reload Physics Testing is to be performed after a normal reactor startup (i.e. NOT by dilution per 2-3200088, Unit 2 Initial Criticality Following Refueling), Then GO TO POP 3200091, Reload Startup Physics Testing.
RE or US
- 38. Raise Reactor power at a sustained startup rate of less than
.5DPM.
5
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1---___,;.4.;...9_ _-IREACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 3 TO MODE 2 42 of 67 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-GOP-302 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.14 (continued) INITIAL NOTE If necessary, remain at low power until ASI is favorable for power escalation.
- 39. Stabilize Reactor power as indicated on the higher reading of RPS Nuclear or Delta-T power as follows:
A. .!fAFW is in service, Then MAINTAIN power between 1%-
3%.
B. .!f MFW is in service, Then MAINTAIN power between 2%-
4%.
- 40. Verify Linear Range Nuclear Instruments respond and that channel readings are in agreement.
- 41. Continue the plant start-up in accordance with 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1.
Reviewed B y : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Date: __/__/__
us END OF SECTION 6.0 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# Page 5 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
Continue Reactor Startup to 10-12% Power Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
VERIFY Linear Range Nuclear Instruments respond and that RO channel readings are in agreement.
Transition to 2-GOP-201 Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to SRO Mode 1and DIRECT the crew to continue the plant start-up.
When reactor power is at the point of adding heat and relatively stable, or at the Lead Evaluator's direction, PROCEED to Event 2.
5 Scenario 2 7
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 6 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
TE-2223 Fails Low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: Trigger E-3 "TE 2223 Fails Low" when directed.
Evaluator Note: V2520 should close on rising letdown temperature (135°) but does not. The malfunction will clear automatically when V2520 is taken to bypass/reset.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator M-10 CVCS Jon Exchanger Temp High.
Identifies increasing temperature on TIC-2224. When temperature alarm annunciates identifies V2520, ion exchanger RO bypass valve did not close. Manually places V2520 to the bypass reset position.
Observes FIS-14-6 'Letdown Hx Flow' (CCW flow toLD heat exchanger) decreasing Places TIC-2223 to manual. Controls letdown temperature in manual to less than alarm setpoint.
Places V2520 to the AUTO position when directed.
Implements 2-AOP-02.03 Charging and Letdown step 4.2.8 SRO (attached page 9) 'Letdown HX Temperature Controller Malfunction' Directs V2520 ion exchanger bypass placed to the Bypass Reset position. Step 4.2.8.1.1.A Directs TIC-2223 placed in manual. Step 4.2.8.1.1.6 Direct placing V2520 back to auto when temperature has been lowered in manual control. Step 4.2.8.1.3 Contact SM and IC 6 Scenario 2 8
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 CHARGING AND LETDOWN 16 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.8 Letdown HX Temperature Controller Malfunction D 1. VERIFY TIC-2223, TEMPERATURE, (Letdown 1.1 PERFORM the following:
Temperature Controller) is A. PLACE V2520, ION responding as expected. EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE, in BYPASS RESET to bypass letdown ion exchangers.
B. PLACE TIC-2223, TEMPERATURE, (Letdown Temperature Controller) in MANUAL and ADJUST letdown temperature to setpoint.
1.2 IF unable to place TIC-2223 in MANUAL, THEN DISPATCH an Operator to bypass TCV-2223, LETDOWN HX DISCH, by performing the following:
A. Throttle OPEN SB14254, TCV-2223 BYPASS.
B. CLOSE SB14248, TCV-2223 UPSTRM ISOL.
- c. ADJUST SB14254, TCV-2223 BYPASS, as directed by the SM I US to Control Letdown Temperature.
1.3 IF letdown temperature is stable at the desired temperature, THEN PLACE the letdown ion exchanger( s) in service by placing V2520, ION EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE, to the AUTO position.
9
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 7 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
RWT LIS-07 -28 fails low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger event 4, RWT LIS-07-26 fails low.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators S-19 RWT RAS and Q-2 ESFAS ATI Fault Direct the implementation of 2-AOP-99.01 step 4.1 (attached, SROT.S. Page 11) RWT level LIS-07-2B fail low. Implement T.S. 3.3.2 Table 3.3-3. (action 19). (attached page 12,13)
Direct placing ESFAS channel MB RWT level in bypass or trip SRO T.S. lAW 2-AOP-99.01 'Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation' step 4.2.18. (attached page 14)
Recognize LIS-07-2B has failed low. Annunciators S-19 RWT RO RAS and Q-2 ESFAS ATI. Refers to ARP S-19 and Q-2 Bypass or trip ESFAS RWT level channel MB as directed.
- Obtain key 114 and 131.
- Ensure B Channel is bypassed .
7 Scenario 2 10
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 10 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A TRANSMITTER failure can be discriminated from a METER failure by the presence of annunciators and protection and control actuations.
D 1. CONFIRM failed channel by any of the following methods:
- Channel check comparison with redundant channels
- Bistable or status lights
- Any instrument-related testing or surveillance procedure in progress 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE BISTABLE TRIP UNIT is abbreviated as BTU in this AOP.
D 1. IF entering this procedure to restore an affected channel, THEN GOTO Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
11
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.
ACTION:
- a. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.
4.3.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.
The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.
4.3.2.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No.
of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/~ Amendment No. 67 12
TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION
- 4. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOlATION (MSIS)
- a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1,2,3 16
- b. Steam Generator 4/steam 2/steam 3/steam 1, 2, 3(c) 13*, 14 Pressure - Low generator generator generator
- c. Containment Pressure -
4 2 3 1,2,3 13*, 14 High
- d. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1,2,3 12
- b. Refueling Water Storage 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 19 Tank- Low
- c. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 12 ST. LUCIE- UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 90, 132
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 37 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.18 RWT Level Channel Failure NOTE
- The ESFAS bypass keyswitch and associated bistable trip unit are NOT in a true vertical alignment from each other in some cases.
- Per Ops policy OPS-503, Technical Specification Guidance, an RWT level channel in the TRIPPED condition shall be limited to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> minus the time the channel has been in bypass.
D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument:
- LIS-07-2A
- LIS-07-2B
- LIS-07-2C
- LIS-07-20 D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTU listed:
- RAS (Key 131)
A. BYPASS affected BTU using keyswitch.
B. TRIP affected BTU per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.
14
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# _4~---- Page 8 of 19 Event
Description:
PCV-8801 Drifts Open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed {recommend when power is around 3-4%), trigger E-4 "PCV-8801 Drifts Open" If directed, initiate 'Isolate PCV 8801' this will close the manual isolation valve for 8801.
Control Room Indications Available: Red I Green light on PCV-8801, Valve indicates CYAN on DCS. SG pressure also will lower along with RCS temperature.
Recognize open indication on PCV-8801, CYAN indication on BOP SBCS DCS page.
RO Recognize Tave lowering. Reactor power increasing.
Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-AOP-08.03, 'Steam SRO Bypass Control System' OR 2-AOP-08.01 'Steam Leak' section 4.2.3 (attached page 16,17)
Direct SBCS permissive switch taken to OFF.
SRO Notifies I&C of event and Management I SM notifications Direct the BOP to place at least one ADV on each SG to AUTO I AUTO set to 900 psia. (step 4.2.4.1.B of AOP-08.03)
BOP Place PCV-8801 in manual and attempt to close.
When directed place SBCS permissive switch to off. Verify PCV-8801 fully closed.
8 Scenario 2 15
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 9 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D 3. VERIFY SBCS is raising S/G pressure to normal for existing 3.1 IF S/G pressures remain below normal, plant conditions. AND are NOT trending to normal for existing plant conditions, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. PLACE STEAM BYPASS PERMISSIVE switch in OFF.
B. VERIFY SBCS valves CLOSED:
- PCV-8801, TO CONDENSER VALVE
- PCV-8802, TO CONDENSER VALVE
- PCV-8803, TO CONDENSER VALVE
- PCV-8804, TO CONDENSER VALVE
- PCV-8805, TO CONDENSER VALVE 3.2 IF SBCS valves NOT CLOSED, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. PRESS EMERGENCY OFF push button.
B. VERIFY all SBCS Valves are CLOSED.
16
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM 11 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-08.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions {continued)
CAUTION Stabilizing the plant will require the use of manual actions when restoring RCS temperature. Manual actions shall be maintained, otherwise, there may be a potential to reactivate the failure.
D 4. VERIFY RCS temperature control has been restored.
4.1 RESTORE RCS temperature control as follows:
A. IF SBCS is being operated in manual, and US directs ADVs be placed in service, THEN PERFORM the following:
{1) ENSURE SBCS in MANUAL.
{2) Slowly OPEN ADVs while simultaneously closing the SBCS valves to maintain Tavg at approximately 532°F or at a temperature directed by the US.
B. IF SBCS is NOT in service, THEN slowly OPEN ADVs to maintain Tavg at approximately 532°F or at a temperature directed by the us.
17
--~--~------------------------------------------
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ....;...._ Scenario # 1 Event # _5~---- Page 9 of 19 Event
Description:
Slipped CEA #59 >15 inches Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger E-5 Slipped CEA#59 >15" Booth Operator Response: When 1/C called to determine cause of abnormal condition wait five minutes and call back, 'a loose card was reseated' and CEA problem should be corrected.
If RE called, report no limitations on recovering CEA If upper management called, report CEA retrieval should be attempted.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator K-11 CEA Motion Inhibit, K-30 deviation, ADS display.
SRO/RO Recognize CEA #59 slipped > 15" (not dropped)
SRO Direct RO to secure dilution if initiated.
Recognize T.S. 3.1.3.1 Action d, realign within 7" of other SRO T.S.
CEA's within COLR fig. 3.1-1a (attached page 19,20)
Direct Immediate Operator actions lAW 2-AOP-66.01, 'Dropped or Misaligned CEA Abnormal Operations':
- Verify all CEA motion has stopped
- Verify No dropped CEA's:
0 Rod bottom lights 0 ADS Display CRT 0 DCS screen Implement 2-AOP-66.01, "Dropped or Misaligned CEA SRO Abnormal Operations", subsequent operator actions step 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 (attached pages 21-23)
Step 4.2.6.2, Direct Attachment 4, Major Misalignment step 1 SRO and 2, (attached page 24)
Direct step 3 of Attachment 4, Perform Attachment 6, CEA functional test and operability determination (attached page 25-27)
Direct Attachment 4 to re-align CEA to within 7" of other CEA's Within group. (attached page 28-29) 9 Scenario 2 18
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES CEA POSITION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1 The CEA Block Circuit and all full-length (shutdown and regulating) CEAs which are inserted in the core, shall be OPERABLE with each CEA of a given group positioned within 7.0 inches (indicated position) of all other CEAs in its group.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.
ACTION:
- a. With one or more full-length CEAs inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the CEA Block Circuit inoperable, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> either:
- 1. With one CEA position indicator per group inoperable take action per Specification 3.1.3.2, or
- 2. With the group overlap and/or sequencing interlocks inoperable maintain CEA groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 fully withdrawn and the CEAs in group 5 to less than 15%
insertion and place and maintain the CEA drive system in either the "Manual" or "Otr' position, or
- 3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY.
- c. With more than one full-length CEA inoperable or misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches (indicated position), be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- d. With one full-length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that the misaligned CEA is positioned within 15 inches of the other CEAs in its group in accordance with the time constraints shown in COLR Figure 3.1-1a.
- See Special Test Exceptions 3.1 0.2, 3.1 0.4 and 3.1 0.5.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. 8, 92 19
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ACTION: (Continued)
- e. With one full-length CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by more than 15 inches beyond the time constraints shown in COLR Figure 3-1-1a, reduce power to~ 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER prior to completing ACTION e.1 or e.2.
- 2. Declare the CEA inoperable and satisfy SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1. After declaring the CEA inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 provided:*
a) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7.0 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on COLR Figure 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT STAND BY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- f. With one or more full-length CEA(s) misaligned from any other CEAs in its group by more than 7.0 inches but less than or equal to 15 inches, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue, provided that within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the misaligned CEA(s) is either:
- 1. Restored to OPERABLE status within its above specified alignment requirements, or
- 2. Declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. After declaring the CEA inoperable, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6 provided:
a) Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the remainder of the CEAs in the group with the inoperable CEA shall be aligned to within 7.0 inches of the inoperable CEA while maintaining the allowable CEA sequence and insertion limits shown on COLR Figure 3.1-2; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation.
b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- g. With one full-length CEA inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, and inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits but within its above specified alignment requirements, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may continue pursuant to the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.6.
- If the pre-misalignment ASI was more negative than -0.15, reduce power to~ 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER or 70% of the THERMAL POWER level prior to the misalignment, whichever is less, prior to completing ACTION e.2.a) and e.2.b).
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-19 Amendment No. 8, 89, 92 20
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions
- 1. MAINTAIN T-avg- T-ref deviation by adjusting turbine load or RCS boron concentration to meet the following conditions:
- Stable
- Less than or equal to +/-2°F D 2. NOTIFY the following personnel of time and nature of abnormal event:
- Reactor Engineering
- I&C D 3. VERIFY NO dropped or slipped CEAs have been retrieved within 3.1 CONSULT with upper management to determine the the past 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. following:
- Should CEA retrieval be attempted?
- Should power operation be continued?
21
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 10 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D 4. RECORD the following data:
- Event initiation time:
- Stable ll T power level established after event:
D 5. VERIFY NO dropped CEAs: 5.1 IF CEA DROPPED with reactor critical, THEN PERFORM
- All rod bottom lights OFF Attachment 2, Dropped CEA Recovery With Reactor Critical
- Pulse Count Displays Attachment 3, Dropped CEA Recovery With Reactor Subcritical.
22
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 11 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D 6. VERIFY NO misaligned CEAs: 6.1 IF 3200091, Reload Startup Physics Testing, is in progress,
- ADS FLAT PANEL THEN REFER TO that procedure DISPLAY for alignment actions.
- Pulse Count Displays 6.2 IF major misalignment is indicated AND reactor is critical, THEN PERFORM Attachment 4, Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical
(~15 inches).
6.3 IF major misalignment is indicated AND reactor is subcritical, THEN PERFORM Attachment 5, Other Misalignments.
6.4 IF ONLY minor misalignments are indicated, THEN PERFORM Attachment 5, Other Misalignments.
D 7. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met. 7.1 IF additional misaligned or dropped CEAs need alignment or recovery, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.2 Step 3.
23
-~----~----------------------------------------------------------------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 20 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)
(Page 1 of 4)
- 1. VERIFY the following:
- CEDMCS MODE SELECT switch is in OFF.
- T-avg- T-ref deviation is stable AND less than or equal to +/-2°F.
- CEA motion inhibit exists.
- 2. RECORD and MAINTAIN ~T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4.
Power level to maintain: - - - - - - - %
- 3. PERFORM Attachment 6, CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination.
- 4. IF at any time a dropped CEA occurs during performance of this attachment, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.1 Step 1.
NOTE Tech Specs allow a maximum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to realign CEAs. The COLR times are variable based on F,T . The use of the most conservative value is to used in determining the allowed time.
- 5. DETERMINE allowable amount of time to restore CEA to within 7.0 inches of all other CEAs in its group, as follows:
A. OBTAIN most recent F,T value from Plant Physics Curve Book Figure C.3.
B. Using most recent F,T value and COLR Figure 3.1-1 a or 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, DETERMINE allowable time to align CEA to its group.
Allowable time: - - - - minutes 24
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 28 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 1 of 5) 1.0 FUNCTIONAL TEST NOTE Per OPS-503, Technical Specifications Guidance, between required surveillance requirement performances, if a CEA is immovable but trippable, then the CEA is considered to be OPERABLE.
- 1. MAINTAIN L'lT power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4 or 70%, whichever limit is in effect.
- 2. IF cause of abnormal condition is known, THEN VERIFY problem has been corrected.
- 3. DETERMINE if affected CEA can be moved as follows:
A. NAVIGATE to the affected CEA on the ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY for CEA position indication during CEA recovery.
B. On MODE SELECT switch, SELECT Ml (manual individual).
C. On INDIVIDUAL CEA SELECTION panel, SELECT affected CEA.
D. On GROUP SELECT switch, SELECT affected group.
E. IF CEA motion inhibit is present, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:
(1) PRESS and HOLD CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
(2) PRESS and RELEASE BYPASS ENABLE pushbutton.
F. IF affected CEA was dropped, THEN EXERCISE CEA as follows:
(1) DO NOT EXCEED 10 inches withdrawn without US permission.
(2) WITHDRAW affected CEA until positive indication of movement is verified by observing CEA on ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY.
(3) IF CEA will NOT move, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. IF held pressed, THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
- b. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF.
25
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 29 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 2 of 5) 1.0 FUNCTIONAL TEST (continued)
- 3. F. (3) (continued)
- c. GO TO Attachment 6 Section 2.0 Step 1.
(4) VERIFY rod bottom and LEL lights are OFF.
(5) INSERT affected CEA to LEL or rod bottom light, whichever occurs first, while checking for normal operation and indications.
(6) VERIFY rod bottom or LEL light is ON, as applicable.
(7) IF held pressed, THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
(8) IF CEA moved freely in both directions, THEN CONSIDER CEA functional and OPERABLE and RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.
G. IF affected CEA was misaligned AND NOT dropped, THEN EXERCISE CEA as follows:
(1) DO NOT EXCEED +/-1 0 inches CEA movement from original misaligned position without US permission.
(2) NOTE CEA initial position and INSERT affected CEA until positive indication of movement is verified by observing the CEA on ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY.
(3) IF CEA will NOT move, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. IF held pressed, THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
- b. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF.
- c. GO TO Attachment 6 Section 2.0 Step 1.
(4) WITHDRAW affected CEA to its position just prior to insertion.
(5) IF held pressed, THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
(6) IF CEA moved freely in both directions, THEN CONSIDER affected CEA functional and OPERABLE and RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.
26
~~~---~---------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 30 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 6 CEA Functional Test and Operability Determination (Page 3 of 5) 2.0 OPERABILITY DETERMINATION
- 1. DETERMINE OPERABILITY for immovable CEA as follows:
A. IF CEA is dropped, THEN CONSIDER CEA trippable and OPERABLE.
B. IF CEA is misaligned, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) REQUEST I&C and Engineering to determine if CEA is trippable.
(2) IF I&C requests additional troubleshooting of inoperable CEA, THEN concurrently PERFORM Attachment 6 Section 3.0 while continuing with next step.
(3) IF CEA is determined to be trippable, THEN CONSIDER CEA to be OPERABLE.
(4) IF CEA is determined to be NOT trippable, THEN DECLARE CEA to be inoperable.
C. PERFORM applicable actions per Attachment 7, Tech Specs Related to CEA Abnormal Operations.
D. RETURN TO section or attachment and step in effect.
27
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 22 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)
(Page 3 of 4)
NOTE
- In MODES 1 and 2, Tech Specs requires the affected CEA to be aligned within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
- 7. PREPARE to align CEA as follows:
A. NOTIFY Reactor Engineering of the following information as it relates to this alignment:
- Current power level:
- Rate of CEA movement: ----------------- inches/minute
- Any other CEAs to be moved:
B. OBSERVE the following limitations while aligning CEA(s):
- WITHDRAW regulating CEAs in normal sequence.
- MAINTAIN overlap between regulating groups within 54 inches.
- DO NOT EXCEED sustained SUR of 1.3 DPM.
28
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 DROPPED OR MISALIGNED CEA ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 23 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-66.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Major Misalignment With Reactor Critical (~15 inches)
(Page 4 of 4)
- 8. ALIGN affected CEA as follows:
A. MAINTAIN ~T power less than or equal to power level recorded in Section 4.2 Step 4 and T-avg and T-ref matched within +/-2°F as follows:
(1) IF affected CEA is to be withdrawn to its group, THEN BORATE RCS as needed while withdrawing CEA.
(2) IF affected CEA is to be inserted to its group, THEN REDUCE turbine load as needed while inserting CEA.
B. NAVIGATE to the affected CEA on the ADS FLAT PANEL DISPLAY for CEA position indication during CEA recovery.
C. On MODE SELECT switch, SELECT Ml (manual individual).
D. On INDIVIDUAL CEA SELECTION panel, SELECT affected CEA.
E. On GROUP SELECT switch, SELECT affected group.
F. IF CEA motion inhibit is present, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:
(1) PRESS and HOLD CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
(2) PRESS and RELEASE BYPASS ENABLE pushbutton.
G. ALIGN affected CEA to its group as closely as possible.
H. IF held pressed, THEN RELEASE CMI BYPASS pushbutton.
I. VERIFY§!! CEAs in group aligned within 7.0 inches of each other using ADS and DCS.
J. ENSURE group positions are adjusted for proper sequencing using MANUAL GROUP mode.
K. PLACE MODE SELECT switch in OFF.
L. RETURN TO Section 4.2 Step 7.
29
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: _.;...._ Scenario# Event# ....;5;....__ _ _ _ Page 10 of _1..-9---tl Event
Description:
Slipped CEA #59 >15 inches Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
RO Secure dilution when directed Perform immediate Operator actions:
- Place CEDMCS control panel in off.
- Verify No dropped CEA's:
0 Rod bottom lights 0 ADS Display CRT 0 DCS screen Perform subsequent operator actions step 4.2.1 through 4.2.6 RO (attached pages 21-23) as directed RO Perform attachment 4 as directed (attached pages 24)
Perform step 3 of attachment 4, Perform Attachment 6, CEA RO functional test and operability determination as directed (attached page 25-27)
Re-align CEA as per attachment 4 step 7 and 8 as directed RO (attached page 28-29) while maintaining power level recorded in section 4.2 10 Scenario 2 30
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 11 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 2B HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger E-6 Dropped CEA'sN1201 lifts Examiners Note: As CEA #59 is being re-aligned, CEA 14 & 1 will drop which should result in a manual reactor trip. At that time, V1201 lifts full open which results in a Loss of Coolant accident. 480V MCC 2A6 de-energizes on trip.
EXAMINERS NOTE: V1201 will reseat when RCS pressure is -1000 psia.
Control Room Indications Available: Lowering RCS pressure, increasing Containment pressure. Acoustic monitor led indication on V1201.
Booth Operator Response: Respond as NPO to perform Appendix X. 10 minutes later call Appendix X complete.
Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
- RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal
- BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
SRO On SIAS recognize 2B HPSI does not start. Direct starting of CRITICAL 2B HPSI and attempt to open HCV-3647.
TASK SRO Direct stopping ALL RCP's when RCS subcooling <20°F. If CRITICAL SIAS first, direct stopping one RCP/LOOP TASK Start 2B HPSI pump and attempt to open HCV-3647.
BOP/RO Communicate to SRO 2B HPSI pump started but HCV-3646 failed to open.
Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of BOP EOP-99.
11 Scenario 2 31
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 12 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Booth Operator Instructions: The SNPO could be dispatched to open de-energized HPSI valves in the field if directed but ONLY AFTER the 28 HPSI pp has been manually started from the RTGB.
Control Room Indications Available:
Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses) 0 Recognize MCC 2A6 de-energized Evaluator's Note: On SIAS, HCV-3627 and HCV-3637 are de-energized due to the loss of MCC 2A6. HCV-3647 has power but failed to open on SIAS. If attempted, HCV-3647 will not open from the control room.
12 Scenario 2 32
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 13 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of 2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 2B HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
RCS Heat Removal
- Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following 0 SG level is between 20 and 83% NR 0 Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR
- S/G pressure is between 835 and 915 psig 0 ADV's in auto set to 900 psia.
0 IF SG pressure <735 psig close MSIV's
- MSR warmup valves are closed. (closed prior to trip)
- If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED 13 Scenario 2 33
~*
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 14 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of 2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig BOP
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms RO/BOP CRITICAL Start 28 HPSI pump on SIAS TASK When directed, attempt to open HCV-3647 (valve won't open RO/BOP from RTGB or locally)
RO Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control RO
- Verify Reactor power is lowering.
- Verify startup rate is negative .
- Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .
Inventory Control RO
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
- Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%
14 Scenario 2 34
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 15 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Pressure Control RO
- Verify RCS pressure is between 1800-2300 psia CRITICAL
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia TASK
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F 0 Recognize RCS subcooling <20°F and stop ALL RCP's Core Heat Removal RO
- Verify loop delta Tis <10° F Evaluator Note: The 2 HPSI valves without power have the ability to be opened locally. The SNPO could be dispatched to perform this operation if directed but ONLY AFTER the 28 HPSI has been manually started from the RTGB.
RO CRITICAL Stop all RCP's when directed (RCS subcooling <20°F) or if TASK SIAS first, stop one RCP/LOOP.
15 Scenario 2 35
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 16 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I Jl Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Exit EOP-01 and Implement 2-EOP-03, "Loss of Coolant SRO Accident" (attached page 37-48)
- Ensure SIAS flow adequate per Figure 2 Sl flow Vs .
RCS pressure.(attached page 51)
Within 30 minutes of SIAS ensure CCW to RCP's remains isolated by directing:
- Ensure RCP bleedoff remains isolated by placing two RCP bleedoff valves to close Ensure Both of the following:
- CIAS actuated
- MSIS actuated (if Containment pressure setpoint met)
Evaluator Note: V1200 will reseat around 1000 psia.
16 Scenario 2 36
~--- -~---------------~------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 6 of73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A harsh containment condition exists if containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should be used for determination of subcooling when indicated containment temperature is less than or equal to 200°F.
Figure 1B should be used when indicated containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should also be used if containment temperature had exceeded 200°F during event progression but was lowered to 200°F or less by containment cooling systems.
NOTE
- Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available. Reg Guide 1.97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.
- Steps designated with an* may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously.
0 1. Confirm Diagnosis VERIFY Safety Function Status 1.1 REDIAGNOSE the event using Check acceptance criteria are 2-EOP-01 Chart 1, Diagnostic satisfied every 15 minutes. Flow Chart, and GO TO ONE of the following:
- The appropriate Optimal Recovery Procedure
- 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery 37
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PROCEDURE NO.:
7 of73 2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 2. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.
REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies.
D 3. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.
D 4. Sample Steam Generators SAMPLE S/Gs. 4.1 MONITOR other indications of a REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling SGTR.
0 5. Ensure Safety Injection Actuation 5.1 Manually START/ALIGN SIAS components.
!f ANY of the following conditions REFER TO Table 1, Safety exist, Injection Actuation Signal.
- RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia
- Containment pressure is greater than 3.5 psig Then ENSURE SIAS has ACTUATED.
38
---*---~-*--------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 8 of73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 6. Maximize Sl Flow 1f SIAS is present, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
A. ENSURE ALL available Sl Pumps are RUNNING.
B. VERIFY adequate Sl flow. B.1 TAKE actions to restore Sl flow:
REFER TO Figure 2, Safety Injection Flow vs. RCS Pressure. 1. ENSURE electrical power to Sl pumps and valves.
- 2. ENSURE correct Sl valve alignment.
- 3. ENSURE operation of necessary auxiliary systems.
C. ENSURE ALL available C.1 1f the Charging Header is NOT Charging Pumps are RUNNING. available, Then CONSIDER charging to the HPSI header.
REFER TO Appendix T, Alternate Charging Flow Path to RCS Through 'A' HPSI Header.
0 7. RCP Trip Strategy A. 1f RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia, Then ENSURE ONE RCP in EACH loop is STOPPED.
B. 1f RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED.
C. 1f CCW is LOST to the RCPs for greater than 10 minutes, Then STOP ALL RCPs.
39
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT PROCEDURE NO.:
9 of73 2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 8. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERIFY CCWto the RCPs. A.1 !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW.
REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.
A.2 !fa VALID SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED.
A.3 !f CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleed off valves to CLOSE.
B. !f BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleed off flowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleed off flowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.
40
---**~-*--**--~*--~*--------------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 10 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 9. Verify RCP Operating Limits 9.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits.
lf RCPs are RUNNING, Then VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied.
REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits.
0 10. Isolate the LOCA ISOLATE the LOCA by performing ALL of the following:
A. lf RCS pressure is less than A.1 PERFORM ANY of the following:
2300 psia, Then VERIFY BOTH PORVs are 1. OVERRIDE the open PORV(s).
CLOSED.
- 2. CLOSE the associated PORV block valve(s).
B. ENSURE Letdown is ISOLATED.
- c. ENSURE ALL SIX RCS sample valves are CLOSED.
D. VERIFY NO RCS leakage into the CCW system:
- 1. Absence of CCW Surge Tank high level alarm (Annunciator LB-10).
- 2. ENSURE sample flow to the 2.1 lf RCS to CCW leakage is CCW radiation monitors suspected, and NO indication of activity. Then ISOLATE the leak.
REFER TO 2-AOP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.
(Continued on Next Page) (Continued on Next Page) 41
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 11 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 10. (continued) 10. (continued)
E. VERIFY LOCA is NOT occurring E.1 !fa LOCA is occurring outside of outside of containment : containment, Then LOCATE and ISOLATE the leak.
- 1. No unexplained RAB radiation monitors in alarm.
- 2. No unexplained RAB sump level alarms (Annunciators LA-2, LA-8, LB-2 and LB-8).
0 11. Ensure Containment Isolation and Cooling
!f ANY of the following conditions exist,
- Containment pressure is greater than 3.5 psig
- Containment radiation is greater than 10 R/hr
- SIAS is ACTUATED Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
(continued on next page) 42
-~------~----------- ------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 12 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 11. (continued) 11. (continued)
A. ENSURE BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE CIAS has 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN CIAS ACTUATED. components.
REFER TO Table 2, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.
- 2. lf Containment pressure is 2.1 Manually START/ALIGN MSIS greater than 3.5 psig, components.
Then ENSURE MSIS has REFER TO Table 5, Main Steam ACTUATED. Isolation Actuation Signal.
B. ENSURE ALL available Emergency Containment HVAC systems are RUNNING:
- At least ONE train of SBVS
- At least ONE train of Containment Fan Coolers 0 12. Ensure Containment Spray 12.1 Manually START/ALIGN CSAS Actuation components.
REFER TO Table 3, Containment lf Containment pressure is greater Spray Actuation Signal.
than 5.4 psig, Then ENSURE BOTH of the following:
- 1. CSAS has ACTUATED.
- 2. Containment Spray flow is at least 2700 gpm from EACH header.
43
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 13 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 13. Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. !f Circulating Water flow to the Main Condenser has been lost, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:
- 1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.
- 2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.
B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant.
REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.
D 14. Restore Instrument Air
!fa LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.
44
-~~-~~------------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 14 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 15. Extend Hydrazine Operation Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of CSAS actuation, ENSURE only ONE Hydrazine Pump is RUNNING by opening the associated pump breaker:
- Breaker 2-41259 (2A Hydrazine pump)
- Breaker 2-42053 (2B Hydrazine pump) 0 16. Early Containment Spray Pump Stop Within one hour of CSAS actuation, evaluate early stop criteria:
!f both containment spray pumps are operating and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
- Containment pressure less than 42 psig and lowering.
- At least two containment cooling fans are in operation.
- Safety injection has actuated and flow is within Figure 2, Sl Flow vs.
RCS Pressure.
Then STOP the Containment Spray Pump on the train of the non-running hydrazine pump.
REFER TO Appendix P, Restoration of Components Actuated by ESFAS.
45
""~--*~~~-*~--------------------------~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 16. (continued) 16. (continued)
Verify containment pressure 16.1 Take action to restore full maintains below 42 psig. containment spray flow.
- Start Idle Containment Spray Pump.
- Ensure containment spray flow grater than 2700 gpm per header.
D 17. LOCA Isolated Branch Step
!! the LOCA is isolated Then GO TO step 54.
NOTE Cool down rates up to 100°F in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.
COOLDOWN the RCS using SBCS. 18.1 COOLDOWN the RCS using ADVs.
A. lf RCPs are operating, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 18.2 COOLDOWN using 2C AFW 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period. Pump and alternate steaming REFER TO 2-GOP-305, Reactor flow paths.
Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby to REFER TO Table 12, Alternate Cold Shutdown. S/G Heat Removal Paths.
B. lf RCPs are NOT operating, Then COOLDOWN not to exceed 50°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period.
REFER TO 2-AOP-01.13, Natural Circulation Cooldown.
46
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 16 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Maintaining subcooling as low as possible while still within the limits of Figure 1A or 1B will lower the break flow rate and minimize the severity of the accident.
0 19. Depressurize the RCS to SOC CONTROL the RCS depressurization to SOC entry conditions using ANY of the following:
A. DEPRESSURIZE the RCS using Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer sprays.
B. !f HPSI throttle criteria are met, Then CONTROL pressure by throttling Sl flow.
REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.
CAUTION RCS inventory and containment conditions safety functions should be under positive control prior to blocking safeguards signals. Safety functions should be closely monitored for degradation. Manual actuation of ESFAS may be necessary should conditions warrant.
0 20. Block MSIS and SIAS As the RCS cooldown and depressurization proceed, PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. !f MSIS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of MSIS.
B. !f SIAS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of SIAS.
47
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
29 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 17 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 21. HPSI Throttling Criteria
!f_HPSI pumps are operating, and ALL of the following conditions are satisfied,
- RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling
- Pressurizer level is at least 30%
and NOT lowering
- At least ONE S/G is available for RCS heat removal with level being restored to or maintained between 60 and 70% NR
- Rx Vessel level indicates sensors 4 through 8 are covered, or NO abnormal differences (greater than 20°F) between T HOT and Rep CET temperature Then THROTTLE Sl flow.
REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.
0 22. HPSI Pump Restart Criteria
!f ANY of the HPSI throttle criteria can NOT be maintained, Then RESTORE Sl flow.
REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.
48
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 3 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)
A Train(--./) B Train(--./)
D 1. !fa LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
D A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
D B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 26 Instrument Air Compressors.
CAUTION If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.
NOTE
- HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-86) starts to open
- When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset D 2. !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:
- HCV-14-8A
- HCV-14-9 OR
- HCV-14-86
- HCV-14-10 49
- ---~~------------------------~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 4 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2) 0 3. 1f the 'N' Header has been restored, Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:
A. 1f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE.
B. OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.
0 4. 1f the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples ~
for isotopic activity and Tritium.
0 5. 1f SIGs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.
END OF APPENDIX A 50
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 124 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300 I I I I I I NOTE 1200 This curve represents minimum expected I~
Sl Flow. If measured flow is less than this p
1100 ~ figure, Then Sl System lineup should be I~
R E
s 1000 \\ verified.
s u
R 900 1\
I z
E 800 R
700 \
\
p R
E 600 s
s u 500 \v 1 Full Train in Operation R
E 400 ~
2 Full Trains
- in Operation 300 ~
p
~
s i 200 \.
a 100 1---
-....... r-- ----..:
~ ..........
0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (P/OPS/2* EOP-99/Fig2/Rev. 0/tif) 51
---~-----------*------*
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 17 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of 2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 28 HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I I Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
- At least one train SBVS
- At least one train Containment fan coolers Ensure Containment spray if Containment pressure >5.4 psig:
- CSAS actuated
- Flow ~ 2700 gpm each header Direct RCS cooldown not to exceed 50°F in any one hour SRO period using ADV's. (cooldown up to 100°F in any one hour period to maintain or regain subcooling)
Direct HPSI throttling when throttling criteria met:
HPSI pumps are operating, and ALL of the following conditions are satisfied,
- RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling
- Pressurizer level is at least 30%
and NOT lowering SRO
- At least ONE S/G is available for RCS heat removal with level being restored to or maintained between 60 and 70% NR
- Rx Vessel level indicates sensors 4 through 8 are covered, or NO abnormal differences (greater than 20°F) between THOT and Rep CET temperature 17 Scenario 2 52
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 2 Event# 6,and 7 Page 18 of 19 NRC Event
Description:
CEA's 14 & 1 drop and loss of 2A6 480V MCC. V1200 lifts. 2B HPSI fails to start and HCV-3647 fails to open.
Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior I ~
Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Direct manual start of AFW system. (this will be required to SRO meet the Safety Function of RCS heat removal when SG levels lower to <60% NR.)
BOP Verifies Figure 2 Sl flow Vs. RCS pressure.
Initiate AFW flow when directed. Refer to 2-NOP-09.02, BOP Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation.
BOP Places four CCW valves to/from RCP's to close when directed BOP Places two RCP bleed off valves to close when directed BOP Verifies one train SBVS and one train Containment fan coolers Initiates cooldown using ADV's not to exceed 50°F in any one RO hour period to meet Figure 1A. (cooldown up to 100°F in any one hour period to maintain or regain subcooling)
Suggested termination point: the crew is performing a controlled cooldown and ECCS flow meets figure 2. (attached page 51)
Suggested termination point: the crew is performing a controlled cooldown and ECCS flow meets figure 2. (attached page 51) 18 Scenario 2 53
~--------~-----~*--------~----**------
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:
Protected Train: B Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0.03 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Continue startup to 10-12% power.
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
None Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A BAM Pump N/A with 2B BAM pump available 2A Charging Pump N/A with 2C and 2B Charging pumps available.
OPS 513's:
None Locked in Annunciators:
N-47 2A BAM Pump OVRLD/CS Stop/ SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2553 OVRLD Current Status: Unit 1 is at 100% power. Unit 2 is critical at approximately 5x1 o-4 %
power, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 1285 ppm. Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass are in service. Directions for the shift are to raise power to 10-12% in preparation for rolling the turbine. RE recommends having the CEA's at 105" withdrawn in preparation to synch to the grid. 2-GOP-302 is complete up to 6.14.38.
Equipment Problems:
2A BAM pump removed form service three hours ago to replace shaft seal. 2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals. None of the above are expected to be returned to service this shift.
19 Scenario 2 54
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: HLC 21-NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions: 100% power 2A Charging pump OOS for repack.
Turnover: 100% power, No evolutions scheduled.
Critical Tasks:
- Initiate Containment Spray prior to exceeding 20 psig (Containment Pressure)
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RIRO 2A Heater Drain pump amps rise due to bad bearing. A Unit down N I BOP, power to 90% is required to remove 2A Heater Drain Pump from SRO service.
2 1 T.S. I SRO When the 28 Charging pump is started for the rapid downpower, recirc valve fails to close when started.
3 2 CIRO V1474 PORV Leakage 4 3 T.S. I SRO PT-1102C, Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel "C" fails low 5 4 CIBOP The 2A 4.1616.9 KV Aux Transformer removed from service due to high winding temperature 6 5 Ml All ESDE in Containment on the 2A SG and SGTR on the 28 SG post trip 7 6 CIBOP Turbine fails to trip on Rx trip requiring MSIV's to be closed.
8 7 CIRO Failure of channei"A" CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start 9 8 CIRO FCV-07 -1 8, "28 Containment Spray header valve" fails to open on "8" CSAS actuation.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The unit is turned over at 100% power. The 2A Heater Drain Pump amps start rising. The pump will trip if not manually secured. The crew must perform a rapid downpower to remove the pump from service and maintain adequate feed pump suction pressure. When the 2nd Charging pump is started (28 Chg pp) as required for a rapid down power, its recirc valve fails to close. The crew may choose to secure the 28 Chg pp or they may have the SNPO manually isolate the recirc valve. If the valve is isolated, the pump may be considered operable. While the recirc valve is open and not isolated, only the 2C Charging pump is operable. The SRO should refer to T.S.
and apply the appropriate action statement. The down power should then continue with only the 2C Charging pump running. -
After the desired power level is reached, PORV 14741eakage (< 10gpm) requires the PORV block valve to be closed and the other PORV placed in service.
After the alternate PORV is in service, PT-1102C, Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel "C" instrument will fail low requiring Pressurizer Pressure High (RPS), TMLP (RPS), and Pressurizer Pressure Low (RPS) to be bypassed. T.S. will be evaluated by the SRO.
C-60, AUX/START UP XFMR WINDINGS TEMP HIGH, alarms. The ARP directs actions lAW 2-AOP-53.02. Auxiliary Transformer. The 2A 4160V/6900V Aux Transformer on Tl-53-1 reading is 105 oF and rising. The BOP will be directed to remove the 2A Aux Transformer from service per Attachment 1 of the AOP.
An ESDE on the 2A SG in the Containment will slowly ramp in requiring the crew to manually trip the reactor. After the Rx is tripped, the turbine does not trip (Throttle Valve 1 and Governor Valve 1 fail as is). The crew will be required to close the MSIV's (the turbine will trip on the secondary generator lockout or locally from the front standard). A SGTR will also ramp in on the 28 SG post trip. 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" is to be implemented.
"A" train CSAS does not auto actuate on high containment pressure. When manually actuated, the 2A CS pump will not start. "B" train CSAS will auto actuate but FCV-07-1 B (28 CS header valve) will not open. It will be necessary to take further manual actions to start the 2A CS pump or open FCV-07-28 from the RTGB to meet the safety function for Containment temperature and pressure control.
The scenario may be terminated when the 2A SG is isolated, RCS temperature is under positive control and CS is initiated.
2 Scenario 3 2
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Procedures Used
- 2-AOP-09.04, Feedwater, Condensate and Heater Drain pump Abnormal Operation
- 2-AOP-01.1 0, Pressurizer Pressure and Level
- 2-0NP-22.01, Rapid Down Power
- 2-AOP-53.02. Auxiliary Transformer
- 2-0NP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions
- 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery
- 2-EOP-99, Appendices Figures and Tables Technical Specifications Entered
- T.S. 3.1.2.4 Reactivity Control system
- T.S. 3.3.1 Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1(PT-1102C) 3 Scenario 3 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario # 6 Event# 1 and 2 Page 4 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain pump from service. 28 Chg pump recirc valve fails to close when pump is started Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.
Initiate IC 100% power, MOL Start the 2C Chg pp then place the 2A Charging pump in Stop. Place the Charging pp selector switch to the "2B-2C" position.
When directed by the lead examiner, Trigger: Heater Drain pump 2A bearing failure.
Booth Operator Instructions: The 2B Chg pp recirc valve fail to close malfunction is part of initial conditions and will show up when pump is started.
Control room Indications Available: 2A Heater Drain pump amp indication rising Control room Indications Available when the 2B Chg pp is started: 2B Charging Pump recirc valve indication stays red, charging flow remains at -44 gpm.
Implement 2-AOP-09.04, "Feedwater, Condensate and Heater SRO Drain pump Abnormal Operation" section 4.2.2 (attached page 5-7)
The US should recognize that the 2A HDP is not operating properly and must be removed from service. Since the unit is at 100%, a power reduction should be directed lAW 2-AOP 22.01, "Rapid Downpower". Directs boration and CEA insertion (attached page 8-14).
The down power can be stopped when the following conditions are met: (should be approximately 90% power)
- S/G Levels are 60 - 70%
- MFW pump suction pressure is > 400 psig (2-AOP-09.04,Section 4.2.2 contingency action 1.1)
Directs Pressurizer to be placed on recirc lAW 2-AOP-22.01 Attachment 5 (attached pages 19)
Directs additional Charging pump started lAW 2-AOP-22.01 Attachment 4 (attached page 20)
Direct DEH programmed for load rate step 4.1.2.A and B.
4 Scenario 3 4
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 8 of 25 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE Attachment 1, General Information, lists pump trip signals.
D 1. PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.
Table 1 Abnormal Condition Section MFW pump, condensate pump, or heater drain pump trip Section 4.2.2 MFW pump low flow Section 4.2.3 MFW pump low suction pressure Section 4.2.4 MFW pump low oil pressure Section 4.2.5 MFW pump high bearing temperature Section 4.2.6 D 2. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met. 2.1 RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 1.
D 3. EXIT this procedure.
5
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of25 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MFW, Condensate, or Heater Drain Pump Trip NOTE MFW pump low suction pressure alarms at 350 psig lowering and MFW pump low suction pressure trip occurs at 275 psig lowering.
D 1. VERIFY current power level can be supported by number of 1.1 COMMENCE downpower per 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Down power, running MFW, condensate, and until the following conditions are heater drain pumps. met:
- S/G levels 60% to 70% NR
- MFW pump suction pressure greater than or equal to 400 psig D 2. IF heater drain pump was tripped, THEN PLACE quench water on tripped pump as follows:
- For 2A Heater Drain Pump, OPEN V38238, DEMIN WTR TO 2A HTR DRAIN PUMP GLAND QUENCH SEAL ISOL.
(TGB/26/N-31/W-A)
- For 2B Heater Drain Pump, OPEN V38239, DEMIN WTR TO 2B HTR DRAIN PUMP GLAND QUENCH SEAL ISOL.
(TGB/26/S-31/W-A) 6
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 FEEDWATER, CONDENSATE, AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 10 of 25 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MFW, Condensate, or Heater Drain Pump Trip (continued)
D 3. IF any of the following has tripped, THEN, NOTIFY Chemistry to monitor for dissolved oxygen levels.
- Heater Drain Pump
- Condensate Pump
- Feedwater Pump D 4. RETURN TO I Section 4.2.1 Step 2.
7
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 5 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE OPS-530, Pre-Planned Power Change Guidance, delineates operations department policy for the use of pre-planned down power profiles provided by the Plant Physics Curve Book.
4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. BEGIN boration per operator aid.
D 2. PERFORM the following:
A. PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction rate.
B. SET DEMAND to desired power level.
D 3. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature.
8
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 6 of39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions
- 1. WHEN a Tavg lowering is noted, 1.1 IF in turbine MANUAL, THEN THEN PRESS the GO pushbutton PRESS and RELEASE the GV on the turbine DEH control panel. LOWER pushbutton as necessary to reduce I control the load reduction rate.
D 2. IF reducing power by more than 20%, THEN NOTIFY SNPO to secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02.26, Zinc Addition.
D 3. NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows:
"Attention all personnel, Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower due to "
(reason)
D 4. NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction.
D 5. PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 5, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.
9
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 7 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued}
D 6. START additional charging pump as required per guidance from Attachment 4, Charging Pump Guidance.
NOTE
- 0-NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control, provides additional guidance on ASI Control.
- US may direct temporary operation outside of ASI limit.
- 7. MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index 7.1 IF operation outside ASIIimit is
+/-0.5 of ESI using CEAs. unavoidable, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. NOTIFY US.
B. MAINTAIN ASI within RPS LPD pre-trip limits.
C. RESTORE ASI to within limits as soon as practical.
7.2 IF ASI CANNOT be maintained within transient band due to the inoperability of CEA(s),
THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering to assist in determining the load reduction rate to minimize effects of operation outside of transient limits.
10
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 8 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 8. MAINTAIN Tret and Tavg within 6.6°F.
8.1 VERIFY boration flow path to RCS.
8.2 ESTABLISH Tret and Tavg within 6.6 oF using any of the following:
- RCS Boration Rate
- CEA Position
- Turbine Load 8.3 IF Tref and Tavg can NOT be maintained within 6.6 °F, THEN NOTIFY US AND:
A. TRIP reactor.
B. GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
D 9. VERIFY boration lineup per Attachment 1, RCS Boration Guidance 11
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 9 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions {continued)
NOTE A Manual turbine trip is required anytime condenser back pressure exceeds 8.5 inches Hg absolute. Condenser back pressure is allowed to exceed the 6 inch Hg absolute limit for a maximum of 5 minutes prior to tripping the turbine.
The 6 inch Hg absolute condenser back pressure limit applies anytime unit load is greater than or equal to 45% power and less than 65% power.
- 10. VERIFY the following parameters: 10.1 IF either parameter is exceeded, THEN NOTIFY US AND:
- Differential pressure between the condensers A. TRIP reactor.
less than 2.5 inches of Hg.
B. GO TO 2-EOP-01,
- VERIFY Turbine back Standard Post Trip Actions.
pressure less than or equal to 8.5 inches Hg absolute.
- IF unit load is greater than or equal to 45% power but less than 65% power, THEN VERIFY back pressure does NOT exceed 6 inches Hg absolute for greater than 5 minutes.
TIME 6 in Hg absolute exceeded :
- IF back pressure exceeds 6 inches Hg absolute, THEN INITIATE a CR to the SCE to determine and record time spent in the limited region of CT-27476.
12
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 10 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 11. VERIFY parameters listed on 11.1 EVALUATE out of limit parameter Attachment 3, Rapid Downpower with respect to:
Parameters, are within limits.
- Trip criteria
- Plant conditions
- Potential consequences
- Load reduction rate NOTE Rapid Downpower may result in Pressurizer Pressure dropping below DNBR Limit.
- 12. MAINTAIN PZR pressure 12.1 VERIFY pressurizer spray, between 2225 and 2275 psia. proportional and back-up heaters are operating properly in automatic.
12.2 REFER to 2-AOP-01.1 0, Pressurizer Pressure and Level.
NOTE A large rate of change in T avg may cause transient level variance.
- 13. MAINTAIN PZR level between 13.1 ENSURE backup charging pump 27% and 68%. starts.
13.2 Manually CONTROL Letdown as required.
13
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 11 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued}
- 14. WHEN Final power level is achieved, THEN GO TO Section 4.2 Step 32 to STABILIZE the unit.
- 15. WHEN power level is approximately 45%,
THEN PERFORM the following:
A. VERIFY flow is within the A.1 CONTINUE power reduction until capacity of one MFW all conditions are satisfied.
pump, as indicated by:
- Pump amps low.
- Feed regulating valves are almost CLOSED to maintain Steam Generator levels.
- Total feedwater flow is less than 15,000 GPM.
B. REMOVE the PSS from service as follows:
(1} PLACE the PSS control switch to OFF.
14
~---~-------------------------------
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 1 and 2 Page 5 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain pump from service. 28 Chg pump recirc valve fails to close when pump is started Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 28 Charging pump recirc isolation if directed.
Indications: None SRO When Tave decrease noted direct GO on the turbine step 4.2.1 Recognizes 2B Charging Pump recirc valve not closing Directs RO to secure 28 Charging Pump (may direct NLO to locally close recirc. isolation valve)
Refer to 2-AOP-02.03, Charging And Letdown. Recognize no SRO specific guidance for loss of single Charging pump as long as one Charging pump still running.
Recognizes T.S. 3.1.2.4 Reactivity Control system, Restore two SROT.S. Charging pumps within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Also T.S. 3.5.2 ECCS, Action a.2, restore two Charging Pumps within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Directs the downpower be continued with one Charging pump running.
Notifies shift manager of event Notify MM to repair and SM of T.S action required.
Commence boration per 2-AOP-22.01'Rapid Downpower' RO Operator aid and later verify lineup per Attachment 1. (attached page 16,17) 5 Scenario 3 15
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 31 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 RCS Boration Guidance (Page 1 of 2)
NOTE
- Step 1 in this attachment is applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress. If other than normal alignment, use guidance of 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
- An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid Placard.
- 1. BORATE the RCS by the following:
A. START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.
B. PLACE FCV-2210Y, BORIC ACID (RTGB-205), control switch in AUTO.
C. IF borating to the Charging Pump suction, THEN OPEN V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE (RTGB-205).
D. IF borating to the VCT, THEN OPEN V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VL V (RTGB-205).
E. ADJUST FIC-221 OY, BORIC ACID, to the desired flowrate.
F. IF desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, THEN CLOSE the running BAM pump recirc valve.
- V2650, TANK 2A RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
- V2651, TANK 2B RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
G. CYCLE V2513, VENT VALVE (RTGB-205) to maintain VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig.
H. CYCLE V2500, DIVERT VALVE (RTGB-205} to WMS if necessary to maintain the desired VCT level.
16
--------- -~---~-----~~~~--~-
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 32 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 RCS Boration Guidance (Page 2 of 2)
- 2. SECURE boration as follows:
A. ENSURE BAM pump recirc valves, OPEN
- V2650, TANK 2A RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
- V2651, TANK 2B RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
B. CLOSE FCV-221 OY, BORIC ACID (RTGB 205).
C. ADJUST FIC-221 OY, BORIC ACID, to zero (RTGB 205).
D. STOP running Boric Acid Pump.
E. ENSURE CLOSED V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV (RTGB-205).
F. ENSURE CLOSED V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE (RTGB-205).
G. ENSURE CLOSED V2513, VENT VALVE (RTGB-205)
H. ENSURE V2500, DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO (RTGB 205).
17
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 1 and 2 Page 6 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
Unit down power to remove 2A Heater Drain pump from service. 28 Chg pump recirc valve fails to close when pump is started Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Indications: None Insert control rods approx. 6 inches per 2-AOP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower'step 4.1.3 for power reduction as directed.
RO (CEDMCS Control switch toMS and IN/HOLD/OUT switch to IN.)
If directed place Pressurizer on recirc. lAW 2-AOP-22.01
'Rapid Downpower' Attachment 5 (attached page 19).
If directed start the 28 Charging pump lAW 2-AOP-22.01
'Rapid Downpower' Attachment 4 (attached page 20).
Recognize and communicate Charging flow has not changed after starting the 28 Charging pump. Recognize recirc valve did not change position. Secures 28 Charging Pump Program DEH per 1(2)NOP-99.07 Operations Hard cards, Attachment 1.0, Turbine Adjustments. (attached page 21-23)
ADJUST values, as directed by US, for the following on BOP MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
- TARGET SELECT
- RATE SELECT Stop 2A Heater Drain pump when directed.
6 Scenario 3 18
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 39 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines (Page 1 of 1)
NOTE
- The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.
- From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:
Time (in min.) to correct mismatch= [(Pzr ppm- RCS ppm) -25 ppm] x 3
- 1. To place the Pressurizer on recirculation, PERFORM following:
A. PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.
B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on Pressurizer Pressure Cntl Vlv PIC-11 OOX or PIC-11 OOY, PRESSURE, to maintain normal operating pressure.
C. OBSERVE Pzr Pressure Spray Cntl Vlv HIC-11 00, SPRAY, AND Pressurizer Spray Valves, PCV-1100E I 1100F, VALVE 2B2 I VALVE 2B1, position indication to verify Main Spray flow.
19
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 38 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Charging Pump Guidance (Page 1 of 1)
- 1. IF Charging Pump(s) are to be started, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE that each Charging pump that is to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.
B. PLACE V2520, lon Exchanger Bypass Valve, to BYPASS RESET unless otherwise requested by the Chemistry Department. (RTGB 205)
WARNING Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow with resultant reduction in transport time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.
This may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration Room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed the Locked High Radiation Area limit of 1000 mr/hr.
C. START the Charging pump.
D. ADJUST the bias on HIC-111 0, PZR LEVEL LTON CNTL VLV (RTGB-205), to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer level to program RRS Pressurizer level for current plant conditions, if required.
E. IF FIA-2212, CHG FLOW TO REGEN HX (RTGB-205), is in service, THEN VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-2212 rise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
F. IF FIA-2212, CHG FLOW TO REGEN HX, is NOT in service, THEN VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
G. WHEN letdown temperature stabilizes, PLACE V2520, lon Exchanger Bypass Valve, to AUTO.
H. ENSURE Charging Pump Recirc Valve CLOSED.
I. PLACE the CHRG PUMP SEL RUNNING B/U switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard , Charging Pump Combinations vs. Selector Switch, on RTGB-205.
J. NOTIFY Health Physics of the charging pump alignment.
20
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-1 01. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.
Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Use of appropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant responses and system performance to ensure proper control of the plant.
Notification to the SM/US is required prior to manipulation for any abnormal indications.
- Reactor Power
- MW (Load)
- CEA POSITION
- DCS Power
- RCS Temp
- Pzr Level
- ASI
- 1. ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
- 2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- 3. ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
- TARGET SELECT
- RATE SELECT
- 4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)
- TARGET
- RATE 21
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS {continued)
- 5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551)
- 6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on DEH main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM- OPERATION PANEL.
(display 5551)
- 7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
(display 5551)
B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:
(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.
