Text

Initial Exam 2013-301 Draft RO Written Exam
	ML14028A105
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	01/24/2014
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	50-369/13-301, 50-370/13-301
	Download: ML14028A105 (216)
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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 ij SYSOO3 A 1.03 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 /45.5)

RCP motor stator winding temperatures Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is operating at 100% RTP

Ops Test Group is performing a slave relay test and a procedural error results in the inadvertent closure of 1RN-277B (RB NON ESS RET CONT OUTSIDE ISOL)

At 1400, the following NC pumps indications are noted:

NC Pump IA lB IC ID Current Stator 250.5°F 259.5°F 265°F 253.6°F Winding Temp.

Temp. Increase 1.8°F/mm 1.5°F/mm 1.2°F/mm 1.7°F/mm Based on the conditions above, which ONE (1) of the following indicates the FIRST NC pump that would have to be manually secured in accordance with AP-08, (MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP)?

A. 1A B. lB C. 1C D. 1D Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 1 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 General Discussion The closure of IRN-277B would result in the loss of RN cooling to the NC Pump Motor Coolers. The resulting effect on all of the U-i NC Pumps would be an increase in the pump stator temperatures. Per AP-08 (Malfunction of NC Pump), if this parameter reaches a value of 31 1°F, the associated pump would be required to be tripped.

Based on current temperatures and temperature rise, the IA NC pump would be the first to reach the temperature limit of 311°F:

NCP l = (31 1-250.5)/1.8 = 33.61 minutes 4CP 1D = (311-253.6)11.7 = 33.76 minutes NJCP lB (311-259.5)/1.5 34.33 minutes JCP IC = (311-265)71.2 = 38.33 minutes Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that the limit for continued operation is 300°F which is the Stator Winding Hi-Hi Temperature alarm setpoint. If this were the case, NCP lB would be the first to reach this temperature:

ICP lB = (300-259.5)71.5 = 27.00 minutes 1CP 1D (300-253.6)71.7 = 27.29 minutes CP IA (300-250.5)71.8 = 27.50 minutes JCP 1C (300-265)71.2 29.17 minutes Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that the limit for continued operation is 280°F which is the Stator Winding Hi Temperature alarm setpoint. If this were the case, NCP IC would be the first to reach this temperature:

NCP 1C (280-265)71.2 12.50 minutes CP lB = (280-259.5)71.5 13.67 minutes NCP ID (280-253.6)71.7 15.53 minutes

\ICP 1A = (280-250.5)/i .8 = 16.39 minutes Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that the limit for continued operation is 305°F. This plausible since it is 5°F above the Hi-Hi Temperature alarm setpoint (300°F). If this were the case, 1D NCP would be the first to reach this temperature:

NCP ID (305-253.6)71.7 = 30.24 minutes TCP IA = (305-250.5)71.8 30.28 minutes N4CP lB = (305-259.5)71.5 30.33 minutes Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 2 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1

[NCP 1C (305-265)11.2 33.33 minutes Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to demonstrate the ability to predict which NC pump would be the first to exceed the stator winding temperature limit which would require the NC pump to be manually tripped.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must recall from memory the Stator Winding temperature limit that would require the NC pump to be tripped. Then the applicant must calculate when each pump would exceed that temperature limit based on the initial temperature and the rate of temperature increase for that particular pump.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2011 NRC QI (Bank 4353) MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NCP AP-08 Malfunction ofNC Pump Learning Objectives:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NCP Objectives 7 & 15 SYSOO3 A 1.03 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 /45.5)

RCP motor stator winding temperatures 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 3 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 2 SYSOO4 A1.1O Chemical and Volume Control System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 /45.5)

Reactor power Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is operating at 90% RTP

The controller for 1 KC-1 32 (LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP CTRL) has been placed in MANUAL due to erratic operation

Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature is initially 1 00°F

Subsequently, NV letdown flow is increased by 10 GPM as requested by Chemistry Based on the conditions above, reactor power and NC system temperature will initially (1)

If Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature increases to a maximum of (2) 1 NV-i 27A (LD HX OUTLET 3-WAY TEMP CNTRL) will automatically divert letdown to the VCT.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. INCREASE

2. 120°F B. 1. INCREASE

2. 138°F C. 1. DECREASE

2. 120°F D. 1. DECREASE

2. 138°F Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 4 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 2 General Discussion Requires operator to determine the effect of increasing letdown temp on the MB Demineralizer. At low temperatures, the boron affinity is increased. At high temperatures, boron affinity is reduced. If the temperature is increased previously captured boron ions are released from the MB Demineralizer thus increasing NC system boron concentration. If Letdown Hx outlet temperature increases to 138°F, INV-127A will divert to the VCT to protect the demineralizer resin.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses the change in letdown heat exchanger temperature and NC system boron concentration with the change in NC system temperature and reactor power.

The second part is plausible because the Letdown Hx Outlet Hi Temperature annunciator (IAD-7 / H2) alarms at 120°F.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses the change in letdown heat exchanger temperature and NC system boron concentration with the change in NC system temperature and reactor power.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the Letdown Hx Outlet Hi Temperature annunciator (IAD-7/ H2) alarms at 120°F.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the question involves a situation where the CVCS controls have been operated and the applicant must predict the outcome of those operations on reactor power.

Also, having knowledge of when the protective feature should occur (swap of INV-127A) provides the Operator with the ability to prevent exceeding the design limit of the demineralizer resin by manually swapping INV-127A to the VCT position should the automatic action fail to occur.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First, the applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine that letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature has increased. They must then determine that the increase in letdown temperature results in boron being released into the letdown system which ultimately results in an increase in NC system boron concentration which in turn results in the initial decrease in NC system temperature and power.

The applicant must then recall from memory the setpoint for the 3-Way Temperature Control valve swap to the VCT.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2010 NRC Q2 (Bank 2702) MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP-MC-PS-NV Section 2.6 OP-BNT-CHO5 Section 7.3 Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 5 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-NV Objective 11 OP-BNT-CHO5 Objective CH05025 SYSOO4 A1.1O Chemical and Volume Control System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Reactor power 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 6 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 3 SYSOO4 A4.08 Chemical and Volume Control System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41/7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Charging Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A power decrease from 100% RTP was in progress

The following indications were observed:

o Pressurizer level = 51%

o Reactor power = 75%

The power decrease is halted when the crew notes that I NV-238 (CHARGING LINE FLOW CONTROL VALVE) is NOT maintaining pressurizer level at program level

I NV-238 is placed in manual and adjusted to restore pressurizer level to program level

1) When the crew discovered 1 NV-238 was not maintaining program level, how did actual level compare to program level?

2) When 1 NV-238 is repaired, what operator action(s) will be required to restore automatic pressurizer level control?

A. 1. Actual level was lower than program level

2. Place I NV-238 in automatic ONLY B. 1. Actual level was lower than program level

2. Place I NV-238 in automatic AND restore the Pressurizer Level Master to automatic using the DCS soft controls C. 1. Actual level was higher than program level

2. Place I NV-238 in automatic ONLY D. 1. Actual level was higher than program level

2. Place I NV-238 in automatic AND restore the Pressurizer Level Master to automatic using the DCS soft controls Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 7 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 3 General Discussion When 1NV-238 is placed in manual, the LEVEL MASTER goes to manual. Even after 1NV-238 is placed in auto, the master remains in MAUNAL until the operator places it back in auto by using the soft control. As long as the master is in manual, 1NV238 will not get signals to change position.

Pzr program level is based on selected Tave. A program level is selected to match as nearly as possible, the level changes that would occur as average coolant temperature changes from no-load (557 F) to full load (585.1 F). Tref is based on Turbine Inlet Pressure which is proportional to turbine load (0% to 100%), from 557 F to 585.1 F. Pzr program level is 25% (0%) to 55% (100%).

Assuming Tave is maintained with Tref then this equates to a 0.3% increase in Pzr level per % power. At 75 % power Pzr program level will be

(.3 X 75) + 25 47.5 %. Therefore the level value of5l% in the stem is 3.5 % higher than program level.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible that actual Pzr level was lower than program if it is not understood how program Pzr level is ramped with power or if there is a miscalculation.

Placing INV-238 ONLY in automatic is plausible if the applicant does not understand that the Pzr Level Master is automatically swapped to manual when INV-238 is swapped to manual. If that were the case, the applicant would conclude that the Pzr Level Master was still in automatic and that the only action required to restore automatic pressurizer level control would be to place 1NV-238 in automatic.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE Plausible that actual Pzr level was lower than program if it is not understood how program Pzr level is ramped with power or if there is a miscalculation.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE First part is correct. Actual level is higher than program level per the discussion.

Placing 1NV-238 ONLY in automatic is plausible if the applicant does not understand that the Pzr Level Master is automatically swapped to manual when INV-238 is swapped to manual. If that were the case, the applicant would conclude that the Pzr Level Master was still in automatic and that the only action required to restore automatic pressurizer level control would be to place 1NV-238 in automatic.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because it tests the applicants ability to monitor and manually operate charging in the control room.

Basis for Hi Cog This is Hi Cog because it requires the applicant to perform a calculation to determine actual level vs program level due to the failure of the charging flow control valve and recall from memory the actions required to restore automatic pressurizer level control.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2009 CNS NRC Q29 (Bank 1629) MODIFIED Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 8 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 3 Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS Section 2.16 Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ILE Section 2.4.2 and Figure 7.3 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-ILE Objectives 2 & 3 SYSOO4 A4.08 Chemical and Volume Control System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41/7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Charging 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 9 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 4 SYSOO5 K5 05 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS: (CFR: 41.5 /45.7)

Plant response during solid plant: pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in solid operations while cooling down

Both trains of ND are in service

2A NV pump is in service

Letdown is through 2NV-121 (ND LETDOWN CONTROL)

Based on the conditions above, which ONE (1) of the following would cause NC system pressure to increase? (Consider each separately)

A. 2ANVpumptrips B. Loss of VI to 2ND-19 (2A ND Hx Outlet)

C. Loss of Vito 2ND-34 (A & B ND Hx Bypass)

D. Loss of VI to 2KC-57 (2A ND Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Control)

Thursday, October 17,2013 Page 10 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 4 General Discussion A loss of VI to 2ND 34 would cause the valve to fail open. This would result in bypassing flow to the ND HXs. This would result in an increasing NC system temperature which would cause NC system pressure to increase.

If the 2A NV pump trips it would result in a decrease in charging flow which would cause NC system pressure to decrease.

Loss of VI to 2ND-19 would cause the valve to fail open. This would result in increased flow through the ND HX. This would cause NC system temperature to decrease which would cause NC system pressure to decrease.

Loss of VI to 2KC-57 would cause the valve to fail open this would increasing cooling water flow to the 2A ND HX. This would reduce NC system temperature and result in a decrease in NC system pressure.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the effect of charging and letdown on NC system pressure. If so, the applicant could conclude that the NV pump tripping would cause NC system pressure to increase.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the fail-safe position of ND-19. If the applicant concludes that ND-19 fails closed on a loss of VI, they would also conclude that the reduction in flow through the ND HX would cause an increase in NC system temperatue and consequently and increase in NC system pressure.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the fail-safe position of KC-57. If the applicant concludes that KC-57 fails closed on a loss of VI, they would also conclude that the reduction in cooling water flow to the ND HX would cause an increase in NC system temperatue and consequently and increase in NC system pressure.

Basis for meeting the KA By demonstrating a knowledge of the effects of component failures on the dynamics of the NC and ND systems during solid plant operations, the applicant demonstrates a knowledge of the operational implications and the plants response as a consequence of the relative incompressibilty water and its effect on system pressure.

Basis for I-li Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

To determine the correct answer the applicant must first determine the result of each malfunction.

The applicant must then determine how the outcome of each of the malfunction ultimately effects NC system pressure.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References [Student References Provided

References:

0P12/A16100/SD-8 (Water Solid Operations)

Learning Objectives:

ONE Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 11 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 4 SYSOO5 K5 05 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Plant response during solid plant: pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water O1-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 12 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 5 SYSOO6 K1.14 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8) lAS Concerning the operation of Engineering Safeguards Modulating Control Valves:

Upon receipt of a (1) signal, the modulating control valve circuit will (2) the control valves.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. Safety injection ONLY

2. align Vito B. 1. Safety injection Q. Blackout

2. align Vito C. 1. Safety Injection ONLY

2. ventairoff D. 1. Safety injection OR Blackout

2. ventairoff Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 13 of 291

C FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 General Discussion The modulating control valve circuitry controls the solenoids supplying air to selected safety related control valves. These control valves are normally controlled by other non-safety controllers and instrumentation. In order to prevent these non-safety controls from causing the control valves to assume an improper position after a safety event, these safety related solenoids valves will vent air off its control valve to cause it to assume its safe position. These solenoid valves de-energize upon receipt of a safety injection signal from the DIG load sequencer.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that air must be applied to the ESF Modulating Valves to cause them to position to their safeguards position.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part includes a B/O signal in addition to the SI signal. Both are ESF signals, both come from the sequencer and both result is the repositioning of many safety related valves. It would be reasonable for the applicant to believe the modulating control valves are affected by both signals.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that air must be applied to the ESF Modulating Valves to cause them to position to their safeguards position.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above Answer 0 Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part includes a B/O signal in addition to the SI signal. Both are ESF signals, both come from the sequencer and both result is the

-epositioning of many safety related valves. It would be reasonable for the applicant to believe the modulating control valves are affected by Eoth signals.

Second part of the answer is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the applicant is being tested on the cause-effect relationship between an ECCS actuation signal and the resulting effect on ECCS valves which are supplied by the lAS. The signal results in a change in alignment of the VI supply to these control valves.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q5 (Bank 2705)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN Section 2.6.1 (Rev 47B)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PSS-RN Obj: 12 SYSOO6 K1.14 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 /

45.7 to 45.8)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 5 lAS 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus 1

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 15 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 6 SYSOO7 K3.O1 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

A Reactor Trip has occurred

The crew is performing E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

Containment pressure is NEGATIVE 0.1 PSIG and stable Subsequently the following occurs:

ONE (1) PZR safety valve has stuck partially open

After the PRT rupture disc relieves, Containment pressure begins to rise at 0.1 PSlGperminute

1) How long will it be before the upper limit of Technical Specification 3.6.4 (CONTAINMENT PRESSURE), is reached?

2) How long will it be before the Lower Containment Ventilation (VL) AHUs automatically switch to HIGH speed?

A. 1. 3 minutes

2. 5 minutes B. 1. 3 minutes

2. 4 minutes C. 1. 4 minutes

2. 5 minutes D. 1. 4 minutes

2. 6 minutes Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 16 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 6 General Discussion The lower limit for Containment pressure lAW TS 3.6.4 is 0.3 PSIG. The upper limit is

+0.3 PSIG. At an initial pressure of-0.l PSIG and a pressure increase of 0.1 PSIG/min., it will take 4 minutes for pressure to reach the upper limit.

At a Containment pressure of +0.5 PSIG, the VL AHUs will swap to HIGH speed. With an initial pressure of-0.1 PSIG and a pressure increase of 0.1 PSIG/min., it will take 6 minutes for the VL AHUs to swap to HIGH speed.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant omits the Containment initial pressure from the time calculation to reach the Containment pressure Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG). If so, with Containment pressure increasing at 0.1 PSIG/min, the limit of 0.3 PSIG would be reached in 3 minutes.

Second part is plausible if applicant omits the Containment initial pressure from the time calculation for Containment pressure to reach the VL Fan auto-swap setpoint (0.5 PSIG). If so, with Containment pressure increasing at 0.1 PSIG/min, the applicant would calculate that the VL Fans will shift to HIGH speed in 5 minutes.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant omits the Containment initial pressure from the time calculation to reach the Containment pressure Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG). If so, with Containment pressure increasing at 0.1 PSIG/min, the limit of 0.3 PSIG would be reached in 3 minutes.

Second part is plausible if applicant correctly performs the time calculation but concludes that the VL Fans auto-swap setpoint is the same as the Tech Spec Containment high pressure limit (0.3 PSIG). In this case, they would calculate that the VL Fans would shift to HIGH speed in 4 minutes.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant omits the initial Containment pressure from the calculated time to reach the VL Fan auto-swap setpoint.

If that is the case they will calculate that it takes 5 minutes for the VL Fans to swap to HIGH speed.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must have knowledge (i.e. TS Pressure Limit) of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS (i.e.

Rupture Disc operating) will have on the Containment.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is high cognitive level because it requires more than one mental step.

First, the applicant must recall from memory the Tech Spec high limit for Containment pressure and the Containment pressure at which the VL Fans auto-swap to high speed.

Text, the applicant must perform a calculation to determine the time that it will take Containment pressure to reach the pressures that they have previously recalled from memory.

Basis for SRO only r

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2011 AUDIT Q7 (Bank 4452) MODIFIED Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 17 of 291

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6 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 Development References Student References Provided

References:

PS-NC (section 2.9; Rev 37)

Technical Specification LCO 3.6.4 Learning Objective:

OP-MC-PS-NC Objective 19 SYSOO7 K3.O1 Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 18 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 SYSOO8 K3.03 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following:

RCP Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Small Break LOCA occurred in Containment

SI has actuated on both trains

1 B NV pump tripped on overcurrent

Containment pressure is 3.5 PSIG Based on the above conditions, JJ, cooling would be lost to the NC pump A. seals ONLY.

B. motor bearings ONLY.

C. seals AND pump lower bearings.

D. motor bearings AND pump lower bearings.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 7 General Discussion Due to the LOCA, pressure inside Containment has increased such that a Safety Injection signal and a Phase B isolation signal have been generated. The Phase B signal has resulted in Component Cooling Water (KC) being isolated to Containment. The KC isolation results in a loss cooling to the NC pump motor bearing coolers and to the NC pump thermal barrier. However, NC pump seal injection is maintained because 1A V pump remains in service. NC pump lower bearing temperatures will increase slightly due to the loss of cooling to the NC pump thermal barriers. However, ALL cooling to the lower pump bearings has NOT been lost because seal injection flow is maintained.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant believes that NC pump seal injection has been lost because of the Phase B isolation or the lB NV pump trip.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant believes that NC pump seal injection has been lost because of the Phase B isolation or the lB NV pump trip. Also, while there is a slight increase in lower bearing temperatures due to the loss of KC to the thermal barrier, the primary cooling for the lower bearing which is seal injection has not been lost.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant believes that NC pump seal injection has been lost because of the Phase B isolation or the lB NV pump trip and KC has been lost. Seal injection is maintained because the IA NV pump is still running. Therefore, only KC has been lost. Cooling to the NC pump motor bearings and thermal barrier has been lost. The loss of KC to the thermal barrier will cause a slight increase in lower bearing temperatures.

However, all cooling has not been lost since seal injection is still maintained.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must understand how the KC system is affected on a Phase B Signal (i.e. KC cooling lost to NCP5) and resulting effects on NC system components.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze given plant condition to determine that KC cooling to the NC pumps has been isolated as a result of the Phase B isolation and that NC pump seal injection is still in service.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC QI5 (Bank 3054)

Development References ent References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-KC (Rev 29) Sections 2.6 and 3.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PSS-KC Objective 4 SYSOO8 K3.03 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following:

RCP Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 20 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 8 SYSO1O K5.O1 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Determination of condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 100% RTP

A loss of offsite power occurs Current Conditions:

Natural Circulation established

NC system pressure is 2000 PSIG and STABLE

All Tcolds 550° F and STABLE

Pressurizer level is 32% and STABLE

Pressurizer temperature is 635° F

The 1A, lB and 1 D PZR HTR MODE SELECT switches on 1MC-10 have been placed in MAN Based on the conditions above:

The Pressurizer is (1 When the BOP closes the PZR HTR Group Supply breakers from IMC-5, the Pressurizer Backup Heaters (2) automatically energize.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. saturated

2. WILL B. 1. subcooled

2. WILL C. 1. saturated

2. WILL NOT D. 1. subcooled

2. WILL NOT Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 22 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 General Discussion Using the steam tables, it can be determined that the indications represent a slightly subcooled condition in the Pressurizer. At 2000 PSIG (2015 PSIA) saturation temperature in the Pressurizer would be 636.84°F. Since the Pressurizer temperature is 635°F, it is slightly subcooled.

Under the conditions given, to recover control ofthe Pressurizer Heaters, the Operator must place the Backup Heater Mode Select switches on IMC-10 to MAN (manual), then close the Backup Heater Group Supply breakers using the controls switches on IMC-5. and finally must depress the Pressure Heater Controls Switches START pushbuttons on IMC-10 to energize the Pressurizer Heaters.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because if the applicant uses PSIG when reading the Steam Tables as opposed to PSIA, they will determine that Pressurizer conditions are right at saturation.

