ML21054A134

302 Exam Administrative Items 2A-3 (2 Year Delayed Release)

ML21054A134
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/23/2021
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Duke Energy Carolinas
References
50-369/20-302, 50-370/20-302 50-369/OL-20, 50-370/OL-20
Download: ML21054A134 (30)

Text

ES-401 1

Form ES-401-2 Facility: McGuire 1&2 Date of Exam: September 2020 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

3 3

3 N/A 3

3 N/A 3

18 2

4 6

2 2

2 1

1 2

1 9

2 2

4 Tier Totals 5

5 4

4 5

4 27 4

6 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

3 2

2 3

2 2

2 3

3 3

3 28 3

2 5

2 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

10 1

1 1

3 Tier Totals 4

2 3

4 3

3 3

4 4

4 4

38 5

3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

2 3

2 3

2 2

1 2

Note: 1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ML21054A134

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 X

X 007EK1.02; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the reactor trip: Shutdown margin 007EG2.4.3; Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

007E G2.4.20 - Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

3.4 3.9 4.3 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X

008AK2.03; Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and: Controllers and positioners 2.5 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 X

009EK2.03; Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and: S/Gs 3.0 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 X 011EG2.4.11; Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

4.2 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 X

015AK2.10; Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and:

RCP indicators and controls 2.8 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 X

022AK3.01; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Emergency Boration: When emergency boration is required 4.1 000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 X

025AA2.07; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

Pump cavitation.

3.4 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 X

026AA2.05; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Loss of CCW: Normal values for CCW header flow rate and flow rates to the components cooled by CCW 2.5 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 X

027AA1.01; Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:

PZR heaters, sprays, PORVs 4.0 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 X

029EA1.06; Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to an ATWS: Operating switches for normal charging header isolation valves 3.2 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 X

038EK1.04; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR: Reflux boiling 3.1 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 X

054AA2.03; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater: Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup 4.1 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 X

055EG2.2.37; Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

2.9 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 X

056AA1.18; Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Control room normal ventilation supply fan.

3.2 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 X

057AK3.01; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus.

4.1 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X

058AG2.2.37; Ability to determine operability or availability of safety-related equipment.

4.6 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 X

062AA2.01; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Location of a leak in the SWS 2.9 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X

065AK3.04; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

Cross-over to backup air supplies 3.0 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 X

077AG2.2.40; Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

4.7 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X

WE04G2.2.44; Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

4.4

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 (W E05) Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 X

WE05EG2.4.2; Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

4.5 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 X

WE11EA2.2; Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

4.2 (W E12) Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators / 4 X

WE12EK1.2; Knowledge of the operational implications of:

Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures associated with Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators.

3.5 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

3 3

3/2 3/4 Group Point Total:

18/6

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 X

003AA1.05; Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Reactor power - turbine power 4.1 000005 (APE05) Inoperable/stuck Control Rod / 1 X

005AA2.01; Ability to determine and interpret: Stuck or inoperable control rod from in-core and ex-core NIS, in-core, or loop temperature measurements.

3.3 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 X

024AK3.02; Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Emergency Boration: Actions contained in EOP for emergency boration 4.2 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08)

Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 X

036AK1.02; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Fuel Handling Incidents: SDM 3.4 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 X

037AA2.2.04; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the SGTL: Comparison of RCS fluid inputs and outputs, to detect leaks 3.4 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X

051AG2.1.31 - Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.

3.8 4.4 000068 (APE 68; BW A06)

Control Room Evacuation / 8 X

068AK2.01; Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: Auxiliary shutdown panel layout 3.9 000069 (APE 69) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 X

069AA2.02; Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity 3.9 076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X 076AG2.4.31; Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

4.1 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X WE01&02G2.1.32: Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.

4.0 (W E03) LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization / 3 X

WE03EK2.2; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as it applies to LOCA C/D and Depressurization:

Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to operation of the facility 3.7 (W E08) Pressurized Thermal Shock / 4 X

WE08EA2.2; Ability to determine and interpret the following as it applies to PTS: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments 3.5 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 X WE15EK1.2; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following as it applies to Containment Flooding: Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures 2.7 K/A Category Point Totals:

2 2

1 1

2/2 1/2 Group Point Total:

9/4

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P) Reactor Coolant Pump X

003K1.10; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and: RCS 3.0 004 (SF1; SF2) Chemical and Volume Control X

X 004K1.05; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between CVCS and:

CRDS operation in automatic mode control 004K5.18; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to CVCS:

Relationship between neutron flux and reactivity 2.7 2.8 005 (SF4P) Residual Heat Removal X

X 005K3.06; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on: CSS 005A2.02; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown on RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

3.1 3.7 006 (SF2; SF3) Emergency Core Cooling X

X 006A1.14; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ECCS controls including:

Reactor vessel level.

006A2.11, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of rupture of ECCS header on ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

3.6 4.0 007 (SF5) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X

X 007A1.03; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including:

Monitoring quench tank temperature 007K1.01; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause/effect relationships between the PRTS and: Containment system 2.6 2.9 008 (SF8) Component Cooling Water X

008K2.02; Knowledge of bus power supplies to:

CCW pump, including emergency backup 3.0 010 (SF3) Pressurizer Pressure Control X 010G2.4.46; Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

4.2 012 (SF7) Reactor Protection X

012K6.04; Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS:

Bypass-block circuits 3.3 013 (SF2) Engineered Safety Features Actuation X

X 013A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Rapid depressurization on ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

013A2.04; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the loss of instrument bus on ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

4.4 4.2 022 (SF5) Containment Cooling X

X 022A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic operation of CCS, including: Initiation of safeguards mode of operation 022A4.03; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Dampers in the CCS 4.1 3.2 025 (SF5) Ice Condenser X

025K4.02; Knowledge of ice condenser system design feature(s) and/ or interlock(s) which provide for:

System control 2.8

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 026 (SF5) Containment Spray X

X 026K4.02; Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for: Neutralized boric acid to reduce corrosion and remove inorganic fission product iodine from steam (NAOH) in containment spray 026A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CSS, including: Pump starts and correct MOV positioning 3.1 4.3 039 (SF4S) Main and Reheat Steam X

039K5.08; Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS:

Effect of steam removal on reactivity 039K5.01; Knowledge of the operational implications of the Definition and causes of steam/water hammer.

as it applies to the MRSS.

3.6 2.9 17 059 (SF4S) Main Feedwater X

X 059K3.03; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on: S/Gs 059G2.4.20; Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

3.5 4.3 061 (SF4S AF)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X

X 061K6.02; Knowledge of the effect a loss or malfunction of pumps will have on AFW components.

061G2.4.18; Knowledge of specific bases for EOPs.

2.6 4.0 062 (SF6) AC Electrical Distribution X

062G2.4.45; Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.

4.1 063 (SF6) DC Electrical Distribution X

X 063A2.02; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of grounds on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions.

063A4.01; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Major breakers and control power fuses 2.5 2.8 064 (SF6) Emergency Diesel Generator X

064A1.05; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the EDG system controls including: EDG room temperature.

064A4.01; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Local and remote operation of the EDG 2.5 4.0 25 073 (SF7) Process Radiation Monitoring X

073A2.02; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of detector failure on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

2.5 076 (SF4S) Service Water X

X 076G2.4.3; Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

076K2.04; Knowledge of bus power supplies to:

Reactor building closed cooling water 3.7 2.5 078 (SF8) Instrument Air X

078K4.03; Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Securing of SAS upon loss of cooling water 3.1 103 (SF5) Containment X

103A3.01; Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: containment isolation 3.9 K/A Category Point Totals:

3 2

2 3

2 2

2 3/3 3

3 3/2 Group Point Total:

28/5

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 (SF1) Control Rod Drive X 001G2.1.23; Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

4.3 002 (SF2; SF4P) Reactor Coolant X 002G2.1.25; Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

3.9 011 (SF2) Pressurizer Level Control X

011A2.07; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of isolation of letdown on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

3.0 015 (SF7) Nuclear Instrumentation X

015K6.03; Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: component interconnections 2.6 016 (SF7) Nonnuclear Instrumentation X

016K4.01; Knowledge of NNIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for: Reading of NNIS channel values outside control room 2.8 028 (SF5) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control X

028A1.01; Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameter (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating HRPS controls including: Hydrogen concentration 3.4 034 (SF8) Fuel-Handling Equipment X

034K4.01; Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for: Fuel protection from binding and dropping 3.4 035 (SF 4P) Steam Generator X

035K5.01; Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the S/Gs: Effect of secondary parameters, pressure, and temperature on reactivity 3.4 34 041 (SF4S) Steam Dump/

Turbine Bypass Control X

041K3.01; Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the: S/G 3.2 045 (SF 4S) Main Turbine Generator X

045A3.05; Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MT/G system, including: Electrohydraulic control 2.6 055 (SF4S) Condenser Air Removal X

055K1.06; Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CARS and the following systems:

PRM system 2.6 068 (SF9) Liquid Radwaste X

068A4.03; Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Stoppage of release if limits exceeded.

3.9 071 (SF9) Waste Gas Disposal X

071A2.03; Ability to (a) predict the impacts of rupture disk failures on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

2.7 K/A Category Point Totals: 1 0

1 1/1 1 1

1 1/1 1 1

1/1 Group Point Total:

10/3

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-3 Facility: McGuire Date of Exam: September 2020 Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-only IR IR

1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

2.9 2.1.14 Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such l as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.

3.1 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

4.6 2.1.21 Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy.

3.5 70 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

4.4 Subtotal 2

2

2. Equipment Control 2.2.15 Ability to determine expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.

4.3 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.

3.8 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power l sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

3.1 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

3.9 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

4.2 Subtotal 3

2

3. Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

3.2 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

3.4 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

3.8 Subtotal 2

1

4. Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4.5 Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, l abnormal, and emergency evolutions.

4.3 2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, & notes.

3.8 73 2.4.28 Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event (non-safeguards information).