(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)
- a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
- b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.
- c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")
from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.
- 8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:
- Reactivity rate
- Turbine load rate 22
~--* ~--~~----------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 13 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 9. IF desired to stop load change, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- c. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.
23
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 3 Page 7 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
PORV V-1474 Leakage Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger PORV leakage when directed.
Indications Available: Temperature increase on TIA 1110 PORV line for V147 4 One LED illuminated on the PACB No.2 for PORV V1474 Annunciator H-32 Quench Tank Level High I Low Identify increasing temperature on TIA 111 0 PORV line for RO V14 74. Monitors pressurizer pressure.
Identifies PORV V-14741eaking Verify spray valves close in response to lowering pressure Implements 2-AOP-01.10 Pressurizer Pressure and Level SRO section 4.2.2.1 (attached pages 25-33)
Directs PORV V-1474 placed in override and block valve V-1476 closed. Step 4.2.2.4 Direct placing alternate PORV V-1475 is service by opening block valve V-1477. Step 4.2.2.8 RO Closes PORV block V-1476 when directed.
Opens PORV block valve V-1477 when directed.
Verify TIA-1110 lowering and LED on PACB No.2 has extinguished.
7 Scenario 3 24
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 7 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE
- Attachment 2, Automatic Responses to Pressurizer Pressure Deviations, contains a listing of automatic actions associated with Pressurizer pressures.
- Attachment 3, Automatic Responses to Pressurizer Level Deviations, contains a listing of automatic actions associated with Pressurizer levels.
- Attachment 4, Pressurizer Level Program Graph, provides Pressurizer level program vs T -avg.
D 1. PERFORM applicable section per Table 1.
Table 1 Abnormal Condition Section Pressurizer PORV or safety valve OPEN or leaking Section 4.2.2 Selected Pressurizer pressure control channel failure Section 4.2.3 Pressurizer Spray or Auxiliary Spray Valves OPEN or leaking Section 4.2.4 Selected RRS channel failure Section 4.2.5 Selected Pressurizer level control channel failure Section 4.2.6 Pressurizer pressure or level abnormal Section 4.2.7 Pressurizer heaters deenergized Attachment 5 25
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 9 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking NOTE One PORV is normally isolated in Modes 1, 2, or 3.
D 1. VERIFY any Pressurizer PORV or safety is OPEN or leaking using 1.1 IF PORV position indication status lights are NOT available, any of the following: THEN GOTO Section 4.2.2 Step 11:
- V1474, PORV, status lights
- V1474, PORV
- V1475, PORV, status lights
- V1475, PORV
- Acoustic Monitor (PACB-2) 1.2 RETURN TO
- PORV discharge Section 4.2.1 Step 1.
temperature greater than 210°F:
- TIA-11 06, PORV LINE
- TIA-111 0, PORV LINE
- Safety valve discharge temperature greater than 185°F OR rising greater than 1oF per hour:
- TIA-1107, SAFETY VALVE
- TIA-11 08, SAFETY VALVE
- TIA-11 09, SAFETY VALVE
- Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 26
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 10 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
D 2. IF safety valve leakage is identified, THEN GOTO Section 4.2.2 Step 9.
D 3. IF PORV flow is indicated, THEN VERIFY Tl-1115, 3.1 IF V1474, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less 2A 1 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE, than 490 psia, AND Tl-1125, 2B1 COLD LEG THEN PERFORM the following:
TEMPERATURE, indicate RCS temperature is greater than the
- PLACE V1474, PORV, in following: OVERRIDE.
- 255°F during heatup
- CLOSE V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE.
- 240°F during cooldown 3.2 IF V1475, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 490 psia, THEN PERFORM the following:
- PLACE V1475, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
- CLOSE V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE.
27
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 11 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
- 3. (continued) 3.3 IF affected PORV can NOT be identified AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 490 psia, THEN ENSURE both PORVs in OVERRIDE and associated block valves CLOSED:
- V1475, PORV, and V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE 3.4 IF affected PORV MODE SELECT switch was NOT in LTOP, THEN EVALUATE positioning affected PORV switches as follows:
- PORV in OFF 3.5 GO TO Section 4.2.2 Step 8.
28
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 12 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
D 4. IF V1474, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, THEN ENSURE the following:
- V1474, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
- V1476, PORV BLOCK VALVE, CLOSED D 5. IF V1475, PORV, indicates flow AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, THEN ENSURE the following:
- V1475, PORV, in OVERRIDE.
- V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE, CLOSED 29
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 13 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.1 0 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking {continued) 0 6. IF affected PORV can NOT be identified AND Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, THEN ENSURE both PORVs in OVERRIDE and associated block valves CLOSED:
7.1 EVALUATE positioning switches as follows:
- V1474, MODE SELECT
- PORV MODE SELECT switch in NORMAL
- V1475, MODE SELECT
- PORV in OFF 30
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 14 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued)
D 8. IF either PORV was isolated AND is available, THEN EVALUATE placing isolated PORV in service as follows:
D 9. IF Quench Tank parameters are normal AND either of the following safety valve leakage conditions exist:
- Safety valve tailpipe temperature(s) are increasing greater than 1oF per hour.
- Safety valve tailpipe temperature(s) are greater than 185°F.
THEN PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per 2-GOP-1 01, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes.
31
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 15 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking {continued)
D 10. VERIFY Pressurizer PORVs and safety valves CLOSED using §.!! of 10.1 IF PORV or safety valve is still leaking, the following: THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-01.08, RCS Leakage Abnormal
- V1474, PORV, status lights Operations .
- V1475, PORV, status lights
- Acoustic Monitors
- TIA-11 06, PORV LINE
- TIA-1110, PORV LINE
- TIA-1107, SAFETY VALVE
- TIA-1108, SAFETY VALVE
- TIA-1109, SAFETY VALVE
- Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 0 11. VERIFY position indication status lights available for the following:
11.1 MONITOR the following for indications of PORV leakage:
- V1474, PORV
- TIA-111 0, PORV LINE
- V1475, PORV
- TIA-11 06, PORV LINE
- Quench tank level, temperature and pressure 11.2 DOCUMENT tailpipe reading and quench tank parameters every eight hours.
32
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 16 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.1 0 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve OPEN or Leaking (continued}
- 11. (continued}
11.3 IF PORV leakage is indicated, THEN RETURN TO Section 4.2.2 Step 1.
D 12. VERIFY Pressurizer pressure stable 12.1 RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 1.
OR trending to Pressurizer pressure setpoint:
- PR-11 00, PRESSURE
- PIC-1100X, PRESSURE
- PIC-11 OOY, PRESSURE D 13. GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 2.
33
- -------------------~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 4 Page 8 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
PT-11 02C, Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel "C" fails low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger Pressurizer Pressure fails low when directed.
Indications Available: Annunciators as listed in section 4.2.1 2-AOP-99.01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation (attached).
RPS Channel C TMLP Bistable tripped Identifies PT-11 02C Pressurizer Pressure Safety Channel has RO/BOP failed low (1500 psia)
Implements 2-AOP-99.01 Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation SRO Step 4.1.1 (attached pages 35,36)
Refer to Attachment 5 of 2-AOP-99.01 (attached page 37)
Refer to step 4.2.6 to bypass PT-1102C (attached page 38)
Implements T.S. 3.3.1 table 3.3.1. Within one (1) hour, directs bypassing RPS channel A Variable Power level, Local Power Density, Thermal Margin I Low Pressure and Loss of Load.
Notify 1/C, Step 4.2.1.3 8 Scenario 3 34
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 10 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A TRANSMITTER failure can be discriminated from a METER failure by the presence of annunciators and protection and control actuations.
D 1. CONFIRM failed channel by any of the following methods:
- Channel check comparison with redundant channels
- Bistable or status lights
- Any instrument-related testing or surveillance procedure in progress 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions NOTE BISTABLE TRIP UNIT is abbreviated as BTU in this AOP.
D 1. IF entering this procedure to restore an affected channel, THEN GOTO Section 4.2.1 Step 5.
35
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 11 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued) 0 2. Using Attachment 5, Channel Failure Impact Table, PERFORM the following:
A. LOCATE table row for affected instrument or channel.
B. REFER TO applicable Tech Specs.
- c. PERFORM applicable procedure section for affected instrument.
D 3. INITIATE work request for affected instrument or channel and NOTIFY I&C or EM as applicable.
D 4. DOCUMENT problem as required:
- EOOS Log
- Condition report
- Ops narrative log 36
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 90 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Channel Failure lm~act Table (Page 2 of 4)
Channel Indicator Tech RPS Trip ESFAS Trip Other Functions AOP Section (source device) Specs VHP, LPD, TM/LP CWPs HI POWER >107%/+9.61% (VHP) LIN 1 15%
Linear Power Range Safety Nl 3.3.1 LOC PWR DEN (variable) (LPD) N/A Input to TM/LP setpt (ASI) Section 4.2.5 MAIMB/MC/MD 3.2.4 TM/LO PRESS Input to HI RATE/LOSS LOAD trip blocks 37 Pressurizer Pressure Pzr Press > 2370 psia 3.3.1 SIAS < 1736 psia DSS > 2450 psia (ATWS) Section 4.2.6 PI-1102AIB/C/D TM/LO PRESS (TM/LP) 3.3.2 T-cold Input to ~T Power Tl-11 02AIB/C/D N/A N/A Input to TM/LP setpt (Q Pwr) 3.3.1 Section 4.2. 7 (TY-1112CAICB/CC/CD Input to LPD CWP TY-1122CAICB/CC/CD)
T-hat Input to ~T Power Tl-11 02AIB/C/D N/A N/A Input to TM/LP setpt (Q Pwr) 3.3.1 Section 4.2.8 (TY-1112HAIHB/HC/HD Input to LPD CWP TY-1122HAIHB/HC/HD)
Variable between 1900 and TM/LP Setpoint Generator N/A N/A 2370 psia. 3.3.1 Section 4.2.9 PIA-11 02AIB/C/D Set to 2500 psia for ASGT S/G Pressure S/G Press :s; 626 psia (auct low)
Pl-80 13AIB/C/D MSIS < 600 psia Input to AFAS 3.3.2 Section 4.2.1 0 TM/LO PRES (ASGT >120 psid)
PI-8023AIB/C/D
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 21 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.6 Pressurizer Pressure Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected instrument:
- PI-1102A
- Pl-11028
- PI-1102C
- Pl-11020 NOTE
- Placing ATWS in TRIP condition is NOT required (optional).
D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTUs listed:
- HI PZR PRESS (RPS)
(Key 106)
- TM/LO PRESS (RPS)
(Key 107)
- PZR PRESS SIAS (Key 132)
- PZR PRESS ATWS (Key 157)
A. BYPASS affected BTUs using keyswitches.
B. TRIP affected BTUs per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.
38
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 5 Page 9 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
2A Aux Transformer High Windings Temperature Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger 2A Aux Xfmr Winding High Temp when directed.
ANPO report from the field the following:
No local alarms are present on the 2A Aux XFRM alarm panel.
No indication of any fires/smoke on the 2A Aux XFRM.
Gas Accumulator Indicators on the 2A Aux XFRM are indicating 0 cc.
Winding Hot Spot temperature on the 2A Aux XFRM is 112°C and stable.
Top Oil Temperature is 100°C on the 2A Aux XFRM and stable.
All 6 Cooling Fans on the 2A Aux XFRM are running.
Both Oil Cooing Pumps on the 2A Aux XFRM are running.
All Reflash Alarm Panels are clear.
Indications Available: Annunciators C-60 Aux/Start Up Xfmr Windings Temp High (alarms at 110°C). Temperature Recorder 53-1 trending up.
Implement 2-AOP-53.02, "Auxiliary Transformer" (attached SRO page 40-44 ).
Dispatch an Operator to perform Attachment 4 of 2-AOP-53.02 After verifying Top Oil Temperature on the on the 2A Aux XFRM is less than 11 0°C and Winding Hot Spot temperature on the 2A Aux XFRM is less than 140°C, (step 4.2.6.3) remove the the 2A Aux XFRM from service lAW Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-53.02 (attached page 45-47)
Place the 2A Startup XFRM in service and remove the 2A Aux BOP XRMR from service lAW Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-53.02 (attached page 45-47) 9 Scenario 3 39
~~---------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 6 of32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions D 1. IF Reactor trips due to auxiliary transformer fault, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01 I Standard Post Trip Actions.
D 2. VERIFY NO fire on 2A or 28 Auxiliary Transformer(s).
2.1 ENSURE Aux Transformer Deluge System activated.
2.2 IMPLEMENT 2-0NP-1 00.01 I Response to Fire.
2.3 REMOVE affected transformer per Attachment 1, Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service.
- 3. As soon as practical, NOTIFY System Load Dispatch of any auxiliary transformer malfunction.
40
- --- --------~--*---------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 7 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
WARNING An energized transformer with a gas reading above 200 cc should NOT be approached as elevated gas levels can be explosive.
0 4. DISPATCH an operator with a copy of Attachment 4, Auxiliary 4.1 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading 400 cc or more, Transformer Local Alarms and THEN PERFORM the following:
Responses, to verify 2A and 28 Aux Transformer Gas A. TRIP Reactor.
Accumulator Indicators reading 0 cc. B. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
4.2 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading between 200 and 400 cc AND one or more of the following exist:
- Fault Pressure Trip alarm (C-18 or C-20)
- Local MECH. RELIEF ALARM
- Oil leak observed THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TRIP Reactor.
B. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
4.3 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading greater than 200 cc, THEN SHUTDOWN plant per 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown-Full Load to Zero Load.
41
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 8 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
- 4. (continued) 4.4 IF Gas Accumulator Indicator reading greater than 0 cc, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. DIRECT operator to record data on Attachment 3, Transformer Gas Accumulation Data Sheet, every 10 minutes until transformer is isolated OR substation personnel provide additional instructions.
B. NOTIFY Fire Brigade Leader of situation.
C. TRANSMIT site announcement using Gai-Tronics with Boost function, warning personnel to stay clear of the Main, S/U, and Aux transformers.
4.5 IF after 60 minutes of data taking AND transformer gas accumulation rate is greater than or equal to 100 cc/hr (16 cc/1 0 min),
THEN SHUTDOWN plant per 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown-Full Load to Zero Load.
42
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 9 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D 5. VERIFY the following annunciators are CLEAR:
5.1 DISPATCH operator to investigate cause of alarm per Attachment 4, Auxiliary Transformer Local
- C-48, AUX XFMR 2A Alarms and Responses.
ALARM PANEL
- C-50, AUX XFMR 2B ALARM PANEL D 6. VERIFY C-60, AUX/START UP XFMR WINDINGS TEMP HIGH, is 6.1 VALIDATE alarm by observing one or more of the following is CLEAR. 1oooc or higher on recorder TR-53-1, (Transformer)
TEMPERATURE, on RTGB-201:
- CHNL 1, AUX XFMR 2A 6.9 KV
- CHNL 2, AUX XFMR 2A 4.1 KV
- CHNL 3, AUX XFMR 2B 6.9 KV
- CHNL 4, AUX XFMR 2B 4.1 KV 6.2 DISPATCH operator to investigate cause of alarm per Attachment 4, Auxiliary Transformer Local Alarms and Responses.
43
- -~~~~~~~~~~----~--------*-----*~*-----
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 10 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions {continued)
- 6. {continued) 6.3 IF valid alarm persists, THEN ISOLATE transformer per Attachment 1, Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service, before reaching any of the following:
- Top Oil Temperature of 110°C
- Hot Spot Temperature of 140°C D 7. VERIFY the following ground alarms are CLEAR:
7.1 IF ground exists, THEN PERFORM the following:
- C-28, AUX XFMR 2A A. NOTIFY the Electrical 4.16KV GROUND Department.
- C-30, AUX XFMR 28 B. INSPECT bus ground fault 4.16 KV GROUND relay targets to determine the location of the fault.
- C-38, AUX XFMR 2A 6.9KV GROUND c. CONSIDER transferring loads to the Startup
- C-40, AUX XFMR 28 Transformer per 6.9KV GROUND Attachment 1, Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s)
From Service.
44
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 15 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service (Page 1 of 6) 1.0 REMOVING AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 2A FROM SERVICE 1.1 Transferring Loads to Start-Up Transformer 2A
- 1. IF Start-Up Transformer 2A is NOT available, THEN GO TO Attachment 1 Section 1.2.
- 2. IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is NOT loaded and needs to be removed from service, THEN GO TO Attachment 1 Section 1.3.
- 3. INSERT Sync Plug into 6.9 KV BUS 2A 1 sync selector switch and POSITION to ST-2A1.
- 4. VERIFY SYN-888, SYNCHROSCOPE, is stationary at 12 o'clock position.
- 5. VERIFY the following are approximately matched:
- VM-8881, INCOMING VOLT
- VM-888R, RUNNING VOLT
- 6. PLACE and HOLD Bkr 2-30102, START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A, control switch in CLOSE.
- 7. VERIFY START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A breaker CLOSED.
- 8. Slowly RELEASE Bkr 2-30102 control switch and ENSURE Bkr 2-30101, AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 2A, automatically OPENS.
- 9. Momentarily POSITION Bkr 2-301 01 control switch to TRIP to green flag breaker.
- 10. POSITION Sync Plug to OFF and REMOVE.
- 12. VERIFY SYN-888, SYNCHROSCOPE, is stationary at 12 o'clock position.
- 13. VERIFY the following are approximately matched:
- VM-8881, INCOMING VOLT
- VM-888R, RUNNING VOLT 45
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 16 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service (Page 2 of 6)
- 14. PLACE and HOLD Bkr 2-20102, START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A, control switch in CLOSE.
- 15. VERIFY START-UP TRANSFORMER 2A breaker CLOSED.
- 16. Slowly RELEASE Bkr 2-20102 control switch and ENSURE Bkr 2-201 01, AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 2A, automatically OPENS.
- 17. Momentarily POSITION Bkr 2-20101 control switch to TRIP to green flag breaker.
- 18. POSITION Sync Plug to OFF and REMOVE.
- 19. NOTIFY System Load Dispatch of plant conditions.
- 20. IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is to be removed from service, THEN GO TO Attachment 1 Section 1 .3.
1.2 Start-Up Transformer 2A Unavailable CAUTION Deenergizing 6.9 KV or 4.16 KV non-vital buses will cause a reactor trip.
- 1. TRIP Reactor.
- 2. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions, prior to isolating the transformer.
- 3. IF a vital AC bus is lost, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-47.01A, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus - Train A.
- 4. IF a non-vital AC bus is lost, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-47.02A, Loss of a Non-Safety Related A.C. Bus -Train A.
- 5. IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is to be removed from service, THEN GO TO Attachment 1 Section 1.3.
46
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 17 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-53.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Removing Auxiliary Transformer(s) From Service (Page 3 of 6) 1.1 Transferring Loads to Start-Up Transformer 2A (continued) 1.3 Removing Auxiliary Transformer 2A From Service
- 1. IF Auxiliary Transformer 2A is to be removed from service, THEN ENSURE the following breakers are OPEN:
- Bkr 2-40814, UNIT AUX TRANSF 2A COOLING (Preferred Supply)
(480V MCC 2A1)
- Bkr 2-41605, UNIT AUX TRANSF 2A COOLING STAND BY SUPPLY (480V MCC 281)
NOTE Electrical isolation of the Aux Transformer(s) will require a plant shutdown and the main generator removed from the grid.
- 2. CONTACT Power Delivery I Substation Department to determine the need to isolate the Auxiliary Transformer 2A.
- 3. IF transformer isolation is required, THEN REQUEST a generator clearance from the System Load Dispatch.
47
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 6 and 7 Page 10 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
ESDE in Containment on 2A SG requires manual Reactor trip, Turbine does not trip.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Trigger ESDE on 2A SG when directed. SGTR 200 gpm on 28 SG is auto triggered on the reactor trip. TV1 and GV1 Fail As Is is also auto triggered on the reactor trip When directed to manually trip the turbine from the front standard, wait till the turbine trips on Generator Motoring, then report the turbine is tripped.
Indications Available: Containment pressure rising, RCS temperature lowering, SG pressure lowering, Pressurizer pressure lowering.
When Unit tripped, Throttle valve 1 and Governor valve 1 fail as is. Pressurizer pressure lowering.
Recognize Containment pressure rising, RCS temperature RO lowering, SG pressure lowering, Pressurizer pressure lowering.
Direct manual Reactor trip as above parameters rapidly SRO change.
Recognizes Turbine did not trip when Reactor tripped.
BOP Manually pushes Turbine Trip pushbutton, recognizes Turbine still not tripped.
SRO Directs Both MSIV's to be closed manually from the RTGB when identified Turbine did not trip. Directs NPO to locally trip the turbine from the front standard.
Note: The turbine will eventually trip on a secondary lockout (Generator Motoring).
BOP Manually closes the MSIV's 10 Scenario 3 48
~*
--~-------**-*** --~--------.-- --~----~---- -* .. -* -- -------*-
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 6 and 7 Page 11 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
ESDE in Containment on 2A SG requires manual Reactor trip, Turbine does not trip.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
- RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal
- BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
Directs one RCP in each loop stopped when SIAS on low pressurizer pressure. Direct all RCP's stopped if CCW lost >10 minutes.
11 Scenario 3 49
-- -------~---~-------~---~-~-----------.----*--*--*-- ---------*----*------~-----*- ---~-
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 6 and 7 Page 12 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
ESDE in Containment on 2A SG requires manual Reactor trip, Turbine does not trip.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available: Rising Containment pressure. Failure of 'A' train CSAS actuation when setpoint exceeded.
SRO Direct 'A' side CSAS manually actuated when identifies auto Critical actions did not occur. Direct 2A CS pump started, FCV-07-1 B Task opened.
BOP Close MSR reheat block valves.
Notify NPO to perform Appendix X (NPO Actions) section 1 of EOP-99.
Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint of Vital Auxiliaries RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
RCS Heat Removal
- Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535° F
- Place ADV's in service
- Close Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 12 Scenario 3 50
~----------------- *-*----*-------*---------------------
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8 and 9 Page 13 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1 B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available: SJAE in alarm 6 minutes post trip Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig (recognize Containment Pressure rising)
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms. (recognize SJAE in alarm approximately 6 minutes after trip)
BOP Recognize 'A' side CSAS did not actuate. Manually actuate 'A' Critical side CSAS, manually start 2A CS pump and open FCV-07-1 B Task Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Recognize SIAS on low pressuirizer pressure and stops one RCP in each loop when directed.
Reactivity Control
- Verify Reactor power is lowering .
- Verify startup rate is negative .
- Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted .
Inventory Control
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
- Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (take manual control of chg pumps and isolate letdown) 13 Scenario 3 51
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8 and 9 Page 14 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on 28 SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1 B 28 CS header fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When Chemistry asked to sample SG's report back 10 minutes later, activity increasing on 28 SG.
Indications Available: Note: SG blowdown radiation will not show up on PC-11.
Step 6 of EOP-15 will direct sampling SG's.
Pressure Control
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Core Heat Removal
- Verify loop delta T is < 1oo F Note: AFAS will actuate approximately 5 minutes after the trip. 2A SG will initially be fed, then AFAS-1 lockout will occur 10 minutes after trip and only 28 SG SG will be fed.
SRO Direct throttling AFW to 28 SG to approximately 220 gpm Direct resetting AFAS-2 when notified AFAS reset criteria met.
Directs entry to 2-EOP-15, "Functional Recovery" due to dual event (SGTR I ESDE) (attached pages 53-58)
Directs RO to trip all RCP's if CCW lost >1 0 minutes. (if not performed previously)
Direct Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's (may ask for 'quick frisk') (attached pages 59,60).
14 Scenario 3 52
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 6 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A harsh containment condition exists if containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should be used for determination of saturation margin when indicated containment temperature is less than or equal to 200°F. Figure 1B should be used when indicated containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should also be used if containment temperature had exceeded 200°F during event progression but was lowered to 200°F or less by containment cooling systems.
NOTE
- Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available. Reg Guide 1.97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.
- Steps designated with an
- may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously.
0 1. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.
REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies.
D 2. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.
53
~ -----------------~--------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
7 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 3. RCP Trip Strategy A. !f ANY of the following conditions exist,
- RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia
B. !f ANY of the following conditions exist,
- Main or Auxiliary Feedwater flow can NOT be re-established
- RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling
54
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
8 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 4. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERIFY CCW to the RCPs. A.1 !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW.
REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.
A.2 !fa VALID SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED.
A.3 !f CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
B. !f BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff flowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleed off flowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.
55
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
9 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 5. Verify RCP Operating Limits 5.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits.
!f RCPs are RUNNING, Then VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied.
REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits.
D 6. Sample S/Gs Sample BOTH S/Gs for activity and boron.
REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling Steam Generators.
0 7. Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. !f Circulating Water flow to the Main Condenser has been lost, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:
- 1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.
- 2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.
B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant AS NECESSARY.
REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.
56
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
10 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERA TOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 8. Restore Instrument Air 1f a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.
0 9. Perform Safety Function Status Checks PERFORM the Safety Function Status Checks every 15 minutes.
REFER TO Attachment 1, Safety Function Status Check Sheet.
0 10. Identify Success Paths IDENTIFY the success paths to be used to satisfy each safety function.
REFER TO Attachment 3, Functional Recovery Success Paths.
57
--~-~~--~~~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
11 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 11. Perform Success Path Instructions PERFORM ALL of the following IN THE ORDER LISTED.
A. Instructions for a success path MOST LIKELY to be met for safety functions that are NOT met by ANY success path.
B. Instructions for success paths for safety functions that are NOT met by Success Path 1.
C. Instructions for ALL other success paths for safety functions met by Success Path 1.
0 12. Perform Long Term Actions When ALL Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied, Then PERFORM Long Term Actions.
REFER TO Section 4.9, Long Term Actions.
END OF INITIAL ACTIONS 58
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 3 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)
A Train (...J) B Train (...J)
D 1. !fa LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
D A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
D B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.
CAUTION If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.
NOTE
- HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-88) starts to open
- When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset D 2. !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:
- HCV-14-8A
- HCV-14-9 OR
- HCV-14-88
- HCV-14-10 59
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 4 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERA TORS (Page 2 of 2)
D 3. 1f the 'N' Header has been restored, Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:
A. 1f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE.
B. OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.
D 4. 1f the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples ~
for isotopic activity and Tritium.
D 5. 1f SIGs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.
END OF APPENDIX A 60
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8 and 9 Page 15 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on 28 SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-18 28 CS header fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When Appendix R outside actions directed, call back in five minutes and report complete.
Indications Available:
Direct Hydrogen Analyzers placed in service per Appendix L SRO EOP-99 (attached pages 62,63)
Direct BOP to perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 (attached pages 64-67).
Direct Safety Function Status Check's performed every 15 minutes Identify Success paths in service per Attachment 3 as:
RC-1 MVA-DC-1 MVA-AC-1 IC-2 PC-1 HR-2 Cl-1 (not met until 2A SG Isolated)
CTPC-3 (if 2A Containment Spray started and I or FCV-07-1 B 28 Spray header valve opened)
Performs success path for Cl-1 (attached pages 68-71) first, due to Safety Function not being met until 2A SG isolated.
Identify and Isolate the most affected SG. (2A SG). Step 2 Refers to HR-2 (step 4.6.11) to address isolation of 2A SG, then returns to Cl-1 when the 2A SG isolated. Direct 2-EOP-99 Appendix R to isolate the 2A SG (attached pages 72-74).
15 Scenario 3 61
~~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 68 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 1 of 2)
A Train (.Y) B Train (.Y)
- 1. SELECT ONE sample point by PLACING the sample valve selector switch in the desired position. FSE-27-8 FSE-27-12_
(Upper Cntmt. Dome) (Lwr. Cntmt.)