The second part is plausible because Pressurizer pressure is below the setpoint where the Pressurizer Backup Heaters would normally be energized. Also, Pressurizer level is greater then 5% above program which would also normally energize the BU heaters. Even if the applicant understands that the BU heaters would not energize based on PZR level or pressure, if they do not recall that the BU START pushbutton must be depressed, they may conclude that with the Mode Select switch in MANUAL, the PZR heaters would energize as soon as their Group Supply Breaker is closed.

Answer B Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

rhe first part is correct.

F he second part is plausible because Pressurizer pressure is below the setpoint where the Pressurizer Backup Heaters would normally be mergized. Also, Pressurizer level is greater then 5% above program which would also normally energize the BU heaters. Even if the applicant inderstands that the BU heaters would not energize based on PZR level or pressure, if they do not recall that the BU START pushbutton must be iepressed, they may conclude that with the Mode Select switch in MANUAL, the PZR heaters would energize as soon as their Group Supply Breaker is closed.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because if the applicant uses PSIG when reading the Steam Tables as opposed to PSIA, they will determine that Pressurizer conditions are right at saturation.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion

[CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA

[The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to determine the conditions in the Pressurizer using the Steam Tables.

Basis for Hi Cog is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to perform a calculation to determine the conditions in the Pressurizer.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Steam Tables Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-IPE (Rev. 4D) Section 2.5 Learning Objectives:

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 8 OP-MC-PS-IPE Objective 3 SYSO1O K5.O1 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the PZR PCS: (CFR: 41.5 /45.7)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 9 SYSO12 K6.1O Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/7)

Permissive circuits Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is increasing power following a Refueling Outage

At 45% reactor power, the P-8 permissive failed AS IS

Reactor power is currently at 50%

Based on the conditions above:

The P-8 HI PWR LO FLO RX TRIP BLOCK status light on ISI-18 is (1)

If one NC pump were to trip, an automatic reactor trip (2) occur.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. LIT

2. WILL B. 1. LIT

2. WILL NOT C. 1. DARK

2. WILL D. 1. DARK

2. WILL NOT Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 25 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 9 General Discussion When the P-8 permissive fails as is at 45 % power the status light indication for P-8 onstatus indication panel ISI-18 will be LIT (Low flow Rx trip is blocked). Once power is increased above 48%, the P-8 status indication would normally be dark and the single loop loss of flow Rx trip would be unblocked (2/4 PR >/=48%). Since P-8 has failed at 45% power, the status light would remain lit at 50% power and the single loop loss of flow Rx trip would be blocked. Therefore, the effect on the Rx protection system would be that with the loss of an NCP the single loop loss of flow Rx trip will not occur automatically with Rx power> 48% because of the loss of the P-8 permissive circuit.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the status light being lit makes an automatic Rx trip plausible because of the logic (lit or dark being blocked or unblocked) and it could be determined that with the status light lit that an automatic Rx trip will occur.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because of the logic (lit or dark being blocked or unblocked).

The second part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that with the status light dark (i.e. the BLOCK not in effect) that an automatic Rx trip will occur.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because of the logic (lit or dark being blocked or unblocked).

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA Meets the KA because it is testing the failure of a permissive (P-8) and how it will affect the reactor protection system (prevent an automatic trip when one was actually required).

Basis for Hi Cog Student must determine that the failure occurred below the P-8 setpoint and failing as is means that it is still in the blocked state it was in at the lower power level even though it should be unblocked, and based on that, determine whether an automatic reactor trip would occur.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2008 CNS NRC Q37 (Bank 1737)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IPE (Section 3.1.3)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-IPE Objective 11 SYSO12 K6.10 Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7/45/7)

Permissive circuits Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 26 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 io SYSOI3 K2.O1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

ESFAS/safeguards equipment control Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Small Break LOCA has occurred

The crew has reached the step in E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT) to reset SI and the Sequencers

The crew is unable to reset the Sequencers Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the locations where Operators must be dispatched to de-energize BOTH Sequencers?

A. 1EVDA;1EVDB B. 1EVDA;IEVDD C. 1EVDB;1EVDC D. IEVDC;IEVDD Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 28 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 i General Discussion If one or both Sequencers can not be reset, E-1 Step 10 RNO directs operators to be dispatched to the 125 VDC Vital Instrument and Control Panelboard to dc-energize the affected Sequencer. The Train A sequencer is power from 1EVDA Breaker 6 and the Train B Sequencer is power from 1EVDD Breaker 8.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because IEVDA is correct and 1EVDB is another 125 VDC Vital Instrument and Control Panelboard.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1EVDB and 1EVDC are both 125 VDC Vital Instrument and Control Panelboards.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because IEVDD is correct and 1EVDC is another 125 VDC Vital Instrument and Control Panelboard.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the DO Load Sequencers control ESFAS/Safeguards equipment. The applicant must know the power supplies to the DG Load Sequencers to know where to dispatch NEOs to de-energize the sequencers.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2OIONRCQII (Bank 2511)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-EQB Rev. 19 Section 2.4 EPII/A/5500/E-1 (Loss or Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E1 Objective 4 SYSO13 K2.O1 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

ESFAS/safeguards equipment control 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 29 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 ii SYSO22 K2.O1 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Knowledge of power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Containment cooling fans Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the power supply alignment for Containment Cooling Fans during a BLACKOUT or SAFETY INJECTION?

A. On a BLACKOUT, the VR Fans (on the affected bus) swap to EMERGENCY power.

On a SAFETY INJECTION the VR Fans (on the affected bus) are shunt tripped OFF.

B. On a BLACKOUT, the VT Fans (on the affected bus) are shunt tripped OFF.

On a SAFETY INJECTION the VT Fans (on the affected bus) start.

C. On a BLACKOUT the VU Fans (on the affected bus) start.

On a SAFETY INJECTION the VU Fans (on the affected bus) are shunt tripped OFF.

D. On a BLACKOUT the VL Fans (on the affected bus) are shunt tripped OFF.

On a SAFETY INJECTION the VL Fans (on the affected bus) start and run in low speed.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 General Discussion The normal power supply for the VU units is a 600VAC Essential Motor Control Center. Following a Blackout, all units will be sequenced on regardless of switch position. Under these conditions, these fans can not be stopped until the sequencer is reset.

The VU units are shunt-tripped from the essential power system upon receipt of an SS signal and the ON-OFF indication on the HVAC panel is lost.

During a Blackout, BOTH VL Units start in LOW speed. And, on a Safety Injection signal, the VL Units are shunt tripped off, swap to emergency power, and then start in HIGH speed.

During a Blackout, BOTH VR fans start. And, on a Safety Injection signal both VR swap to emergency power and start.

During a Blackout, Both VT Fans start. And, on a Safety Injection all fans swap to emergency power and start.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the VR fans swap to emergency power on a Safety Injection.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses a Blackout and Safety Injection because most of the Containment cooling fans are shunt tripped off on a Safety Injection.

The second part is plausible because on a Safety Injection the VT Fans start after swapping to emergency power.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses a Blackout and Safety Injection since the VL units are shut tripped off on a Safety Injection signal.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses a Blackout and Safety Injection because the VL units start in LOW speed on a Blackout.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the power supplies to Containment Cooling fans during emergency conditions.

Basis for Hi Cog LBasis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2003 MNS Audit (Old MNS Bank 993)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VUL Rev. 30 Sections 2.1 and 3.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CNT-VUL Objective 5 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 31 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 ii SYSO22 K2.O1 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Knowledge of power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Containment cooling fans 401-9 Comments: Remarks!Status j

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 L SYSO22 K4.03 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Automatic containment isolation Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The Unit is operating at 100% RTP

Train B components are in service

An Inadvertent SI is initiated by Maintenance performing testing Based on these conditions Lower Containment Ventilation Cooling will be supplied from (1)

Containment Ventilation System Supply Isolation valves ORN-3O1AC and ORN-302B will close upon (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. RVpumps

2. Phase A Isolation signal B. 1. RVpumps

2. Phase B Isolation signal C. 1. RN non essential header

2. Phase A Isolation signal D. 1. RN non essential header

2. Phase B Isolation signal Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 33 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 I2 General Discussion Lower Containment Ventilation (VL) cooling is supplied by the RV system which is normally supplied from the RN non-essential header on each unit.

On an SI signal, the Reactor Building Non-Essential header (which includes VU and VL cooling) is isolated from RN. If an RV pump was not running prior to the isolation, non-essential header pressure will decrease to less than 50 PSIG and the RV pump selected to AUTO will start to supply the non-essential header.

Any Safety Injection signal will provide a Phase A Containment Isolation signal

)n a Hi-Hi Containment Pressure (Sp) signal (>3.0 PSIG), Containment Ventilation Cooling isolates and the RV pump suction valves from the

[ow-level intake close but, the running RV pumps remain running.

Answer A Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part of the answer is correct.

rhe second part of the answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that a Phase A Containment Isolation signal closes RV supply isolations.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the RN and RV supplies to the Containment Ventilation Cooling system. Normally Containment Ventilation cooling is supplied by the Nuclear Service Water system (RN) Reactor Building non-essential header. However, RN non essential header will isolate upon receipt of SI signal.

The second part of the answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that a Phase A Containment Isolation signal closes RV supply isolations.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the RN and RV supplies to the Containment Ventilation Cooling system. Normally Containment Ventilation cooling is supplied by the Nuclear Service Water system (RN) Reactor Building non-essential header. However, RN non essential header will isolate upon receipt of SI signal.

The second part of the answer is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the applicant must know the effect of a Containment Isolation signal (Sp) on the alignment of the Containment Ventilation Cooling System Supply Isolation valves.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is Hi Cog since more than one mental step is required. The applicant is required to analyze current plant conditions to determine from what source Lower Containment Cooling is being supplied from. The applicant will have to determine that RN Non essential header isolates on the SI signal and RV pumps selected to auto will start on decreasing RN non essential header pressure of 50 psig.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-RV (Rev 20A) Section 3.1 & 3.2 Learning Objectives:

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 12 OP-MC-CNT-RV Objectives 8 & 13 SYSO22 K4.03 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Automatic containment isolation 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 35 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 SYSO25 K4.02 Ice Condenser System Knowledge of ice condenser system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following; (CFR; 41.7)

System control Which ONE (1) of the following condition(s) will automatically close 1NF-228A (NE Supply Containment Isolation Valve)?

A. Phase A Containment Isolation ONLY B. Phase B Containment Isolation ONLY C. Low-Low glycol expansion tank level ONLY D. Phase A Containment Isolation OR Low-Low glycol expansion tank level Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 36 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 L 13 General Discussion The NF supply containment isolation (INF-228A) is located outside containment and closes on:

I. A loss of air or power

2. A St signal.

3. A Low-Low expansion tank level.

1NF-228A is controlled from the control room.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because a Phase A is ONE of the signals that will close 1NF-228A.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because INF-228A is a Containment Isolation valve. The applicant could confuse the signals and conclude that the valve is automatically closed on a Phase B signal as opposed to Phase A signal.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because a low-low expansion tank level is ONE of the signals that will close INF-228A.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of an Ice Condenser (NF) system design feature which provides for system Lcontrol (i.e. automatic isolation ofNF system containment isolation valve).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2010 M1JS AUDIT Ql4 (Bank 2914)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-NF (Rev 33) Section 2.2 Learning Objective:

OP-MC-CNT-NF Objective 9 SYSO25 K4.02 Ice Condenser System Knowledge of ice condenser system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 l4 SYSO26 A4.O1 Containment Spray System (CSS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

CSS controls Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A LOCA has occurred inside Containment

The crew has implemented E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

All Containment Spray (NS) pump discharge valves are OPEN

Safety Injection has been RESET Based on the conditions above, to manually start a Containment Spray (NS) pump, the crew must verify that CPCS pressure is greater than a MINIMUM of (1) PSIG AND must depress the (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. 0.35

2. NS pump START pushbutton ONLY B. 1. 0.50

2. NS pump START pushbutton ONLY C. 1. 0.35

2. DG Sequencer RESET pushbutton AND NS pump START pushbutton D. 1. 0.50

2. DG Sequencer RESET pushbutton AND NS pump START pushbutton Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 39 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 l4 General Discussion With the post-mod NS system, there are no automatic starts for the NS pumps. The NS Pumps can be started with the pump start pushbutton if CPCS is greater than 0.35 psig, its discharge valves are open and the DIG sequencer is reset.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the DG Sequencer must be reset prior to manually starting and NS pump. This is a recenct mod to the plant.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because there is a Containment high pressure alert annunciator alarm at 0.5 PSIG which automatically starts any Containment VL fan that is not running and swaps all fans to high speed.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the DO Sequencer must be reset prior to manually starting and NS pump. This is a recenct mod to the plant.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

( The first part is plausible because there is a Containment high pressure alert annunciator alarm at 0.5 PSIG which automatically starts any Containment VL fan that is not running and swaps all fans to high speed.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have specific knowledge of the Containment Spray pump controls and the interlocks associated with those controls to be able to manually start a Containment Spray pump.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first analyze the plant conditions to determine what initial conditions exist and how they affect the operation of the Containment Spray System. The applicant must then recall from memory the requires which must be met to start a Containment Spray pump and associate those requirements back to the initial conditions.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2012 MTh.IS NRC Q17 MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-NS, Section 2.2 Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-EQB, Section 3.4 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ECC-NS Objective 5 SYSO26 A4.0l Containment Spray System (CSS)

Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7145.5 to 45.8)

CSS controls Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 40 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus After the 2012 MNS NRC Exam was administered, a mod was installed that changed the requirements to start an NS pump.

Post-mod, in addition to having a 0.35 PSIG CPCS signal and ONE pump discharge valve open. the NS pumps are locked out by the DG Sequencer. Since the NS pump are no longer considered a safety-related load, this lockout prevents starting the S pumps while the Sequencer is trying to load the Emergency Busses. This is done to prevent potentially overloading the DG.

Consequently. the associated train Safety Injection signal must be RESET and the associated DG Sequencer must be RESET to manually start an NS pump (in addition to the CPCS pressure and discharge valve requirement).

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 l5 SYSO39 A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS. including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) tsolation of the MRSS Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 100% RTP

1A SIG pressure is 925 PSIG and lowering slowly

NC system pressure is 2200 PSIG and lowering slowly Based on the conditions above:

A Main Steam Isolation will occur if the 1A S/G pressure decreases to less than a MINIMUM of (1) PSIG.

If a Main Steam Isolation occurs, in addition to closing the MSIVs, the (2) will also close.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 775

2. MSIV Bypasses ONLY B. 1. 875

2. MSIV Bypasses ONLY C. 1. 775

2. MSIV Bypass AND SM PORVs D. 1. 875

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 I5 General Discussion With NC system pressure greater than P-I 1(2000 PSIG) a Main Steam Isolation (MSI) will occur if SG pressure decreases to less than 775 PSIG.

A Main Steam Isolation Signal will close:

- MSIVs

- MSIV Bypasses

- SM PORVs Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because the SM PORVs are used for NC system cooldown when the Steam Dumps are unavailable. With a MSI, the Steam Dumps are unavailable until the MSIVs are reopened. If the applicant does not recall that neither the Steam Dumps or SM PORVs are available until the MSI is reset, the could conclude that the SM PORVs do not receive a MSI signal.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because this is the setpoint for the SG LO STEAM PRESSURE annunciator alarm (IAD-4 / B5).

Part 2 is plausible because the SM PORVs are used for NC system cooldown when the Steam Dumps are unavailable. With a MSI, the Steam Dumps are unavailable until the MSIVs are reopened. If the applicant does not recall that neither the Steam Dumps or SM PORVs are available until the MSI is reset, the could conclude that the SM PORVs do not receive a MSI signal.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because this is the setpoint for the SG LO STEAM PRESSURE annunciator alarm (IAD-4 / B5).

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor automatic isolation of the MRSS by demonstrating a knowledge of when a MSI signal occurs and what valves are isolated on a MS1 signal.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it involves analysis of a given situation, application of system knowledge and solving a problem of what would be required to affect a reset of the main steam isolation signal.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-STM-SM (Rev 28) Section 2.6 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-STM-SM Objective 10 SYSO39 A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Isolation of the MRSS Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 43 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 l6 SYSO59 2.1.23 Main Feedwater (MFW) System SYSO59 GENERIC Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /45.2 / 45.6)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The Main Generator is tied to the grid with both Generator breakers CLOSED

Turbine Inlet pressure is 550 PSIG

Both CF pumps are running Based on the conditions above, the entry conditions of AP-03 (LOAD REJECTION)

(1) be met if EITHER CF pump trips.

(2) be met if EITHER Busline de-energizes.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. WILL

2. WILL B. 1. WILL NOT

2. WILL C. 1. WILL

2. WILL NOT D. 1. WILL NOT

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 16 General Discussion Based on the conditions given (i.e. Turbine Inlet pressure greater than 500 PSIG (56%)), a load rejection will occur if:

Either Main CF Pump Trips EITHER Generator Breaker OPENs Loss of ONE Busline If Turbine Inlet pressure was less than 450 PSIG (50%) a load rejection will occur if:

Loss of BOTH Buslines BOTH Generator Breakers OPEN Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant concludes that turbine power is less than 50% since a runback will not occur even if BOTH CF pumps trip.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the requirements for loss of a Busline above 56% with a loss of Busline below 50% as this would require loss of BOTH Buslines to initiate a load rejection.

Answer 0 Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant concludes that turbine power is less than 50% since a runback will not occur even if BOTH CF pumps trip.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant concludes that turbine power is less than 50% since a runback will not occur unless a loss of BOTH Buslines occurs.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of procedure entry requirements for a condition where a Main Feedwater System malfunction has occurred.

Basis for Hi Cog For the conditions given the applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine the initial plant status. The applicant must then recall from memory the conditions that will result in a load rejection. The applicant must then compare the plant status to the requirements for a load rejection to determine if entry conditions for AP03 (Load Rejection) are met for two different situations. Because this requires more than one mental step, this is a higher cognitive level question.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-03 (Load Rejection)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-03 Objective 2 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 46 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 16 SYSO59 2.1.23 Main Feedwater (MFW) System SYSO59 GENERIC Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 l7 SYSO59 K3.02 Main Feedwater (MFW) System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

AFW system Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is in Mode 3

The crew is performing unit heatup and pressurization.

NC pressure is 1940 PSIG

CA auto start defeat DEFEATED lights are LIT T

The following sequence of events occur on Unit 1:

1. A CF isolation occurs due to SIG Hi-Hi level

2. The S/G Hi-Hi level clears

3. CF isolation is reset

4. Tavg increases and NC pressure increases to 1960 PSIG Based on the conditions above, the CA pumps will receive an automatic start signal when Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. the SG Hi-Hi level clears ONLY B. NC pressure increases above 1955 PSIG ONLY C. CF isolation is reset AND the SG Hi-Hi level clears D. NC pressure increases above 1955 PSIG AND CF isolation is reset Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 48 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 General Discussion The S/G HI HI level signal (P 14) will trip both CF Pumps. Both CF Pumps Tripped would normally start the MD CA pumps. However, the MD CA Pump auto start has been defeated as evidenced by the Defeated lights being lit. When NC pressure increases above P-il (1955 psig), the auto start defeat will automatically unblock and the MD CA Pumps will auto start.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

P-14 start signal is defeated by CA auto start defeat The clearing of the P14 signal would allow for CF pump start. The applicant could confuse this with a CA permissive.

Onswer B Discussion ORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Either one of these action would allow for CF pump operation, applicant may conthse CF pump permissives with CA.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible because CF isolation would allow for CF pump operations.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant must know how the Feedwater Isolation (i.e. loss of the MFW) will affect the operation of the AFW system (i.e. AFW auto start).

Basis for Hi Cog This question is a higher cognitive level question since more than one mental step is involved. The applicant must analyze changing plant conditions and determine due to P-l4 signal that both CF pumps are tripped. Therefore, when NC pressure is increased to greater than 1955 psig and CA Auto Start Defeat automatically clears a start signal is present for the MDCA pumps.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Retake Q18 (Bank 2218)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CA Section 2.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-CA Objectives 4 & 6 SYSO59 K3.02 Main Feedwater (MFW) System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 18 18 SYSO61 K5.O1 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the AFW: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

A loss of offsite power (LOOP) results in a reactor trip

The TDCA pump has tripped on overspeed and cannot be reset

The IA CA pump is tagged out for pump replacement

The I B CA pump failed to start due to a breaker failure

FR-H.1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK) has been implemented and the crew is performing a feed and bleed Current conditions are:

The TDCA pump has been repaired

CA flow has been restored using the TDCA pump

Containment pressure = 2.1 PSIG o CETs = 584°F and DECREASING slowly

NC pressure = 1350 PSIG and STABLE In accordance with FR-HI, which ONE (I) of the following indicates the MINIMUM heat sink requirements that must be met to allow termination of NC system feed and bleed?