4.1 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

3.8 74 2.4.39 Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

3.9 Subtotal 3

2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier /

Group K/A Reason for Rejection From in-house peer review prior to BC approval:

T1G2 051AG2.2.3 NRC reviewer noted there are no unit differences in condenser vacuum systems or abnormal procedures. There are 12 non-sampled areas in T1G2 that I could resample the whole system from, but Loss of Vacuum is fairly important and is a trip-initiator, so I decided to stay in that event. Had to keep a G topic because this was the only G in RO T2G1. Randomly selected new Generic statement 051G2.1.31 - Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. IR 4.4 T2G1 059K3.02 NRC reviewer noted overlap between this K/A (Effect that a loss of MFW will have on AFW) and T1G1 054AA2.03, Loss of MFW: Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup. IR of the 059 sample was 3.6, vs. 4.1 for the 054, so I decided to resample the K3 piece for 059. (The RO T2G1 K3 count was 2 (others had 3), so I needed to stay in K3. And all T2G1 systems had been sampled at least once, and 059 only had one sample, so I needed to stay in 059.)

New K/A: 059K3.03 - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on: S/Gs IR 3.5 Requests from licensee, 7/9:

SRO T1G1 007EG2.4.3 Reactor Trip: Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

Licensee: I have spent some time researching this. The only thing I have found that I could possibly tie to a Rx trip would be WR neutron flux. As such, I feel that this is not SRO ONLY material and the TS 3.3.3 bases doesn't have any information that could elevate a second question to the SRO level.

The exam team is requesting any assistance you can provide or a replacement for this K/A.

NRC response: Agree. Staying in EPE007, but randomly selecting a new K/A from the 42 Generic K/As of ES-401 D.1.b, Random.org(42): 31 2.4.20 New K/A: 007EG2.4.20 - Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. 4.3 - mgd, 7/9/20 Requests from licensee, 7/29:

RO T2G1 039K5.08 Main and Reheat Steam System - Knowledge of the operational implications of the effect of steam removal on reactivity.

Essentially the same as 035K5.01, so the exam team is unable to write a discriminating question at the RO level without overlap.

NRC response: Agree with the overlap issue and that a new K/A is needed.

039 only has one sample, so need to stay in that system.

RO T2G1 K5 only has 2 samples, so need to stay in K5.

8 K5s in 039, but only 2 others have IRs 2.5: K5.01 & K5.05. Randomly selected K5.01.

New K/A: 039K5.01 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following as it applies to the MRSS: Definition and causes of steam/water hammer. 2.9/3/1 RO T2G1 076G2.4.3 Service Water System - Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

NSWS is in the PAM tech spec for DG Hx and NS Hx flow. However, there is a note that this function is not applicable if the valve is set to its flow balance position or its associated outlet valve flow balance position is full open. Therefore, this function is not applicable at MNS.

Can't write a discriminating question at the RO level for this K/A.

NRC response: Agree that this is a difficult concept to write a Tier 3 question to.

076 is sampled twice, so we dont have to stay in it (but we can). Another system can be sampled if its sampled only once. Those systems are: 003, 008, 010, 012, 025, 039, 062, 064, 073, [076], 078, &

103. Random.org(12) returned: 8 System 064, EDG In RO T2G1, Generics are sampled three times, so we can sample from any twice-sampled category. Those are K2, K3, K5, K6, A1, & G [after deleting this sample].

Random.org(6) returned: 5 A1 There are 7 A1s in 064, and all but one have IRs 2.5. Random.org(6) returned: 5 A1.05 New K/A: 064A1.05 - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the EDG system controls including: EDG room temperature.

2.5/2.5

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 SRO T3 G2.2.44 Equipment Control - Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

To meet the K/A this will be a tier 2 question (the K/A is specific about operation of a system).

NRC response: Agree that a new K/A is needed to replace G2.2.44 because a discriminating Tier 3 question cant be written to it.

RO Tier 3 Generic category 2.2, Equipment Control has 3 samples, and category 2.1, Conduct of Operations has only 2, so we can resample from 2.2 or 2.1 (leaving 2.3, Radiation Control, out, because we dont want to oversample that topic).

Let 1= 2.1 and 2=2.2. Random.org(2) returned: 1 sample from 2.1 There are 38 topics in 2.1.

1 has an RO IR <2.5 (2.1.35); if its selected, resample.

4 are already sampled in RO & SRO T3 (2.1.5,14, 20, & 23). If any of them are selected, resample.

Random.org(38) returned: 17 2.1.21 New K/A: G2.1.21 - Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy. 3.5/3.6 Request from licensee, 8/24:

RO T1G1 038EK1.04 The exam team has concerns with writing a discriminating question due to reflux boiling not being a mitigation strategy employed for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture at MNS. Exam team requests a new K/A.

NRC response: Agree that a new K/A is needed to replace G2.2.44 because a discriminating Tier 1 question cant be written to it. Every category in T1G1 has 3 samples, so we need to stay in K1. EPE 038 EK1 has three other topics (EK1.01, 1.02, & 1.03), all with IRs 2.5.

Random.org(3): 3 EK1.03 New K/A: 038EK1.03 - Knowledge of the operational implications of the following as it applies to the SGTR: Natural circulation. 3.9/4.2

Digitally signed by Gerald J. McCoy Date: 2021.01.27 17:13:15 -05'00'

ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

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103A3.01 Containment - Ability to monitor automatic operation of containment, including containment isolation This Q was on the 2015 exam and is Sat, but the General Discussion doesnt give one a good understanding of the correct answer or distractor validity. Part of that for me is coming from a place where containment pressure gave Phase A directly (as well as SI causing it), but could you incorporate some of these thoughts:

Containment pressure of 1# initiates an SI signal, which initiates a FWI signal, which closes the CF valves.

PZR pressure of 1845# initiates an SI signal, which initiates Phase A.

The Phase B Containment isolation setpoint is 3#.

Added clarification to the GD for all signals. SLG 9/29 Looks good, thanks. mgd 10/5 K/A Match Statement: the last part talks about determining what auto containment isolation should have occurred, but the Q doesnt do that. Please massage that.

Reworded the K/A Match statement. SLG 9/29 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT 2

F 3

B S

005K3.06 RHR - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of RHR will have on CSS.

Its probably just me not knowing your systems well enough, but I dont understand the Distractor Analysis. The D/A in the Source Q seems straightforward; was it changed for a reason? mgd 9/23 Reworded the B distractor analysis. Looks good, thanks. mgd 9/25 Q is SAT 3

H 3

M S

004K5.18 CVCS - Knowledge of operational implications of the relationship between neutron flux and reactivity as it applies to CVCS The 1st part D/A needs beefing up. Whats there really only supports the answer choices Positive/Stays-the-same. Suggest adding this idea: thinks that higher T increases the resins affinity for boron. {As a newbie I know I and others struggled with this idea of resin affinity changing with T, and which way.} mgd 9/22 Added statement as suggested to D/A for A1 and C1. SLM 9/24 Thanks.

Q is SAT 4

H 2

N S

004K1.05 CVCS - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between CVCS and CRDS operation in automatic mode control The 1st part is fairly easy, but the 2nd part is really easy (great tie to the K/A though), and its not helped by the D/A. I think I can live with the Q, but we need to beef up the Plausibility for rods will NOT insert. Right now it just says that an applicant could pick this if they dont understand the reactivity effects of a dilution. But that doesnt explain why an applicant might think that rods would NOT move.

Is Auto rod withdrawal active at MNS? If so, Insert/Withdraw would be better than this. Because even if I dont fully understand the effects of dilution, I probably know enough to guess that SOMETHING is going to happen, so Id pick will. Changed Q2 answer/distractors to insertion or withdrawal. Updated D/A for A and B Part 2.

In the Basis for meeting the KA, its not so much the charging lineup were asking about is it? Maybe makeup?

Or more broadly, CVCS? Updated the K/A match to makeup as suggested. SLG 9/24 Thanks.

Q is SAT 5

H 3

N S

006A1.14 ECCS - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating ECCS controls including: reactor vessel level Question Source: You changed it enough that you essentially rewrote it; I think you could take credit for it as a New Q. mgd 9/23 Changed question type to New question. SLG 9/24 Concur.

Q is SAT

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07A1.03 PRT - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating PRT controls including: monitoring PRT temperature Credible Distractors: Im having trouble with distractor A, based on 100F for the containment upper compartment TS limit. The other 2 distractors are great, but to have 3 temperatures and then a TS entry condition is too much of a stretch. Is there a containment temperature alarm we could use? Or maybe a reactor vessel head leakoff temperature alarm? Does that leakoff go to the PRT?

Distractor A has been replaced with Rx Vessel Flange Leakoff Hi Temp of 130°F. This leakoff goes to the NCDT but it is plausible in that if we were asking inputs to the PRT this would be a credible distractor. By adding this distractor we had to change the correct answer to A to keep the order correct and thus the new distractor is B.

Agree with the change and re-ordering.

General Discussion and/or D/A need a little work: were asking about an alarm (and then the time to reach it), but the Discussion refs a P&L that says the PRT should remain <114F. True statement, but is that the alarm setpoint? Nothing here or in the Reference package tells me that. mgd 9/23 Changed the discussion to reflect where the correct answer comes from (alarm response) and added the alarm response to the reference package. Removed references that discussed the L&P. SLM 9/24 Thanks, I like that as a distractor much better. mgd 9/25 Q is SAT 7

F 2

M S

007K1.01 PRT - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRT and containment.

Stem Focus: Do we need to tell them containment pressure initially? I dont think so, or else we might as well tell them its temperature too, or RCS P & T. All those things can be assumed to be in-band unless told otherwise.

The reason I bring it up is because I got myself confused with what happened when, and said theres no way Containment P could be stable at 0.1# if the rupture discs went. I know it was a dumb mistake, but I dont want the applicants possibly making it. Is it necessary for the question?

Removed the bullet that contained initial containment pressure. Thanks.