FSE-27 -9 FSE-27 (Pzr. Area) (2B2 RCP)
FSE-27-10_ FSE-27-14 (2A1 RCP) (2B1 RCP)
FSE-27 (2A2 RCP)
- 2. OPEN the Containment Isolation Valves. FSE-27-15 FSE-27 (Sample in to H2 Analyzer)
AND FSE-27 FSE-27 -18 (Sample out of H2 Analyzer)
- 3. ENSURE the function selector switch is in the SAMPLE position.
- 4. PLACE the OFF I STANDBY I ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.
NOTE If power is interrupted and then restored to an in-service Hydrogen Analyzer (such as after an ESFAS or Undervoltage Relay actuation) the remote control selector pushbutton must be depressed to allow for continued operation of the analyzer from the Control Room.
- 5. DEPRESS the remote control selector pushbutton.
- 6. VERIFY the red sample light energizes.
62
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 69 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX L PLACING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2)
A Train (.Y) B Train (.Y)
- 7. ENSURE the Hydrogen Analyzer Recorder has been started. (Start button located on front of Yokogawa recorder) - -
- 8. Allow five to ten minutes for the Hydrogen Analyzer to stabilize as indicated by the (%) indication leveling off. - -
END OF APPENDIX L 63
-- -- -------- ----------~------~------------------------------ --*-------------- -*-------*--*
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 118 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 5 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 1. ENSURE ONLY ONE MFW Pump is RUNNING, with the control switch in RECIRC.
D 2. ENSURE ONLY ONE Condensate Pump is RUNNING.
D 3. 1f AFAS has actuated, and use of Main Feedwater is desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
D A. ENSURE AFAS is RESET.
D B. ENSURE Steam Generator levels are being restored using Auxiliary Feedwater D C. ENSURE BOTH SIG [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
- 1. MV-09-5
- 2. MV-09-6 D D. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
D E. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
D F. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
64
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 119 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 6 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 3. (continued)
D G. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control SIG levels.
D H. RESTORE AFW to the standby alignment.
D 4. !f AFAS has NOT actuated and use of Main Feedwater is desired, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
D A. ENSURE BOTH SIG [Main FRV] Block valves CLOSED.
D B. For EACH MFW header to be placed in service, ENSURE the associated MFIVs are OPEN.
D C. ENSURE BOTH Low Power MIA Stations in MANUAL.
D D. DEPRESS BOTH pushbuttons to RESET the Low Power Feedwater Valves.
D E. ADJUST the Low Power MIA Stations AS NECESSARY to control SIG levels.
D 5. ENSURE BOTH Heater Drain Pumps are STOPPED.
65
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 120 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 7 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 6. ENSURE BOTH of the following:
0 A. Bearing Oil Pump 0 A.1 ENSURE Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and Seal Oil Backup Pump RUNNING.
RUNNING.
0 B. When the turbine reaches 600 rpm, Then Bearing Oil Lift Pump RUNNING.
0 7. ENSURE the Turbine Drain Valves are OPEN.
0 8. ENSURE ONLY ONE Turbine Cooling Water Pump is RUNNING.
0 9. VERIFY Turbine Generator Bearing 0 9.1 DIRECT a field operator to adjust Oil temperature between 11 0 to TCW to the in-service TLO Cooler 120°F. to maintain outlet Oil temperature between 110 to 120°F.
0 10. When Turbine speed reaches ZERO 0 10.1 PERFORM ALL of the following:
rpm, Then VERIFY the turning gear automatically ENGAGES.
0 A. PLACE Turning Gear in MANUAL.
0 B. VERIFY the Turning Gear Permissive Light is ON.
0 C. Locally ENSURE the Turning Gear is ENGAGED.
0 D. Locally START the Turning Gear.
66
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 121 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX X SECONDARY POST TRIP ACTIONS (Page 8 of 8)
Section 2: CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 11. !f Reactor power history is low, Then CONSIDER reducing steam generator blowdown flow to maintain RCS temperature.
D 12. Place Boron Dilution Alarm D 12.1 !f BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System in Operation. System channels are NOT operating, When indicated Reactor power is Then PERFORM applicable less than 1o-5%, actions of 2-AOP-02.01, Boron Then PERFORM BOTH of the Concentration Control System following: (BCCS) Abnormal Operations.
D A. ENERGIZE BOTH channels of Startup Nuclear Instrumentation to place the Boron Dilution Alarm System in operation.
D B. VERIFY BOTH Boron Dilution Alarm System Channels are operating.
NOTE Excessive moisture can build up in CEDMC's room, and impact equipment reliability if 15 KW heaters are not energized after plant shutdown.
D 13.NOTIFY SNPO to energize 15 KW heater located in the CEDMC's room to minimize humidity build-up per 2-NOP-25.1 0, CEDMCS Air Conditioning System Operation.
D 14. CONSIDER contacting the Division Load Dispatcher for a switching order to OPEN the Main Generator disconnects.
END OF APPENDIX X 67
-~ ~--~~~~--~~*
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 148 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION- Cl-1 Success Path 1 -Automatic/Manual Isolation INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 01. Ensure Containment Isolation and Cooling
!f ANY of the following conditions exist,
- Containment pressure greater than 3.5 psig
- Containment radiation greater than 10 Rlhr
- SIAS is ACTUATED Then PERFORM ALL the following:
A. ENSURE BOTH the following:
- 1. ENSURE CIAS has 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN CIAS ACTUATED. components.
REFER TO Table 2, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.
- 2. !f Containment pressure is 2.1 Manually START/ALIGN MSIS greater than 3.5 psig, components.
Then ENSURE MSIS has REFER TO Table 5, Main Steam ACTUATED. Isolation Actuation Signal.
B. ENSURE ALL available Emergency Containment HVAC systems are RUNNING:
- At least ONE train of SBVS
- At least ONE train of Containment Fan Coolers 68
~----- --------~------------- ------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 149 of 206 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION- Cl-1 Success Path 1 - Automatic/Manual (continued) Isolation (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION
!f there is a conflict between isolating a S/G with indications of S/G tube leakage or isolating a S/G with an unisolable steam leak, Then the S/G with the ESD should be isolated. At least ONE S/G must remain available for heat removal.
0 2. Determine If SGTR Present
!fa SGTR has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following,
- S/G activity
- Main steam piping radiation
- S/G level change when NOT feeding
- S/G blowdown activity
- ONE S/G level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same for BOTH
- Feedflow mismatch between S/Gs
- Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a S/G PRIOR to the trip Then IDENTIFY and ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.
REFER TO Heat Removal Success Path HR-1 or HR-2, and RETURN TO this success path when the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.
69
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
150 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION- Cl-1 Success Path 1- Automatic/Manual (continued) Isolation (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 3. Verify No RCS to CCW Leak 3.1 !f RCS to CCW leakage is suspected, VERIFY NO RCS leakage into the Then ISOLATE the leak.
CCW system: REFER TO 2-AOP-14.02, Component Cooling Water Excessive Activity.
A. Absence of CCW Surge Tank high level alarm (Annunciator LB-1 0).
B. ENSURE sample flow to the CCW radiation monitors and NO indication of activity.
70
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
36 FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.:
151 of 206 2-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION* Cl-1 Success Path 1 - Automatic/Manual (continued) Isolation (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 4. Verify Cl-1 Satisfied 4.1 !f Containment Isolation is still in jeopardy, VERIFY Cl-1 (Automatic/Manual Then PURSUE Containment Isolation) is satisfied by ANY of the Isolation following conditions being satisfied: and other jeopardized safety functions simultaneously.
Condition 1: 4.2 CONTINUE efforts to establish Containment Isolation by A. !f ANY secondary plant activity evaluating further actions based on monitor alarms ALL of the following:
or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is
- The urgency of other ISOLATED. jeopardized safety functions B. Containment pressure is less
- The risk to plant personnel than 3.5 psig. and the public of leaving certain containment C. NO containment area penetrations unisolated or atmospheric radiation monitor alarms
- The feasibility of isolating or unexplained rise.
containment penetration(s) by alternate means D. If a SGTR exists, Then the isolated S/G pressure is less than 915 psig (930 psia) and NOT steaming via ADV.
Condition 2:
A. !f ANY secondary plant activity monitor alarms or has an unexplained rise, Then the MOST affected S/G is ISOLATED.
B. CIAS is ACTUATED.
71
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 93 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 1 of 6)
Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation NOTE
- Local actions are located in step 18 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.
- Keys 79 and 80 are required for closing MV-08-14, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-18A ISOL, and MV-08-15, 2A SIG MS ADV MV-08-19A ISOL.
- Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLE/TRIP (contingency).
CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.
0 1. ENSURE HCV-08-1A, Main Steam Header 'A' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.
0 2. !f HCV-08-1A did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.
REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.
0 3. ENSURE MV-08-1A, MSIV Header 'A' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.
If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.
0 4. ENSURE HCV-09-1A, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
0 5. ENSURE HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Header 'A' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
72
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 94 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 2 of 6)
Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-1A and HCV-09-1 B, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 2A, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
D A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:
D MV-09-5, Stm Gen 2A Reg Block Valve D LCV-9005, 2A 15% Bypass D MV-09-3, 2A 100% Bypass D B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.
D 7. ENSURE FCV-23-3, 2A SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.
D 8. ENSURE FCV-23-4, 2A SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.
D 9. ENSURE MV-08-18A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
D 10.CLOSE MV-08-14, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 79)
D 11. PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 2A, in STOP.
D 12.ENSURE MV-09-9, Pump 2A Disch to SG 2A Valve, is CLOSED.
D 13.ENSURE MV-09-11, Pump 2C to SG 2A, is CLOSED.
D 14. PLACE MV-08-13, SG 2A Stm to AFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.
D 15.!f MV-08-13, SIG 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required, Then CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78)
D 16.ENSURE MV-08-19A, 2A SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
D 17.CLOSE MV-08-15, 2A SIG ADV lsol. (Key 80) 73
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 95 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 3 of 6)
Section 1: 2A Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
NOTE Control room isolation actions are now complete. !fa SGTR is in progress, Then the SM should be informed of the status of terminating contaminated steam release forE-Pian purposes.
0 18. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:
0 A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09152, 2C AFW Pump to 2A SIG Isolation.
0 B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09120, 2A AFW Pump to 2A S/G Isolation.
0 C. CLOSE SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.
0 D. !f SE-08-2, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08884, SE-08-2 Inlet Isolation.
0 E. !f MV-08-13, S/G 2A Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
0 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-13 using the handwheel.
0 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:
0 a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.
0 b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:
0 V08622, CB #67 Drain 0 V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol 0 V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 1 74
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8 and 9 Page 16 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on 2B SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-1 B 2B CS header fails to open.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Chemistry reports, after time delay, there is elevated activity in the 2B SG Indications Available:
When Cl-1 satisfied refer to IC-2 (next safety function not met SRO by success path one ( 1)
Direct monitoring Pressurizer level to determine if HPSI throttling criteria met.
Critical Direct RCS cooldown not to exceed 1oooF in any one hour Task period RO Monitor RCS temperature, subcooling, Pressurizer level.
Critical Cooldown the RCS not to exceed 100°F in any one hour period Task when directed.
If CCW lost to RCP's >30 minutes:
A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump BOP valves to CLOSE.
B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
Perform SFSC's of EOP-15 every 15 minutes Perform Appendix A EOP-99 Sample SG's, when directed (attached pages 59,60)
Isolates 2A S/G lAW 2-EOP-99 Appendix R when directed (attached pages 72-74) 16 Scenario 3 75
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8 and 9 Page 17 of 18 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on 28 SG post trip. Failure of A CSAS to actuate. 2A CS pump does not start, FCV-07-18 28 CS headerfails to open.
Time A Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Perform Appendix L EOP-99 Hydrogen Analyzers when BOP directed (attached pages 62,63)
Perform EOP-99 Appendix X section 2 when directed (attached pages 64-67)
Reset AFAS-2 when directed Throttle HPSI flow when directed Scenario Termination:
- RCS temperature and pressure are controlled
- Safety Functions met in EOP-15 17 Scenario 3 76
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:
Protected Train: A Unit 21dentified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 012 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
None Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
None Tech Spec Action Statement:
None.
OPS 513's:
None Locked in Annunciators:
M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsoiN2555 Ovrld/SS lsol Current Status:
100% power, steady state equilibrium Xenon, MOL. RCS Boron concentration is 777 ppm.
Equipment Problems:
2A Charging pump OOS for repack.
18 Scenario 3 77
~~~-~-*-------------------------------
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: HLC 21-NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions: 10-12% power, MOC. 2A Charging pump OOS for repack.
Turnover: 10-12% power with the main generator on line. The 2A Charging pump is OOS for repack.
MFW and SBCS are in service. Raise power to 30%.
Critical Tasks:
- Block MSIS prior to actuation
- Close MSIV's and isolate 2B SG within 30 minutes of SGTR occurring Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 R/RO The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid. Raise power to 30%.
N/ BOP, SRO 2 1 C/BOP Containment Fan Cooler 2-HVS-1A trips.
T.S./ SRO 3 2 1/RO 2A SG WR level instrument LT -9012 Drifts low. Manual control of Low Power Feedwater valve (FCV 9005) is required.
4 3 T.S./ SRO RCS loop (SG) flow instrument (PDT -1111 D) fails low.
5 4 1/RO HIC 1100 Spray Controller fails high 6 5 C/BOP Loss of 2A 1 480V Load center 7 6 M/AII Turbine vibration exceeds 14 mils, manual Rx/Turbine trip required. SGTR on the 2B SG 8 7 C/RO "B" side SIAS does not auto actuate. Manual actuation required.
"A" side SIAS auto actuates but 2A HPSI Pump is air bound and should be secured 9 8 C/BOP While performing Appendix R for the 2B SG, the 2B MSIV does not close from the Control Room. Local closure by the NPO is required
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
~-------------
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 The Unit is at 10-12% power. MFW and SBCS are in service. The main generator has just been synchronized to the grid. Directions for the crew are to raise power to approximately 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201.
Prior to the crew commencing the up power, Containment Fan Cooler 2-HVS-1A, will trip. The BOP should start idle Containment cooler (2-HVS-1 D). The SRO will be required to implement the appropriate T.S. HVS-1A should be declared inoperable and T.S. 3.6.2.1, Action b, restore inoperable cooling train within 7 days. 2-4 minutes after the Containment Fan Cooler trips, the 2A SG WR Level instrument, LIC-9012, drifts low causing the RO to take manual control of LCV 9005. The Main Feedwater AOP should be entered. One minute after the 2A WR Level instrument malfunction is triggered After manual control of SG levels is established and the standby Containment Fan Cooler has been started (and TS actions addressed), the crew should commence the up power. After the crew raises power 3-5%, RCS Loop 2A Channel D flow instrument (PDT-1111 D) fails low causing a low flow indication and half trip signal (also appears on PDI-1101 Don the RTGB).
The crew must diagnose the problem and bypass the trip signal in accordance with 2-AOP 01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation. The SRO will refer to T.S. for the appropriate action statement.
While the SRO and BOP are diagnosing and taking action to bypass the RCS low flow RPS trip, HIC 1100 Spray controller output fails high. Pressurizer pressure will continue to lower until the crew takes manual control of the spray valves.
A loss of the 2A 1 480V load center will occur when the breaker opens. This results in loss of letdown and numerous alarms. The RO should stop the running Charging pumps. The running DEH pump will stop and the backup DEH pump will not start. The BOP should manually start the 2B DEH pump, the 2B Gland exhaust fan and the 2B primary water pump. The breaker can be closed when the crew requests the SNPO to investigate. The report back will be the breaker was opened by mistake in preparation to hang a clearance. The clearance was intended for the other Unit.
After RCS pressure has stabilized, turbine vibration alarms are received (confirmed with control room indications) due to excessive turbine vibrations. The trip vibration limit is exceeded requiring the crew to manually trip the reactor and turbine (power > 15% ).
Following the Rx trip, a SGTR will occur on the 2B SG. As the unit depressurizes, "B" train SIAS does not auto actuate. Manual actuation will be successful. "A" train SIAS auto actuates but the 2A HPSI pump is air bound and should be secured. This causes the need to manually initiate "B" train ECCS. The 2A HPSI pump will require venting to become operable (but not untii"B" SIAS is manually actuated).
As the RCS is cooled down (to less than 51 0°F Thot) and depressurized, the MSIS block permissive will be received. The crew should block MSIS to maintain SBCS in service to limit steaming the ruptured generator to atmosphere. This is a critical task. When the 2B SG is being isolated lAW EOP-99 Appendix R, the 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Local closure lAW EOP-99 Appendix I will be successful.
The scenario may be terminated when 2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture is implemented, the 2B SG is isolated and the RCS is being cooled down.
2 Scenario 4 2
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Procedures Used
- 1 (2)-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1
- 2-NOP-09.01, Main Feedwater System Operation
- 2-AOP-09.01, Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation
- 2-AOP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Equipment
- 2-AOP-01.1 0, Pressurizer Pressure and Level
- 2-AOP-25.01, Loss of RCB Cooling Fans
- 2-AOP-47.02A, Loss of Non Safety Related AC Bus- Train A
- 1(2)-AOP-22.02 Turbine Supervisory
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions
- 2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- 2-EOP-99, Appendix R
- 2-EOP-99, Appendix I Technical Specifications Entered
- T.S. 3.6.2.1 Containment Cooling
- T.S. 3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation Scenario 4 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# Page 4 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
- Initiate IC #13, 11% power, then execute HLC 21 NRC Scenario 41esson .
- Ensure the main generator is synchronized to the grid .
- Ensure 28 and 2C Charging pumps are running and 2A Charging Pump out of service.
- Charging pump selector switch in the 2B/2C position .
- Sign off applicable steps in (1)2-GOP-201 up to step 66
- Hand out (1)2-GOP-201 signed off up to step 66 .
Indications Available: Numerous alarms due to power level and status of the secondary.
Direct power increase lAW 1(2)-GOP-201 step 66. (Generator SRO is approximately 100 MW) continue with up power.
WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 100 MW, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE Hydrogen I Air Side Seal Oil Coolers differential temperature is less than or equal to 2°F.
B. INITIATE preparation of MSRs for service per Attachment 3, MSR Operation. (attached page 5-7)
Withdraw CEAs in 'Manual Sequential' as directed to raise Rx RO power.
EVALUATOR'S NOTE: Power should be raised initially by CEA's. CEA's should be withdrawn to at least 102" prior to 20% power to meet LTSSIL Raise Turbine load using 1-NOP-99.07 Turbine Adjustment BOP (attached page 8-10)
Monitor SG levels for proper operation of FWCS. (step 67 of GOP-201)
Scenario 4 4
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 56 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS (continued)
- 60. REFER to 1-GOP-1 01, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes.
- 61. PERFORM applicable sections of 1-0SP-100.27, Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations.
- 62. PERFORM applicable sections of 1-0SP-100.30, Secondary Plant Operating Checks and Tests.
NOTE Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 may be referenced for Reactor Protective Instrumentation requirements.
- 63. IF High Startup Rate Trip bistable was removed from service due to Linear Range Safety Channel being out of service, THEN it may be returned to normal if BOTH of the following conditions are met:
- Reactor power is greater than 15%,
- High Startup Rate Trip bistable is NOT in TRIP OR BYPASS for any other reason.
- 64. IF High Startup Rate Trip bistable was placed in TRIP by removing Trip module and Trip module has been reinserted, THEN NOTIFY I&C to perform a functional test in accordance with 1-IMP-64.05A, B, C, or D, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Calibration Channel A, B, C, or D.
- 65. ENSURE TCV-13-15, H2 Cooler Outlet, maintains Hydrogen Cold Gas Temperature between 40°C and 46°C per 1-NOP-13.03, Turbine Cooling Water -system Normal Operation.
- 66. WHEN GENERATOR LOAD is approximately 100 MW, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE Hydrogen I Air Side Seal Oil Coolers differential temperature is less than or equal to 2°F.
B. INITIATE preparation of MSRs for service per Attachment 3, MSR Operation.
5
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 85 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATIACHMENT3 INITIAL MSR Operation (Page 1 of 11)
- 1. ENSURE alignment of MSR tube side vents to condenser are as follows:
COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL 1A MSR Scavenging Vent to 18 Cndsr lsol V11829 OPEN (TG8/48/S-12/W-D)
MSR 1A Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 58 V11836 CLOSED (TG8/67/S-14/E-8) 18 MSR to 18 Cndsr MSR Scavenging Vent lsol V11834 OPEN (TG8/48/S-12/W-D)
MSR 18 Scavenging Vent to HP Heater 58 V11831 CLOSED (TG8/68/S-14/E-8) 1C MSR Scavenging Vent lsol.
V11839 OPEN (TG8/47/S-11/E-K)
MSR 1C Scavenging Vent to HP Heater SA V11846 CLOSED (TG8/67/S-8/E -8) 1D MSR Scavenging Vent Isol.
V11844 OPEN (TG8/47/S-11/E-K)
MSR 1D Scavenging Vent to HP Heater SA V11841 CLOSED (TG8/68/S-8/E-8)
CAUTION Admitting steam to the MSR drain collector system with a partially filled system may cause severe water hammer. To avoid water hammer, any cold water remaining in the drain collector tank and I or drain piping should be drained prior to admitting steam.
A. IF water has NOT been drained from MSR drain collectors tanks and drain collector piping, such as during a refueling outage, THEN REFER TO Appendix U of 1-GOP-502.
6
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
88 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP- MODE 2 TO MODE 1 86 of95 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL MSR 02eratlon (Page 2 of 11)
- 2. (continued)
B. PREPARE MSRs for service as follows:
(1) ENSURE the following MSR Warmup Valves are OPEN:
COMP ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL MV-08-5 Warmup 1A MSR OPEN MV-08-7 Warmup 1D M SR OPEN MV-08-9 Warmup 1B MSR OPEN MV-08-11 Warmup 1C MSR OPEN (2) RESET MSR Reheat Control Valves as follows:
- a. ENSURE MSR CONTROL PANEL, is open.
(display 5552)
- b. TOUCH SELECT MODE from MODE OF OPERATION group. (display 5552)
- c. TOUCH RESET from MODE OF OPERATION SELECT pop-up. (display 7060)
- d. VERIFY MODE OF OPERATION group displays RESET MODE. (display 5552)
(3) Locally VERIFY the following MSR TCVs are closed:
COMP 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL TCV-08-1 MSto 1A MSR CLOSED TCV-08-3 MS to 1B MSR CLOSED TCV-08-4 MS to 1C MSR CLOSED TCV-08-2 MS to 1D MSR CLOSED 7
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-101. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.
Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Use of appropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant responses and system performance to ensure proper control of the plant.
Notification to the SM/US is required prior to manipulation for any abnormal indications.
- Reactor Power
- MW (load)
- CEA POSITION
- DCS Power
- RCS Temp
- Pzr Level
- ASI
- 1. ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
- 2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- 3. ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
- TARGET SELECT
- RATE SELECT
- 4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)
- TARGET
- RATE 8
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551)
- 6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on DEH main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM- OPERATION PANEL.
(display 5551)
- 7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
(display 5551)
B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:
(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.
(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)
- a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
- b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.
- c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")
from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.
- 8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:
- Reactivity rate
- Turbine load rate 9
~- ----~~-----------~---------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 13of19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 9. IF desired to stop load change, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- c. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.
10
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# Page 5 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
Raise power to 30% in accordance with 2-GOP-201 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Monitor SBCS for proper operation (i.e. valves closing as BOP Turbine load is increased) during power increase.
Contact NPO to ENSURE Hydrogen I Air Side Seal Oil Coolers differential temperature is less than or equal to 2°F.
INITIATE preparation of MSRs for service per Attachment 3, MSR Operation. (attached page 5-7)
Scenario 4 11
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 6 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
2-HVS-1A Containment Fan Cooler Trips Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 2, HVS-1A trips.
Indications Available: Annunciator T-12, CNTMT FAN CLR HVS-1C OVRLDITRIP Evaluator Note: 2- 4 minutes after event 2 was triggered, trigger event 3.
This is to ensure the BOP does not operate the FWCS for the next event (event 3)
BOP Acknowledge alarm and recognize HVS-1A tripped.
Implement 2-AOP-25.01, Loss Of RCB Cooling Fans Section SRO 4.2.5 (attached page 13-16)
Direct starting HVS-1 Din FAST speed BOP Start HVS-1 D in FAST speed when directed.
SRO Direct monitoring Containment air temperature Recognize fan is not operable. Review T.S. 3.6.2.1 Action 1.b T.S. SRO restore inoperable containment cooling train within 7 days.
(attached page 17)
Monitor Containment air temperature (UR-07-1 Bon RTGB 206)
BOP to ensure Containment temperature does not exceed 120°F.
Scenario 4 12
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS 13 of 21 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.5 Loss of Containment Fan Cooler CAUTION Sufficient Containment Fan Coolers are required to be operating to maintain Containment air temperature less than or equal to 120°F to maintain the reactor vessel support structure within its design basis. On loss of Containment Fan Coolers, operator action is required within 45 minutes from the time Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F to restore air temperature to less than or equal to 120°F OR initiate reactor trip and cooldown to at least Hot Shutdown. The total time allowed from the time Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F to reaching Hot Shutdown is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
(Section 6.2 Commitment 1, Section 6.2 Commitment 2) 0 1. START standby Containment Fan Cooler:
1.1 PERFORM Attachment 4, Containment Cooling Fan Local Breaker Operations.
- HVS-1A 1.2 PERFORM one start attempt of all
- HVS-18 available Containment Fan Coolers.
- HVS-1C 1.3 IF any Containment Fan Cooler
- HVS-10 does NOT start, THEN NOTIFY EM. I 1.4 REVIEW Tech Specs 3.6.2.1, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.
13
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS 14 of 21 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.5 Loss of Containment Fan Cooler (continued)
GJ 2. MONITOR Containment air temperature less than or equal to 2.1 IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Down power.
120°F as average of following (RTGB-206): 2.2 REVIEW Tech Specs 3.6.1.5, Containment Air Temperature.
- Tl-07 -3A, TEMPERATURE 2.3 IF Containment air temperature is
- UR-07-1B, CNTMT & NOT less than 120°F within SUMP PRESS/TEMP, 45 minutes from first rising to Channel1, TE-07-3B, 120°F, CNTMT AIR TEMP THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TRIP reactor.
B. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
- c. COOLDOWN to at least Hot Shutdown within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> from first rising to 120°F per 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown -
Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.
D 3. VERIFY Attachment 4, Containment Cooling Fan Local 3.1 PERFORM Attachment 4, Containment Cooling Fan Local Breaker Operations, performed. Breaker Operations.
D 4. VERIFY tripped Containment Fan Coolers OPERABLE.
4.1 NOTIFY the US and SM.
4.2 REVIEW Tech Specs 3.6.2.1, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.
14
REVISION NO.; PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; 1
LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS 15 of 21 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.5 Loss of Containment Fan Cooler (continued)
D 5. WHEN Section 3.0, EXIT CONDITIONS, are met, THEN EXIT this procedure.
15
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS 21 of 21 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Containment Cooling Fan Local Breaker Operations (Page 1 of 1)
- 1. VERIFY electrical alignment of stopped Containment Fan Cooler as follows:
- Bkr 2-40215, FDR BKR FOR MCC-2A9 2HVS-1A, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 58, 480V Vital Load Center 2A2)
- Bkr 2-40359, FDR BKR FOR MCC-2A9 2HVS-1 B, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 3D, 480V Vital Load Center 2A5)
- Bkr 2-40506, FDR BKR FOR MCC-289 2HVS-1C, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 38, 480V Vital Load Center 282)
- Bkr 2-40658, MCC-289 FDR BKR 2HVS-1 D, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 3D, 480V Vital Load Center 285)
- Bkr 2-42601, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 2HVS-1A, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 1A, MCC-2A9)
- Bkr 2-42602, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 2HVS-1B, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 1B, MCC-2A9)
- Bkr 2-42701, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 2HVS-1C, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 1A, MCC-289)
- Bkr 2-42702, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER 2HVS-1D, CLOSED.