A. NR level in at least ONE S/G>11%

B. NR level in at least ONE S/G > 32%

C. WR level in at least THREE S/Gs > 24%

D. WR level in at least THREE S/Gs > 36%

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 18 l8 General Discussion Per FR-H.!, NC system feed and bleed must continue until NR level in at least one SIG is greater than 11%.

Answer A Discussion

[33RECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 32% in one SIG is the minimum heat sink requirement if Containment pressure was greater than 3 PSIG.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because three S/Gs < 24% is the requirement for initiating feed and bleed. It is therefore plausible for the applicant to conclude that if three S/Gs were> 24% that the entry conditions for intiating feed and bleed were no longer met and that it could be secured.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because three S/Gs < 36% is the requirement for initiating feed and bleed under adverse Containment conditions. It is therefore plausible for the applicant to conclude that if three S/Gs were > 36% that the entry conditions for intiating feed and bleed were no longer met and that it could be secured.

Basis for meeting the KA During feed and bleed, RCS heat transfer is via SI flow and the open PZR PORVs. Once CA flow is re-established and an adequate heat sink is tstored (by establishing minimum SIG level), feed and bleed may be secured. By demonstrating a knowledge of the amount of AFW flow equired to re-establish an adequate heat sink for securing feed and bleed, the applicant demonstrates a knowledge of the operational implications f the relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer.

This is also reinforced by FR-H.! in that after the procedure verifies minimum S/G level, the next step performs an addition check for adequate neat sink by veriiying that NC system temperature is GOING DOWN. If NC system temperature is not going down, the operator is returned to ni previous step to perform additional actions to establish a secondary heat sink (via CA flow, CF flow, CM flow, or RY flow).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-H.! (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

Learning Objectives:

NONE SYSO61 K5.O1 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the AFW: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus This question was sent for pre-401-9 review.

Based on comments from pre-401-9 review did not believe the Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 52 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 l9 SYSO6 1 K6.02 Auxiliary! Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps Given the following on Unit 1:

A reactor trip from 100% RTP has occurred

The TD CA pump tripped on overspeed upon starting

Bus IETA locked out due to a ground fault on the bus Based on the conditions above, which ONE (I) of the following describes which S/Gs are currently being fed and the associated flow rates?

A. 1A and I B S/Gs at 450 GPM total flow B. 1C and 1 D S/Gs at 450 GPM total flow C. IA and I B S/Gs at 450 GPM to each S/G D. 1C and 1 D S/Gs at 450 GPM to each SIG Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 54 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 General Discussion The Turbine Driven CA pump is tripped. If it were running it would feed all 4 S/Gs. IA CA Pump normally feeds S/Gs IA and lB. lB CA Pump normally feeds S/Gs IC and ID. With the loss of power to Emergency Bus 1ETA, the 1A CA Pump will not be running. Therefore, only 18 CA Pump will be running feeding 1C and 1D S/Os.

Bach motor driven CA Pump is capable of supplying two S/Os at a design total flow rate of 450 GPM.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall which S/Os are fed by each MDAFW pump. The flowrate is correct.

answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall which S/Os are fed by each MDAFW pump. Also, the flowrate number is correct but it is total flow and not flowrate to each S/G.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the S/Os supplied are correct and the flowrate numerical value is correct but it is total flowrate and not flowrate to each S/G.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must know the effect of the loss of both the TD CA pump and the lB CA Pump on both the CA flow rate AND which SOs are being fed.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a comprehension level question because the applicant must associate multiple pieces of information, some given and some recalled from memory. First, the candidate must analyze the conditions given to determine that with Emergency Bus 1 ETA locked out, the IA MDAFW pump will be unavailable. The candidate must then recall which S/Gs are fed from each MDAFW pump. The applicant must also recall that the rated flow for the MDAFW pumps.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2012 MNS NRC Q20 MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CA Section 2.1 & 2.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-CA Objectives 4, 7, & 8 SYSO6I K6.02 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 201 SYSO62 2.4.47 AC Electrical Distribution System SYSO62 GENERIC Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. (CFR: 41.10

/43.5/45.12)

Given the following plant conditions:

. An electrical grid disturbance has resulted in degrading grid frequency

. AP-05 (GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELCTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES) has been implemented

. The crew is monitoring frequency on the OAC and notes the following trend:

Frequency (Hz) vs. Time 60 59 58 57 56 55 14:00 14:10 14:20 14:30 14:40 14:50 15:00 15:10 15:20 15:30 15:40 15:50 16:00 16:10 16:20 Frequency (Hz) vs. Time Assuming that both units remain tied to the grid AND that the current frequency trend continues, what is the EARLIEST time that the units will reach the NC Pump Bus Underirequency trip setpoint?

A. 14:50 B. 15:00 C. 15:30 D. 15:40 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 57 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 2O General Discussion A reactor trip and trip of all NC pumps will occur if 2/4 NC pump bus frequencies decrease to 56.4 FIz (per TS Table 3.3.1).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This time corresponds to a frequency of 58.4 Hz. It is plausible for the applicant to confuse 58.4 Hz with 56.4 Hz and conclude that this is the correct answer.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This time corresponds to a frequency of 58 Hz. This is slightly below the frequency that AP-06 directs separation from the grid. It is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the reactor should be tripped at a frequency below where separation from the grid is required and conclude that 58 Hz was the required trip frequency.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer corresponds to a frequency of 56.8 Hz. This is very close to the actual trip setpoint frequency. The applicant could therefore conclude that this is the required trip frequency.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to diagnose a trend associated with the AC distribution system using control room reference material (i.e. the OAC).

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First, it requires the applicant to recall from memory the setpoint for the NC Pump Bus Underfrequency trip.

Then the applicant must analyze the trend of a degrading bus frequency to determine when the trip setpoint is reached.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References udentReferences Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IPE Section 3.1.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-IPE Objective 10 SYSO62 2.4.47 AC Electrical Distribution System SYSO62 GENERIC Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. (CFR: 41.10

/43.5/45.12) ióZ9 Comments: Remarks!Status This question was submitted for pre-40I-9 review.

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FOR REVIEW ONLY DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 20 Attempted to revise question based on Chief Examiners comments. However, based on unrelated validator comments and a conflict between the lesson plan and Tech Specs, the trend

[graph in the stem of the question had to be revised. Question revised on 9/30/20 13 HCF.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 21 SYSO62 A2.06 AC Electrical Distribution System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /45.13)

Keeping the safeguards buses electrically separate Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is operating at 100% RTP

The IA DIG has just been declared inoperable due to an oil leak on the Woodward governor Which ONE (I) of the following describes jJ checks which must be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to ensure compliance with TS 3.8.1 (AC SOURCES OPERATING)?

A. Flowpaths through which I ETA AND 1 ETB are being supplied by offsite power.

B. Flowpath through which 1 ETA is being supplied by offsite power AND determine that I ETA is being supplied independently from 1 ETB.

C. Flowpath through which 1 ETA Qj, 1 ETB is being supplied by offsite power AND determine that I ETA and 1 ETB are being supplied independently.

D. Flowpaths through which I ETA AND 1 ETB are being supplied by offsite power AND determine that I ETA and 1 ETB are being supplied independently.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 2l General Discussion Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.1. requires verification of the flowpath through which ETA and ETB are being supplied by offsite power AND that the buses are being supplied independently.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant believes that only the flowpaths to the Safety Buses needs to be checked.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant believes that only the flowpath to the affected Safety Bus needs to be checked and train separation also needs to be ensured.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the applicant does not understand that the flowpath to both Safety Buses needs to be checked and train separation also needs to be ensured.

Answer 0 Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must use procedures ( T.S. 3.8.1) to correct, control or mitigate the malfunction of the IA DIG Woodward governor. By performing surveillance requirement (Offsite Verification PT) the applicant ensures safeguards buses are electrically separate.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2012 MNS Audit Exam Q2l (Bank 3018)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

TS 3.8.1. AC Sources Operating PT/I/A14350/025, Essential Auxiliary Power System Power Source Verification Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EL-EP Objective 39 SYSO62 A2.06 AC Electrical Distribution System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5/43.5 /45.3 / 45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 22 SYSO63 Ki .03 DC Electrical Distribution System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Battery charger and battery Given the following conditions:

Initially Vital Battery EVCA voltage is I25VDC

Battery Charger EVCA trips and cannot be restarted

After 30 minutes of supplying the same loads, Battery EVCA voltage is now 12 OV DC Based on the conditions above, battery discharge rate is (1) than it was initially AND battery current is (2) than ft was initially.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. lower

2. lower B. 1. lower

2. higher C. 1. higher

2. higher D. 1. higher

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 22 General Discussion As battery terminal voltage decreases, assuming the load on the battery remains the same, the discharge rate increases. This is shown by the formula P=EI. Since the power (P) which is dictated by the load remains constant, as the terminal voltage (E) decreases, the current (I) must increase to produce the same amount of power. As the current increases, the discharge rate increases.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because the applicant could conclude that since the batterys capacity is diminished the discharge rate would diminish as well.

Part 2 is plausible because the applicant could conclude that since the batterys capacity is diminished that battery current would diminish as well.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because the applicant could conclude that since the batterys capacity is diminished the discharge rate would diminish as well.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because the applicant could conclude that since the batterys capacity is diminished that battery current would diminish as well.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between the DC Electrical Distribution system and the battery charger and battery.

The cause is the loss of the battery charger. The effect is how battery discharge rate and current are effected by the loss of the battery charger.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant would have to mentally or on paper solve the_power equation for the battery to determine the effect on both current and battery discharge rate.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 AUDIT Q22 (Bank 4460)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-EPK Section 3.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-EPK Objective 22 SYSO63 K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 23 23 SYSO64 A4.03 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDIG) System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Synchroscope Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Manual Control Room start of the IA Diesel Generator is being performed per OP/I /A163501002 (1A D/G STARTUP)

The following indications are observed:

Line volts 4160 VAC

Diesel Generator volts 421 0 VAC -

Synchroscope is moving rapidly in the counter clockwise direction In accordance with OPII/A6350/002, which ONE (1) of the following must be done before closing the 1 ETA Emergency Breaker?

A. Raise the Diesel Generator governor control output B. Lower the Diesel Generator governor control output C. Raise the Diesel Generator voltage adjust output D. Lower the Diesel Generator voltage adjust output Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 65 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 23 General Discussion OP/1A16350/002 step 3.33 reads Using IA DIG Gov Control, adjust D/G speed to allow synchroscope to move slowly in the Fast direction.

Based on the conditions in the stem, the applicant must recognize that raising the D/G Governor Control output is required to reverse the direction of the synchroscope to Slowly in the clockwise (fast) direction.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the function of the governor and/or voltage controls in both isochronous and speed droop modes of operation.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the function of the governor and/or voltage controls in both isochronous and speed droop modes of operation.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the function of the governor and/or voltage controls in both isochronous and speed droop modes of operation.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched due to the applicant having to monitor the current status of the synchroscope and operate the D/G Governor Control to change the synchroscope speed and direction.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine if the generator is in isochronous or speed droop mode.

The applicant must then determine what action must be taken to establish the conditions where the synchroscope will be turning slowly in the fast direction.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 MNS NRC (Bank 3662)

Development References Student References Provided 1

References:

OP/1/A16350/002 Diesel Generator Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DG Section 2.5 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-DG-DG Objective 15 SYSO64 A4.03 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 24 SYSO73 A2.02 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Detector failure Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is operating at 1 00% RTP

Train A equipment is in operation

The power supply to 2EMF46A (TRAIN A COMPONENT COOLING) has failed

1) What is the impact of the power supply failure?

2) What procedure will be used to address the situation?

A. 1. Alarm on Annunciator Panel 2RAD-1 ONLY

2. Annunciator Response for 2RAD-1IA-4 2EMF 46A Train A KC Hi Rad B. 1. Alarm on Annunciator Panel 2RAD-1 ONLY

2. OP/2/A/6400/005 (COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM)

C. 1. Alarm on Annunciator Panel 2RAD-1 AND 2KC-122 (COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK VENT) will auto close

2. Annunciator Response for 2RAD-1/A-4 2EMF 46A Train A KC Hi Rad D. 1. Alarm on Annunciator Panel 2RAD-1 AND 2KC-122 (COMPONENT COOLING WATER SURGE TANK VENT) will auto close

2. OP/2/A/6400/005 (COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 24 General Discussion RP-86A modules are fail-safe and actuate Trip 1 and Trip 2 during a loss of power. The High Rad alarm will sound and lock in until reset (once power comes back). If power is lost to 1(2)EMF-46A, Trip 2 will occur. Should a Trip 2 high radiation alarm be received on either 1(2)EMF-46A or 1(2)EMF-46B, the component cooling water surge tank vent l(2)KC122 is automatically closed to prevent release of volatile fission products. The Annunciator Response is the appropriate procedure to address due to the alarm condition. AP21 does not include High Radiation as an entry condition. The ARP has the operator check for increasing Surge Tank level and if so, directs the Operator to AP-lO.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Trip 2 will cause the KC Surge Tank Vent to close and an annunciator alarm on panel 2RAD-1.

Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Trip 2 will cause the KC Surge Tank Vent to close and an annunciator alarm on panel 2RAD-l.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes a train swap is necessary due to Hi rad alarms when operating A train.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes a train swap is necessary due to Hi rad alarms when operating A train.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because impact is evaluated by asking what will occur, and action is addressed by determination of response for the selected impact.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2011 MNS AUDIT Exam Q24 MODIFIED (Bank 3242)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.4 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 3 & 9 SYSO73 A2.02 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 25j SYSO76 A3.02 Service Water System (SWS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Emergency heat loads Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A loss of power has occurred on 2ETA and 2ETB

The 2A and 2B DGs started and all loads sequenced on Based on the conditions above, which ONE (1) of the following loads is currently being supplied by the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system?

A. Safety Injection Pump motor cooler B. Containment Spray heat exchanger C. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump motor cooler D. Residual Heat Removal Pump motor cooler Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 71 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 25 General Discussion The Safety Injection Pump motor cooler is supplied on a Safety Injection signal (Ss) but not on a Blackout (BO) signal.

The Containment Spray heat exchanger is supplied by RN on a Containment Spray Signal (Sp) but not on an Ss or BO.

The Residual Heat Removal pump motor cooler is supplied on a Safety Injection but not on a BO or Sp.

The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump motor cooler is supplied on both a Safety Injection and a Blackout.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the SI Pump motor coolers are emergency loads for the RN system that are supplied by the RN Essential header under different accident conditions.

Answer B Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

fhis answer is plausible because the Containment Spray heat exchanger is an emergency load for the RN system that is supplied by the RN Essential header under different accident conditions.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE: This answer is plausible because the RHR Pump motor coolers are emergency loads for the RN system that are supplied by the RN Essential header under different accident conditions.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the applicant must know what loads are supplied by the RN system under different accident conditions. With that knowledge, the applicant can monitor various indications in the control room to determine if the RN system has properly aligned to supply those components required for a specific accident condition.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze plant conditions to determine the RN system alignment and then, recall from memory which loads are being supplied, based on that alignment.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS NRC Q26 (Bank 4376)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN Section Learning Objectives: OP-MC-PSS-RN Objective 10 SYSO76 A3.02 Service Water System (SWS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: (CFR: 41.7/45.5)

Emergency heat loads 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 72 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 26 SYSO76 K2.04 Service Water System (SWS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Reactor building closed cooling water Which ONE (1) of the following is the normal power supply to the IA Nuclear Service Water (RN) pump?

A. 1TA B. ITO C. 1ETA D. 1EMXA Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 74 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 26 General Discussion Power supplies to the Nuclear Service Water pumps are:

RNPumpA- 1(2)ETA RN Pump B 1(2)ETB Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because various large motors throughout the unit are powered from 1TA. Also, 1TA is the normal power supply for 1ETA which supplies the IA RN pump.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because various large motors throughout the unit are powered from 1TC. Also, ITC is capable of supplying 1ETA via SATA which supplies the 1A RN pump.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1EMXA is a Train A Essential Power source.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must know the power supply to the lB RN pump which supplies the Reactor Building closed cooling

, water system.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN Section 2.2 Learning Objective:

OP-MC-PSS-RN Objective 3 SYSO76 K2.04 Service Water System (SWS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Reactor building closed cooling water 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 75 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 L 27 SYSO78 K4.O1 Instrument Air System (lAS)

Knowledge of lAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Manual/automatic transfers of control The Diesel Generator Starting Air system (VG) can be used to supply the Auxiliary Building Instrument Air system (VI) provided:

Diesel Generator speed is greater than a MINIMUM of (1)

AND a (2) signal is present.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 97%

2. Blackout ONLY B. 1. 95%

2. Blackout ONLY C. 1. 97%

2. Blackout OR Safety Injection D. 1. 95%

2. Blackout OR Safety Injection Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 76 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 27 General Discussion The solenoids which can be aligned to the Auxiliary Building VI Header from VG have interlocks which only allow the solenoids to open if:

1) DO speed is greater than 95%

2) A Blackout signal is present with NO SI signal Answer A Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because this is the DO speed at which the Accelerated Sequence is enabled.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because this is the DO speed at which the Accelerated Sequence is enabled.

The second part is plausible because VI is required to supply components under both Blackout and Safety Injection conditions.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because VI is required to supply components under both Blackout and Safety Injection conditions.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is presented with a situation where control of VI header pressure has been transferred from its normal supply source (Lead Compressor) to a backup source (Compressor selected for Auto Hot Start).

Basis for Hi Cog This is an analysis level question because the applicant is given set of plant conditions and must recall a setpoint from memory to determine if a set of automatic actions should have occurred.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DGA (Rev 35B) Section 2.2 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-DG-DGA Objective 7 SYSO78 K4.O1 Instrument Air System (lAS)

Knowledge of lAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Manual/automatic transfers of control 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Question submitted for pre-401-9 review.

Based on comments from pre-40 1-9 review, did not believe that Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 77 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 27 original question was salvageable. Replaced with new question.

HCF 09/30/13 Question changed out to try and better match KA. HCF 09/30/13 Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 78 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 28 SYS 103 A2 04 - Containment System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 /43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Unit 2 is in Mode 6 loading fuel

2EMF-39(L) (CONTAINMENT GAS-LO RANGE) Trip 2 alarm

2EMF-3 (CONTAINMENT REFUELING BRIDGE) Trip 2 alarm Procedure Legend:

AP-25 (SPENT FUEL DAMAGE)

AP-40 (LOSS OF REFUELING CANAL LEVEL)

The Containment Evacuation alarm (1) be activated.

Based on the above conditions, the crew will be required to implement (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. WILL

2. AP-25 B. 1. WILL NOT

2. AP-25 C. 1. WILL

2. AP-40 D. 1. WILL NOT

2. AP-40 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 79 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 28 General Discussion Entry conditions for AP-25 are:

I(2)EMF-36 Hi Rad I(2)EMF 38,39 or 40 Hi Rad 1(2)EMF-42 Hi Rad 1 EMF- 1 6/2EMF-3 1 EMF- I 7/2EMF-4 Entry conditions for AP-40 are:

SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL LO computer alarm Level in refueling cavity going down INCORE INST ROOM SUMP HI LEVEL alarm IEMF-16 / 2EMF-3 CONTAINMENT REFUELING BRDG alarm 1EMF-17/ 2EMF-4 SPENT FUEL BUILDING BRDG alarm Containment evacuation alarm is activated by a Trip 2 on IEMF-l6/2EMF-3 (CONTAINMENT REFUELING BRDG) and/or Trip 2 on 1(2)

EMF-39L (Containment Gas) unless both SR high flux trips are blocked.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the applicant does not recall which radiation monitors activate the Containment Evacuation alarm or concludes that the SR Hi Flux Trips are blocked which would block the rad monitor actuations of the Containment Evacuation alarm.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible since 2EMF-3 (Containment Refueling Bridge) Trip 2 alarm is also an entry condition for AP-40. Applicant must use all information in stem to determine AP-25 is appropriate response.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the applicant does not recall which radiation monitors activate the Containment Evacuation alarm or concludes that the SR Hi Flux Trips are blocked which would block the rad monitor actuations of the Containment Evacuation alarm.

Second part is plausible since 2EMF-3 (Containment Refueling Bridge) Trip 2 alarm is also an entry condition for AP-40. Applicant must use all information in stem to determine AP-25 is appropriate response.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it required the applicant to predict the impact of the indications given (i.e. whether or not the Containment Evacuation alarm will sound) AND the applicant has to determine which procedure will be entered based on the conditions given (i.e. use procedures to correct control or mitigate).