Credible Distractors, 1st part: I saw vent valve and thought, Vent valve? Theres no automatic vent valve.

And of course there isnt. I think even a less-than-competent operator would dismiss that. I was going to say I could go for a safety valve, but then we couldnt really include the piece where the PRT (and therefore Containment) stabilizes at 2#. Thats the half of the source Q you changed, and we need the other half to hit the K/A, but I just dont think that vent valve is going to fly. Im willing to get a cold 2nd opinion from another Chief though. Im guessing you thought a lot about it and thats the best you could come up with. I cant do any better, Im afraid. I had an idea to substitute the PRT spray system, but then you wouldnt have the effect on Containment. Lets talk about this one some more.

We dropped the second bullet about PRT pressure stabilizing at 2psig and then asked in Q1 if a relief valve or a rupture disc would operate to reduce PRT pressure. Therefore, A1 and C1 distractors are now relief valve. The NCDT is a tank in containment that receives inputs from various sources in containment (similar to the PRT) and this tank has a relief valve with a setpoint of 100 psig (same as PRT rupture disc). We think there is enough plausibility here. Thoughts? Thats great. Id forgotten about the NCDT (RCDT to most people), but how lucky that it has a relief valve that goes at 100#. mgd 9/25 Q is SAT 8

H 3

B S

008K2.02 CCW - Knowledge of bus power supplies to: CCW pump, including emergency backup.

Bank Q, no comments. mgd 9/23 Q is SAT

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010G2.4.46 PZR PCS - Ability to verify that alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

General Discussion: something seems to have changed in the Stem from when this was written, because this talks about a -17psig error. It doesnt change anything, but please make it match. And when does the bottom left annunciator, PZR LO PRESS ALERT go off? Maybe add that to the GD also. Made the changes to match with question stem. Pzr Lo Press Alert setpoint is 1945 psig. Not sure that will add value to the general discussion. Thanks for making them match. Agree that the alarm setpoint wouldnt add value. mgd 9/25 LOD: The annunciator thats lit shouldnt be lit until 25# low, is that right? And the backup htrs also come on at 25# low? So someone might see that light lit and choose B/U htrs ON, is that kind of the main idea here?

Because Im guessing that everyone knows that when that alarm comes in you look at B/U htrs and announce that theyre on? Based on that I want to give this LOD=3, but:

If someone DOES closely read the Stem (as they should), a -15# error (or -17) isnt likely to make anyone jump on B/U htrs ON. But, what if we put the error at say 22#? Now I have to think, I know that setpt is 20-something

1. , but is it 20, or 25? What do you think? mgd 9/23 LOD: The idea is that an applicant could conclude that since the annunciator is lit, the B/U htrs must be on. You are correct in that most operators are conditioned to look at the alarm and then ensure the htrs are on since this is the immediate action of the ARP. However, the annunciator and the heaters are fed separately from the Pzr PCS system and the annunciator is NOT what causes the htrs to energize. It is viable that the annunciator has malfunctioned. Thanks for the explanation, especially that the heaters and annunciator are fed separately. (FYI, conversations like this will be deleted from the final 401-9.) mgd 9/25 We would prefer to leave the error signal at -15 psig because there is a set of htrs that are full on at this error signal and it has been brought up by a validator that there is a deadband for when the B/U htrs would turn off and we need to stay away from that deadband (off at -17 psig error signal). SLM 9/24 Thats a good reason, and good feedback from the validator. Leave at -15. mgd 9/25 Q is SAT 10 F

3 B

S 012K6.04 RPS - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of bypass-block circuits will have on RPS Bank Q, no comments. mgd 9/23/20 Q is SAT 11 F

3 N

S 013A2.03 ESFAS - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of rapid depressurization on ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

Im going to call this one New because both halves of the STP Q were changed. I think more New questions on the exam looks better, so we may as well take credit for it.

Designated question as NEW and removed the bank question from list of development references. SLM 9/28 General Discussion: OTDT has a pressure term in the equation, while OPDT doesnt, is that right? I didnt see it in the References and dont want to waste time looking for it. If so, could you kind of get at that in the GD and the D/As for B.2 & D.2? Thats a common misunderstanding people have, so its a real strong reason someone might choose OPDT. mgd 9/24 Added statements in the GD section and in Distractors B2 and D2 about OPDT having a temperature penalty applied but no pressure penalty applied, whereas, OTDT has both. SLM 9/28 Perfect. mgd 9/29 Q is SAT 12 H

3 M

S 022A3.01 CCS - Ability to monitor operation of CCS, including initiation of safeguards mode of operation Credible Distractors: Are there Pipe Tunnel Booster Fans and just Pipe Tunnel Fans? I dont think so based on reading the LP, but I ask because D/A C.1 & D.1 say that the VU and pipe tunnel fans will shunt trip off and not swap to emergency power to restart. But the correct answer is that the pipe tunnel booster fans HAVE swapped to E-power. Was a different fan meant there in the D/A?

MNS only has pipe tunnel booster fans. D/As C1 and D1 have been updated to reflect this. The correct answer to Q1 is that the Pressurizer Booster fans (different fans) have swapped to E-power. Q2 asks about the pipe tunnel booster fans. Specifically, whether they remain off after being shunt tripped off. SLM 9/28 Looks good. mgd 9/29 Stem: 1st 2 bullets are past-tense, so Id like to see the last bullet as: The [fans] have shunt tripped OFF. Does that terminology work? Stem has been corrected to show past tense. SLM 9/28 Thanks. mgd 9/29 Q is SAT

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K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 13 H

3 B

S 022A4.03 CCS - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: dampers in CCS Stem Focus, 1st part: Since we have to ensure that 10s have elapsed to get to the right answer, I think we have to ask about the Air Return Fans at 13:02 or later (but no more than 9m later). Unless you want to include seconds in the times (which Im not a fan of). That doesnt hurt anything, does it?

Changed time in Q1 to 1302, agree we dont want to use seconds. SLM 9/28 Thanks. mgd 9/29 2nd part: do we need to tell them what dp were talking about, or is it obvious? I see from the GD that its between containment lower & upper compartments, but is that necessarily these dampers dp? mgd 9/24 Made changes as suggested (added "between lower and upper containment" after D/P in Q2). SLM 9/28 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT 14 F

3 M

S 025K4.02 Ice Condenser - Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for system control.

Plausible Distractors: I see this is a Bank Q from an Audit exam, but I still need to challenge it. I chose all those valves close pretty much because, Why wouldnt they all close?

The GD tells me they all close on ST/Phase A. Auto or Manual, right?

Does the SS/SI signal close any of them?

D/A A talks about SP/Phase B, but the GD doesnt mention Phase B at all. So why would an applicant think Phase A closes insides, while Phase B gets outsides? Is that based on anything? Isnt Ph.B there like most everywhere else in that it gets additional flowpaths than Ph.A, things you dont want to isolate too early (RCPs)?

• PLUS*, this choice only isolates the return penetration; if I know anything about containment isolation I discard that. So this distractor isnt acceptable.

D/A B is a true statement, but again, why would an applicant think that? Wouldnt he reason that the system would signal all these valves to close for redundancy in case one didnt close?

And D/A C is just the opposite of A, so the same comment applies.

One Unsat distractor and 2 borderlines, Im not sure were going to be able to make this Q work. mgd 9/24 Exam team agrees with your feedback. This was our attempt to match the KA in a system with very little "system control". We replaced this question with a modified bank question from CNS. It addresses valve closures for an expansion tank lo-lo level condition. Its modified to address the fact that MNS doesn't have a bypass interlock for the lo-lo level condition. We would have to place jumpers to accomplish this. Therefore, we kept Q2 from the old question as the Q2 for this question. We also added some additional information to distractors A2 & C2 as to why we think Phase B is plausible. SLM 9/28 I like the new Modified question. And good D/As. mgd 9/29 Q is SAT 15 F

2 B

S 026K4.02 CSS - Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for: neutralized boric acid to reduce corrosion and remove inorganic fission product iodine from steam (NAOH) in containment spray From Catawba 2017 exam. I think boron concentration is borderline too easy, but since it was a recent RII exam Ill let it go. But:

D/A C.2/D.2 need to be reworded: BA is an acid and therefore cant contribute to alkaline pH requirements.

Change it to something like does affect the pH of the sump water and Ill be good with it. mgd 9/24 Made changes as suggested to D/As C2 and D2. SLM 9/28 That was good, adding cannot contribute to alkaline pH requirements. mgd 9/29 Q is SAT 16 F

3 B

2018 exam S

07A1.03 CSS - Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CSS, including pump starts and MOV positioning No comments on this Q from the 2018 MNS exam mgd 9/29 Q is SAT

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S 039K5.01 Main and Reheat Steam - Knowledge of the operational implications of the definition and causes of steam/water hammer This Q was on the exam these applicants took in February. Just as questions from applicant audit exams arent allowed on the NRC exam, these applicants shouldnt get questions they had on their NRC exam. Granted, NUREG 1021 doesnt specifically prohibit it, but to meet the spirit of the rules we should Modify it. It wouldnt be fair and equitable for the applicants who passed the February exam if these applicants get 3 questions theyve already seen (2 SRO Qs are also from that exam). mgd 9/25 Considering this is the first retake exam the current exam team has been involved in, we were not aware of any additional NUREG requirements. Therefore, we applied the rules allowed by the NUREG in regards to previous exams. Understand. This is my 1st retake exam also. And even though the NUREG allows it (or more specifically, doesnt disallow it), I appreciate you modifying the Q to meet the spirit of the thing. mgd 9/29 Changes have been made to the stem that puts the crew in FR-H.3 instead of FR-H.2 and the distractor for C1 and D1 have been replaced. Exam team is aware that the current version is similar to the old version. However we believe we meet the guidance in the NUREG for a modified question (condition in the stem and a distractor has been changed). SLM 9/28 Agree that the Q is modified enough. mgd 9/29 Q is SAT 18 H

3 N

S 059K3.03 MFW - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of MFW will have on the S/Gs Stem Focus: I think this is a good Q, but the setup confuses me. Can we give a little bit more about where the plant is at without giving too much away? S/D in progress. Power is [low]%. Transition from the MFRVs to the Bypass valves is in progress. A FRV is 20% open with its Bypass closed. B FRV is 10% open with its bypass x% open. C and D are [??]. Subsequently, at time 1300, CF-28 & 26 inadvertently close. At 1301: Part 1 Q/Part 2 Q. Am I way off base with whats going on?