(Cubicle 1B, MCC-289)
- 2. TROUBLESHOOT stopped Containment Fan Cooler's 480 V load center breaker and fuses per 0-NOP-47.02, 480V Load Center Breaker Operation.
- 3. ENSURE fuses of stopped Reactor Support Cooling Fan's MCC breaker are checked and replaced as necessary.
- 4. NOTIFY Control Room of breaker status.
- 5. IF breaker is tripped, THEN IMPLEMENT 1250020, Valve, Breaker, Motor and Instrument Instructions.
16
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDII!ON FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: Containment Spray System: MODES 1, 2, and MODE 3 with Pressurizer Pressure ~ 1750 psia.
Containment Cooling System: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
- 1. Modes 1. 2. and 3 with Pressurizer Pressure ~ 1750 psia:
- a. With one containment spray train inoperable, restore the inoperable spray train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCO; otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />.
- b. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 7 days and within 10 days from initial discovery of failure to meet the LCO; otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- c. With one containment spray train and one containment cooling train inoperable, concurrently implement ACTIONS a. and b. The completion intervals for ACTION a. and ACTION b. shall be tracked separately for each train starting from the time each train was discovered inoperable.
- d. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, restore one cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- e. With two containment spray trains inoperable or any combination of three or more trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3. immediately.
- 2. Mode 3 with Pressurizer Pressure < 1750 psia:
- a. With one containment cooling train inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; otherwise be in MODE 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- b. With two containment cooling trains inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 314 6-15 Amendment No. ~. 70 17
~~~~~~~~~~~*
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 7 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
LT-9012, 2A SG WR level instrument LT-9012 Fails Low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: With Event 2 in progress and upon cue from examiner, Trigger Event 3, l T-9012 drifts low.
Indications available:
- "A" SG level rising
- Annunciator G-1, "2A SG level Hi/lo"
- DCS Display will show l T-9012 lowering Direct BOP actions in accordance with 2-AOP-09.01 SRO 'Feedwater Control System Abnormal Operation' (attached page 19)
Notifies shift manager and I&C of event Direct up power stopped RO Recognize "A" SG level indication slowly rising Place FCV-9005 controller to manual to restore and maintain SG levels to 60-70%.
Evaluator Note: The wide range level control input is the anticipatory (feed forward) signal when feedwater control is in the low power mode. With L T 9012 drifting low, it influences actual level to rise with the NR inputs operating normally. L T-9012 eventually fails off-scale low and holds last good value (2 minute old value).
Scenario 4 18
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
3 FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 6 of63 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions NOTE A high power feed regulating valve (HPFRV) and its associated low power feed regulating valve (LPFRV) have flow-compensation logic such that operating one in manual with the other in auto may cause the valve in auto to reposition in at attempt to keep the feed flow rate constant.
- 1. VERIFY S/G levels between 60% 1.1 IF automatic level control is and 70% NR AND stable. malfunctioning, THEN TAKE manual control of feed flow and STABILIZE S/G levels to 60% to 70% NR.
CAUTION If a 100% bypass valve is open during a turbine trip or high S/G level event, manual closure will be necessary to prevent S/G overfill.
0 2. VERIFY S/G levels are greater 2.1 TRIP reactor.
than 50% NR.
2.2 IF any 100% bypass valve is open, THEN CLOSE it.
2.3 GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions 19
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page 8 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
RCS Loop (SG) flow instrument (PDT-1111 D) fails low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instruction: When directed Trigger Event 4, POT-1111 0 fails low Indications Available: Annunciators L-10, L-18, Reactor Coolant Low Flow Pre-Trip I Trip.
SG ~p 2A1, POI-11010 reads '0' on RTGB 203 apron section.
POI-11010 reads -10.9 (half of normal) on RTGB.
SRO/RO Recognize alarms. Confirm failed channel Directs implementation of 2-AOP-99.01, Loss Of Tech Spec SRO Instrumentation step 4.1.1 (attached page 21-23)
Refers to step 4.2.16 and directs bypassing failed 'D' channel Recognize entry into T.S. 3.3.1 action 2#. (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place in SROT.S.
trip or bypass)
Notifies Shift Manager of PDT-1111 D failure and entry into 2-AOP-99.01, Loss Of Tech Spec Instrumentation.
Obtains key 103 and Bypasses Channel D RPS trip bistable as BOP directed per of 2-AOP-99.01, Loss Of Tech Spec Instrumentation step 4.2.16.2.A Scenario 4 20
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 11 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)
D 2. Using Attachment 5, Channel Failure Impact Table, PERFORM the following:
A. LOCATE table row for affected instrument or channel.
B. REFER TO applicable Tech Specs.
- c. PERFORM applicable procedure section for affected instrument.
D 3. INITIATE work request for affected instrument or channel and NOTIFY I&C or EM as applicable.
D 4. DOCUMENT problem as required:
- EOOS Log
- Condition report
- Ops narrative log 21
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 91 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Channel Failure Impact Table (Page 3 of4)
Channel Indicator Tech RPS Trip ESFAS Trip Other Functions AOP Section (source device) Specs S/G Level S/G Level< 20.5%
LIC-9013A/B/C/D Level < 19% NR Hi Level Override >78% NR 3.3.2 Section 4.2.11 (admin limit< 50%)
LIC-9023A/B/C/D Feedwater Pressure PI-Q9-9AIB/C/D N/A N/A Input to AFAS 3.3.2 Section 4.2.12 22 PI-Q9-1 OA/8/C/D Turbine EH Fluid Pressure Loss of Load s 800 psig AND N/A NIA 3.3.1 Section 4 .2.13 P5-22-95AIB/C/D reactor power > 15%
SIAS > 3.5 psig Containment Pressure 3.3.1 Cntmt Press > 3.0 psig CIAS > 3.5 psig NIA Section 4.2.14 PIS-Q7-2AIBIC/D 3.3.2 CSAS > 5.4 psig w/SIAS Containment Radiation CIS> 10 Rlhr Rl5-26-3-2 thru 2 N/A NIA 3.3.2 Section 4.2.15 (refueling > 90 mr/hr)
(CHAN 3, 4, 5, 6)
RCSflow PDI-1101A/BIC/D RCS flow< 95.4% N/A NIA 3.3.1 Section 4.2.16 (PDI-1111AIB/C/D PDI-1121AIB/C/D)
CCW flow to RCPs Loss of CCW to RCPs N/A N/A 3.3.1 Section 4.2.17 FI5-14-15AIB/C/D < 636 gpm for 10 minutes RWT Level US-o7-2AIB/C/D N/A RAS < 6 feet in RWT NIA 3.3.2 Section 4.2.18
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 LOSS OF TECH SPEC INSTRUMENTATION 35 of 92 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-99.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.16 RCS Flow Channel Failure D 1. CIRCLE affected SG L\P TOTAL CORE FLOW instrument:
- PDI-1101A
- PDI-1101B
- PDI-1101C
- PDI-1101 D D 2. PERFORM one of the following for the affected BTU listed:
(Key 103)
A. BYPASS affected BTU using keyswitch.
B. TRIP affected BTU per Attachment 3, Tripping and Restoring Protection Bistables.
23
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 5 Page 9 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
HIC Spray Valve Controller Output Fails High Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner initiate HIC 1100 Fails High.
Indications Available: Pressurizer pressure lowering, both spray valves indicate full open.
Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down I main spray SROIRO valves fully open Directs RO to take manual control of HIC-1100 Refers to 2-AOP-01.1 0, 'Pressurizer Pressure and Level' step 4.2.3 (attached page 25-27) Direct spray controller operated in manual.
May direct hold on power increase (if still in progress)
Directs RO to control RCS pressure by energizing additional heaters, if available and manual control of spray valves.
Notifies SM and I&C of event Refers to Tech Spec 3.2.5 (DNB) if pressure <2225 psia.
Restore within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Recognizes pressurizer pressure trending down I main spray RO valves fully open Secures dilution if directed by SRO (if still in progress)
Places HIC 1100, Spray Controller, in manual as per step 4.2.3 Scenario 4 24
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.1 0 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. IF at Normal Operating Pressure, THEN VERIFY PIC-1100X(Y),
1.1 IF Pressurizer pressure less than 2300 psia PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND PORV leakage is indicated stable. or PORV has failed OPEN, THEN PLACE affected PORV in I
OVERRIDE and CLOSE associated block valve:
- V1475, PORV, and V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE D 2. VERIFY selected Pressurizer pressure control channel 2.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to PIC-1100X(Y), PRESSURE, non-affected pressure control NORMAL. channel.
D 3. VERIFY selected RRS channel Pressurizer level setpoint 3.1 PLACE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM selector switch to NORMAL as indicated on non-affected RRS channel.
LR-111 0, PRESSURIZER LEVEL.
D 4. VERIFY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-111 OX(Y),
4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to LEVEL, NORMAL. non-affected level control channel.
25
~~-~ ~ **~. -----
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 17 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-Q1.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Selected Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Failure D 1. VERIFY PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch 1.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to selected to non-affected pressure non-affected pressure control control channel. channel.
D 2. IF pressure control channel failed high (greater than 2340 psia),
THEN RESET Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF/RESET and to AUTO or ON.
D 3. VERIFY Pressurizer pressure stable 3.1 CONTROL Pressurizer pressure at 2250 psia (2225 to 2275 psia)
OR trending to Pressurizer as follows:
pressure setpoint:
A. PLACE HIC-1100, SPRAY,
- PR-11 00, PRESSURE in MANUAL.
- PIC-1100X, PRESSURE B. OPERATE spray controller HIC-1100, SPRAY.
- PIC-11 OOY, PRESSURE C. OPERATE Pressurizer heaters.
D 4. GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 2.
26
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 18 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.4 Pressurizer Spray or Auxiliary Spray Valves OPEN or Leaking NOTE Divergence of spray line temperatures between 261 and 262 spray lines may indicate a stuck open spray valve. The stuck open spray valve would have the spray line with the higher temperature approaching cold leg temperature.
D 1. IF either of the following conditions are met:
1.1 IF PCV-1100E, SPRAY VALVE 262, is OPEN, THEN PLACE Pressurizer spray
- Pressurizer pressure is less valve selector switch in 11 OOF .
than 2275 psia 1.2 IF PCV-1100F, SPRAY VALVE
- Pressurizer pressure is 261, is OPEN, lowering uncontrollably THEN PLACE Pressurizer spray valve selector switch in 11 OOE.
THEN VERIFY spray valves CLOSED: 1.3 IF spray valve is still failed OPEN AND Pressurizer pressure
- PCV-1100E, SPRAY approaches TM/LP setpoints, VALVE 262, status lights THEN PERFORM the following:
- PCV-1100F, SPRAY A. TRIP reactor .
VALVE 261, status lights B. IMPLEMENT 2-EOP-01,
- TIA-1103, 261 SPRAY Standard Post Trip Actions.
LINE (Water Temperature),
and TIA-1104, 262 SPRAY C. IF PCV-1100E, SPRAY LINE (Water Temperature), VALVE 262, is NOT indicate approximately CLOSED, equal temperatures. THEN STOP 262 RCP.
D. IF PCV-1100F, SPRAY VALVE 261, is NOT CLOSED, THEN STOP 261 RCP.
27
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 10 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by examiner, initiate loss of 2A1 480V Load Center.
Booth Operator Instructions: When field Operator is requested to investigate, report the SNPO was hanging a clearance which was intended for the other Unit.
Breaker 2-40103 was opened inadvertently.
Booth Operator Instructions: Start 2B Closed blowdown cooling water pump when directed.
When asked, report back Main Transformer cooling is operating.
Recommend triggering next event when breaker 2-40103 has been closed.
Indications Available: Numerous alarms. Running DEH pump trips and backup DEH pump does not start. Running Gland exhaust fan stops, running Primary water pump stops. Letdown valves close.
Report numerous electrical alarms and Breaker 2-40103 2A1 BOP 480V Load Center breaker is open.
Recognize and communicate no DEH pumps running. Request to start the 2B DEH pump.
Place Turbine up-power on HOLD when directed When directed call SNPO to investigate breaker 2-40103.
When directed call NPO to ensure Main Transformer cooling is operating.
Verifies 2B isophase Bus cooler is running SRO Direct up-power to be placed on hold.
Implement 2-AOP-47.02A Loss of Non-Safety Related AC Bus SRO
-Train A (attached page 29-32)
Scenario 4 28
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS- TRAIN A 11 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1
~
- Attachment 2, Major Vital AC Loads List, contains a listing of the major loads that have been lost.
- Closing Bkr 2-401 03, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER, should only be attempted after the cause of loss is identified and corrected unless an emergency situation exists.
0 1. DISPATCH operator to check load center for possible problems.
D 2. VERIFY EH Fluid Pump 2B is running and maintaining DEH 2.1 START EH Fluid Pump 2B per 2-NOP-22.03, DEH System pressure. (RTGB-201) Operation.
D 3. VERIFY Condenser Exhauster 2B is operating. (RTGB-201) 3.1 START Condenser Exhauster 2B per 2-NOP-12.07, Condenser Air Removal System Operations.
D 4. VERIFY Primary Makeup Water Pump 2B is running. (RTGB-202) 4.1 START Primary Makeup Water Pump 2B.
D 5. DISPATCH operator to verify main transformer cooling.
5.1 IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-53.03, Main Transformer.
D 6. VERIFY lsophase Bus Air Cooler Fan 2B is running.
6.1 Locally START lsophase Bus Air Cooler Fan 2B. (South of fan) 29
~----------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS- TRAIN A 12 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued) 0 7. VERIFY Instrument Air pressure is being maintained.
7.1 IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-18.01, Instrument Air Malfunction.
0 8. VERIFY 2-HVS-19, TGS Supply Fan is running.
8.1 Locally START 2-HVS-19, TGS Supply Fan. (South of fan)
NOTE If two closed blowdown cooling pumps were operating prior to the loss of power, consider lowering blowdown flow.
0 9. VERIFY Closed Slowdown 9.1 START Closed Slowdown Cooling Cooling Pump 2S is operating. Pump 2S per 2-NOP-34.02, Slowdown Cooling System -
Closed.
0 10. PERFORM the following:
A. VERIFY Waste Gas A.1 PLACE Waste Gas Compressor Compressor select switch select switch in WG2S.
positioned to WG2S.
B. VERIFY Waste Gas 8.1 PLACE Waste Gas Compressor Compressor 2S start switch 2S in service per 2-0530020, positioned to AUTO. Waste Gas System Operation.
30
~-------~
~-*---- ... ~-~--- -------~----
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS- TRAIN A 13 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-47.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)
- 10. B. (continued) 8.2 IF Waste Gas Compressor 28 NOT available, THEN CONSIDER shutting down Waste Gas System per 2-0530020, Waste Gas System Operation.
D 11. VERIFY 480V MCC 2C is energized from 480V LC 281.
11.1 IMPLEMENT Attachment 4, Loss of 480V MCC 2C.
D 12. Locally, VERIFY Screen Wash Pump 28 is in AUTO.
12.1 Locally, PLACE Screen Wash Pump 28 control switch in AUTO.
D 13. NOTIFY Electrical Maintenance of current condition of Load Center.
- 14. PERFORM one of the following due to loss of ADS Display:
- VERIFY compliance with Tech Spec 3.1.3.1, Moveable Control Assemblies
- IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-66.02, CEA Position Indicating System Abnormal Operation 31
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 LOSS OF A NON-SAFETY RELATED AC BUS- TRAIN A 14 of 32 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-4 7.02A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.3 Loss of 480V Load Center 2A1 (continued)
D 15. WHEN determined power may be restored to 480V LC 2A1, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. VERIFY Bkr 2-2011 0, A.1 CLOSE Bkr 2-20110, STATION STATION SERVICE SERVICE TRANSFORMER 2A1.
TRANSFORMER 2A 1, is CLOSED. (RTGB-201)
B. ENSURE Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A 1 FEEDER, is green flagged.
(RTGB-201)
- c. CLOSE Bkr 2-40103, 480 V BUS 2A1 FEEDER.
(RTGB-201)
D. IF charging and letdown needs to be restored, THEN ESTABLISH charging and letdown per 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.
D 16. RETURN TO Section 4.2.1 Step 4.
32
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 6 Page 11 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of 2A 1 480V Load Center Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
When directed start 2B DEH pump, 2B Gland Exhaust Fan, 2B BOP Primary water pump.
Communicates Letdown has been lost and stops running RO Charging pumps.
BOP When directed close breaker 2-40103 2A 1 480V Load Center.
Scenario 4 33
----------------- ---------*------*---------~---------*--
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 7 Page 12 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
Turbine vibration exceeds 14 mils, manual Rx/Turbine trip required.
SGTRon 28 SG Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, Trigger Event 6, Turbine Vibration exceeds 14 mils on Bearing #9 (Y) ramps in over 3 minutes.
Indications Available: Annunciator D-15, "Turbine Vibration Abnormal" BOP Acknowledge alarm and verify indications on the DEH display Refer to 2-AOP-22.02 section 4.2.2, "Turbine Supervisory" for SRO guidance (attached page 35)
Examiners note: Due to Unit 2 simulator upgrade to new DEH system and Unit 2 yet to upgrade, the crew will be using Unit 1 DEH I Turbine related procedures. Unit 1 has been upgraded to new DEH system.
Recognize and communicate to SRO Turbine vibration has BOP exceeded 14 mils.
SRO Direct Unit trip when notified vibration has exceeded 14 mils.
Examiners note: If Reactor power <15% when Turbine tripped, the Reactor will not trip.
Crew may elect to trip the Reactor.
Examiners note: A SGTR of about 300 gpm will be inserted upon the unit trip.
Scenario 4 34
----------------------~-~--------~---
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 TURBINE SUPERVISORY 11 of34 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 Turbine Vibration Abnormal (continued)
GJ 3. VERIFY turbine vibration is less than 14 mils.
3.1 IF annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD/LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED, is CLEAR, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TRIP reactor.
B. ENSURE turbine tripped.
C. IF turbine vibration continues to rise, THEN OPEN MV-10-1A and MV-10-1B, VACUUM BREAKER. (RTGB-201)
D. GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
3.2 IF annunciator L-29, LOSS OF LOAD/LCL PWR DENS CHANNEL TRIP BYPASSED, is IN ALARM, THEN TRIP turbine.
3.3 IF turbine vibration continues to rise, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. OPEN MV-10-1A and MV-10-1B, VACUUM BREAKER.
B. TRIP reactor.
C. GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
35
--~~"~-----~--------*~*-----*----
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 7 Page 13 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on the 28 SG Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available: Pressurizer level and pressure rapidly lowering Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, SRO Core Heat Removal BOP: Vital Auxiliaries, RCS heat removal, Containment Conditions.
NOTE: Pressurizer spray valves will probably be in manual I open at time of trip. The RO should take control of the controller and close the spray valves. If this does not occur SIAS will occur earlier than what should have occurred from the SGTR.
Performs EOP-01 Safety Functions as directed for Reactivity RO Control, Inventory Control, Pressure Control, Core Heat removal Reactivity Control
- Verify Reactor power is lowering
- Verify startup rate is negative .
- Verify a maximum of one CEA is not fully inserted .
Inventory Control
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
- Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35% (Letdown isolated from 2A1 480V failure)
Direct RO to isolate Letdown (Close V2515, V2516, V2522) in SRO attempt to maintain Pressurizer level. (Letdown isolated from 2A 1 480V failure)
Scenario 4 36
"~-~-*----~---~---------*-------
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 7 Page 14 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on the 28 SG Time ~ Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Examiners note: SIAS will actuate approximately. 10 minutes after trip.
Pressure Control
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia (control manually)
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Core Heat Removal
- Verify loop delta Tis <1 0 F Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Vital BOP Auxiliaries, RCS Heat Removal, Containment Conditions When SIAS, recognize 'B' side did not actuate. Communicate RO and manually actuate 'B' side SIAS.
Critical When SIAS actuated, recognize 28 HPSI pump did not start Task and manually start 28 HPSI pump.
Scenario 4 37
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 4 Event# 7 Page 15 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
SGTR on the 28 SG Time I Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 281, 282 and 283 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
- All vital and non vital DC Buses energized .
RCS Heat Removal
- Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535 F
- Verify SG pressure is between 835 and 915 psig .
- Ensure MSR Block valves and warmup valves closed Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm .
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120 F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms (SG Slowdown may be in alarm Upon unit trip, notify NPO to perform Appendix X sect.1 of EOP-99.
Scenario 4 38
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8&9 Page 16 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 28 HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 28 MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 28 SG.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Evaluate diagnostic flow chart of 2-EOP-01 Determines SGTR.
SRO Directs entry to 2-EOP-04, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" (attached page 40-48)
Direct BOP/STA to perform SFSC's of EOP-04 Implements place keeper Notifies shift manager to classify the event Direct performance of EOP-99 Appendix A, sampling SG's (attached page 49,50)
Direct BOP to verify Si flow per Figure 2 (attached page 51)
Ensure all available charging pumps are operating Direct one RCP/LOOP stopped when SIAS received on low Pressurizer pressure.
Direct RO to stop all RCP's no later than 10 minutes after SIAS due to loss of CCW.
Directs RO to perform controlled cooldown to <510°F Thot using SBCS in manual, not to exceed 30°F in any one hour period.
(30°F in any one hour period is limit if no RCP's are operating and SG has been isolated)
NOTE: Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.
Scenario 4 39
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NO.:
6 of46 2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE
- Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available. Reg Guide 1 .97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.
- Steps designated with an
- may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously.
0 1. Confirm Diagnosis VERIFY Safety Function Status 1.1 REDIAGNOSE the event using Check acceptance criteria are 2-EOP-01 Chart 1, Diagnostic satisfied every 15 minutes. Flow Chart, and GO TO ONE of the following:
- The appropriate Optimal Recovery Procedure
- 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery 0 2. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.
REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies.
D 3. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.
40
--------~--**- ---------~-----*----~--- ----*" ---
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 7 of46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 4. Sample Steam Generators SAMPLE S/Gs. 4.1 MONITOR other indications of a REFER TO Appendix A, Sampling SGTR.
0 5. Ensure Safety Injection Actuation 5.1 Manually START/ALIGN SIAS components.
!f RCS pressure is less than REFER TO Table 1, Safety 1736 psia, Injection Actuation Signal.
Then ENSURE SIAS has ACTUATED.
0 6. Maximize 51 Flow
!f SIAS is present, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
A. ENSURE ALL available Sl Pumps are RUNNING.
B. VERIFY adequate Sl flow. 8.1 TAKE actions to restore Sl REFER TO Figure 2, Safety flow:
Injection Flow vs. RCS Pressure.
- 1. ENSURE electrical power to Sl pumps and valves.
- 2. ENSURE correct Sl valve alignment.
- 3. ENSURE operation of necessary auxiliary systems.
C. ENSURE ALL available C.1 !f the Charging Header is NOT Charging Pumps are RUNNING. available, Then CONSIDER charging to the HPSI Header.
REFER TO Appendix T, Alternate Charging Flow Path to RCS Through 'A' HPSI Header.
41
- ----- -------------------- --------------------~--------~-----*--*-----*~---*-"- *-~---------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 8 of46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 7. RCP Trip Strategy A. !f RCS pressure is less than 1736 psia, Then ENSURE ONE RCP in EACH loop is STOPPED.
B. !f RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED.
C. !f CCW is LOST to the RCPs for greater than 10 minutes, Then STOP ALL RCPs.
42
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 9 of46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 8. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERIFY CCW to the RCPs. A.1 !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW.
REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs.
A.2 !fa VALID SIAS has isolated CCW to the RCPs, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED.
A.3 !f CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
(continued on next page) 43
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NO.:
10 of 46 2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 8. (Continued)
B. !f BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff flowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleedoff flowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.
0 9. Verify RCP Operating Limits 9.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits.
!f RCPs are RUNNING, Then VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied.
REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits.
CAUTION Operation of the 2C AFW Pump should be avoided to minimize direct releases to the environment. If motor driven AFW pumps are NOT available, steam from the least affected S/G should be used.
D 10. RCS Cooldown to less than 51 0°F 10.1 COOLDOWN the RCS to THoT less than 51 ooF using ADVs from Cooldown the RCS to THOT less than BOTH S/Gs.
51 ooF using SBCS.
10.2 COOLDOWN using 2C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths on the unisolated S/G.
REFER TO Table 12, Alternate S/G Heat Removal Paths.
44
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NO.:
11 of 46 2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE RCP operation is desirable while depressurizing the RCS during a SGTR event.
- RCP operation takes precedence over equalizing primary and secondary pressures.
- Maintain minimum subcooling within the limits of Figure 1A.
0 11. Depressurize the RCS 11.1 !f RCS pressure can NOT be LOWERED and MAINTAINED PERFORM a controlled RCS within the specified criteria, depressurization as follows: Then OPERATE the PORVs or RCGVS to reduce pressure.
A. MAINTAIN RCS pressure within ALL the following criteria (listed in order of priority):
- Within the limits of Figure 1A, RCS Pressure Temperature
- Less than 930 psia
- Above the minimum pressure for RCP operation
- Approximately equal to the most affected S/G pressure (within 50 psia)
B. OPERATE Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer spray.
C. !f HPSI throttle criteria are met, Then THROTTLE Sl flow.
REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.
45
~-----------*---------~-------------~---*--
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NO.:
12 of 46 2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION RCS inventory and containment conditions safety functions should be under positive control prior to blocking safeguards signals. Safety functions should be closely monitored for degradation. Manual actuation of ESFAS may be necessary should conditions warrant.
0 12. Block MSIS and SIAS As the RCS cooldown and depressurization proceed, PERFORM ANY of the following:
A. J1 MSIS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of MSIS.
B. J1 SIAS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of SIAS.
0 13. Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. J1 Circulating Water flow to the Main Condenser has been lost, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:
- 1. ENSURE MSIVs are CLOSED.
- 2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.
B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant.
REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.
46 \ f
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NO.:
13 of 46 2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 14. Restore Instrument Air
!fa LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 28 Instrument Air Compressors.
D 15. Determine the MOST Affected S/G.
DETERMINE the MOST affected S/G by considering ALL of the following:
- S/G sample activities
- Main Steam Line radiation monitoring trending prior to the trip
- S/G level change when NOT feeding
- SGBD radiation monitoring
- ONE S/G level rising faster than the other with feed and steaming rates being essentially the same
- Feed flow mismatch between S/Gs
- Steam flow vs. feed flow mismatch in a S/G prior to the rip 47
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
27 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 14 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 16. Isolate the MOST Affected S/G When RCS hot leg temperature is less than 51 oaF, Then ISOLATE the MOST affected S/G.
REFER TO Appendix R, Steam Generator Isolation.
0 17. Maintain ISOLATED S/G below 915 psig (930 psia)
MAINTAIN the ISOLATED S/G pressure less than 915 psig (930 psia) by ANY of the following:
A. Manual operation of the MSIV Bypass valve. (If condenser vacuum exists).
B. Manual operation of the associated ADV.
C. Local operation of the associated ADV.
D 18. Verify Correct S/G was Isolated 18.1 !f the wrong S/G was isolated, Then RESTORE feeding and VERIFY the MOST affected S/G is steaming capability to the isolated isolated by observing ALL of the S/G.
following:
18.2 When RCS heat removal has been
- S/G sample activities re-established on the least affected S/G,
- SGBD monitor radiation levels Then ISOLATE the most affected S/G.
- SJAE exhaust monitor radiation REFER TO Appendix R, Steam level Generator Isolation.
- S/G levels 48
~~-*
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 3 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 1 of 2)
A Train (v) B Train (v) 0 1. !fa LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
0 A. ENSURE 2AB 480V Load Center is aligned to an energized bus.
0 B. DISPATCH an operator to restore Instrument Air.
REFER TO Appendix H, Operation of the 2A and 2B Instrument Air Compressors.
CAUTION If a VALID SIAS occurs, the CCW 'N' header shall NOT be aligned to ANY essential header. This will maintain train separation while safeguards signals are still present.