Basis for Hi Cog First the applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine whether the Containment Evacuation alarm will be activated.

Then, the applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine which procedure entry conditions are met.

Since this process requires more than one mental step, it is a higher cognitive level question.

Basis for SRO only Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 80 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2010 MNS AUDIT Exam Q58 MODIFtED (Bank 2958)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.1.5 AP-25 (Spent Fuel Damage)

AP-40 (Loss of Refueling Cavity Level)

Learning Objectives:

AP25001 OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 3 SYS 103 A2 04 Containment System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 81 of 291

Q28

References:

From Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.1.5 (Containment Airborne Monitor):

DUKE ENERGY MCGUIRE OPERA TIONS TRAINING Objective #4 Three sample points, selected from the control console, provide coverage of the containment Sample points are located in:

Upper Containment

Lower Containment

[ncore Instrumentation Room The three sample points are monitored by a single Particulate-Iodine-Gas detector assembly. Selection of the point to be sampled is made using the toggle switches on the sample flow select module on the control cabinet (referto Drawing 71) To prevent damage to the sample pump, at least one flow path must be opened. The sample air is returned to the containment.

According to the basis of TS. 34i5 (RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation), a sample from the lower containment region is required for NC leakage detection. The reason is that the NC system is physically located within the lower containment region The jg,çgjarea and lower containment samples are both obtained from the lower containment region. Applicable RP and Operations procedures reflect this requirement.

For example, the Semi-Daily PT has a note to alert the operators that EMF-38 is inoperable if the sample pump is selected to Upper Containment only for greater than 15 minutes Objective I A Trip 2 high radiation alarm on EkF-3(L). EF-4O(Li. or ErF_3g(L channels will stop the CFAES pumps and tile Incore Sump pimp. Also trip 2 .ill initiate a Containment Ventilation isolation signal (S through the Solid State Protection System This 5 signal will

SecureVC

Secure VP A high alarm on the EWF-39(L) (gaseous) channel will also sound the Containment Evacuation Alarm unless both source range high flux trips are blocked The purpose of the aLito actions are to

terminate a release originating in containment which is discharging to tile Unit Vent if tile release limits are exceeded

Stop the containment simp PUI11P5 to prevent pumping potentially highly contaminated water into the Aux BLuicling (i e. FDT or VIEFT1

Sound tile containment evacuation alarm to inform personnel to leave tile containment dLIe to the potential for high airborne concentration existing iti containment.

he Gas channel has a high and by. range. The cv range uses a plastic detector while the high range uses a GM detector The iodine portion uses a OP-MCWEEMF FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY REV. 33A Page 13 ofB3

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 29 SYSOO1 A4.1 I - Control Rod Drive System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8)

Determination of SDM Regarding Control Rod Insertion Limits:

The reason from maintaining Control Rods above a minimum insertion limit is to ensure (1)

If the annunciator IAD-2 I B8 (CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT) is received as the result of a RUNBACK, the crew will (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

Procedure legend:

AP-38 (EMERGENCY BORATION AND RESPONSE TO INADVERTENT DILUTION)

A. 1. adequate Shutdown Margin is maintained

2. ensure the alarm clears as Xenon builds in B. 1. adequate Shutdown Margin is maintained

2. initiate Emergency Boration in accordance with AP-38 C. 1. axial flux distribution limits are maintained

2. ensure the alarm clears as Xenon builds in D. 1. axial flux distribution limits are maintained

2. initiate Emergency Boration in accordance with AP-38 Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 82 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 29 General Discussion In accordance with AP-03 (Load Rejection), if the Control Rod Lo Limit alarm (IAD-2 / A9) is received, the crew is directed to ensure the CONTROL ROD LO LIMIT alarm clears as Xenon builds in.

In accordance with the ARP for IAD-2 / A9, if the alarm is NOT due to a runback. the crew viIl be directed to AP-38 where they will be directed to emergency borate.

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IRE. the reason for maintaining control rods above a minimum height is to ensure that adequate shutdown margin is maintained.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible because lAW with the ARP for I AD-2 / A9, if the alarm is NOT due to a runback, the crew will be directed to AP-38 where they will be directed to emergency borate.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because boron concentration and rod heights are adjusted based on flux mapping and directions from Reactor Engineering over core life to maintain axial peaking factors within design limits.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because boron concentration and rod heights are adjusted based on flux mapping and directions from Reactor Engineering over core life to maintain axial peaking factors within design limits.

Second part is correct.Second part is plausible because lAW with the ARP for IAD-2 / A9, if the alarm is NOT due to a runback, the crew will be directed to AP-38 where they will be directed to emergency borate.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor SDM by demonstrating a knowledge of the Technical Specifications associated with SDM.

Basis for Hi Cog L

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IRE Section 4.1.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-IRE Objective 14 Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 83 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 29 SYSOOI A4.1 I Control Rod Drive System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 4 1.7/45.5 to 45.8)

Determination of SDM 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 84 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 3O SYSO1 1 K2.O1 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Charging pumps The WCC SRO has requested a Safety Tag be hung on the breaker for the Unit 2 Reciprocating Charging Pump (PD).

Which ONE (1) of the following electrical panels will the operator need to go to in order to hang this Tag?

A. LC2ELXD B. MCC2MXJ C. MCC2MXK D. MCC2EMXB Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 85 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 General Discussion According to PS-NV-DCS, the Reciprocating Charging Pumps are powered from 1MXK and 2MXK respectively. According to EL-EP, these electrical buses are 600 Volt Unit Motor Control Centers.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly conclude that an Essential Load Center (such as 2ELXD) provides power directly to the PD pump.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly conclude that MCC 2MXJ provides power directly to the PD. MCC BMXA can provide power to MCC 2MXK and 2MXJ.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly conclude that an Essential Motor Control Center (such as 2EMXB) provides power directly to the PD pump.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate knowledge (i.e. power supplies of all three Charging Pumps) of the bus power supplies to the Charging pumps (ETA/ETB/MXK).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2009 MNS Audit Q31 MODIFIED (BANK 3147)

Development References Student References Provided R.eferences:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS Section 2.25 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS Objective 12 SYSO1 I K2.01 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Charging pumps 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 86 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 SYSO17 K4.03 In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System r

Knowledge of ITM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Range of temperature indication Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Large Break LOCA has occurred

5 HI TIC AVG indicates 715°F on the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM) 5 HI T/C AVG indication on the (ICCM) (1) be displayed in reverse video.

The range of indication for 5 HI T/C AVG is (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. WILL

2. 0°Fto2300°F B. 1. WILL NOT

2. 0°Fto2300°F C. 1. WILL

2. 32°Fto2300°F D. 1. WILL NOT

2. 32°F to 2300° F Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 87 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 Ic 3

General Discussion 5 HI TIC AVG is displayed on the Core Cooling display section of the Vessel Level summary page of ICCM. The range for 5 HI T/C AVG is 32 degreesFto 2300 degrees F. If the average temperature exceeds 700 degrees F, the ICCM display will be shown in reverse video.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE First part is correct.

Second part is plausible since zero is the lower end of the indicating range for most instruments on the control boards.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE First part is plausible if applicant incorrectly concludes reverse video begins at a temperature higher than 700 degrees F. Such as 1200 degrees F which is used as a major decision point in FR-S 1 and FR-Cl.

Second part is plausible since zero is the lower end of the indicating range for most instruments on the control boards.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

AnswerD Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE First part is plausible if applicant incorrectly concludes reverse video begins at a temperature higher than 700 degrees F. Such as 1200 degrees F which is used as a major decision point in FR-S 1 and FR-Cl.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA

/ The K/A is matched due to requiring the applicant to have knowledge of 5 HI T/C AVG range of indication.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-ICM Section 2.4.2 Learning Objectives:

DP-MC-IC-ICM Objective 11 SYSO17 K4.03 In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System Knowledge of ITM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Range of temperature indication 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 88 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 32 E 32 SYSO34 K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Fuel Handling System (CFR: 41.7 /45.7)

Radiation monitoring systems Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

VF in Filter Mode

1EMF-42 (FUEL BLDG VENT HI RAD) is in service

Loaded Dry Cask movement is in progress in Unit I SFP

Control Room receives a I RAD 3 Cabinet Trouble Alarm due to a loss of power to 1EMF-17 (SPENT FUEL BLDG REFUEL BRDG)

Based on the conditions above, which one of the following states the required Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) action (if any)?

A. Dry Cask movement may continue since IEMF-42 is in service.

B. Suspend all fuel movement operations in the fuel handling area being monitored WITHIN 1 HOUR.

C. Suspend all fuel movement operations in the fuel handling area being monitored IMMEDIATELY.

D. Dry Cask movement may continue since this is not movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 89 of 291

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32 General Discussion Per SLC 16.7.6 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations), 1EMF-17 (Spent Fuel Handling Area Radiation Monitor) is required with fuel in the fuel storage areas or fuel building. If one or more required channels for Spent Fuel Handling Area, Reactor Building Fuel Handling Area or Tew Fuel Vault Fuel Handlihg Area Radiation Monitors non-functional. Then, Suspend all fuel movement operations in the fuel handling area being monitored IMMEDIATELY.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the applicant concludes that movement may continue since the Spent Fuel Building effluent is being monitored by IEMF-42 (Spent Fuel Building Ventilation Monitor).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the applicant concludes that immediate action is not necessary. Various other shutdown T.Ss and SLCs have actions that are required within one hour.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the applicant confuses T.S requirements for movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant must recall the T.S. required actions to immediately suspend fuel movement operations due to the loss of IEMF-l7.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2005 MNS NRC Q50 MODIFIED (Bank 3673)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

SLC 16.7.6 (Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-FH-FC Oblective 8 SYSO34 K6.02 Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Fuel Handling System: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Radiation monitoring systems 401-9 Comments: I RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 90 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 33 SYSO41 A1.O1 Steam Dump System (SDS)/Turbine Bypass Control Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 /45.5)

T-ave., verification above low/low setpoint Concerning the Steam Dump Control System:

The P-12 LO-LO Tavg setpoint is (1)

In the Load Rejection Mode, the setpoint at which the Bank 1 Steam Dump valves receive a trip open signal is at a (Tavg Tref) difference of

- (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A 1 551°F 2 81°F B 1 553°F 2 81°F C 1 551°F 2 144°F D 1 553°F

2. 14.4°F Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 91 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 33j General Discussion P-12 setpoint is 553°F with logic of(2/4 Lo Lo Tavg 553°F).

The Load rejection Mode HIGHMONS are used to provide a separate dump valve trip open signal when the signal reaches the value where the bank should be fully open. The setpoint for Bank one is 8.1°F (Tavg Tref).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant confuses Lo-Lo Tavg setpoint with minimum temperature for criticality of 551°F.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant confuses Lo-Lo Tavg setpoint with minimum temperature for criticality of 551°F.

Second part is plausible if applicant confuses Load Rejection Mode with Plant Trip Mode setpoint for bank one valves, which is 14.4°F.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if applicant confuses Load Rejection Mode with Plant Trip Mode setpoint for bank one valves, which is 14.4°F.

,Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the P-12 interlock setpoint to be able to predict / verify that temperature is F above/below the low low Tavg setpoint.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source F

RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-STM-IDE-DCS Sections 2.5.7, 2.3, and 2.4 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-STM-IDE-DCS Objective 5 & 6 SYSO41 Al.Ol Steam Dump System (SDS)/Turbine Bypass Control Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SDS controls including: (CFR: 41.5/45.5)

T-ave., verification above low/low setpoint 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 92 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 93 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 34 SYSO45 K5.23 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Relationship between rod control and RCS boron concentration during T/G load increases Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A turbine load increase is in progress following a Refueling Outage

Main Generator electrical load is currently 660 MWe The withdrawal of control rods (1) restricted by fuel maneuvering limits.

Regarding NCS boron concentration, dilution (2) required during the power escalation.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. IS NOT

2. IS B. 1. IS NOT

2. IS NOT C. 1.IS

2. IS D. 1.lS

2. IS NOT Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 94 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 General Discussion With conditions given, the plant is above the conditioned power level therefore above 40% RTP, rod withdrawal is restricted to less than 3 steps per hour per the rod maneuvering limit guidance in the U-I Data book. This restriction on Rod movements would result in additional dilutions required to compensate for the negative reactivity associated with power defect during the power escalation.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant does not recall the effect of unconditioned fuel on rod movement. The applicant may conclude based on plant conditions that there is no restriction on control rod movement under the conditions given.

Part 2 of the question is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant does not recall the effect of unconditioned fuel on rod movement. The applicant may conclude based on plant conditions that there is no restriction on control rod movement under the conditions given.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the effect of Xenon in the scenario described in the stem. On a power escalation after a runback, Xenon would burning out and adding positive reactivity.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct and therefore plausible.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses the effect of Xenon in the scenario described in the stem. On a power escalation after a runback, Xenon would burning out and adding positive reactivity.

Basis for meeting the KA This K/A is matched because the question is relating the effect of a T/G load increase during an initial power escalation with unconditioned fuel.

The applicant must evaluate how this would affect the relationship between Rod control and RCS boron concentration due to the limitations imposed on rod movement.

Basis for I-li Cog This is a hi cog question because it involves a level of analysis of given situation, apply system knowledge and solve a problem of what both would be the effect and how the conditions given in the stem would affect operation. It also requires more than one mental step to arrive at the correct answer and is therefore a higher cognitive level question.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q37 (Bank 2737)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Data Book Sect. 1.3 Enc. 4.3 Lesson Plan OP-MC-CTH-CP Sections 3.3. and 3.5 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CTH-CP Objective 29 SYSO45 K5.23 Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Relationship between rod control and RCS boron concentration during T/G load increases Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 95 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 35 SYSO55 2.4.11 Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)

SYSO55 GENERIC Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is at 40% RTP

Exhaust Hood temperature is 160°F

Condenser vacuum is 26 inches HG and DEGRADING slowly

(1ZJP5000) CSAE steam pressure is reading 100 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following actions is directed by AP-23 (LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM) to mitigate this event?

A. Reduce turbine load B. Start additional RC pumps C. Open the Exhaust Hood Spray valves D. Dispatch operator to increase CSAE steam pressure Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 97 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 35 General Discussion For the conditions given, there is no indication that a reduction of RC flow has occurred. So, reducing turbine load or starting additional RC pumps will not correct the problem.

Exhaust Hood temperature is higher than normal but does not warrant opening exhaust hood spray.

The CSAE steam pressure is low and increasing CSAE steam pressure will be most effective in mitigating the degrading vacuum.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because this action is directed in Step 5 of AP-23 but would ineffective for the scenario described. This is explained by the note prior to this step.

Answer B Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because this action is directed in Step 5 of AP-23 but would ineffective for the scenario described. This is explained by the note prior o this step.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because AP-23 directs opening the Exhaust Hood spray valves if Exhaust Hood temperatures are greater than 175°F.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the plant condition given is a loss of condenser vacuum and the question requires the candidate to evaluate the plant conditions and choose the correct actions which would be required by the appropriate abnormal procedure AP-23.

Basis for Hi Cog The Analysis Cog level is justified because the question requires the candidate to evaluate the loss of condenser vacuum is attributed air in leakage not loss of cooling and apply that to a particular strategy in the AP. This requires the understanding of the basis for the procedure actions.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q25 (Bank 3019)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-23 Background Doc (Rev 3)

AP-23, Loss of Condenser Vacuum (Rev 7)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-23 Objective 2 SYSO55 2.4.11 Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)

SYSO55 GENERIC Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 98 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 36 SYSO56 K1.03 Condensate System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Condensate System and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)

MFW Both Main Feedwater (OF) pumps will trip if (1) Condensate Booster pumps trip.

An individual CF pump will trip if its suction pressure decreases to less than a minimum of (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 2/3

2. 230 PSIG B. 1. 3/3

2. 230 PSIG C. 1. 2/3

2. 330 PSIG D. 1. 3/3

2. 330 PSIG Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 100 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 36 General Discussion The conditions which will result in both main feed pumps tripping:

if all three CBPs trip on a Safety Injection actuation on SIG Hi-Hi-level (P-14)(83%)

on Hi Hi Dog House level in either inner or outer Dog House (12 inches)

The conditions which will result in tripping the associated main feed pump:

two out of three of its suction pressure switches are low (230 psig) two out of three of its discharge pressure switches are high (1435 psig) manual trip two out of three low bearing oil pressure (7 psig) two out of three low vacuum (14 inches Hg) overspeed fire lockout thrust bearing wear (0.01 inch axial movement)

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because most of the trips for the CF pumps have a 2/3 coincidence. Therefore, it is plausible for the applicant to confuse the CF pumps trip on loss of the CBPs with a 2/3 coincidence.

Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because most of the trips for the CF pumps have a 2/3 coincidence. Therefore, it is plausible for the applicant to confuse the CF pumps trip on loss of the CBPs with a 2/3 coincidence.

Second part is plausible because 330 PSIG CF pump suction pressure is the auto start setpoint for the standby Hotwell and standby Condensate Booster Pumps. It is also the Low Suction Pressure Alarm for the CF pumps on the OAC.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because 330 PSIG CF pump suction pressure is the auto start setpoint for the standby Hotwell and standby Condensate Booster Pumps. It is also the Low Suction Pressure Alarm for the CF pumps on the OAC.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect of a loss of Condensate Pumps on the MFW (CF) system (specifically the CF pumps).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level ognitiveLevel QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 101 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CF Section 2.1 Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CM Sections 2.2 & 2.12 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-CF-CF Objective 4 SYS056 Ki .03 Condensate System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Condensate System and the following systems: (CFR:

41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 SYSO68 A2.04 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operatios: (CFR: 41.5/43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Failure of automatic isolation Given the following plant conditions:

Both units are at 100% RTP

The B WMT is being released in accordance with an approved LWR Permit

This is the first attempt to release this tank using this permit Subsequently:

Annunciator 1RAD-1 /05 (EMF-49 LIQUID WASTE DISCH HI RAD) alarms in the Control Room

1WP-35 (WMT & VUCDT TO RC CNTRL) indicates OPEN

IWP-37 (LIQUID WASTE TO RC CNTRL) indicates OPEN Based on the conditions above, (1) has/have failed to automatically close.

The FIRST action directed by the Alarm Response Procedure for 1RAD-1 / 05 is to (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. WP-35 ONLY

2. stop the release from the Control Room B. 1. WP-35 ONLY

2. direct Radwaste to stop the release locally C. 1. BOTH WP-35 and WP-37

2. stop the release from the Control Room D. 1. BOTH WP-35 and WP-37

2. direct Radwaste to stop the release locally Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 103 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 37 General Discussion A Trip 2 alarm on EMF-49 will automatically close WP-35. If IRAD-I / C5 annunciator alarms and 1WP-35 does not automatically close, the ARP directs the operators to Ensure that 1WP-35 closes. Ensure means that the operator checks to see if the action has happened and if it has not happened to take the appropriate action to place the component in the required condition. Therefore, the operators should attempt to close IWP-35 from the Control Room.

If attempts to close 1WP-35 from the Control Room are unsuccessful, lAW the ARP, the operators will direct Radwaste to close 1WP-35 locally.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because this is the immediate action that is directed if I WP-35 cannot be closed from the Control Room.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because if minimum RC flow is less than required for the release, BOTH IWP-35 and 37 will receive an auto close signal.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because if minimum RC flow is less than required for the release, BOTH IWP-35 and 37 will receive an auto close signal.

Second part is plausible because this is the immediate action that is directed if IWP-35 cannot be closed from the Control Room.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of actions required if a failure of the automatic isolation of a LWR occurs.

Basis for Hi Cog The applicant must first analyze the conditions given to determine that only WP-35 should have closed (as opposed to both valves on a reduction of RC flow).

Then the applicant must recall from memory the immediate actions require for WP-35 failing to close (i.e. which action occurs first).

Since this involves multiple mental steps, it is a higher cognitive level question.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS Audit Exam Q34 (Bank 3152)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.1.14 ARP for 1RAD1 / C5 Learning Objectives:

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 37 SYSO68 A2.04 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operatios: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 38 SYSO72 A3.O1 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ARM system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Changes in ventilation alignment Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

2EMF-59 (EQUIPMENT STAGING BUILDING VENTILATION MONITOR) is in Trip 2 alarm IfVK(EQUIPMENTSTAGINGBUILDINGVENT)isin (1) ,THEN (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. AUTO

2. the Supply fans ONLY will trip B. 1. AUTO

2. the Exhaust AND Supply fans will trip C. 1.ON

2. the Supply fans ONLY will trip D. 1.ON

2. the Exhaust AND Supply fans will trip Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 106 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 General Discussion 2EMF-59 is used to monitor gaseous activity exhausted to the atmosphere from the Equipment Staging building. If VK System selector switch is selected to Auto, a Trip 2 condition will trip the supply and exhaust fans, if VK system selector switch is selected to On, no automatic actions will occur.