And do they need to know turbine inlet pressure? Is that a way to tell them what power theyre at, or does it tie into the AMSAC logic?

Turbine Inlet pressure is a way to tell where reactor power is without giving a specific % power and Turbine Inlet pressure does input to AMSAC (340#and 370#) depending on which direction the unit is moving.

There is enough information in the stem to know AMSAC is active and the valve positions require the applicants to analyze all conditions and determine if the CF Flow path AMSAC logic is met. Understand, thanks.

We made a slight wording change in the stem at time 1300. I like that.

We also added the time 1301 into Q1 and got rid of the separate bullet for 1301. Looks much cleaner to me.

T/F: Not really this, but nowhere else to put it, and this gets close. The 2 parts of the Q are essentially unrelated, and we try to avoid that. Couldnt you just ask if you could block the AMSAC signal caused by the unviable flowpaths? You have 30s in which you could do that, right? Could even ask about that aspect, the 30s. mgd 9/2 Changed Q2 to ask about CF pump logic vs. CF flowpath logic as it applies to AMSAC and this is directly tied to Q1 now. SLM 9/28 I like the change you made here, and that they now have to choose between two options of what can be blocked, rather than the previous Will/Will Not for one thing. mgd 9/29 Stem Focus: this was bugging me before but I wasnt sure why: CF-104 is fully CLOSED. We dont usually say valves are fully closed, because closed is closed and stands alone. But CF-105 is OPEN, so was fully meant to go there, fully OPEN?

Related to that, in the GD: a FRV must be at least 25% open if its bypass valve is not fully open. Does 105 need to be fully OPEN in the Stem to satisfy this? mgd 9/29 Removed fully from before CF-104 and put 100% OPEN for CF-105. Used % to align with given values for other valves. SLG 9/30 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT 19 H

4 M

S 061K6.02 AFW - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of pumps will have on AFW components Answer Choice D: Id like to see and in all-caps to make it stand out more and match ONLY in B & C; like you did with AND in Q14 Choice D. mgd 9/25 Made change as suggested. Thanks. mgd 9/29 Q is SAT

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K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 20 H

3 N

S 062G2.4.45 AC Electrical - Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm D/A: This Q is probably okay, but I dont get a good understanding why from the GD and D/A. And the reference package doesnt have the ARP for ETA DEGRADED VOLTAGE. You may not have to change anything if you can explain whats going on. mgd 9/25 Due to the KA being prioritize, we gave them two different lit annunciators to evaluate. These two are not related (other than being on the electrical system and displayed on 1MC-11) or caused by a single event/malfunction.

Each needs to be evaluated separately and determine the actions required, or automatic actions in this case, that will mitigate the event.

Ultimately, with no operator action and a ten minute time delay, the degraded voltage event will result in opening the ETA normal incoming breaker and causing a blackout on the 4160V essential bus.

Distractors A and D discuss automatic actions (unit runback) that occur due to a zone lockout. IPB fan tripping is also an auto action that will occur on these zone lockouts. We tried to show how IPB fan trips are associated with the zone lockouts. I hope this helps, if not, we can discuss it. Included 1AD-11 L1 as a reference for Degraded Voltage. Thanks, I have a better understanding of it now. No changes necessary mgd 9/29 Q is SAT 21 F

2 N

S 063A2.01 DC Electrical - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of grounds on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

One editorial comment was fixed. mgd 9/28 Q is SAT 22 H

3 B

S 063A4.01 DC Electrical - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Major breakers and control power fuses An editorial comment was fixed. mgd 10-5 Q is SAT 23 H

3 B

S 064A4.01 EDG - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in control room: Local & remote operation of the EDG Bank Q from MNS 2012 NRC exam, no comments. mgd 9/28 Q is SAT 24 F

2 B

S 073A2.02 Process Radiation Monitoring - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of detector failure on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate.

WOOTF: I think this Cabinet Trouble alarm is in the MCR, but is it an annunciator window, or something on the 2EMF-46A module, or both? If a window, should we give its location, like 1AD-2 / D10 in Q29? mgd 9/28 Changed Cabinet Trouble to 2RAD-1/F5 (CABINET 1-2 TROUBLE). SLG 9/29 Thanks. mgd 10-5 Q is SAT 25 H

3 N

S 064A1.05 EDG - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including: EDG room temperature Stem Focus: Is the EDG running? If not, Im thinking theres a fire, because what else would make T go up that high and that fast? We should probably have the diesel running loaded for some reason.

If the room fan(s) tripped or werent running with the EDG running, theres no alarm in the MCR? Maybe an alarm in the room that annunciates in the MCR as EDG Trouble or something? If theres anything like that we need to give it to them.

Added that the DG was running per the PT. Fans tripping will not directly cause an annunciator but is listed as a cause for Building Ventilation Malfunction temp to be reached (B distractor). SLG 9/29 Credible Distractors: Using the temperature limits for these terminal boxes seems a bit of a reach, and 150F is pretty high. But what if we used 145F from that same table, the limits for the Spray Pump Room and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Room? Maybe thats something an applicants more likely to be aware of? mgd 9/28 Exam team suggests if the 145F and 150F range is too high then we could move off the SLC table and use 130F (12.5 minutes) as distractor D. This is the high number on the band for Jacket Water Temperature. SLG 10/5 I could go with that. Is it just the high end of the band on the logs, or is there an associated alarm? I do like the symmetry of that, it makes all the answer choices exactly 2.5F apart. mgd 10-5 Discussed via phone and agreed to change D distractor to 12.5 minutes which relates to 130F. SLG 10/6 Concur. mgd 10/6 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

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K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 26 H

3 N

S 076K2.04 SW - Knowledge of bus power supplies to: Reactor building closed cooling water Stem Focus: Check my understanding: 1TA is the normal supply to 1ETA, while 1TC is a backup supply, correct? 1TC isnt a diesel-backed bus, is it? Could 1TC be supplying 1ETA for some reason at 100% power, or are there restrictions against that? If it could, then maybe we need something in the stem to tell the applicants the electric plant is in a normal alignment (or similar). mgd 9/28 Added bullet to stem that electrical supplies are aligned normally. SLG 9/29 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT 27 F

3 N

S 078K4.03 IA - Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for securing of SAS upon loss of cooling water Stem Focus: Should we add: Regarding the Low Pressure Station Air System, since theres a low pressure and a high pressure system? Added Low Pressure. SLG 9/29 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Something about this Q is bothering me, but its not flawed per se. Ill try to explain it: the first part nails the K/A and by itself is probably LOD 3, but also by itself its a 50/50, so call it LOD 2.5. The 2nd part is mostly an add-on that doesnt pertain to the K/A, which is okay. But Im guessing everyone knows that LP SA is supplied by IA, and theres this old compressor we never run; am I close? And then applying the since youre asking me analysis, the 2nd half LOD is maybe 1 or 1.5. Average is 1.75-2, so overall its okay. But just okay.

How about this: what if we put the 2nd part first, and instead of asking what the normal supply is, ask what the backup supply is? Then follow that with the 1st part as-is:

The backup supply to LPSA is _____.

When running in Auto, the LPSA compressor will trip on low ___ flow.

Now when I look at that as an applicant Im sort of primed to pick VI-820 as the backup, because thats the way these things usually work, right? A compressor supplies air to an air system, but if P gets low enough maybe a cross-connect valve auto-opens. Could you live with a change like that? mgd 9/28 Made change as suggested. SLG 9/29 Thanks. I raised the LOD to 3. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT 28 H

2 M

S 003K1.10 RCPs - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between RCPs & RCS Half of this Q on the 2020 exam, but its modified enough to be okay.

Q is SAT 29 F

3 B

S 001G2.1.23 Control Rod Drive System - Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation Cred Dist: Choice A kind of stands out from the others because it doesnt have a time component like the others do. If youd add IMMEDIATELY to the beginning Id be happy with it.

Made change. SLG 9/29 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Partial: I thought of this only after typing out the above. Looking at AP-14 I dont see anything that would EXCLUDE you from entering it, even if the Entry Conditions dont exactly cover a loss of DRPI for one rod. In Mode 3 you might not see much effect from a dropped rod, so I wouldnt fault someone for going there if they lost a DRPI indication. Step 2 is an Immediate Operator Action to place rods in Man, right? But its incorrect because were asking what the SLC 16.7.9 requirement is. Id like to get that piece added to the D/A for Choice A, please.

Added clarification to the DA for DRPI issues in relation to AP-14. SLG 9/29 That was good citing the Note that AP-14 doesnt apply to DRPI issues. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT 30 H

4 M

S 011A2.07 PZR LCS - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of isolation of letdown on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences Cueing: In the stems last bullet can we delete inadvertently and for one minute? So: Charging line flow is lowered to 18 gpm. I feel like inadvertently kind of cues them to really think about what that means, while I think one minute is covered by WOOTF 1): If the controller output remains constant, I know youre trying to bound the 20 second thing, but if you set the flow to 18 and then it remains there, then the answer is going to happen.