NOTE
- HCV-14-9 (HCV-14-10) will open 5 seconds after HCV-14-8A (HCV-14-86) starts to open
- When SIAS is present, placing the control switches in CLOSE and then OVERRIDE will open the CCW 'N' header valves, until SIAS is reset 0 2. !fan INADVERTENT SIAS has closed the 'N' Header valves, Then PERFORM EITHER of the following:
- HCV-14-8A
- HCV-14-9 OR
- HCV-14-86
- HCV-14-10 49
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 4 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A SAMPLING STEAM GENERATORS (Page 2 of 2)
D 3. !f the 'N' Header has been restored, Then OPEN_FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves by performing the following:
A. !f CIAS or high radiation has closed the SGBD Sample Valves, Then OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9 by PLACING the control switch to CLOSE I OVERRIDE.
B. OPEN FCV-23-7 and FCV-23-9, SGBD Sample Valves.
D 4. !f the 'N' Header is in service, Then DIRECT Chemistry to perform SIG samples ~
for isotopic activity and Tritium.
D 5. !f SIGs cannot be sampled, Then DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant local area radiation surveys.
END OF APPENDIX A 50
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 124 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 2 SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300 I I I I I I 1200 NOTE I1-This curve represents minimum expected 1 Sl Flow. If measured flow is less than this!
"\\'
p R 1100 figure, Then Sl System lineup should be j 1 -
verified.
E s 1000 s \
u R 900 1\
I z 800 E
R p 700 \
R E 600 \
s s
u 500 \ V~
1 Full Train inOpeion R
E 400 ~\
1 2 Full Trains
- in Operation 300 ~
- ~--~ ---
p
~
s i 200 \
- - ----- -~~-* - - **--
a 100 r--..
"""'~ - r--.:
0 0 1000 1--+---
2000 f----+
3000
+-- f..----+-
4000 5000 6000 TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (PIOPS/2-EOP-99/Fig2/Rev.OIIir) 51
---***-~~-------- -- -----~-----**-----------------*
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8&9 Page 17 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 28 HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 28 MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 28 SG.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If SNPO called to investigate 2A HPSI pump, state the pump appears OK.
Trigger vent 2A HPSI pump when asked to vent the 2A HPSI pump. Wait 5 minutes and report back the 2A HPSI has been vented and a large volume of air was vented.
Indications Available:
- 2A HPSI pump Amps oscillating .
- MSIS Block Permissive Annunciator Direct RO to depressurize RCS lAW 2- EOP-04
- Within Figure 1A (Attached page 53)
SRO * <930 psia
- Above RCP minimum pressure
- Approx. Equal to 2A SG pressure (within 50 psia)
Recognize SIAS B side did not actuate at setpoint of 1736 psia.
Directs manual actuation of B side SIAS Critical Task Recognize 28 HPSI pump failed to start upon B side SIAS actuation. Directs manual start of 28 HPSI pump.
SRO Recognize 2A HPSI pump low amps. Direct stopping 2A HPSI SRO pump. Direct BOP to notify SNPO to investigate 2A HPSI pump.
Direct venting 2A HPSI pump Direct starting the 2A HPSI pump when venting complete Critical Direct MSIS blocked when block permissive received at 685 Task psia.(must be done before MSIS occurs at 600 psia)
SRO Scenario 4 52
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 122 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1)
(Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F)
CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 2-EOP-99, Table 13.
2400 ..... _
~e~
...... _ _ .......... 2eo.ool-~ .......
.. OpRDI,.,. .... ~ ... ......,.,.nawv._,
EOPeoc.ntw) 2000 .. ,..
1800 Maximum
&ubcooled*
Minimum Subcootecl' 800 RCPNPSH Requirement*
800 .
400
'Includes InStrument u-n.. -
0 0 100 200 300 400 500 800 700 800 RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 40 to 1ao*F 1000 psia to 500 psia 50 to 11o*F Less than 500 psia ao to 16o*F
)
53
~- --~--~-------
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8&9 Page 18 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 2B HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 2B MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Critical Task Directs BOP to isolate 28 Steam Generator when Thot is
<510°F lAW 2-EOP-99, Appendix R (attached page 55-57)
SRO Critical Task Direct performance of 2-EOP-99 Appendix I, MSIV local closure, to close HCV-08-1 B, 28 MSIV (attached page 58)
SRO Scenario 4 54
~~~--~~-
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 96 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 4 of 6)
Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation NOTE
- Local actions are located in step 18 and may be directed prior to completing control room actions.
- Keys 82 and 81 are required for closing MV-08-17, 28 SIG ATMOSPHERIC ISOL, and MV-08-16, 28 SIG ADV ISOL. Key 78 may be needed for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTILE/TRIP (contingency).
CAUTION If SIG isolation is due to a SGTR the secondary plant may have higher than normal radiation levels. Contact Health Physics for area accessibility instructions.
D 1. ENSURE HCV-08-18, Main Steam Header 'B' Isolation Valve (MSIV), is CLOSED.
D 2. !f HCV-08-1 B did not close remotely, Then PERFORM local closure.
REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.
D 3. ENSURE MV-08-1 B, MSIV Header 'B' Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
NOTE Instrument air must be available to close MFIVs using RTGB control switch.
If instrument air is NOT available when MFIV closure is required, then manual initiation of MSIS should be considered.
0 4. ENSURE HCV-09-2A, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
0 5. ENSURE HCV-09-28, Main Feedwater Header 'B' Isolation Valve, is CLOSED.
(continued on next page)
.J 55
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 97 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 5 of 6)
Section 2: 2B Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
D 6. !f BOTH HCV-09-2A and HCV-09-28, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to SIG 28, are NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
0 A. ENSURE ALL of the following valves are CLOSED:
0 MV-09-6, Stm Gen 28 Reg Block Valve D LCV-9006, 28 15% Bypass 0 MV-09-4, 28 100% Bypass 0 B. STOP BOTH Main Feedwater Pumps.
0 7. ENSURE FCV-23-5, 28 SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.
0 8. ENSURE FCV-23-6, 28 SG Slowdown, is CLOSED.
D 9. ENSURE MV-08-198, 28 SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
0 10.CLOSE MV-08-17, 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 82) 0 11.PLACE the control switch for auxiliary feed, Pump 28, in STOP.
0 12.ENSURE MV-09-10, Pump 28 Disch to SG 28 Valve, is CLOSED.
D 13.ENSURE MV-09-12, Pump 2C to SG 28, is CLOSED.
0 14.PLACE MV-08-12, SG 28 Stm toAFW PP 2C, in CLOSE.
D 15.1f MV-08-12, SIG 28 Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, AND feed flow from 2C AFW pump is NOT required, Then CLOSE MV 08-3, 2C Pump to ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump. (Key 78) 0 16.ENSURE MV-08-188, 28 SIG Atmos Dump Vlv, is CLOSED.
D 17.CLOSE MV-08-16, 28 SIG ADV lsol. (Key 81)
(continued on next page) 56
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 98 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 OAPPENDIX R STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION (Page 6 of 6)
Section 2: 28 Steam Generator Isolation (continued)
.t!Q!E Control room isolation actions are now complete. !! a SGTR is in progress, Then the SM should be informed of the status of terminating contaminated steam release forE-Pian purposes. Continue with local actions.
0 18. PERFORM the following LOCAL operations:
D A. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09158, 2C AFW Pump to 28 SIG Isolation.
D B. UNLOCK and CLOSE V09136, 28 AFW Pump to 28 S/G Isolation.
0 C. CLOSE SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid.
0 D. !f SE-08-1, Main Steam to 2C AFW Pump Warm-up Valve Solenoid is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then CLOSE V08883, SE-08-1 Inlet Isolation.
0 E. !f MV-08-12, S/G 28 Steam to AFW Pump 2C, is NOT CLOSED or suspected of leaking, Then PERFORM ANY of the following AS NECESSARY:
D 1. Locally CLOSE MV-08-12 using the handwheel.
0 2. ISOLATE steam to 2C AFW Pump as follows:
0 a. VERIFY CLOSED MV-08-3, 2C Pump.
0 b. Locally CLOSE the following valves:
0 V08622, CB #67 Drain 0 V08618, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol D V08619, Drain off MV-08-3 lsol End of Section 2 END OF APPENDIX R 57
-*~--"-----------*--"------ --*----------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 64 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX I MSIV LOCAL CLOSURE (Page 1 of 1)
D 1. To locally CLOSE HCV-08-1A, 2A SIG MSIV, PERFORM the following:
0 A. CLOSE V181197, lnst Air to 2A MSIV- Air Accum & HCV-08-1A lsol.
(Inside Steam Trestle just North of 2A MSIV) 0 B. CLOSE local instrument valve for PS-08-12A.
(Inside Steam Trestle just North of 2A MSIV) 0 C. REMOVE T-Handle cap from PS-08-12A test connection.
(Inside Steam Trestle just North of 2A MSIV)
CAUTION Loud noise and air blowing when venting; stay clear of vent path.
0 D. OPEN PS-08-12A local instrument valve to bleed air from system through the test connection.
0 2. To locally CLOSE HCV-08-1 B, 28 S/G MSIV, PERFORM the following:
0 A. CLOSE V181195, lnst Air to 28 MSIV- Air Accum & HCV-08-1 B lsol.
(West of Steam Trestle door entrance)
D B. CLOSE V08423, PS-08-128 lsol.
(West of Steam Trestle door entrance) 0 C. REMOVE T-handle cap from PS-08-128 test connection.
(Steam Trestle just South of 28 MSIV)
D D. OPEN V08423, PS-08-128 lsol to bleed air from system through the test connection.
END OF APPENDIX I 58
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8&9 Page 19 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 28 HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 28 MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 2B SG.
Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed to perform local actions of Appendix R, trigger isolate 2B SG When instructed to locally close 2B MSIV, trigger locally close 28 MSIV. Wait 5 minutes and inform the control room.
Indications Available: Close indication on 2B MSIV, HCV-08-1 B Call SNPO to investigate the status of 2A HPSI pump. State BOP low amps, low flow was observed.
BOP Direct SNPO to vent the 2A HPSI pump BOP Start the 2A HPSI pump when directed BOP Isolate 2B Steam Generator lAW Appendix R, when directed.
Critical (attached page 55-57)
Task BOP Communicate HCV-08-1 B 2B MSIV did not close.
Inform the US HCV-08-1 B, 2B MSIV is closed when NPO BOP communicates Appendix I is complete.
BOP Critical Block MSIS when directed by SRO Task Scenario 4 59
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 6 Event# 8&9 Page 20 of 21 NRC Event
Description:
2-EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SIAS B side does not actuate. 28 HPSI pump does not start. 2A HPSI pump becomes air bound. 28 MSIV does not close from the control room. Isolate the 28 SG.
Time I Position II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Indications Available:
Cooldown the RCS to <510°F Thot using S8CS, in manual, not to exceed 30°F in any one hour period.
RO Cooldown rates up to 100°F in ANY 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period are permitted to regain or maintain minimum subcooling.
When directed, depressurize the RCS lAW step EOP-04.
Examiners Note: Only Auxiliary spray is available due to RCP's off.
- Within Figure 1A (attached page 53)
- <930 psia
- Above RCP minimum pressure
- Approx. Equal to 2A SG pressure (within 50 psia)
Suggested termination point:
- 28 SG is isolated lAW Appendix R
- 28 MSIV is closed Scenario 4 60
"---*-*-~---------------~~----~------ ---- -- ----~----
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:
Protected Train: B Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 012 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Raise power to 100%
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A Charging Pump N/A with 28 and 2C ("AB" Bus aligned to the "A" train) Charging pumps available.
OPS 513's:
Locked in Annunciators:
M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD Current Status:
Unit 1 at 100% power, Unit 2 at 11% power BOL. (1)2-GOP-201 is complete up to step
- 66. The Generator has just been synchronized to the grid. All turbine testing is completed SAT. MFW and SBCS are in service.
Equipment Problems:
2A Charging pump removed from service to replace plunger seals. Not expected to be returned to service this shift 61
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: St. Lucie Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: HLC 21-NRC Examiners: Operators: SRO:
RO:
BOP:
Initial Conditions: 100% power Turnover: Both Units at 100% power. 2A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is on a clearance due to motor oil leak. The 2A Charging Pump is on a clearance for packing removal.
Critical Tasks:
- Power one Safety Related 4160 V bus from Unit 1 within 25 minutes of the loss of power per the Unit 1 UFSAR 15.2.13. This is applied administratively to Unit 2 also.
Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 1 CIBOP Controller for FCV-23-12 ("2A SG" Slowdown) fails causing the valve to fully open. BOP takes manual control of valve.
2 2 I IRO Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-1100X (selected} fails low T.S. I SRO 3 3 T.S. I SRO A 3 gpm leak develops on the 2B RCS cold leg. Crew identifies leak rate. SRO determines that shutdown is required.
4 RIRO, Downpower to remove unit from service to investigate increasing RCS leakage.
N I BOP, SRO 5 4 CIBOP 2A Intake Cooling Water Pump trips T.S. I SRO 6 5 Ml All A switchyard malfunction occurs causing the loss of one Midway line. Shortly thereafter, a second Midway Line de-energizes requiring a manual trip for Unit 2. On the trip, a LOOP occurs.
7 6 CIBOP The 2B Diesel Generator fails to start and 2A Diesel Generator output breaker fails to close. Restore power from Unit 1 through the Station Blackout (SBO) Cross-tie breaker.
8 7 CIRO 2C AFW Pump trips on electrical overspeed. RO able to reset and feed both steam generators.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 1
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Turnover will be given that both Units are at 100% power. The controller for FCV-23-3, Stm Gen 2A Slowdown, fails and the valve fully opens. Operators respond lAW ARP M-7 and take manual control of the blowdon FCVs. Due to the SGBD malfunction, Rx power (calormetric) will rise above 100% (approximately 100.5%) so action will be required to lower power to< 100%. The guidance is contained in 2-AOP-08.01, "Steam Leak", for minor power excursions above 100.5% (reduce power within 15 minutes).
During the down power Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-11 OOX (selected) fails low. This will result in letdown lowering to minimum. RO should transfer level control to the 'Y' channel. Pressurizer heaters will de-energize and will need to be restored in accordance with 2-AOP-01.1 0 Pressurizer Pressure and Level. Only half of the Pressurizer heaters will be able to be restored resulting in the SRO entering T.S. 3.4.3 Action a. (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO).
A 5 gpm RCS leak develops on the B RCS cold leg. Crew identifies leak rate SRO determines that shutdown is required. TS 3.4.6.2.b requires shutdown within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Crew should enter 2-AOP-01.08 RCS Leakage Abnormal and 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Down power.
Next, the 2A Intake Cooling Water pump trips. The 2C Intake Cooling water pump should be started on the 'A' header using 2-AOP-21.03A, 2A Intake Cooling Water System Header. The SRO should address T.S. 3.7.4 for the 2C ICW pump taking the place of the 2A ICW pp.
When the Intake cooling water system is restored loss of a Midway line will occur. No action is needed for loss of only one line other than referring to 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity. Unit 2 is the designated unit to remove from service due to the RCS leak and other unit equipment complications.
A loss of a second midway line occurs shortly thereafter. Unit 2 should be tripped. A LOOP will occur. The 2B Diesel will fail to start and the 2A Diesel output breaker will not close. The MVA success path (Appendix V) from EOP-01 should be implemented first to restore power from Unit 1 through the Station Blackout (SBO) Cross-tie. The 2C AFW Pump trips on electrical overspeed after the crew enters 2-EOP-10, 'Station Blackout'.
The overspeed can be reset and the pump should be restarted.
The scenario can be terminated when AFW flow has been established and Unit 2 has one emergency bus powered through the station cross-tie breaker.
2 Scenario 5 2
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Procedures Used
- 2-AOP-01.1 0, Pressurizer Pressure and Level
- 2-AOP-01.08 RCS Leakage Abnormal
- 2-AOP-08.01, Steam Leak
- 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity
- 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Downpower
- 2-AOP-21.03A, 2A Intake Cooling Water System Header
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions
- 2-EOP-10, Station Blackout Technical Specifications Entered
- TS 3.4.6.2.b RCS leakage
- T.S. 3.7.4 ICW System
- T.S. 3.4.3 Pressurizer heaters 3 Scenario 5 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# Page 4 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
2A SG Slowdown valve FCV-23-12 fails open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Place protected train B sign up, OLRM GREEN.
Initiate IC 1100% power. MOL. Place 2A AFW pump to stop. Place Orange control switch ECO tags on the pump.
Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by the lead examiner, Trigger Event 1, FCV-23-12 controller (2A SG Slowdown) output fails to 0% in auto. (2A SG blowdown at max. flow) NOTE: this failure takes appx. 5 minutes to show power increasing.
If the NPO is directed to search for steam leaks, call back in 5 minutes and report nothing abnormal observed.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator M-7 Closed Slowdown HX Temp High comes in appx. 6 minutes after failure.
Annunciator N-5, SGBTF Control Panel Trouble.
Note: Excessive SG blowdown shows as steam leak in that RCS temperature lowers and calorimetric power rises above 100%.
RO Acknowledges alarm and reports to the Unit Supervisor Recognizes RCS temperature lowering and power rising.
(Calorimetric power will rise above 100% if blowdown flow not reduced in a timely manner)
If directed close SG blowdown isolation valves 2A FCV-23-3 and 4, 28 FCV-23-5 and 6.
Reviews guidance from the 2-ARP-01-M?, Step #6 of Operator Actions- excessive blowdown flow. (attached page xx) (may SRO refer to 2-NOP-23.02, 'Steam Generator Slowdown System Operations')
May enter 2-AOP-08.01, Steam Leak, step 4.2.2.6.1 (attached page xx) and close 2A SG blowdown isolation valves.
Direct boration or CEA insertion to lower power if power rises to above 100%.
Scenario 5 4
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL:
OA ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE M PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW:
2-ARP-01-M? ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7 CLOSED SLOWDOWN HX TEMP HIGH M-7 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT:
23X-3 SGBT/SGB Cntl Pnl TIS-23-8 ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Loss of blowdown flow indicated on FIA-23-12 I FIA-23-14 on rear of RTGB-203.
OPERA TOR ACTIONS:
NOTE Hi h tern erature will cause TCV-23-8 to close which will cause blowdown flow to be lost.
- 1. VERIFY the ICW system is in operation with flow aligned to the OBHX.
- 2. VERIFY at least ONE of the following pumps is in service:
- 2A Closed Slowdown Cooling Pump
- 28 Closed Slowdown Cooling Pump
- 3. CONSIDER starting the second Closed Slowdown Cooling Pump.
- 4. VERIFY the following valves are operating properly:
- TCV-34-3A, 2A Slowdown HX Temperature Control Valve
- TCV-34-38, 28 Slowdown HX Temperature Control Valve
- 5. When cause of alarm has been determined and corrected, Then RESTORE blowdown flow in accordance with 2-NOP-23.02, Steam Generator Slowdown System Operations.
- 6. J1 S/G Slowdown flow was excessive, Then PERFORM the following:
A. ADJUST the S/G Slowdown flow control valves as required to reduce blowdown flowrate.
B. NOTIFY Chemistry that S/G blowdown flowrate has been reduced.
CAUSES: Alarm may be caused by EITHER of the following:
- Excessive blowdown flow
- Loss of closed blowdown cooling water REFERENCES 1. CWD 3509-B-327 sheet 1350
- 2. P&ID 3509-G-115 sheet 18
- 3. P&ID 3509-G-116 sheet 2
- 4. TEDB 5
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 STEAM LEAK 11 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-08.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 MODE 1 {continued)
D 6. VERIFY the following SG Slowdown Isolation valves are 6.1 PLACE the following control switches in CLOSE:
CLOSED: (RTGS-206)
- SG SLOWDOWN 2A
- FCV-23-3, SG (FCV-23-4)
SLOWDOWN 2A
- SG SLOWDOWN 2S
- FCV-23-4, SG (FCV-23-6)
SLOWDOWN 2A 6.2 PLACE the following control
- FCV-23-5, SG switches in CLOSE OVRD:
SLOWDOWN 2S
- SG SLOWDOWN 2A
- FCV-23-6, SG (FCV-23-3)
SLOWDOWN 2S
- SG SLOWDOWN 2S (FCV-23-5) 6
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# Page 5 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Controller for FCV-23-12,fails low causing FCV-23-12 to fully open Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
Goes the back of RTGB panel 202 to observe the controller for BOP FCV-23-12 & 14.
Notes that the output on controller FCV-23-12 is 100% and flow is off-scale high Directs that the controller be placed in manual and flow lowered SRO to 40 gpm (match flow to the "B" train)
BOP Places the controller in manual and adjusts flow to 40 gpm.
EVALUATOR NOTE: 2A SG SLOWDOWN FLOW IS NOT LOST (ALARM CONFIRMATION). FCV-23-12 CONTROLLER RED PEN GOES OFF-SCALE HIGH WITH CONTROLLER OUTPUT INDICATION= 0 (INDICATES OUTPUT TO THE VALVE TRYING TO CLOSE IT)
Initiate boration or CEA insertion as directed by SRO if Reactor RO power rises above 100%
5 Scenario 5 7
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario # 5 Event# 2 Page 6 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-1100X (selected) fails low Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 2, Pressurizer Level transmitter LT-11 OOX fails low.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators: H-17 PZR level high/low and Letdown flow lowering, LIC-1110X offscale low, LI-1110X offscale low, loss of half of PZR heaters. Also B-9 and H-29. H-37 comes in when Pzr Lvl key taken to LEVEL position Identifies and communicates abnormal Pressurizer level RO indications and letdown at minimum.
Performs Immediate Operator Actions lAW 2-AOP-01.10,
'Pressurizer Pressure and level' by:
Step 4.1.4 VERFIY selected Pressurizer level control channel RO LIC-1110X, LEVEL, NORMAL Step 4.1.4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector to non-affected control channel.
Directs Immediate Operator Actions lAW 2-AOP-01.1 0, SRO
'Pressurizer Pressure and level' (attached page xx)
Enter subsequent actions, sections 4.2.6 'Selected Pressurizer Level Control Channel Failure (attached page xx)
Enters T.S. 3.4.3 Action a, one group of heaters inoperable, restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (attached page xx)
NOTE: If Pressurizer pressure lowers to 2225 psia, the SRO should enter DNB T.S.
3.2.5 restore pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Direct Attachment 5 of 2-AOP-01.1 0 to recover available heaters (attached page xx) Note: not able to regain P-1, B-1, 2
,3 heaters due to level channel failure.
Places B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL and Resets 'B' side RO Pressurizer heaters P-2, B-4, B-5, B-6 (attached page xx step 5 and page xx step 8) when directed.
Scenario 5 8
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 6 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.1 0 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions 0 1. IF at Normal Operating Pressure, THEN VERIFY PIC-1100X(Y),
1.1 IF Pressurizer pressure less than 2300 psia PRESSURIZER PRESSURE, AND PORV leakage is indicated stable. or PORV has failed OPEN, THEN PLACE affected PORV in I
OVERRIDE and CLOSE associated block valve:
- V1475, PORV, and V1477, PORV BLOCK VALVE 0 2. VERIFY selected Pressurizer pressure control channel 2.1 PLACE PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to PIC-11 OOX(Y), PRESSURE, non-affected pressure control NORMAL. channel.
D 3. VERIFY selected RRS channel Pressurizer level setpoint 3.1 PLACE REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM selector switch to NORMAL as indicated on non-affected RRS channel.
LR-1110, PRESSURIZER LEVEL.
D 4. VERIFY selected Pressurizer level control channel LIC-111 OX(Y),
4.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to LEVEL, NORMAL. non-affected level control channel.
9
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 23 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.6 Selected Pressurizer Level Control Channel Failure D 1. VERIFY LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch 1.1 PLACE LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL selector switch to selected to non-affected level non-affected level control channel.
control channel.
D 2. VERIFY Pressurizer level stable OR trending to Pressurizer level 2.1 PLACE selected Pressurizer level indicating controller in MANUAL.
setpoint:
2.2 OPERATE selected Pressurizer
- LR-1110, PRESSURIZER level indicating controller to LEVEL maintain Pressurizer level within 2% of setpoint.
- PR11 08/LR111 OX, LEVEL PRESSURE 2.3 IF level is below setpoint AND lowering,
- LIC-111 OX(Y), LEVEL THEN PERFORM the following:
A. START additional charging pump(s) to maintain level within 2% of setpoint.
B. IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.
- c. IF cause of lowering level has NOT been identified, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-01.08, RCS Leakage Abnormal Operations.
D 3. VERIFY power to Pressurizer heaters.
3.1 IMPLEMENT Attachment 5, Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters.
10
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 24 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.6 Selected Pressurizer Level Control Channel Failure (continued)
NOTE Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow, which may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5 ft Pipe Penetration room or 19.5 ft Letdown Cubicle room to exceed 1000 mR!hr (Locked High Radiation Area limit) due to reduced transport time of short lived radioactive isotopes.
D 4. IF letdown is in service AND two or more charging pumps are operating, THEN NOTIFY Radiation Protection of the current charging pump alignment.
D 5. GO TO Section 4.2.1 Step 2.
11
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a minimum water level of greater than or equal to 27% indicated level and a maximum water level of less than or equal to 68% indicated level and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters capable of being powered from 1E buses each having a nominal capacity of at least 150 kW.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
- a. With one group of the above required pressurizer heaters inoperable, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified to be at least 150 kW at least once per 92 days.
4.4.3.3 The emergency power supply for the pressurizer heaters shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by verifying that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss of offsite power:
- a. the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from the emergency power sources, and
- b. the pressurizer heaters can be reconnected to their respective buses manually from the control room after resetting of the ESFAS test signal.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 8, 11 12
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 36 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 1 of 3)
- 1. VERIFY all the following conditions are met:
- Pressurizer level is greater than 27%.
- At least one 4160V vital bus is energized:
- 2A3
- 283
- 2. IF any of the following control channels failed, THEN ENSURE non-affected control channel(s) selected:
- Reactor Regulating System
- Level
- Pressure
- 3. IF Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3, is OPEN AND Ell of the following conditions are met:
- LIC-111 OX, LEVEL, indicates greater than 27%
- Vital 4160 V bus 2A3 is energized
- SIAS "A" is RESET
- Annunciator B-19, PZR HTR XFMR 2A3 FEEDER BKR OVRLD TRIP, is CLEAR THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3, control switch indicates green flag.
B. CLOSE Bkr 2-20204, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2A3.
13
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 37 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.1 0 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 2 of 3)
- 4. IF Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3, is OPEN AND all of the following conditions are met:
- LIC-111 OY, LEVEL, indicates greater than 27%
- Vital 4160 V bus 2B3 is energized
- SIAS "B" is RESET
- Annunciator A-19, PZR HTR XFMR 2B3 FEEDER BKR OVRLD TRIP, is CLEAR THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3, control switch indicates green flag.
B. CLOSE Bkr 2-20403, PRZR HEATER TRANSFORMER 2B3.
NOTE The Backup Interlock Bypass Key Switch, selected to the LEVEL position, allows the 480V heater power supply contactors controlled by the selected channel to be reset.
- 5. IF only one Pressurizer heater bus has power available OR only one Pressurizer level control channel is functioning, THEN PLACE B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL.
- 6. IF EDG is powering vital bus(es), THEN RESET only Backup Banks B-1 and/or B-4 by placing heater control switch(es) to OFF/RESET and to AUTO or ON.