Answer A Discussion ENCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant concludes the automatic actions due to 2EMF-59 Trip 2 signal only secures the Supply fans. This is reasonable since it would ensure that the building remains at a negative pressure and prevents an unmonitored release.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not understand when the automatic trips are available.

The second part is plausible if the applicant concludes the automatic actions due to 2EMF-59 Trip 2 signal only secures the Supply fans. This is reasonable since it would ensure that the building remains at a negative pressure and prevents an unmonitored release.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not understand when the automatic trips are available.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant must be able to monitor the position of the VK selector switch to determine what changes if any will occur in the ventilation alignment.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2005 MNS NRC Q52 (Bank 3675)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.1.20 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 3 SYSO72 A3.01 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ARM system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 EPEOO7 EK1.03 Reactor Trip Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the reactor trip: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Reasons for closing the main turbine governor valve and the main turbine stop valve after a reactor trip Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Reactor Trip has occurred

E-O (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) has been implemented In accordance with E-O, if the turbine has not automatically tripped and can NOT be manually tripped, the crew will NEXT attempt to (1)

The E-O basis for the required actions above is to (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. close the MSIVs AND MSIV bypasses

2. Prevent an uncontrolled cooldown B. 1. place the turbine in MANUAL AND close the governor valves

2. Prevent an uncontrolled cooldown C. 1. place the turbine in MANUAL AND close the governor valves

2. Maintain steam generator inventory D. 1. close the MSIVs AND MSIV bypasses

2. Maintain steam generator inventory Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 109 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 39 General Discussion In accordance with E-O (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), after the Reactor Trip is verified, the turbine is verified tripped. This is done by checking all Turbine throttle valves closed.

If the turbine throttle valves are NOT closed, the operators are directed to the RNO column which directs the crew to trip the turbine.

If the turbine will NOT trip, the crew is next directed to place the turbine in MANUAL and close the governor valves in fast action.

Finally, if the governor valves will NOT close with the turbine in MANUAL, the crew is directed to close the MSIVs and MSIV bypasses.

The E-O basis for closing the main turbine governor and throttle valves is to prevent an uncontrolled cooldown of the NC system.

The FRS-1 basis for closing the main turbine governor and throttle valves is to maintain steam generator inventory Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since closing the MSIVs and MSIV bypasses is the RNO action that would be taken if governor will not close in Turbine MANUAL.

The second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and therefore plausible.

The second part is plausible due to the basis for closing the main turbine governor and throttle valves in FRS-l is to maintain steam generator inventory. Since the steps in FR-S.l for securing the turbine are identical to the steps in E-O for isolating the turbine it is reasonable for the applicant to confuse the basis for performing those steps between the two procedures.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since closing the MSIVs and MSIV bypasses is the RNO action that would be taken if governor will not close in Turbine MANUAL.

The second part is plausible due to the basis for closing the main turbine governor and throttle valves in FRSI is to maintain steam generator inventory. Since the steps in FR-S.I for securing the turbine are identical to the steps in EO for isolating the turbine it is reasonable for the applicant to confuse the basis for performing those steps between the two procedures.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is presented with a condition where the reactor has tripped but the turbine has not and is asked to identify the required actions per E-O and the EP basis for closing the main turbine governor and stop valves.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2011 MNS NRC Q39 MODIFIED (BANK 4392)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E0 Objectives 5 & 7 EPEO07 EKI .03 Reactor Trip Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the reactor trip: (CFR 41.8 /41 10 / 45.3)

Reasons for closing the main turbine governor valve and the main turbine stop valve after a reactor trip 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 111 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 EPEOO9 EK2.03 Small Break LOCA Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

S/Gs Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit has experienced a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection due to a Small-Break LOCA

The crew has just completed the actions of E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

NV pump flow to the NC system Cold Legs is 390 GPM

. NC system pressure is 1300 PSIG and STABLE

SG pressures are 1092 PSIG and STABLE

NC system subcooling on the ICCM is 22°F and STABLE Which ONE (1) of the following describes plant conditions upon transition to E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT)?

SG5 NC Pumps Required for Running? Heat Removal?

A. NO YES B. NO NO C. YES YES D. YES NO Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 112 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 General Discussion For this plant condition, even though NV pumps are running and injecting into the NC system, since NC subcooling is not less than 0°F, NC pumps should still be running (E-0 Foldout Page requirement).

Additionally, since NC system pressure is greater than SO pressures and both NC system and SG pressures are stable, the SGs are required for 4C system cooling.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because the applicant might conclude that NC pumps should not be running since a Safety Injection has occurred and the NV pumps are injecting into the cold legs at 390 GPM. However, the NC pumps are only secured in accordance with E-0 Foldout Page criteria if the NV pumps are running and NC system subcooling has been lost.

Part 2 is plausible because the applicant may conclude that the SGs are not required for NC system heat removal since there is 390 GPM of flow to the cold legs from the NV pumps.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because the applicant might conclude that NC pumps should not be running since a Safety Injection has occurred and the NV pumps are injecting into the cold legs at 390 GPM. However, the NC pumps are only secured in accordance with E-0 Foldout Page criteria if the 4V pumps are running and NC system subcooling has been lost.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because the applicant may conclude that the SOs are not required for NC system heat removal since there is 390 GPM of flow to the cold legs from the NV pumps.

Basis for meeting the KA rhis K/A is met because the applicant must evaluate a given situation where a small break LOCA has occurred and determine that the SOs are still required for NC system heat removal.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a hi cog question because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must analyze the given conditions and compare them to recalled memory (E-0 Foldout Criteria) to determine that the NC Pumps should still be running.

Additionally, the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine that with NC system pressure stabilizing above the secondary safety valve set pressure, that break flow is not sufficient to remove all decay heat energy and that the SGs are required for NC system heat removal.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q41 (Bank 2741)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

WOG HPBG-E-l, Rev 2, Section 2.1, 3/8°<break<l, pages 7 & 8 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-El Objective 7 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 113 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 L EPEOO9 EK2.03 Small Break LOCA Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 41 APEO15/017 2.1.7 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions APEO 15/017 GENERIC Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5/43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

The BOP observes that vibration reading on the 1 C NCP are INCREASING

The following is the vibration trend for the 1 C NCP:

Time 2100 2105 2110 2115 Shaft Vibration 5 15 19 22 Frame Vibration 2 4 6 8 Based on the vibration trend above, which ONE (1) of the following indicates the EARLIEST time that the 1C NCP must be secured?

A. 2100 B. 2105 C. 2110 D. 2115 Tuesday, October 15,2013 Page 115 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 41 General Discussion must be tripped if vibration exceeds: shaft 20 mils, frame 5 mils.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the required vibration trip values for SHAFT and FRAME. The 5 mil indication for the SHAFT vibration at time 2100 is equal to the required vibration trip setpoint for FRAME vibration. Therefore, the applicant could determine that the CP must be tripped at this time.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the annunciator alarm setpoint with the required vibration trip setpoint. The 15 mil SHAFT vibration indicated at time 2105 is the Hi Vibration annunciator alarm (1AD-6 Eli 1) setpoint. Therefore, the applicant could conclude that the NCP must be secured at this time.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible since the SHAFT vibration is now above the required vibration trip setpoint. If the applicant incorrectly recalls the FRAME vibration trip setpoint but correctly recalls the SHAFT vibration trip setpoint they would conclude that the 1 C NCP does not have to be secured until 2115.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to evaluate the pump vibration data (i.e. instrument interpretation) and make an operational udgment as to when the NCP must be secured.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2006 CNS NRC Q5 (Bank 611)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NCP Section 3.1 (Normal Operation)

OP/i/A16100/0i0 G (Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-6 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-NCP Objective 15 APEO 15/017 2.1.7 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions APEO15/017 GENERIC Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 116 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 42 APEO25 AA2.07 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Pump cavitation Given the following initial conditions:

Unit I is in Mode 6

NC system is mid-loop at +10

Both ND trains are in operation

NC system temperature is 268°F Based on the indications above, ND pump cavitation will occur if ND pump suction pressure decreases below a MINIMUM of (1) PSIG.

One indication that the ND pump is cavitating would be that motor amps are (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1.25

2. fluctuating B. 1.40

2. fluctuating C. 1.25

2. high D. 1.40

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 42 General Discussion The ND pumps will cavitate ifND pump suction pressure decreases below the saturation pressure associated with ND pump suction temperature.

At 268°F ND pump suction temperature, saturation pressure is 40.5 PSIA or approximately 25.5 PSIG.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant reads saturation temperature straight off the Steam Table without converting it to PSIG.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the indications of pump cavitation with pump runout.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant reads saturation temperature straight off the Steam Table without converting it to PSIG.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the indications of pump cavitation with pump runout.

Basis for meeting the KA be able to determine the pump sucpr sure that ll result in pump cavition and what condition Basis for Hi Cog This question is comprehension level because the applicant must use the Steam Tables to determine what suction pressure will result in a pump cavitation and must recall from memory what condition can result in a low suction pressure.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Steam Tables Lesson Plan OP-BNT-CPO4 Section 3.0 Learning Objectives:

CP04006, CP04009, CP04033, CP04039, & CP04044 APEO25 AA2.07 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Pump cavitation 401-9 Comments: Remarks!Status Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 119 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 APEO26 AAI. 07 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the CCWS interactions among the components Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in HOT SHUTDOWN on ND Cooling (Both Train A and B)

2A Train KC is aligned to supply Reactor and Aux Bldg Non-Essential Headers with both 2A1 and 2A2 KC pumps in operation

2B Train KC is aligned to supply the B ND HX Header with both 2B1 and 2B2 KC pumps in operation

The 2B2 KC pump has just tripped

2A KC Surge Tank level is slowly decreasing due to a leak In accordance with the Limits and Precautions of OP/2/A164001005 (COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM), KC flow through the 2B ND Heat Exchanger shall be throttled to less than a MAXIMUM of (1) GPM.

In accordance with AP-21 (LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE), the Operators will take action to isolate flow to the Auxiliary Building Non-Essential Header if the 2A KC Surge Tank level decreases below a MINIMUM of (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 4000

2. 1 foot B. 1. 2000

2. 1 foot C. 1. 4000

2. 2 feet D. 1. 2000

2. 2 feet Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 121 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 General Discussion In accordance with the KC System Limits and Precautions, if one KC pump is tagged, flow through the train-related ND Heat Exchanger is limited to 4000 GPM to prevent runout of the remaining KC pump.

In accordance with AP-21 Foldout Criteria, if KC Surge Tank level decreases to less than 2 feet due to a KC system leak, operators are directed to isolate KC system non-essential headers lAW Enclosure 2 (Isolation of KC Non-Essential Headers). Per Enclosure 2, Operators are directed to isolate the Auxiliary Building Non-Essential Header with KC Surge Tank level less than 2 ft and further isolate the Reactor Building Non Essential Header if KC Surge Tank level decreases to below 1 ft.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible because AP-21 directs the Operators to isolate the Reactor Building Non-Essential Header if KC Surge Tank level decreases to less than 1 ft.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because 2000 GPM is the minimum flow through each ND Heat Exchangers with NC system temperature grater than 200°F and the ND system in RHR mode.

The second part is plausible because AP-21 directs the Operators to isolate the Reactor Building Non-Essential Header if KC Surge Tank level decreases to less than 1 ft.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because 2000 GPM is the minimum flow through each ND Heat Exchangers with NC system temperature grater than 200°F and the ND system in RHR mode.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because a loss of CCW has occurred and the applicant is asked to demonstrate a knowledge of the flow rate limit to a component supplied by the CCW system.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2012 MNS NRC Exam Q45 MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP/2/AJ6400/005 (Component Cooling Water System AP-21 (Loss of KC or KC System Leakage)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-2I Objective 3 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 122 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 APEO26 AA1. 07 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) c 43 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the CCWS; interactions among the components 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 123 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 44 APEO27 2.4.9 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction APE027 GENERIC Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5 /45.13)

The following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit was initially at 100% RTP

A Reactor Trip and Safety injection occur

Off-Site power was lost coincident with the Reactor Trip

The NC System has been cooled to 510°F in accordance with ES-1.2 (POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION)

Containment pressure has peaked at 1 .9 PSIG and is now STABLE

NC System Pressure is 1600 PSIG

PZR level is 2%

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the method of NC System depressurization directed by ES-i .2?

A. One PZR PORV B. TwoPZRPORVs C. NormalPZRSpray D. Auxiliary PZR Spray Tuesday, October 15,2013 Page 124 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 44 General Discussion Because offsite power has been lost, NC pumps are not running. Therefore, normal spray is not available for depressurization.

With normal spray not available, ES-I.2 will direct the crew to depressurize using ONE PZR PORV.

If a PZR PORV could not be opened ES-I.2 would direct the operators to depressurize using NV Auxiliary Spray.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because ES-l.2 directs depressurizing using a PZR PORV. Using two PORVs is plausible because this is the method used to depressurize the NC in FR-H. I when establishing NC system bleed and feed.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because Normal PZR Spray is the preferred method of depressurization in ES-l.2. If the applicant misdiagnoses the conditions given, they could conclude that the NC pumps are still running and that normal spray is available.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because Auxiliary PZR Spray is the method of depressurization used in ES-1.2 if Normal PZR Spray and the PORVs are unavailable.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System malfunction on the accident mitigation strategy during a small-break LOCA.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

The applicant must first recall from memory the preferred methods of depressurization in ES-I.2. The applicant must then analyze the given conditions to determine what methods of depressurization are available.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2008 MNS Audit Exam Q40 (Bank 3358)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

ES-l.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E1 Objectives 3 & 6 APEO27 2.4.9 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction APEO27 GENERIC Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 45 EPEO38 EAI .27 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Steam dump valve status lights and indicators Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A SGTR has occurred on the 1A SG

E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) has been implemented When P-12 (LO-LO Tavg) status light on 1 SI-I 8 is lit, the operator will be required to (I) to continue NC system cooldown.

Maximum cooldown rate will be achieved when open status lights are lit for steam dump valves (2)

Which ONE (I) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Place Steam Dump Select switch to Bypass Interlock

2. 3,6and9 B. I. Place Steam Pressure Controller in Manual

2. 3,6and9 C. 1. Place Steam Dump Select switch to Bypass Interlock

2. 3, 12 and 21 D. 1. Place Steam Pressure Controller in Manual

2. 3, 12 and 21 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 127 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 45 General Discussion Per E-3, When the P-12 Lo Lo Tavg status light is lit, the next action is to place the Steam Dump Select switch to Bypass Interlock. Once this action has occurred, the cooldown at maximum rate may continue. Per OP-MC-STM-IDE-DCS lesson plan, cooldown can only be performed using Steam Dump valves SB-3, SB-12 and SB-21(referred to as cooldown valves).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if applicant confuses which three steam dump valves in Bank one are selected as cooldown valves. Bank one valves are SB-3, SB-6, SB-9, SB-12 and SB-21.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes taking the Steam Dump Controller to manual would override the automatic action that has occurred due to the P-l2 signal.

Second part is plausible if applicant confuses which three steam dump valves in Bank one are selected as cooldown valves. Bank one valves are SB-3, SB-6, SB-9, SB-12 and S13-21.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes taking the Steam Dump Controller to manual would override the automatic action that has occurred due to the P-12 signal.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the steam dump valves allowed to open after P-12 interlock is met, by monitoring which individual valves open status light would be lit.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev 23)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-STM-IDE-DCS (Rev. I)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E3 Objectives 3 & 4 OP-MC-STM-IDE-DCS Objective 2 EPEO38 EAI.27 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR: (CFR 41.7 /45.5 / 45.6)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 46 APEO54 AK1 .02 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.8 / 41.10/

45.3)

Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit has experienced a feedwater line break of the 1 A SIG inside containment and a total loss of feedwater

FR-H.1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK) has been entered and feed and bleed of the NC system was initiated

Shortly after opening the PORVs, the Turbine Driven CA pump is returned to service and a source of feedwater is available

CETsareSTABLE

All S/G WR levels are indicating 0%

Containment pressure is 3.5 PSIG

1) Based on the conditions described above which ONE (1) of the following describes the criteria for restoration of CA flow?

2) What is the basis for the restoration of flow criteria?

A. 1. Restore cooling to ALL intact S/Gs at a rate not to exceed 100 GPM

2. To minimize additional NC cooldown causing thermal stress to the reactor vessel B. 1. Restore cooling to ALL intact S/Gs at a rate not to exceed 100 GPM

2. To minimize the thermal stress on the S/G to prevent failure of S/G components C. 1. Restore cooling to ONE intact S/G at a rate not to exceed 1 00 GPM

2. To minimize additional NC cooldown causing thermal stress to the reactor vessel D. 1. Restore cooling to ONE intact S/G at a rate not to exceed 100 GPM

2. To minimize the thermal stress on the S/G to prevent failure of S/G components Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 130 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 [ 46 General Discussion In the scenario given, a loss of feedwater/heat sink had occurred. FRP H-i has been implemented and feed and bleed was established. When the capability to feed from AFW is restored the procedure contains a continuous action statement in the RNO for Step 7 e to return to step 7.h. if CA is restored and Step 37 has been performed which it would have since feed and bleed has been established.

With all S/G <17% WR level (all dry), H-i directs that flow be established to one intact SIG at less than or equal to 100 GPM. There is a note prior to this step concerning the risk of thermal shock to the SIG and also a caution in FR H-5 (Response to SIG Low Level) which reads Initiating feed flow to a dry SIG causes thermal stresses and raises the risk of S/G failure, especially on the SIG shell. The risk is greatest at higher S/G temperatures.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct for flow rate but only one S/G will be fed; if CETs were increasing then feeding all of intact SIGs would be correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible because overcooling the NC system is stated in H-i as a concern in multiple notes and cautions concerning initiating feed to a dry generator.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct for flow rate but only one S/G will be fed; if CETs were increasing then feeding all of intact S/Gs would be correct and therefore plausible.

Second part regarding the basis is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because overcooling the NC system is stated in H-i as a concern in multiple notes and cautions concerning initiating feed to a dry generator.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KIA is matched because a loss of feedwater has occurred and the question is testing knowledge related to how many 5/0s will initially be fed (operational implication) and what concern is being addressed by this strategy (effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G).

Basis for Hi Cog This is a hi cog question because it involves a level of analysis of given situation. This involves a multi part mental process where the applicant must evaluate the indications given and determine its meaning related to the scenario given and determine a course of action and the basis for that action.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q47 (Bank 2747)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

FRP H-i (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) (Rev 17)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRH Objective 4 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 131 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 APEO54 AK 1.02 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 /

45.3)

Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G 14019 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 132 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 47 EPEO55 EKI .02 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: (CFR 41.8/41.10 / 45.3)

Natural circulation cooling Given the following initial conditions:

Unit I and 2 have been in a Loss of Offsite Power condition for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months

BOTH Diesel VI compressors are unavailable

ECA-0.0 (LOSS OF ALL AC POWER) was implemented on Unit I and the crew has just transitioned to ECA-0.1 (LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT S/I REQUIRED)

Current conditions:

NC ThQts are STABLE

S/G pressures are STABLE at 725 PSIG

S/G levels are decreasing and approaching 11% NR

5 are 490° F and STABLE NC TCold

VI header pressure is 0 PSIG Based on the indications above:

Natural Circulation flow (1) been established.

In accordance with ECA-0.1, the Operators will (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. HAS

2. increase CA flow using flow controllers in the control room B. 1. HAS

2. increase CA flow by notifying NEC to throttle CA valves locally C. 1. HAS NOT

2. increase dumping steam using SM PORV controller on main control board AND increase CA flow using flow controllers in the control room D. 1. HAS NOT

2. dispatch an operator to locally increase flow from the SM PORV AND increase CA flow by notifying NEC to throttle CA valves locally Thursday, October 17,2013 Page 133 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 47 Genera I Discussion In the scenario given, the station has experienced a complete loss of offsite power as well as the loss of both vital AC buses on U-i.

Additionally, the backup diesel powered VI compressors are not available therefore; instrument air has been lost as well. The applicant is asked to evaluate actions required by ECA 0.1 (Loss of AC Power Recovery Without S/I Required) to address given indications that Natural circulation cooling is effective and that SIG levels need to be increased.

In the first part of the answers, the applicant is asked to determine if conditions for natural circulation have been established. Generic Enclosure (Natural circulation parameters) is provided as a reference. With the conditions given, the crew would NOT be required to raise dumping steam because S/G conditions are within the limits of the graph provided in the reference. Additionally, the required actions have been affected by the loss of VI (Instrument Air) and the loss of AC power making them unique to a loss of all AC scenario.