Make sense? Made change as suggested. SLG 9/29 Thanks. mgd 10/5 Q is SAT

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K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 31 H

4 M

S 015K6.03 NIs - Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction component interconnections will have on NIs Q=K/A: We dont think this one hits the K/A. (2nd opinion from David Lanyi.) This Q hits K2.01 knowledge of power supplies, but since that K/A tests power supplies I dont think we can call a power supply a component interconnection to make it fit this K/A. Maybe the list of things in K1 will give you some ideas. mgd 9/29 Agree this is a power supply question. Replaced with a modified B question that better matches K/A. SLM 10/05 I like this new Q, really tests the K/A. No comments. mgd 10/6 Q is SAT 32 F

2 B

S 016K4.01 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation - Knowledge of NNIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for reading NNIS channel values outside control room Minutia: This is an okay question on the other metrics, but on the fence in my opinion for Minutia. Because if I dont know that a certain indication is on this panel but not on that panel, does that make me a less-than-competent operator? If I go to the correct panel the procedure sent me to, then I work with whats there, and Im not going to need THAT indication for THAT procedure. David L. agreed, but pointed out that the K/A itself is mostly Minutia, so I can provide a new one if you like. mgd 9/29 Rather than go for a new K/A and start from scratch, the exam team has selected a bank question that meets the K/A and addresses your issues with "on this panel and NOT on that panel". By asking an indication that is available on both the ASP and the SSF, we believe this removes the issue of this being minutia. SLM 10/05 Agree that the new Bank Q matches the K/A and is not Minutia. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT 33 F

2 M

S 028A1.01 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in hydrogen concentration (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls.

Q=K/A: This is just systems knowledge, theres no predicting or monitoring of anything, and certainly not of containment hydrogen concentration. (Peer checked by David Lanyi.) mgd 9/29 Modified the question to ask what H2 concentration the blower is placed in service to maintain. Moved the original Q1 down to Q2. SLG 10/05 The modification is good, matches the K/A now. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT 34 H

2 B

S 035K5.01 S/Gs - Knowledge of operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the S/Gs: Effect of secondary parameters, pressure, and temperature on reactivity Credible Distractors: I really dont like power will lower, but not enough to call it 2 bad distractors and unsat the Q. I see that Ginna used the positive MTC argument, but is that really credible at McGuire? Does anybody operate with a positive MTC core?

I could live with it if the distractor choice was that Rx power remains the same, what do you think about that?

Because as I was reading the Q I was wondering what the turbine controls would actually do if a GV drifted open a bit. I think in the right conditions (Auto? Imp In? Imp Out?) the turbine controller would actually throttle down on the other GVs. Because isnt it trying to maintain a constant impulse chamber pressure? mgd 9/29 Exam team couldn't use source question due to lack of plausibility for positive MTC, although that can occur at MNS. Also unable to find plausibility for Q2 and Q1 together at 20% RTP while moving the turbine with MW loop in service. Replaced with a bank question that meets the K/A. SLM 10/05 No comments on this Bank Q. Meets the K/A. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT 35 H

3 M

S 041K3.01 Steam Dumps - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the S/Gs Borderline K/A match, but Im allowing it. I saw why after looking at the Source Qs K/A.

Source: the second half was changed from the Source Q, technically making this Modified. mgd 9/30 Q is SAT 36 F

3 B

S 045A3.05 Main Turbine Generator - Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MT/G system, including EHC Credible Distractors: What do you think about using 110%, the mechanical trip setpoint cited in the LP? More likely that people know that number than the 111% backup OPC number, thus making the Q more discriminating.

mgd 9/30 Made change to C.2. SLG 10/1 Thanks. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 37 F

2 M

S 055K1.06 CARS - Knowledge of physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between CARS and PRM Credible Distractors: I see that this Q dates back to at least a 2009 Retake Exam, but I dont think discharge path isolates is very credible. When I read it I immediately threw it out. Maybe all of the other PRMs that monitor a flowpath DO, but this is the Main Condenser air ejectors: if you lose them youre going to (slowly, probably) lose vacuum and trip. Which probably isnt necessary for a 200gpd leak with no fuel failure given.

But, what if it swapped to the plants Waste Gas collection and treatment system, is that at all plausible for you guys? At Robinson it kind of would be because the hotwells could be aligned to the radioactive wastewater collection system for cleanup after a tube leak; do you guys do that? Maybe you have another idea, but I really dont like isolates unless you can convince me otherwise.

Exam team agrees with comments concerning credible distractors. Specifically, C2 and D2. Would prefer to leave Q1 as is. 3/4 RO validators chose turbine building roof by picking either answer A or C.

Q2 replaced with 2EMF -33 trip 2 will/will NOT isolate CSAE drains to the turbine building sump. This will change the question to "modified". SLM 10/06 Good change to SJAE drains. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT 38 H

3 M

S 068A4.03 Liquid Radwaste System - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: stoppage of release if limits exceeded Good modification of this Bank Q. Would you beef up the D/As just a little please:

A2/C2: it would help the readers understanding if the two sentences were connected with but: Plausible because you can send this other tank to the WMT, but theres actually no way to do that with this tank, so thats why its incorrect. Added but between the 2 distractor sentences. SLG 10/01 Thanks.

C1/D1: all this is true, but I got from reading the D/A in the Source Q that both WP-35 and WP-37 get a close signal on low RC flow. So, before I read that in the Source I was thinking, Okay, EMF-44 Trip 2 closes only WP-35, while low RC flow closes only WP-37. But no, according to the older D/A, low RC flow closes 35 and 37, which to me lends it a bit more plausibility. Thanks. mgd 9/30 Added 1WP-35 to the D/As on C1 and D1. SLG 10/01 Thanks. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT 39 H

3 N

S EPE007EK1.02 Reactor Trip - Knowledge of the operational implications of SDM as it applies to reactor trip LOD/Plausible Distractors: This is one of those where the interplay between the two distractors in an answer choice allows you to eliminate it, not that the distractors are necessarily implausible on their own. So Im calling it 2 implausibles. I could make the case that Choices A, B, & C are implausible, based on how you read the words or what you assume its asking.

I see what you were getting at here, but it doesnt quite get there, and there are some wording issues. Two things go into Xenon concentration, right? Creation of Xe-135 from decay of Iodine-135, and destruction (burnout/burnup) by neutron flux. But the Q doesnt ask about Iodine, just Xe. And Xe-135s half-life is 9.2h, so Xe decay is negligible initially after the trip. And how would you lose the decay of Xenon? Its a natural process thats going to happen. What youve really lost is the decay rate of I-135 because theres less of it being produced.

All that said, Im amenable to trying to salvage this Q (maybe you could bring in Iodine and talk about the creation/destruction of both it and Xe in some way), or you could probably find a Bank Q to use here. mgd 9/30 Exam team agrees with CE on plausible distractors. Upon further review, we didn't feel it was the best K/A match.

Wrote a new question that we believe is a better match for the K/A. SLM 10/06 Good New Q. No real comments on it, but Ill just note here (in case it comes up later) that Comprehension-level depends solely on the 1st part, and thats marginal. No changes needed. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 40 H

3 N

S APE008AK2.03 PZR Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open) - Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and controllers and positioners Q=K/A: There isnt a vapor space accident here. The leak isnt big enough to force a trip, and youd probably be in the RCS Leakage AOP. You wouldnt even know that the leak is in the line to the PORVs, it could be anywhere in the RCS and have the same effects. It was a creative attempt to hit this difficult K/A though. What if I gave you a different AK2 topic instead? mgd 10/1 Exam team believes we have a good Q1 and Q2 to address the controllers and positioners part of the K/A.

Exam team changed the stem to a PORV that has opened and failed to close. By definition of our transient analysis lesson plan this is considered a LOCA. We realize that the controller output may be insignificant during this transient. However, it still functions the same on decreasing pressure and the setpoints for OTDT and OPDT are still in play since the reactor will trip on OTDT prior to reaching the low Pzr pressure reactor trip (proven at MNS). If this doesn't work, we will probably need a new K/A. SLM 10/06 I agree that now theres a Vapor Space Accident. I think this Q works overall, even though as you alluded to its a bit odd to be asking about the Master Pressure Controller and OPDT after a Rx trip. Let me know if there are any validation issues. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT 41 H

3 B

S EPE009EK2.03 SBLOCA - Knowledge of the interrelations between the SBLOCA and S/Gs Bank Q from Catawba 2019 NRC exam, no comments. mgd 10/1 Q is SAT 42 F

3 B

S EPE011G2.4.11 LBLOCA - Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Bank Q from MNS Exam Bank with no pedigree on the Source Q, which was listed as New. Verified it wasnt on either of the last 2 MNS NRC exams. No comments. mgd 10/1 Q is SAT 43 H

3 B

S APE015/017AK2.10 RCP Malfunctions - Knowledge of the interrelations between RCP malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and RCP indicators and controls Bank Q from MNS 2011 NRC exam, no comments. mgd 10/1 Q is SAT 44 H

3 M

S APE022AK3.01 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup - Knowledge of the reasons for adjustment of RCP seal backpressure regulator valve to obtain normal flow Good modification, and great K/A match. No comments. mgd 10/1 Q is SAT 45 H

2 B

S APE025AA2.07 Loss of RHR - Ability to determine and interpret pump cavitation as it applies to loss of RHR Credible Distractors: when first reading through the answer choices I questioned how pump is not cavitating was even plausible, then when I saw it was a Catawba NRC Exam Q I thought, How did we let THAT get through? But when I found the Source Q in the References I saw that we didnt: you modified it. (Maybe after validation or something.) After learning that then the GD & DA made more sense where they were talking about runout, because theres no runout in this Q, and I certainly wasnt thinking it as I read it.

The original Q is fine if you want to use it as a Bank, but these conditions just scream cavitation. And even if I dont know what that is, I can recognize that these indications arent normal, so since youre asking me Im going to choose, Yes, something unusual IS happening And with no other choice like runout (which I think is weak, but can go with it), am I really determining and interpreting pump cavitation?