- 7. IF "A" Pressurizer Heater Bus is energized from offsite power, THEN RESET the following Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF/RESET and to AUTO or ON:
- PROPORTIONAL BANK P-1
- BACKUP BANK B-1
- BACKUP BANK B-2
- BACKUP BANK B-3 14
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 38 of 38 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Recovering Power to Pressurizer Heaters (Page 3 of 3)
- 8. IF "B" Pressurizer Heater Bus is energized from offsite power, THEN RESET the following Pressurizer heaters by placing heater control switches to OFF/RESET and to AUTO or ON:
- PROPORTIONAL BANK P-2
- BACKUP BANK B-4
- BACKUP BANK B-5
- BACKUPBANKB~
- 9. IF B/U INTLK B/P (Key 98) in LEVEL AND the following conditions are met:
- "A" and "B" Pressurizer heater buses energized
- "X" and "Y" Pressurizer level control channels available THEN PERFORM the following:
A. PLACE B/U INTLK B/P in LOCKED OFF.
B. ENSURE all Pressurizer heaters RESET.
15
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 7 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
5 gpm leak develops on the 28 RCS Cold Leg Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed by the lead examiner, trigger Event 3, 5 gpm RCS leak.
Control Room Indications Available:
- Rx Cavity leakage recorder FR-07-1 rises (approximately 2-3 minutes)
- Annunciator M-46, Reactor Cavity Leakage High
- Letdown flow lowering Based on indications of RCS leakage, implements 2-AOP-SRO 01.08, "RCS Leakage Abnormal Operations". (attached page xx)
Directs RO to estimate RCS leak rate based on Charging and letdown mis-match.
Refer to Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 (identified leakage)
SRO Reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in T.S. at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Determine that >1 gpm unidentified RCS leakage is exceeded so power operation cannot continue.
Leak rate is approximately 4-5 gpm based Chg and Letdown flow mismatch and the Rx Cavity Leakage recorder.
Scenario 5 16
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 8 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
5 gpm leak develops on the 28 RCS Cold Leg Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Same Recognize entry into the DNB T.S. 3.2.5 IF pressurizer SRO/RO pressure lowers to less than 2225 psia. Restore pressure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Informs SM of leak, may need to classify the event lAW the emergency plan.
RO Energize additional Pressurizer heaters Monitors Pressurizer level and ensure letdown flow lowers to maintain level.
Determines leak rate of approximately 4-5 gpm per Rx Cavity Leakage recorder indication and Charging and Letdown flow mismatch.
Scenario 5 17
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RCS LEAKAGE ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 8 of 61 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.08 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Operator Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions 4.2.1 General Actions
- 1. ADD RCS makeup per applicable section(s) of Table 1 as directed by US while CONTINUING with this AOP:
Table 1 Makeup Method Selection Based on Plant Conditions MODE SIAS Status Makeup Methods Attachment Section Available Charging Attachment 7 Section 1.0 1, 2, or 3 Charging Attachment 7 Section 1.0 Blocked HPSI Attachment 7 Section 2.0 Charging Attachment 7 Section 1.0 4, 5, or6 Blocked HPSI Attachment 7 Section 2.0 LPSI Attachment 7 Section 3.0 18
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RCS LEAKAGE ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 9 of 61 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.08 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)
- 2. MAINTAIN RCS level 2.1 IF leak rate is greater than stable OR rising. available charging pump capacity AND unit is in MODE 1 or 2, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TRIP reactor.
B. GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
2.2 IF the following conditions are met:
- Leak rate is greater than available charging pump capacity.
- Unit is in MODE 3.
- SIAS is NOT blocked.
THEN GO TO 2-EOP-03, Loss of Coolant Accident.
19
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RCS LEAKAGE ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 10 of 61 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.08 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)
NOTE Thumb rule for estimating leak rate is that 1" level rise on Ll-07 -6, RX CAVITY LEVEL, on RTGB-205 is about 46 gallons.
- 3. DETERMINE RCS leak rate by any of the following methods:
- ESTIMATE leak rate based on gross charging-letdown mismatch.
- ESTIMATE leak rate based on abnormal tank or sump level rise rates.
- CALCULATE leak rate per 2-0SP-01 .03, Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance.
20
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RCS LEAKAGE ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 11 of 61 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.08 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)
NOTE To aid in classifying RCS leaks for E-Pian purposes, Attachment 1, General Information, defines certain terms to ensure classifications are made consistently within this context.
- 4. VERIFY all of the following 4.1 REFER TO Tech Specs 3.4.6.2, conditions are met: Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
- UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 4.2 IF leak rate is known to be less than or equal to 1 gpm unisolable AND greater than Tech Spec limits,
- IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE THEN IMPLEMENT E-Pian .
less than or equal to 10 gpm 4.3 IF personnel are inside Containment, THEN CONSIDER
- NO secondary plant evacuating Containment.
radiation alarms or rising trends on any of the following:
- Condenser air ejector monitor
- S/G blowdown monitors
- Main steamline monitors 21
-*--*-*----~--------~----- - - -
REVISION NO~: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RCS LEAKAGE ABNORMAL OPERATIONS 12 of 61 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-01.08 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.1 General Actions (continued)
D 5. IF both conditions are met:
- Unit in MODE 1, 2, or 3
D 6. IF both conditions are met:
- Unit in MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6
- S lAS blocked THEN PERFORM Section 4.2.3, Actions for Modes 3 Through 6 With SIAS Blocked.
D 7. VERIFY Exit Conditions are met.
D 8. EXIT this procedure.
22
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 4 Page 9 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Down power to remove unit from service to investigate increased RCS leakage Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None Implements 2-AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power. (attached page SRO xx)
Immediate Operator Actions
- 1. BEGIN boration per operator aid.
- 2. PERFORM the following:
SRO/RO A. PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction
/BOP rate.
B. SET DEMAND to desired power level.
Begins Boration per Attachment 1 of 2-AOP-22.01 Rapid Down RO Power. (attached pages xx)
Inserts Lead CEA Group 6 inches.
- Select MANUAL SEQUENTIAL.
- Insert CEAs by taking IN/HOLD/OUT switch to insert .
Starts 2C Charging pump lAW AOP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Attachment 4 (attached page xx)
Places Pzr. On recirc. lAW AOP-22.01 'Rapid Downpower' Attachment 5. (attached page xx)
NOTE: Pressurizer heater availability from LT-1100X failure is not sufficient to place the Pressurizer on recirc.
Programs the DEH per NOP-99.07, Attachment 3, Turbine BOP Adjustment lAW SRO downpower rate. (attached page xx)
Notifies Plant Dispatcher step 4.2.4 Scenario 5 23
~-~--**--------------------------~-------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 5 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE OPS-530, Pre-Planned Power Change Guidance, delineates operations department policy for the use of pre-planned down power profiles provided by the Plant Physics Curve Book.
4.1 Immediate Operator Actions D 1. BEGIN boration per operator aid.
D 2. PERFORM the following:
A. PROGRAM the turbine DEH for the desired load reduction rate.
B. SET DEMAND to desired power level.
D 3. INSERT the Lead CEA Group approximately 6 inches to initially lower RCS temperature.
24
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 6 of39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions
- 1. WHEN a Tavg lowering is noted, 1.1 IF in turbine MANUAL, THEN THEN PRESS the GO pushbutton PRESS and RELEASE the GV on the turbine DEH control panel. LOWER pushbutton as necessary to reduce I control the load reduction rate.
D 2. IF reducing power by more than 20%, THEN NOTIFY SNPO to secure Zinc Injection per 2-NOP-02.26, Zinc Addition.
D 3. NOTIFY plant personnel using Gai-tronics and boost function as follows:
"Attention all personnel, Unit 2 has commenced a Rapid Downpower due to "
(reason)
D 4. NOTIFY System of the rapid downpower load reduction.
D 5. PLACE Pressurizer on recirculation per Attachment 5, Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines.
25
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 7 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D 6. START additional charging pump as required per guidance from Attachment 4, Charging Pump Guidance.
NOTE
- 0-NOP-1 00.02, Axial Shape Index Control, provides additional guidance on ASI Control.
- US may direct temporary operation outside of ASI limit.
- 7. MAINTAIN Axial Shape Index 7.1 IF operation outside ASIIimit is
+/-0.5 of ESI using CEAs. unavoidable, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. NOTIFY US.
B. MAINTAIN ASI within RPS LPD pre-trip limits.
C. RESTORE ASI to within limits as soon as practical.
7.2 IF ASI CANNOT be maintained within transient band due to the inoperability of CEA(s),
THEN CONTACT Reactor Engineering to assist in determining the load reduction rate to minimize effects of operation outside of transient limits.
26
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 8 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) 0 8. MAINTAIN Tref and Tavg within 6.6°F.
8.1 VERIFY boration flow path to RCS.
8.2 ESTABLISH Tref and Tavg within 6.6 °F using any of the following:
- RCS Boration Rate
- CEA Position
- Turbine Load 8.3 IF Tref and Tavg can NOT be maintained within 6.6 °F, THEN NOTIFY US AND:
A. TRIP reactor.
B. GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
D 9. VERIFY boration lineup per Attachment 1, RCS Boration Guidance 27
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 31 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 RCS Boration Guidance (Page 1 of 2)
NOTE
- Step 1 in this attachment is applicable when the CVCS is normally aligned, with no RCS boration or dilution in progress. If other than normal alignment, use guidance of 2-NOP-02.24, Boron Concentration Control.
- An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-205. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid Placard.
- 1. BORATE the RCS by the following:
A. START either Boric Acid Pump 2A or 2B.
B. PLACE FCV-221 OY, BORIC ACID (RTGB-205), control switch in AUTO.
C. IF borating to the Charging Pump suction, THEN OPEN V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE (RTGB-205).
D. IF borating to the VCT, THEN OPEN V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV (RTGB-205).
E. ADJUST FIC-221 OY, BORIC ACID, to the desired flowrate.
F. IF desired to maximize the boric acid flow rate, THEN CLOSE the running BAM pump recirc valve.
- V2650, TANK 2A RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
- V2651, TANK 2B RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
G. CYCLE V2513, VENT VALVE (RTGB-205) to maintain VCT pressure less than or equal to 30 psig.
H. CYCLE V2500, DIVERT VALVE (RTGB-205) to WMS if necessary to maintain the desired VCT level.
28
~---"----- ---------*----------------~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 32 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 RCS Boration Guidance (Page 2 of 2)
- 2. SECURE boration as follows:
A. ENSURE BAM pump recirc valves, OPEN
- V2650, TANK 2A RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
- V2651, TANK 2B RECIRC VALVE (RTGB-205)
B. CLOSE FCV-221 OY, BORIC ACID (RTGB 205).
C. ADJUST FIC-221 OY, BORIC ACID, to zero (RTGB 205).
D. STOP running Boric Acid Pump.
E. ENSURE CLOSED V2512, REACTOR MAKEUP WATER STOP VLV (RTGB-205).
F. ENSURE CLOSED V2525, BORON LOAD CONTROL VALVE (RTGB-205).
G. ENSURE CLOSED V2513, VENT VALVE (RTGB-205)
H. ENSURE V2500, DIVERT VALVE, in AUTO (RTGB 205).
29
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 38 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 4 Charging Pump Guidance (Page 1 of 1)
- 1. IF Charging Pump(s) are to be started, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE that each Charging pump that is to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO, if time permits.
B. PLACE V2520, lon Exchanger Bypass Valve, to BYPASS RESET unless otherwise requested by the Chemistry Department. (RTGB 205)
WARNING Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow with resultant reduction in transport time of short-lived radioactive isotopes.
This may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration Room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle Room to exceed the Locked High Radiation Area limit of 1000 mr/hr.
C. START the Charging pump.
D. ADJUST the bias on HIC-1110, PZR LEVEL LTDN CNTL VLV (RTGB-205), to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer level to program RRS Pressurizer level for current plant conditions, if required.
E. IF FIA-2212, CHG FLOW TO REGEN HX (RTGB-205), is in service, THEN VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing FIA-2212 rise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
F. IF FIA-2212, CHG FLOW TO REGEN HX, is NOT in service, THEN VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
G. WHEN letdown temperature stabilizes, PLACE V2520, lon Exchanger Bypass Valve, to AUTO.
H. ENSURE Charging Pump Recirc Valve CLOSED.
I. PLACE the CHRG PUMP SEL RUNNING B/U switch in the proper position for current plant conditions per operator aid placard , Charging Pump Combinations vs. Selector Switch, on RTGB-205.
J. NOTIFY Health Physics of the charging pump alignment.
30
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
7 RAPID DOWNPOWER 39 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-22.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 5 Pressurizer Recirculation Guidelines (Page 1 of 1)
NOTE
- The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.
- From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Heater Banks may be determined as follows:
Time (in min.) to correct mismatch= [(Pzr ppm- RCS ppm) -25 ppm] x 3
- 1. To place the Pressurizer on recirculation, PERFORM following:
A. PLACE all available Backup Heater Bank control switches to ON.
B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on Pressurizer Pressure Cntl Vlv PIC-11 OOX or PIC-11 OOY, PRESSURE, to maintain normal operating pressure.
C. OBSERVE Pzr Pressure Spray Cntl Vlv HIC-1100, SPRAY, AND Pressurizer Spray Valves, PCV-1100E I 1100F, VALVE 2B2 I VALVE 2B1, position indication to verify Main Spray flow.
31
~~----~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------~~~~~~---
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 11 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 1 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at RTGB-101. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these changes on a new Operator Aid placecard.
Critical Parameters This activity affects reactivity. Use of appropriate critical parameters to recognize, monitor and detect for abnormal operational changes in plant responses and system performance to ensure proper control of the plant.
Notification to the SM/US is required prior to manipulation for any abnormal indications.
- Reactor Power
- MW (Load)
- CEA POSITION
- DCS Power
- RCS Temp
- Pzr Level
- ASI
- 1. ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
- 2. TOUCH MODIFY from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- 3. ADJUST values, as directed by SM/US, for the following on MODIFY RAMP SETPOINTS: (display 7055)
- TARGET SELECT
- RATE SELECT
- 4. VERIFY values for the following are as directed by US/SM on RAMP INTERFACE group: (display 5551)
- TARGET
- RATE 32
- -------------*----~-------------------~---~--------~-------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 12 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 2 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 5. TOUCH GO from RAMP INTERFACE group. (display 5551)
- 6. MONITOR turbine governor valves response on DEH main operation window, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM- OPERATION PANEL.
(display 5551)
- 7. IF turbine governor valves are NOT responding correctly, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
(display 5551)
B. IF turbine shutdown can NOT be suspended, THEN CONTINUE shutdown as follows:
(1) TOUCH SELECT from GV CLOSE INTERFACE group.
(2) PERFORM the following on GV MANUAL CLOSE INTERFACE pop-up: (display 7079)
- a. TOUCH FUNCT ENABLE from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
- b. TOUCH NORMAL from RATE SELECTION group.
- c. TOUCH and HOLD, as necessary, lower ("T")
from CLOSE INTERFACE group.
C. IF there is indication that governor valves are NOT functioning properly, THEN INVESTIGATE and CORRECT cause of failure.
- 8. MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref as close as possible during load changes by adjusting either or both of the following:
- Reactivity rate
- Turbine load rate 33
-----~------------------~---
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 OPERATIONS HARD CARDS 13 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-NOP-99.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ATTACHMENT 3 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS TO MAINTAIN POWER (Page 3 of 3) 1.0 TURBINE ADJUSTMENTS (continued)
- 9. IF desired to stop load change, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE DEH display 5551, TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM -
OPERATION PANEL, is open.
B. TOUCH HOLD from RAMP INTERFACE group.
- c. TOUCH CANCEL from RAMP INTERFACE group.
34
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: .....;...._Scenario# 5 Event# _4.;..._____ Page .1.Q.._ of _2;;;..1;...._-11 Event
Description:
Down power to remove unit from service to investigate increased RCS leakage Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: None WHEN a Tavg lowering is noted, BOP THEN PRESS the GO pushbutton on the turbine DEH control panei.AOP-22.01 step 4.2.1.
Continues to Supervise/Coordinate Power reduction in SRO accordance with AOP-22.01 Rapid Down Power Steps 4.2.8 thru 4.2.14.
Controls ASI as directed by SRO with CEAs or per NOP-100.02, Axial Shape Index Control IF a load reduction is required above 50% power, PERFORM the following:
A. MAINTAIN ASI within the transient control band limits RO below:
+ 0.1 during load transients is recommended but should be within + 0.2
+ 0.5 during load transients with concurrence from Reactor Engineering RO/BOP Maintains T-avg within 6.6°F ofT-ref per step 4.2.8.
10 Scenario 5 35
*-*- -*-*---~----- --------~~-------------------- -----------------~-
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 5 Page 11 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
2A Intake Cooling Water Pump Trips Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 5, 2A Intake Cooling water pump trip (3 minute ramp).
When directed by BOP Trigger 2C ICW PP discharge valve 10 turns open. When directed by BOP and 2C ICW PP running, slowly open discharge valve.
Control Room Indications Available: Increasing Amps on the 2A ICW pump.
Annunciator: E-6 2A ICW PUMP OVRLD/TRIP E-30 ICW HEADERS PRESS LOW, E-11 HYPO LOCAL ALARM S-3 Recognize rising amps on the 2A ICW pump. Stops 2A ICW BOP pump and place switch in Pull to Lock position, of if pump already tripped, place switch in pull to lock position.
Implement 2-AOP-21.03A 2A Intake Cooling Water System SRO Header section 4.2.2 (attached page xx).
Direct performance of Attachment 1 section 2.0, (attached page xx). (NPO to perform steps 13-16 of Attachment 1)
Notify ANPO to perform steps 3 and 4, Attachment 1, of 2-BOP AOP-21.03A (attached page xx).
When directed Bypass IX by placing V2520 IX bypass valve to RO BYPASS. Step 2.0.5 Attachment 1 page 3 of 5 BOP Monitor Generator Cold Gas temperature BOP Announce and start 2C ICW pump when directed.
When pressure rises on 2A ICW header direct ANPO/NPO to slowly open 2C ICW discharge valve SB21206.
Scenario 5 36
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 2A INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 7 of46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-21.03A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2.2 2A ICW Pump Ovrld/Trip D 1. VERIFY 2A ICW pump amps normal.
1.1 IF 2A ICW pump indicates abnormally high amps, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. PLACE 2A ICW pump control switch to PULL TO LOCK position.
B. PERFORM Attachment 1 Section 2.0.
1.2 IF 2A ICW pump TRIPPED, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. IF health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, THEN ATTEMPT one restart only.
(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 1)
B. IF 2A ICW pump was NOT restarted, THEN PERFORM Attachment 1 Section 2.0.
37
~---~--~**---~-~---------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 2A INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 28 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-21.03A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 2A ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 3 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION
- 1. ENSURE 2A ICW Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position.
- 2. ENSURE 2C ICW Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position.
- 3. ENSURE 2C ICW Pump aligned to 2A ICW header.
A. LOCK CLOSED SB21211, 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH TO 'B' TRAIN ISOL.
(I NTK/9/N-4/W-C)
B. LOCK OPEN SB21165, 2C ICW PUMP X-TIE DISCH TO 'A' TRAIN ISOL.
(I NTK/9/N-4/W-C)
- 4. THROTTLE SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL, approximately 10 turns OPEN.
(I NTK/18/N-3/W-C)
- 5. BYPASS CVCS lon Exchangers by placing V2520, ION EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVE, to BYPASS.
(RTGB-205)
- 6. MONITOR Generator Average Cold Gas temperature.
- IF Average Cold Gas Temperature rises to 47°C, THEN REDUCE MVARS to minimum, but NOT less than (unity) 0 MVARS.
(Section 6.1.3 Management Directive 2)
- IF Average Cold Gas Temperature rises to 50.7°C, THEN IMPLEMENT 2-AOP-22.01, Rapid Down power to REDUCE power as necessary to stabilize main generator cold gas temperature.
- 7. IF 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump is NOT running, THEN ENSURE AB 4.16kv bus ALIGNED to A side.
A. ENSURE 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump control switch in PULL TO LOCK position.
B. OPEN Bkr 2-20504, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2AB- 2B3. (RTGB-201)
C. OPEN Bkr 2-20409, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2B3 - 2AB. (RTGB-201)
D. CLOSE Bkr 2-20208, 4.16KV BUS TIE 2A3- 2AB. (RTGB-201)
E. CLOSE Bkr 2-20505, 4.16KV BUS Tl E 2AB - 2A3. (RTGB-201) 38
~-----
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 2A INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 29 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-21.03A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 2A ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 4 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION (continued)
- 8. WHEN 2C ICW Pump alignment is complete, THEN START 2C ICW Pump.
- 9. IF 2C ICW Pump start was NOT successful, THEN GO TO Attachment 2, Contingency Actions With 2A ICW Header Depressurized.
- 10. As pressure begins to rise in 2A ICW header as indicated by PI-21-5C, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH PRESS (INTK/26/N-3/E-B), SLOWLY OPEN, SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL, until valve is fully OPEN.
- 11. LOCK OPEN, SB21206, 2C ICW PUMP DISCH ISOL.
- 12. IF 2C COMPONENT COOLING WATER Pump OR 2C ICW Pump are operating and supplying the applicable header, THEN ENSURE Tech Spec requirements of Section 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 are satisfied.
NOTE The following step will require a ladder at CCW platform for access to HX vent valves and a pipe wrench to remove vent caps.
- 13. VENT 2A Essential ICW header until a steady stream of water issues for 1 minute by opening and closing each of the following valves individually:
A. SH21332, SS-21-1A VENT (CCW/28/S-A/W-4)
B. SH212049, SS-21-1A BACKWASH OUTLET VENT (CCW/31/S-A/W-4)
C. SH21197, 2A CCW HX TUBE SIDE INLET HEAD VENT (CCW/32/N-BIW4)
D. SH21198, 2A CCW HX ICW OUTLET VENT (CCW/38/S-A/W-2)
- 14. VENT 2A Non-Essential ICW Header until a steady stream of water issues for 1 minute by opening and closing each of the following valves individually:
A. SH21358, SS-21-4A VENT (TGB/26/S-20/W-G)
B. SH21171, 2A TCW HX TUBE SIDE OUTLET HEAD VENT (TGB/26/N-21/E-K)
C. SH21172, 2A TCW HX TUBE SIDE INLET HEAD VENT (TGB/26/N-21/W-D) 39
--*-**-*--*-~-~--~------------------------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
4 2A INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEADER 30 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-21.03A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Start Standby Pump On 2A ICW Header With Header Depressurized (Page 5 of 5) 2.0 STARTING 2C ICW PUMP FROM STANDBY CONDITION (continued)
- 15. ENSURE SH40077, 2C ICW HYPO HDR ACID RETURN ISOL, OPEN (I NTK/17/N-3/E-C).
- 16. ENSURE SH40079, 2A ICW HYPO HDR ACID RETURN ISOL, CLOSED (INTK/17/N-3/E-C).
40
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 6 Page 12 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Switchyard malfunction, loss of one Midway line Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 6, switchyard malfunction, loss of Midway line #1.
When system dispatcher called, inform the control room will investigate loss of Midway line Control Room Indications Available: Annunciators: LR-6, Midway #1 low load.
BOP Recognize loss of Midway line #1 Implement 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission SRO Capacity. (attached page xx)
Refers to attachment 1 and determines two lines in service after the loss of one line. Action 2 is applicable. Declare transmission system in ALERT. Notify SM. Contact System for additional requirements.
BOP Monitor Main Generator MW, Voltage and Vars.
Scenario 5 41
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 REDUCED OFFSITE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY 6 of 10 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-AOP-53.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions None 4.2 Subsequent Actions NOTE With the Transmission System in a state of ALERT, the following considerations should be given for possible unit trip:
- Existing Technical Specification Action Statements.
- Short Notice Outage Work.
- Time in core life.
- Each unit's present power level.
With one St. Lucie I Midway circuit in service, offsite power requirements should be evaluated in accordance with required Technical Specification minimums.
CAUTION Failure or delay in tripping the selected unit with two units on line with one transmission line in service beyond the values specified in Attachment 1, St.
Lucie I Midway Reduced Transmission Capacity Actions, may result in a LOOP and permanent damage to the transmission line.
D 1. IF any St. Lucie I Midway circuit is lost OR removed from service, THEN GO TO Attachment 1, St.
Lucie I Midway Reduced Transmission Capacity Actions.
42
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 REDUCED OFFSITE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY 7 of 10 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-AOP-53.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT IINSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Actions {continued)
D 2. WHEN 3 lines are in service with 2 units on line, AND there is a preplanned outage of 1 line, THEN ENSURE there are NO load threatening activities planned.
D 3. WHEN 2 lines are in service with 2 units in service, THEN once per shift NOTIFY System Load Dispatch which unit is the selected unit to be tripped in event of a loss of another line.
D 4. WHEN 2 units are in service AND less than 3 lines are in service, THEN SUSPEND all load threatening activities.
D 5. REFER TO 0010721, NRC Required Non-Routine Notifications and Reports.
43
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 REDUCED OFFSITE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY 8 of 10 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-AOP-53.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT 5.0 RECORDS Normal log entries
6.0 REFERENCES
AND COMMITMENTS 6.1 References 6.1.1 Implementing References
- AP 0010721, NRC Required Non-Routine Notifications and Reports.
- 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions 6.1.2 Developmental References
- St. Lucie Unit 1 Technical Specifications
- Section 3/4.8.1.1, Electrical Power Systems, A. C. Sources Operating
- Section 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems, A. C. Sources Shutdown
- St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specifications
- Section 3/4.8.1 .1, Electrical Power Systems, A. C. Sources Operating
- Section 3/4.8.1.2, Electrical Power Systems, A. C. Sources Shutdown
- Plant Drawings
- 8770-G-417, St. Lucie Plant Switch yard Main One Line Diagram 6.1.3 Management Directives None 6.2 Commitments None 44
~---
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 REDUCED OFFSITE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY 9 of 10 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-AOP-53.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT ATTACHMENT 1 St. Lucie I Midwa~ Reduced Transmission Caeacit~ Actions (Page 1 of 2)
NOTE A unit trip may be required in order to meet the prescribed action time.
- 1. PERFORM the following prescribed actions for the applicable condition listed:
ONE UNIT ON LINE TRANSMISSION LINES IN SERVICE TIME TO COMPLETE ACTION BEFORE EVENT AFTER EVENT (MINUTES)
ACTIONS I
3 2 N/A ACTION 1 I 3 1 N/A ACTION 2 I 2 1 N/A ACTION 2 I BOTH UNITS ON LINE TRANSMISSION LINES IN SERVICE TIME TO COMPLETE ACTION ACTIONS BEFORE EVENT AFTER EVENT (MINUTES) 3 2 N/A ACTION 2 I 2 1 4 ACTION 3 I 3 1 4 ACTION 3 I A. IF in ACTION 1, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) NOTIFY the SM I US.
(2) CONTACT System Load Dispatch for additional requirements.
B. IF in ACTION 2, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) DECLARE Transmission System in ALERT status.
(2) NOTIFY the SM I US.
(3) CONTACT System Load Dispatch for additional requirements.
45
~-~*---~---*---------------------~-----------~------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
1 REDUCED OFFSITE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY 10 of 10 PROCEDURE NO.:
0-AOP-53.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT ATTACHMENT 1 St. Lucie I Midway Reduced Transmission Capacity Actions (Page 2 of 2)
- 1. {continued)
C. IF in ACTION 3, THEN PERFORM the following:
{1) TRIP the selected unit to reduce Transmission System output to less than 1000 MWe.
{2) NOTIFY the SM I US.
{3) CONTACT System Load Dispatch for additional requirements.
{4) IF Unit 1 was tripped, THEN GO TO 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
{5) IF Unit 2 was tripped, THEN GO TO 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
46
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 7 Page 13 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 28 Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed trigger event 7, loss of second Midway line.
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator LR-24, Midway 1,2,3 current high. LR-18, Midway No.3 Load Low.
Determines Transmission system in Action 3 from attachment 1 of 0-AOP-53.04, Reduced Offsite Transmission Capacity.
SRO Required to trip the Unit within 4 minutes. Option to trip either Unit but Unit 2 should be tripped due to RCS leakage.
Direct manual trip and carry out 2-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions.
EXAMINERS NOTE: The 25 minute clock to energize at least one vital 4.16kv bus starts at time of trip.