CA (Aux Feedwater) control also would not be available from the C/R. Normally, if VI is lost, CA flow is controlled by motor driven valves from the C/R. However in this case power is not available so local manual operation would be required.

Due to the given indication that Natural Circ is adequate but SIG levels are approaching the minimum level allowed, local operations would be required to establish CA flow to the S/Gs to recover level.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (I) is correct.

Part (2) is plausible because if AC power was available, this would be correct because procedurally, CA flow would be controlled via operation of the associated motor operator valves from the control room.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (1) is plausible if the applicant misreads the graph in Enclosure 33 OR concludes that Natural Circulation conditions are not met because NC Tcolds are not at saturation for given S/G pressure (i.e. does not read the qualifier in Enclosure 33 that states Within the limits of the graph below).

Part (2) is plausible because if the applicant concludes that Natural Circulation is not adequate the increasing steam dump would be the required action. Since the SM PORV is normally controlled from the C/R, if the applicant failed to realize that the loss of VI would prevent this capability it would be reasonable to select this answer.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (1) is plausible if the applicant misreads the graph in Enclosure 33 OR concludes that Natural Circulation conditions are not met because C Tcolds are not at saturation for given SIG pressure (i.e. does not read the qualifier in Enclosure 33 that states Within the limits of the graph below).

Part (2) is plausible because if the applicant concludes that Natural Circulation is not adequate the increasing steam dump would be the required action. With the loss of VI if the applicant concludes that increasing steam dump is appropriate, dispatch an operator to locally throttle open the SM PORV would be correct. Having a NEO locally increase CA flow is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the in the scenario given in the stem of the question, a station blackout has occurred and applicant must demonstrate the ability to veri that adequate natural circulation cooling has been established by evaluating a set of plant indications. He must then demonstrate knowledge of how to increase dumping steam (operational implications) with the degraded plant control capabilities associated with the loss of power.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is Hi Cog because the applicant must evaluate a given set of conditions and through a multipart mental process, determine the red actions based on these conditions.

9 Basis for SRO only Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 134 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 [ 47]

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2011 MNS NRC Exam Q5 I MODIFIED (Bank 4404)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Generic Enclosure 33 Generic Enclosure 33 ECA-0.l. Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without S/I Required Learning Objectives:

EPEO55 EK1.02 Loss ofOffsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout : (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 48 APE056 2.4.20 Loss of Offsite Power APEO56 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following plant conditions:

A loss of all AC power has occurred on both units

Both units have implemented ECA-O.O (LOSS OF ALL AC POWER)

Only Channel I of S/G Pressure indication for B & C S/Gs on BOTH units is available due to load stripping

Power has just been restored to 1 ETA

The crew is preparing to restore power to the Vital Battery Chargers In accordance with ECA-O.O:

Restoration of power to the Vital Battery Chargers is time critical. The reason for this is that the Vital Batteries are sized to supply their design loads for a MINIMUM of (1)

If Channel 1 S/G Pressure indication for B & C S/Gs is lost, alternate indication is available in the (2) doghouses.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

2. exterior B. 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. exterior C. 1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

2. interior D. 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. interior Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 136 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 48 General Discussion The life expectancy of the Vital Batteries supplying their design loads with no battery charger in service is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The life expectancy of the Aux Batteries supplying their design loads is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The alternate S/G pressure indications for the B & C SIGs on both units are located in the interior doghouses.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses what components are in the interior and exterior doghouses.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible if the applicant confuses the life expectancy of the Vital and Aux Batteries. Since the Vital batteries are more important, it would be logical to conclude that they would have a longer life expectancy.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses what components are in the interior and exterior doghouses.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant confuses the life expectancy of the Vital and Aux Batteries. Since the Vital batteries are more important, it would be logical to conclude that they would have a longer life expectancy.

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA This question requires the operator to have knowledge of two notes associated with ECA-0.0 (Loss of All AC Power). The operational implication associated with these notes is that the operator needs to know how long he has before DC loads supplied from the Vital Batteries will be affected by the loss of power AND he needs to know where to dispatch operators to check SG pressure indications if the Channel I SO pressure indication is lost. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

ECA-0.0 (Loss of All AC Power)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-EPL Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EL-EPL Objective 12 APEO56 2.4.20 Loss of Offsite Power APEO56 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 / 45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 49 APEOS7 AK3.01 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

UnitisatlOO%RTP

A Loss of Offsite Power occurs

Diesel Generator IA fails to start

Diesel Generator I B successfully loads bus 1 ETB

The crew is performing actions in E-O (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

The crew has reached E-O Step 4 RNO which directs restoring power to the affected bus as time allows

1) Which ONE (1) of the following is the reason that E-O does NOT require power to be restored to I ETA immediately?

2) To ensure power is maintained to all Vital AC Instrument busses on both units, which Battery Charger(s) must be restarted?

A. 1. Only one train of safeguard equipment is required to deal with emergency conditions.

2. EVCAANDEVCB B. 1. Minimum shift crews are assumed in the EOPs and manpower is not available to restore power to I ETA

2. EVCAANDEVCB C. 1. Only one train of safeguard equipment is required to deal with emergency conditions.

2. EVCA ONLY D. 1. Minimum shift crews are assumed in the EOPs and manpower is not available to restore power to IETA

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 General Discussion rE-0 (Rx Trip or Safety injection) step 4 basis states power must be checked from either the offsite sources or the diesel generators to ensure adequate power sources to operate safeguards equipment. At least one train of safeguards equipment is required to deal with emergency conditions.

4ormal alignment of Battery Chargers is Battery Chargers EVCA and EVCB aligned to Unit I and Battery Chargers EVCC and EVCD aligned to Unit 2. Both EVCA and EVCB lost power when offsite power was lost. However, Battery Charger EVCB was automatically sequenced on when I B DO started and loaded. Therefore, only EVCA must be restarted.

Answer A Discussion 1CORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the battery chargers get automatically sequenced on when the DG loads. Since Battery Charger EVCA and EVCB both lost power if the applicant does not recall that the battery charges get automatically sequenced on, they would conclude that both EVCA and EVCB must be restarted.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because manpower resources are always an issue during loss of power scenarios.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall that the battery chargers get automatically sequenced on when the DG loads. Since Battery Charger EVCA and EVCB both lost power if the applicant does not recall that the battery charges get automatically sequenced on, they would conclude that both EVCA and EVCB must be restarted.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer 0 Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because manpower resources are always an issue during loss of power scenarios.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the applicant is given a situation where power is lost to Vital AC instrument bus battery chargers (as a result of a loss of offsite power) and the applicant is ask to have knowledge of the reason for actions performed related to the loss of power.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-EO (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) (Rev 19)

Learning Objectives:

pMC-EP-EO Objective 6 Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 140 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 49 APEO57 AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss ofVital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.5.41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 141 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 5O APEO58 AA2.03 Loss of DC Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The 125VDC/12OVAC Auxiliary Control Power System is in normal alignment

The supply breaker from DCA to Static Inverter K)(A trips open Based on the conditions above:

Bus KXA (1) automatically swap to its alternate power source.

The crew can verify power has been restored to KXA by observing that (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. WILL

2. the NC pump vibration monitors are IN SERVICE B. 1. WILL

2. the indicating light (control power) to ORN-1OAC (TRAIN 1 B & 2B LLI SUPPLY) is LIT C. 1. WILL NOT

2. NC pump vibration monitors are IN SERVICE D. 1. WILL NOT

2. the indicating light (control power) to ORN-1OAC (TRAIN I B & 2B LLI SUPPLY) is LIT Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 142 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 General Discussion Static Inverter KXA is one of the DC loads supplied from DCA. If power is lost to Static Inverter KXA an ABT switch will automatically transfer Bus KXA to its alternate power source.

The operators can verify power is restored to KXA by verifying the NC pump vibration monitors are in service.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses vital and auxiliary control power.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because the vital static inverters must be manually swapped to an alternate power supply.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because the vital static inverters must be manually swapped to an alternate power supply.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant confuses vital and auxiliary control power.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect of a loss of a DC load and how it affects the ability to monitor plant systems.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

The applicant must first recall from memory the arrangement of the I25VDC/I2OVAC Auxiliary Control Power system to determine Bus KXA has an auto bus transfer feature.

The applicant must then analyze the given condition to determine what indications are available to indicate that power has been restored to KXA.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2005 MNS NRC Exam Q2 (Bank 3623)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EL-EPK (Rev 29A)

Learning Objectives:

ELEPKOI7 APEO58 AA2.03 Loss of DC Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 143 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 APEO62 AA2.O1 Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Location of a leak in the SWS Given the following indications on Unit 1:

The Unit is operating at 100% RTP

IAD8 I D2 (SUMP B GROUNDWATER DRAINAGE HI HI LVL) just alarmed

An AO has been dispatched to investigate reports that the B Groundwater sump is overflowing Which ONE (1) of the following describes the source of the flooding?

A. 2A RN strainer basket shaft seal failure B. 2B RN Pump Suction piping weld failure C. RF piping break in the Unit I CA pump Room D. 1 B RN strainer automatic backwash valve has failed open Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 145 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 5I General Discussion The applicant is presented with indications of flooding in the vicinity of Groundwater Sump B. This is one of 3 groundwater sumps in the Aux building. Sump A is located in the U-i CA Pump Room, Sump B is located in the U-2 CA pump room. A third Sump C is located on the same elevation on the north end of the aux building. The suction strainers and associated piping for the nuclear service water (RN) pumps are located in these rooms as well with the A train components for both units located in the U-i CA pump room and the B Train components located in the U-2 CA pump room.

With the indication given, the location of the leak is located in the U-2 CA pump room. (B Groundwater sump). The 2B RN suction piping is located in this room and a leak large enough to cause the sump to overflow would threaten other safety related equipment in the area including the U-2 Aux feedwater pump and the U-2 Aux Shutdown panel. This leak would have to be isolated and would result in a loss of that train of RN.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant recognizes that the leak is located in the U-2 CA pump room but confuses the location of the U-2 A Train RN strainer. It is a U-2 component but located in the U-I CA Pump room.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the location of the B groundwater sump with the A sump which is located in the U-I CA pump room this would be a probable source.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant recognizes that the leak is located in the U-2 CA pump room and that the lB RN strainer is located in the same room but confuses the flowpath for the strainer backwash. The manual backwash for this strainer discharges to the B sump but not the auto backwash, the applicant could reverse the two.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because the applicant must determine the location of a leak in the Nuclear Service Water system given indirect indication.

The 2B RN suction piping is located in this room and a leak large enough to cause the sump to overflow would threaten other safety related equipment in the area including the U-2 Aux feedwater pump and the U-2 Aux Shutdown panel. This leak would have to be isolated and would result in a loss of that train of RN.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS NRC Q54 (Bank 4407)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-WZ (Rev 8A) Section 2.1 AP-44 (Plant Flooding) Enclosure 2 (Unit 1 CA Pump Room Flooding) Rev. 13 Learning Objective:

OP-MC-SS-WZ Objective 4 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 146 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 5l APEO62 AA2.O1 Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13)

Location of a leak in the SWS 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 147 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 5i]

APEO65 AK3.03 Loss of Instrument Air Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6/45.13)

Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain equipment from instrument air Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 100% RTP

The air line for 1 NV-241 (Seal Injection Flow Control) blows off Based on the conditions above, Seal Injection flow to the NC pumps will (1)

The reason for the Seal Injection flow response above is that 1 NV-241 fails (2 on a loss of instrument air.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. INCREASE

2. OPEN B. 1. DECREASE

2. OPEN C. 1. INCREASE

2. CLOSED D. 1. DECREASE

2. CLOSED Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 148 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 52]

General Discussion In accordance with Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS, NV-241 fails OPEN on a loss of air.

Since NC pump seal injection flow is controlled by throttling NV-241 to provide a backpressure in the charging line to force flow into the NC pump seal injection lines, when NV-241 fails open, the backpressure in the charging line decreases and Seal Injection flow to the NC pumps decreases.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The common arrangement for a seal water supply to a pump is to place the throttle valve which supplies seal water to the pump directly in the flow path to the seals. MNS is different than most Westinghouse plants in that the Seal Water injection flow control valve is in the charging flow path and provides a back pressure (via throttling in the closed direction) to increase the backpressure in the charging line to force flow into the seal injection line. If the applicant forgets the unique nature of the design of the MNS Chemical Volume Control system, they would conclude that the NC Seal Injection flow control valve is in the direct flow path for the seal supply (standard configuration). If they then correctly recalled that NV-241 fails open on a loss of instrument air, they would conclude that seal injection flow would INCREASE. Therefore, the first part of this answer would be plausible.

The second part of this answer is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

If the applicant correctly recalls the arrangement of the NV Charging Flow Control valve (NV-238) and NC Pump Seal Injection Flow control valve (NV-241) but concludes that NV-241 fails CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, this would be the correct response. Therefore, this answer isplausible.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

If the applicant incorrectly recalls the arrangement of the NV Charging Flow Control valve (NV-238) and the NC Pump Seal Injection Flow Control valve (NV-241) and concludes that NV-241 is in the direct flow path to the NC pump seals instead of directly in the charging flow path AND concludes that NV-24 I fails CLOSED on a loss of instrument air, this would be the correct answer. Recalling the incorrect valve arrangement is plausible since this is the standard arrangement for piping systems that provide seal injection to a pump. Therefore, this answer is plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the response of NV seal injection to a loss of instrument air to one of the NV system components and the reason that the system responds the way it does.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must recall from memory how NV-241 fails on a loss of air. Then, the applicant must then analyze the effect ofNV-24l failing on the backpressure in the NV Charging line and the subsequent effect on NC pump seal injection flow.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS (Rev 6B) Section 2.23.1 (NV System Controls)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS Objective 7 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 149 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 52 APEO65 AK3.03 - Loss of Instrument Air Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: (CFR 41.5,41.10 /45.6 / 45.13)

Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain equipment from instrument air 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Original question submitted for pre-40l-9 review.

Based on pre-40 1-9 comments, did not believe that original question was salvageable and did not believe that a valid question could be written to original KJA. Requested new K/A from Chief Examiner. New KIA randomly selected by Chief Examiner.

New question written for replacement K/A. HCF 09/30/20 13 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 150 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 53 WEO4 EK2. 1 LOCA Outside Containment Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7/45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is responding to a LOCA Outside Containment

The crew has implemented ECA-1.2 (LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

In accordance with ECA-1.2:

The crew will FIRST attempt to isolate the leak by isolating the (1) system from the NC system.

If an NC system cooldown is required, the crew will be directed to use (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1.NI

2. NC feed and bleed B. 1.ND

2. NC feed and bleed C. 1.Nl

2. the Steam Generators D. 1.ND

2. the Steam Generators Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 151 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 53 General Discussion ECA-l .2 (LOCA Outside Containment) will first direct the operators to isolate the ND system from the NC system as this is the most likely source of the leak.

If a cooldown is required in ECA-1.2, the procedure will direct the operators to dump steam from the S/Gs (either to the condenser if available or via the SM PORVs).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because the NI system is next isolated after the ND system. If the applicant confuses the order, they would conclude that the fi system is isolated first.

Part 2 is plausible because NC system feed and bleed is used to cooldown the NC system on a loss of heat sink. It is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the LOCA results in significant NC system voiding which would make cooling using the S/Os ineffective.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is correct.

Part 2 is plausible because NC system feed and bleed is used to cooldown the NC system on a loss of heat sink. It is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the LOCA results in significant NC system voiding which would make cooling using the S/Os ineffective.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part I is plausible because the NI system is next isolated after the ND system. If the applicant confuses the order, they would conclude that the II system is isolated first.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of components related to the LOCA Outside Containment (i.e. which components are isolated first when attempting to isolate the leak and which components are used to provide heat removal).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

ECA-I.2 (LOCA Outside Containment) Rev. 5 Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-EI Rev. 28 Section 9.0 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-El Objective 3 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 152 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 53 WEO4 EK2.1 LOCA Outside Containment Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 /45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 54 WEI I EK3.4 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.5 /41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

Which ONE (1) of the following lists ALL of the reasons forthe ECA-1.1(LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC) major action that requires the Reactor Operator to further depressurize S/Gs to cooldown and depressurize the NC system?

List of Reasons

1. Minimize NC subcooling

2. Reach RHR system conditions

3. Minimize break flow from the LOCA

4. Allow Cold Leg Accumulators to inject A. 1 and 4 ONLY B. 2 and 3 ONLY C. 2, 3, and 4 ONLY D. 1,2,and3ONLY Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 154 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 54 General Discussion rPer ECA-1.l Basis, the reasons for further depressurizing the SOs during the performance of ECA-1.1, (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) are to (1) enable cold leg accumulator injection, (2)minimize break flow, and (3) establish RHR conditions.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Allow CLAs to inject is a correct answer. However, minimize NC subcooling is not. Plausible since depressurizing the NC system initially is also a major action in ECA-l.1 and the basis is to minimize NC subcooling.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Reach RHR system conditions and minimize break flow from the LOCA are reasons for this major action. However, the question asks for ALL reasons and allow CLAs to inject is also correct.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Reach RHR system conditions and minimize break flow from the LOCA are correct answers. However, minimize NC subcooling is not.

Plausible since depressurizing the NC system initially is also a major action in ECA-1.1 and the basis is to minimize NC subcooling.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the question establishes a context of ECA-l.1 performance, including an important function performed by the RO during the Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. It also tests knowledge of the reasons (basis) for performing these actions, with an inherent knowledge component of why they are important (minimizing break flow, assuring injection, etc.). This also addresses the K/A component of (limitations are not violated).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK CNS Bank 4267 Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-El Rev. 28 Section 8.3 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-EI Objective 3 WEll EK3.4 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 55 WEO5 EK2.2 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7/457)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay. heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

The crew has implemented FR-H.1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK)

All attempts to restore CA flow have been unsuccessful

SG 1A is faulted inside Containment

Containment pressure peaked at 3.2 PSIG and is currently 1.8 PSIG In accordance with FR-RI:

The first source of feedwater which is prioritized for restoration is (I)

If feedwater cannot be restored, NC system feed and bleed must be initiated when SG WR levels decrease to a minimum of (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Condensate (CM)

2. 24%

B. I. Condensate (CM)

2. 36%

C. 1. Main Feedwater (CF)

2. 24%

D. I. Main Feedwater (CF)

2. 36%

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 157 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 55 General Discussion In accordance with FR-Hi, attempts to restore feedwater begin with the Main Feedwater (CF) system. If the Main Feedwater system cannot be restored, then attempts are made to restore the Condensate (CM) system.

If attempts to restore feedwater are unsuccessful, NC system feed and bleed must be initiated when WR level in at least three SOs decreases to less than 24% (36% adverse). In this case since Containment pressure has increased above 3 PSIG, adverse numbers must be used.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because Condensate is one of the choices for restoration of feedwater.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that adverse Containment numbers do not apply to this situation since Containment pressure is no longer above 3 PSIG.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because Condensate is one of the choices for restoration of feedwater.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that adverse Containment numbers do not apply to this situation since Containment pressure is no longer above 3 PSIG.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Secondary Heat sink and the facilities decay heat removal systems (i.e. the CF and CM systems) and how to prioritize restoration of those systems. The applicant must also have knowledge of the relationship between the proper operation of those system to the operation of the facility. Specifically, if the CF and CM system cannot be restored, the applicant must know the criteria for initiating NC system feed and bleed.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine if Containment adverse numbers apply. The applicant must then recall from memory the correct setpoint for when NC system feed and bleed must be initiated. The applicant must also recall from memory the priority for restoring feedwater.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-H.i Rev 17 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRH Objective 3 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 158 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 55 WEO5 EK2.2 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 56 APEO77 AA1.05 - Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 41.10/45.5, 45.7, and 45.8)

Engineered safety features Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 5

A momentary grid disturbance results in a loss of 4KV Essential power lasting 5 seconds Based on the conditions above, the Unit 1 DGs will Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. NOT START B. START but will not load C. START and load using Committed Sequence D. START and load using Accelerated Sequence Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 160 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 56 B General Discussion The loss of power to IETA and IETB will cause both DGs to start. However, because power was lost for less than 8.5 seconds the DGs will not load.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Because of the short duration of the event, the applicant may conclude that the DG does not start. If they confuse the loss of power for less than 8 seconds where the DG starts but does not load, they would conclude that the DG does not start.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the DG will start. If the applicant does not recall that power must be lost for greater than 8.5 seconds for the DG load sequence to start, they would conclude that it will load using either the Committed or Accelerated Sequence.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the DG will start. If the applicant does not recall that power must be lost for greater than 8.5 seconds for the DG load sequence to start, they would conclude that it will load using either the Committed or Accelerated Sequence.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is presented with a situation where an electrical grid disturbance has occurred (momentary loss of

/ power) and must determine the response of the DGs (an Engineered Safety Feature).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 AUDIT Q53 (Bank 4481)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-EQB Section 3.3 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-DG-EQB Objective 5 APEO77 AA1 .05 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 41.10/45.5, 45.7, and 45.8)

Engineered safety features 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 161 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 57 APEOOI AAI.07 Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal (CFR 41.7 / 45.5/45.6)

RPI Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

AP-14 (ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION) has been implemented due to continuous rod movement

Rods have just been placed in manual

A Data A Failure occurs on Rod D-4 Based on the conditions above:

1) Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the Annunciator(s) that are in alarm?