Exam team agrees that modifying this question resulted in major problems. Question has been returned to the original bank and the correct answer is B. Reducing flow would be performed prior to taking the pump off if all flow control valves were working properly. We didn't give any information in the stem as to such. SLM 10/06 Going back to the Bank Q was a good choice. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT 46 H

3 B

S APE027AA1.01 PZR PCS Malfunction - Ability to operate and/or monitor PZR heaters, sprays, and PORVs Credible Distractors: I realize this was a CNS NRC exam Q, but after reading the GD, D/A, & LP I have to question how plausible all PORVs open is, given a failure. I understand that if actual P were 100# high all 3 would be open, but thats from two sort of different inputs/reasons, isnt it? 32B & 36B directly from Pressurizer Pressure Instruments via DCS (SPP-2 signal?), and 34A from the Master controller? If thats true, then given some kind of failure, a person probably wouldnt jump on all Open, but if they got them backwards they might choose ONLY 32V & 36B Open. Does that make sense, and is it a little more plausible than all? mgd 10/2 Made changes in answer choices as suggested. SLM 10/06 Thanks. mgd 10/7 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 47 H

4 N

S EPE029EA1.06 ATWS - Ability to operate and monitor operating switches for normal charging header isolation valves I like this Q, a lot going on here. The operate switches part of the K/A isnt hit, but I think this is close enough by monitoring 2 valves. This is a hard one to hit, and youve done a good job with it.

Stem: You havent used this light lit, light dark annotation before (Q2, Q9), and I understand why you mayve had to for these kind of switch/valve indications, but see if theres a way to maybe enhance the lit and shade the dark so the indications can stand alone. Because obviously you dont have that when youre standing at the control panel. This doesnt seem like an actual photo; if not, maybe thats an option. mgd 10/7 We were able to get simulator pictures for these switches. SLG 10/8 Perfect, that looks MUCH better. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT 48 H

3 B

S EPE038EK1.03 SGTR - Knowledge of the operational implications of natural circulation Bank Q, Watts Bar 2009 NRC exam. No comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT 49 F

3 B

S APE054AA2.03 Loss of MFW - Ability to determine and interpret conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup Bank Question 5741 from MNS exam bank, verified not on last 2 exams. No comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT 50 H

3 B

S EPE055G2.2.37 Station Blackout - Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

Bank Q from MNS Bank. Verified not on last 2 exams. No comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT 51 F

3 N

S APE056AA1.18 LOOP - Ability to operate and / or monitor control room normal ventilation supply fan Two typographical errors fixed. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT 52 H

3 M

S APE057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus - Knowledge of the reasons for actions contained in EOP Good Q, no comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT 53 F

3 B

S APE062AA2.01 Loss of SW - Ability to determine and interpret the location of a leak in the SWS Bank Q from 2013 MNS NRC exam, no comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT 54 F

3 N

S APE065AK3.04 Loss of IA - Knowledge of the reasons for cross-over to backup air supplies No comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT 55 H

3 B

S WE05G2.4.2 Loss of Heat Sink - Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

Bank Q from Catawba audit, no comments. mgd 10/2 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 56 F

3 B

S WE12EK1.2 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators - Knowledge of the operational implications of normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures to uncontrolled depressurization of all S/Gs Stem Focus: In ECA-2.1 Step 6.a youve highlighted the RNO for ALL S/Gs not >11%, and then used this minimum feed flow value of 25gpm as the basis for the question. Which works, but:

1) If all ARE >11% and you follow the A/ER column to 6.b, then if C/D rate was too high youd RNO to 25gpm AGAIN, but likely for a different reason.

2) But if C/D rate was okay youd A/ER to 6.c and check all <50%. If No, you RNO to throttle feed flow to maintain <50%. Again, probably for a different reason.

3) And finally, if <50%, you check T-hots and might have to throttle for that. So another different reason.

All that to say that the stem doesnt put you in the exact place you need to be to correctly answer this Q.

Look at the Source Q in the Reference package, and then look at its Source Q, at the top of its 2nd page: it says that the basis for 60gpm is all those things (the same as in this Q). And Q11 on the 2014 RNP exam is exactly the same, except it uses 80 gpm.

I saw where you marked up the LP where it supports the Step 6.a 25gpm, but the LP doesnt help on the bases behind the other sub-steps discussed above.

I think we need to give them the 25gpm flow, or at least that ALL S/Gs are <11%, but Im not sure if the 2nd way is fair for ROs. mgd 10/5 Agree that more information needs to be in the stem. Otherwise, there may be multiple correct answers or no correct answer. Added "to any S/G with N/R level less than 11% (32% ACC) to the stem. SLM 10/07 That looks good. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT 57 F

2 M

S APE003AA1.05 Dropped Control Rod - Ability to operate and / or monitor Reactor power - turbine power as they apply to the dropped rod Source: listed as MNS NRC 20-1, which is why I missed it before (Q17 and the 2 re-used SRO Qs were labelled 2020 MNS NRC).. This is the 2nd RO Q taken from the 2020 NRC exam that these applicants had, and the 3rd RO Q from the last 2 exams. (2nd part was changed slightly, but not enough to be Modified.) As with Q17, request that you modify or replace it. mgd 10/5 Q2 has been replaced. Question is now "modified" and is a better fit for the K/A. The modification looks good, and I agree its a better K/A match because it brings reactor power directly into it. mgd 10/13 Reviewed change to 2nd half to fix the overlap with SRO Q90. This put the Q back to similar to the Feb exam Q, but asks the 2nd half in a different way and with a different answer, which makes it Modified. mgd 10/19 Q is SAT 58 F

3 B

S APE024AK3.02 Emergency Boration - Knowledge of reasons for the actions in EOP for emergency boration Credible Distractors: In C2/D2 could you give one or two specific examples of AOPs or EOPs that reference 60 gpm? I didnt see anything in the Reference package. mgd 10/5 60 gpm was an old number that we were familiar with but can't find it in AP-38 or FR-S.1 now. Therefore, we changed C2 and D2 distractor and updated the distractor analysis. SLG 10/7 The change to 50 gpm looks good. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 59 F

3 M

S APE036AK1.02 Fuel Handling Incidents - Knowledge of the operational implications of SDM as it applies to Fuel Handling Incidents K/A Match: 1) This isn't a fuel handling incident, it's mismanagement of an administrative requirement. Look through the topics in APE036 and youll see it doesnt fit any of those. There's no AOP, no damage, no radiation, no alarms, no evacuations, no ventilation alignments, etc.

2) Even if it did match the stem of the K/A, no knowledge of SDM is required, because its basically used as the distractor. If you know the 3-days piece you dont even have to evaluate SDM.

If you cant find or make a good Q I can supply a new K/A. mgd 10/6 MNS doesnt have an AOP for fuel handling accidents. Damage, alarms, radiation, ventilation and evacuations have no tie in with the "operational implications" of SDM. SDM is only affected by temperature, rods and boron concentration. Temperature and rods are not in play during refueling operations.

We researched five questions from industry exams (2 from region 2 and 3 from other regions) for this K/A and all were similar to ours (boron concentration).

With that said, exam team is confident that we cannot write a question to meet this K/A and would like to have a new one. 10/07 No fuel handling accident AOP? Thats interesting. I see your point though about SDM and Fuel Handling Incidents. Send me the 2 RII questions you found (or just tell the exam and question #) and Ill reevaluate. 1013 Sent the Two region 2 questions to CE. SLM 10/19 Use the Sequoyah 2016 question. mgd 10/20 Credible Distractor: Ive reviewed the Modified Sequoyah question and gotten hung up on Distractor D, but I think its an easy fix. Suspend positive reactivity changes and suspend operations that dilute the RCS are pretty much the same thing, so as a test-taker Id probably throw that one out. Because somethings going on thats diluting the refueling cavity, which is adding positive reactivity, so that needs to be stopped.

Id like to cross one or both of the correct pieces of A with something thats wrong, like the Source Q did for both correct pieces, but I wont hold you to that.

Instead, if we swap the 1st part of B with the 1st part of D I think that would work:

B. suspend positive reactivity changes and establish containment integrity D. suspend core alterations and suspend operations that dilute the RCS Thoughts on that? mgd 10/21 Changed distractor D as suggested by CE. Distractor B was changed to cross correct pieces of A as suggested but could not be completely changed as suggested due to Distractor C. SLG 10/22 Thanks. mgd 10/11 Q is SAT 60 H

3 M

S APE037AA2.04 SGTL - Ability to determine and interpret the following: Comparison of RCS fluid inputs and outputs, to detect leaks No comments. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT 61 H

3 M

S APE051G2.1.31 Loss of Condenser Vacuum - Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup Credible Distractors: 160F exhaust hood temp seemed pretty normal to me. Is there an OAC alarm or anything below that value that gives it plausibility? If not, what do you think about changing it to 170, then maybe I mis-remember that the AP-23 action value is actually 165 instead of 175. mgd 10/6 There is not a lower OAC alarm setpoint for exhaust hood temperature. The HI setpoint is 175F which is the action level in the AP. We changed the stem value to 165F which is higher than normal and closer to the alarm setpoint. SLG 10/8 I can live with that, thanks. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT 62 H

3 M

S APE068AK2.01 Control Room Evacuation - Knowledge of the interrelations between CR Evacuation and the auxiliary shutdown panel layout Good Q, no comments.

Q is SAT 63 F

3 B

S WE03EK2.2 LOCA C/D and Depressurization - Knowledge of the interrelations between this and the facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, decay heat removal systems, and relations between proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Stem Focus:

Step 10 of ES-1.2 is the high-level Initiate C/D step, and 10.B is where the Part 2 answer comes from. But what about 10.C? Could someone argue that ND is in RHR mode and therefore youd first use THAT? I think that could be fixed by starting them at 100% and having them just transitioning to ES-1.2. Thoughts?