Directs implementation of 2-EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions" as follows:
- RO: Reactivity control, Inventory Control, Pressure control, Core Heat Removal, RCS heat removal, Containment conditions
Performs EOP-01 Safety functions as directed for: Maint. of Vital Auxiliaries NOTE: The RO will be performing all the Safety Functions except MVA due to the BOP aligning electrical to be received from Unit 1.
Reactivity Control
- Verify Reactor power is lowering .
- Verify startup rate is negative.
- Verify ALL CEA's are fully inserted .
Note that reactivity control is being met.
Scenario 5 47
--- --~--------------~-------- ---------------~---
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 7 Page 14 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If Unit 1 asked about Diesel Generator availability state Unit 1 has both Diesels loaded on their respective bus.
Control Room Indications Available: 2B EDG lockout annunciator.
Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries
- Verifies turbine governor and throttle valves closed BOP
- Verify GEN Brk open (East breaker, Mid Breaker and Exciter Breaker)
- Verify all vital and non vital AC Buses energized. (2A 1, 2A2, 2A3 2AB, 2B1, 2B2 and 2B3 6.9 and 4.16kv buses)
Identifies 2B Diesel did not start and 2A Diesel output breaker BOP did not close.
SRO Directs attempt to start 2B Diesel and manual breaker closure of 2A Diesel BOP Attempt to close 2A Diesel output breaker and attempt to start 2B Diesel. 2A Diesel breaker fails to close and the 2B Diesel fails to start.
SRO Directs BOP to perform MVA contingency EOP-01 action step CRITICAL 2.C.3 be performed to restore power from Unit 1. (attached page xx)
TASK NOTE: Because the BOP will be tied up restoring power from Unit 1, the RO will be performing all Safety Functions except MVA BOP Notify Unit 1 to perform 1-EOP-99, Appendix W. BOP to CRITICAL Perform 2-EOP-99, Appendix V (includes performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7).
TASK Scenario 5 48
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
28 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 7 of 17 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
MAINTENANCE OF VITAL AUXILIARIES (AC & DC POWER)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 2. (continued) 2. (continued)
- c. VERIFY ALL Vital C.1 !f EITHER Vital 4.16 KV Bus is NOT and Non-Vital AC buses powered from offsite, transfer from Auxiliary to Then ENSURE BOTH of the following:
Start-up Transformers and are ENERGIZED. 1. The associated EDG has STARTED.
- 2. The associated EDG output breaker is CLOSED.
C.2 !f ANY 6.9 KV or non-vital 4.16 KV bus is NOT powered from offsite, Then INITIATE action to RESTORE power to the bus.
C.3 !f NO Vital 4.16 KV buses are energized, Then PERFORM ALL the following:
- 1. CONTACT Unit 1 to determine power availability.
D. VERIFY ALL Vital 0.1 !f the 2AB DC Bus is de-energized, and Non-Vital DC Buses are Then ALIGN the 2AB DC Bus to an ENERGIZED. energized Vital DC Bus.
49
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 3 Event# 7 Page 15 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 28 Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Multiple alarms Perform 2-EOP-99, Appendix V (includes performing 2-EOP-BOP 99, Table 7). (attached page xx)
- 1. When Unit 1 is ready to supply power to Unit 2, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
BOP A. CLOSE the Unit 2 SBO crosstie breaker, 2AB 4.16 KV BUS CRITICAL SBO TIE (20501 ).
B. REQUEST Unit 1 close their SBO crosstie breaker, 4160V TASK SWGR 1AB UNIT X-TIE BKR (1-20501).
C. VERIFY the 2AB 4.16 KV bus has power restored.
EXAMINERS NOTE: When step 1.C above complete, the 25 minute critical task clock stops.
- 2. ALIGN the selected train Vital 4.16 KV bus to the 2AB 4.16 KV bus by CLOSING the TWO crosstie breakers:
2AB to 2A3 (.['") 2AB to 2B3 (.f'")
2AB-2A3 (20505)_ 2AB-2B3 (20504)_
2A3-2AB (20208)_ 2B3-2AB (20409)_
NOTE: Due to the 2A AFW pump OOS at time of trip the crew should energize the 2B3 bus to allow the use of 2B AFW pump. (not critical but should be considered)
Inventory Control RO
- Verify pressurizer level is between 10 and 68%
- Pressurizer level is trending to 30 - 35%
Note that Charging pumps may not be available yet.
15 Scenario 5 50
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 102 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXV RECEIVING AC POWER FROM UNIT 1 USING SBO CROSSTIE (Page 1 of 9)
Section 1: Preparations for Crosstie D 1. SELECT the train that will be used to receive AC power from Unit 1 (..J).
A Train B Train NOTE All of the following factors should be considered:
- The potential for recovering a Unit 2 AC power source
- Equipment availability
- 10 CFR 50 Appendix R considerations ('A' train is preferred on Unit 2)
D 2. ENSURE Table 7, Vital Power Breaker Configuration I Station Blackout, has ~
been completed.
D 3. DISPATCH an operator to locally PLACE the selected train EDG Output Breaker NORMAL /ISOLATE switch in ISOLATE.
D 4. PLACE the following CCW Pumps in PULL TO LOCK:
D 2C CCW Pump D Selected train CCW Pump D 5. PLACE the selected train Containment Spray Pump in STOP.
D 6. PLACE the following Safety Injection Pumps in STOP:
D Selected train HPSI Pump D Selected train LPSI Pump D 7. PLACE the following Charging Pumps in STOP:
D 2C Charging Pump D Selected train Charging Pump D 8. PLACE ALL RCP Oil lift Pumps in OFF.
51
- ------------*--*----~--------------------------------*-----~-~------*--
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 103 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXV RECEIVING AC POWER FROM UNIT 1 USING SBO CROSSTIE (Page 2 of 9)
Section 1: Preparations for Crosstie (continued)
D 9. PLACE the selected train motor driven AFW Pump in STOP.
D 10. PLACE the following ICW Pumps in PULL TO LOCK:
D 2C ICWPump D Selected train ICW Pump D 11. PLACE ALL Containment Fan Coolers in STOP.
D 12. ENSURE further attempts to restore power to the selected train from a Unit 2 source are suspended while Unit to Unit crosstie efforts are in progress.
HOLDPOINT Do not proceed to Section 2 until ALL steps of Section 1 have been completed.
End of Section 1 52
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 104 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXV RECEIVING AC POWER FROM UNIT 1 USING SBO CROSSTIE (Page 3 of 9)
Section 2: Receiving Power from Unit 1 D 1. When Unit 1 is ready to supply power to Unit 2, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
D A. CLOSE the Unit 2 SBO crosstie breaker, 2AB 4.16 KV BUS SBO TIE (20501 ).
D B. REQUEST Unit 1 close their SBO crosstie breaker, 4160V SWGR 1AB UNIT X-TIE BKR (1-20501}.
D C. VERIFY the 2AB 4.16 KV bus has power restored.
D 2. ALIGN the selected train Vital 4.16 KV bus to the 2AB 4.16 KV bus by CLOSING the TWO crosstie breakers:
2AB to 2A3 (...J) 2AB to 283 (...J) 2AB-2A3 (20505)_ 2AB-2B3 (20504)_
2A3-2AB (20208)_ 2B3-2AB (20409)_
D 3. VERIFY the selected train Vital 4.16 KV bus has power restored.
D 4. 1f TWO Unit 1 EDGs are RUNNING, Then GO TO Section 3, Restoring Loads With TWO Unit 1 EDGs Running.
D 5. 1f only ONE Unit 1 EDG is RUNNING, Then GO TO Section 4, Restoring Loads With ONE Unit 1 EDG Running.
D 6. 1f Unit 1 has Offsite Power, Then GO TO Section 5, Restoring Loads With Unit 1 Offsite Power.
End of Section 2 53
--------------------------------*-*-*------*-----~--~---*--***-*-----*
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 105 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIXV RECEIVING AC POWER FROM UNIT 1 USING SBO CROSSTIE (Page 4 of 9)
SECTION 3: Restoring Loads With TWO Unit 1 EDGs Running D 1. VERIFY with Unit 1 the crosstied EDG is carrying less than or equal to 2500 KW (350 amps).
CAUTION Restoring power to the vital 480V Load Centers will cause load sequence to occur within 35 seconds. Unit 1 will need to closely monitor EDG KW and 1AB 4.16 KV bus amps to ensure an overload condition will not occur.
D 2. RESTORE power to the selected train vital 480V Load Centers by CLOSING the associated supply breakers:
- 282 and 285 Load Centers share a common 4.16KV supply breaker 2A2 480V Load Center (...J) 282 480V Load Center (...J)
STATION SERVICE XFMR 2A2 (20213)__ *480 V STATION SERVICE XFMR 285 (20402) 480V 2A2 FEEDER (40219)_ 480V 282 FEEDER (40503) __
2A5 480V Load Center (...J) 285 480V Load Center (...J) 480V STATION SERVICE XFMR 2A5 *480V STATION SERVICE XFMR 285 (2021 0) (20402)_
480V 2A5 FEEDER (40361 ) _ 480V 285 FEEDER (40653) __
D 3. VERIFY with Unit 1 that the crosstied EDG is operating satisfactorily.
NOTE The crosstied EDG KW and AB 4.16KV amps should be checked frequently as equipment is restored. Potential loads should be balanced against available capacity to ensure an overload condition will NOT occur.
REFER TO Table 11, Emergency Diesel Generator Loading (SBO).
D 4. START Charging Pumps AS NECESSARY to maintain Inventory Control safety function.
54
-- --- -----------~---------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
44 APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 106 of 159 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX V RECEIVING AC POWER FROM UNIT 1 USING SBO CROSSTIE (Page 5 of 9)
SECTION 3: Restoring Loads With TWO Unit 1 EDGs Running (continued)
D 5. RESTORE power to the 2AB 480V Load Center by CLOSING the TWO crosstie breakers:
2A2 to 2AB 480V Load Center (V) 282 to 2AB 480V Load Center (v) 480 V BUS TIE 2A2-2AB (40220)_ 480 V BUS TIE 2B2-2AB (40504) 480 V BUS TIE 2AB-2A2 (40702) __ 480 V BUS TIE 2AB-2B2 (40706)_
D 6. START a CCW Pump.
REFER TO 2-NOP-14.02, Component Cooling Water System Operation.
D 7. START a ICW Pump.
REFER TO 2-NOP-21.03A(B)(C)-2A(2B)(2C) Intake Cooling Water System Operation.
D 8. START a motor driven AFW Pump AS NECESSARY to maintain RCS Heat Removal safety function.
D 9. START additional equipment as EDG load capacity permits. Do NOT exceed 3730 KW (530 amps) on the Unit 1 EDG.
End of Section 3 55
~--- *--*-- ***---*~-~----~-------------------~~----*--------- ------------------------- ---~----*-----------~***--
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 3 Event# 7 Page 16 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 28 Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time ~ Position ~ Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Multiple alarms Pressure Control
- Verify RCS pressure is trending 2225-2275 psia
- Verify RCS subcooling is >20° F Note that no Pzr heaters are available.
Core Heat Removal
- Verify loop delta Tis <1 oo F Note that no RCP's are running and that CCW is not available to the RCP's.
RCS Heat Removal
- Verify at least one SG has BOTH of the following o SG level is between 20 and 83% NR o Feedwater is available and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR
- Verify RCS Tavg is between 525 and 535°F
- MSR warmup valves are closed
- If maintaining vacuum desired, ENSURE MV-08-814 Spillover bypass valve is CLOSED (N/A) 16 Scenario 5 56
*~-
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 3 Event# 7 Page 17 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
Loss of Second Midway line, Manual trip, LOOP, 2B Diesel fails to start, 2A Diesel breaker fail to close. Station Black Out. Perform alignment to restore power from Unit 1 Time II Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: None Control Room Indications Available: Multiple alarms Due to power lost, ADV's will have to be operated in the RO MANUAL I MANUAL mode. (DC control)
Containment Conditions
- Verify containment pressure <2 psig RO
- Verify NO containment radiation monitors in alarm
- Verify containment temperature is less than 120° F
- Verify NO secondary plant radiation alarms Note that containment conditions are being met.
Exit EOP-01 and Implement 2-EOP-1 0, 'Station Blackout' SRO (attached page xx)
RO Close MSIV's, SGBD valves and SG sampling when directed.
Isolate letdown, and RCP controlled bleedoff when directed.
Ensure all6 RCS sample valves closed.
Control Tcold <535oF using ADV's Verify Natural Circulation Block MSIS I SIAS when directed 17 Scenario 5 57
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 7 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D s. Protect Main Condenser PERFORM BOTH of the following:
A. PERFORM ALL of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:
- 3. ENSURE S/G Sampling is B. Locally CLOSE MSIVs.
ISOLATED. REFER TO Appendix I, MSIV Local Closure.
B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant.
REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2.
0 6. Minimize RCS Leakage 6.1 .!f valves do NOT close, Then manually INITIATE CIAS.
PERFORM ALL of the following:
A. ENSURE Letdown is ISOLATED.
B. ENSURE RCP Controlled Bleedoff is ISOLATED.
- c. ENSURE ALL SIX RCS sample valves are CLOSED.
58
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 8 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 7. Stabilize RCS Temperature 7.1 !f RCS T coLD is greater than 535°F, ENSURE RCS T coLD is less than Then VERIFY MSSVs are 535°F and controlled by operation of controlling RCS temperature.
ADVs.
7.2 !f ADVs are unavailable, Then use alternate steaming paths.
REFER TO Table 12, Alternate S/G Heat Removal Paths.
0 8. Ensure S/G Level 60 to 70% NR 8.1 !f 2C AFW Pump is tripped on overs peed, ENSURE at least ONE S/G has level Then ATTEMPT a restart.
being restored to or maintained REFER TO 2-AOP-09.02, between 60 and 70% NR. Auxiliary Feedwater.
8.2 Locally OPERATE 2C AFW Pump.
REFER TO Appendix G, Local Operation of the 2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
59
"*--------~---------------------------- ~--~~-~--------
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 9 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 9. Prepare for Power Restoration PERFORM ALL of the following to configure the plant for restoration of AC power:
A. NOTIFY Unit 1 to perform Appendix W, Supplying Unit 2 With AC Power Using SBO Crosstie; Section 1.
B. PERFORM Table 7, Vital Power Breaker Configuration I Station Blackout.
C. PERFORM Appendix V, Receiving AC Power From Unit 1 Using SBO Crosstie; Section 1.
D. CONTACT Division Load Dispatcher to restore power to the switchyard.
60
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT PROCEDURE NO.:
10 of 31 2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 10. Restore Vital Power Initiate action to restore AC power to at least ONE Vital 4.16 KV bus by PERFORMING ANY of the following:
A. RESTORE Power with Unit 2 EDG.
REFER TO Appendix B, Power Restoration to a De-energized Bus.
B. RESTORE Power from Offsite.
REFER TO Appendix B, Power Restoration to a De-energized Bus.
C. For power from Unit 1, PERFORM the following:
- 1. !f Unit 1 has at least ONE energized vital 4.16 KV bus, Then ENSURE Unit 1 has completed Section 1 of Appendix W.
- 2. CROSSTIE AB 4.16 KV 2.1 !f SBO Crosstie is NOT available, buses from Unit 1 to Unit 2. Then consider alternate crosstie REFER TO Appendix V, from Unit 1.
SBO Crosstie From Unit 1 to REFER TO Appendix F, Alternate Unit 2; Section 2. Method of Crosstying AC Power From Unit to Unit Using 2A4 or 2B4 Switchgear.
61
~--- --------------------~---------------~--*------*-*-**--~----~-----~~--
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 11 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 11. Reduce DC Loads 1f AC power has NOT been restored, Then DE-ENERGIZE unnecessary DC equipment.
REFER TO Table 9, 125V DC Equipment Which May Be De-energized to Extend Battery Life.
0 12. Ensure Supplemental Cooling 1f AC power has NOT been restored, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
A. ENSURE adequate ventilation or supplemental cooling for the following areas:
- Control Room
- Turbine Switchgear Room
- Cable Spread Room
- A and B Electrical Switchgear Rooms
- A and B Battery Rooms
- 1. CONTACT E/M for portable generators and temporary fan hookup.
- 2. OPEN interior doors for the battery rooms.
B. CONTACT Security to OPEN exterior doors to Control Room and Electrical Equipment Rooms.
62
- ---~----~---~**------------------~-----------~~-------------- ---------------------~~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 12 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 13. Verify Single Phase Natural 13.1 ENSURE proper control of S/G Circulation feeding and steaming.
VERIFY natural circulation flow in at least ONE loop by ALL of the following:
- Loop ~T (T HOT minus T coLD) less than 50°F
- Hot leg temperature constant or lowering
- Cold leg temperature constant or lowering
- RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling based on Rep CET temperature (If QSPDS unavailable, use T HoT)
- NO abnormal difference (greater than 20°F) between T HOT and Rep CET temperature (If QSPDS available) 0 14. Evaluate Condensate Inventory ENSURE the condensate inventory is greater than the minimum required.
REFER TO Data Sheet 1, Determination of Condensate Required to Remove Decay Heat and RCP Heat.
63
--- *-*-*----~----*~----------*-~-------------------------------*---*------*----~~-~------~~--
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 13 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Maintaining subcooling as low as possible while still within the limits of Figure 1A will reduce leakage and loss of inventory through existing leakage paths.
0 15. Maintain Subcooled Margin
!f AC power has NOT been restored, Then PERFORM ALL of the following, AS NECESSARY, to maintain subcooled margin greater than or equal to minimum subcooling, based on Rep CET temperature. (If QSPDS unavailable, use T HoT)
A. COOLDOWN using ADVs. A.1 CONTROL RCS temperature using 2C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths on the available S/G( s ).
REFER TO Table 12, Alternate S/G Heat Removal Paths.
B. At 50°F intervals, VERIFY that the reactor will remain shutdown for 50°F less than current indicated T coLD and the existing boron concentration at the time of EOP Entry.
C. !f the projected shutdown margin indicates that the reactor will NOT remain shutdown, Then STOP the cooldown.
(continued on next page) 64
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT PROCEDURE NO.:
14 of 31 2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 15. (continued)
D. As the RCS cooldown and depressurization proceed, PERFORM BOTH of the following AS NECESSARY:
65
- - - - - ~----
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT PROCEDURE NO.:
15 of 31 2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS HOLD POINT The following step is a hold point. Do NOT perform the remaining steps of this procedure until at least ONE Vital 4.16 KV Bus is energized.
CONTINUE performing steps 1 through 15.
0 16. Restore AC and DC Loads When at least ONE Vital 4.16 KV bus is energized, Then PERFORM ALL of the following AS NECESSARY:
A. ENSURE associated 480V buses are energized.
REFER TO Appendix B, Power Restoration to a De-energized Bus, if power is from a Unit 2 source.
REFER TO Appendix V, Receiving Power from Unit 1 using SBO Crosstie, if power is from a Unit 1 source.
B. ENSURE AC power is restored to associated Battery Chargers.
REFER TO 2-NOP-50.01A, 125V DC Bus 2A (Class 1E) Normal Operation, 2-NOP-50.01 B, 125V DC Bus 2B (Class 1E)
Normal Operation, 2-NOP-50.01AB, 125V DC Bus 2AB (Class 1E)
Normal Operation, C. When AC power has been restored to the associated Battery Chargers, Then RESTORE power to DC loads that were de-energized in Table 9, 125V DC Equipment Which May Be De-energized to Extend Battery Life.
66
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 16 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 17. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. !f CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
- 2. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
NOTE Annunciator R-8, SIAS Channel AlB Actuation Block Permissive, alarms at a setpoint of 1836 psia.
0 18. Depressurize the RCS A. COMMENCE depressurizing the RCS to between 1800 and 1850 psia.
B. MAINTAIN pressurizer level between 10 and 68%.
67
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
20 STATION BLACKOUT 6 of 31 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-EOP-10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERA TOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE
- Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory indications are available.
- Steps designated with an
- may be performed non-sequentially or are to be performed continuously.
0 1. Confirm Diagnosis VERIFY SBO Safety Function Status 1.1 REDIAGNOSE the event using Check acceptance criteria are 2-EOP-01 Chart 1, Diagnostic satisfied every 15 minutes. Flow Chart, and GO TO ONE of the following:
- The appropriate Optimal Recovery Procedure
- 2-EOP-15, Functional Recovery 0 2. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions.
REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies.
D 3. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.
D 4. Perform Secondary Surveys DIRECT Health Physics to conduct secondary plant area radiation surveys.
68
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 8 Page 18 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
2C AFW pump trips on electrical overspeed Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: when Crew has entered 1-EOP-10, 'Station Blackout' and directed by the lead evaluator, trigger event 8, 2C AFW overspeed trip.
If asked as NPO report that electrical overspeed tripped and the pump is not rotating.
Booth Operator Instructions: When directed, trigger restore Instrument Air per Appendix H of EOP-99. (IF AB 480V bus energized)
Control Room Indications Available: Annunciator G-46 2C AFW Pump Turbine FailureiTripiOVRLDISS ISOL. Closed position indication of MV-08-3 and G-46 resets (clears), indicates electical overspeed trip.
Recognizes alarm and indications that 2C AFW pump has RO tripped on electrical overspeed.
Directs implementation of 2-AOP-09.02 'Auxiliary Feedwater' Attachment 1 (attached page xx) to reset 2C AFW pump SRO electrical overspeed trip AND I OR if 283 4.16KV bus and associated MCC's energized direct 28 AFW pump started and aligned to feed 2A and 28 SG's.
CRITICAL When 2C AFW pump overspeed reset, direct both SG level restored to 60-70% NR OR if 283 4.16kv and the vital MCC's to TASK power the 8 side MOV's energized, start the 28 AFW pump.
When directed perform Attachment 1 to reset 2C AFW pump RO overspeed AND I OR start 28 AFW pump.
RO When 2C AFW pump overspeed reset OR 28 AFW pump CRITICAL available, feed both SG's to restore SG level to 60-70% NR TASK When directed depressurize the RCS to between 1800 and 1850 psia.
Scenario 5 69
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 7 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
!INSTRUCTIONS I ICONTINGENCY ACTIONS I 4.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
D 5. VERIFY 2C Auxiliary Feedwater pump is NOT tripped.
5.1 IF the 2C Auxiliary Feedwater pump mechanical or electrical overspeed trip has occurred, THEN PERFORM Attachment 1, Resetting 2C AFW Pump Following Overspeed Trip.
D 6. IF the 2C AFW pump has been RESET, 6.1 IF 2C Auxiliary Feedwater pump can NOT be controlled from the THEN VERIFY 2C Auxiliary Control Room, Feedwater pump can be THEN PERFORM local operation controlled from the Control Room. per Attachment 3, Local Operation of 2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, if required.
D 7. IF steam binding occurs on one or more Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, THEN:
A. STOP the affected pump(s).
B. FEED the steam generators with the unaffected Auxiliary Feedwater pump(s).
70
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 13 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Resetting 2C AFW Pump Following Overspeed Trip (Page 1 of 3)
NOTE
- An electrical overspeed trip results in closed position indication for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLEffRIP, and alarm reset on G-46.
- A mechanical overspeed trip results in closed position indication for MV-08-3, 2C AFW PUMP THROTTLEffRIP, and alarm G-46 locked in.
- 1. IF 2C AFW pump tripped due to mechanical OR electrical overspeed trip, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. CLOSE MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C. (RTGB-202)
B. CLOSE MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C. (RTGB-202)
C. PERFORM the following to reset and OPEN MV-08-3, 2C PUMP:
{1) CLOSE MV-08-3, 2C PUMP. (RTGB-202- Key 78).
{2) IF 2C AFW pump tripped due to mechanical overspeed trip, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a. RESET the 2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump mechanical overspeed linkage.
- b. VERIFY top surface of trip tappet nut is in line with the line marked on the head lever to ensure full engagement.
{3) PLACE MV-08-3, 2C PUMP (2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump),
in OPEN.
{4) VERIFY MV-08-3, THROTTLE I TRIP VALVE FOR AFW PUMP 2C, is OPEN.
71
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 14 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Resetting 2C AFW Pump Following Overspeed Trip (Page 2 of 3)
- 1. (continued)
D. IF 2C AFW pump is rotating, THEN PERFORM the following:
(1) UNLOCK AND CLOSE V08884, SE-08-2 INLET ISOL.
(TRSL/30/N-T3/W-TA)
(2) WHEN 2C AFW pump stops rotating, THEN slowly OPEN V08884, SE-08-2 INLET ISOL.
(3) IF 2C AFW Pump does NOT stop rotating, THEN REFER TO Attachment 5, Actions to Stop the 2C AFW PUMP From Rotating.
(4) LOCK OPEN V08884, SE-08-2 INLET ISOL.
E. PERFORM one of the following to drain oil from the underside of the governor main speed piston:
(1) WAIT 3 minutes after pump stops rotating.
OR (2) PERFORM the following:
- a. PLACE manual control knob on the side of the turbine governor in the FULLY COUNTER-CLOCKWISE idle speed position.
- b. RETURN manual control knob on the turbine governor to FULLY CLOCKWISE maximum speed position.
F. ENSURE MV-09-11, PUMP 2C TO SG 2A is CLOSED. (RTG8-202)
G. ENSURE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO SG 28 is CLOSED. (RTG8-202)
H. IF both Steam Generators are intact AND NOT faulted, THEN OPEN the following valves simultaneously:
(1) MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C (2) MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C 72
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:
2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 15 of 35 PROCEDURE NO.:
2-AOP-09.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ATTACHMENT 1 Resetting 2C AFW Pump Following Overspeed Trip (Page 3 of 3)
- 1. (continued)
CAUTION Operation of the 2C AFW Pump should be avoided to minimize direct releases to the environment. If motor driven AFW pumps are NOT available, steam from the least affected S/G should be used.
I. IF either Steam Generator is faulted, THEN OPEN the steam supply valve from the NON-FAULTED S/G:
(1) MV-08-13, SG 2A STM TO AFW PP 2C.
OR (2) MV-08-12, SG 28 STM TO AFW PP 2C.
J. IF flow is to be restored to 2A S/G, THEN ENSURE SE-09-4, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 2A S/G VLV, is OPEN. (Key 85)
K. IF flow is to be restored to 28 S/G, THEN ENSURE SE-09-5, 2C PUMP DISCH TO 28 S/G VLV, is OPEN. (Key 86)
L. THROTTLE MV-09-11, PUMP 2C TO S/G 2A, to establish required flowrate to the 2A steam generator.
M. THROTTLE MV-09-12, PUMP 2C TO S/G 28, to establish required flowrate to the 28 steam generator.
73
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: HLC21 Scenario# 5 Event# 8 Page 19 of 20 NRC Event
Description:
2C AFW pump trips on electrical overspeed Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:
Control Room Indications Available:
If CCW is lost for greater than 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by RO PLACING the FOUR Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE.
- 2. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE.
Suggested termination point:
- Power has been restored from Unit 1 to Unit 2
OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM Day: Today Desk RCO: Board RCO:
Protected Train: 8 Unit 2 Identified RCS Leakage: 0.08 Unit 2 Unidentified RCS Leakage: 0.14 Unit 2 Scheduled Activities per the OSP:
Upcoming ECOs to Hang or Release:
Tech Spec Action Statement:
2A AFW pump T.S. 3.7.1.2 Action a.
2A Charging Pump N/A with 2C and 2B Charging pumps available.
OPS 513's:
Locked in Annunciators:
G-24 2A AFW Pump Brk Fialure/CS Stop/SS lsol M-46 2A Charging Pump SS lsol/2555 OVRLD/SS/ISOL Current Status:
Both Units are at 100% power MOC RCS Boron concentration is 777 PPM.
2A AFW pump removed from service two hours ago due to motor oil leak. The 2A Charging Pump is on a clearance for packing removal. None of the above are expected to be returned to service this shift Equipment Problems:
20 Scenario 5 75