2) What color will the RPI indicator for Rod D-4 display?

A. 1. RPI Non-Urgent Failure ONLY

2. RED B. 1. RPI Non-Urgent Failure ONLY

2. YELLOW C. 1. RPI Non-Urgent Failure AND RPI Urgent Failure

2. RED D. 1. RPI Non-Urgent Failure AND RPI Urgent Failure

2. YELLOW Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 163 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 57 General Discussion Based on the conditions given the Data A Failure will result in an RPI Non-Urgent Failure annunciator only.

The RPI indicator for Rod D-4 will display in YELLOW.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the rod color display for different failure combinations since an RPI Non-Urgent Failure in combination with an RPI Urgent Failure will result in a RED display for the affected rod.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant does not understand what conditions can cause an RPI Non-Urgent and an RPI Urgent Failure as both conditions can exist simultaneously.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the DRPI failures as a Date A Failure in combination with a Data B Failure would result in an Urgent and Non-Urgent Failure simultaneously and the effected rod would appear in RED.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant does not understand what conditions can cause an RPI Non-Urgent and an RPI Urgent Failure as both conditions can exist simultaneously.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the operation ofthe RPI system to determine the correct response after the continuous rod withdrawal where aDRPI malfunction has occurred.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given to determine what indications will be observed relative to the current conditions.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-EDA Learning Objectives:

4ONE APEOO1 AA1.07 Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 58 58 APEO36 AK3.02 Fuel Handling Incidents Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Interlocks associated with fuel handling equipment Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

NC system temperature is 400°F

NC system pressure is 650 PSIG

A cooldown and depressurization is in progress for refueling During the cooldown and depressurization, the FIRST MODE reached where the Personnel Airlock Door (PAL) interlock can be defeated allowing both doors on the same airlock to be opened at the same time is MODE (1)

The reason that both PAL doors are allowed to be open at the same time is that a dedicated operator is assigned to ensure that (2) closed and sealed if a fuel handling incident occurs.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1.4

2. a minimum of one airlock door is B. 1.5

2. a minimum of one airlock door is C. 1.4

2. both airlock doors are D. 1.5

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 58 58 General Discussion In accordance with OP/0/A/6700/006 (Personnel Airlock Operations) Enclosure 4.2 (Operation To Allow Both Airlock Doors To Be Opened During An Outage) the unit must be in MODE 5, 6, or No MODE to allow opening of both Airlock Doors.

In accordance with OP/0/A/6700/006 (Personnel Airlock Operations) Enclosure 4.5 (Emergency Closure of Airlock Door) only one Airlock Door with one seal inflated is required for Containment closure.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall when Containment Closure is required as opposed to when Containment Integrity is required.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall when Containment Closure is required as opposed to when Containment Integrity is required.

The second part is plausible because during normal operation both airlock doors are required to be closed and sealed.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because during normal operation both airlock doors are required to be closed and sealed.

Basis for meeting the KA fhe PAL door interlocks are normally defeated during Refueling to allow ease of personnel access and movement of equipment in and out of Dontainment. The question asks the applicant to demonstrate a knowledge of when the airlock door interlocks can be defeated and the reason why t is permissible to open both airlock doors at the same time. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP/0/A/6700/006 (Personnel Airlock Operations)

Learning Objectives:

1ONE APEO36 AK3.02 Fuel Handling Incidents Knowledge of the reasons forthe following responses as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: (CFR 41.5,41.10/45.6 / 45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 59 APEO37 AK1.0 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 /45.3)

Use of steam tables Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A Steam Generator Tube Leak has occurred

All NC pumps are running Which ONE (1) of the following sets of operating conditions will result in the least Primary-to-Secondary leakage while maintaining the NC system subcooled?

REFERENCE PROVIDED NCS Temperature NCS Pressure A. 505°F 775 PSIG B. 511°F 8I5PSIG C. 517°F 855 PSIG D. 523°F 895 PSIG Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 169 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 59 General Discussion Primary-to-Secondary leakage can be minimized by reducing NC system subcooling to a minimum. For this example:

Solution A:

775 PSIG+ 14.696=789.696PS1A Steam Table Interpolation(750 to 800 PSIA) 518.21°F-SI 0.84°F = 7.37°F! 50 PSIA = 0. 1474°/PSIA At 789.696 PSIA Saturation Temperature 789.696 750 = 39.696 PSIA x 0. 1474°F!PSIA = 5.8511904

- + 510.84 516.6911904°F Subcooling = 516.6911904-SOS = 11.6911904°F Solution B:

815 PSIG + 14.696 = 829.696 PSIA Steam Table Interpolation (800 to 850 PSIA) 525.24°F 518.21°F = 7.03°F! 50 PSIA = 0. 1406°F/PSIA At 829.696 PSIA Saturation Temperature 829.696 800 = 29.696 PSIA x 0. 1406°F!PSIA = 4.1752576 + 518.21

- = 522.3852576°F Subcooling 522.3852576 51 11 1.3852576°F Solution C:

855 PSIG + 14.696 = 869.696 PSIA Steam Table Interpolation (850 to 900 PSIA) 531.95°F 525.24°F = 6.71°F! 50 PSIA 0.1342°F!PSIA At 869.696 PSIA Saturation Temperature = 869.696 850 = 19.696 PSIA x 0.1342°F!PSIA = 2.6432032 + 525.24

- = 527.8832032°F Subcooling° 527.8832032-517 = 10.8832032°F Solution D:

895 PSIG + 14.696 = 909.696 PSIA Steam Table Interpolation (900 to 950 PSIA) 538.39°F 53 1.95°F = 6.44°F! 50 PSIA = 0.1288°F!PSIA At 909.696 PSIA Saturation Temperature 909.696-900 = 9.696 PSIA x 0.1288°F!PSIA = 1.2488448 + 531.95 533.1988448°F Subcooling = 533.1988448-523 10.1988448°F The minimum subcooling and hence the minimum Primary-to-Secondary leakage would be the condition in Answer D.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

With the four sets of conditions given, all four subcooling values are within 1.5°F of each other. It would be very easy to perform a math error and determine that any one of the four answers would result in minimum subcooling and thus minimum Primary-to-Secondary leakage.

Therefore, all answers are plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

With the four sets of conditions given, all four subcooling values are within 1.5°F of each other. It would be very easy to perform a math error and determine that any one of the four answers would result in minimum subcooling and thus minimum Primary-to-Secondary leakage.

Therefore, all answers are plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

With the four sets of conditions given, all four subcooling values are within 1.5°F of each other. It would be very easy to perform a math error and determine that any one of the four answers would result in minimum subcooling and thus minimum Primary-to-Secondary leakage.

Therefore, all answers are plausible.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is match because the applicant is given a set of conditions where a Steam Generator Tube Leak is present and must perform calculations involving interpolation of the Steam Tables to determine which condition minimizes subcooling thus minimizes Primary-to-Secondary leakage.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to perform multiple calculations to determine which condition represents the minimum subcooling.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 59 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Steam Tables Steam Tables Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-E3 Objective 4 APEO37 AKI.01 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8 /41.10/45.3)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 6O APEO51 AA2.02 Loss of Condenser Vacuum Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is operating at 1 00% RTP

Main condenser vacuum is degrading slowly

AP-23 (LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM) has been implemented In accordance with AP-23, a turbine trip is required if Main Condenser vacuum is less than a MAXIMUM of (1)

After the Main Turbine is tripped, decay heat removal will be via the (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 231 HG

2. Steam Dumps B. 1. 20HG 2 Steam Dumps C. 1. 23HG

2. SMPORVs D. 1. 20 HG

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 General Discussion AP-23 required the Main Turbine to be tripped if Main Condenser vacuum is less than 20HG. With condenser vacuum less than 20HG, C-9 will not be met (i.e. condenser is not available) and the Steam Dumps will not arm. Therefore, heat removal will be via the SM PORVs.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since annunciator for condenser lo vacuum turbine trip will alarm at less than 23 HG.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes the steam dump system can still be armed with degrading vacuum.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes the steam dump system can still be armed with degrading vacuum.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since annunciator for condenser lo vacuum turbine trip will alarm at less than 23 HG.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant will be required to interpret plant conditions and determine when a Reactor and/or turbine trip is required.

Basis for Hi Cog This is Hi Cog since the applicant will be required to evaluate the loss of condenser vacuum and determine the affect on the steam dump system.

C-9 will not be met (i.e. condenser is not available) and the Steam Dumps will not arm. Therefore, heat removal will be via the SM PORVs.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q58 (Bank 4484)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-23 (Loss of Condenser Vacuum)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-23 Objective 4 APEO5 1 AA2.02 Loss of Condenser Vacuum Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 61 61 APEO68 AA2.05 Control Room Evacuation Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Availability ofheat sink Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The Control Room has been evacuated due to toxic gas

AP-17 (LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM) has been implemented In accordance with AP-17:

A local operator will ensure an adequate heat sink is maintained by monitoring S/G (1) level indication.

The local operator maintains S/G levels within the specified range by (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Narrow-Range

2. adjusting the manual loaders at the local CA pump panels B. 1. Wide-Range

2. adjusting the manual loaders at the local CA pump panels C. 1. Narrow-Range

2. manually throttling the motor operated isolation valves in the Doghouses D. 1. Wide-Range

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 61 6l General Discussion In accordance with AP-17, an operator is dispatched to the CA pump panel to take local control of the CA pumps and control SG at the CA pump panel. The indication that is available at the CA pump panel is WR level.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall what indication is available at the CA pump panel.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not understand what indications are available in the interior and exterior doghouses.

The second part is plausible because during an SSF event SG levels are controlled in the interior and exterior doghouses using the TD CA pump motor operated valves.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not understand what indications are available in the interior and exterior doghouses.

The second part is plausible because during an SSF event SG levels are controlled in the interior and exterior doghouses using the TD CA pump motor operated valves.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of what indications are available for determining if an adequate heat sink is available and how S/G levels are adjusted to maintain an adequate heat sink.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q61 (Bank 2961)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-17 (Loss of Control Room)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-I7 Objective 5 APEO68 AA2.05 Control Room Evacuation Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: (CFR: 43.5 /45.13)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 62 APEO76 AK2.OI High Reactor Coolant Activity Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following: (CFR 41.7/45.7)

Process radiation monitors Given the following on Unit 1:

IEMF-48 (REACTOR COOLANT NC SAMPLE LINE) is in Trip 2 alarm

1EMF-18 (REACTOR COOLANT FILTER IA) is in Trip 2 alarm

The crew has implemented AP-18 (HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT) 1 EMF-48 is located in the NM (Nuclear Sampling) system downstream of the Reactor Coolant (1) Sample Hx.

Related to its capability to identify a failed fuel event, EMF-48 detects (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Cold Leg

2. total gamma flux AND N16 gamma from NC system coolant B. 1. Cold Leg

2. total gamma flux from NC system after a 1 minute sample delay time C. 1. Hot Leg

2. total gamma flux AND N16 gamma from NC system coolant D. 1. HotLeg

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 62 General Discussion The sample tap for EMF-48 (Reactor Coolant NC Sample Line) is downstream of the NC Hot Leg Sample Hx.

EMF-48 detects total gamma flux from the NC system after a 1 minute sample delay time.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because Licensed Operators frequently confuse the location of the sample tap for EMF-48 and dont recall whether it is a Cold Leg or Hot Leg sample.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the sample line arrangement specific to EMF-48. If EMF-48 did not have a delay loop, it would be sampling both total gamma flux and N 16 gamma and this would be a correct answer.

Answer B Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because Licensed Operators frequently confuse the location of the sample tap for EMF-48 and dont recall whether it is a Cold Leg or Hot Leg sample.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the sample line arrangement specific to EMF-48. If EMF-48 did not have a delay loop, it would be sampling both total gamma flux and N16 gamma and this would be a correct answer.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The applicant must have knowledge of the capability of EMF-48 (a process radiation monitor) as it relates to a failed fuel event (High Reactor Coolant Activity). By demonstrating this knowledge the applicant demonstrates a knowledge of the interrealation between Process Radiation monitors and high Reactor Coolant activity. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog -

Basis for SRO only -___________________________________________________

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF AP-18, (High Activity in Reactor Coolant)

E Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 2 APEO76 AK2.O 1 High Reactor Coolant Activity Knowledge of the interrelations between the High Reactor Coolant Activity and the following: (CFR 41.7 I 45.7)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 63 WE15 2.4.4 Containment Flooding WEI5 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6)

Given the following on Unit 1:

The unit is initially at 100% RTP

At 1100 a Large Break LOCA occurs

At 1215, the crew is in E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT), waiting for the time to transfer to Hot Leg Recirc

Containment sump level is 7.5 feet and slowly increasing

1) If Containment Sump level is increasing at a constant rate of 0.25 feet per minute, at what time is entry into FR-Z.2 (RESPONSE TO CONTAINMENT FLOODING),

FIRST required?

2) Why is safe plant recovery not assured for a design-basis Large Break LOCA when Containment water level requires entry into FR Z.2?

A. 1. 1225

2. Operation of critical ECCS components needed for safe recovery is endangered by submersion.

B. 1. 1235

2. Operation of critical ECCS components needed for safe recovery is endangered by submersion.

C. 1. 1225

2. Operation of the hydrogen skimmer system is compromised by loss of direct access to the containment atmosphere.

D. 1. 1235

2. Operation of the hydrogen skimmer system is compromised by loss of direct access to the containment atmosphere.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 General Discussion Per EP-F-0, FR-Z.2 will be entered due to an Orange condition upon Containment Sump level increasing to 12.5 feet. Containment sump level will stop going up at about 13.5 ft. as this is the level at which spillover to the in-core instrument room sump will occur.

12.5 ft 7.5 ft = 5.0 ft. Level is increasing at 0.25ft/min. 5.0 ft/ .25ft/min 20 minutes.

Per FR-Z.2 background document, Containment flooding is a concern since critical plant components necessary for plant recovery may be damaged and rendered inoperable.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes ten feet is required Containment Sump level for entry into FR-Z.2 Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes ten feet is required Containment Sump level for entry into FR-Z.2 Second part is plausible since Hydrogen Skimmer fans take a suction on various lower containment dead end spaces and discharge into upper containment.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since Hydrogen Skimmer fans take a suction on various lower containment dead end spaces and discharge into upper containment.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched since the applicant must be able to determine when to enter FR-Z.2 (Response to Containment Flooding) based on current trend in Containment Sump level.

Basis for Hi Cog The question is Hi Cog since the applicant must analyze the current conditions and calculate when Containment Sump level reaches the level required for entry into FR-Z.2 (Response to Containment Flooding).

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q65 (Bank 4487)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

FR-Z.2 (Response to Containment Flooding)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-FRZ Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRZ Objectives 2 & 4 WE15 2.4.4 Containment Flooding WEI5 GENERIC Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 /45.6)

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 64 WEO3 EK2.2 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7/45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant. emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems. and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Small-Break LOCA has occurred

ES-1.2 (POST LOCA 000LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION) has been implemented

Containment pressure is 2.8 PSIG and STABLE In accordance with ES-1.2:

The crew will FIRST attempt to establish an NC system cooldown using the (1)

The crew will coold own (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. SMPORVs

2. as close as possible without exceeding 100°F in an hour B. 1. SMPORV5

2. at the maximum rate C. 1. Condenser Dumps

2. as close as possible without exceeding 100° F in an hour D. 1. Condenser Dumps

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 64 General Discussion ES-i.2 specifies a cooldown rate based on NC T-colds as close as possible without exceeding 100°F in an hour.

ES-i .2 directs the operators to first attempt to establish a cooldown using Steam Dumps.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant concludes that steam flow using the Condenser Dumps can NOT be established. The SM PORVs would be the next choice directed by ES-l.2. Also, if Containment pressure was greater than 3 PSIG, a Main Steam Isolation would have occurred and the operator would have to reset the MS1 and open the MSIVs to establish a cooldown. Even so, in the interim until the MSIVs can be reopened, ES-1.2 directs the operator to establish a cooldown using the SM PORVs.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant concludes that steam flow using the Condenser Dumps can NOT be established. The SM PORVs would be the next choice directed by ES-i .2. Also, if Containment pressure was greater than 3 P51G. a Main Steam Isolation would have occurred and the operator would have to reset the MSl and open the MS1Vs to establish a cooldown. Even so, in the interim until the MSIVs can be reopened, ES-i .2 directs the operator to establish a cooldown using the SM PORVs.

The second part is plausible because cooling down at the maximum rate is a strategy that is used in other situations in the EOP network when an NC system cooldown is required.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because cooling down at the maximum rate is a strategy that is used in other situations in the EOP network when an NC system cooldown is required.

Basis for meeting the KA

[iiK/A is met by testing the interrelationship with Post LOCA cooldown and depressurization and heat removal (maximum permissible cooldown rate and method of cooldown).

Basis for I-li Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2009 CNS NRC Q23 MODIFIED (Bank 1623)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

ES- 1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-El Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-Ei Objective 3 WEO3 EK2.2 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Knowledge of the interrelations bettveen the (LOCA Cooldown and Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 184 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 Depressurization) and the following:

r 64 (CFR: 41.7 /45.7)

Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 65 WEO8 EK3.3 Pressurized Thermal Shock Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.5 /41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Small-Break LOCA has occurred

Containment pressure is 1.2 PSIG

NC system pressure is 400 PSIG

FR-P.1 (RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK) has been implemented

SI Termination criteria per FR-P.1 has been met To terminate Safety Injection, FR-P.1 directs the operator to reset (1) and stop (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. theSequencersONLY

2. both NI pumps and all but one NV pump ONLY B. 1. Safety Injection AND the Sequencers

2. both NI pumps, both ND pumps and all but one NV pump C. 1. Safety Injection AND the Sequencers

2. both NI pumps and all but one NV pump ONLY D. 1. theSequencersONLY

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 65 B General Discussion Per FR-P.1, when SI termination criteria is met, SI and the Sequencers must be reset. Termination of SI flow is required to stop any unwarranted cooldown and this is accomplished by stopping all but one NV pump, both NI pump and both ND pumps if ND pumps suction is aligned to the FWST. Due to the SI that has occurred, ND pump suction is aligned to the FWST.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Sequencers only is plausible since the sequencer is what loaded the emergency safeguards pumps on the bus and must be reset to regain control board control of these pumps. However, if SI is not reset the initiating start signal would still be present.

Second part is true but not complete. Plausible since applicant must be aware that ND pumps are taking a suction on the FWST due to the SI that has occurred and must be secured.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible Second part is true but not complete. Plausible since applicant must be aware that ND pumps are taking a suction on the FWST due to the SI that has occurred and must be secured.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Sequencers only is plausible since the sequencer is what loaded the emergency safeguards pumps on the bus and must be reset to regain control board control of these pumps. However, if SI is not reset the initiating start signal would still be present.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must know which controls to manipulate to terminate Safety Injection flow that is causing an undesired cooldown of the NC system.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-EP-FRP Objective 3 WEO8 EK3.3 Pressurized Thermal Shock Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.5 /41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 66 GEN2.1 2.1.36 GENERIC Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.6/45.7)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is in Mode 6

A ND Train is in operation

B ND Train is available Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would prevent commencing fuel movement?

(Consider each individually)

A. The Refueling Cavity level is lowered to 370 on 1 NCP-5990 (NC WR LEVEL).

B. MCB Annunciator 1AD1OIF-1 (UPPER CONT AIRLOCK RX DOOR OPEN),

alarms.