We changed the lead-in to the question to the standard lead-in and added bullets to show what reactor power was initially and how the crew got to ES-1.2. SLM 10/08 That does look better. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 64 H

3 B

S WE08EA2.2 PTS - Ability to determine and interpret: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments Stem Focus: Do you see any harm in telling them that theyre at Step 26? Specifically that, The crew is performing the 60-minute soak per Step 26 of FR-P.1? I dont think it gives anything away, just maybe tightens it up a bit. mgd 10/6 Made changes as suggested. SLM 10/08 Thanks. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT 65 H

3 B

S WE15EK1.2 Containment Flooding - Knowledge of the operational implications of normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures No comments on this bank question. mgd 10/6 Q is SAT 66 F

3 B

S G2.1.5 Conduct of Ops - Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.

Bank Q, no comments. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT 67 F

3 N

S G2.1.14 Conduct of Ops - Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.

Good distractors and analyses. No comments.

Q is SAT 68 F

4 B

S GE2.2.36 Equipment Control - Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations Bank Q from Farley 2010 exam, no technical comments. A type was fixed. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT 69 F

3 B

S G2.2.42 Equipment Control - Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for TS No comments on this MNS Bank Q. Verified not on the last 2 exams. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT 70 F

2 B

S G2.1.21 Conduct of Ops - Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy Cues: In Q1 Id like to strike if committed to memory. I thought that the choice between can and can NOT perform Information Use procedures without referring to them was pretty easy, but when you add if committed to memory, then of course you can. I think its okay though because the LOD of the 2nd part (I picked 7d) brings it up to at least 2 overall.

AD-004 at 5.3.10 talks about Information Use procedure usage, but it doesnt specifically say committed to memory. I do see that in the Att. 1 Use and Adherance Matrix. Committed to memory to me means something like the E-0 Immediate Actions, that level of memorization. I wouldnt expect anybody to have that level of memory of an Information Use procedure. If you want to keep the concept of memory in it, then maybe: A user ___ perform IU procedures from memory without referring to Made changes to Q1 such that it is aligned better with the standard (dropped the "if committed to memory") and thus Q1 answers were changed to is/is NOT allowed. SLM 10/08 Looks good. mgd 10/8 Q is SAT 71 H

2 B

S G2.3.4 Radiation Control - Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions Credible Distractors: I know this was a 2016 RNP NRC exam Q, but Im struggling with plausibility of some of the answer choices, and neither this Q or the Source Q explains WHY an applicant might choose one of the 3 distractors. Whatever you think the WHYs are for A, C, & D, please put those in the D/As. mgd 10/8 Exam team was unable to come up with a "why" for the distractors chosen on the Robinson exam. Therefore, we replaced distractors A, C, and D with new distractors A, B and D due to the correct answer moving down into the "C" slot. New distractors align with the Alert, Exclude and Non-Duke exposure Limits associated with the annual dose limit and all distractor analysis for these have been updated. SLM 10/12 The new distractors and D/As are great. mgd 10/16 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 72 F

2 B

S G2.3.13 Radiation control - Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Credible Distractors: I realize this was a Catawba NRC exam Q, but youve asked the 2nd part in a different way that I think makes it too easy. Maybe a procedure changed or something made that change necessary, but I cant think of anything more better than continuous HP coverage. So if thats the best thing you can have, then of course its going to satisfy the requirements. Does that make sense?

Additionally, theres a bit of cueing there with the phrase the additional dose monitoring requirements. So youre telling me there are additional requirements, then asking if continuous HP coverage meets them.

Exam team agrees, Q2 was modified due to validator feedback into the submitted version.

Stem Focus: the Catawba question just 3 years ago used PD-RP-ALL-0001, Radiation Worker Responsibilities, to set up both parts of the question. Was that changed so that it wasnt usable here? Ive gotta say I like that better than 2 procedure references for the 2 halves.

None of the information that answered both questions is contained in the AD-RP-0001 document anymore. New fleet procedures have distributed the information among several procedures. Found a more recent bank question from CNS that included the current procedures that the answers are found in. References have been updated to include RP-ALL-2017 and the new bank question has been added to the references. We believe this will remove the concern with "credible distractors" and "cueing" noted above in Q2. All stem focus concerns were also addressed. SLM 10/12 Agree that this Q (different 2nd half) is better. mgd 10/16 Q is SAT 73 F

2 N

S G2.4.20 Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of the operational implications of warnings, cautions, & notes.

Plausible Distractors: You can eliminate B & C because of the interplay between the words; CAUTION just sounds worse than NOTE, and critical is worse than advisory, that sort of thing. Dave Lanyi had a good idea for fixing it though: Per Procedure xxx, this is/is NOT a NOTE {or use CAUTION} because it gives __(2)__.

We initially made the change as suggested but still struggled to write D/A for all choices. Decided to change Q2 and leave Q1 between NOTE/CAUTION because they no longer have a Q2 with the description of what they are.

They now have to know from memory what a note or caution should be. 10/13 I like that change. mgd 10/16 Now counting this as a NEW question since it doesnt really align with the original source question at all anymore.

SLG 10/13 Concur. mgd 10/16 Q is SAT 74 F

2 M

S G2.4.35 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

Modification of Q74 from the Feb 2020 exam. No comments. mgd 10/9 Q is SAT 75 F

3 B

S G2.4.39 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation Bank from 2015 MNS NRC exam (Q75). No comments. mgd 10/9 Q is SAT 76 H

4 N

S 005A2.02 RHR - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown on RHR, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences Good Q, pretty hard I think, but it looks to be technically solid. mgd 10/14 Q is SAT 77 H

2 N

S 006A2.11 ECCS - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of a rupture of ECCS header on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences Credible Distractor / D/A: Choosing whether or not you go to Loss of Recirc from a LOCA Outside Containment is a pretty easy choice to make, which I reflect with LOD=2. But it might be okay enough.

BUT, the D/A for Dont go to ECA-1.1 (C1/D1), while a true statement (ES-1.2 if pressure is going down at Step 19.B RNO), its not the whole story. Because you only get to 19.B if the leak was isolated at 17.B, so Id like you to add that to the D/As. Thanks. mgd 10/9 Made changes to D/As C1 and D1 as suggested. SLM 10/14 Perfect, thanks. mgd 10/14 Q is SAT 78 H

2 B

S 013A2.04 ESFAS - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of loss of instrument bus on ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences No comments on this 2017 Catawba NRC exam question. mgd 10/13 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 79 H

4 N

S 059G2.4.20 MFW System - Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes Stem Focus: I like this Q, theres a lot going on here, but the SI piece may be open to challenge. I read the References and know where the question puts you and what/why youre asking, but an applicant isnt going to have all that background. To help bound that youve just left H.1, and therefore theres no OTHER reason for SI that you should be worrying about, what if we added that to the 3rd bullet: The crew has just transitioned to ES-0.1? Added just to bullet 3. SLM 10/14 Thanks. mgd, 10/15 And I think we should change the answer choices to Should/Should Not direct SI. I know we try to avoid should, but thats what were really asking: Should you be SIing at this point?

Made changes to A2-D2 distractors (should/should not). SLM 10/14 I like it better with should/should NOT, but let me know how it validates. mgd 10/14 General Discussion: For Q2 its relying on the FR-H.1 basis document, but doesnt H.1 procedure step 19.C RNO C.2.a tell you the same thing specifically? Not the why piece, you can leave that from the Basis, but lets tie the correct answer directly to this step in H.1. And while its not a Note, its effectively acting like one, and that helps this part of the Q match the K/A also (Q1 already does). mgd 10/13 Made changes to GD as suggested. SLM 10/14 Thanks. mgd, 10/14 Q is SAT 80 F

2 N

S 061G2.4.18 AFW - Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs Credible Distractors: I wasnt sure of the answer to Part 2, but applied the since youre asking me philosophy and chose IS to minimize the effects of the RCS C/D. Then I got to the D/A for that part and saw minimize thermal stress from ECA-2.1. What do you think about making it a choice between those two reasons?

Or if you dont like that I could live with putting minimize thermal stress as the reason in Part 2, with the answer then being is NOT. mgd 10/13 Wed like you to consider leaving this "as is". We understand the philosophy you applied to answer Q2. However, applying that philosophy in the SRO section of this exam would result in 8 incorrect choices. There are 8 times we used negative responses and 7 times we used positive responses in the SRO section (not counting this question).

Good point, and I started seeing that as I got deeper into SRO Qs. Thanks for counting them up for me, good balance there. mgd 10/14 Also, having a distractor that uses the term "thermal stress" when asking the basis for a step in the Pressurized Thermal Shock procedure is almost misleading the applicant to select the incorrect answer. Thoughts? SLM 10/14 I guess itll be okay as-is. But I wonder if the reasons for 25gpm in both procedures arent essentially the same thing. mgd 10/14 Q is SAT 81 H

3 B

S 002G2.1.25 RCS - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

Credible Distractors: The distractor choice is 0.98, but the D/A says that 0.99 is the max for Cold Shutdown, which led me to wonder if it was a typo or why they didnt match. Its like that in the 2015 Q also. I think the basis is the TS definition of Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, so 0.99 isnt a typo.

So, shouldnt the distractor be 0.99? Just like the answer is less-than-or-equal-to the real limit, the distractor should also be a limit, and not just a number less than a plausible limit. Does that make sense?

And if it is based on the TS Table 1.1-1 definition of CSD, lets put that in D/A C1/D1, or whatever you want the basis to be. Changed 2 distractors to 0.99 as suggested. (A1 and B1) after shuffling the answers. SLM 10/14 Thanks. mgd 10/19 Q is SAT 82 F

3 M

S 034K4.01 Fuel Handling Equipment - Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for fuel protection from binding and dropping K/A Match: Theres no design feature or interlock here, nothing to keep you from doing it other than knowledge of the SLC. And this isnt really Fuel protection from dropping [it]. The Source Q had a different K/A, which was matched. Understand your comments on meeting the K/A. Replaced with a modified bank question from the 2015 CNS exam that we believe meets the K/A. SLM 10/14 No comments on the Modified Q from the 2015 CNS exam. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 83 F

3 M

S 071A2.03 WGDS - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of rupture disk failures on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences I like the Q and well be able to keep it, but there are some issues.