C. The Equipment Hatch is closed with 2 bolts fastened.

D. The reactor has been subcritical for 96 hours0.00111 days 0.0267 hours 1.587302e-4 weeks 3.6528e-5 months .

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 66 General Discussion ccording to Technical Specification LCO 3.9.4, the equipment hatch must be closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Since there is only two bolts holding the hatch in place, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment must be stopped immediately (LCO 3.9.4 Condition A).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since Technical Specification LCO 3.9.7,requires Refueling cavity water level to be maintained >23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since Technical Specification LCO 3.9.4, requires that a minimum of one door in each air lock must be closed during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since SLC 16.9,17 requires that the reactor be shutdown greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must have knowledge (i.e. conditions that result in a suspension of Core Alterations) of the effect of a

[toss of containment integrity under shutdown conditions.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK CNS Exam Bank Q1561 Development References Student References Provided

References:

Tech Spec 3.9.4 (Containment Penetrations)

Learning Objectives:

JONE GEN2.1 2.1.36 GENERIC Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Knowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations. (CFR: 41.10/43.6 / 45.7) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 190 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 L 67 GEN2.1 2.1.45 GENERIC Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is in MODE 4 with the A Train of ND in service

LTOP key switches for PORVs are selected to NORM position

Annunciator 1AD-9 I Al (1 ND-2A OPEN AND NC HI PRESS) has just come in alarm

NC WR pressure is indicating 460 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following describes the redundant indication which would be used to verify that this annunciator is valid?

A. PRT Level increasing ONLY B. CF&E sump level increasing ONLY C. PORVs NC-32B and NC-34A would be lifting D. 1ND-1B (C HL SUCTION TO ND ISOLATION) would have auto closed Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 191 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 67 General Discussion In the scenario given, the Unit is shutdown in Mode 4 on RHR cooling. Annunciator IAD-9/ Al (1ND-1A Open and NC Hi Press) has alarmed and the alarm setpoint for this annunciator is 440 PSIG NC System WR pressure. The suction relief for the RHR (ND) pump opens at 450 PSIG and relieves to the PRT.

The applicant is asked to determine what alternate indication could be used to validate that this alarm is valid and the actual NC System is greater than 440 PSIG. Additional information given in the stem of the question is that the LTOP key switches are in the normal The correct answer is A which would be consistent with actual NC system pressure being greater than the ND suction relief setpoint of 450 PSIG which would therefore be open and relieving to the PRT which would result in an increasing PRT level. IND-lB is in series with 1ND-2A in the suction of the ND piping and has a open permissive at 385 PSIG but when RHR is in service, the FDR breakers for these two valves are maintained open.

LTOP PORV setpoint is 385 PSIG when LTOP is placed in service but with the LTOP key switches is normal, LTOP is not in service Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the CF&E sumps are located in the containment building and receive a number or relief valve discharge flow from various systems including the NCP thermal barriers and the NCDT reliefs. The applicant could conclude that this as a reasonable flowpath for the ND suction relief valves.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because if LTOP was in service and pressure was greater than 385 P51G. both of the PORV should be open. Therefore it would be reasonable for the applicant to select this response if he failed to realize that LTOP has not been placed in service.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because 1ND-1B is interlocked with NC system WR pressure at 385 PSIG and cannot be opened until NC pressure is below this value. Prior to ND being placed in service, the feeder breaker for this is opened and maintained open during RHR operation. If the applicant does not recall that this breaker is maintained open it would be reasonable to believe that this valve would close if actual pressure was at 460 PSIG.

Basis for meeting the KA The KIA is matched because the applicant is presented with a scenario is which an annunciator (IND-2A Open and NC Hi Press) has alarmed which is associated with the RHR (ND) system aligned in a shutdown cooling mode. Also in the stem there is conflicting NC pressure indication given and he must then demonstrate the ability to select the correct alternate indication which could be utilized to confirm the annunciator is valid.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must perform a level of analysis concerning the given indications and determine the resulting effect and predict a response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS NRC Exam Q4 (Bank 4358)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ND Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-IPE-DCS Section 2.7 Annunciator Response for IAD-9/ Al Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 192 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 67]

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PS-ND Objective 6 GEN2.1 2.1.45 GENERIC Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Ability to identify and interpret diverse indications to validate the response of another indication. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus 1 Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 193 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 68 GEN2.2 2.2.18 GENERIC Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 /43.5 /45.13)

Regarding Maintenance Rule Assessments:

NSD-403 (SHUTDOWN RISK MANAGEMENT) is the official tool for performing risk assessment in MODES (1)

When using the Electronic Risk Assessment Tool (ERAT), the color associated with a condition where the capability of the ERAT software has been exceeded is (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 4, 5, 6, and No MODE ONLY

2. RED B. 1. 3,4,5,6and NoMODE

2. RED C. 1. 4, 5,6, and No MODE ONLY

2. WHITE D. 1. 3, 4, 5,6and NoMODE

2. WHITE Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 194 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 68 General Discussion rin accordance with ADM-MRA. NSD-403 (Shutdown Risk Management) is the official tool for performing risk assessment in MODES 4. 5, 6 and NO MODE.

The color associated with a condition where the capability of the ERAT tool has been exceeded is white.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant misinterprets the question and concludes that it is asking the color associated with a condition where the highest level of acceptable risk has been exceeded as opposed to the capability of the ERAT software being exceeded.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the applicability of NSD-403 since MODE 3 is a shutdown condition specified by Tech Specs.

The second part is plausible if the applicant misinterprets the question and concludes that it is asking the color associated with a condition where the highest level of acceptable risk has been exceeded as opposed to the capability of the ERAT software being exceeded.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the applicability ofNSD-403 since MODE 3 is a shutdown condition specified by Tech Specs.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA e KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the procedures used to assess and manage shutdown risk.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References tudent References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ADM-MRA Section 2.1 Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-ADM-MRA Objectives 5 & 6 GEN2.2 2.2.18 GENERIC Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations. such as risk assessments, work prioritization. etc.

(CFR: 41.10/43.5/45.13)

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 195 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 69 GEN2.2 2.2.3 8 GENERIC Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 /45.13)

Given the following:

Unit 1 is shutdown

NC system temperature is 140°F

cA Train components are in operation

DIG 1 B is tagged for maintenance

The NC system WR level is 55 inches Given the following events occur:

The 1A RN pump trips on overcurrent

The operating crew has completed the actions of AP-20 Case 1 (LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN)

What actions are required (if any) per Tech Spec 3.7.7 (NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM)?

A. RN is not required to be Operable:

No action is required per this LCO.

B. Only ONE train of RN is required to be Available:

No action is required per this LCO.

C. BOTH trains of RN are required to be Operable:

Enter the applicable action statement of TS 3.7.7.

D. Only ONE train of RN is required to be Operable:

Enter the applicable Action Statement of TS 3.7.7.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 197 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 69 General Discussion Technical Specification 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System is applicable in Modes 1-4. It is given that the Unit is in ModeS. Therefore, TS 3.7.7 is not applicable.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE Plausible because many of our LCOs require only one train in Mode 4 or 5 and SLC 16.5.2 requires both trains to be available but not operable.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because the applicant may conclude this T.S. is applicable in Mode 5 and/or confuse the requirements of SLC 16.5.2 which requires both trains to be available but not operable.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because many of our LCOs require only one train in Mode 4 or 5.

Basis for meeting the KA

[iie K/A is matched since the question tests the conditions and limitations of Tech Spec requirements for the Nuclear Service Water system.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because the applicant must analyze plant conditions and determine that TS 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System is not applicable in the current mode.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC Q17 (Bank 3011)

I Development References Student References Provided

References:

Tech Spec 3.7.7 (Nuclear Service Water System)

SLC 16.5.2 (Power Systems and Decay Heat Removal - Reduced Inventory Operation)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-PSS-RN Objective 17 GEN2.2 2.2.38 GENERIC Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 198 of 291

Q69

References:

From Tech Spec 3.7.7 (Nuclear Service Water System):

3 7 PLiJT SYSTEMS jy;1e.ESeRice Water System (FISW 5.1 Two NSWStrains shall be OPERAELE.

APPLICAEILIT MODESI 2 3 and4 ACTIONS CONDITION REDUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One NSWStrain A.1 -NOTES---------

inoperable. 1. Enterapplicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO3.8.1. AC Sources Operating for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by NSWS.

2. Enterapplicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.8. RCS LoopsMODE 4, for residual heat removal loops made in o perae by N SW S.

Restore NSWStrain to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

(co nti nu cdl cLjre Units I kind 2 3.7.7-1 Amendment Hcs. 1341

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 GEN2.3 2.3.12 GENERIC Radiation Control r

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12/45.9 / 45.10)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Letdown Heat Exchanger Room dose rate = 3000 mREM/HR In accordance with NSD-507 (RADIATION PROTECTION):

The Letdown Heat Exchanger Room must be posted as a (1) Area.

Access to the room must be controlled by (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Locked High Radiation

2. locking the entrance or posting a guard at the entrance B. 1. Locked High Radiation

2. placing a flashing yellow sign at the entrance C. 1. Very High Radiation

2. locking the entrance or posting a guard at the entrance D. 1. Very High Radiation

2. placing a flashing yellow sign at the entrance Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 199 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 General Discussion In accordance with NSD-507, Section 507.7.2B:

Locked High Radiation Area an area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of 1.0 rem in 1 hr at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates. These areas are locked or guarded and require continuous RP coverage for entry. In areas that cannot be reasonably locked, a flashing yellow light is used as a warning device.

Very High Radiation Area an area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels could result in an individual receiving an absorbed dose in excess of 500 rad in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at 1 meter from a radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates. These areas are locked at all times and require continuous RP coverage for entry.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because this would be correct if the area did not have door that is lockable.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the posting requirements ofNSD-507 or misreads the stem of the question and concludes that dose rates are greater than the 500 RIHR limit in NSD-507 for a VHRA posting.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant does not recall the posting requirements ofNSD-507 or misreads the stem of the question and concludes that dose rates are greater than the 500 RIHR limit in NSD-507 for a VHRA posting.

Second part is plausible because this would be correct if the area did not have door that is lockable.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of how a locked high-radiation area is defined and how access is controlled to that area.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only L

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK ONS Bank Question 4007 Development References Student References Provided

References:

4SD-507 Rev 16, Section 507.7.2 B (Posting Definitions)

Learning Objectives:

JONE Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 200 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 7O GEN2.3 2.3.12 GENERIC Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: marksIStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 201 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 7l GEN2.3 2.3.13 GENERIC Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4/45.9/45.10)

In accordance with NSD-507 (RADIATION PROTECTION):

You must immediately exit the RCAIRCZ if a (1) alarm is received.

This alarm (2) automatically reset.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. DOSE

2. WILL B. 1. DOSE RATE

2. WILL C. 1. DOSE

2. WILL NOT D. 1. DOSE RATE

2. WILL NOT Thursday, October 17, 2013 Page 202 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 7l General Discussion In accordance with NSD-507:

If the ED dose alarm sounds, immediately inform co-workers, exit the RCAIRCZ and call RP. Reentry is not permitted until the alarm is cleared by RP.

ED dose-rate alarms may be anticipated by RP due to higher dose rates in the travel path to the work location OR a worker being in close proximity to a radiation source. Anticipated dose rate alarms shall be discussed during RP brief prior to beginning work. Work can continue following a travel path dose rate alarm providing the alarm clears prior to arriving at the work location. For anticipated dose rate alarms due to proximity to a radiation source, work may continue for no more than two dose rate alarms. IF a third anticipated dose rate alarm is received, stop work and notify RP immediately. For unanticipated dose rate alarms (any dose rate alarm that is SOT briefed by RP prior to beginning work) immediately stop work and contact RP.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses a DOSE alarm with a DOSE RATE alarm. The DOSE RATE alarm will automatically clear when the dose rate decreases to less than 80% of the alarm setpoint.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is if the applicant confuses the DOSE alarm with a DOSE RATE alarm. This is plausible since RP must be notified if either a DOSE alarm or an unanticipated DOSE RATE alarm is received.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses a DOSE alarm with a DOSE RATE alarm. The DOSE RATE alarm will automatically clear when the dose rate decreases to less than 80% of the alarm setpoint.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion

[NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is if the applicant confuses the DOSE alarm with a DOSE RATE alarm. This is plausible since RP must be notified if either a DOSE alarm or an unanticipated DOSE RATE alarm is received.

rhe second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of their response to a radiation monitor (ED) alarm.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

SD-507 (Radiation Protection)

Learning Objectives:

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 203 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 7l NONE GEN2.3 2.3.13 GENERIC Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 204 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 72 GEN2.3 2.3.4 GENERIC Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4/45.10)

Given the following conditions:

A worker will be replacing a valve in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building

The workers current dose for the year is 1400 mREM

The dose rate in the area where he will be working is 50 mREM/HR The worker can take up to (1) to complete the job before exceeding the Duke Energy annual ALERT exposure limit.

To exceed the ALERT exposure limit, the worker must (2)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. notify their supervisor B. 1. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

2. notify their supervisor C. 1. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

2. obtain a dose extension D. 1. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

2. obtain a dose extension Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 205 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 General Discussion Radiation Monitoring and Control System Flags To ensure individuals do not exceed dose limits, the EDC computer program provides the following flags as individuals approach their established dose limit:

Alert Flag Notification that individual reached 80% or greater, but less than 90%, of established administrative limit. Individual should notifi his/her supervisor. Individual must receive RP supervision approval to enter a High Radiation Area or Locked High Radiation Area.

Exclude Flag Notification that individual reached 90% or greater of established administrative limit. Individual may not enter the RCAIRCZ until he/she receives a dose extension approved by their Section Manager and the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM).

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the ALERT and EXCLUDE exposure limits as this would be correct for the EXCLUDE limit.

Second part is correct,.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the ALERT and EXCLUDE exposure limits. A dose extension is required for a worker to exceed the EXCLUDE exposure limit.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant confuses the ALERT and EXCLUDE exposure limits as this would be correct for the EXCLUDE limit.

Second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the ALERT and EXCLUDE exposure limits. A dose extension is required for a worker to exceed the EXCLUDE exposure limit.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the Duke Energy administrative exposure limits.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, it requires the applicant to recall from memory the Duke Energy administrative exposure limits and the requirements for exceeding those limits. Then, the applicant must perform a calculation to determine when the worker will exceed the associated exposure limit.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

References:

SD-507 Rev. 16 Section 507.6.3 (Exposure Monitoring Warning Flags/Alarms)

Learning Objectives:

NONE Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 206 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 72 GEN2.3 2.3.4 GENERIC Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 I 43.4 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 207 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 73 GEN2.4 2.4.11 GENERIC Emergency Procedures! Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A loss of Instrument Air (VI) has occurred

The crew has implemented AP-22 (LOSS OF VI)

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would IMMEDIATELY require tripping the reactor in accordance with AP-22?

A. Pressurizer level going up in an uncontrolled manner.

B. Reactor Coolant Pump stator temperatures are 301 °F and going up.

C. Reactor coolant system temperature less than 557°F and going down.

D. FRV controllers indicate 1 00% demand and S/G levels are going down.

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 73 General Discussion With FRV demand at 100% and SG levels going down, this meets the criteria for SG levels going down in and uncontrolled manner which would require the Operators to immediately trip the Reactor and go to E-0.

In time the NC pumps would have to be tripped but not at this time.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because pressurizer level increasing in an uncontrolled manner is expected as a possible consequence of the loss of VI and AP-22 contains Foldout actions to mitigate the Pressurizer level increase.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because loss of cooling to the NC pump stators is an expected consequence of the loss of VI. AP-22 would have the Operators trip the reactor and stop all NC pumps. However, NC pump stator temperatures have not yet increased high enough to require a reactor trip.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because NC system temperature decreasing in an uncontrolled manner is expected as a possible consequence of the loss of VI and AP-22 contains Foldout actions to mitigate the uncontrolled cooldown.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of AP-22.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2005 MNS NRC Exam (Bank 3624) Old MNS Bank Ql 103 Development References Student References Provided

References:

AP-22 Rev. 32 (Loss of VI)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-AP-22 Objective 5 GEN2.4 2.4.11 GENERIC Emergency Procedures! Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /45.13) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 209 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 74 GEN2.4 2.4.25 GENERIC Emergency Procedures! Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of fire protection procedures. (CFR: 41.10/43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following plant conditions:

A fire has occurred in the Unit 2 Turbine Building basement

The A Main Fire Pump auto-started due to a low fire header pressure signal

The fire brigade has extinguished the fire after forty-five minutes

IA and 1 B Jockey Pumps are OFF

A Main Fire Pump is running

B and C Main Fire Pumps are OFF Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the process of recovering from a low fire header pressure and returning the Main Fire and Jockey pumps to normal alignment in accordance with OP/i 1A164001002A (FIRE P ROT ECTI ON SYSTEM)?

A. Stop the A Main Fire Pump, place the Jockey pump to be started in MAN, and place the other Jockey pump in START.

B. Stop the A Main Fire Pump, place the Jockey pump to be started in START, and place the other Jockey pump in MAN.

C. Place the Jockey pump to be started in START, the other Jockey pump in MAN, and stop the A Main Fire Pump.

D. Place the Jockey Pump to be started in MAN, START the Jockey Pump selected to MAN, and stop the A Main Fire Pump.

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 211 of 291

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE 2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 74 General Discussion In accordance with OP/1/A16400/002A (Fire Protection System) Enclosure 4.1 (Startup and Normal Operation of RF/RY System) Section 3.7 (Stopping a Main Fire Pump):

1) IF only one Main Fire Pump is running perform the following:

A. Place the RF Jockey Pump to be started in MAN B. Depress START for selected RF Jockey Pump.

C. HOLD until RF Pressurizer Tank pressure indicates greater than or equal to 107 psig.

D. Stop running Main Fire Pump.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The Fire Protection System is an infrequently operated system. Since neither jockey pump is running initially the applicant may conclude that a Jockey Pump does not have to be started prior to stopping the Main Fire Pump. The applicant may also not understand the significance of the switch positions for the Jockey Pumps and conclude that these positions are correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The Fire Protection System is an infrequently operated system. Since neither jockey pump is running initially the applicant may conclude that a Jockey Pump does not have to be started prior to stopping the Main Fire Pump. The applicant may also not understand the significance of the switch positions for the Jockey Pumps and conclude that these positions are correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

The Fire Protection System is an infrequently operated system. It is correct that a jockey pump must be started first and then the Main Fire Pump is stopped. However, to start the Jockey Pump, the MAN pushbutton must first be depressed and then the START pushbutton can be depressed to start the Jockey Pump.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the Fire Protection System operating procedure.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS AUDIT Q68 (Bank 3796)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP/l/A!6400!002A Enclosure 4.1 (Startup and Normal Operation of RY/RY System)

Learning Objectives:

4ONE GEN2.4 2.4.25 GENERIC Emergency Procedures / Plan Emergency Procedures! Plan Knowledge of fire protection procedures. (CFR: 41.10! 43.5 !45.13)

Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 212 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 75 GEN2.4 2.4.31 GENERIC Emergency Procedures I Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.3)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A BLACKOUT has occurred on 1 ETA

DIG iN failed to start due to an 86N relay actuation

Annunciator lAD-i 1/ B4 (BATTERY EVCA UNDERVOLTAGE) is in alarm Per the Annunciator Response Procedure, which ONE (1) of the following addresses the Battery EVCA under voltage condition?

A. Cross tie EVDB to EVDA B. Cross tie EVDC to EVDA C. Swap Battery Charger Connection box to 2EMXH D. Swap Battery Charger Connection box to 2EMXA Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 214 of 291

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2013A MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 L General Discussion The Annunciator Response Procedure will direct the operator to swap Battery Charge EVCA power supplies in accordance with OP/0!A!6350/OOlA (125 VDC!120 VAC Vital Instrument And Control Power System). Enclosure 4.19 (Swapping Battery Charger 600V Supply Breaker at Charger Connection Box) will give the operator the option of energizing the battery charger from IEMXA or 2EMXA. Since 1EMXA is unavailable due to the BLACKOUT on IETA, the operator would energize the battery charger from 2EMXA.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Since BOTH EVDA and EVDB can be supplied from Battery Charger EVCS, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that via a series of breaker manipulations, the two busses can be cross-tied.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Since BOTH EVDA and EVDC can be supplied from Battery Charger EVCS, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that via a series of breaker manipulations, the two busses can be cross-tied.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Since 2EMXH can supply Battery Charger EVCS which can supply Bus EVCA, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that this may be the correct course of action.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KJA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the how the annunciator response procedures can help mitigate the consequences of a malfunction during implementation of the Emergency Procedures.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the condition given and then determine a course of action. 1 Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2007 M1JS NRC Exam Q52 (Bank 3745)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

OP/l/A16100/OIOL (Annunciator Response for IAD-l I)

OP/0!A16350!00l A (125 VDC/120 VAC Vital Instrument and Control Power),

Enclosure 4.19 (Swapping Battery Charger 600V Supply Breaker at Charger Connection Box EVCA-EVCD)

Learning Objectives:

ONE GEN2.4 2.4.3 1 GENERIC Emergency Procedures! Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.3) 401-9 Comments: RemarkslStatus Tuesday, October 15, 2013 Page 215 of 291

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