K/A Match: Do MNS WGDTs even have rupture disks? Im guessing not, because the CNS Source Qs K/A Match Discussion field said they dont, but their Chief Examiner let them write to the K/A anyway. So:

1) read that discussion, 2) determine if you do or dont, and 3) if you dont, put something to that effect in the K/A Match Discussion, that I agreed.

Stem Focus: I like what you did with the stem here, setting up a scenario for what youre about to ask, giving it an operational facet. But in this case, by elaborating on the Source Qs straight SLC question you mightve muddied the waters a bit. Heres what I mean: If a WGDT was being prepared for release, then its probably no longer lined up to the vent header, correct? Because Chemistry isnt going to want to sample it if it could change before they make up the release permit. So if Im a too-smart applicant I think of that and go, Well, suspending additions already happened, so I guess Id better choose reduce within limits instead. Granted, reducing within 1h is wrong, but do you see the gist of the argument? With the tank already isolated for release, the only other SLC action you can do is lower the activity.

Plausible Distractors: when I read reduce within limits within 1h I wrote, Not easy to do. Plausible? I dont think it is plausible, which is why the SLC gives you 48h. I think the fix here is simple though: just go back to the way the Source Q was: Required Action is to immediately (1)/(2). Even underline or all-cap immediately if you want. Does that work for you? Because it was the other half of the Q you changed, not this half, except for this small change in wording. mgd 10/13 Removed the first bullet from the stem. Removes all issues with "preparing for release". (Stem focus)

Changed Q1 and A1-D1 to align with the source question. (plausible distractors)

Added statement to K/A match regarding the fact MNS has no rupture discs on our WGDTs. (K/A match)

We believe we have addressed all the issues mentioned above. SLM 10/14 You have. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 84 H

3 N

S EPE007G2.4.20 Reactor Trip - Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Job-Link: I think this is fine as an SRO question, but the Basis for SRO only section states that they need information contained in a basis document; if thats referring to the reason in the second-half Q then its not really true, because the reason is stated in a Note at the beginning of Enclosure 4. So anyone whos run that Enclosure has been exposed to that Note. mgd 10/14 Exam team agrees that the information can be found in the note in enclosure 4 and in the basis document. Also agree this is an SRO ONLY question based on selection of procedure enclosures. Corrected the reason for this being SRO ONLY (enclosure selection) and removed the statement about being contained in the basis document.

SLM 10/14 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 85 H

3 B

S APE026AA2.05 Loss of CCW - Ability to determine and interpret the normal values for CCW header flow rate and flow rates to components cooled by CCW as they apply to Loss of CCW Stem Focus: Just questioning the order of presenting the two halves. It seems awkward to say: 56A wont open.

Whats the min flow required through 56A if it could open? Back to 56A not opening, is 2A ND Operable?

What if we rearranged to: 56A wont open. Because of that, is 2A ND Operable? Now that youve dealt with that, whats the ES-1.3 min flow required through 56A? mgd 10/14 Agree, made change as suggested. SLG 10/14 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 86 H

3 M

S APE058G2.2.37 Loss of DC Power - Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety-related equipment This Q was on the exam these applicants took in February. Could you modify it in some way so its not exactly the same as that question? mgd 10/14 Changed the stem for specific gravity of two of the cells (bullet one) and changed Q1 to ask which condition or conditions is/are required to be entered. Distractor analysis has been updated for C1 and D1, General discussion has been updated, Q has been changed to Modified and we removed TS 3.8.6 basis from the references (no longer required to answer question). SLM 10/19 I like the change, thanks for working with us on that. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 87 H

3 B

S APE077G2.2.40 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances - Ability to apply Technical Specifications No comments on this 2009 MNS NRC Exam question. mgd 10/15 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 88 F

3 M

S WE04G2.2.44 LOCA Outside Containment - Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Stem Focus: On the Feb exam, it was to allow them to be closed, which makes more sense to me. Was there a reason for that change? Because when I first read the Q I thought, What kind of interlock that closes these valves on a lowering temperature? [The 2015 iteration of this Q had it like it is here, though, to close.]

Corrected C1 and D1 to "to be closed", there is no interlock for auto closure. Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 89 H

3 B

S WE11EA2.2 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation - Ability to adhere to appropriate procedures and operate within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments No comments on this Bank question from a Catawba audit exam. mgd 10/15 Q is SAT 90 H

3 B

S APE005 AA2.01 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod - Ability to determine and interpret a stuck or inoperable rod from in-core and ex-core NIS, in-core or loop temperature measurements Stem: Should we say what Bank the rod is in? I dont think it helps or hurts, but we did in Q57.

Added the Control Bank as suggested. SLM 10/19 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Bank: This was Q90 on the 2013 MNS exam; would you rearrange the answer choices please? mgd 10/15 Answer choices have been rearranged. SLM 10/19 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 91 F

2 M

S APE069AA2.02 Loss of Containment Integrity - Ability to determine and interpret verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity Credible Distractors: Do you know the history of this Q? I didnt find it on any NRC exams. Theres a subset issue, because if I were to lock the operable door closed w/in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, then Ive also closed the operable door w/in 1h. Granted, youre asking for the action that must be taken w/in 1h, but if someone missed that and appealed I think theyd win. I cant think of another plausible distractor though. We could certainly cap or bold one hour, and that would clearly make lock incorrect (as it is now), but really, were kind of differentiating between minutia here: its important to know that you need to close the OTHER door. Whether you also lock it is just an administrative thing.

Modified question by turning it into a two by two (is/is NOT). We believe this removes any subset issues and any ability to use Q1 to answer Q2. SLM 10/20 Im sorry, but I dont like the change to is NOT required to be locked closed within one hour, for a couple of reasons: 1) the applicants might do like I did and miss the locked piece and choose is required to be closed within 1h, and I dont want to trick anyone like that. 2) More importantly, if someone chose yes, its required to be locked closed w/in 1h theyd appeal it and likely win; back to the Minutia argument I made earlier.

We spoke on the phone 10/20 and agreed to taking locked out. Reviewed that version 10/21.

Q is SAT 92 F

3 N

S APE076G2.4.31 High Coolant Activity - Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures Cues: I think that putting SLB in Q2 really points you to SGTR as the other reason, since both involve the S/Gs.

What do you think about asking:

ONE of the Bases reasons is: LOCA/SGTR

-OR-The Bases reasons are: SLB & SGTR / LOCA & SGTR [both are LOCAs; Id prefer that to pairing LOCA w/ SLB]

What do you think? mgd 10/15 Changed Q2 so that it would align with asking SGTR and what other accident. SLM 10/19 I like the change, raised LOD to 3 based on that. Also like the way you reworded Q2. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 93 F

3 B

S WE02G2.1.32 SI Termination - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions Stem Focus: In Q1, this threw me off a bit: CRS will direct initiation of the SI termination sequence Then I saw those words werent in the source Q. Was there a reason for adding them? mgd 10/15 Yes. The Ops SRO supporting the exam team correctly commented that steps will be performed to terminate SI in E-0 and ES-1.1 because E-0 will send you to step 9 of ES-1.1. He felt the source question could be argued that both answers were correct due to the way the question was written and we agreed. SLM 10/19 Sounds reasonable. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist. Partial Job-Link Minutia # /

units Back-ward Q=

K/A Source B/M/N Status U/E/S Explanation 94 F

3 M

S G2.1.20 Conduct of Operations - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps D/As A2&D2: Is it true that there are emergency notifications you all make to NRC w/in 15m? When I was licensed we notified the State & Counties w/in 15m of course, but NRC was w/in 1h. You can still use 15m if you want, but change the D/As. mgd 10/15 Removed NRC from distractor analysis for A2 and D2. To answer your question, per AP-47 (Security Events)

NRC notification must be made within 15 minutes of confirmation of a security event. SLM 10/19 Interesting, never heard of that. You can put NRC back if you want, but Im calling the Q Sat now. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 95 H

4 B

2018 Exam S

G2.1.23 Conduct of Operations - Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation No comments on this question from the 2018 McGuire exam. mgd 10/15 Q is SAT 96 H

2 N

S G2.2.15 Equipment Control - Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tagouts, etc.

Stem, Q2: Should we add Per OP-SO-1 to tighten it up? Thats what the GD says its based on.

Made change as suggested. SLM 10/19 Thanks. mgd 10/20 General Discussion: For the 1st part, can you put in some numbers so the reader can understand why 70=Lowered Inventory? Maybe flange height, Lowered inventory, and Reduced inventory. mgd 10/16 Added info in GD. SLM 10/19 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 97 F

3 B

S G2.2.20 Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities Stem Focus, Q2: To match the words in AD-0201 Att. 2 (and the GD), I think we should put the word other here: Prior to approvalevaluate impact on other protected equipment. mgd 10/16 Good call, made change as suggested. SLM 10/19 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 98 H

3 B

S G2.3.14 Radiation Control - Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities No comments on this bank question. mgd 10/16 Q is SAT 99 H

2 B

S G2.4.5 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions Stem Focus: 1) Since all PORVs were opened at Step 24.B.RNO, should we list that before the head vent valves? If someone knows the procedure that well I wouldnt want them to get hung up on that.

2) In the bullet for the head vent path, would it read better if we added that it is/was aligned? mgd 10/16 Made changes as suggested. SLM 10/19 Thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT 100 F 4

M E

G2.4.28 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event This Q was on the exam these applicants took in February. Could you modify it in some way so its not exactly the same as that question? mgd 10/16 Modified by changing the time to greater than 30 minutes. There is an Enclosure 3 used when greater than 30 minutes. This changed the answer for Q1 from Enclosure 2 to Enclosure 3. SLM 10/20 Good change, thanks. mgd 10/20 Q is SAT